Ms H Worthington v North Ayrshire Women’s Aid: 8001366/2024
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the claimant was not unfairly dismissed and the claim is dismissed.REASONS
[1]The claimant presented a claim of unfair dismissal on 4 September 2024. The respondents resist the claim, and a final hearing was fixed over two days. The claimant represented herself, and the respondents were represented by Ms Stirton, HR consultant.Issues
[2]It is accepted that the claimant was dismissed. The respondents say the reason for dismissal was that the claimant’s role required her to have the use of her one own vehicle, which she did not have. It was identified at the commencement of the hearing that this was ‘some other substantial reason’ (‘SOSR’) in terms of section 98 (1) (b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the ERA).[3]The claimant does not accept the reason for dismissal and this is therefore an issue for the Tribunal.[4]If the Tribunal is satisfied that that there was a potentially fair reason for dismissal, the issue is then whether that dismissal for that reason was fair or unfair in terms of Section 98(4) of the ERA.[5]If the claimant succeeds the Tribunal would consider remedy.The Hearing
[6]For the respondents, evidence was given by:• Amy Park, Service Manager - Dismissing Officer; and• Mary Beglan, Chief Officer - Appeal Officer.[7]The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf.[8]The parties produced their own bundles of documents. Findings in Fact The respondents[9]The respondents are a charity engaged in the provision of support services to woman and children in North Ayrshire. The support provided includes the provision one to one support and of refuge accommodation. The had around 12 employees to include around 9 Women’s Aid Support Workers (WASWs). A significant element of the duties of a WASW meeting with service users to provide support. It is the service user who decides where to meet with the WASW (e.g. at their own accommodation or to come into the respondent’s office to meet them). The WASW’s role also involves transporting woman and children and household goods to accommodation, cleaning, and doing dump runs as well as a number of other duties.[10]In 2022, the person specification for the role of WASW provided that a driving licence with the use of own vehicle was an essential requirement of the job. A driving licence and use of own vehicle was considered necessary by the respondents to allow WASWs to carry out their duties in particular personal appointments. The respondents did not consider that the use of public transport to carry out the role of WASA was a viable option due to the rural and sparsely populated nature of much of the territory their services covered, the quality the public transport services available, and the travel time for journeys by public transport being much longer than by car.[11]A person specification for the WASW role was produced on 4 March 2023 and was uploaded on the respondent’s website which did not contain as an essential requirement the use of own vehicle. This was an error on the part of the respondents and has been corrected.[12]Prior to August 2023, the respondents had three vehicles for the use of staff to carry out their duties. Around that time, they sold these and acquired two new vehicles. Around the same time, the respondents also developed a new role of General Assistant (GA). It was envisaged that the GA would provide support to the WASA’s and undertake tasks such as delivering household goods/cleaning houses/dump runs. GA’s were not required to have their own car for the performance of this role. It was intended that they would use the respondent’s vehicles to perform their tasks.[13]A Company Vehicle Policy was introduced in September 2023. It provided for a booking system to book the company vehicles. The policy provided that staff should be using their own cars for general appointments/home visits and that if there was an issue with their own vehicle, it must be discussed as soon as possible with the line manager.[14]The policy provided that there were a range of tasks that the vehicles could be booked for. Booking was done digitally, in the same way as appointment rooms were booked. The tasks were:• transporting women and children to refuge accommodation;• group pickups/drop offs;• maintenance type visits;• longer journeys;• joint visits; and• dump runs.[15]The respondents recruited two GA in around October 2023, with another GA joining them for a few months over the winter period. None of these GA’s remained employed as of June 2024. The respondents were by that time advertising for another GA, and one was recruited in July 2024.[16]The respondents find it difficult to recruit staff. As a result of this, around the end of 2022/beginning of 2023 they recruited two WASW’s who did not have driving licenses. Both were given six months to pass their driving test and obtain their own vehicle. This time limit was subsequently extended. Neither of these individuals remined employed by the respondents. One left for another job and one was dismissed.[17]All of the WASW’s have a driving licence and, with the exception of the claimant, have the use of their own vehicle in the performance of their role.