Ms J Ozga v The Highland Laundry Room Ltd and Mr N Forbes: 8001534/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8001534/2024

Between

Ms Jolanta OzgaClaimant

The Highland Laundry Room Ltd and Mr N ForbesRespondent

Before

Employment Judge A Kemp

Date 5 February 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claim of direct discrimination on the protected characteristic of race under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 is dismissed on withdrawal.

[2]The claim as directed against the second respondent is dismissed as a result of that withdrawal.

[3]The claim that the respondent is in breach of section 8 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is dismissed. E.T. Z4 (WR)

[4]The claim that the respondent did not provide a statement of particulars in accordance with the terms of sections 1 – 4 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 succeeds.

[5]The Tribunal grants a declaration that the respondent made unlawful deductions from the wages of the claimant under section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[6]The claimant is awarded the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIX POUNDS NINETY TWO PENCE (£806.92) payable by the respondent to the claimant.

REASONS

[1]This was a Final Hearing into claims that originally included direct discrimination. In correspondence prior to the hearing the claimant indicated that she did not wish to pursue that claim, and that was confirmed with her at the commencement of it. The claim for that matter is therefore dismissed and as a result the basis of the claim as directed to the second respondent no longer exists, and is also dismissed.

[2]That leaves claims for not having a Statement of Particulars required by sections 1 – 4 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, in relation to a payslip under section 8 of that Act, and for unauthorised deductions from wages under section 13. The respondent denies the claims.

[3]The Tribunal held a Preliminary Hearing on 15 January 2025, and a second on 2 June 2025, at which it made case management orders. The hearing took place remotely by order subsequently made.

[4]The claimant is a party litigant, and the respondent represented by Mr Ishaq. The claimant is Polish and a translator Mr Syta translated for her. The claimant had not had experience of Tribunal proceedings, and prior to the hearing of evidence I explained how the process would be undertaken, about the giving of evidence in chief, cross examination, and re-examination, about referring to documents in evidence as without that those in the Bundle would not be considered, and as to making submissions. I also addressed with the parties the issues in the case.

Issues

[5]I proposed the issues as follows, which the parties agreed with:(i) Did the respondent fail to provide the statement of particulars of employment required by section 1 and following of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the Act”)?

(ii) Did the respondent fail to provide a payslip to the claimant as required by section 8 of the Act?

(iii) Did the respondent make unauthorised deductions from the wages of the claimant under section 13 of the Act?

(iv) If any claim succeeds to what remedy is the claimant entitled?

Evidence

[6]The parties had provided documents by a single Bundle.

[7]The claimant gave evidence herself, calling Ms Meri Anuska a former colleague who gave brief evidence, and the respondent called Mr Neil Forbes as its only witness. I asked questions of both main witnesses to elicit the facts under Rule 41.

Facts

[8]I found the following facts, material to the issues before me, to have been established:

[9]The claimant is Ms Jolanta Ozga.

[10]The respondent is The Highland Laundry Room Ltd.

[11]The claimant commenced employment with the respondent on 9 April 2024 as a Laundry Assistant.

[12]At no stage did the respondent provide her with a written statement of particulars of her employment.

[13]The claimant was aware of her employment being part-time, and that she was to be paid an hourly rate for that. She was paid monthly at or before the end of each month.

[14]The respondent has its payroll provided by a third party on the basis of information as to hours worked it provides. The third party provided payslips to the respondent’s employees on the basis of information as to hours worked provided by the respondent.

[15]The claimant worked part-time on variable hours of around 22 – 25 per week.

[16]On 17 July 2024 the claimant emailed the respondent to intimate her resignation. She stated it would be with effect from the last day of a holiday she was then taking being on 26 July 2024. She referred to her accrued holiday pay and asked that that be added to her final pay.

[17]The parties exchanged emails that day, which included the respondent stating “notice accepted” in one, and in another that “you don’t get a contract when your [sic] part-time”. The practice of the respondent was not to give any written statement of particulars of employment, or contract of employment, to employees who were part-time or which it regarded as being in their probationary period. The probationary period the respondent considered applicable to the claimant was of three months, but that had not been communicated to the claimant.

[18]The last day on which the claimant carried out work for the respondent was 11 July 2024. After that date she had been on the said holiday.

