Ms A D Vere v Tennent Caledonian Breweries UK Ltd: 8002387/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8002387/2025

Venue Edinburgh

Hearing 24 April 2026

Between

Ms A de VereClaimant

Tennent Caledonian Breweries UK LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Sangster

Ms R Kight (instructed by Barrister) for respondent

Date 1 May 2026

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Tribunal is that:• The Tribunal does have jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s complaints of detriment as a result of making a protected disclosure and victimisation.

• The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s complaints of unfair dismissal, direct sex discrimination, harassment related to sex, direct disability discrimination and discrimination arising from disability. Those complaints are therefore dismissed.

REASONS

[1]The claim was set down for a preliminary hearing to determine whether the complaints were lodged within the requisite time limits and, if made, an amendment application. The claimant confirmed at the commencement of the preliminary hearing that she had not sought to amend her claim, so no such application required to be determined.

[2]Parties had prepared a list of issues, which was discussed at the commencement of the preliminary hearing. The claimant confirmed, with reference to this, that the complaints brought are as follows: 2.1. Constructive unfair dismissal. 2.2. Direct sex discrimination/harassment related to sex. The claimant asserts that the actions of Pat MaAfee (PM) in the period from July 2021 to August 2023 amounted to direct discrimination or harassment. 2.3. Direct disability discrimination and/or discrimination arising from disability. The claimant asserts that her removal from road duties in around May-July 2023, and colleagues treating her as ‘mentally unwell’ when she was employed by the respondent (as evidenced by a comment made by a colleague (TK) in May-July 2023, and by a comment made by PM in March 2025) amounted to direct discrimination or discrimination arising from disability. 2.4. Victimisation. The claimant asserts that a disclosure she made to HR on 27 July 2025 was a protected act, and that she was subjected to a detriment as a result of that when, on 14 August 2025, Amanda Huston, an ER Specialist employed by the respondent, indicated that there would be ‘no further correspondence’ regarding the disclosure. 2.5. Detriment as a result of making protected disclosures. The claimant asserts that disclosures she made to HR on 27 July 2025 and to ‘Speak Up’ between 16-20 August 2025 were protected disclosures, and she was subjected to a detriments as a result of those when, on 14 August 2025, Amanda Huston, an ER Specialist employed by the respondent, indicated that there would be ‘no further correspondence’ regarding the disclosure, and as a result of the respondent’s delay and failure to address the disclosures.

[3]Following discussion, it was noted that there was no dispute that the complaints of detriment as a result of making protected disclosures were lodged timeously. It was agreed that the issues to be determined at the preliminary hearing were as follows: Unfair dismissal complaint 3.1. Was the complaint presented within the primary three month time limit? 3.2. If not, was it reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within that period? 3.3. If not, was it presented within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable? Equality Act complaints 3.4. Can the claimant show a prima facie case (or reasonably arguable basis) for her contention that the various acts are so linked as to be continuing acts or to constitute an ongoing state of affairs? 3.5. If not, were the individual complaints brought within 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates? 3.6. If not, were they brought within such other period as the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable?

[4]The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf. The respondent did not lead any evidence. A joint set of productions was lodged, extending to 394 pages. A copy of a Judgment, in Employment Tribunal proceedings raised by the claimant against separate organisations, was also produced by the respondent. Findings in fact

[5]This Judgment does not seek to address every point about which the parties have led evidence or made submissions on. It only deals with the points which are relevant to the issues which the Tribunal must consider in order to determine the issues which required to be addressed at this hearing. If a particular point is not mentioned, it does not mean that it has been overlooked, it simply means that it is not relevant to the issues to be determined. The relevant facts, which the Tribunal found to be admitted or proven, are set out below.

[6]The claimant commenced employment with the respondent, as an HGV Driver on 10 May 2021. Around the end of June 2021, the claimant started a relationship with PM. They moved in together in around July 2021. She moved out for a period of around 3 weeks in November 2022, and then moved out permanently in May 2023. Whilst the claimant’s relationship with PM continued for periods beyond that date, the relationship was intermittent, and there were significant periods where the relationship had broken down and parties had no contact.

[7]The claimant consulted her GP in June 2023 due to gastrointestinal issues which caused significant weight loss.

[8]The claimant resigned on 29 August 2023 and her employment with the respondent ended on 8 September 2023.

[9]The claimant commenced alternative employment on 18 September 2023 and has worked continuously, with a variety of employers, from that date onwards.

[10]In consultations with her GP on 29 August and 6 October 2023, the claimant referred to her relationship having broken down, that her and her former partner used to work at the same company and the circumstances of the breakup. In a consultation with her GP on 13 November 2023, she confirmed she was driving from Glasgow to Aberdeen, as part of her role as an HGV driver, on a daily basis.

