Ms A T M Morales v DT Edinburgh Opco Ltd: 8002603/2025 and 8000622/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8002603/2025, 8000622/2025Venue EdinburghHearing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 June 2026
Between
Ms A T M MoralesClaimantDT Edinburgh Opco LimitedRespondent
Before
Employment Judge A JonesMr G Dunlop (instructed by Advocate) for respondent[Instructed by for respondentSquire Patton for respondentBoggs] for respondentDate 25 June 2026
JUDGMENT
The Claimant’s claims fail in their entirety and are dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The Claimant lodged a claim on 11 March 2025. She was subsequently dismissed and lodged a further claim on 28 October 2025 which was combined with the initial claim. A joint list of issues was lodged prior to this hearing commencing, and a joint bundle of documents was lodged together with an additional bundle of documents by the Claimant.[2]The Claimant gave evidence and was assisted during the proceedings by a number of different Spanish interpreters. The Respondent led evidence from nine witnesses some of whom had been requested by the Claimant. The Tribunal heard from Mr Williams the Respondent’s General Manager, Mr Harris who is now retired but had been the Maintenance Manager of the Hotel at which the Claimant was employed which was the Carlton Hilton on North Bridge in Edinburgh (‘the Hotel’), Mr Brown the Claimant’s line manager, Mr Maxwell Fraser the Manager of the Hotel, Ms Conetta, Ms Kent and Ms McCormack all part of the Respondent’s HR Team, Mr Mitchell who had taken a decision in relation to disciplinary proceedings against the Claimant and Mr Bray who took the decision to dismiss the Claimant.[3]Having listened to the evidence, considered the documents to which reference was made and the submissions of the parties, the Tribunal found the following material facts to have been established. Findings in fact[4]The Claimant commenced employment with the Respondent on 9 September 2024 in the role of Group Reservations Executive. The Claimant is a Venezuelan national who obtained political asylum in Spain and has lived in the UK for around 11 years. She was 45 years old at the time of her dismissal. The Claimant was based at the Hotel and was responsible for dealing with reservations involving bookings of more than 10 rooms at the Hotel.[5]The Hotel is one of a number of hotels which are operated by the Respondent’s parent company Klarent Hospitality Ltd, throughout Scotland, England and the Republic of Ireland.[6]Prior to commencing employment, the Claimant completed a medical questionnaire indicating that she had a number of allergies including to dust and paint.[7]The Claimant signed a contract of employment on 8 August 2024. There was a provision in that contract under the heading “sick leave” which stated that “In order for the Company to exercise its rights and comply with its employment law obligations, you will, at the request of Company, agree to undergo a medical consultation with an occupational health specialist/doctor of the Company’s choice. If requested you should also agree to assist the Company in obtaining information from your own doctor (or other medical advisor) about your health to the extent that it has an actual or potential bearing upon your ability to perform your duties under this agreement or in relation to any other aspect of your employment.” This provision was not only applicable during periods of sick leave.[8]At the time of the Claimant’s recruitment and when the Claimant commenced work, the Hotel was undergoing major refurbishment which has not yet been completed. The Respondent sought to minimise the impact of the works on staff and customers so far as possible.[9]The Claimant’s role required her to be based in the Hotel in order to allow her to respond quickly to any queries in relation to groups whose bookings she was responsible for.[10]The Claimant reported to Mr Brown (‘EB’) who was based in Glasgow as he was also responsible for group bookings in a hotel in Glasgow. When the Claimant commenced in her role, EB spent around 2 days a week for the first 6 weeks working with her in the Hotel to provide guidance and training on the Respondent’s systems and her duties.[11]The Claimant has asthma which the Respondent accepts is a disability for the purposes of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. The Claimant uses a number of inhalers at different times depending on the severity of her condition. None of the Respondent’s staff who gave evidence before the Tribunal saw the Claimant use an inhaler during her employment or saw inhalers on her desk.[12]If the Claimant required annual leave she would ask EB about this but it was for the Operations manager in the Hotel to update the system which recorded leave.[13]The Claimant’s performance at work was very good as she had previous experience in similar roles and after the initial period of training, EB did not feel the need to oversee the Claimant in person. The Claimant would communicate with EB by phone, email and through Teams including by video call. The Claimant used her mobile phone to communicate as there was limited access to a landline in the Hotel.[14]Initially the Claimant was based in the Highland Suite in the Hotel, which had previously been used as a function suite. All the back-office staff, who were not directly client facing, were based in a section of that room which had been arranged as a temporary office space. There were around 10 staff based in that area.[15]The main office area was part of the area under refurbishment at that time.[16]On 19 November 2024 the Claimant was advised, along with some others based in the Highland Suite that they would be moving to a temporary office the following day, while the new offices were being finished. The temporary office area was based in the staff canteen on the -2 floor of the Hotel. Some of the staff found the Highland Suite cold to work in and so alternatives were found for them. The decision was that of the Hotel management and not EB.[17]There was a ventilation system working in the Highland suite while the Claimant was based there.[18]The Claimant and colleagues would on occasion be required to move their desks to facilitate the ongoing works. If an employee had an issue in moving any furniture or equipment they could request the assistance of the maintenance team. The Hotel manager sometimes helped in moving furniture or equipment.[19]It was intended that the move to the canteen would only be for 2 days, but due to the ongoing works the Claimant and colleagues were based in the canteen for 17 days. In an email dated 19 November 2024, the Hotel Manager stated “If you have an alternative solution, please come and see me. We are open to temporary suggestions whilst we await our final move to the new offices.” The Claimant did not make any other suggestions. The ventilation system worked in the canteen, although the area was warm.[20]In a Teams message on 6 December, the Claimant informed EB that she had asthma and that there was no ventilation in the canteen. She also stated “I honestly don’t know why everyone is so stressed”.[21]The Claimant was then moved to another temporary office on the -2 floor with other back-office staff.[22]Weekly operations meetings took place in the Hotel which the Claimant attended. The purpose of the Claimant’s attendance was to answer any questions the managers may have. Sometimes they did not have any questions, and the Claimant would be told that she did not have to stay for the rest of the meeting. This was consistent with how other staff were treated who were not managers and did not have to stay for the whole of the meeting.[23]EB visited the Hotel on 17 December 2024 for work purposes and for a dinner with the Claimant and other team members. At that time the Claimant advised EB that she wasn’t happy with her working environment and conditions and that she would be looking for another job.[24]Prior to this visit the Claimant sent a message to EB outlining points to discuss including how she could get a bonus. The Claimant was entitled to the same bonus as EB which was called “Take the lead” and applied when an employee took action which resulted in a booking being made at one of the hotels operated by Klarent.[25]The Respondent had a long-standing contract with a pest control company. The building works at the Hotel resulted in an increase in pest control issues for a period, but the Respondent’s contractor took steps to minimise any issues.[26]On 15 January 2025 the Claimant informed EB that a ceiling tile had fallen on the floor in the room she was working. The tile had been dislodged. No one was hurt by the tile and no damage was caused. It was not necessary for the Respondent to complete an accident report or provide any report to the Claimant. The hotel maintenance manager inspected the area and determined that no further action was required.[27]In a message on 16 January, the Claimant said to EB that she did not talk to the Hotel manager because “everytime I do, he shuu me”. The Claimant was referring to one occasion when the Hotel manager had helped the Claimant with an IT issue and had asked for her to be quiet when he was concentrating on dealing with the issue.[28]On 17 January in response to a message from EB as to whether the Claimant had any plans for the weekend, the Claimant replied stating “Apply for new jobs Euan. The conditions and treatment here are just unsustainable.” EB responded by stating “See if you put everything in writing I’m going to speak to Stephen [the General Manager of the Hotel]. 100% do not want you to leave.” EB then followed up this request on 20 January in an email to the Claimant stating “Are you able to give me some bullet points on this. I’m keen to get this sorted sooner rather than later.”[29]The Claimant sent an email to EB on 20 January outlining thirteen issues of concern which she said were “leading me to search employment elsewhere”. She stated that she and the Director of Sales would have a meeting to review the matters. The Claimant also stated that “Just wanted to clarify that I love my job and what I do. Jade, Rada, Marianne, Claire and Euan have been exceptional. However, something needs to be done before it is too late.” Some of the issues outlined in the email related to the Claimant’s working environment and others related to other matters such as that other staff went home on a Friday before their clock out time, that there was dishonesty in that the Claimant had been told she would be in the canteen for 3 days and was there for 17, that there were no incentives for the Claimant for sales, and that the printer wasn’t working.[30]The Claimant then emailed EB and the Director of Sales, saying that the Director of Sales had spoken to the Hotel manager and that “he said it was normal and not their priority, so he does not want to hear anything else about it” and that she was not going to go to HR about it because of how an issue relating to a colleague had been handled. She stated “I can’t quit right away because I have bills to pay, but rest assured when I find a new job, I will let you know and give you the correspondent notice.”[31]EB replied to the Claimant stating that he was sorry things had reached that point and asking the Claimant to share her plans with him in relation to her looking for a new opportunity.