[19]On 26 July 2024 the claimant’s employment with the respondent terminated. She emailed the respondent that day about not being paid the sums due to her for wages and holiday pay as she had not received any payment from the respondent by that date. The respondent replied that the wages were done at the end of the month.

[20]The claimant also emailed the respondent’s payroll provider that day, who replied to the effect that they were waiting for information from the respondent.

[21]On 2 August 2024 the claimant was paid by the respondent in full for the hours that she had worked in July 2024, being those up to 11 July 2024. Nothing was paid to her as to accrued holiday entitlement at that time. The respondent provided a payslip in relation to that payment by sending it to the claimant on 2 August 2024.

[22]On 7 August 2024 the claimant commenced early conciliation with ACAS. The certificate for the same was issued on 18 September 2024. The present Claim Form was presented on 25 September 2024.

[23]On 25 October 2024 the respondent paid the claimant in full for her accrued holiday pay, and provided on or around that date both a payslip for that payment and a P45 form for tax purposes. The P45 stated a termination date of 11 July 2024.

[24]The claimant’s average pay, gross, when employed by the respondent was £820 per month, which was paid monthly. The weekly equivalent of the same is £189.23. Submissions

[25]Both the claimant and respondent made brief submissions explaining why they considered that they should prevail, of which what follows is a very brief summary. The claimant argued that there had been a breach of the provisions as to a statement of particulars, and that the payslip and holiday pay had been paid late, with pay for July 2024 made late in addition.

[26]The respondent argued that although it was accepted that no statement of particulars had been provided there was no suggestion of confusion, uncertainty or exploitation. It was not argued that part time working or a probationary period were exceptions in law. It was argued to be a technical breach without practical detriment. Payslips had been received, and the issue was one of the timing of the payments. On unauthorised deductions from wages the claimant had accepted that all sums had been paid, the issue was of timing. The delay was from an administrative issue, and was not a refusal to pay. It was promptly resolved.

[27]Any remedy should be proportionate and reflect the absence of practical detriment. It was argued that the date of termination was 11 July 2024, and in relation to the terms as to compensation in section 24 it was argued that any award should be modest and proportionate. In regard to the statement of particulars reference was made to section 38 of the 2002 Act.

The law

[28]The Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) makes provision in sections 1 – 4 for a written statement of particulars of employment to be provided to a worker where the worker begins employment. There are exceptions at section 5 not relevant for the present claim. The remedy for breach of that is provided for in section 38 of the Employment Act 2002 “the 2002 Act”). It is not a standalone remedy, but requires that one of the provisions in Schedule 5 of the 2002 Act is engaged. One of those provisions is section 23 of the 1996 Act as to unauthorised deductions.

[29]The 1996 Act makes provision for payslips to be provided in section 8, at or before the time at which any payment of wages is made. Section 11 entitles a worker to make a claim to the Employment Tribunal for any breach of sections 1, 4 or 8.

[30]The right not to suffer unauthorised deductions from wages is set out in section 13 of the 1996 Act. There are exceptions in section 14 which are not relevant for the purposes of this case. There is a right to make a claim at the Employment Tribunal provided for in section 23. The definition of wages is within section 27, and includes holiday pay.

[31]The right to holiday pay arises from the Working Time Regulations 1998, and includes accrued entitlement as at the date of termination of employment under Regulation 14.

Discussion

[32]Whilst this case involves relatively limited sums I decided not to issue an oral judgment but consider matters and issue this written judgment.

[33]I was entirely satisfied that both the claimant, Ms Anuska and Mr Forbes sought to give honest evidence. Mr Forbes relied on accountants, or to some extent a manager, for some of the detail of managing matters, but they did not give evidence. To some extent he sought to suggest that fault lay with those parties.

[34]There was not a great deal of dispute on fact, but where there was I preferred the evidence of the claimant. She gave her evidence clearly and was to a small extent supported by Ms Anuska. Mr Forbes was not able to answer some of the questions, and his evidence as to why no statement of particulars, or contract, was given to the claimant was not correct in law, as Mr Ishaq acting for the respondent properly conceded. I have also not accepted Mr Forbes’ view as to when the contract terminated, his evidence on that being not possibly right as I shall come to, not least as it is contrary to emails the respondent sent. I concluded that where there was a dispute with the claimant the evidence of Mr Forbes was not reliable, having regard to all the evidence before me. That included the written messages exchanged between the claimant and respondent.