[18]The respondents staff handbook contains a disciplinary procedure.[19]The respondents have to meet the requirements of their funders, which include achieving an acceptable level of home visits to their service users. The claimant[20]The claimant, whose date of birth is 19 May 1975, was employed by the respondents as a WASW commencing on 6 June 2022. The claimant was dismissed from that employment on 20 June with two weeks’ notice.[21]It was agreed that the claimant’s salary from that employment was £597.30 gross per week and £2030.97 net per calendar month and that the respondents paid a pension contribution of £120.92 per month. A ‘money off’ benefit was offered on medical insurance to which the respondents pay £13.50 per month.[22]When the claimant applied for the role, she was provided with the person specification which identified that that holding a driving and having use of her own vehicle was essential. At the interview for the post for the job, the claimant had indicated that she had a car. The claimant was aware when she applied for and accepted the job that she needed the use of her own car to perform the role.[23]When the claimant commenced her employment, she was provided with a statement of main terms and conditions and a company handbook which was incorporated into her contract. There was no reference in these documents to a requirement for a driving licence or use of a vehicle.[24]The claimant frequently used the company vehicles in carrying out her duties, including attending personal appointments.[25]There was no issue with the quality of the claimant’s performance at work. Events leading to dismissal[26]The claimant attended a supervision meeting with her line manager, Ms Park on 9 January 2024. During that meeting, the claimant advised Ms Park that she no longer had a car. She told her that she had to scrap her car and that it was a bit of a struggle financially to get another one. Ms Park asked the claimant how she was getting to her appointments. The claimant said that she had managed before and that a lot of women came to the hub (the respondent’s office). She also said that she could use public transport as her colleagues did, that she could use the respondent's vehicle. Ms Park told the claimant that using the respondent’s vehicle could not be a long term solution and that she needed to have her own car for the job. The claimant asked if there was a possibility of a trial period of her using the respondent’s vehicle. Ms Park told her that this would not be an option and that they would have to discuss the matter again soon. She asked the claimant if she was looking for a car; she confirmed that she was but that she was finding this difficult. Ms Park told the claimant that they would speak again soon, as she needed a car for her work.[27]The claimant did not acquire the use of her own vehicle. She was asked to attend a meeting with Ms Park on 29 February 2024 to discuss this. Ms Park was accompanied by Mr Muir of HR at this meeting. This was a short meeting in which the claimant confirmed she still did not have a car and was told that this situation could not go on. She was told that they would meet again in two months for an update.[28]A further meeting took place on 22 May 2024 with the claimant, Ms Park and Mr Muir. Minutes of the meeting were produced, in which it was stated that the meeting was a formal meeting. Ms Park told the claimant that she needed a car to carry out her duties to go and visit service users, and that using the respondent’s vehicle was not acceptable. The claimant responded that she did not know that this was in the contract and she had not seen it anywhere she said she was told that she could not claim mileage if there was a company car available. Ms Park agreed that she was told this too, but said that they had discussed since around December 23 2023 that she needed a car. The claimant agreed that it had been discussed since around December and said that she had had a car but had had to scrap it around that time. Ms Park told the claimant that not having a car and using the respondent's vehicle to attend meetings with service users was unfair to other staff members who provide their own transport, and that it also affected her performance as it was not meeting the respondent's contractual obligations to their funders. The claimant disputed that this was impacting her performance. Ms Park told her that they had discussed that requirement to have a car to support service users in relation to funding commitments. She proposed that they meet again on 19 June 2024, and that if the claimant failed to have the use of a car by then, that this could affect her employment going forward.[29]This meeting was followed up with a letter from Ms Park of the same date in which she sent the claimant the minutes of the meeting. She advised that she stressed that the clamant needed the use of a car because of her contractual obligations, the service levels required under the respondent’s contractual obligations to their funders, and the respondent’s policy over the use of pool cars.[30]The letter stated: “As we discussed at the meeting, I expect that you will have the use of a car by 19 June 2023 when we next meet. If you fail to have the use of a car or advise me of an agreed date when you will, your future employment with NAWA will be at risk.”