[32]On 21 January the Claimant sent a video to EB of the noise of drilling in the Hotel. EB replied by stating “It’s not ideal I know. Glasgow Central had a major refurbishment in 2016 and then there was all the roadworks outside the front of the hotel for most of last year. Every morning before I leave for work I say to my kids, be kind and be resilient. I say it to them but I also say it to myself too.” EB was not comparing the Claimant to his children but was trying to empathise with the Claimant being required to work in a noisy environment. There was nothing inappropriate in his message.[33]The Hotel shared a goods entrance on Jeffrey Street with restaurants based on North Bridge. That entrance was often open both to allow contractors access and for the rubbish from the Hotel and the restaurants to be collected. There was also a staff entrance nearby which was entered with a fob key. While the doors of the goods entrance were often open this did not pose a particular security risk. The main entrance to the Hotel did not restrict access to it.[34]EB was of the view that he had to escalate the concerns raised by the Claimant given their seriousness. He contacted HR and sent relevant emails to Carol Conetta (‘CC’) a HR business partner. CC then contacted the Claimant to arrange a meeting to discuss her concerns.[35]The Claimant sent an email to CC on 7 February making a few points prior to the meeting with her. She stated at the end of that email “Delighted to continue this conversation on Monday since there is no such thing as confidentiality in this company.” The Claimant was aggrieved that EB had raised her concerns with HR when the Claimant had said that she did not want to involve HR.[36]A meeting took place by Teams on 10 February, between the Claimant and CC. EB and the Director of Sales were also present and the Claimant was accompanied by a colleague who took notes during the meeting. The meeting was not treated as a formal grievance meeting but an attempt to resolve the Claimant’s issues on an informal basis.[37]CC then sought to investigate each of the issues raised by the Claimant.[38]In February 2025 the Claimant was receiving treatment for a chest infection and was taking antibiotics and steroids.[39]EB asked the Claimant to have a Teams call with him on 12 February to discuss her mid-year review. The Claimant replied by stating “I don’t feel comfortable doing phone calls anymore, I have a chest and ear infection. I just had my call with the GP after work I need to go to get antibiotic and medicine to open my airways. I can barely hear anything in the office with the works going on upstairs plus I lose my breath if I talk too much. Excuse me ignorance, but this Klarent connect (the review) is it really relevant when I already said that I am actively seeking for another job and no performance 30 and 90 days were done?”[40]EB had not carried out performance reviews with the Claimant during her probationary period as he was satisfied with her performance and did not see the need to do so.[41]The Claimant sent a picture of dust on a desk on 12 February to EB. This was not a matter which required to be logged in an accident book.[42]On 13 February, CC had a further discussion with the Claimant regarding where she was based. The Hotel manager offered to move out of the office he was using on the 3rd floor of the hotel to allow the Claimant to relocate there until matters were resolved. The Claimant was content to be moved to that room and sent an email to EB and CC stating “Thank you both.” The Claimant was to share that room with an Accounts Executive who had been sharing the room with the Hotel manager. The room had a window which could be opened. While the Claimant did not have access to a phone in this office, she could use Teams or her mobile phone and could have plugged headphones into her computer to communicate verbally. By this stage the Claimant did not want to communicate verbally with EB.[43]The Claimant’s camera which was used for video calls was lost enroute to the new office in which she was based. This was accidental.[44]During EB’s absence on leave, the Claimant emailed the Director of Sales on 18 February at 12.02 to inform her that she would be leaving at 1.30 for a GP appointment and would come back after it. The email did not state that the appointment was an emergency appointment or when it had been made. When EB returned from leave, he emailed the Claimant to ask her to provide notice of any such appointments where possible. There was nothing unreasonable or inappropriate in that request.[45]An email was sent by Ms McCormack, the Group HR Manager to the Claimant on 20 February with a letter from CC who had gone on leave. The email apologised for the ongoing disruption caused by the construction work and stated that the Claimant could contact herself or CC if they could provide any further support.[46]The letter from CC addressed all the issues which had been raised by the Claimant. It did not provide immediate solutions to all those issues as this was not possible given the ongoing works. The letter explained the position and offered solutions where possible. In addition, the letter stated that CC “was very sorry to hear that your asthma has worsened. We would like to explore how we can better support you, and I would be happy to arrange a meeting to discuss potential adjustments, including a referral to our Occupational Health provider if appropriate.” The letter also stated that CC was happy to discuss the matters further.[47]The Claimant responded to the email of 20 February on the following day stating “After careful consideration, I must respectfully reject the contents of the attached letter and the manner in which the company has handled my situation. Please be advised that I will no longer engage in any further discussions regarding my disputes, whether verbal or written, with any employee form Klarent Hospitality/Hilton Edinburgh Carlton. As a courtesy, I am letter you know that I have escalated my case to the Employment Tribunal. An ACAS conciliator will be in contact with you in due course.”[48]Ms McCormack responded by indicating that if the Claimant wished to raise the issues formally, she would assign an independent manager to investigate further in line with the Company’s internal grievance procedures. The Claimant did not lodge a grievance. She did not respond to the offer of an occupational health review.[49]There were a number of occasions from February 2025 onwards which EB stated that he would either deal with matters the Claimant was dealing with, that she should refer certain matters to him for a sense check or that he would contact clients directly. These occasions were routine responses to various tasks or issues and were not influenced in any manner by the Claimant having raised concerns regarding her working environment or any of the other issues raised by the Claimant with the Respondent. EB exercised his managerial authority reasonably at all times and was not influenced by the concerns raised by the Claimant or her asthma in that regard.[50]The Claimant no longer had trust and confidence in the Respondent from February 2025, and she was of the view that the relationship had broken down by that stage. The tone of emails sent by the Claimant to EB became increasingly abrupt. The Claimant was particularly aggrieved at being asked to clock in and out by EB despite this being the Respondent’s procedure.[51]On 27 March the Claimant sent an email to EB stating that if the noise continued in the afternoon she was going home as she had a terrible migraine. She also stated “Can you please speak to HR if I can get a laptop to work from home while they are doing the lift and the 5th floor”?”[52]EB replied that day saying he was going to source a laptop and “get it set up to allow you to work from home should the noise become too intense. This will not be a permanent arrangement though as your role is hotel based. Any noisy work is not anticipated to be for a prolonged period of time. Please come into the hotel as planned each day. If you believe it is too noisy please give a call via Teams and we can agree at that point if you need to work from home. Its important that you don’t just leave without notifying me first. If I am unavailable then the conversation should be with the on-site Hotel Manager, Michael. Let’s see how that goes for the next week and we can review at the end of next week to see how its working.”[53]It was not made clear to the Claimant that the laptop would not be for her sole use, although the intention was that the laptop would be available for the use of other staff, when not in use by the Claimant. The laptop was delivered directly to the Claimant on 10 April.[54]On 15 April the Claimant emailed EB regarding an interaction with the Hotel manager that day when the Hotel manager had asked the Claimant about the laptop and discussed how it was to be used. EB replied explaining how the laptop was to be used. The Claimant replied indicating “It is a little shocking that instead of apologizing for being humiliated by the hotel manager and for you not telling me everything about the laptop, you rather send me home” (EB had offered to arrange for a taxi to take the Claimant home as she had said she was having a mental breakdown). There was nothing inappropriate in the conduct of the Hotel Manager or EB towards the Claimant.[55]The Claimant sent an email to EB and the Respondent’s Group Director of HR on 28 April raising a complaint about how she had been treated by the Hotel Manager on 15 April. She asked that she be allowed to work from home “until the tribunal case is over since I feel worried for my health and fear of getting more retaliated.”[56]EB replied by saying that the Claimant could head home and work remotely for the rest of the day and the Claimant replied by asking again to work from home until the tribunal was over. She stated “The hotel is not suitable for me to work specially after the incident with Michael.” EB sent a further email that day informing the Claimant that she should work from home the following day too.[57]The Group Director of HR informed the Claimant that she was appointing Sophie Kent to investigate the concern raised by the Claimant about the Hotel manager in line with the grievance procedure. She stated that as there was no oversight as to when a final Tribunal hearing would take place the Claimant’s request to work from home until then was not granted.[58]EB was finding the approach of the Claimant towards him increasingly difficult to deal with. He sent an email on 30 April to a number of senior people in the organisation indicating that he felt that he was “treading on eggshells around her”, that the situation was impacting on him personally and he didn’t know if he could continue to manage the Claimant.[59]The Respondent took a decision that the Claimant’s line management should be changed for a period to Claire Paterson (‘CP’), who was EB’s line manager. That decision was not clearly communicated to the Claimant. This was because of the number of people involved in the decision and was nothing to do with the Claimant’s disability or the fact she had raised complaints about her working environment.[60]The Claimant was invited to a meeting with Sophie Kent (‘SK’) on 8 May to discuss her grievance. In advance of that meeting the Claimant sent SK a detailed chronology of events which had caused her concern.[61]A meeting took place with SK by Teams on 8 May at which the Claimant was accompanied by a colleague. Notes were taken of the meeting.