[35]It was not disputed that the respondent had not provided a statement of particulars of employment. The respondent argued that that was a technical breach, that the claimant had known of the essential terms, and had not raised a complaint during employment. But that in my view misses the point. Parliament has chosen to provide this right. The claimant had a right to that statement when she commenced employment. The particulars that must be provided in writing when a worker commences with the respondent, and here the claimant was admitted to be an employee, are far beyond those very basic facts raised with the claimant in cross examination.

[36]The reason the claimant was not provided with the statement of particulars required was Mr Forbes’ belief that part-time employees were not entitled to it, nor were those in their probationary period. But the issue of what the probation period had been had not been put to the claimant at all in cross examination, and in any event the Act does not have a probationary period as a form of exception. Section 1 specifically refers to the commencement of employment. There is no exception for part-time workers, and the reasoning of Mr Forbes is liable to have been a contravention of the PartTime Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000, albeit that no claim under those Regulations had been made before me. The respondent’s position in this regard is in my view not tenable.

[37]It is not accurate to describe this failure to comply with the requirement for a statement of particulars as merely technical. The Act sets out the minimum provisions that must be set out in writing, and they include important matters in relation to remuneration such as when it is paid, the rate applicable, holiday pay, sick pay, and pensions, as well as disciplinary and grievance procedures and many other details. These are important details that must be given in writing to a worker on beginning employment. The respondent was in breach of that, from a wholly misconceived view of what the law was. The claimant’s evidence included not knowing what her position was in respects including about holiday pay and pensions, anxiety about what she was to be paid and when, and had the respondent provided the statement that would have been clear. It was not a mere technical breach in my view.

[38]The issue in relation to payslips was somewhat different. Payslips were provided. There did not appear to be any dispute but that they were provided during the employment period. The issue was that the holiday pay was paid around three months late, and the payslip was provided at that time, and not earlier.

[39]Section 8 states that it must be provided at or before the time of payment, and it was, even though that payment was, as I shall come to, late on two occasions. The payslips were provided with the payment, and sent to the claimant which I consider is sufficient to comply with the terms of the section. On that basis I did not consider that there had been a breach of section 8 and this claim is dismissed.

[40]There were two issues as to unauthorised deductions from wages. The first is late payment of wages for July 2024 being for the hours worked. They were paid on 2 August 2024.

[41]The respondent argued that the employment had terminated on the last day of worked hours on 11 July 2024. But that is not a statable position. The claimant was on holiday after then, and she emailed her resignation on 17 July 2024 making clear her notice with effect from 26 July 2024. The respondent specifically replied “notice accepted”. The contract terminated on 26 July 2024 in my view.

[42]It is not in any event competent to regard that resignation intimated on 17 July 2024 as with effect from an earlier date of 11 July 2024. The respondent knew that she was resigning with 9 days’ notice, and could have responded if it wished by proposing that it be with immediate effect from and after 17 July 2024. But it did not. It accepted the notice she gave, and did so in writing (electronically).

[43]The respondent had time to arrange payment of the sums due to the claimant to be paid, as it ought to have been, on or before 26 July 2024. That being the date of termination, as I have found, payment for accrued sums was due by then. The respondent failed to do so. The payment for July wages was made on 2 August 2024. It was therefore late.

[44]A late payment of wages is in my view an unauthorised deduction from wages. That a late payment is a deduction is confirmed by the terms of section 13(3) which provides that where the total amount paid on any occasion is less than the total of the amount of the wages properly payable the amount of the deficiency is treated as a deduction. What matters is when wages are due to be paid, and whether they have been paid in full or not. That is echoed in section 27, which refer to wages being any sum “payable” to the worker, and sets out details of those.

[45]An unauthorised deduction from wages does not cease to be so if it is paid later. Sections 24 and 25 provide specifically for how to deal with late payments. Where sums due are paid in full there is no second payment of the same sum, but an entitlement in certain circumstances to compensation, as I shall come to. What there is at the least is an entitlement to a declaration as to the unauthorised deduction having been made where the sum payable is later paid. That is also the approach taken in Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law at B1 paragraph 379.

