Mr J Melvin v Horizon Parking Ltd: 8001875/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8001875/2025Venue GlasgowHearing 2 February 2026
Mr J MelvinClaimantHorizon Parking LimitedRespondent
Employment Judge S MacLeanMs L Reed (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 11 February 2026

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the claimant was not a disabled person between March 2025 and April 2025 in terms of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.

REASONS

[1]The respondent is a private company providing parking management services. The claimant was employed as a mobile patrol officer from approximately 2017/2018 until 30 April 2025, when his employment ended following the claimant’s four weeks’ notice, which he worked in full.[2]Early conciliation commenced on 10 June 2025, and the early conciliation certificate was issued on 16 June 2025. The claim form was presented to the Tribunal on 31 July 2025. At section 8.1, the claimant indicates that he brings a complaint of disability discrimination. At section 8.2, he states that in March 2025 he was informed that he would be required to undertake maintenance duties as part of his role. He asserts that he advised the respondent he could not work on electrical boxes because he is colour blind. He further asserts that he was instructed to purchase colour‑blindness corrective glasses at his own expense. He refused to do so. He states that he was then told to go as he asked if the respondent wanted his resignation. The claimant subsequently resigned.[3]In its response, the respondent denies the claims. It does not accept that the claimant is a disabled person. It states that the claimant has not provided any information describing the impact of his condition on his normal day‑to‑day activities. The respondent also raises a time‑bar issue and asserts that it would not be just and equitable to extend the time limit.[4]At initial consideration, the claimant was directed to provide to the Tribunal evidence from an optometrist or GP confirming a diagnosis of colour vision deficiency and its type. The respondent was directed to confirm whether disability remained in dispute and, if so, to explain concisely why. The respondent also requested that the claimant specify the type of discrimination he alleges he has suffered. The case was to proceed to a 2 hour case management preliminary hearing on 5 November 2025.[5]On 17 September 2025, the claimant provided further information. He confirmed that he has Px colour deficiency (deuteranope). He referred to indirect discrimination (paragraph 1), failure to make reasonable adjustments (paragraph 2), and victimisation (paragraphs 3, 4 and 6). At paragraph 5, the claimant set out how his condition affects him on a daily basis. The claimant also submitted an optometrist’s report dated 16 September 2025.[6]Having reviewed the diagnosis and further information, the respondent wrote to the Tribunal on 3 October 2025 advising that it did not consider the claimant’s condition to meet the statutory definition of disability, on the basis that it did not have a substantial and long‑term adverse effect on his day‑to‑day activities.[7]The respondent applied for the disability status issue to be addressed at a preliminary hearing. The claimant made no comment. Accordingly, the preliminary hearing listed for case management was converted to a preliminary hearing to determine(1) whether the claimant has a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010, and(2) to make any further case management orders, including listing the matter for a final hearing if appropriate.[8]The respondent prepared a joint set of documents comprising its agenda and a draft list of issues. These were emailed to the Tribunal and the claimant on 29 October 2025.[9]On 4 November 2025, the Vice President postponed the preliminary hearing due to lack of resources. A new hearing date was fixed for 2 February 2026.[10]On 2 February 2026 at 08:34, the respondent sent to the Tribunal and the claimant its skeleton argument for the preliminary hearing.[11]At the preliminary hearing, the claimant appeared as a litigant in person. He joined the Cloud Video Platform using a mobile telephone. I explained the purpose of the preliminary hearing and the issues to be determined. The claimant confirmed that he could access the claim form, his additional information, and the respondent’s skeleton argument, but could not do so while on the platform as he had no other device. It was agreed that the relevant passages would be read to him before any questions were put. The claimant gave evidence and was cross‑examined in the usual way. The hearing was adjourned for 30 minutes to allow him time to read the skeleton argument. When we reconvened, Ms Reed made submissions and the claimant responded. I reserved judgment.[12]I have set out the essential facts as found for the purpose of determining the issue of disability status. Points raised in submissions are addressed within the sections dealing with the facts, the law, and the application of the law to those facts. Findings in fact[13]The claimant was born in 1962. At age 16 he applied to join the Navy. He was told that he was colour blind and because of this, “he would never work with electricity”. His application was rejected.[14]The claimant has difficulty distinguishing between red, green, and brown. He considers that his vision is quite good.[15]On 16 September 2025, he was diagnosed as PX colour‑deficient (deuteranope). No other issues with his vision were identified. The optometrist recommended multifocal glasses, and noted that he was suitable for contact lenses.[16]Since 2017/2018, the claimant was employed by the respondent as a mobile patrol officer, working in Glasgow. His duties included travelling between designated sites to monitor and maintain car parks, upholding health and safety standards, issuing parking charge notices, reporting faults, cleaning cameras, and managing misuse of parking facilities.[17]The claimant has a driving licence and drives a car. He knows the sequencing of traffic lights. The claimant was issued with a company car.[18]The claimant lives with the fact that he cannot differentiate certain colours. When buying clothes, he chooses black to avoid colours that may clash. His family assists him in selecting appropriate colours, and he accepted that he could also ask a shop assistant for help. When cooking, he burns food to ensure it is cooked, although he acknowledged that he retains his sense of smell. He sometimes buys the wrong type of milk, but accepted that he is able to read labels and can identify the type of milk from the packaging. He prefers to use cash and is reluctant to use debit or credit card machines, although he is able to use contactless payments.[19]When carrying out his duties he required to enter details about the colour of a vehicle. He guessed or used an app which provides details about the vehicle from the registration number.[20]The claimant cannot undertake electrical work. Although his role required him to carry out maintenance duties, he was not involved in electrical tasks.[21]On 31 March 2025, the claimant was instructed to attend to a fault with a camera, which required to be rebooted. When he arrived, he did not wish to open the box containing the electrical components. He telephoned a colleague to request assistance, and assistance was provided. Observation on evidence[22]I considered that the claimant gave his evidence in a straightforward measured manner. He conveyed that he gets on with his life and has learned how to cope.