[62]The Claimant provided a fit note dated 15 May to the Respondent on 28 May which stated “Please consider to allow the above patient to work from home as current working conditions at work may be contributing to increased asthma symptoms. Patient able to work from home at present.” The fit note was for a period of 3 months.[63]SK conducted investigations into the Claimant’s grievance against the Hotel manager and interviewed EB, the Hotel manager and the Head Chef who had been with the Hotel manager during the interaction. Notes were taken of those interviews.[64]SK wrote to the Claimant on 29 May with an outcome to her grievance which was not upheld. The letter however recognised that if it had been made explicitly clear that the laptop was to be shared amongst the team the situation would not have arisen. The Claimant was informed that she could appeal the outcome of the grievance but did not do so. The Claimant was also informed that she could work from home and that this would be reviewed on a monthby-month basis.[65]CC wrote to the Claimant on 5 June to arrange a call to discuss expectations and ways of working in relation to the Claimant’s working from home arrangements. The Claimant replied indicating that she had lost her voice and asked to move the call. The Claimant then contacted the Director of HR to ask that SK conduct the meeting rather than CC as CC was a “witness against me and when I reported the issues our call did not go that well”.[66]A meeting took place on 9 June between the Claimant, SK and CP and an email was sent to the participants that day summarising what had been discussed. The Claimant was informed that she should revert to reporting to EB from that time. The Claimant was also instructed to ensure that she communicate with EB and other managers in a respectful manner as, in the opinion of CP, some of her previous communications had not been respectful. That opinion was justified.[67]EB invited the Claimant to a meeting on 4 August as a check-in to see how working from home had been going. The Claimant replied indicating “I have been advised by Citizens Advice not to engage in phone conversations with any employees of the company due to the ongoing Employment Tribunal proceedings. As such, I must decline your phone call and request that all communications be in writing, particularly given your role as a witness against me in the case. Additionally, I am currently experiencing voice strain from persistent coughing, making phone calls difficult.” The Claimant also stated that she had received a further fit note for three months.[68]SK emailed the Claimant on 1 August stating that it was entirely reasonable for the Respondent to require the Claimant to communicate with them by telephone or video call. SK offered to have the meeting without EB and to have breaks or for the meeting to be postponed for a further week.[69]The Claimant replied stating “I am still not doing the call. I am not denying communication, just doing it in writing. I need to have everything in writing the moment a became a whistleblower and since the defence lawyer is lying to the judge, so you are more than welcome to ask me anything.”[70]SK replied by reiterating that it was not open to the Claimant to decline the review meeting. SK offered for a colleague to join the meeting to take a written note and offered for the Claimant to be accompanied by a colleague or friend/family member. A rearranged date was proposed. The Claimant was informed that failure to engage would be considered a refusal to comply with a reasonable management instruction and could result in disciplinary action. In addition, the Claimant was informed that SK considered it appropriate to refer her to Occupational Health.[71]The Claimant then informed the Respondent that she would not engage in any verbal communication with any employee of the Respondent or Klarent and that she did not consent to any home visits or referrals to Occupational Health. The email continued “Please ensure that all future communications are respectful of my rights and current health status.”[72]The Respondent decided to initiate a disciplinary investigation into the Claimant’s conduct in refusing verbal communication and a referral to Occupational Health. The Claimant was required to attend a meeting to be chaired by Niall Mitchell, the Regional Operations Director of Klarent on 19 August and to send any documents she wished to rely on by 18 August. Mr Mitchell did not know the Claimant and had not had any dealings with her prior to this involvement.[73]The Claimant sent an email to SK on 18 August outlining key dates and issues. She also wrote on 19 August indicating she would not engage in any verbal communication and that she did not authorize the receipt of workrelated emails to her personal inbox outside of working hours.[74]The disciplinary hearing was then postponed to 21 August and SK sought to address some of the issues raised by the Claimant in her emails of 18 and 19 August in an effort to persuade the Claimant to participate in the hearing.[75]The Claimant did not attend the reconvened hearing. NM issued a first written warning to the Claimant in a letter of 28 August which set out the basis for his decision. He also indicated that he was making a recommendation that a formal process should be instigated to consider the viability and practicability of the employment relationship going forward. The Claimant was given the opportunity to appeal the disciplinary sanction but did not do so.[76]Paul Bray who at the time was the Head of Asset Management of Klarent and had no previous dealings with the Claimant was appointed to determine whether there had been a break down in trust and confidence between the Claimant and Respondent. The Claimant was invited to a formal meeting on 9 September to discuss the matter. The Claimant replied by reiterating that she would not engage in any verbal communications. She went on to state “I am kindly asking you to please allow me to work from home without being harassed and threaten with termination until the court case is over in December and I get compensated.”[77]Mr Bray met with EB and SK separately to investigate the issue of whether the relationship with the Claimant had broken down. Having done so he concluded that the Claimant continued to “harbour a fundamental mistrust, suspicion and dissatisfaction with your colleagues and the Company as whole. This remains the case no matter what steps the Company takes to engage with you, what accommodations are offered, and despite the reasonable explanations that have been given to you as to why such engagement is required.” Mr Bray concluded that there were no alternatives available and that the Claimant should be dismissed with effect from 26 September and paid in lieu of notice.[78]The Respondent’s agents wrote to the Claimant on 27 February 2026 requiring her to sign an undertaking that she would maintain her duties of confidentiality under her contract of employment. The letter was written in response to a schedule of loss provided by the Claimant in the context of the Tribunal proceedings which included detailed information regarding the Respondent’s revenue forecast for 2025 which it was suggested must have been acquired during the Claimant’s employment and retained after the termination of her employment. Observations on the evidence[79]The Claimant was clearly aggrieved at having to work in a hotel undergoing major refurbishment. The Tribunal accepted that the environment in which the Claimant was required to work was not ideal. There was noise on occasion from building works. On very few f occasions there was a small amount of debris or dust on desks in the area caused by the building works. The works have continued until the present day. The Hotel has remained open to guests throughout. However, it also appeared to the Tribunal that it was not only the working environment which was a concern to the Claimant but that she was unhappy with her pay and other matters. While the Claimant raised serious issues with the Respondent regarding her working environment, rather than work with the Respondent to find a solution for the issues of concern, the Claimant’s initial response was she was going to find another job and then when HR sought to engage with her directly to find solutions, to lodge a Tribunal claim. The Claimant’s position appeared to be that once EB had forwarded on her concerns to HR, she could no longer trust him. Her argument was that EB had said that the matter was closed as he accepted she was going to leave and therefore should not have taken matters further.[80]The Claimant did not appear to understand that the Respondent had a duty of care to her to address her concerns and once it sought to do so, the Claimant viewed everything done and said to her in a negative light. While the Tribunal accepted that the Claimant had a genuine belief that the Respondent was not acting in her interests, that belief was not at all reasonable.[81]The Tribunal accepted the evidence of EB, CC and SK that they were simply trying to support the Claimant and provide solutions to allow her to remain in employment. There was no doubt that the Claimant’s performance was good and that EB wanted the Claimant to stay in employment which was why he raised the matters with HR. Issues to determine[82]The Tribunal was required to determine the following issues; DIRECT DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION Was the Claimant subjected to the following treatment: i. On 19 November 2024, Euan Brown did not care about the Claimant’s health ii. On 20 November 2024, the Claimant was moved to the canteen with no ventilation by Stephen Williams iii. On 15 January 2025, the Claimant reported falling tiles to Steven Harris but was not provided with the accident book iv. Every Wednesday Michael Maxwell Fraser humiliated the Claimant at operations meetings where she was asked to leave after two minutes v. On 12 February 2025, did the Duty Manager fail to give the Claimant an accident report after “the dust fall from the ceiling incident” and no incident was logged vi. On 13 February 2025, the Claimant’s video camera disappeared “in order [for her] to be silenced”, meaning she could not call anyone if anything happens to her vii. On 13 February 2025, the Claimant was put in an office on the 3rd floor (with low ventilation) so she needed to walk further to reheat her food on -2 floor or to leave the building from -4 floor viii. In being placed in the 3rd floor office on 13 February 2025, the Claimant was isolated from everybody and not provided with a phone ix. On 20 February 2025, the Respondent (via Carol Conetta) issued an outcome letter to the Claimant, in which everything she had raised was denied/dismissed x. On 28 August 2025, the Claimant was subject to a disciplinary process and issued with a first warning xi. In September 2025, the Claimant was subject to a formal “SOSR” process. xii. On 26 September 2025, the Claimant was dismissed by the Respondent INDIRECT DISABIILTY DISCRIMINATION Did the Respondent have the following PCP(s): i. requiring its office-based staff to work in the staff canteen and/or -2 office without ventilation, with acoustic contamination and dust; ii. not permitting its office-based staff to work from home; iii. allowing loud noises, rubbish and dust within the hotel as a result of the ongoing