Mr G Lambie v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland: 8002179/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8002179/2025

Between

Mr G LambieClaimant

Chief Constable of the Police Service of ScotlandRespondent

Before

Employment Judge M A Macleod

Dr A Gibson (instructed by Solicitor) for respondent

Date 17 April 2026

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is:(1) That the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to hear some of the claimant’s claims and they are therefore dismissed, being time-barred;

(2) That the claimant’s application to amend his claim dated 28 October 2025 is granted, in part, and his application to amend his claim dated 14 March 2026 is refused in its entirety; and

(3) That the two allegations identified by the respondent as having been raised and judicially determined before are dismissed on the grounds of res judicata. ETZ4(WR)

REASONS

[1]In this case, a Preliminary Hearing was listed to take place on 16 March 2026 in the Employment Tribunal, Glasgow. However, very shortly before that Hearing was due to commence, the claimant had presented a further application to amend his claim, and accordingly the Hearing was postponed, and relisted for 30 March 2026 in order to consider that and the other outstanding issues before the Tribunal.

[2]Following the postponement of that Hearing, the Tribunal wrote to the parties to advise that the following issues would be addressed at this Hearing:

[1]The Hearing listed to take place on today’s date is adjourned, and will be reconvened at 10am on Monday 30 March 2026 in the Employment Tribunal, Glasgow, for the duration of 1 day;

[2]The Hearing will address the following issues:a. Whether the claimant's claim, or any part of it, is time-barred, and if so, whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to allow it to proceed;

b. Whether the claimant's application to amend should be granted, in relation to those paragraphs of the document of 28 October 2025 to which the respondent currently objects, namely 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 and 28; and whether the claimant’s further application to amend dated 14 March 2026 should also be granted; and

c. Whether any aspect of the claimant's claim should be excluded on the basis of res judicata.

[3]The Tribunal will then issue its decision on these matters as soon as possible thereafter in order to allow parties sufficient time to conclude their preparations for the final Hearing;

[4]The claimant’s intention to seek disclosure of certain documents from the respondent may be discussed at the reconvened Hearing on 30 March 2026, though if he wishes to make such an application, he should do so in advance of the Hearing in order to allow the respondent to consider its response thereto. 3. A Preliminary Hearing bundle was prepared and produced by the respondent for this Hearing. 4. The claimant appeared on his own behalf, and Dr Gibson appeared for the respondent.

[5]The claimant gave evidence and was subject to cross-examination by Dr Gibson.

[6]Based on the evidence led and the information provided, the Tribunal was able to find the following facts admitted or proved. Findings in Fact

[7]The claimant presented his claim to the Tribunal on 7 September 2025 (58ff). In that claim, he complained about discrimination on the grounds of sex and disability. His employment with the respondent was continuing as at that date.

[8]The claimant notified ACAS of his intention to present a claim to the Tribunal on 25 June 2025, and received the ACAS Early Conciliation Certificate (57) on 6 August 2025 by email.

[9]The claimant had previously presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal against the respondent on 28 May 2019 (2ff). In that case, he had ticked the boxes marked unfair dismissal, disability discrimination and unlawful deductions from wages. He withdrew that claim by email dated 19 October 2020 (54), citing the length of time which the proceedings had taken and the impact upon him and his family. The claim was dismissed by the Tribunal’s Judgment dated 10 November 2020 (56).

[10]In his 2025 claim (which is the subject of these proceedings), the claimant attached a separate document entitled “Claimant: Sergeant Gavin Lambie overview of what happened” (72-108).

[11]The claimant was aware of the time limits within which he required to present his claim, when he presented his 2025 claim, on the basis that he had previously lodged a claim with the Employment Tribunal in 2019. At that time, however, he had never had any formal legal advice in relation to his claims.

