S Thompson v The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland: 8001440/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8001440/2024

Between

S ThompsonClaimant

The Chief Constable of the Police Service of ScotlandRespondent

Before

Employment Judge J G d’Inverno

Date 26 June 2026

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is:- (First) That the respondents subjected the claimant to an instance of harassment in terms of section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 by asking her, on 4 days’ notice, to attend the Glenrothes Police Office on 20 April 2024, together with other members of the training team, to assist the team in complying with an urgent requirement that they remove their team equipment and furniture from the space, to enable it to be occupied by other members of divisional staff. (Second) That the claimant suffered injury to her feelings in consequence of the act of harassment in context of the immediate experience of the act. (Third) That fair, reasonable and just compensation for the causative injury to the claimant’s feelings falls to be quantified in the sum of £2,500 (Two Thousand Five Hundred Pounds). (Fourth) That the respondent shall pay to the claimant the sum of £2,500 in compensation for injury to her feelings. Edinburgh May 2026 at 12:40 hours A. Upon hearing the respondent’s representative in support of an application for strike-out of certain elements of the claim as referred to in abbreviated form in the final list of issues confirmed as at 12 May 2026, and the claimant’s representative in reply, on the grounds that, the claimant having given her evidence-in-chief no evidence had been presented in relation to those elements which accordingly fell to be regarded as enjoying no reasonable prospect of success the Tribunal, (First) grants the application in so far as relating to the claims referred to at issues 1.3, 1.5, 8.1 and 8.7 which claims are hereby struck out in terms of Rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024; (Second) continues consideration of the application in so far as relating to issues 1.2 and 2.2 for determination after all of the evidence in the case has been heard.

REASONS

[1]This case called for an in-person final hearing at Edinburgh on 12, 13, 14 and 15 May 2026.

[2]Each party enjoyed the benefit of legal representation; for the claimant Mr D Jaap, Solicitor and for the respondent Dr A Gibson, Solicitor.

[3]In the course of case management discussion conducted at the outset of the hearing parties’ representatives confirmed that the claims which the claimant gave notice of offering to prove at the Final Hearing were:- a) A section 13 Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”) complaint of direct discrimination because of the claimant’s accepted protected characteristic of disability, in the period 18 December 2023 to 21 August 2024 inclusive; b) A section 15 EQA complaint of discrimination arising from disability; c) A section 26 EQA complaint of harassment related to protected characteristic of disability; and d) A section 27 EQA complaint of victimisation.

[4]Parties’ representatives jointly confirmed, and the Tribunal recorded that the issues requiring investigation and determination at the final hearing were issues 1 to 8 inclusive, (together with their relative sub-paragraphs) as set out in the list of issues at pages 59 to 61 of the joint bundle subject to the addition, at the end of issue 8.2 on page 61, of the clause “and failing to record her reasonable adjustments,” all as had been reflected in the updated version of the list of issues lodged by the respondent’s representative in advance of today’s hearing, which updated version incorporating that change, parties were agreed and the Tribunal allowed be treated as substituted for the version appearing at pages 59 to 61 of the joint bundle. The substitute agreed list of issues is referred to for its whole terms which, for reasons of brevity, are held incorporated in this Note of reasons by reference.

[5]At the request of the Tribunal the parties lodged a dramatis personae, (a list of those persons who were to give evidence or to be referred to in evidence together with a brief description of the part which they played in events) which document the Tribunal found helpful. Sources of oral and documentary evidence

[6]The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf.

[7]For the respondent the Tribunal heard evidence from: Chief Inspector (“CI”) Thomasina Howe, the claimant’s third line Manager; Police Sergeant (“PS”) (Retd), Laura Dobbie – the claimant’s designated welfare contact; Police Inspector (“PI”) Craig Kidd – the claimant’s second line manager; Police Sergeant (“PS”), as he then was, Lee Soutar, the claimant’s first line manager whose remit, at the request of the claimant, did not include welfare matters in respect of the claimant; Superintendent (“Supt”) Richard Thomas – the grievance decision Manager in relation to the claimant’s grievance; Chief Superintendent (“CS”) Pat Campbell – the grievance appeal Manager in relation to the claimant’s grievance.

[8]All witnesses gave evidence on oath or on affirmation, and answered questions in cross-examination and questions from the Tribunal.

[9]Parties lodged a joint bundle of documents extending to 325 pages to some of which the Tribunal was referred in the course of the evidence and submissions.

[10]It was a matter of agreement, binding upon the Tribunal for the purposes of the hearing, that at the material time for the purposes of her complaints, the claimant was a person possessing the protected characteristic of disability in terms of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010, by reason of her mental impairment of “Anxiety and Depression”. Submissions of the Parties

[11]Each of the parties’ professional representatives made detailed oral submissions both in relation to the proposed Findings in Fact which they invited the Tribunal to hold the evidence supported and in relation to the effect on the applicable law when applied to those facts. Each of the representatives provided to the Tribunal and exchanged written copies of their detailed submission. In those circumstances parties’ submissions are not summarised at length here rather each of the parties’ written copies of their oral submissions made are referred to for their terms which are held incorporated within these written Reasons, by reference for reasons of brevity. Read short, and by reference to the Agreed List of Issues the claimant’s representative invited the Tribunal to find in fact and law the instances of discrimination and of victimisation set out in the List of Issues as established with the exception of those at paragraph 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, 3, 5, 8.1 and 8.7.

[12]In relation to the assessment of witness evidence the claimant’s representative submitted;(a) That the claimant should be found to be credible and reliable and that her oral evidence was in general consistent with contemporaneous documents which were produced and spoke to by her.

(b) That the evidence of Chief Inspector Howe should be regarded at times as being unreliable, that there were occasions on which what she said in evidence was at odds with some of the other of witnesses for the respondent in relation to the degree of her involvement with the claimant.

(c) That PS (Retd) Dobbie be regarded as not credible or reliable and that where her evidence was at odds with the evidence of the claimant the evidence of the claimant should be preferred on the grounds that some of the documentary evidence was both consistent with that of the claimant than of PS Dobbie.

(d) That the evidence of PS Soutar should be regarded as being, at times, unreliable as he appeared to be unable to recall certain matters on the grounds that they occurred a long time ago while also being able to specifically remember other matters despite there having been no contemporaneous notes made in relation to those matters.

(e) That the evidence of PI Kidd should be regarded as “somewhat unreliable” given that when challenged in cross examination he appeared to accept that he could not accurately recall some things which in terms of his evidence in chief he had suggested he did.

(f) That the evidence of Superintendent Thomas be accepted as both credible and reliable.

(g) That the evidence of Chief Superintendent Campbell be accepted as both credible and reliable.

[13]Read short, in submission the respondent’s representative: -(a) Reminded the Tribunal that the burden of proof at first instance sat with the claimant in respect of all of her claims.

(b) That in order to succeed the claimant required to discharge that burden in respect of the specific cases given notice of as summarised and set out in the Agreed List of Issues and not some other version of those allegations which were not given notice of.

(c) That on the issue of the source of the comments contained in the Occupational Health referral relating to the claimant not being able to drive after 1800 hours and that by reason of her medication that the Tribunal should reject the contention of the claimant that PS Dobbie had “falsely (that is deliberately and knowing them to be wrong) included the statements in the Occupational Health referral and to accept the explanation of Sergeant Dobbie, as it was accepted by the Grievance and Grievance Appeal Officers in the internal proceedings that the statement reflected what Sergeant Dobbie understood the claimant herself to have told her.

(d) That the explanation which the claimant had invited the Tribunal to accept in evidence namely that Sergeant Dobbie had deliberately included what she knew to be a false statement with a view to pushing her out of the team was entirely speculative and wholly without any evidential foundation in fact.

(e) Neither was there established any primary facts upon which the Tribunal could draw an inference that in including the statement albeit one which she retrospectively acknowledged was not factually correct PS Dobbie had acted in a directly discriminatory manner. Otherwise the respondent’s representative invited the Tribunal to hold, on the evidence presented, that the claimant had failed to discharge her onus of proof such as to establish any of the instances of discrimination and or of victimisation set out in the Agreed List of Issues.

(f) On an esto basis, let it be assumed that the Tribunal held established any of the instances of section 15 EqA discrimination arising in consequence of disability which were set out at paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of the List of Issues, that the respondent had shown that that treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

(g) On an esto basis, let it be assumed that a PCP had been applied by the respondent to its employees including the claimant such as to place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage in light of her disability and which gave rise to a duty to make adjustments in terms of section 20 of the EqA, that the respondent had in fact taken such steps as it was reasonable to have to take in the circumstances to avoid the disadvantage.

(h) In relation to the claimant’s evidence, the respondent’s representative submitted that the claimant’s evidence was substantially general in its nature and insufficient to support positive Findings in Fact in relation to the particular cases of which the claimant gave notice as set out in the Agreed List of Issues that the claimant’s evidence was in large part opinion evidence based upon speculation rather upon and having no factual evidential foundation and that it was in other parts confused and self-contradictory in particular in relation to the allegations of victimisation.