refurbishment works; iv. not providing purified air; v. requiring its employees to return shared laptops to the Respondent; vi. requiring its employees to push desks, PCs and cables into the -2 office and/or the Highland events room during refurbishment works; vii. applying and/or requiring compliance with its sickness absence policy; Did the Respondent apply any of those the PCPs to the Claimant? Did the Respondent apply any such PCP to people without the Claimant’s disability or would it have done so? Did the PCP put someone in the same material circumstances as the Claimant (i.e. disabled employees) at a particular disadvantage when compared with those without a disability, in that it exacerbated the Claimant’s asthma and related conditions. Did the PCP put the Claimant at that disadvantage? Was the PCP a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? Did the Respondent have the following provision, criteria or practice: i. a requirement for its office-based staff to work in the staff canteen and/or office without windows, ventilation, with acoustic contamination and dust; ii. a requirement for its office-based colleagues to work from the hotel (and to not allow home working); iii. a requirement for its office-based colleagues to work near where rubbish is stored; and iv. a requirement for its employees to communicate with colleagues using all modes of communication, rather than just writing. v. To work in a rodent infested building, and lack of security by leaving the doors open in -4 floor when intruders got in. Did the PCP put the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without the Claimant’s disability? The Respondent understands this to be the exacerbation of her asthma and related conditions Did a physical feature, namely the lack of ventilation in the temporary office(s) made available to the Claimant, put the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without the Claimant’s disability? The Respondent understands this to be the exacerbation of her asthma and related conditions Did the Respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the Claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage? Did the Respondent fail in its duty to take such steps as it would have been reasonable to have taken to avoid the disadvantage? The Claimant says that the following adjustments to the PCP would have been reasonable: i. allowing her to work from home; ii. allowing the Claimant not to communicate with any employees of the Respondent verbally (including over the phone, via video call and/or in person); iii. allowing the Claimant only to engage with the Respondent in writing. By what date should the Respondent reasonably have taken those steps? DISCRIMINATION ARISING FROM A DISABILITY Did the Respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the Claimant had the disability? The Respondent accepts that the Claimant’s asthma is a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. The Respondent’s position is that it became aware that the Claimant’s asthma amounted to a disability under the Equality Act 2010 in December 2024 as part of these proceedings. It does not accept it had knowledge (whether actual or implied) of the Claimant’s disability prior to this. If so, did the Respondent treat the Claimant unfavourably in any of the following alleged respects: i. On 13 February 2025, by Michael Maxwell Fraser moving the Claimant to an office on the third floor ii. From 13 February 2025, by not providing the Claimant with a phone when she was moved to the third force office and by isolating her from all colleagues iii. On 20 February 2025, by Euan Brown criticising the Claimant for not giving him enough notice of a doctor’s appointment iv. On 4 August 2025, by Sophie Kent asking the Claimant to consent to an Occupational Health referral despite not having been absent from work v. In August 2025, by expecting the Claimant to comply with its sickness absence policy and contract of employment (specifically in relation to Occupational Health referrals) vi. On 26 September 2025, by dismissing the Claimant Did those things arise in consequence of the Claimant’s disability. Has the Claimant proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the unfavourable treatment was because of any of those things? If so, can the Respondent show that there was no unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability? DIRECT RELIGION OR BELIEF DISCRIMINATION The Claimant’s religion/belief relates to the Claimant’s religion of Catholicism. Was the Claimant subject to the following treatment: i. On 5 February 2025, Euan Brown escalated issues raised by the Claimant with the Respondent’s HR team, despite her telling him she did not want HR to be involved ii. On 14 March 2025, the Claimant was subject to non-stop retaliation by Euan Brown iii. On 15 April 2025, Euan Brown and/or Michael Maxwell Fraser did not tell the Claimant that the laptop issued to her was a shared laptop iv. On 2 and 26 May 2025, Euan Brown left the Claimant “lost with emails” at work after she returned from annual leave v. On 29 May 2025, HR failed to take action after the Claimant reported being humiliated by Michael Maxwell Fraser Did the Claimant reasonably see the treatment as a detriment/less favourable. If so, was any of that conduct less favourable treatment because of the Claimant’s religion? DIRECT AGE DISCRIMINATION The Claimant is 46 years old. Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to the following conduct? i. On or around 20 January 2025, Stephen Williams said “she’s not in her twenties, she should know this is normal” ii. On joining the Respondent, not being compensated according to her value (age and experience) iii. Being compared my situation with Mr Euan Brown children. If so, was the conduct less favourable treatment because of age? Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? Did the Respondent do the following alleged things: i. On 29 May 2025, Sophie Kent excused the behaviour of Michael Maxwell-Fraser towards the Claimant by not upholding her grievance; ii. On 30 May 2025, Sophie Kent failed to communicate the correct information to the Claimant, specifically failed to inform her that she was prohibited to communicate with Euan Brown from 15 April and failed to confirm whether she could work from home following submission of her fit note on 15 May 2025; iii. On 9 June 2025, Sophie Kent allowed Claire Paterson to “gaslight” her during a meeting and did not allow her to defend herself (as she had severe voice strain) and confirmed the Claimant’s working from home arrangements was subject to a monthly review; iv. On 31 July 2025, Euan Brown and Sophie Kent tried to force the Claimant to join a video call to review her working from home arrangement, even though a review was not done in July; v. On 1 August 2025, Sophie Kent insisted on a video call with the Claimant despite her voice strain and “all the times” she had “lied to her”; vi. On 4 and 5 August 2025, Sophie Kent insisted on a video call, expressed her personal opinion, threatened disciplinary action and forced a referral to Occupational Health; vii. On 14 August 2025, Sophie Kent invited the Claimant to a disciplinary meeting; viii. On 15 August 2025, Sophie Kent pressured the Claimant to see if she had read the disciplinary meeting invitation; ix. On 19 August 2025, Euan Brown called the Claimant “unprofessional” in an email; x. On 21 August 2025, Euan Brown forced the Claimant to take a day’s leave if her internet did not work whilst she was working from home; xi. On 26 August 2025, Euan Brown did not approve her holiday requests (which included dates to accommodate Tribunal proceedings); xii. On 5 September 2025, Sophie Kent and Paul Bray invited the Claimant to a formal meeting to consider the working relationship; xiii. On 9 September, Euan Brown asked the Claimant for her password and log-in detail 2025; xiv. On 9 September 2025, Sophie Kent emailed the Claimant again regarding the invitation for the formal meeting and pressured her to attend; xv. On 11 September, Euan Brown made the Claimant look unprofessional in front of clients via emails, giving her no chance to defend herself against his allegations, and started to take clients away from the Claimant. xvi. Missing 28th May 2025: Information about the prehearing video call being leaked to force me to take a settlement. If so, was that unwanted conduct? Was it related to the Claimant’s disability? Did the conduct have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant? VICTIMISATION (EQUALITY ACT 2010 SECTION 27) The protected acts being relied upon are lodging claims with the Employment Tribunal on 4 May 2025 and 6 November 2025. Did the Respondent do the following things: i. dismiss the Claimant on 26 September 2025. The Respondent accepts it dismissed the Claimant on this date but denies that this was because she did a protected act. PROTECTED DISCLOSURES Was the Claimant subjected to the following detriments and if so was it because she made a protected disclosure? i. On 14 February 2025, the Claimant was moved by Michael Maxwell Fraser to a small office on the 3rd floor which was remote from others, without adequate Wi-Fi or a phone ii. On 20 February and 11 March 2025, Carol Conetta denied rodent activity and leaving doors open in an outcome letter issued to the Claimant regarding complaints she had raised iii. On 5 March 2025, Euan Brown took work away from the Claimant, stating “because we need to win” iv. On 5 March 2025, Euan Brown accused the Claimant of deleting emails v. On/from 17 March 2025, Euan Brown micro-managed all of the Claimant’s “moves” and questioned everything she did vi. On 18 March 2025, Kirstine Rowland sent an intimidating email to “scare” the Claimant vii. On 20 March 2025, Euan Brown ignored the Claimant and took work away from her viii. On 31 March 2025, Euan Brown “chased” the Claimant for not clocking out ix. On 7 April 2025, Euan Brown questioned the Claimant about why she released a booking x. On 28 May 2025, Euan Brown took work away from the Claimant xi. Euan Brown failed to speak to the Claimant from 10 February 2025 onwards xii. On 27 February 2026: The Respondent threating me to take me to High court for breach of confidentially. Did the Claimant reasonably see that act or deliberate failure to act as subjecting her to a detriment? If so, was it done on the ground that she made a protected disclosure? Relevant law Direct discrimination[83]Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”) provides that a person(a) (A) discriminates directly against another(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. The protected characteristics are defined at section 4 and include, inter alia, sex, race, disability, age, religion or belief, sexual orientation, gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, and marriage and civil partnership.[84]The essential question is whether the protected characteristic operated on the mind of the alleged discriminator and materially influenced the treatment in issue. The tribunal is concerned with the reason for the treatment, not merely the motive. A benign or even laudable motive does not preclude a finding of direct discrimination if the prohibited ground was an effective cause of the treatment.