[12]He felt that he was misled by the respondent, when he raised matters with his Divisional Commander, who asked him to give them more time in order to seek legal advice and consider their position and response. He maintained that the reason why he presented his claim on 7 September 2025 and not before was that he was trying to resolve matters with the respondent himself. The claimant is the sole carer for 2 young children and suffers from health issues. He was hospitalised in or around July 2025 due to a reaction to an insect bite, in Wishaw General Hospital, and was aware, from his previous experience of a Tribunal claim, of the high blood pressure and stress from which he had suffered. He estimated that he was absent from work for approximately 2 to 3 weeks as a result of the insect bite.

[13]The claimant said in evidence that the reason why he had not raised all of his claims before was that he was awaiting information from his employers, and that he had not had an explanation from them as to their actions towards him.

[14]The claimant maintains that the complaint that the respondent failed to make reasonable adjustments in respect of his disability in February 2024 is an ongoing complaint or continuing act. He had a workplace needs assessment in June 2024, and 2 further diagnostic reports in October 2024 and January 2025. He has dealt with a large number of different managers but no reasonable adjustments were put in place for him.

[15]When it was put to the claimant by Dr Gibson that the Note following Preliminary Hearing from 13 October 2025 (123ff) summarised what the claimant’s claims were, he did not accept that. In particular, he rejected the statement made in paragraph 26 of the Note by Employment Judge Hoey (128), that “The issues the Tribunal will decide are set out below in summary form. The complaints below are the only complaints the claimant is advancing. The parties will consider this list carefully to make sure that it accurately records such matters and expand upon it to ensure it fully and comprehensively sets out each element of each complaint, is precise and detailed as to particular acts relied upon. The claimant accepted that he had included a large amount of other material in writing but that the only complaints he wishes to advance (subject to any minor amendment needed to clarify) are as follows:…”

[16]The claimant persists in his criticism of this Note as having been inaccurate and incomplete. Indeed, he made clear in his evidence that he considers that the Preliminary Hearing Note should be removed from the record. I deal with this below.

[17]He did not accept that there was only one act, alleged to have taken place on 11 April 2025, in relation to direct sex discrimination. He referred to the further document presented on 28 October 2025 in which he responded to the Tribunal’s Note, and to the original 37 page paper apart attached to the ET1.

[18]When Dr Gibson sought to put to him that there were a number of allegations under different headings which were out of time, the claimant reluctantly accepted that this may be the case, but did not accept that the allegations taken from the draft List of Issues and the Note were a full and proper reflection of the claims made by him. Submissions

[19]For the respondent, in addition to a written submission, Dr Gibson made oral submissions. He referred to the previous decision of the Tribunal relating to the claimant’s document dated 28 October 2025, in which the Tribunal had determined which parts amounted to applications to amend the pleadings and which did not. He also referred to the respondent’s previous correspondence in which they had set out which parts they opposed.

[20]He confirmed that the respondent opposes in its entirety the claimant’s application to amend dated 14 March 2026, and in part the claimant’s application to amend dated 28 October 2025 (to the extent defined as an application to amend). Anything which is not opposed, he said, the respondent is content to see proceed to a full Hearing.

[21]Dr Gibson submitted that the new allegations which are part of the amendment applications could have been included within the original claim when presented. He argued that the whole purpose of the Preliminary Hearing in October before Employment Judge Hoey was to clarify the claimant’s claims. The respondent took comfort from that exercise, which has now, as he put it, been thrown into complete disarray given that the claimant has gone back on his position clearly expressed in the Note. The issues were set out simply, succinctly and comprehensibly.

[22]He said that it was “tolerably clear” that the last application for promotion was made by the claimant in April 2025 but the claimant has chosen to go well beyond an allegation relating to that to introduce further material which makes it extremely difficult for the Tribunal, and the respondent, to understand the claims being made.

[23]The delays in the proceedings have been caused by the claimant.

[24]The balance of justice strongly favours the refusal of the claimant’s applications to amend his claim, to the extent that they are opposed by the respondent.