[14]Impression of witness evidence (a). While the Tribunal did not consider the claimant to be a generally incredible witness, it found her evidence to be insufficient for the most part, to establish the complaints which she gave notice of as set out in the agreed list of issues. (b)The Tribunal considered the evidence of Superintendent Thomas and Chief Superintendent Campbell to be both credible and reliable. (c). While aspects of the reliability of the remaining witnesses was challenged in cross-examination the Tribunal did not consider the effect of such challenge to be such as to supply the want of sufficiency in the claimant’s evidence. (d) The credibility of the claimant on the one hand and that of PS (Retd) Dobbie on the other was directly focussed in relation to the question of the source of the comment, included at section 3 of the Occupational Health referral of 15/18 December 2024, and which referred to the claimant having a medication related modification which prevented her from driving after 1900 hours. It was Sargeant Dobbie’s position in evidence that it was the claimant herself who had first raised that matter with her requesting that it be further modified to not working and driving after 1800, and that it was the claimant who had attributed the modification to the effect of medication which she took. The claimant, for her part, asserted in evidence that she had never discussed the question of driving, or of the impact of medication upon her ability to drive, on any occasion with anyone including Sargeant Dobbie. It was the claimant’s deduction, therefore knowing that no such modification existed or was recorded in her records, that Sargeant Dobbie must have deliberately manufactured the entirety of the entry for malicious reasons and, based upon that speculative deduction, the case which she gave notice of offering to prove was that the respondent (per Sargeant Dobbie) had “falsely” (deliberately, knowingly and dishonestly) made the statement in the Occupational Health Review. The Tribunal accepted as both credible and reliable Sargeant Dobbie’s evidence on the point to the extent that while accepting, in retrospect, the statement was one which lacked factual foundation and therefore was erroneous, she had not knowingly, deliberately, falsify the statement, her explanation being that she was re-iterating what she understood the claimant had told her. (e) While the Tribunal did not find the claimant incredible in asserting her belief that Sargeant Dobbie had deliberately made the statement knowing it to be untrue, the Tribunal considered that that belief of itself was insufficient to establish the character of the act which the claimant attributed to it and which she offered to prove. Otherwise, the Tribunal did not find that it’s determination of the issues was directly informed by the credibility or reliability of the remaining witnesses.

The Applicable Law

[15]Parties’ representatives were agreed, and the Tribunal concurred, that the applicable law was set out and was to be found in sections; 13, Direct Discrimination, 15, Discrimination Arising from Disability, 20 and 21, Duty and Breach of duty to make Adjustments, 26, Harassment related to disability and 27, Victimisation of the Equality Act 2010. The terms of those statutory provisions were familiar to both representatives and the Tribunal and, other than in respect of the impact of section 26(4)(c) upon the facts as found, the construction of those sections was not an issue put in dispute between the parties. The terms of the sections are accordingly not rehearsed at length but rather Sections; 13, 15, 20, 21, 26 and 27 of the Equality Act 2010 are referred to for their whole terms and, for reasons of brevity, are held incorporated by reference within this Note of Reasons. Findings in fact

[16]On the oral and documentary evidence presented and upon consideration of parties’ submissions, the Tribunal makes the following essential findings in fact, restricted to those relevant and necessary to the determination of the issues set out in the “Agreed List of Issues”, numbers 1 to 8 inclusive. Numbers appearing in round brackets are references to page numbers in the joint bundle of documents. Subject to the exception arising by way of putting the Tribunal’s position beyond doubt, the Tribunal does not make negative findings in fact. Accordingly, where a contended for finding in fact does not appear, parties should understand that the Tribunal did not consider the available evidence to be sufficient to sustain such a finding.

[17]The respondent is the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland appointed under and in terms of section 7 of the Police & Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012The claimant is Sarah Thompson who resides at the address set out in her initiating application ET1. .

[18]The claimant served as a Police Constable under the direction and control of the respondent. Having commenced her service on 8 November 2024.

[19]At the time of the hearing the claimant had retired by reason of ill-health, effective from September 2025.

[20]Since the 29 April 2019, the claimant had been employed in the “Criminal Justice Services Division, People and Development” – Training (“CJSDTD”), with her base office being Glenrothes Police Office at the material time for the purposes of the claimant’s complaint of discrimination.

[21]The claimant presents complaints under the Equality Act 2010 (“EQA”) of Discrimination because of the protected characteristic of Disability being;a. section 13 complaints of direct discrimination,

b. section 15 complaints of discrimination arising from disability:

c. section 21(2) and Section 20 complaint of failure to comply with a duty to make adjustments,

d. section 26 complaints of harassment and

e. section 27 complaints of victimisation.

• The material time for the purposes of the claimant’s complaints is the period 18 December 2023 to 21 August 2024. (paragraph 1 of the agreed list of issues “the list of issues” at page 59 of the bundle as amended)

• It was a matter of concession on the part of the respondent, binding upon the Tribunal for the purposes of the hearing, that, at the material time the claimant was a person possessing the protected characteristic of disability in terms of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010, by reason of her diagnosed mental impairment of “anxiety and depression”

[22]Between September 2009 and June 2021 the claimant had reported unfit for work, on in excess of 20 occasions, the reason for absence being recorded as psychological disorders of anxiety, or depression or stress.

[23]The respondent recognised that the claimant experienced difficulties with her mental health and put in place various adjustments to her role as a Police Constable to assist her during that period and beyond.

[24]From on or around 5 October 2022 it was agreed between the respondent and the claimant that the claimant would work from home on work which had been triaged to exclude work that might trigger her anxiety or stress although she could attend at a Police Office in person if given reasonable notice to do so. The same was an “adjustment” put in place by the respondent based upon previous Occupational Health advice. The claimant could not be deployed operationally. It was agreed between the parties that arrangement would be reviewed in a six month period.

[25]Between 12 January 2023 to 6 February 2023 the claimant reported unfit to work the reason cited being “psychological disorders – stress”.

[26]On 13 April 2023 the reasonable adjustment was reviewed and continued in order to be reviewed again in a further six months.

[27]Between 18 July 2023 and 1 August 2023 the claimant reported unfit to work. The reason for absence was recorded as “psychological distress – stress”.

[28]Between 24 September 2023 and 13 November 2023 the claimant reported unfit to work the reason for absence recorded as “psychological disorders – stress”.

[29]On 16 November 2023, the review date of the claimant’s adjustments which are referred to by the respondents as “modified duties”, was extended for two months pending the return to duty of Inspector Kidd, the claimant’s second line manager and the intended Reviewing Manager.

[30]At the material time, the Criminal Justice Services Division, People & Development – Training Team (“CJSD TD”) comprised of a Police Inspector, a Sergeant, three Police Constables and a Police Staff Member. It was overseen in terms of line management by a Chief Inspector within CJSD TD.

[31]The claimant was on a phased return following her absence from 24 September 2023 and 13 November 2023 and, in those circumstances the reasonable adjustments had been continued.

[32]As at November 2023, the staff within the CJSD TD were Police Inspector (PI) Craig Kidd, second line manager, Police Sergeant (PS) Lee Soutar, first line manager, Police Constables Sarah Thompson (the claimant), Stuart Birrell, Jacqui Methven and Police Staff Member Jill Donaldson. In addition Police Constable (PC) Craig Reid was seconded to the training department on a temporary basis.

[33]The claimant did not wish her first line manager, Sergeant Lee Soutar, to deal with any aspect of her welfare or absence management/modified duties (reasonable adjustments). Although Sergeant Soutar remained her first line manager for other matters Police Sergeant (Retd) Laura Dobbie was appointed to act as the claimant’s welfare point of contact, dealing also with the management of her absences at first line level and interaction with Occupational Health.

[34]The respondents had an internal case management system for staff known by the abbreviation “SCOPE”.

[35]The SCOPE system identified the claimant as having reasonable adjustments in place in relation to her role. The SCOPE system identified the claimant as working on modified duties. The SCOPE system was available to and accessible by the claimant’s first line manager, PS Lee Soutar.

[36]In order to inform the two month extended review of the claimant’s reasonable adjustments the claimant’s third line manager, Chief Inspector (CI) Howe, in the absence of her second line manager Inspector Kidd and in consultation with PS Dobbie the claimant’s first line welfare manager who had been appointed to that role only shortly previously, advised the claimant that they sought her consent to refer her to “Optima Health” who are the respondent’s Occupational Health advisors.

[37]The claimant and PS Dobbie discussed the issues which the claimant was then currently experiencing and which were having the effect of triggering depression, on 23 November 2023.

[38]The discussion of 23 November 2023 was one of a number of discussions which proceeded, about that time, between the claimant and PS Dobbie relating to the claimant’s welfare.

[39]In the course of her discussion with PS Dobbie, the claimant was giving consideration to making a change of departments.

[40]In the email at (175) of the bundle she stated “I think perhaps I do need to look at doing something different for a bit and seeing if that helps. I think I’d be interested to see if the Divisional services thing would be an option as a secondment?”

[41]In the course of their discussions, the claimant and the respondent’s Sergeant Dobbie discussed the content of the Occupational Health referral which was to be made with the claimant’s consent.

[42]On 27 November 2023 the claimant wrote by email to PS Dobbie advising her that following discussions with a therapist whom she had consulted, she wished to stay within the CJST training department. She went on to state in the same email that she now did not believe that she required her referral to Occupational Health. She did not withdraw her consent to the same.

[43]In the same email of 27 November 2023 the claimant stated however that she sought a further reasonable adjustment that being the alteration to the giving of the minimum of one week’s notice of any requirement that she attend at a Police Station.

[44]On 15 December 2023, PS Dobbie created a report to Optima Health (an Occupational Health referral) in respect of the claimant.

[45]Due to an administrative issue with the spelling of PS Dobbie’s surname, the report was not received by Optima Health until 18 December 2024.

[46]The claimant had an existing modification of her duties in terms of which she would not be required to work after 1900 hours. In her discussions with PS Dobbie about the content of the referral 15/18 December 2024 the claimant asked there be included a request for her not working after time being adjusted to 1800.

[47]In an email of 29 November 2023, sent by the claimant to Sergeant Dobbie relating to the adjustment of the adjustment to the date of her internal review of modified duties (page 177) the claimant went on to state “also just leave asking about the time change. Thanks.”