[11]In January 2024, the claimant provided PM’s details to a prospective employer, as a referee. The prospective employer had difficulty contacting him and obtaining the reference.

[12]In March 2024, the claimant applied for a tenancy in her own name. (From May 2023 to this point she had been staying in rented rooms and with friends). Whilst there were issues securing the first property, she secured long-term, stable housing later that month.

[13]The claimant was absent from work due to illness for short periods in September 2024, on 16 & 17 January 2025, and then from 29 January to 4 February 2025. Other than these periods of absence, she was able to attend work.

[14]The claimant’s relationship with PM ended completely in March 2025.

[15]In February 2025, the claimant started early conciliation in relation to her employment with another organisation (where she worked from 2024-2025). She raised Employment Tribunal proceedings in relation to that employment on 12 March 2025. Her claim included complaints under the Equality Act 2010. She attended two preliminary hearings in relation to that claim (on 16 May and 25 August 2025). The final hearing in relation to that claim took place on 28 & 29 October 2025. A number of the complaints raised were dismissed as a result of having been raised outside the requisite timescales.

[16]On 27 July and 19 August 2025, the claimant raised concerns with the respondent in relation to PM’s conduct towards her during their relationship. She had not raised these issues with the respondent previously. She attended a meeting with an investigator, appointed by the respondent, on 5 September 2025.

[17]The claimant engaged in early conciliation in relation to these proceedings from 20 August to 1 October 2025. She presented her claim in these proceedings on 5 October 2025.

[18]The claimant was diagnosed as having ADHD Inattentive Type in January 2026. Submissions

[19]The claimant gave a brief submission in which she stated that there was a continuing course of conduct, but even if viewed separately it was just and equitable to extend time.

[20]The respondent summarised the evidence, timeline and relevant law. In summary the respondent submitted that: 20.1. The claimant has not demonstrated that it was not reasonably practicable for her to present her complaint of unfair dismissal within the relevant time limit, or that she did so in a reasonable period thereafter. The onus is on her to demonstrate this. 20.2. There is no reasonable prospect of the claimant demonstrating that the individual allegations of discrimination and victimisation form a continuing act. It is not just and equitable to extend time in relation to the individual acts which are submitted outside the relevant time limits. The balance of prejudice weighs more heavily on the respondent, given that the claimant first raised these issues with them in July 2025, hampering their ability to investigate matters Relevant Law Unfair dismissal

Relevant Law

[21]The relevant time limits in relation to unfair dismissal complaints is set out in section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA).

[22]These provisions state that a Tribunal shall not consider a complaint unless it is presented to the Tribunal before the end of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.

[23]In considering whether there is jurisdiction to hear such complaints, Tribunals accordingly required to consider the following questions: 23.1. Were the complaints presented within the primary three month time limit? 23.2. If not, was it reasonably practicable for the complaints to be presented within that period? 23.3. If not, were they presented within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable?

[24]The question of a what is reasonably practical is a question of fact for the Tribunal. The burden of proof falls on the claimant. Whether it is reasonably practicable to submit a claim in time does not mean whether it was reasonable or physically possible to do so. Rather, it is essentially a question of whether it was ‘reasonably feasible’ to do so (Palmer and Saunders v Southend-onSea Borough Council

[1984] IRLR 119

[25]Whether the claim was presented within a further reasonable period requires an assessment of the factual circumstances by the Tribunal, to determine whether the claim was submitted within a reasonable time after the original time limit expired (University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust v Williams

UKEAT/0291/12

). Discrimination complaints

[26]The relevant time limits in relation to complaints of discrimination is set out in section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA).

[27]This states that such complaints should be brought within either: 27.1. the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates; or 27.2. such other period as the Tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[28]Section 123(3) EqA states that conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period and failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it.

[29]The ‘just and equitable’ test is a broader test than the ‘reasonably practicable’ test. What is just and equitable depends on all the circumstances. The burden of proof is on the claimant, as explained in Robertson v Bexley Community Centre

[2003] IRLR 434

, in which the Court of Appeal also said, at para 25: “When tribunals consider their discretion to consider a claim out of time on just and equitable grounds there is no presumption that they should do so unless they can justify failure to exercise the discretion. Quite the reverse. A tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time. So, the exercise of discretion is the exception rather than the rule.”

[30]In British Coal Corporation v Keeble

[1997] IRLR 336

the EAT indicated that task of the Tribunal, when considering whether it is just and equitable to extend time, may be illuminated by considering section 33 Limitation Act 1980. This sets out a check list of potentially relevant factors, which may provide a prompt as to the crucial findings of fact upon which the discretion is exercised, such as:(a) the length of and reasons for the delay;

(b) the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay;

(d) the promptness with which the claimant acted once they knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and

(e) the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once they knew of the possibility of taking action.