[25]With regard to the issues presented by Employment Judge Hoey, anything before 26 April 2025 is time-barred. Dr Gibson urged the Tribunal to treat the List of Issues as being definitive in this case.

[26]As to whether or not a number of applications for promotion may amount to a continuing act, Dr Gibson submitted that this would require very careful consideration.

[27]The claimant made a short oral submission on his own behalf.

[28]He referred to his written submissions in which he said he had covered most of the points. He maintained that he was not seeking to waste the Tribunal’s time, and whatever decision was made following this Hearing he would accept.

[29]He said that the delays in the proceedings were not caused by him. He understood that his original claim was out of time by one day, having misunderstood precisely when he should have presented it. The ET3, he maintained, was also presented out of time by the respondent.

[30]He did not accept that any delay to the process would prejudice the respondent, as all Police processes are carefully recorded.

[31]He also argued that as a disabled self-representing person he is in a different position to that of the respondent, who is professionally represented. Discussion and Decision

[32]Before dealing with the particular issues for determination in this Hearing, it is appropriate to address the claimant’s persistent questioning of the Preliminary Hearing Note issued by Employment Judge Hoey following the Hearing dated 13 October 2025.

[33]The claimant was present at the Preliminary Hearing. The respondent was represented by Ms Meek, solicitor, and accordingly Dr Gibson, their representative in this and the two previous Preliminary Hearings, was not in attendance, and could not therefore speak about what took place there. The Hearing was conducted by Employment Judge Hoey, and accordingly I was not present.

[34]The Note which was issued by Employment Judge Hoey was, and remains, the authoritative record of the Hearing. It is not appropriate nor would it be possible for me to seek to go behind the record of that Hearing. No complaint has been submitted by the claimant to the Employment Tribunal, nor has any specific application for review been presented by him in relation to the Note.

[35]The claimant took the step of setting out, in a document dated 28 October 2025, his response to the List of Issues proposed by Employment Judge Hoey. I do not intend to go over this document again, given that the Note which I issued following the PH on 9 February 2026 deals with the claimant’s approach taken therein.

[36]At paragraph 26 (which I have quoted at paragraph 15 above), Employment Judge Hoey recorded the only complaints which the claimant was making, and specifically noted that the claimant accepted that he had included a large amount of other material, but that the only complaints he wished to advance (subject to any minor amendment required to clarify) were then set out.

[37]The claimant’s position is that the discussion at that Hearing had to be cut short due to a lack of time, and that this was never intended to be such a record of the issues.

[38]In my view, the matter is straightforward: the record of the Hearing of October sets out the claims made by the claimant, subject to any minor clarifications; the record is authoritative and must stand on its own terms; there is no suggestion therein that the discussion was somehow curtailed, and on the face of it, it is clear and comprehensive. It is not open to me as an Employment Judge hearing a later Hearing to interfere with the terms of that Note, and therefore the claimant’s request that it be struck from the record is simply not one I can deal with.

[39]Accordingly, the Note of October 2025 is considered to be accurate and comprehensive on its own terms, and it is no part of my role unilaterally to alter or review its terms. If the claimant is seeking from me a review of the Note, it is refused.

[40]It is critical that progress is made in these proceedings, and that the constant references to the Note must now end. Time Bar

[41]I consider, then, whether the claim or any part of it is time-barred, and if so, whether the Tribunal should extend the time for its acceptance.

[42]The claimant notified ACAS under the Early Conciliation Scheme on 25 June 2025, and the Early Conciliation Certificate was issued to him by email on 6 August 2025; he then presented his claim to the Tribunal on 7 September 2025.

[43]Dealing with the allegations set out by Employment Judge Hoey in the Note (128ff), I considered whether any or all of them were out of time.

[44]In considering this, and seeking to deal with these matters as briefly as possible, I have noted that following the Note I issued, at considerable length, following the PH on 9 February 2026, the respondent helpfully submitted an amended draft finalised List of Issues, addressing the points which I had identified required their response. I will therefore refer to this document as containing a summary of the List of Issues, based on the original claim, Employment Judge Hoey’s Note and my own Note assessing the terms of the document of 28 October 2026.