[48]In the management Occupational Health referral of 15/18 December, 2023 PS Dobbie, it’s author, included at item 3 the following statement: “Item 3 Related to Sarah’s request for one week notice to attend a Police building, Sarah highlighted one of her current reasonable adjustments to her duty modifications, Sarah has a current modification related to not being able to drive after 1900. In recent conversation Sarah requested that this be changed to 1800 but then withdrew the request. Sarah provided her reasoning that she currently takes certain medications which prevent her from driving vehicles in the evening. She did not advise why she required a driving modification to be brought forward by one hour.” (page 184)

[49]It was Sergeant Dobbie’s position in evidence that she had discussed the content of the report including the particular passage at item 3 with the claimant and the fact that despite the claimant, in her email of 29 November, asking her to “just leave” that request for an adjustment in time from 1900 to 1800, she would in fact continue to include that element in the referral while also confirming the claimant no longer wished the time to be adjusted, and that she would continue to do so because of the concerns which it raised with her as to the claimant’s ability to drive after 1900 in the evenings.

[50]It was the claimant’s position in evidence that she had never discussed any such matter or request, in relation to driving, with anyone including in particular with Sergeant Dobbie, and she speculated therefore, given that no such existing modification was in fact recorded on SCOPE, that she believed that PS Dobbie must have manufactured the entire entry for some malicious reason.

[51]The relevant regulations, while requiring that there be discussion between the referring officer and the subject about the content of the referral, do not require that a copy of the proposed referral be exhibited to and approved by the subject prior to its being submitted to the Occupational Health provider.

[52]PS Dobbie discussed the proposed content of the report with the claimant.

[53]PS Dobbie did not exhibit the final copy to the claimant prior to submitting it to the Occupational Health provider.

[54]In retrospect, PS Dobbie accepted that at the time of her including the statement in the Occupational Health Report which, as narrated in the report, she maintained she had done on the basis of the claimant informing her of the same, there was in fact no such modification/adjustment in place for the claimant relating to driving, as opposed to working, beyond 1900.

[55]PS Dobbie subsequently apologised to the claimant for including what had turned out to be a misstatement in the report.

[56]PS Dobbie did not accept before the Tribunal, or in the course of the internal investigation into the claimant’s grievance about, amongst other matters, the inclusion of that statement, that she had done so “falsely” that is to say deliberately knowing it to be untrue.

[57]PS Dobbie maintained, in both the internal grievance proceedings and in evidence before the Tribunal, that it was the claimant who advised her of the existence of such a modification in such terms, while in retrospect accepting also that it was in fact not the case.

[58]PS Dobbie pointed to paragraph 4 of the Occupational Health Report of 9 January 2024, issued in response to the referral, in which the Occupational Health Doctor records Ms Thompson as having made reference in her discussions with the doctor to a request not to “finish and drive” after 6pm.

[59]As part of it’s determination of the claimant’s grievance Superintendent Thomas stated in respect of the inclusion by PS Dobbie of the erroneous statement:- “I believe she was acting in good faith based on limited information.”

[60]In his evidence before the Tribunal Superintendent Thomas stated that he did not suspect that any malicious act had taken place on the part of PS Dobbie when filling out the referral document.

[61]The claimant was invited, along with all other members of the team and by the same email sent to all, to the team celebration to mark the end of PC Reid’s secondment with the team.

[62]The claimant, at first instance, accepted the invitation and subsequently, on changing her mind, declined it.

[63]The respondent’s first line manager had set up a WhatsApp group within the team. The WhatsApp group was not utilised by its participants for any operational policing matter.

[64]WhatsApp is not a platform which is supported by the Police Service of Scotland for use on any operational police matter. It’s use is not proscribed for non operational matters.

[65]The claimant was invited to join the WhatsApp group when it was set up. The claimant declined to do so explaining that she did not wish to share her personal telephone number with fellow employees and that she wished to keep her social life and work life separate.

[66]In so determining, the claimant excluded herself from the WhatsApp group.

[67]The invitation, issued to all members of the team in relation to PS Reid’s leaving event, was not issued through the WhatsApp platform but rather by email.

[68]At no point during the period which constitutes the material time for the purposes of her claim was the claimant ever required to deliver training in person rather than remotely.

[69]In the course of the series of discussions which took place between the claimant and her welfare contact, PS Dobbie, in the month of November 2023, the claimant gave consideration to a change of department.

[70]One option to which the claimant was giving consideration was that of a potential move to Divisional Services. In her email to PS Dobbie following one such meeting (page 175) the claimant stated – “I think perhaps I need to look at doing something different for a bit and seeing if that helps. I think I’d be interested to see if the Divisional Services thing would be an option as a secondment?”

[71]In March 2024, the claimant’s “My Career discussion” included discussion about the possibility of the claimant, while remaining within the training team, taking on some other work from the wider department, being work of a type that she was able to undertake, in circumstances where there was insufficient work of that type to keep her fully occupied within the team.

[72]The claimant was not able to undertake custody training which comprised the bulk of the work carried out by the training team.

[73]On or around 1 May 2024, Chief Inspector Howe, the claimant’s third line manager, was advised, in the absence of the claimant’s first line and second line managers, by Sharon Mullen of the respondent’s Human Resources Department, that the four month review by Occupational Health which had been advised by the Occupational Health practitioner in terms of the Output Report issued on 9 January 2024, was scheduled to take place on 7 May; but that Human Resources had discovered that the adjustments to the claimant’s modifying duties, which had been recommended in the 9 January report, had not yet been agreed with the claimant and uploaded onto SCOPE.

[74]Ms Mullen of HR advised, and CI Howe accepted, that the perceived purpose of the review was to assess how the recommended adjustments were assisting or not assisting the claimant and, in that context, to advise of any further adjustments to be made.

[75]Sharon Mullen of HR and CI Howe concluded that were the review to go ahead on the planned date of 7 May, in circumstances where the adjustments had not been agreed and uploaded, what they perceived to be it’s intended purpose would likely be frustrated.

[76]On 1 May 2024 in the context of her believing the same, CI Howe telephoned the claimant explaining her understanding of the position and asked the claimant if she might agree to the Occupational Health review date being “pushed back”.

[77]The claimant responded in the negative, disclosing to CI Howe that “things had changed for her” and that she therefore wanted, and was entitled to have, an appointment, so that she could have discuss what had changed with the Occupational Health Doctor.

[78]In response CI Howe indicated that she had not been aware of the change for the claimant and, in those circumstances, that she had no issues with the claimant taking the appointment on the scheduled date of 7 May.

[79]The claimant’s OH appointment proceeded on the 7 May as scheduled.

[80]In the course of her conversation CI Howe formed the view that the claimant had become upset. Following the call CI Howe reported the outcome of the call and the fact that the claimant had appeared to be upset both to Ms Mullen of HR and to her own line manager Superintendent Caroline Logan, explaining to them both that she would send an email to the claimant apologising for what had transpired had been her unintentionally causing of upset.

[81]CI Howe sent the email of apology to the claimant (page 310).

[82]Between the 21 January and 25 January 2024 the claimant reported unfit to work, the reason cited being “psychological disorders – stress”.

[83]On 27 March 2024, the Output Report of 9 January having been made available to the respondent, the respondent and the claimant, in the presence of an HR representative and a Scottish Police Federation representative held the previously scheduled but postponed meeting to review the claimant’s modifications (reasonable adjustments).

[84]At the review meeting of 27 March 2024 several modifications were reviewed to establish which were still relevant to the claimant’s recovery and working conditions and what could be re-adjusted or added to better assist her.

[85]On 1 April 2024, the respondents sent confirmation of the agreed adjustments to the claimant. These included;a. one paid hour a week, preferably at the end of the working day, to allow the claimant to attend a weekly evening therapy session which meant that she could not be rostered to work beyond 1900 hours,

b. the appropriate recording of requests for leave/TOIL/rest and recuperation days so as to reduce any requirement for the claimant to repeatedly discuss personal matters with multiple line managers;

c. that the claimant to continue to not be deployable for frontline duties, or to deliver face to face training, but to conduct training via teams;

d. one week notice of a requirement to attend at a Police Station;

e. being excused from the requirement to wear a Police uniform;

f. the overt wearing of Police identification whilst on premises being considered sufficient; and,

g. adjustments to the annual review of reasonable adjustments process.

[86]On 8 April 2024 the claimant wrote advising of further amendments and adjustments which she wished to make but which did not reflect the arrangements made at the review meeting.

[87]On 5 May 2024 the claimant reported unfit to work. The reason for absence was recorded as “psychological disorders – stress”.

[88]On 31 May 2024 the respondent contacted the claimant in relation to an application which she had made for ill-health retirement.

[89]On 3 July 2024 the claimant submitted a grievance against a number of named individuals including CI Howe, PI Kidd, PS Soutar, PS Dobbie and PC J Methven.

[90]Four days prior to the 20 April 2024, the claimant’s line manager, PS Soutar, sent a request to members of the team who were located proximate to the Glenrothes Police Station, including to the claimant, requesting that they attend at the Police Station on 20 April 2024, to assist with an urgent requirement that the training team vacate the office premises then occupied by them, and remove from them their furniture and equipment, in order that their premises might be occupied by other members of the division. Sergeant Soutar sent the email on a Friday requesting attendance on the following Wednesday.

[91]As at the 1 April 2024 the respondent had agreed with the claimant and had confirmed the Agreement to the claimant, a further modification (adjustment), amongst others, that she would be given seven days’ notice of any request that she attend at a Police Station.

[92]That reflected an agreed adjustment to the previously in place modification that the claimant be given “reasonable notice” of such a request.

[93]Because the process of finally agreeing all adjustments in the context of the internal review had not been brought to a conclusion, the seven day notice adjustment had not, at the material time, been uploaded to the respondent’s SCOPE system and accordingly, PS Soutar who at the claimant’s request was not involved in the discussions was unaware of the requirement to give 7 days notice of such a request.

