Ms S Watson v Northern Marine Group Ltd: 8001112/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8001112/2025Venue GlasgowHearing the CVP/Kinly platform on the 8 August 2025 at 10am
Between
Ms S WatsonClaimantNorthern Marine Group LimitedRespondent
Before
Employment Judge Jane Porter SIRMr N Caiden, Counsel for respondentDate 12 August 2025
JUDGMENT
It is the judgment of the Employment Tribunal to refuse the claimant’s application for interim relief. ETZ4(WR)
REASONS
[1]The claimant was employed by the respondents as a Finance Business Partner between the 11 November 2024 and the 6 May 2025 when her employment was terminated by the respondents. In these proceedings she claims detriment and dismissal under s47B and s103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[2]The claimant’s claims are resisted and there was a Preliminary Hearing (“PH”) in the case on the 9 July 2025 before EJ MacLean. After hearing from the parties EJ MacLean allowed some but not all of the claimant’s proposed amendments to her ET1. As a result of that decision a hearing to determine the claimant’s application for interim relief (s103A being one of the jurisdictions relied upon) was listed for the 8 August 2025 at 10am on the CVP/Kinly platform. ETZ4(WR)[3]At the Hearing the claimant represented herself and the respondents were represented by Mr Caiden of Counsel. There was no Joint Bundle of Productions. Instead, the claimant referred to her Bundle of Productions which was unnumbered and consisted of 22 separate items including a Witness Statement from the claimant and a Witness Statement from Tracey Dunbar. The respondents’ Bundle of Documents was numbered 1- 242.[4]In advance of the hearing the respondents submitted a Skeleton Argument.[5]Prior to submissions, the Employment Judge explained the nature of the hearing to the claimant with reference to the relevant law. It was explained to the claimant that oral evidence would not be heard at the hearing. This explanation was re-iterated in the course of the claimant’s submissions, which were presented in a manner akin to oral evidence. Submissions for the Claimant[6]The claimant made very detailed and lengthy submissions with reference to the documentation. The Tribunal took a careful note of the submissions and considered them fully before reaching a conclusion in the matter. Following a request for written reasons the claimant summarised her submissions. This summary is reproduced below and is in the claimant’s own words:. “APPLICATION FOR INTERIM RELIEF The Claimant applies for interim relief under s.128 Employment Rights Act 1996, having been dismissed for making protected disclosures contrary to s.103A ERA 1996. QUALIFYING DISCLOSURES 1. Workplace Stress Concerns (27 November 2024)• Disclosed systemic workplace stress affecting employee wellbeing• High staff turnover, excessive working hours (emails at 1-3am), team resignations• Protected under s.43B(1)(d) ERA - health and safety of individuals 2. Unsupported Revenue Accrual (28 February 2025)• Identified revenue accrual without supporting documentation contrary to IFRS 15• Requested backup documentation per professional ethics requirements• Escalated to Stena AB Corporate Governance (10 March 2025)• Protected under s.43B(1)(b) ERA - breach of legal obligations in financial reporting 3. Intercompany Reporting Irregularities (11 April 2025)• Reported incorrect intercompany reporting instructions from line manager• Confirmed by Stena Group Chief Accountant as improper procedure• Protected under s.43B(1)(b) ERA - breach of legal obligations in financial reporting DETRIMENTS Clear pattern of victimisation following disclosures:• Continuous requests to process unsupported accruals after 28 February disclosure• Bullying and harassment escalating after whistleblowing (grievance raised 20 March on advice received from Head of Corporate Governance at Stena AB)• Denied trade union representation at routine 1-1 and probation review meeting (18 April, 6 May)• Dismissal on 6 May 2025, immediately following protected disclosures CONCLUSION• Multiple qualifying disclosures in public interest• Clear temporal connection between disclosures and dismissal• Respondent’s performance concerns were not genuine and instead a mechanism by which to cover up for its real principal reason for dismissal, namely whistleblowing• Procedural failures in dismissal process (no appeal rights and no notice given)” Submissions for the Respondents
CONCLUSION