[45]It seems to me that the discussion about the claimant’s proposed amendments and time bar have become slightly conflated, and this decision is an attempt to bring to a conclusion these discussions so that the List of Issues for the final Hearing may now be prepared.

[46]It should be said that when the claimant was asked about the allegations in cross-examination in this Hearing, he was very reluctant to be drawn as to their accuracy, and in my view his approach was very unhelpful, though, as I have said before, it appears to me that this is based on his concern not to give up any possible complaint which might be available before the Tribunal.

[47]The claimant complains of direct sex discrimination, based on an act of 11 April 2025, in which it was alleged that the claimant was ambushed by female officers at a meeting. Taking the Early Conciliation process into consideration, which was commenced within 3 months of the relevant date, this would have been in time, had the claimant not presented the claim on 7 September rather than an earlier date. He was out of time, by one day.

[48]So far as the allegations of direct disability discrimination are concerned, the claimant’s complaints relate to 27 February 2018, 25 October 2022, 17 January 2024, September 2024, 1 April 2025 and February to September 2025.

[49]In my judgment, the allegations relating to 2018 and 2022 are very considerably out of time, and there is no reason advanced by the claimant as to why they were not presented to the Tribunal earlier. The claimant suggests that he was ignorant of time limits when he presented this claim, and notes that he is self-representing. However, he has been capable of presenting an earlier claim, and engaging with the Tribunal and the respondent in advancing that claim to the point where he chose to withdraw it.

[50]In the absence of any good reason advanced by the claimant, it is my judgment that it would be very prejudicial to the respondent to have to face allegations dating back to 2018 and 2022, requiring witnesses to remember points arising in interviews at that time. The claimant proposed that the Police keep records of everything but in my judgment it would be unreasonable to expect the respondent’s witnesses to be able to remember what had happened on these occasions. The prejudice to the claimant in refusing to hear these claims would be considerably outweighed by the prejudice to the respondent in having to defend them.

[51]I then considered the allegation that on 17 January 2024, the claimant was asked hypothetical questions outwith the agreed national assessment in an interview. Once more, this falls well outwith the statutory timescale, and it is not clear why this was not presented to the Tribunal at an earlier stage.

[52]The claimant complained that in September 2024, the respondent bypassed a national recruitment process. It is plain that, like the previous allegations, this was known to the claimant at the time, and no convincing explanation has been given as to why the claimant did not raise proceedings before. The length of time makes it prejudicial for the respondent to have to consider such allegations which relate to events taking place some 12 months before the claim was presented.

[53]The claim relating to 1 April 2025 is within the 3 month period in which Early Conciliation was commenced, and thus falls just outside the statutory time limit.

[54]The claim that the claimant was excluded from portfolios involving partnerships from February 2024 to September 2025 is difficult to assess at this stage. The claimant suggests that this amounted to a series of continuing acts by the respondent. There is insufficient information before me to allow me to draw any conclusion about this matter. If it is a series of continuing acts, then the claimant’s claim is within the statutory time limit.

[55]The question is whether it would be just and equitable to allow these allegations to proceed. It is my judgment that the allegations of direct discrimination relating to 11 April 2025 (sex) and 1 April 2025 (disability), which were presented a day beyond the time limit, should be allowed to proceed to a Hearing. The claimant’s explanation is that he was seeking to resolve matters internally with the respondent, and that a number of issues did arise in that time. While these claims were presented out of time, and it is understood that the just and equitable jurisdiction still requires a Tribunal to consider whether or not it would be in the interests of justice to allow a case to proceed when a time limit, which must be taken seriously, has been breached.

[56]However, it is my conclusion that the allegations relating to 1 and 11 April 2025 should be allowed to proceed, on the basis that the delay in presenting the claim was negligible.