[94]It would have been reasonable in the circumstances for the respondents to have taken forward with the claimant to a conclusion the process of agreeing the totality of the adjustments, and or to have uploaded those adjustments which were agreed as at 1 April to the SCOPE System so that the claimant’s managers could be aware of and give effect to them, which failing, to have uploaded the recommended substitute adjustments onto the SCOPE System pending their further meeting with the claimant to agree them.

[95]In giving the claimant four days’ notice of a request that she attend at Glenrothes Police Station, PS Soutar believed that he was giving what amounted to the previously agreed “reasonable notice”, in the relatively urgent circumstances pertaining.

[96]In May of 2025, PS Soutar issued a circular to all members of the training team, including the claimant, in which he advised of his intention to introduce a rota whereby members of the team, in their turn, would be required to attend at the Police Station to take forward the necessary task of updating the laptop computers used by Officers attending their training courses, that task having been previously undertaken by only one member of the team.

[97]The claimant was never required or asked to attend at a Police Station for the purposes of updating computers with less than seven days’ notice, or at all.

[98]The claimant was never required or asked to carry out her role in person, as opposed to remotely.

[99]On 6 March 2024, the claimant’s “My Career” discussion took place with her second line manager, PI Kidd, that being a date agreed between them as suitable for both.

[100]The claimant’s “My Career” discussion took place with her second line manager PI Kidd because the claimant did not wish to have the discussion with her first line manager PS Soutar.

[101]In the course of the “My Career” discussion of 6 March 2024, PI Kidd discussed with the claimant the possibility of her taking on some additional work of the type which she was able to undertake from another department in circumstances in which there was insufficient work of the limited type which the claimant was able to undertake, within the training team.

[102]PS Dobbie’s decision to continue to include the claimant’s request for an adjustment to the “not after working and driving time”, notwithstanding the claimant’s subsequent request that she leave that out, was informed by her concern for the claimant’s own and the public safety and as to the consequences of the claimant driving beyond 1900 hours in circumstances where she was aware that the claimant conducted her own private business in the evenings.

[103]At the material time, the respondents did not operate and apply to their then members of the training team a PCP of requiring postponement of “My Career” process.

[104]At the material time the respondent did have and operate a PCP of requiring non disabled members of the training team to attend to deliver training in person.

[105]At the material time, the PCP of requiring attendance to deliver training in person was not applied to the claimant, it having been disapplied to her by reason of modification (reasonable adjustment).

[106]At the material time, the respondent did make one request of the claimant that she attend the Police Station in person to assist with the office move (as opposed to for the purposes of conducting training). The claimant did not comply with the request, and was never required to so attend and did not do so.

[107]On or about 16 April 2024, the respondent’s Sergeant Soutar asked the claimant, along with other members of the training team who were located approximate to the Glenrothes Police Station to attend at the station, on four days’ notice, to assist with an urgent office move.

[108]At that time, the claimant and the respondent had agreed an adjustment to her modified duties which included she being given seven days’ notice of any request/requirement to attend at a Police Station.

[109]That adjustment had not been uploaded on to the SCOPE system and Sergeant Soutar, her first line manager who made the request was unaware of it.

[110]At the time of making the request Sergeant Soutar thought that the preexisting adjustment continued to be in place namely that the claimant be given “reasonable notice” of such a request.

[111]At the time of making her request Sergeant Soutar believed that four days’ notice was reasonable notice in the circumstances.

[112]The request made by Sergeant Soutar did not have as it’s purpose the creating for the claimant any of the effects outlined in section 26(b)(1) and/or (2) of the Equality Act 2010.

[113]In circumstances in which the claimant knew that the seven day notice adjustment had been agreed, her being asked to so attend did have the effect of creating for the claimant an intimidating environment in terms of section 26(1)(b)(ii).

[114]In circumstances where what the claimant knew to be the agreed adjustment appeared to be being disregarded, it was reasonable for the claimant to perceive that conduct as having that effect, in terms of section 26(4) of the 2010 Act.

[115]The claimant declined the request and did not attend. Discussion and Disposal

[116]In approaching the determination of complaints of discrimination and of victimisation such as those before the Tribunal in the instant case, it is relevant to bear in mind that; a) While records of what a witness who is giving evidence before the Tribunal may have said on a previous occasion, including statements not given on oath or affirmation in an internal enquiry, may be put to the witness for the purposes of challenging their credibility and/or reliability of their evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal’s disposal of the issues before it falls to be determined primarily on the evidence of witnesses given on oath or affirmation, at the hearing. b) Upon being invited to consider the conclusion which is reached by the internal grievance officer and internal appeal officer and their reasons, it is not open to the Tribunal to substitute it’s own assessment of the credibility and reliability of those witnesses for that of the grievance or appeal officer in that internal process. Were the Tribunal to do so it would err in law. c) Neither is it the function of the Tribunal at hearing relating to complaints of Discrimination to conduct a judicial review of the reasonableness of the respondent’s actings in the context of it’s internal investigation of complaints as to, a degree it would do in the case of a complaint of unfair dismissal. d) Rather, in respect of each of the issues and in the context of the identification of the party with whom the burden of proof rests (including, if engaged, by operation of the terms of section 136 of the EQA), the Tribunal must consider; on the evidence presented, on the application of the standard of the balance of probabilities and, upon the preponderance of the evidence, whether the burden has been discharged in respect of each of the listed/subsisting issues. e) In cases where liability is denied and/or there are competing explanations for loss, or of alleged detriment or other consequence, causation cannot be established by a process of elimination. The balance of probabilities test requires that the “court” (the Employment Tribunal) must be satisfied on rational and objective grounds, that the case for believing that the suggested means of causation occurred is stronger than the case for not so believing. The ultimate question for the Tribunal, in relation to each issue, is whether it is satisfied that the contended for explanation is more likely than not to be true, bearing in mind that it is not obliged to come to a conclusion at all. f) The case in respect of which the burden of proof is to be found discharged or not discharged is the case that is given notice of. The principles of natural justice prohibit a party succeeding on a case which is not the case of which they have given notice. Consideration and Disposal of the issues

[117]The numbers appearing in square brackets are references to the issue number appearing on the list of issues. Direct Discrimination

[118][1] Did the respondent treat the claimant less favourably because of her disability than they treated or would treat a non-disabled employee? The less favourable treatment alleged and said to have occurred within the period 18 December 2023 to 21 August 2024 being:- “[1.1] Being falsely stated to be incapable of driving after 7pm.”

[119]As the Tribunal has found in fact, and as accepted by the respondent, the Optima health referral of 15/18 December 2023, made by the respondent in relation to the claimant, contained at item 3 the following statement; “Item 3: Related to Sarah’s request for one week notice to attend a Police building, as Sarah highlighted one of her current Reasonable Adjustments to her Duty Modifications. Sarah has a current modification related to not being able to drive after 1900. In recent conversation Sarah requested this to be changed to 1800 but then withdrew the request. Sarah provided her reasoning that she currently takes certain medications which prevent her from driving vehicles in the evening. She did not advise why she required the driving modification to be brought forward by an hour.” (on the one hand).

[120]All witnesses agreed that upon the SCOPE system being checked, no such duty modification appeared as recorded on the systems and the claimant, for her part, confirmed that none of the medication which she was taking, at the material time, had the effect of restricting or limiting her ability to drive in the evenings, that being evidence which was not challenged in crossexamination and was accepted by the Tribunal.

[121]To the extent that the referral contains a statement, said to be heresay of the claimant, that the claimant was not able to drive after 1900 hours and which the claimant is said to have attributed to the effect of medication taken by her, the Tribunal found in fact that that statement was not one founded in fact; that it was a misstatement.

[122]The Oxford English Dictionary attributes to the noun “false” four principal meanings applicable in varying contexts:- viz;• Erroneous: Contrary to truth, fact, or reason; incorrect or mistaken.

• Deceptive: Deliberately designed to mislead or deceive; untruthful.

• Counterfeit: Not real, artificial, or sham (e.g., false teeth, a false passport).

• Insincere: Not genuine or loyal; treacherous (e.g., a false friend or false smile)”

[123]The dictionary defines the adverb “falsely” across five primary categories of meaning, as acting viz:- “1. With intent to deceive; deceitfully: acting with deliberate aim to mislead or lie; 2. Wrongly or incorrectly: doing something in a way that is factually mistaken or based on error; 3. Dishonestly or treacherously: exhibiting disloyalty or betraying someone (often framed as playing someone false); 4. Untruthfully or mendaciously: exhibiting or expressing statements that are contrary to fact; 5. Not genuinely: artificially: acting in a way that is insincere, simulated, or feigned.”

[124]The position in evidence of, the claimant’s Welfare Contact, author of the referral PS (Retd) L Dobbie, in respect of the provenance of the statement within it which is quoted at paragraph (126) above, was that set out in terms within the referral itself. That is to say that the claimant was the source of that information and statement.

[125]The position of the claimant, in evidence, was that of denying that she had ever made such a statement to Sergeant Dobbie or indeed to anyone and that that, when taken together with the fact that no such restriction or modification in fact existed, led her to the conclusion that PS(Retd) Dobbie knowing it to be untrue had deliberately stated that is to say, had “falsely stated” that to be the position in the referral. There was, in the claimant’s consideration, no other possible explanation nor was there any scope for PS(Retd) Dobbie being merely mistaken and merely making the statement wrongly or, incorrectly rather, it must be the case that she acted deliberately and dishonestly in including that statement within the referral.

[126]The Tribunal was satisfied on the claimant’s evidence that in using the term “falsely” the claimant did not intend to, and did not give notice of a case of merely “wrongly or incorrectly” acting but rather a case of deliberate falsehood and dishonesty.