[7]The respondents relied upon their skeleton submissions, which the claimant and the Tribunal had the benefit of considering in advance of the Hearing. In response to a request by the Tribunal the respondents summarised their submissions. This summary is reproduced below, is in the respondents’ own words and should be read in conjunction with the respondents’ skeleton submissions. “The burden of proof is on the Claimant to establish all necessary elements of her claim and that, having done so, she would have a pretty good chance of success at a full hearing in showing that her dismissal was because of any alleged protected disclosure(s). Failure to Establish the Claimant’s Alleged Protected Disclosures It is not clear that the Claimant has established, on the material before the Tribunal, the relevant protected disclosures she relies upon. The first alleged disclosure does not constitute a disclosure of information in the public interest that, in the Claimant’s reasonable belief, shows that “the health and safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered”. In particular, the information disclosed related to a private issue of the Claimant and (ii) the Claimant’s witness statement before the tribunal was silent on this disclosure. The second alleged disclosure expresses the Claimant’s opinion, rather than discloses information. It is not clear that the alleged disclosure shows the Claimant’s reasonable belief that the health and safety of an individual is likely to be endangered. The third alleged disclosure constitutes a limited disclosure of any discernible “information” and does not demonstrate a reasonable belief that the health and safety of an individual is likely to be endangered. The fourth alleged disclosure does not provide relevant information which would constitute a protected disclosure. The circumstances of the alleged disclosure meant that the Claimant could have no reasonable belief that the Respondent was likely to fail to comply with a legal obligation to which it is subject. The fifth alleged disclosure constitutes an inquiry and the Claimant’s opinion. No information was disclosed which shows the Claimant’s reasonable belief that the Respondent was failing to comply with any legal obligation to which they were subject. Further Respondent Submissions In any event, the decision maker did not dismiss the Claimant because of any earlier protected disclosure.(a) The Claimant’s dismissal was for conduct, behaviour and performance at work;(b) the decision maker did not have knowledge of three of the five alleged disclosures when deciding to dismiss;(c) the timing of the dismissal is not consistent with the alleged disclosures having any real influence;(d) it is not clear what benefit the Respondent would obtain from dismissing the Claimant for making the alleged disclosures; and(e) the Claimant cannot establish a “pretty good chance” that her dismissal was principally because of any protected disclosure(s).”
The Law
[8]Applications for interim relief are governed by 128-132 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and Rule 95 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, Schedule 1 which provides that rules 53 to 56 apply to the hearing and that the Tribunal shall not hear oral evidence unless it directs otherwise.[9]The test which the claimant must establish is that she has a ‘pretty good chance of success’ at a full hearing (Taplin v C Shippam Ltd 1978 ICR 1068, EAT, Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz 2011 IRLR 562, EAT) On the issue of the determination of applications for interim relief generally, the Tribunal was guided by the case of London City Airport Ltd v Chacko 2013 IRLR 610, EAT where the EAT clarified that the Tribunal must carry out an ‘expeditious summary assessment’ as to how the matter appears on the material available, doing the best it can with the untested evidence advanced by each party. It was observed that this necessarily involves a far less detailed scrutiny of the parties’ cases than will ultimately be undertaken at the full hearing.[10]The Tribunal also had regard to the words of HHJ Her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she was known then) in the case of His Highness Sheik Khalid Bin Saqr Al Qassim v Robinson (2018) UK EAT 0283/17. At paragraph 59 she summarised the position thus: “I start by reminding myself of the exercise that the ET had to undertake on this application. By its nature, the application had to be determined expeditiously and on a summary basis. The ET had to do the best it could with such material as the parties had been able to deploy at short notice and to make as good an assessment as it felt able. The Employment Judge had to be careful to avoid making findings that might tie the hands of the ET ultimately charged with the final determination of the merits of the points raised. His task was thus very much an impressionistic one: to form a view as to how the matter looked as to whether the Clamant had a pretty good chance and was likely to make out her case, and to explain the conclusion reached on that basis, not in an over formulistic way but giving the essential gist of his reasoning, sufficient to let the parties know why the application had succeeded or failed given the issues raised and the test that had to be applied.”