[57]In addition, it is my view that the allegation relating to the claim being excluded from portfolios involving partnerships should be admitted to probation, with the question of time bar reserved to the final Hearing in order to allow evidence to be led to determine whether or not there was a series of continuing acts.

[58]The remaining allegations, however, are of such antiquity as to be extremely prejudicial to the respondent if they were allowed to proceed, and in my judgment the balance of prejudice falls much heavier upon the respondent if they were not excluded than it would upon the claimant if they were.

[59]Similarly, the allegations under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 relate to actions which arose well before the start of 2025, other than the allegation that on 1 April 2025, the claimant’s application for promotion was sifted negatively because of the way in which he presented his answers, and from February 2024 until September 2025 the claimant was excluded from portfolios involving partnerships. On the same basis as above, I consider that these allegations should be allowed to proceed.

[60]However, the allegations relating to 25 October 2022, 17 January 2024 and September 2024 arose a considerable time before the claimant presented his claim to ACAS or to the Tribunal. I am not persuaded that it would be just and equitable to allow these allegations to proceed, and accordingly, these are excluded from the claims to go to the final Hearing.

[61]In my judgment, the claims relating to indirect discrimination under section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 should be allowed to proceed. They relate to PCPs which were allegedly applied from January to April 2025, and to the divisional sift on 1 April 2025. They were therefore only presented out of time by a short time and, for the reasons set out above, I consider that it is just and equitable to allow them to proceed.

[62]With regard to the claimant’s claims of failure to make reasonable adjustments, the claimant complains that there were a series of continuing acts amounting to the failure to make reasonable adjustments.

[63]It is not entirely clear when the claimant is saying the respondent should have put in place the reasonable adjustments on which he relies. In the case of The Scottish Ministers v Blair

[2025] EAT 74

, the Employment Appeal Tribunal, at paragraph 20, stated: “A failure to make reasonable adjustments in not a continuing act. Absent a decision not to make an adjustment, or an act inconsistent with making an adjustment (see Humphries v Chevler Packaging Ltd

UKEAT/0224/06

at paragraph 25), the time limit for bringing a reasonable adjustments claim starts to run on the expiry of the period within which the employer might reasonably have been expected to make the adjustments (see Matuszowicz v Kingston-upon Hull City Council

[2009] EWCA Civ 22

at paragraph 20).”

[64]With regard to the provision of glasses, this was implemented on 19 March 2025. Other than that, it is rather unclear from the pleadings what reasonable adjustments the claimant is relying upon, and by when it would have been reasonable for the respondent to have implemented them. In his October document, the claimant set out a series of reasonable adjustments (153) but did not identify dates within these allegations. The PCPs all related to a period up to 15 May 2025, but the issue in relation to time bar is when the time limit for bringing a reasonable adjustments claim should be seen to have begun, that is the expiry of the period within which the employer might reasonably have been expected to make the adjustments.

[65]In my judgment, the lack of clarity here suggests that the reasonable adjustments claim may have been presented within the statutory timescale, and therefore should be permitted to proceed at this stage, reserving the question of time bar to the final Hearing at which clear findings in fact may be made by the Tribunal as to when the reasonable adjustments, if found to be reasonable, should have been implemented.

[66]With regard to the victimisation claim, I would refer to paragraph 68 of the Note following Preliminary Hearing dated 9 February 2026, in which I have determined that it was clear that the claimant was seeking to amend a claim of victimisation into the pleadings, and therefore I deal with that under that (restricted) section below.

[67]With regard to the claim relating to protected disclosures, there are two proposed disclosures relied upon by the claimant, namely on 18 May 2018 and on 8 April 2025.

[68]The respondent accepts that the disclosure on 18 May 2018 amounted to a protected disclosure, but not on 8 April 2025.

[69]The detriments relied upon by the claimant are set out in the October 2025 document (159ff).