[127]That the above was the claimant’s confirmed position in evidence is consistent with her use of the adverb falsely and her offer to prove, as given notice of and encapsulated in the agreed list of issues, of the matter being “falsely stated”.

[128]The Tribunal was satisfied on the preponderance of the evidence, that the complaint given notice of at paragraph 1.1 of the agreed list of issues (“the list of issues”) went beyond that of establishing a mere mistake or error but rather that the case given notice of was one of dishonestly, deliberately and knowingly misstating the position.

[129]The claimant’s representative submitted that in order to determine this issue it would be necessary for the Tribunal to choose to believe or disbelieve the evidence of the claimant and of PS(Retd) Dobbie in relation to their respective explanations as to the provenance of the statement. The Tribunal respectively disagrees with that contention. The case given notice of is one involving deliberate, dishonest, deceit and it is that case which must be established on the balance of probabilities it the complaint in terms of issue 1.1 is to be held established. It is for the claimant to discharge that burden of proof at first instance.

[130]The Tribunal holds, on the evidence presented, that she has failed to do so. That is perhaps not a surprising outcome standing that the claimant’s characterisation of the misstatement of fact as one being “falsely made”, as defined above, was a characterisation based upon speculation on her part.

[131]In the alternative and although an argument not advanced by the claimant’s representative in submission, let it be assumed that the inaccuracy of the statement in itself were to be regarded as primary facts amounting to “something more” for the purposes of shifting the burden of proof to the respondent in terms of section 136, something which the Tribunal has not so concluded, it would have separately found, on the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses which evidence was not substantially challenged in cross-examination and which it accepted as both credible and reliable, that they would have included such as statement in a referral to Occupational Health relating to a Police Officer whose circumstances were the same as those of the claimant but for her protected characteristic of disability and thus that the claimant had not been directly discriminated against in terms of section 13 of the EqA.

[132]In section 4 (reasonable adjustments) of the Occupational Health report, Dr. Voisian writes: “Miss Thompson advised me that she attends a class once a week to help manage her psychological health from 7pm, and this is the reason she requested not to finish and drive after 6pm but so far, she has not finished work until after 5pm and feels this adjustment is not needed.”

[133]The Tribunal was satisfied on the face of that statement that the claimant had herself discussed directly with the Occupational Health doctor the issue of her driving after 7pm. The explanation which the doctor recounts the claimant as giving to her of her position, makes no mention of the modification (adjustment) actual or proposed being something which had been entirely manufactured by the PS(Retd) Dobbie, and is evidence which points away from the proposition that Ms Dobbie had acted knowingly and deliberately untruthfully in including what she did in the referral.

[134]The Tribunal finds that the issue [1.1] of the list of issues is not established and that the claimant’s claim, in so far as founded upon that issue, falls to be dismissed.

[135]“[1.2] Being required to deliver training in person rather than remotely”

[136]There was no evidence before the Tribunal that went to establish that the claimant had ever been required to deliver training in person rather than remotely.

[137]The claimant’s complaint of direct discrimination, in so far as founded upon alleged less favourable treatment set out at paragraph [1.2] of the list of issues, falls to be dismissed.

[138]“[1.3] Being advised what language to use in teams meetings.” This issue was struck out as no longer relied upon by the claimant in the course of the hearing.

[139]“[1.4] Excluded from team social events (in the period 18 December to 21 August 2024)”

[140]The only team social event given notice of as having occurred at the material time was the team social evening for the departure of the seconded member Mr (PC) Reid.

[141]As the claimant accepted in cross-examination and as the Tribunal has found in fact, the claimant was invited to that event in common with all team members by the same email invitation. The claimant initially accepted the invitation but subsequently changed her mind opting not to attend. On the claimant’s own evidence the averred active exclusion did not occur.

[142]In so far as the complaint was said to rely upon the fact that two members of the team who were having some conversation at a point in time when the claimant joined a remote Teams meeting which had not yet commenced, and did not break off their conversation to greet the claimant, the Tribunal considered that the claimant failed to discharge her burden of proof in establishing either that the same constituted less favourable treatment in the circumstances or, let it be assumed that it did, that it was attributable to the claimant’s disability.

[143]The complaint was said to also rely upon the fact that there was some preliminary informal discussion on a team WhatsApp group, of which the claimant was not a member, about the social event prior to the details being finalised and the informal invitation being issued to all team members including the claimant by email. The claimant, accepted in evidence and the Tribunal has found in fact, that the claimant was invited to join the WhatsApp group but had declined to do so variously, because she considered it to be a medium which was unsupported by Police Scotland and because she wished to keep her social life and working life entirely separate and did not wish to share her personal telephone number with her work colleagues.

[144]The Tribunal considered that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden of proof in this regard. Nor had she established any primary facts from which, absent another explanation, the Tribunal could infer that let it be assumed that any discussion about social events on a WhatsApp group of which the claimant was not a member constituted less favourable treatment, or that the treatment such as it was was treatment because of the claimant’s disability. A hypothetical non disabled comparator who had opted not to be a member of a WhatsApp group would have been treated in the same way.

[145]In so far as it may be said that the claimant was excluded from the WhatsApp discussions the Tribunal was satisfied on the evidence that this was because the claimant had opted to exclude herself from such discussion and that she had not been so excluded by the respondent because of her disability.

[146]In so far as founded upon the alleged less favourable treatment set out at paragraph [1.4] of the list of issues, the complaint of direct discrimination falls to be dismissed.

[147]“[1.5] Advised to consider ill-health retirement or change departments”

[148]As the Tribunal has found in fact, on 23 November 2023 the claimant had a discussion with PS(Retd) Laura Dobbie, in her capacity as the claimant’s welfare contact, relating to the claimant’s health issues and their impact upon her attendance. In the email of the same date, copied and produced at page 1074 and sent to Laura Dobbie, the claimant concluded by stating: “Thank you for being reasonable to speak with.” In a further email sent to Laura Dobbie later that same day the claimant stated….”I’ve logged back on to get my pension statement, to help me to look at options going forward. I’m still awaiting my therapy which is later on today. I think perhaps I do need to look at doing something different for a bit and seeing if that helps. I think I’d be interested to see if the divisional services thing would be an option as a secondment? At the moment I don’t see how I can continue working for my current team……”

[149]At that time the claimant was giving consideration to a change of department. No steps were subsequently taken, either by the claimant or by the respondent, to progress any change of department for her.

[150]In March 2024, in the course of her “my career” discussion, there was discussion relating to the possibility of the claimant taking on some work from other departments which was work of a type which she was able to do and was already doing within her own department, that is to say administrative work which would not be “triggering” for the claimant, in circumstances where, because of the modifications (reasonable adjustment) put in place for the claimant, there was insufficient work of that type to fully occupy her.

[151]The Tribunal considered on the evidence presented, that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden of proof such as to establish that the respondent’s participation in discussing such matters with the claimant constituted less favourable treatment; and separately, in respect of establishing that a hypothetical non disabled comparator would not have been treated in the same way.

[152]The Tribunal considered that the discussions, in the circumstances in which they took place, fell within the ambit of the discharge by the respondent of its obligations owed to the claimant in respect of her health, and in respect of facilitating her fulfilling the full remit of her role.

[153]The Tribunal finds that the complaint of direct discrimination, in so far as founded upon the alleged less favourable treatment set out at paragraph [1.5] of the list of issues, falls to be dismissed.

[154]“[1.6] To re-arrange a follow-up Occupational Health Appointment”

[155]As the Tribunal has found in fact, the request that the claimant consider rearranging the follow-up Occupational Health appointment in question was a request made by CI Howe, her second line manager at the time, in circumstances in which;a. she herself had been absent for two weeks at the Police Treatment Centre followed by a period of annual leave,

b. she was contacted by Sharon Mullen, the HR Advisor for the Criminal Justice Service Division, who told her that whereas the claimant’s reasonable adjustments, as recommended in the Occupational Health Medical Assessment of 9 January 2024 had not been loaded onto the respondent’s SCOPE system,

c. in the OH assessment of 9 January 2024 under the heading “Suggested Review Arrangements” the Occupational Health Doctor had suggested that the claimant be referred back to Occupational Health “in about four months for a well-being review”.

d. Karen Mullen, the HR Advisor and CI Howe understood the purpose of that review to include an assessment, and, if appropriate the recommendation of adjustment to the claimant’s modifications including to the adjustments which had been recommended on the 9 January but had not yet been loaded onto the SCOPE system.

[156]At that time, both PS (Retd) Dobbie, the claimant’s welfare point of contact, and PI Kidd, the claimant’s second line manager both of whom were closer to the circumstances than CI Howe who was the claimant’s third line manager, were respectively on holiday and absent due to illness. Acting on the advice of HR and in the belief that the principal purpose of the review would be rendered nugatory if it proceeded on the planned date of 7 May at a time when in the preceding four month period the modifications (reasonable adjustments) which were to be reviewed had not been uploaded on to the system, CI Howe spoke to the claimant on the telephone, on or about 1 May 2024, and asked if the claimant would be prepared to push the appointment back in those circumstances. The claimant replied in the negative explaining that things had in fact “changed for her” in the intervening period and that she was entitled to have the appointment and wished it to go ahead on the planned date. CI Howe explained that she hadn’t been aware of the fact that things had changed for the claimant, and that, in those circumstances, she had no issues with the appointment proceeding on the planned date which it duly did.

[157]In the course of the conversation, CI Howe became aware of the fact that the claimant was upset and, following the conversation, she sent an email to the claimant in which she apologised for having been the cause of upset which had not been her intention.

[158]On the evidence presented, the Tribunal considered that it had not been established, on the balance of probabilities, that CI Howe’s request that the claimant consider deferring to a later date for the Occupational Health Review for the reason given, amounted to direct discrimination in terms of section 13 of the EQA.