[31]In London Borough of Southwark v Afolabi

[2003] IRLR 220

the Court of Appeal confirmed that, whilst that checklist provides a useful guide for Tribunals, it does not require to be followed slavishly. In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan

[2018] EWCA Civ 640

, the Court of Appeal confirmed this, stating that it was plain from the language used in s123 EqA (‘such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just and equitable’) that Parliament chose to give Employment Tribunals the widest possible discretion and it would be wrong to put a gloss on the words of the provision or to interpret it as if it contains such a list.

[32]In Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust

[2021] EWCA Civ 23

, the Court of Appeal approved the approach set out in Afolabi and Morgan and, at paragraph 37, Underhill LJ confirmed, that ‘rigid adherence to a checklist can lead to a mechanistic approach to what is meant to be a very broad general discretion, and confusion may also occur where a tribunal refers to a genuinely relevant factor but uses inappropriate Keeble-derived language. The best approach for a tribunal in considering the exercise of the discretion under section 123(1)(b) is to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time, including in particular “the length of, and the reasons for, the delay”. If it checks those factors against the list in Keeble, well and good; but I would not recommend taking it as the framework for its thinking.’ Discussion & Decision Unfair dismissal

[33]The Tribunal considered whether the complaint of unfair dismissal was presented within the primary three month time limit. The Tribunal noted that the effective date of termination of the claimant’s employment was 8 September 2023. The relevant time limit accordingly expired on 7 December 2023.

[34]Whilst the claimant engaged in early conciliation in 2025, as this was done after the expiry of the primary time limits, it did not result in the extension of the primary time limit.

[35]The claim against the respondent was presented on 5 October 2025. The claim was accordingly not presented in the primary three month time limit. It was presented nearly 2 years after it expired.

[36]In relation to whether it was reasonably practicable for the complaints to be submitted on or before 7 December 2023, the Tribunal considered whether it was reasonably feasible for the claimant to have done so. The Tribunal considered the principal explanations for the late submission of the claim which the claimant advanced and reached the following conclusions in relation to each: 36.1. Health. It is clear that the claimant suffered weight loss as a result of gastrointestinal issues in June 2023. There was no evidence however of that continuing beyond June 2023. While the claimant made reference to her health immediately after the termination of her employment with the respondent, the Tribunal found that there was no physical or mental impediment which rendered it not reasonably feasible for the claimant to lodge her claim by 7 December 2023. The claimant was sufficiently well to commence alternative employment from 18 September 2023, and maintain this thereafter, with no periods of absence due to ill health noted for the remainder of 2023. As of 13 November 2023, she was driving an HGV from Glasgow to Aberdeen on a daily basis. The claimant also referred to her diagnosis of ADHD, in January 2026, as a factor, stating that this existed long before her diagnosis. It is clear however that she was able to raise Tribunal proceedings in relation to another employer at a later date. She did not allude to any particular limitations as a result of ADHD, in the period from 8 September to 7 December 2023, which were not present subsequently. 36.2. Relationship with PM. The claimant asserted her relationship with PM was abusive and coercive/controlling, and this meant it was not reasonably feasible for her to raise her claim at the time. The Tribunal did not however accept this was the case in the period from 8 September to 7 December 2023. The Tribunal noted that she was not living with PM at the end of 2023, having moved out in May 2023. Whilst the relationship may have been resurrected for a short period(s) subsequently, it is not clear when that occurred. It is however clear from her medical records that, in the period from 29 August 2023, until at least 10 October 2023, she considered him to be her ex/former partner. They were accordingly not engaged in relationship or living together at that time. She has not explained why, in light of that, her former relationship with PM (whatever the nature of that) presented any impediment to her presenting her claim.

[37]Taking these points into account, the Tribunal conclude that the claimant did not demonstrate that it was not reasonably practicable for her to bring her claim within the requisite time limit.

[38]As she did not do so, the Tribunal did not require to consider whether the claim was submitted in a reasonable further period. For the avoidance of doubt however, had the Tribunal required to do so, it would also have found that the claim was not submitted in a further reasonable period. In particular, it is clear that, by March 2025, the claimant claimant’s relationship with PM had ended completely, she was in stable housing, and she was able to bring Employment Tribunal proceedings against other organisations, having engaged in early conciliation in relation to those proceedings from 21 February to 11 March 2025. Despite this, she delayed further in raising these proceedings against the respondent: commencing early conciliation on 20 August 2025 and presenting her claim on 5 October 2025. No satisfactory explanation has been provided for that further delay.