[85]Less favourable treatment requires a comparison between B and an actual or hypothetical comparator whose circumstances are not materially different (section 23). The comparator must be in the same or not materially different circumstances save for the protected characteristic. In appropriate cases, the tribunal may construct a hypothetical comparator.[86]The statutory formulation “because of” requires a causal connection between the protected characteristic and the treatment complained of. The protected characteristic need not be the sole or even the principal reason; it is sufficient if it is a significant influence on the outcome. Where there are multiple reasons, the tribunal must identify the operative cause or causes.[87]Section 136 governs the burden of proof. Where there are facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that A has contravened the Act, the tribunal must uphold the complaint unless A shows that A did not contravene the provision. Accordingly, if the Claimant establishes a prima facie case of less favourable treatment because of a protected characteristic, the burden shifts to the Respondent to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation.[88]The tribunal must make findings on primary facts, draw appropriate inferences from those facts, and assess the evidence in the round. Direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare; the tribunal is entitled to rely on inferences from circumstantial evidence, including the adequacy and consistency of the Respondent’s explanation Indirect disability discrimination[89]Section 19 of the EqA defines indirect discrimination. By virtue of section 6 and section 39, that prohibition applies to disability in the employment field. Indirect disability discrimination arises where an employer applies to the Claimant a provision, criterion or practice (“PCP”) which is ostensibly neutral but which places persons who share the Claimant’s disability at a particular disadvantage, and in fact places the Claimant at that disadvantage, unless the Respondent can show that the PCP is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.[90]The statutory elements may be stated as follows. First, the Respondent must apply, or would apply, a PCP to the Claimant (s.19(1)–(2)(a)). The concept of a PCP is broad and includes any formal or informal policy, rule, requirement or way of doing things, whether written or unwritten, and whether applied consistently or on a one-off basis.[91]Secondly, the PCP must put, or would put, persons with whom the Claimant shares the same disability at a “particular disadvantage” when compared with persons who do not share that disability (s.19(2)(b)). This requires a comparative assessment. The relevant pool for comparison is fact-sensitive, and must be constituted so as to test the impact of the PCP fairly. The disadvantage must be more than trivial, but need not be substantial in the sense required for the definition of disability. Group disadvantage may be established by evidence, including (where appropriate) statistical material, but may in a proper case be inferred from the nature of the PCP and the known features of the disability.[92]Thirdly, the Claimant must herself suffer that disadvantage (s.19(2)(c)). It is not sufficient to show group disadvantage alone; there must be a causal nexus between the PCP and the disadvantage experienced by the Claimant.[93]Fourthly, the Respondent will avoid liability if it proves that the PCP is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim” (s.19(2)(d)). The burden of proof in relation to justification rests upon the Respondent.[94]The concept of a legitimate aim is construed broadly but must correspond to a real, objective consideration of a business or organisational nature. It must not be discriminatory in itself. Cost alone will not ordinarily suffice, although cost may be taken into account as part of the overall assessment when coupled with other factors.[95]Proportionality requires the Tribunal to conduct a structured evaluation. The Tribunal must consider(i) whether the aim relied upon is sufficiently important to justify limiting a protected right;(ii) whether the PCP is rationally connected to that aim;(iii) whether a less discriminatory measure could have been used to achieve the aim; and(iv) whether, balancing the discriminatory effects of the PCP against the importance of the aim, the former are outweighed. This is an objective test. The Tribunal must form its own view, taking into account all the evidence, including the extent of the disadvantage and the availability of alternative means.[96]In cases concerning disability, the duty to make reasonable adjustments under sections 20–21 of the EqA may be relevant to the question of proportionality. A failure to take reasonable steps to alleviate the disadvantage caused by a PCP will often weigh heavily against a Respondent in seeking to justify that PCP, although the two regimes are analytically distinct.[97]Finally, in accordance with section 136 of the EqA, where there are facts from which the Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the Respondent has contravened the provision, the burden shifts to the Respondent to prove that it did not do so. In the context of indirect discrimination, that will typically require the Respondent to establish justification under section 19(2)(d).[98]The duty to make reasonable adjustments is set out in sections 20 and 21 of the EqA together with Schedules 8 and 21 to the EqA. A Tribunal is also required to give consideration to the EHRC statutory Code of Practice in determining what might be a reasonable adjustment (as set out in paragraph 6.28 of that Code).[99]Environment Agency v Rowan 2008 ICR 218 establishes that that it is necessary to consider the nature and extent of any disadvantage suffered by a claimant in order to determine whether the duty to make reasonable adjustments applies and if so, what adjustments would be reasonable.[100]It is a defence to a claim that a Respondent has failed in a duty to make reasonable adjustments if the Respondent did not and could not reasonably have been aware that a Claimant was a disabled person at the material time.[101]Even if an employer knows that an employee is a disabled person an employer will not be liable for a failure to make reasonable adjustments if it did not know that a Claimant was subject to a substantial disadvantage in relation to a PCP (paragraph 20(1)(b) Schedule 8 EqA), which states: (1) A is not subject to a duty to make reasonable adjustments if A does not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know—…. (b) in any case referred to in Part 2 of this Schedule, that an interested disabled person has a disability and is likely to be placed at the disadvantage referred to in the first, second or third requirement. Discrimination arising from a disability[102]Section 15 of the EqA, which provides, so far as material: “(1) A person(a) (A) discriminates against a disabled person(b) (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.”[103]A claim under section 15 therefore requires the Tribunal to address four principal questions:a. Whether the Claimant was a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 of the EqA;b. Whether the Claimant was subjected to unfavourable treatment by the Respondent;c. Whether the unfavourable treatment was “because of something arising in consequence of” the Claimant’s disability; andd. If so, whether the Respondent can show either(a) that it did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know of the disability, or(b) that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.[104]The concept of “unfavourable treatment” does not require a comparator. It is to be contrasted with the concept of “less favourable treatment” in direct discrimination. The focus is on whether the treatment in question placed the Claimant at a disadvantage or was adverse in its context.[105]The phrase “something arising in consequence of” the disability requires a causal connection between the disability and the “something”, and a further causal connection between that “something” and the unfavourable treatment. The causation test is not one of strict or sole causation; it is sufficient that the “something” is an effective or operative cause of the treatment. The Tribunal must identify both:(a) the “something” (for example, absence, conduct, or reduced performance), and(b) whether that “something” arises in consequence of the disability.[106]It is not necessary for the Respondent to have appreciated that the “something” arises from the disability. However, by virtue of section 15(2), liability only arises where the Respondent knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, that the Claimant was disabled. Constructive knowledge will suffice.[107]If the elements of section 15(1)(a) are established, the burden shifts to the Respondent to demonstrate objective justification under section 15(1)(b). The Respondent must show that:(i) it pursued a legitimate aim; and(ii) the unfavourable treatment was a proportionate means of achieving that aim.[108]A legitimate aim must correspond to a real business need, be lawful, and not be discriminatory in itself. Common examples include ensuring the efficient running of the business, maintaining attendance levels, or safeguarding health and safety.[109]Proportionality requires the Tribunal to carry out a balancing exercise, weighing the discriminatory effect of the treatment against the importance of the Respondent’s aim. The Tribunal must consider whether the means adopted were reasonably necessary and whether there were less discriminatory alternatives available. The assessment is objective, albeit informed by the Respondent’s evidence as to its reasoning and the steps considered.[110]In conducting that assessment, the Tribunal may take into account, among other matters, whether the Respondent complied with its duty to make reasonable adjustments, although a failure to make reasonable adjustments does not of itself establish liability under section 15.[111]Finally, the Tribunal is required to consider the evidence as a whole and apply the burden of proof provisions in section 136 of the EqA. Where there are facts from which the Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that discrimination has occurred, the burden shifts to the Respondent to prove that it did not act in contravention of the Act.[112]Section 26(1) of the EqA provides that a person(a) (A) harasses another(b) (B) if A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and that conduct has the purpose or effect of either: (a) violating B’s dignity; or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.[113]The protected characteristics to which section 26 applies are age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation.[114]The Tribunal must first determine whether the conduct complained of occurred and, if so, whether it was “unwanted” by the Claimant. The question is a subjective one in the sense that it depends on the Claimant’s perception, but the assessment of whether the conduct was unwanted is a matter for the Tribunal on the evidence as a whole.[115]Secondly, the Tribunal must consider whether the conduct was “related to” a protected characteristic. A causal link is required, but it need not be the sole or even the primary cause of the conduct. It is sufficient if the protected characteristic is a material factor. The phrase “related to” is broad in scope and is not confined to conduct which is directly motivated by hostility to the protected characteristic.