[159]The Tribunal accepted that the referral, being relating to the claimant’s state of health, was in turn informed by her disability and that an inference arose, in those circumstances, for the purposes of 136 of the EQA.

[160]The Tribunal considered, on the evidence presented, however, that the making of the request for the reasons explained to the claimant and in circumstances in which CI Howe was not aware that “things had changed” for the claimant, did not constitute less favourable treatment for the purposes of section 13 of the EQA.

[161]The Tribunal holds that the complaint of direct discrimination, in so far as founded upon the issue recorded at paragraph [1.6] of the list of issues, falls to be dismissed.

[162]“[1.7] To attend at a Police Office”

[163]As the claimant accepted in cross-examination, and as the Tribunal has found in fact the claimant was never required, in the sense of being compelled to under threat of sanction, to attend, nor did she ever attend, at a Police office without having received one week’s notice. It has also found that the claimant’s first line manager, PS Lee Soutar, in circumstances where he himself was not available and in which he had been directed on short notice to remove the team and it’s equipment from the premises which it occupied at Glenrothes sent, to the team members, including the claimant, who were based most proximate to Glenrothes, a request that they attend to assist in the execution of that task. The claimant did not attend in response to that request and she was not required to do so.

[164]There was a clear operational reason for the request.

[165]At the time of making it PS Soutar, as he then was, was unaware of the recommended adjustment advised on 9 January Occupational Health assessment, that the claimant be given seven days’ notice of a requirement to attend at a Police Station, by reason of those adjustments not having been placed on the SCOPE system and all matters relating to the claimant’s welfare being dealt with, at her request, by persons other than PS Soutar.

[166]On the evidence presented the Tribunal considered that the claimant had failed to discharge the onus of proof such as to establish that the request constituted less favourable treatment and separately that a non disabled team member, based proximately to Glenrothes, had been or would have been treated differently, the evidence presented in fact going to establish that such non disabled team members were treated in exactly the same way.

[167]Likewise, in respect of the potential updating of laptops, the Tribunal considered that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden of proof in respect of; establishing that she had ever been so required, on less than seven days’ notice, that she ever did so attend and that being advised of her line manager’s intention to put in place a rota whereby all members of the team would in their turn attend at a Police Station to update the rota constituted less favourable treatment, all non disabled members of the team having been advised in the same terms.

[168]The Tribunal holds that the complaint of direct discrimination in so far as founded upon the issue set out at paragraph [1.7] of the list of issues falls to be dismissed. Discrimination because of something arising in consequence of the claimant’s disability

[169]“[2] Did the respondent discriminate against the claimant by treating her unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of her disability? The unfavourable treatment being”:- “[2.1] The respondent suggesting to Optima she could not drive after 7pm.”

[170]Under section 15(1) of the EQA 2010, discrimination arising from disability” occurs where both:• A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s disability and

• A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

[171]In Basildon & Thurrock NHS Foundation Trust v. Weerasinghe

UKEAT/0397/14

Langstaff P, as he then was, held that there were two distinct steps to the test to be applied by Tribunals in determining whether discrimination arising from disability has occurred:(a) Did the claimant’s disability cause, have the consequence of, or result in “something”?

(b) Did the employer treat the claimant unfavourably because of that “something”?

[172]It does not matter which order these questions are addressed. There is no statutory definition of “unfavourable treatment”. However, the supreme court gave some guidance in Williams of Trustees of Swansea University Pension & Assurance Scheme & Another [2018] UKSC65. It requires Tribunals to answer two questions of fact:(a) What the relevant treatment was; and

(b) Whether it was unfavourable to the claimant.

[173]The Court in that case considered that the EHRC Code was helpful while noting that it could not supplant the statutory provisions. The Court referred in particular to the following aspects of the EHRC Code:(a) Being treated unfavourably for the purposes of section 15 of the EQA 2010 means that the person “must have been put at a disadvantage” [5.7]; and

(b) “The Courts have found that ‘detriment’ has similar concept, i.e. is something that a reasonable person would complain about, so an unjustified sense of grievance would not qualify……..It is enough that a worker can reasonably say that they would have preferred to be treated differently” (paragraph 4.9).

[174]Under the Code there is a relatively low threshold for demonstrating the treatment was unfavourable but the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams is that advantageous treatment will not be unfavourable merely because it might have been more advantageous.

[175]It was a matter of concession on the part of the respondent that should the Tribunal find that the inclusion of the words identified at Item 3 of the Occupational Health referral by PS (RETD) Dobbie did constitute Treating the claimant unfavourably, that the treatment “would be treatment because of something arising as a consequence of the claimant’s disability.”

[176]The treatment, founded upon as being unfavourable treatment for the purposes of issue [2.1] is the inclusion by PS Dobbie of the statement which is set out at paragraph (126) above in the referral to Occupational Health referral made by her on 15/18 December 2023 which, read short, was to the effect that medication taken by the claimant to treat the symptoms of her disability resulted in her being unable to drive after 7pm.

[177]The second question to be answered in terms of the Supreme Court guidance in Williams v. Trustees of Swansea is if that be the relevant treatment, whether it was unfavourable to the claimant.

[178]In applying Langstaff P’s two stage test into the circumstances presented in the instant case it is important to bear in mind that the claimant’s disability did not in fact cause, or had the consequence of, or result in her being unable to drive after 7pm nor did any medication taken by her in treatment of the systems caused by her disability have that effect or consequence.

[179]While the inclusion of such a misstatement of fact in the Occupational Health referral is treatment which would cross the threshold such as to qualify as unfavourable treatment, on either and or both the claimant’s and the respondent’s versions of the circumstances leading to it’s inclusion, it was not treatment that occurred because of something (anything) that was the result of or a consequence of the claimant’s disability.

[180]It was the claimant’s position that she had never had any discussion with PS Dobbie or, for that matter with anyone in the past in which she stated or suggested that she could not drive after 6pm or 7pm because of her disability or because of medication taken by her which related to her disability. Rather, it was the claimant’s position that the misstatement was included in the referral by PS Dobbie in consequence of a deliberate intention to act maliciously towards the claimant with the speculated purpose of forcing her out of the training team. It was Sargeant Dobbie’s position that what she retrospectively accepted was a misstatement was included in the referral because the claimant had asked her to include it. On the claimant’s version of events, at its highest, for the purposes of answering the second question, the Tribunal concluded that while the treatment was treatment which might give rise to some other species of discrimination, such as section 26 Harassment or to a common law delict, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding in fact and in law that it constituted discrimination in terms of section 15 of the Equality Act 2010.

[181]The Tribunal concludes that the complaint of section 15 discrimination, in so far as founded upon the issue set out at paragraph [2.1] of the list of issues falls to be dismissed.

[182]“[2.2] That she be required to carry out her role ‘in person’ as opposed to on teams.”

[183]There is no evidence before the Tribunal that went to establish that the claimant had ever been required to carry out her role in person as opposed to on teams. That was a position which she accepted in cross-examination.

[184]The complaint of section 15 EQA discrimination, in so far as founded upon the issue at paragraph [2.2] of the list of issues, falls to be dismissed, the claimant having failed to discharge her burden of proof in that regard.

[185]“[2.3] She was deliberately blocked from progressing with “My Career” because of the respondent’s failure to progress the recommendations in the Optima Report.”

[186]As the Tribunal has found in fact, the claimant’s “My Career” interview and meeting took place with PI Craig Kidd, the claimant’s second line manager, on 6 March 2024, that being a date which was mutually convenient to both CI Kidd and the claimant and it being the claimant’s clear preference that the discussion take place with CI Kidd and not with her first line manager PS Soutar.

[187]The “something” complained of is that the claimant was deliberately blocked from progressing with her “My Career” discussion. The proposition rests upon the claimant’s contention that on 11 January 2024 DS Soutar told the claimant that he could not do the claimant’s “My Career” because the recommendations in the Optima Report were not yet agreed. DS Soutar’s position in evidence was that he did not accept that any such discussion relating to the claimant’s “My Career” discussion took place between himself and the claimant. Let it be assumed that DS Soutar said what the claimant asserts he said, it is separately the case that the claimant did not wish her “My Career” discussion to be conducted with DS Soutar. There was no evidence before the Tribunal which went to show that let it be assumed that such a discussion took place on 11 January 2024, that thereafter CI Kidd, the claimant’s second line manager, or the respondents otherwise, deliberately blocked, or blocked, the arranging of the claimant’s “My Career” discussion with CI Kidd which took place on the agreed date of 6 March 2024.

[188]The Tribunal finds that the claimant has failed to discharge her burden of proof in respect of establishing that “she was deliberately blocked from progressing with her “My Career” discussion because of the respondent’s failure to progress the recommendations in the Optima Report.

[189]The Tribunal determines that the complaint of section 15 EQA discrimination, in so far as founded upon the assertion at paragraph [2.3] of the list of issues falls to be dismissed.

[190]“[3] If yes to 2, has the respondent shown that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?”

[191]Let it be assumed that the Tribunal had found that PS (Retd) Dobbie, inclusion at item 3 of the Occupational Health referral of 15/18 December 2023 the statement relating to the claimant not being able to drive after 1900 hours constituted treating the claimant unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of her disability, which it has not, the Tribunal would have held that the respondent had shown that the treatment was, in the circumstances, a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim for the purposes of section 15(1) of the EQA and thus, for that separate reason that the respondent had not discriminate against the claimant in terms of section 15 of the Act. The Tribunal considered that providing to the Occupational Health Physician in the single referral all the information which might relevantly inform the physician’s discussions with the claimant and assessment of adjustment/variation of existing adjustments with the aim of facilitating the claimant’s communicated desire that she not be required to have multiple referrals, was a legitimate aim.