[39]The Tribunal accordingly concluded that it does not have jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s complaint of unfair dismissal. The claimant’s complaint of unfair dismissal is therefore dismissed on the basis that it was presented out of time. Equality Act complaints

[40]In relation to the complaints under the Equality Act 2010, taken individually, all of the complaints are lodged outside the period of 3 months from the date of the act complained of (as extended by early conciliation, where appropriate), other than the complaint of victimisation. In relation to that complaint, the asserted detriment took place on 14 August 2025. The claimant commenced early conciliation 6 days later and raised these proceedings 4 days after early conciliation ended.

[41]The Tribunal considered whether the claimant had demonstrated a prima facie case that all of the complaints were linked and constituted a continuing act, or an ongoing state of affairs. The Tribunal was content that the claimant had demonstrated that the earlier acts of sex discrimination and harassment related to sex, which occurred during the claimant’s employment, were arguably linked, as they largely related to the actions of PM towards the claimant. Similarly, the Tribunal was content that the claimant had demonstrated that the earlier acts of disability discrimination, which also occurred during the claimant’s employment, were arguably linked, given the nature of them. These findings cover the asserted acts of direct sex discrimination, harassment related to sex, direct disability discrimination and discrimination arising from disability (the Initial Complaints). The Tribunal was not however satisfied that the claimant had demonstrated a reasonably arguable basis for her contention that the Initial Complaints were linked with the later asserted act of victimisation, so as to cumulatively be a continuing act or an ongoing state of affairs. The complaint of victimisation is of an entirely different nature to the earlier acts: it is a complaint that she was subjected to a detriment because she had raised particular concerns, rather than less favourable treatment/detriment because of/related to the protected characteristics of sex or disability. The nature of the detriment asserted is different and it involves an entirely different person, in a different department, in a different time period, when the claimant is no longer an employee.

[42]The Tribunal then considered whether the Initial Complaints were brought within such other period as was just and equitable. The Tribunal noted that the claimant asserts that the Initial Complaints occurred during her employment, and the claim was presented over 2 years after her employment with the respondent terminated. The Tribunal considered the reasons advanced by the claimant for the delay. In relation to her health, while the claimant produced her GP records, these did not demonstrate that the claimant was impeded in any way from presenting a claim. They demonstrate that the claimant was able to work from September 2023 onwards, with only 3 short absences due to ill health from then until October 2025. The Tribunal also noted that the claimant was able to engage in early conciliation and commence Employment Tribunal proceedings against other organisations, and in respect of a more recent period of employment, at the start of 2025. Her health did not inhibit her from doing so. In relation to her relationship with PM, and her assertion that this was coercive/controlling in nature, it is clear that she lived separately from him after her employment terminated, and secured long-term accommodation in her own name from March 2024 onwards. While the Tribunal accepted that the relationship was intermittent in the period from May 2023 to March 2025, there were significant periods during that time where the relationship had broken down and parties had no contact. The relationship then ended completely in March 2025, but the claimant did not present her claim until 5 October 2025. The claimant has not provided a satisfactory explanation for why she did not raise her claim in the significant periods where she was not in a relationship with PM, following the termination of her employment with the respondent, particularly given that she was able to bring other Employment Tribunal proceedings, and was aware that there were time limits for doing so.

[43]The Tribunal took these findings, in relation to the length of and reasons for the delay into account, as well as the balance of prejudice between the parties as a result of the claim proceeding at this stage, when determining whether it is just and equitable to extend time. The Tribunal concluded that no satisfactory explanation was advanced for why the complaints were not brought sooner, particularly where the claimant presented a claim against other organisations, in respect of a more recent period of employment, in the intervening period. Whilst the Tribunal is aware that the claimant will be unable to pursue the Initial Complaints if discretion is not exercised in her favour, the Tribunal is also mindful that the respondent would be prejudiced if the claims were allowed to proceed at this stage. There is no doubt that the cogency of the evidence, which would require to be led in relation to events which took place in 2023, will be adversely impacted by the delay in the claim being raised. The fact that he claimant first raised these issues with the respondent in July 2025, almost 2 years after they occurred, has hampered their ability to investigate. In these circumstances, the Tribunal concludes that the balance of prejudice weighs more heavily on the respondent.

[44]For these reasons the Tribunal is not persuaded it would be just and equitable to extend time in the claimant’s favour. The Tribunal accordingly does not have jurisdiction, under the EqA, to hear the Initial Complaints.

[45]As indicated above, the claimant’s complaints of detriment as a result of making protected disclosures and victimisation were both lodged within the requisite time limits. Those complaints, alone, will proceed.