Deliberations

[23]Section 6(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that a person has a disability if they have a physical or mental impairment and the impairment has a substantial and long‑term adverse effect on the person’s ability to carry out normal day‑to‑day activities. The burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish that he satisfies that definition.[24]The issue for determination was whether the claimant’s physical impairment: deuteranopia, had a substantial adverse effect on his normal day‑to‑day activities at the relevant time: March to April 2025.[25]In his additional information and oral evidence, the claimant relied on the following activities:(a) choosing appropriate clothing;(b) identifying differently coloured items;(c) cooking;(d) using debit or credit card machines; and(e) working with electrical wiring.[26]The statutory definition of ‘substantial’ in section 212(1) of the Equality Act 2010 is ‘more than minor or trivial’. Schedule 1, paragraph 5 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that an impairment is treated as having a substantial adverse effect where measures are taken to correct it and, but for those measures, it would be likely to have that effect. Such measures include medical treatment and the use of prostheses or other aids. This provision does not apply, however, where an impairment is correctable by spectacles or contact lenses.[27]My focus was not on what the claimant could do, but on what he could not do, or could only do with difficulty.[28]For the most part, the claimant got on with his life. He experienced difficulty differentiating certain colours. He chose to wear black clothing. On occasion, he picked up the wrong item and burned food while cooking. He avoided using debit or credit card machines.[29]In my view, the adverse effects described were not substantial. The claimant was comfortable wearing black clothing and chose to do so rather than seeking assistance from family members or shop assistants. When cooking, he retained his sense of smell and could use timers or alternative methods. He was able to use cash and contactless payments.[30]I accepted the respondent’s submission that the claimant was not required to undertake electrical work as part of his role. The instruction on 31 March 2025 related to rebooting a camera and did not involve electrical wiring. Accordingly, working with electrical wiring was not a normal day‑to‑day activity for the claimant.[31]Taking these matters together, I concluded that the claimant’s impairment did not have a substantial adverse effect on his normal day‑to‑day activities at the relevant time.[32]The claimant was therefore not a disabled person for the purposes of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.