[31]The letter also contained information on the percentage of appointments the claimant conducted in and out of the office, which was 51% in office against 49% out of office. It was stated that this did not meet the service the funders required, which was to see more people at home.[32]The letter also stated that the fact that claimant had not claimed travel expense supported the position that she but had booked out the respondent’s vehicle to carry out home visits as opposed to using public transport.[33]The letter stated in the penultimate paragraph: “You are entitled to be accompanied at this meeting by either an accredited trade union official or a work colleague.”[34]No date or venue for the meeting was notified in that letter, however a meeting did take place on 19 June 2024 at the respondent’s premises. The claimant attended unaccompanied. Ms Park was accompanied by Ms Stirton as an HR consultant/note taker.[35]Ms Park told the claimant that she was a good worker, however she needed to be more mobilised and have less telephone appointments.[36]Ms Park advised the claimant that she needed to have a car and this was discussed at her interview, as all staff require a driving licence and their own transport. The claimant said that she could not remember this.[37]Ms Park’s check of the claimant’s records indicated that the claimant had been asked about having a driving licence and her own vehicle at interview and this was confirmed.[38]The claimant said that she still did not have car and that she could not afford a car as she was the only person working in the house and due to the cost of childcare and her partner being unemployed.[39]Ms Park asked the claimant if she thought she could access her own transport in the near future. The claimant responded that would not. She said she did not see why she could not use the respondent’s vehicles. Ms Park told her that they would be required for the two GA’s once they started.[40]The claimant disagreed that she needed her own transport to carry out her role.[41]Ms Park then told the claimant that she had no option but to dismiss her with two weeks’ notice as she could not fulfil the role due to her not having her own transport.[42]Ms Park confirmed her decision in a letter of 20 June 2024. That letter contained an error in that it referred to the claimant’s husband as the claimant is not married.[43]Mr Park took the decision to dismiss the claimant with advice from an HR consultant. Her letter which set out the reasons for her decision to dismiss the claimant. These were:• “You were advised and understood clearly, at interview, that the job required you to have a full driving licence and access to your own transport.• At the time of your interview you advised that you had two cars that you could access.• You have been advised informally and formally throughout your employment that you are required to have your own transport.• For equity, all other staff in the same/similar rules are required and have their own transport.• The organisation’s vehicle is required for other use.• The role requires you to be mobile and deliver goods and services to women the organisation supports across the whole of North Ayrshire.• You are expected to be on the on call rota, and at short notice, an emergency or urgently, you would be required to get to one of the women being supported across the whole of North Ayrshire when the office is closed and no other staff are available.”[44]The respondents issued two versions of this letter, with different dismissal dates (4 July 2024 and 20 June 2024).[45]The claimant was advised of her right to appeal this decision within five days to Ms Beglan, which she did.[46]The claimant submitted two letters of appeal setting out a number of points. These points included that there was no contractual obligation to have access to a car and that she could use public transport if necessary; that she had been dismissed at an informal meeting; that there had never been a disciplinary process; she had been advised that her performance was good; that on call had never been discussed; she had not been told she would be dismissed if she did not have car by 19 June 2024; there was no discussion about in person appointments, and appointments were made to suit the service user; that WASWs had been employed who could not drive; that she had always been able to access the respondents vehicles; that GA’s had more access to the respondents vehicles which was not equitable[47]Ms Beglan was aware that Ms Park was dealing with the car situation with the claimant, however she was not aware of the detail of it.[48]An appeal hearing was held on 4 July 2024. The claimant attended with a work colleague. Ms Beglan was accompanied by Mr Muir as a note taker. There was a delay at the start of the meeting to allow the claimant to read the respondent’s appeal papers which comprised of the notes of the meeting, letters sent to the claimant and the two person specifications for the role. Minutes of the meeting we produced.[49]Ms Beglan did not uphold the appeal. She wrote to the claimant on 10 July 2024 with her reasons on the points raised by the claimant in her appeal.