[116]Thirdly, the Tribunal must consider whether the conduct had the proscribed purpose or effect. Where a Respondent contends that the conduct did not have the purpose of violating dignity or creating an adverse environment, the Tribunal must consider whether it nevertheless had that effect. In doing so, section 26(4) requires the Tribunal to take into account:(a) the perception of the Claimant;(b) the other circumstances of the case; and(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. The test is therefore both subjective and objective: the Claimant’s perception is central, but it is not determinative; the Tribunal must also assess reasonableness.[117]The statutory language makes clear that relatively minor or isolated acts may, depending on the facts, suffice if they meet the threshold set by section 26(1). However, the context is critical. The Tribunal must consider the conduct cumulatively where there is a course of conduct, and must evaluate the social and workplace context in which the conduct occurred. Not every trivial or unattractive comment will meet the statutory threshold; the conduct must attain a level of seriousness such that it properly can be said to violate dignity or create the proscribed environment.[118]It is also well established that the Tribunal must avoid an unduly literal or mechanistic application of the statutory language. The central question is whether, in all the circumstances, the conduct in question had the relevant adverse effect on the Claimant’s working environment or dignity and whether it was reasonable for it to do so.[119]Finally, in cases involving alleged harassment by employees, the Tribunal will consider the liability of the employer in accordance with section 109 of the EqA. An employer is vicariously liable for acts of harassment committed by its employees in the course of employment, unless it establishes the statutory defence that it took all reasonable steps to prevent such conduct. Protected disclosures[120]The statutory protection against detriment for making a protected disclosure is contained in section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”). Section 47B(1) provides that a worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his or her employer on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure.[121]A “protected disclosure” is defined by sections 43A–43L ERA. In the present case, it is accepted by the Respondent that the Claimant made a protected disclosure both orally to EB and then in writing on 20 January 2025.[122]The concept of “detriment” is not exhaustively defined in the statute. The test is an objective one. The Tribunal must determine whether a reasonable worker would or might regard the treatment in question as to his or her detriment: Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] ICR 337 (HL). It is not necessary for the worker to establish financial loss, although such loss may be relevant.[123]The alleged detriment must arise from an “act” or a “deliberate failure to act” by the employer. Omissions are therefore capable of amounting to detriment where there is a deliberate decision not to act.[124]Causation is central. The worker must show that the protected disclosure was the ground, or principal ground, for the treatment complained of: section 47B(1) ERA. The question is why the employer (through the relevant decisionmaker) acted as it did. The Tribunal must ascertain the mental processes of the person(s) who subjected the worker to the detriment: Fecitt v NHS Manchester [2012] ICR 372 (CA).[125]It is not sufficient for the protected disclosure merely to have been part of the background. It must have materially influenced the employer’s treatment of the worker in the sense that it was an operative cause. However, it need not be the sole or even the predominant cause, provided it was more than trivial.[126]Where multiple individuals are involved in the decision-making process, the Tribunal must consider whose knowledge and motivation are to be attributed to the employer. The focus is ordinarily on the decision-maker who imposed or was responsible for the detriment, though knowledge may in some circumstances be imputed.[127]The burden of proof lies on the worker to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she made a protected disclosure and suffered a detriment on the ground of that disclosure. There is no statutory reversal of the burden of proof in whistleblowing detriment claims; however, the Tribunal is entitled to draw appropriate inferences from the evidence as a whole.[128]Where the alleged detriment consists of dismissal, the claim falls to be considered under section 103A ERA (automatic unfair dismissal) rather than section 47B. Section 47B applies to detriments short of dismissal.[129]Finally, the Tribunal must consider each alleged detriment separately, identifying(i) the act or omission complained of,(ii) whether it meets the objective test for detriment, and(iii) whether the protected disclosure materially influenced the treatment in question. Discussion and decision Knowledge of disability[130]The Respondent’s position on the knowledge of the Claimant’s disability status was that it was not aware and could not reasonably be aware that the Claimant was disabled until December 2024. The only allegations which arise prior to the Respondent accepting that it had knowledge of the Claimant’s disability are on 19 and 20 November 2024, which as set out below insofar as these could amount to detriments were not in any way related to the Claimant’s disability. Direct disability discrimination[131]The Claimant alleged twelve acts of direct disability discrimination.[132]It was alleged that on 19 November 2024 EB did not care about the Claimant’s health. It was not clear on what basis this could be said to be a detriment or in what way specifically EB was said not to have cared about the Claimant’s health. Nothing specifically was put to EB in cross examination. In any event, the Tribunal was satisfied that EB did in fact care about the Claimant’s health. EB found the Claimant to be a valuable employee at least until when the relationship broke down. Therefore, insofar as it could be said that this was a detriment (which was not at all clear to the Tribunal) it was not in any way related to the Claimant’s disability.[133]The next allegation was that the Claimant was moved to the canteen with no ventilation on 20 November. The Tribunal has found as a matter of fact that the canteen did in fact have ventilation although it was not particularly effective in that part of the building and it was accepted by the Respondent that the canteen could become warm and did not have windows. The Respondent moved the Claimant together with others to the canteen because there had been complaints (including by the Claimant) that it was cold working in the Highland Suite. On one occasion the Claimant had commented that she had to wear a hat a scarf while working there. The Claimant did not complain about the move at the time or suggest it was in any way related to her disability. She moved with other colleagues, and it was intended that the move would only be for 2 days, although it turned out to be for 17 days. This had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s disability. While the bar to establish a detriment is relatively low, it was not clear to the Tribunal that being required to work in a warm environment after having complained about working in a cold environment amounted to a detriment. In any event it was nothing to do with her disability.[134]The Claimant suggested that the incident when a roof tile fell this ought to have been recorded in an accident book and she should have been provided with that report. In the first instance, it was not at all clear in what way this was said to relate to the Claimant’s disability. While a tile falling nearby would no doubt have startled the Claimant, there was no suggestion anyone was hurt or there was any damage to property. This occurred simply because there was a misaligned tile which became dislodged because of the building work. It was nothing to do with the Claimant’s condition and there was no requirement to complete the accident book in the first place.[135]The Claimant was on occasion told she could leave operations meetings, when the content of the meetings did not concern her. This was nothing to do with her disability and was not on every occasion. The Claimant was not treated any differently from other staff attending the meeting who were not required to actively contribute to it.[136]The Respondent accepted that some dust or debris had fallen on a desk near the Claimant around 12 February. This was nothing to do with the Claimant’s disability and in any event did not require the completion of an accident report. By this stage the Claimant appeared to view everything which happened at work as in some way hostile to her personally and related to her disability, other protected characteristic or that she had raised concerns about her workplace.[137]It was accepted that the Claimant’s video camera for use with her computer went missing when her equipment was moved to the 3rd floor office. The Claimant did not suggest to any of the Respondent’s witnesses that this was a deliberate act to silence her. The camera simply went missing enroute and this was nothing to do with the Claimant’s disability.[138]The Claimant complained that being moved to the 3rd floor office was a detriment. At the time she thanked EB and CC for arranging this. The office had previously been used by the Hotel Manager who gave it up for the Claimant’s use. While the Claimant may well have had to go to different floors to heat up any food she had brought or to leave the building, this was not a detriment and was not in any way related to the Claimant’s disability other than the extent to which it could be said that it was to provide a reasonable adjustment by taking her away from an environment she had complained about previously. It was not clear to the Tribunal why the Claimant couldn’t leave by the main exit on the ground floor. The Claimant appeared to be trying to find problems that she could complain about by this stage.[139]The Claimant was not isolated from everyone by being placed in the 3rd floor office. She was sharing that office with another member of staff and was placed there as it was viewed as a more comfortable working environment. The main staff the Claimant worked with were in fact based in Glasgow. It seemed to the Tribunal that by this stage whatever the Respondent did was viewed negatively by the Claimant even where the Respondent took steps to address concerns raised by her. Every time one concern was addressed, the Claimant appeared to complain about any solutions the Respondent thought it had established. While the Claimant did not have a phone in that office, this had been true also when the Hotel manager had been in the room. The Claimant had other ways in which she could communicate and a landline was not essential to her carrying out her duties or being able to contact others in any emergency. In any event around this time the Claimant decided that she did not want to communicate verbally with colleagues.[140]The letter of 20 February 2025 from CC in response to the Claimant’s concerns was not a detriment. It was simply a response outlining the investigations which had been conducted by CC and the situation in relation to each of those concerns. The letter did not deny or dismiss the concerns but sought to explain the position and find solutions where possible. The approach adopted in the letter was nothing to do with the Claimant’s disability and the letter could not be said to amount to a detriment.