[192]The Tribunal considered that the inclusion in the referral of the particular information, albeit information which is now accepted to have been erroneous, was in those circumstances, a proportionate means of achieving that legitimate aim.

[193]“[4] Did a provision, criterion or practice of the respondent’s put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled?”

[194]The two PCPs given notice of by the claimant as relied upon for the purposes of a complaint of discrimination in terms of section 21 and 20 of the EQA are:-(i) ‘requiring postponement of “My Career” process; and

(ii) Requiring the claimant to attend in person.

[195]The substantial disadvantage given notice of as relied upon by the claimant is said to be that of “feeling ostracised and excluded, not being listened to or given any respect and being unable to progress in her role or actively contribute to her department.”

[196]There was no evidence before the Tribunal that went to establish that, at the material time, the respondents applied a PCP to its employees, for the purposes of section 20 of the EQA, of “requiring postponements of the “My Career” process”. Separately, the Tribunal has found that the claimant has failed to discharge her burden of proof in establishing that she was required to postpone her “My Career” process.

[197]While the respondent did have a PCP of requiring it’s non disabled employees to attend in person to discharge the majority of their duties, that PCP was not applied to the claimant who, by way of adjustment, was allowed to discharge the majority of her triaged and modified duties by working remotely from home. There was no evidence placed before the Tribunal that went to establish that the respondent, at the material time, applied to the relevant pool of its employees a PCP of requiring postponement of the “My Career” process. Nor that a PCP of requiring the claimant, to attend in person was ever applied to the claimant, and either of which satisfied the provisions of section 20(3) of the EQA, such as to give rise to a duty to make adjustments.

[198]Separately, there was no evidence placed before the Tribunal that went to establish how the application of either of the asserted PCPs resulted in or placed the claimant at the substantial disadvantage given notice of by her namely, of her experiencing a “feeling of being ostracised and excluded, not being listened to or given any respect and being unable to progress her role or actively contribute to her department”.

[199]The Tribunal finds that the claimant has failed to discharge her burden of proof in respect of establishing the complaint of discrimination in terms of section 21(2) of the EQA as set out at paragraph [4] of the agree list of issues, which claim falls to be dismissed. “[5] If yes to 4, did the respondent take such steps as it was reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage?”

[200]The Tribunal having found the claimant has failed to establish a primary case of discrimination in terms of section 21(2) of the EQA breach of duty to make adjustments, the question of whether such adjustments as were made by the respondent had the effect of avoiding the disadvantage giving notice of falls away and does not require to be the subject of determination and disposal. Harassment

[201]“[6] Did the respondent harass the claimant by engaging in unwanted conduct related to her disability, and the conduct had the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant “the alleged unwanted conduct of the notice of as relied upon being [6.1] being told that she could not have an appraisal…..”

[202]While the issue given notice of at paragraph [6.2] of the list of issues was lacking in specification in its terms, in the course of her evidence the claimant confirmed that she relied upon two occurrences in support of her complaint of section 26 harassment: a) Firstly the short notice request circulated by her first line manager, DS Soutar, as he then was, to all members of the team, who were located proximate to the team’s then Glenrothes offices, including the claimant, asking that they attend to remove the team’s equipment from their offices so that the same could urgently be occupied by other members of the division. b) Second “being asked to postpone my “My Career” appraisal.

[203]The evidence given by the claimant which was denied by the respondent’s witness DS Soutar was rather that DS Soutar had deliberately blocked her from progressing with her “My Career” appraisal by telling her that he could not conduct it because her most recently recommended adjustments had not yet been loaded onto the SCOPE System. The Tribunal has found that the claimant has failed to discharge her onus of proof in respect of establishing the occurrence of that allegation [when revising reverse the order of these two propositions i.e. move the reference to no evidence before the Tribunal to this point. There was no evidence placed before the Tribunal that went to establish the alleged second incident of section 26 harassment namely that the claimant was asked to postpone her “My Career” appraisal.

[204]The Tribunal holds that the claimant has failed to discharge her onus of proof in respect of the occurrence of second alleged incident, of establishing that alleged instance of section 26 EQA harassment and that the complaint, in so far as founded upon the occurrence of that incident, falls to be dismissed.

[205]Shortly in advance of the 20 April 2024 the claimant’s first line manager, DS Soutar circulated to team members including the claimant, who were located proximate to the Glenrothes Police Office a request that they attend at that office to assist in the removal of the team’s furniture and equipment from the offices, in order that they may be urgently made available for occupation by another team within the Division. In terms of her Occupational Health Review of 9 January 2024 the claimant had asked for and the Occupational Health Doctor had recommended a further adjustment of her then existing duty modifications by substituting for the then existing adjustment that she be given “reasonable notice” of being required to attend at a Police Office by and with the adjustment that she be given a minimum of 7 days’ notice of being required to attend at a Police Office. As at 20 April 2024 that recommendation had been confirmed by the respondent to the claimant as agreed (on 1 April 2024) but had not yet been uploaded onto the SCOPE System as the process of agreeing certain additional requested adjustment was not yet concluded. DS Soutar, when issuing the request to, amongst others, the claimant, was not aware of that further modification believing rather that the requirement remained that the claimant be given reasonable notice. He considered, in the urgent circumstances which had arisen, that the notice given by him on a Friday for attendance on the following Wednesday was “reasonable”. The claimant for her part believed that the Occupational Health Doctor having made that recommendation in January 2024 and the respondent having confirmed to her that it was agreed that she should have received 7 days’ notice of that request.

[206]While accepting the evidence of DS Soutar that it was not his intention that his request should have the effect of intimidating the claimant, and that the claimant, who declined to attend, was not ultimately “required” to do so, the Tribunal also accepted the claimant’s evidence that at the time of receiving the request she had perceived it to be intimidating given that it was one made contrary to what she knew had been agreed and what she therefor felt entitled to expect, would have been 7 days’ notice.

[207]As it has found in fact the Tribunal considered that it would have been reasonable in the circumstances for the respondents to have taken forward with the claimant to a conclusion the process of agreeing the totality of the adjustments, and or to have uploaded those adjustments which were agreed as at 1 April to the SCOPE System so that the claimant’s managers could be aware of and give effect to them, which failing, to have uploaded the recommended substitute adjustments onto the SCOPE System pending their further meeting with the claimant to agree them.

[208]In those circumstances the Tribunal holds that it was reasonable for the claimant to perceive the conduct of requesting her attendance without 7 days’ notice as creating an intimidating environment for her.

[209]The Tribunal holds that in asking the claimant, shortly before the 20 April 2026, to attend at a Police Office with less than 7 days’ notice the respondent harassed the claimant in terms of section 26 of the Equality Act 2010. The Tribunal so holds notwithstanding the fact that the claimant did not accede to the request, was not ultimately required to attend and did not in fact attend at the Police Office in response to the request.

[210]In relation to the second alleged incident section 26 harassment identified by the claimant in evidence as constituting the issue at [6.2] on the list of issues, the Tribunal determined that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden of proof in respect of establishing harassment. The harassment is said to have been constituted by a circular issued, by the team’s first line manager DS Soutar, to all members of the team including the claimant, advising of his intention going forward to introduce a rota by which the operation of the necessary task of updating the laptops used within the team by individuals attending training courses, would be a task shared amongst all team members. This was to be accomplished by team members taking their turn, in rotation, to come into the office and update laptops.

[211]There was no evidence before the Tribunal that went to establish that the claimant was ever asked to attend at a Police Station on any particular date, on any occasion without 7 days’ notice, to carry out that task, which was a task falling within the category of triaged tasks which she was able to undertake.

[212]The Tribunal was satisfied that the operational reasons and purposes for, and served by Sargeant Soutar’s communication of introduction of such a rota, did not include the purpose of creating either of the effects set out in section 26(b)(1)(ii).

[213]Notwithstanding the Tribunal’s finding that the claimant was never so asked to attend at a Police Station for that purpose with less than 7 days’ notice the Tribunal further finds that, let it be assumed that Sargeant Soutar’s inclusion of the claimant in this circular had such an effect on the claimant, it was not reasonable, in those circumstances, for the claimant to perceive it as conduct having that effect.

[214]The Tribunal holds that the inclusion of the claimant in the laptop updating circular did not constitute harassment of her. The Tribunal holds that the section 26 EQA complaint of harassment in so far as founded upon that alleged instance of section 26 EqA Harassment set out at paragraphs 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 (paragraph 6.2 on the list of issues), falls to be dismissed. Victimisation

[215]“[7] Did the claimant do a protected act? The protected acts said to be:- [7.1] An email of 11 January 2024 asserting her reasonably adjusted role. [7.2] Conversation with Sargeant Soutar on 16 January 2024 about her ‘My Career’ appraisal. [7.3] A teams meeting with Inspector Kidd on 17 January 2024 where she further asserted her reasonably adjusted role.” Section 27 Victimisation

[216]On the evidence presented, the Tribunal found that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden of proof such as to establish that any one of the events identified at paragraphs [7.1], [7.2] and/or [7.3] of the list of issues constituted the doing by her of a protected act in terms of section 27 of the Equality Act 2010.

[217]In relation to [7.1] no such email of 11 January 2024 was identified in evidence either orally or within the documentary evidence produced.

[218]In respect of issue [7.2] the claimant’s evidence was restricted to that which she alleged was said to her by Sergeant Soutar, she gave no evidence as to anything which she said in the course of the conversation such that might satisfy the requirements of section 27, sub-section (2).