[50]Ms Beglan found the claimant had clear notice of the potential consequences of the 19 June 2024 meeting.[51]Ms Beglan found that the claimant had been told at four meetings from January 2024 of the need to get a car. She noted the claimant had produced the person specification for the role which did not specify use of own vehicle as an essential requitement. She carried out investigations with the respondents IT provider which confirmed that the person specification which the claimant received when she applied for the job contained use of own vehicle as an essential specification. Ms Beglan provided the claimant with a copy of the meta data confirming this. She advised that the person specification currently on the website was an error and would be taken down immediately.[52]Ms Beglan found that two WASW had been employed who did not drive but that they had been employed subject to the caveat that they passed their driving test and got a car, from which she concluded that everyone was treated the same.[53]Ms Beglan did not uphold that there was never any difficulty in the claimant assessing a vehicle. She referred to the car policy and stipulation to use your own car for personal visits/general appointments. She found that the travel expenses records demonstrated that the claimant had not used her own car, or public transport but had overly relied on the respondent’s vehicles.[54]Ms Beglan did not consider discussion of on call relevant.[55]She agreed that the there were no issues with the claimant’s performance, but again did not consider this relevant.[56]Ms Beglan concluded on the basis of the contents of the 19 June 2024 meeting that it was a formal meeting.[57]Ms Beglan advised that GA’s have a different role and duties requiring the use of the respondent’s vehicles.[58]Ms Beglan advised the claimant that if she got a car and the required car insurance that would be taken into account.[59]The claimant did not contact Ms Beglan with this information. She had emailed Ms Park on 3 July 2024 advising her that she had managed to secure a car for work. Ms Park had responded that that was great and asked her for details so that they could get her back on the insurance for work. The claimant never responded to this. Post termination[60]The claimant was in receipt of universal credit after her employment came to an end. She applied for two jobs and obtained employment under a six month temporary contract commencing on 17 September 2024. This terminates on 17 March 2025. The claimant is hopeful that the contract will be renewed, but has no guarantee of this. There is no negative differential claimed between the claimant’s income from this employment and her income from the respondents. Note on evidence[61]There was not a great deal of material conflict in the evidence, however there were some matters which the Tribunal had to deal with. Overall, the Tribunal formed the impression that the respondent’s witnesses were credible and reliable. Their credibility was enhanced in that their evidence was generally consistent with the contemporaneous documentary evidence. Further, Ms Park was able to make appropriate concessions. She accepted without difficulty that she made an error in referring to the claimant’s husband, and that although she thought that the statement that the claimant said she had two cars at interview came from another manager, she could not verify this. The Tribunal did not consider that anything material turned on these errors.[62]The claimant drew the Tribunal’s attention in her evidence-in-chief to the fact that that there were two dismissal letters. This was not put to the respondent’s witnesses in cross examination and is therefore unexplained. However, the only difference in the letters of the date of termination of employment and the Tribunal did not draw any inference adverse to the respondent’s witnesses credibility from the fact that two letters had been created.[63]The Tribunal did not conclude that the claimant sought any way to deliberately misled, and a great deal of her evidence was also consistent with the contemporaneous documents. It did however form the impression that from time to time she struggled to make appropriate concessions and put a gloss on matters. For example, despite the terms in which it is drafted, the claimant did not accept that the person specification from March 2022 required the uses of a car, simply stating that that was not the document she received. She was unable to explain why she brought up the fact she did not have a car at her meeting with Ms Park. Her position was that she did not receive an invite to the 19 June 2024 meeting, despite the terms of the letter of 22 May 2024 and the fact at she had attended the meeting.[64]The two points the Tribunal had to deal with related to the person specification the claimant received at the information provided at the claimant’s interview.[65]The claimant suggested that the person specification she received did not identify use of own vehicle as an essential requirement. She also suggested that she did not get recruitment documents.