[70]The respondent’s position is that, with the exception of 1.4, 1.5 and 1.8, each of the alleged detriments are out of time, in the list of 1.1 to 1.9 set out at 159.

[71]The claimant seeks to amend to add further detriments, and I will deal with those below.

[72]The difficulty here is that the detriments alleged are very broadly set out by the claimant, and do not identify specific dates but demonstrate that there were failures over an extended period of time. The respondent complains that they are unclear and not well specified. I am not unsympathetic to this submission, but identifying precisely when the detriments took place, given that they have been set out in more detail by the claimant in response to the prompting of Employment Judge Hoey, means that the Tribunal is able to understand the complaints which the claimant is seeking to make.

[73]It is my view that the protected disclosures claim, set out at 1.1 to 1.9 in identifying the detriments, should be allowed to proceed, subject to submissions following the conclusion of the evidence in the final Hearing, to determine whether or not they were truly time-barred.

[74]The claimant’s detriment, at 1.9, is further amplified (160ff), but relates to a letter provided to the claimant on 16 September 2025. Plainly this is not time-barred, but includes an allegation which amounts to an application to amend the claim.

[75]It is understood that the respondent considers that the claimant is complaining about individual promotion applications rather than a policy or practice in place over an extended period, but there is sufficient for the respondent to address in the evidence.

[76]The detriments said to have occurred as a result of the 2018 disclosure appear to range over a considerable period of time, all of which, as the respondent observes, are out of time in terms of the initial claim presented to the Tribunal, but further out of time given that they were included within the October document at 162. I address this below as part of the application to amend the claim.

[77]Accordingly, the claims as set out above may proceed to a final Hearing, subject to the decisions made below in relation to the applications to amend. Applications to Amend

[78]There are two applications to amend before the Tribunal, namely those parts of the October document previously identified by the Tribunal in the Order following Preliminary Hearing on 9 February 2026; and the document of 14 March 2026.

[79]The applications are opposed, to an extent, by the respondent, and addressed helpfully in their submissions to this Hearing.

[80]Firstly, the respondent opposes the application to add pleadings to set out additional responses 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 to the question “Did the respondent have the following PCPs” (149/50). In my judgment, as I have found above, the claims in relation to indirect discrimination should be allowed to proceed in the circumstances, insofar as relating to the manner in which the applications were sifted in April 2025 (that is, paragraph 5, 8 and 9 on 151).

[81]The respondent opposes the inclusion of 5, 8 and 9, but in my judgment, the issue of time bar being dealt with above, it would be in the interests of justice to allow these allegations, together with 1, 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11 (on the basis that these are unopposed) to proceed. I am not prepared to allow the allegations relating to 4 and 7 to proceed, on the basis that they are clearly presented well out of time, and it would not be just and equitable to allow them to proceed.

[82]I accept that the respondent is also opposed to the amendments on the basis that the claimant persists in seeking to add to his claims and that there requires to be finality in the process. I am sympathetic to this view but given that there is time for the respondent to consider these allegations carefully prior to the Hearing, I consider that the prejudice to the claimant in refusing the application would be greater than to the respondent in allowing it, to the extent set out above.

[83]Secondly, the respondent opposes the application to add to the reasonable adjustments claim. As I have indicated above, I am prepared to allow the reasonable adjustments claim to proceed on the basis that the time bar issue is reserved to the final Hearing as a preliminary issue to be dealt with following evidence.

[84]Thirdly, the respondent opposes the claimant’s application to introduce a claim under section 27 of the 2010 Act, namely victimisation. This appears at 154 of the claimant’s October document. Following the PH before Employment Judge Hoey, it was clear that the claimant did not intend to make a claim of victimisation. The claimant disputes this, but it is my view that the Note should be regarded as the record of the Hearing and accurate from that point of view.

[85]The claimant therefore seeks to introduce an entirely new claim to the proceedings, asserting that he did a protected act in the course of emails to a number of individuals, particularly Chief Superintendent Emerson and Chief Superintendent Harrison, between 8 April 2025 and 15 May 2025.