[46]The second matter is the holiday pay. It was paid in full, but only on 25 October 2024. That is also an unauthorised deduction from wages. Again as it was later paid no award is made for the same sum. The suggestion made by Mr Forbes in his evidence that it was paid promptly is untenable. The claimant raised the matter on 17 and 26 July 2024. The respondent failed to pay it when due, either on 26 July 2024 or as it was suggested it would be by the end of that month. That it was only paid after Early Conciliation, and then a full month after the Claim Form was presented, is sufficient to show that it was paid far from promptly.

[47]Both the wages for work carried out in July 2024, and the holiday pay accrued to date of termination, were properly payable on or before 26 July 2024. As a matter of practice had they been paid by the end of the month, that would have conformed to the respondent’s practice. But they were not. In each case they were accordingly deductions. A declaration to that effect is required in light of that.

[48]As to remedy, I address the issue of the statement of particulars first. The declaration as to the fact of an unauthorised deduction from wages having been made, the condition of a matter falling within Schedule 5 is met, in light of that fact that, as I shall come to, an award for that is also made.

[49]The claimant gave unchallenged evidence that her average gross pay was £820 per month. The weekly equivalent of that is £189.23. Under the terms of section 38 of the 2002 Act where it is engaged I must award at least two weeks’ pay as the minimum amount, but have a discretion to award up to four weeks’ pay as the higher amount, all as the section provides.

[50]The respondent failed to provide what I consider to be an important document, setting out the terms of employment as Parliament has provided for. It did so deliberately as a matter of a policy that was misconceived, and contrary to the law. It had a material impact on the claimant, but the remedy is not in my view one as to loss, but akin to a penalty. That is also a view supported by Harvey.

[51]Although there was no argument presented about this, section 38(5) provides that “the duty under subsection (2) or (3) does not apply if there are exceptional circumstances which would make an award or increase under that subsection unjust or inequitable.” I did not consider that that exception applied given the circumstances of this case.

[52]I consider that in these circumstances the appropriate award is for 4 weeks’ pay. That is the sum of £756.92.

[53]So far as unauthorised deduction from wages is concerned, section 24(2) of the Act provides that where a declaration is made the Tribunal “may order the employer to pay to the worker ……such amount as the tribunal considers appropriate in all the circumstances to compensate the worker for any financial loss sustained by him which is attributable to the matter complained of.”

[54]The claimant gave evidence of her distress and anxiety from the late payments, but that is not financial loss within that section. I cannot therefore include that within the award, although I accepted her evidence as to that having occurred.

[55]She gave evidence that she had an overdraft which increased. I consider that it is within judicial knowledge that charges apply to an overdraft and that the claimant will have suffered a financial loss from the late payment of the sums due to her, very small for the earlier payment but more material for that in October 2024. She also did not have the use of those funds at the time when she ought to have which is an element of financial loss. Taking a broad approach and using a figure at the low end of the scale of losses in such circumstances I consider that it is appropriate to award £50 under that head.

[56]The total award to the claimant is accordingly the sum of £806.92.

[57]There are other matters that the claimant raised but which I consider do not fall within the terms of the 1996 Act. The first was as to the wrong date for the termination of employment on the P45. But there is no statutory term as to that found within the 1996 Act, or indeed the 2002 Act, and if anything it is a matter to raise with HMRC as it is a tax document. The second was about her pension and she said that she was not provided initially with information about it. It is again not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as there is no statutory term with regard to that issue. There may be other avenues to do so, but that is not a matter for me. Whilst therefore I accepted these issues I do not consider that it is competent to make an award for those aspects, as there is nothing within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal with regard to them.

Conclusion

[58]On the basis of the evidence before me I have made the findings and the award set out above, and otherwise dismissed the claims. For the avoidance of doubt I was satisfied that the Claim was competently before the Tribunal and within its jurisdiction to the extent of the findings made.

[59]The respondent was in my view in serious breach of its obligations to the claimant, taking a deliberate but wrong position on a statement of particulars or contract, and not paying holiday pay timeously when that had specifically been raised by the claimant on 17 and 26 July 2024. The respondent may wish to consider carefully, with advice from its current advisers, as to how it manages issues such as statements of particulars, and payments to its employees, for the future.