[66]On this latter point, there appeared to be some inconsistency in the claimant’s evidence. She suggested that she did not receive recruitment documentation at all, but also appeared to suggest that the document created in March 2023 was the person specification she received when she applied for the job.[67]On balance the Tribunal accepted Ms Began and Ms Park’s evidence that the person specification which the claimant received when she applied for the post identified the use of own vehicle as essential. This evidence was supported by the investigation carried out at the appeal stage and the meta data report produced which confirmed that the document had not been altered since March 2022. Further, Ms Parks’ explanation of the date at the bottom of the document produced by the claimant credibly explained that the date of the document was created was March 2023, which was after the claimant was recruited.[68]The Tribunal also accepted on balance that this person specification contained an error and has been removed. The fact that the two members of staff who could not drive and did not have their own vehicles were recruited subject to the requirement that they obtain both of these, and that all of the WASW meet this requirement tends to support this conclusion.[69]The Tribunal was also satisfied on balance that the claimant had been asked at interview if she had a car and confirmed that she did. The claimant said she could not remember this being asked, however the Tribunal accepted Ms Parks evidence that when she checked the record of the claimants interview it indicated that this had been asked and answered. There was no basis, as Ms Park accepted, on which to conclude the claimant said she had two cars.[70]The claimant made a submission to the effect that she did not understand that she needed a car, and that she had never been told this formally. The Tribunal did not accept given the terms of the person specification, what was said at interview, and the fact that the claimant brought up in January that she no longer had a car, that she was unaware of this requirement of the job. Submissions[71]Both parties made oral submissions, these were taken into account however in the interests of brevity are not set out here in full, but are dealt with below where relevant.Consideration
[72]Section 95 of the ERA creates the right not to be unfairly dismissed.[73]Section 98 provides: “(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show—(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and(b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (2) A reason falls within this subsection if it— (a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) relates to the conduct of the employee,(c) is that the employee was redundant, or(d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment. ………………… (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.[74]The respondents have the burden of proof in relation to the reason for dismissal. The burden of proof under section 98 (4) is neutral. Reason for dismissal[75]The Tribunal began by considering the reason for dismissal.[76]It was identified at the outset of the hearing that the reason relied upon was that the claimant required the use of her own vehicle to carry out her role and she did not have this, which reflected the terms of the ET3. It was also identified that this was ‘some other substantial reason’ (SOSR) in terms of Section 98 (1)(b). In her submissions, Ms Stirton made reference to the claimant failing to follow a reasonable management instruction, however this was not presented as a misconduct dismissal, either in the course of the pretermination procedure, or in the ET3, or at the outset of this hearing. The Tribunal considered this went beyond a re-labelling exercise, as identifying a misconduct dismissal may have made some difference to the way the hearing was conducted, and it was not permissible to consider the reason as one of misconduct.[77]The Tribunal therefore considered whether the respondents had made out the SOSR of the claimant requiring her own vehicle to perform the role of WASA, which she did not have.[78]An SOSR must be of a kind to justify the dismissal of the employee holding the job in question. The reason must be substantial and not frivolous or trivial. The respondents must show at the stage of establishing the reason for dismissal only that it is a potentially fair one. That is to say that the reason could, but not necessarily does, justify dismissal.[79]The claimant submitted that the job could be done without the use of her own car and there was never any impact on the performance of her duties by virtue of the fact that she did not have access to her own vehicle.[80]The Tribunal was however satisfied that there were genuine and legitimate reasons for the requirement for WASW’s to have access to their own vehicle in the performance of their role. A significant part of that role involved meeting with service users and such visits could at the service users choosing to be at their own home, although it was accepted that the service user could also chose also to come into the office. The respondent’s funders require home visits to be carried out.