[219]While in her evidence before the Tribunal the claimant spoke to a belief on her part that the timing of the Occupational Health referral and the contents of the report were designed to try to get an Optima recommendation to remove the claimant from the department, her evidence as to what she said to CI Kidd in the course of the teams conversation of 17 January 2024 was restricted to stating that she “gave Mr Kidd the OH report and said that she was not happy with the content”. The Tribunal considered that that evidence fell far short of what would be required to establish the doing by the claimant of a protected act in terms of section 27 of the 2010 Act.

[220]“[8] If yes to 7, did the respondents subject the claimant to a detriment because she had done so? The alleged detriments being: [8.2] being ignored by the respondent during the period 15 February 2024 to 20 February 2024 after submitting her Optima Report and failing to record her reasonable adjustments. [8.3] on 6 March 2024 during a team’s appraisal discussion being told she could proceed with her “My Career” appraisal which was contrary to what she had been told on 16 January 2024 and being asked if she would work in another department. [8.4] receiving no response to her revised notes of a meeting of 27 March 2024 which she sent on 9 April 2024 which highlighted the fact that notes made no reference to an apology given to her at the meeting. [8.5] during a telephone call with Chief Inspector Howe on 1 May 2024 she was advised to postpone her review meeting because the Optima recommendations which had been available to the respondents since December 2023 had still not been implemented. [8.6] on 20 April 2024 and again on 13 May 2024 by email Sergeant Soutar seeking the claimant’s attendance at a Police Office without being apparently aware of the Optima Report on reasonable adjustments only to attend after being given one week’s notice.

[221]The Tribunal not having found that the claimant did a protected act the requirement to determine the contingent issues set down at paragraphs [8.2], [8.3], [8.4], [8.5] and [8.6] of the list of issues falls away.

[222]Notwithstanding, for completeness sake, the Tribunal records that had it found that one or other of the asserted communications relied upon did constitute the doing by the claimant of a protected act, which it has not, the Tribunal would not have found, on the evidence presented, that the claimant had established that she had been subjected to any of the alleged detrimental conduct at the hands of the respondent’s officers because she had done any of the alleged protected acts.

[223]The claimant did not present any evidence that went to establish the alleged detriment at paragraph [8.2].

[224]There was no evidence that went to establish a causal connection between the alleged detriment at paragraph [8.3] and the alleged, but not established protected act at paragraph [7.2] which was the only alleged act which predated it, or, as to relative timing in relation to the alleged protected act at paragraph [7.2], such as would establish any protected act as having occurred at an earlier point in the conversation than the alleged detriment.

[225]The email of 9 November 2024 relied upon at paragraph [8.4], contrary to what is asserted in the issue makes no mention of the fact the notes make no reference to an apology given to her at the meeting.

[226]Separately there was no evidence that went to establish a causal connection between any of the alleged protected acts, on the one hand, and the alleged detriment of failing to receive a response to an email on the other.

[227]Neither was there evidence that went to establish primary facts from which the Tribunal could draw an inference that such alleged failure to respond to an email was caused by any of the alleged protected acts.

[228]In relation to paragraph [8.5], there was no evidence that went to establish that Chief Inspector Howe, who was not involved in any of the three alleged protected acts, had any knowledge that the events described in them had occurred, or that the claimant was alleging that they had occurred. There was no evidence that went to establish a causal connection between the alleged detriment on the one hand and any of the alleged three protected acts on the other.

[229]Separately, the evidence of Chief Inspector Howe, which was not seriously challenged in cross-examination and which the Tribunal accepted as both credible and reliable in this regard, goes to establish that the reason, for the request that the claimant consider agreeing to a postponement of the scheduled Occupational Health Review meeting, was a reason wholly unconnected with any of the alleged three protected acts.

[230]In relation to issue [8.6] there was no evidence that Sergeant Soutar had knowledge of the alleged protected acts described at issue [7.1] or issue [7.3] and no evidence which went to establish a causal link between such conversation as he is said to have had with the claimant at issue [7.2], on the one hand, and his asking the claimant, amongst others, on 4/5 days’ notice, to attend at the Glenrothes Office to assist with the move, or including the claimant in the circular communication relating to the intended future production of a rota whereby all members of the team would be asked to come in to the Police Office each in turn to carry out the administrative task of updating team training laptops.

[231]Had there been such evidence, the Tribunal would separately have held that including the claimant in the circular regarding the future introduction of a rota in relation to the updating of team laptops, would not have constituted, on the evidence presented, the subjecting of the claimant to a detriment.

[232]In summary, the Tribunal disposes of the issues by finding, on the preponderance of the evidence and on the balance of probabilities; a) that the claimant has established one complaint of section 26 Equality Act 2010 Harassment, as evidenced by the request only that she attend at Glenrothes Police Office to assist in the moving of furniture and equipment out of that office, on 20 April 2024 with less than 7 days’ notice and b) that otherwise, the claimant has failed to establish her complaints of discrimination and of victimisation which are dismissed.

Remedy

[233]The Tribunal having found that the respondent subjected the claimant to an instance of harassment restricted to that specified [6.2] of the list of issues, the claimant is entitled to be compensated for causative injury to her feelings.

[234]The onus of proof in respect of causation and as to the extent of any resultant injury to feelings attributable to the established act of harassment, sits with the claimant. The standard of proof to be met is that of “on the balance of probabilities”.

[235]An injury to feelings award is not a punitive award but rather is intended to be compensatory. The Tribunal cannot competently award compensation in respect of injury to feelings which is not directly attributable to the instance of harassment which it has found established.

[236]On the evidence presented the Tribunal has found in fact and concludes that the one instance of conduct amounting to Harassment which it has found established in question did cause injury to the claimant’s feelings at the time of her being subjected to it. To that extent, the Tribunal finds that the claimant has discharged her onus of proof in respect of causation of some injury to feelings in the context of the immediate experience of the act of being asked, on less than 7 days’ notice, to attend at the Glenrothes Police Office on 20 April 2024, to assist other team members in the execution of what was an urgent requirement for the team to vacate the office.

[237]In so far as going to establish whether that hurt to feelings endured beyond the immediate experience of that act, the Tribunal considered that there was no evidence presented which went to establish the same. The evidence before the Tribunal established that the claimant did not accede to the request and did not attend the office on the day in question.

[238]The claimant’s own evidence as to injury to feelings was, in its terms, general evidence relating to the totality of her experience as alleged across not only the incident in respect of which the Tribunal has found harassment established but across all of the incidents of alleged discrimination, the balance of which the Tribunal has not found established. It was evidence which did not support, or enable, the making of findings in fact which attribute the extent of any injury to feelings to the specific incident or the particular instance of harassment which the Tribunal has found established.

[239]Neither parties’ representative specifically addressed the Tribunal in submission as to remedy and/or the quantification of any award of compensation. In these circumstances the Tribunal must seek to make an appropriate award on the limited evidence available to it, bearing in mind, as already stated, that an injury to feelings award is not a punitive award but rather is intended to be compensatory.

[240]The relevant Vento bands for awarding compensation for injury to feelings, standing the date of first presentation of the claim on 13 September 2024, are:-• Lower band £1,200 to £11,700 for less serious cases.

• Middle band £11,700 to £35,200 for cases that do not merit an award in the upper band.

• Upper band £35,200 to £58,700 for the most serious cases.

[241]Only in “the most exceptional cases” should an award for injury to feelings exceed the top of the upper band.

[242]The bands originate from the case of Vento v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (No. 2)

[2003] IRLR 102

and are subject to annual update.

[243]The guidance contained in applicable judgments of the higher courts indicate that the lower band is one which will generally apply to isolated or one off incidents with limited (established) health impact, the middle band to serious cases of repeated harassment or significant negative impact and the upper band, to the most serious cases, such as a lengthy campaign of harassment.

[244]The Vento bands are a guideline, the duty of the Tribunal being to fix, in the circumstances of each case, what it considers to be fair, reasonable and just compensation.

[245]Factors emerging from the limited evidence before the Tribunal as to remedy which merit consideration in the case include:-(a) The fact that Sargeant Soutar, was aware at the point of including the claimant in the circular that she already required to be given “reasonable notice” of any requirement that she attend at a Police Office;

(b) That the claimant’s circumstances (i.e. the state of her mental health) had changed such that she had sought and the Occupational Health Doctor had recommended in the course of the Occupational Health Review of January 2024 and although unknown to Sergeant Soutar, the respondent had confirmed its Agreement that that notice be increased to a minimum of 7 days (state of mental health had changed);

(c) That the respondent, albeit not her line manager who included her in the circular) had been aware since the Occupational Health assessment (the Occupational Health Doctor’s Output Report) had been made available to them in January of 2024 of that change of circumstance and recommended additional adjustment;

(d) That the claimant was never in fact required to attend at the Police Office on the occasion but rather was simply asked to;

(e) That the claimant did not accede to the request and did not in fact attend at the office on that occasion.

[246]Weighing the above factors in the balance and standing back and looking at the totality of the relevant evidence, that is evidence relating to injury to feelings that can be seen as attributable to the particular instance of harassment which the Tribunal has found to be established, the Tribunal considers that an award of injury of feelings in the instant case is one which sits within the lower band of the Vento guidelines and in the bottom third thereof.

[247]In respect of injury to feelings following from and attributable to the incident of requesting that the claimant, amongst other members of the team, attend at the Glenrothes Office on 20 April 2024 on the giving of only 4 days’ notice the Tribunal makes a compensatory award of £2,500.

[248]No patrimonial loss was incurred or claimed and the Tribunal makes no award in that regard.

[249]The claimant’s Schedule of Loss at page 57 of the joint bundle makes reference to the claimant having incurred counselling fees details of which were awaited. There was no evidence of such loss presented to the Tribunal, nor was there evidence which would have allowed the Tribunal to positively attribute any particular portion of such loss to the incident of harassment which it has found to be established, and no award is made in that regard.