[141]The Claimant was subjected to a disciplinary process and issued with a written warning on 28 August 2025. A disciplinary sanction can reasonably be viewed as amounting to a detriment. However, the sanction was nothing to do with the Claimant’s disability but because she refused the reasonable management request to have a meeting with her line manager and/or CC to discuss her home working arrangements and refused to engage with occupational health. These were not failures related to her disability but the conscious decision the Claimant made not to engage with the Respondent in this regard. While the Claimant sought on occasion to suggest that she was not able to communicate verbally because of issues with her voice, the Tribunal did not accept that evidence. No doubt the Claimant had a sore throat and may have found it difficult to speak for long periods of time. However, she accepted that she had represented herself at a preliminary hearing in relation to her first claim and spoken for more than an hour during that hearing. The decision not to communicate verbally with the Respondent was because she decided she wanted all communications in writing so she could rely on them if necessary, in her tribunal proceedings. In relation to the referral to occupational health, this was a contractual requirement which she refused to adhere to and in any event was a perfectly reasonable course of action for the Respondent to take. The Respondent had fit notes from the Claimant’s GP saying that the working environment may have been exacerbating her asthma. However, the Claimant had been working at home for some time by August and the Respondent was acting in a responsible manner by seeking further information in relation to the Claimant’s health and any impact her working environment may be having on it.[142]The dismissal of the Claimant can also be viewed as a detriment. However, the reason for the dismissal was that there had been a complete breakdown in the relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent. The Claimant continued to refuse to communicate verbally despite being given a written warning for that conduct. The Claimant stated in evidence that the relationship had broken down from when EB forwarded on her email outlining her concerns to HR. She was looking for another job from December 2024 but was not willing to leave the employment of the Respondent until she secured alternative employment. While that of itself was not unreasonable, her approach to the Respondent from January onwards was such that while she continued to carry out the specific duties required of her, her communications with EB and others became hostile, intemperate and suspicious. That was not conducive to an effective working relationship.[143]The Claimant was not discriminated against because of disability in any respect. Indirect disability discrimination[144]In the first instance, the Tribunal noted that the Claimant did not lead any evidence of a disproportionate impact of any PCPs which may have been applied in relation to people with her disability.[145]The Respondent accepted that office-based staff were required to work in the canteen or an office on the -2 floor. It did not accept that this requirement was to work without ventilation, with acoustic contamination and dust. It was however accepted that the building work caused intermittent noise and sometimes dust, although the Tribunal accepted that there was ongoing cleaning of the premises.[146]The Respondent also accepted that certain staff were not generally permitted to work from home where their role was office based. However, in the Claimant’s case she was permitted to work from home intermittently in April once a laptop had been sourced for her and then from May until the termination of her employment. Any PCP therefore only applied until April 2025.[147]The Respondent also accepted that employees were required to return shared laptops when they were not in use and that on occasion staff assisted in moving desks or equipment. It was also accepted that the Respondent generally required compliance with its sickness absence procedure.[148]Notwithstanding the fact that the Claimant led no evidence about the extent to which any of the PCPs resulted in group disadvantage, the Tribunal went on to consider whether the Claimant herself was disadvantaged by the application of the PCPs and whether these could be justified.[149]While it was true to say that conditions in the Hotel for the staff based in the offices there were not ideal, in that there were a number of moves and there was ongoing disruption by intermittent noise in particular, and that this might have been a disadvantage for someone with asthma at least in relation to any dust, it was not clear that there was a disadvantage caused in relation to the Claimant’s disability in relation to the other matters. There was limited evidence about dust in the photos provided by the Claimant and there was no medical evidence whatsoever to suggest that this dust caused a worsening in the Claimant’s asthma. The Claimant herself said she was suffering from a chest infection. The fit notes merely stated that the working environment ‘may’ be exacerbating her condition. While the tribunal can appreciate on the basis of common sense that in some circumstances dust may exacerbate conditions associated with asthma, the Claimant simply did not lead any evidence to suggest that any dust in the spaces she was based impacted on her condition.[150]It is difficult to discern in what way being subjected to noise in the working environment could impact on a condition such as asthma. There was ventilation in the areas the Claimant worked in although in some areas the (separate) air conditioning system was not fully functional. Any incidents of dust falling from works were isolated and not a regular occurrence and only occurred prior to the Claimant being moved to the office on the 3rd floor.[151]It was not at all clear in what way the requirement to return a shared laptop caused the Claimant a disadvantage in relation to her disability or in what way it could be said that being required to comply with sickness absence policy amounted to a disadvantage.[152]In addition, while the Claimant (and others) on occasion helped move their desks, there was no evidence to suggest that this caused the Claimant any disadvantage. If the Claimant had any difficulty at the time (on which there was no evidence) she could have asked for assistance from maintenance.[153]The Claimant also complained about the rubbish stored in the Hotel. The Respondent’s position was that this was moved around the hotel in an organised manner until it was moved down to the loading bay for collection. There may have been occasion when the Claimant had to walk past cages with bagged up rubbish in them, but there was no evidence as to how this disadvantaged her in relation to her disability.[154]Even if it could be said that there was any disadvantage to the Claimant in relation to the various PCPs complained of, there was no evidence of group disadvantage. In any event, the actions of the Respondent in relation to each PCP complained of were a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, in terms of providing an acceptable working environment for staff during a major refurbishment project.[155]In relation to the practice of not allowing office-based staff to work from home, there was no evidence about other staff and how they were treated other than the Sales Director who was allowed to work at home during the latter stages of her pregnancy. The requirement for the Claimant to work in the Hotel was to ensure that she could deal in person and/or quickly with any issues which might arise in relation to any group bookings in the Hotel. This practice was only in place for the Claimant for a period of time in that the Claimant was permitted to work from home from April, occasionally and then on a full-time basis. The Tribunal was satisfied that the practice was justified until that time.[156]In terms of this aspect of the Claimant’s claims, the issue appeared to be that the Respondent ought to have made a reasonable adjustment by allowing the Claimant to work from home at an earlier stage.[157]The Claimant did not establish what the nature or extent of any disadvantage in relation to her asthma might be in relation to being required to work in the Hotel during refurbishment. She did not lead any evidence to suggest that her asthma was worsened by the conditions in the Hotel, rather than suffering a chest infection. She did not lead any evidence to suggest that the chest infection was caused by the Hotel environment. In addition, the issue of being able to work at home at least from February onwards, appeared to be related more to the Claimant’s ongoing tribunal proceedings rather than to do with her disability. For reasons which were not clear to the Tribunal, the Claimant seemed to form the view that somehow she was entitled not to have any contact with anyone employees who might be called to give evidence in the proceedings she had commenced against the Respondent.[158]In so far as it could be said that the Respondent ought to have made adjustments such as ensuring that there were no rodents in the building and/or that the loading bay should have been secured at all times, these were not adjustments within the Respondent’s gift. In any event, it was not clear in what way the claimant was disadvantaged in relation to her disability in these respects. The issue of security was said to be of concern to the Claimant because of the background to her leaving Venezuela. The Claimant also said she had a fear of rodents, and did not suggest that this was related at all to asthma. The Respondent did what it could to deal with the rodent issue and the company with which it contracted ensured that it attended within 4 hours of any sighting of a rodent and took additional measures to limit the movement of any rodents. The loading bay was used by other businesses on North Bridge and not just the Respondent. In any event the extent to which security concerns (which was what the Claimant complained about in this regard) were in any way related to her asthma was not explained to the Tribunal. It was not clear what it was the Claimant expected the Respondent to do either in relation to the rodents or the security. The Tribunal was of the view that whatever the Respondent had done, would have been unlikely to have satisfied the Claimant in any event as on every occasion a solution to an issue was suggested or arranged for the Claimant (such as moving to an office with a window away from building works) the solution became a further ground of complaint for her.[159]The Claimant only worked near cages with rubbish for a short period and she did not explain in what way that amounted to a disadvantage in relation to her disability.