[81]There is also a requirement to drive women and children to refuges or other location, deliver household goods, clean or do dump runs. While there are two vehicles available there are nine WASWs and at some points 2 GA’s, who all have access to these vehicles for these purposes. The claimant’s evidence was that she never had difficulty accessing these vehicles, however the fact that there was a booking system in place for the vehicles and that they were designated for the purpose of carrying out specific tasks which did not include carrying out personal appointments, which comprised a significant part of WASW duties, supports the conclusion that access to a personal vehicle was a legitimate requirement of the role of WASW.[82]It was reasonable for the respondents to take into account the geography of the area covered and the quality of the public transport services available and to conclude that public transport would make travel times significantly longer and that to was not feasible to rely on this to perform the role. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal take into account that the respondents did recruit two WASW who did not drive, however it was satisfied that this was done because of difficulties in recruitment and that these members of staff were recruited on the condition that they obtained a driving licence and a car within initially a six month period. That period was extended but both employees did not remain employed and all of the WSAW as of June 2024 have the use of their own car. Reasonableness of decision[83]Having regard to these factors, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents had made out the reason for dismissal and went on to consider the fairness of that dismissal. This question is answered by the Tribunal with regard to the overall test of reasonableness under Section 98(4) of the ERA, which involves considering whether dismissal for that reason was fair applying the objective test of a reasonable employer and considering whether the decision to dismiss fell within the band of reasonable responses open to the employer.[84]The claimant submitted that there was no documentation that a car was required.[85]The Tribunal was satisfied that although there was no reference to the requirement to have the use of a vehicle in the statement of main terms issued to the claimant, for the reasons given above under note on evidence, the claimant was aware of this requirement at when she applied for and obtained the post.[86]The claimant made a number of submissions on the fairness of the procedure adopted prior to her dismissal, which she submitted rendered it unfair. She was never invited to a formal meeting; the respondents did not follow the ACAS code; there was no investigation; and Ms Began and Mr Muir could not be impartial as they had previously been involved. Ms Beglan was Ms Park’s line manager and was aware the situation and Mr Muir had attended earlier meetings.[87]The Tribunal did not consider a great deal turned on the distinction which both parties appeared to try to draw between formal and informal meetings. What is material is that that a meeting takes place, that parties know what will be discussed at it; what is aired at that meeting and who is invited to attend. The Tribunal, applying the objective test of a test of reasonable employer, considered the steps taken prior to dismissal.[88]It was not unreasonable that the issue of the claimant not having access to her own vehicle having been discussed in January 2024 and the claimant having been advised that she needed have the use of her own car, that the respondents then arranged two further meetings in February and May to discuss it further.[89]Although the claimant did not accept that she was invited to meeting on 19 June 2024, the Tribunal was satisfied that, notwithstanding that a time and venue were not contained in the letter of 22 May 2024, that the claimant was invited to a meeting on 19 June 2024 as she attended one on that date. The letter of 22 May 2024 advised her what would be discussed on 19 June 2024. She was told that she would need to have a car, or be able to say when she would get one and that if she did not do so, her employment would be at risk. The claimant relied in the fact she was not told that she would be dismissed, however it was not unreasonable for the respondents to state that her employment would be at risk, rather that stating she would be dismissed.[90]Nor was it unreasonable for the respondent to tell the claimant in May 2024 that she could be accompanied by a trade union representative or a work colleague. While the letter of 22 May 2024 is deficient in identifying the time and venue of the meeting, the Tribunal did not consider it plausible, as suggested by the claimant, that she did not understand this statement and was confused by it thinking it referred to the meeting which had just taken place.[91]The Tribunal was not satisfied that as a matter of fact, Ms Beglan had detailed knowledge of the claimant’s situation prior to the appeal. It was not unreasonable for her as the Chief Officer to deal with the appeal. Nor was it unreasonable for Mr Muir to be present as a note taker. There was no evidence that he made the decision in dismissal or appeal.