[86]The respondent accepts that the alleged acts of victimisation relied upon following the protected acts are presented in time, in the claimant’s application to amend. However, they submit that it would not be fair to allow the claimant to add this new claim.

[87]In my judgment, while this is a finely balanced matter, it is my view that it would be in the interests of justice to allow this claim to proceed. The claimant is complaining, within the statutory timescale, of acts which he argues amounted to victimisation on the basis that he had made protected acts. Given that the Hearing listed to take place on 16 March was postponed, there is more time available to the respondent to investigate and deal with these matters. The prejudice upon them, of having to address and investigate a new claim not previously made, is less significant than the prejudice which would be upon the claimant if it were refused. The claimant could have submitted a separate Employment Tribunal claim to address these matters, but to do so would have introduced additional delay and expense to the process. In my judgment it is consistent with the overriding objective to allow the claimant’s application to amend to introduce a victimisation claim to proceed.

[88]Fourthly, the application to amend submitted on 14 March 2026 is opposed in its entirety by the respondent.

[89]I am entirely sympathetic to the respondent’s position here. The claimant has submitted, at the very last minute before a scheduled Preliminary Hearing on 16 March 2026, a new application to amend, interrupting the case management timetable in the case, and requiring the Tribunal to make extraordinary arrangements to convene a further Preliminary Hearing in order to address the matter.

[90]In my judgment, this application to amend must be refused, in order to ensure fairness to both parties, and to make clear to the claimant that the respondent is entitled to finality in litigation. It is plain that the respondent has a concern, justifiably in my view, that the claimant may seek to add further pleadings to this case prior to the final Hearing, and if this application were allowed, that would encourage him to do so.

[91]However, I consider that a considerable amount of work has been done in order to clarify and resolve the outstanding claims made, and that no further claims should be added to those already before the Tribunal. The prejudice to the respondent in adding further claims as proposed by the claimant would be significant. The claimant, however, still has the many claims which have been permitted to proceed to final Hearing, and will be in a position to advance those.

[92]Accordingly, the claimant’s application to amend dated 14 March 2026 is refused in its entirety for these reasons. Res Judicata

[93]The respondent argued that certain pleadings within 4107106.2019 are repeated within these proceedings, and should be excluded on the basis of res judicata.

[94]Firstly, the current claim alleges that on 27 February 2018, in the claimant’s application for promotion, DCI Ferrie wrote 463 words when the limit was 200 which the claimant believes was negative treatment of him.

[95]In the 2019 claim, it is said, DCI Ferrie withdrew management support as part of victimisation and engaged in unlawful conduct to stop the claimant’s promotion form being processed fairly.

[96]The claimant’s position is that nothing prior to 2020 is included within his claim in these proceedings. The respondent argues that these two claims are the same, both relating to negative treatment about the promotion form.

[97]Secondly, in the current claim, it is alleged that there was a denial of training and development over 7 years, as a whistleblowing detriment.

[98]In the 2019 claim, it is said that the respondent prevented the claimant from progressing practical training and development which negatively impacted his career.

[99]The principle of res judicata essentially means that a claimant may not raise again matters which have already been the subject of judicial determination. In the 2019 case, the claimant withdrew his claim, and the claims were dismissed by a Judgment of the Tribunal. There is no doubt, therefore, that the original claim has been judicially determined.

[100]There are a number of principles covered by the authorities in this area, but in my judgment, this is a question of fact: has either of the claims identified by the respondent been raised and determined before? In my judgment, there is sufficient commonality between the claims identified by the respondent in the 2019 proceedings and the current case that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to allow the claimant to proceed with these particular claims.

[101]In my judgment it is clear that these complaints relate to the same matters, even if the wording is slightly different. They are therefore excluded on the principle of res judicata.

[102]The claimant will not be prevented from advancing the majority of his claims, but should not be permitted to raise again matters which have already been the subject of judicial determination.