[160]The Claimant also did not explain in what way the requirement to communicate “with all modes of communication” by which the Tribunal took to mean verbally caused her a substantial disadvantage. All the Respondent was looking for was for the Claimant to speak to her line manager and/or HR to discuss her working arrangements. While the Claimant may have had difficulty in speaking for long period of times when she had a chest infection, that was not what was being asked of her. She was offered breaks and for meetings to take place when her voice was not so bad. She refused to engage with the Respondent at all in relation to its very reasonable requests that an employee communicate directly verbally with a line manager or HR and participate in a discussion about their working arrangements. The Claimant was not placed at a substantial disadvantage in this regard.[161]The only statable aspect of the Claimant’s claim in this regard was that the Respondent ought to have allowed the Claimant to work from home at an earlier stage. However, it was not made clear to the Respondent that the Claimant was being placed at a substantial disadvantage in relation to her disability by the working environment. The Claimant’s email of 20 January which set out her complaints was so wide- ranging from food waste to dishonesty to not having an incentive for sales, that the Respondent could not reasonably understand that the working environment was causing the Claimant a substantial disadvantage in relation to her asthma. The only potential reference was where she stated that “insufficient airflow can lead to poor air quality, reduced productivity and potential health concerns.”[162]The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent would not reasonably have known that the Claimant was substantially disadvantaged in relation to her disability by having to work in the temporary office and that once it became aware (on the provision of a fit note) that her working environment might be impacting on her asthma, it took steps to allow the Claimant to work from home. Therefore, in so far as the Respondent was under a duty to make reasonable adjustments in respect of the Claimant, it complied with that duty. Discrimination arising from disability[163]The Claimant complained that much of the conduct she said amounted to direct discrimination could also amount to discrimination arising from disability. She did not however specify in relation to her complaints what the “something” was which arose in consequence of her disability in relation to these matters.[164]The Claimant’s move to the 3rd floor office was done to improve her working environment and not unfavourable treatment. It was only related to her disability insofar as it sought to provide her with a working environment which was less noisy and dusty than the one she had been in previously.[165]There was no deliberate decision not to provide the Claimant with a phone in her 3rd floor office. No phone had been installed as there was no connection for it to be installed. The Hotel manager had worked from that room without a phone. The lack of phone was nothing to do with the Claimant’s disability and she was not disadvantaged by the lack of a landline.[166]EB asked the Claimant to give notice of any medical appointments after the Claimant had given very short notice of leaving to attend a medical appointment during his leave. This was not unfavourable treatment and was not related to the Claimant’s disability in any way. The Respondent simply sought to ensure that it would be aware of any staff absences at as early a stage as possible given the dynamic nature of the duties of the Claimant and her colleagues.[167]The request to attend occupational health was not less favourable treatment. It arose from the Claimant’s disability only insofar as the Respondent wished to ensure that it was taking all appropriate steps to accommodate the Claimant and better understand any impact the Claimant’s disability was having on her ability to perform her duties and any adjustments which could be made in that regard.[168]The Claimant was not dismissed for any reason relating to her disability but because the relationship between her and the Respondent had broken down due to the Claimant’s refusal to engage with the Respondent other than on her own terms. That refusal did not arise from the Claimant’s disability, but a conscious and deliberate decision taken by her to ensure that communications with her employer were in writing to allow her to rely on them if necessary at subsequent tribunal proceedings.[169]The Claimant was not discrimination against in terms of section 15 EqA. Direct discrimination on religion or belief[170]The Tribunal had initially understood that the Claimant relied on the fact that she was a political refugee from Venezuela in relation to this head of claim. However, in her response to the Respondent’s draft list of issues the Claimant suggested that she was relying on her religion, that of Catholicism. In that regard the Claimant appeared to suggest that this was because she believed in honesty and integrity. Putting to one side that such beliefs could be said to be widely held and not related to a particular religion or set of beliefs, the Tribunal struggled to understand what claim the Claimant sought to advance in this regard. While certain matters were set out in the list of issues, in evidence what the Claimant seemed to rely on was that she had said in an email that she was “praying” she didn’t get an infection, and that she had been brought up as a Catholic to believe in honesty. She seemed to suggest that where she believed the Respondent had lied to her this amounted to discriminatory conduct. While the Tribunal did not accept that the Respondent had lied to her at any stage (other than perhaps when an alternative reason was given for the temporary change in reporting structure, which was not something the Claimant was aware of until the bundle had been prepared), the matters complained of by the Claimant in this regard could in no way be said to amount to less favourable treatment because of religion or belief. Her claim in this regard was entirely misconceived. Direct Age Discrimination[171]The Claimant’s claim in this regard was also entirely misconceived.[172]The Claimant complained that EB had compared her to his children. That was not a reasonable reading of the message she complained about. EB was seeking to empathise with the Claimant about having to work in an environment with noise and disruption. He specifically referred to himself as having to be kind and resilient and was offering support to the Claimant. The message could in no way be interpreted as less favourable treatment, never mind being related to the Claimant’s age.[173]The Claimant also suggested that the General Manager made a comment about the Claimant’s age. The Tribunal did not accept that he did make this comment. He was not cross examined on the point and the Claimant gave no evidence on the allegation.[174]The Claimant suggested she was not properly remunerated. She did not lead any evidence about this other that she was aggrieved at the bonus scheme she was entitled to participate in. The Claimant agreed to the terms of her contract and only became aggrieved some time later when the Claimant formed the view that the role was not going how she anticipated it would go.[175]The Claimant was not discriminated against in relation to her age.[176]The Claimant made sixteen allegations of conduct she said amounted to harassment related to disability. There was overlap in this regard with the other aspects of the Claimant’s claims. None of the matters complained of could reasonably have the effect of creating an intimidating hostile degrading humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant. None of them were related to the Claimant’s disability.[177]The Tribunal concluded that over the period the Claimant alleged these incidents took place, the Claimant viewed everything the Respondent did as hostile towards her. By this stage (the first allegation is 29 May 2025) the Claimant had raised her first Tribunal claim and appeared to approach every interaction with the Respondent in that light on the basis that she would rely on any interactions as proof of unfavourable treatment, without objectively considering whether each interaction could reasonably be viewed as unfavourable. The Claimant’s mindset by this stage was that the relationship had broken down, that her concerns and complaints would be dealt with at a Tribunal and not internally, and that everything the Respondent did was calculated to undermine her position. That mindset was entirely unreasonable and none of the matters the Claimant said amounted to harassment could reasonably be viewed as unfavourable treatment and were certainly not related to her disability.[178]Rather the interactions were all reasonable interactions in order to engage the Claimant in dealing with the many issues of concern she continued to raise or efforts by the Respondent to continue to ensure that the duties carried out by the Claimant and her colleagues were properly carried out. The Claimant was then required to attend hearings to discuss her refusal to communicate other than on her terms with the Respondent. These requests could in no way be said to amount to harassment in the context of the EqA.[179]The Claimant’s claim of harassment fails. Victimisation[180]The Claimant alleges that she was dismissed because she lodged a Tribunal claim. The Claimant was dismissed because the relationship between her and the Respondent had irretrievably broken down. The Claimant accepted that the relationship had broken down from January. Her dismissal was not related to the fact that she had raised a Tribunal claim. Detriment for making protected disclosures[181]There was no dispute that the Claimant had made protected disclosures. She complained of twelve matters which she said amounted to detriments for having made these protected disclosures. There was some overlap in this regard with the Claimant’s other heads of claim.[182]The matters complained of by the Claimant as amounting to detriments were in the large part simply the Respondent asking the Claimant reasonable questions about her duties, making reasonable requests of her or seeking to deal with her concerns.[183]The only matter which could reasonably be viewed as a detriment was a suggestion that action could be taken against the Claimant for breach of confidentiality in relation to the provision of information in her schedule of loss. However, when considered in context, what the Respondent was seeking was an undertaking from the Claimant that she would adhere to the confidentiality undertakings in her contract of employment and that if she did not do so further action could be taken. This correspondence was in the context of preparing for the Tribunal hearing rather than linked to the Claimant having made protected disclosures. While this could potentially be said to amount to a threat, in the overall context of the communication, it was not a detriment and in any event was not because the Claimant had made a protected disclosure, but because the Respondent was concerned about confidential financial projections being placed in the public domain in the Claimant’s schedule of loss.[184]Insofar as the Claimant suggested that her dismissal was because she made a protected disclosure, that claim fails. The sole reason for the Claimant’s dismissal was because the relationship between the Respondent and the Claimant had irretrievably broken down. The reasons for that breakdown related to the conduct of the Claimant and not the Respondent.[185]In all of these circumstances, the Claimant’s claims fail in their entirety and her claims are dismissed.