[92]This was not a misconduct dismissal and in not one in which would it would it be unreasonable not to carry out an investigation such as might occur in a conduct case. Although this is not a type of dismissal to which the ACAS code would apply the respondents did give the claimant notice of what would be discussed at the 19 June meeting, told her the potential consequences of that meeting and advised her that she could be accompanied. She was given the right to of appeal and had an appeal hearing with an outcome letter that attempted to deal all of the points she raised. There were no aspects of this which procedurally could be said to be unreasonable.[93]The claimant submitted that there was no documentation to confirm that a car was required.[94]The Tribunal was satisfied that although there was no reference to the requirement to have the use of a vehicle in the statement of main terms issued to the claimant, for the reasons given above under “Notes on Evidence”, the claimant was aware of this requirement at the point when she applied for and obtained the post.[95]The Tribunal also considered the fact that, as submitted by the claimant, there was no discussion about her on call prior to her dismissal. On call is cited in the letter of dismissal but had not been specifically discussed. The Tribunal did not consider that objectively this was capable of rendering the decision unfair in circumstances where it was satisfied that there was a legitimate requirement for WASWs to have access to a car in the performance of their duties.[96]The Tribunal considered the claimant’s submission to the effect that she never had a problem accessing a car, that she had previously been told that she should use a company vehicle if one was available and that other WASA’s did not drive and had been given longer than her to obtain a licence and a car.[97]Even if the claimant had been told at one stage to use company vehicles, this did not impact the fact that use of own vehicle had been identified as a pre requisite of the job when the claimant applied and that she knew that, that she alerted the respondents to the fact that she did not have car in January 2024 and was told, in line with their vehicle policy that she needed one for, and that she was given time to acquire one.[98]Even if the claimant did not consider she experienced difficulty in accessing a vehicle, it not unreasonable for the respondents to take into account that there were other employees who needed to use the vehicles, including the GA’s who did not require use of their own vehicle, but were expected to use the respondent’s vehicles in the performance of their duties. Although there were no GA posts in June 2024, the post had been advertised and a GA was in place by July 2024.[99]Nor was it unreasonable for the respondents to take into account that all the other WASA had the use of their own vehicles. The respondents were reasonably entitled to conclude that there was an equity point in that if the claimant being permitted not to have the use of her own car, when all their other WASW had to have the use of their own vehicle. The fact that that they had employed two WASWs who did not drive, did not diminish the significance of this in that both been told that they had to obtain a licence and a car within a specified period. Neither of them remained employed.[100]The Tribunal also considered the time frame which the claimant was given to obtain a vehicle. The claimant submitted that this was vague and she was not given any deadlines. However, the Tribunal was satisfied that the timeline was as set out in the findings in fact and that the claimant was made aware that she needed to obtain a car from January 2024 and that this message was reinforced in February and May. By May 2024, a timeline of 19 June 2024 was clearly identified by which she was expected to have a car or say when she would have one. The Tribunal considered applying the objective test a that the period from 9 January 2024 until 19 June 2024 was not an unreasonable one to allow the claimant to obtain access to her own vehicle.[101]It was not unreasonable for the respondents to take into account that by 19 June 2024, the claimant still did not have a vehicle, could not say that she would obtain one in the foreseeable future and continued to adopt the position that she could perform her role without a car.[102]The Tribunal had regard to the steps taken prior to dismissal; the fact that the claimant knew having a car was a requirement of the job when she applied for it; the time allowed for the claimant to obtain her own vehicle; the fact that she did not do so, could not say when she would have a vehicle, and did not accept that she needed one to do her job; and that she was made aware of the potential consequences of not having a car. It also had regard to the fact that others in the organisation also needed to be able to use the respondent’s vehicles, and that the others WASW all had the use of their own vehicles in the performance of their roles.[103]Having regard to these factors, while another employer may have chosen to deal with matters differently, it could not be said that the decision to dismiss for the reason that the reason that the claimant’s post of WASW required her to have the use if her own vehicle, which she did not have, was one which fell out with the band of reasonable response open to a reasonable employer and the claim is dismissed.