[11]And at paragraph 60 it was stated: “The nature of interim relief also informs the approach the EAT has to take. An ET is charged with this summary assessment, precisely because it is best qualified to carry out this role; an Employment Judge will have the experience of having heard many similar cases at Full Hearing and will thus be able to bring that experience to bear in determining what is likely to be the outcome of the case thus presented on a summary basis. It is right, therefore, that the EAT should be reluctant to interfere and, in my judgment, should only do so if satisfied that the ET erred in law or reached a decision that might properly be characterised as perverse or took into account an irrelevant factor or failed to have regard to the relevant.”[12]In Parsons v Airplus International Ltd UKEAT/0023/16 it was held that an interim relief application should be refused where there was nothing sufficiently striking in the chronology to indicate that the claimant was likely to succeed in her claim and that a full merits Tribunal needed to weigh everything up and come to a conclusion.[13]If the Tribunal agrees with the claimant’s application, it must announce its findings and explain to both parties what powers it can exercise and in what circumstances it will exercise them and will invite the employer to reinstate or re -engage the employee on ‘not less favourable’ terms and conditions pending the final determination (s129(2) and (3) ERA). If the parties agree, the Tribunal can make an order to that effect. Failing agreement, unless it determines that the employee has unreasonably refused an offer of re engagement, the Tribunal will then make an order for the continuation of employment compliant with s130 ERA 1996 which preserves pay and other benefits and continuity of employment. DISCUSSION AND DECISION[14]The Tribunal considered firstly the issue of the making of the protected disclosures. To this end the Tribunal noted carefully the detailed submissions of both parties with reference to the documentation.[15]Insofar as the disclosures made by the claimant are concerned, the Tribunal noted that the respondents’ position is that the disclosures made by the claimant are not protected disclosures and therefore she is not entitled to statutory protection for the same. After consideration that the burden of proof lies on the claimant in this application Tribunal concluded that the issue of whether the disclosures are in fact protected disclosures requires to be discussed with the benefit of evidence at the full Hearing on the Merits, for the reasons expressed by the respondents. In these circumstances, and given that the Tribunal’s role is to form an impressionistic view on whether or not the claimant has a ‘pretty good chance of success’ in this case it is the conclusion of the Tribunal that the claimant’s application for interim relief cannot succeed on this ground alone.[16]Further and in any event, the Tribunal considered that there was force in the submissions of the respondents that the very fact that the claimant made such detailed submissions on the issue of the protected disclosures exposed the fact that there was nothing sufficiently striking in her narrative that could lead the Tribunal to conclude on the materials available that the disclosures made by her were protected disclosures.[17]Insofar as the issue of causation is concerned, it is the respondents’ position that the reason for the claimant’s dismissal was that the claimant’s conduct, behaviour and performance were not of the standards expected. Further, the respondents point to the witness statement of the dismissing officer Carol Macdonald which states that at the time of dismissal she did not had knowledge of three of the five alleged protected disclosures.[18]If the respondents establish all of this at the Hearing on the Merits then the claimant will not succeed in her claim. In these circumstances Tribunal found the claimant’s position on the issue of causation of her dismissal to fall short of the statutory requirement of being ‘likely’ or ‘having a pretty good chance of’ succeeding on this issue. To this end the ex parte statements made by the claimant that her dismissal was caused by her protected disclosures require to be aired at the full Hearing on the Merits with the benefit of parole evidence.[19]Overall, the Tribunal concluded that there was nothing sufficiently striking in the claimant’s submissions that could lead them to conclude that she was ‘likely’ or had a ‘pretty good chance’ of succeeding at the Hearing on the Merits.[20]It is for these reasons that it is the decision of the Tribunal to refuse the claimant’s application for interim relief.[21]In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal does not express any opinion on the outcome of the Hearing on the Merits in this case. 08 September 2025 IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT ORDERS(1) You may make an application under Rule 29 for this order to be varied, suspended or set aside. Your application should set out the reason why you say that the order should be varied, suspended or set aside. You must confirm when making the application that you have copied it to the other party(ies) and notified them that they should provide the Tribunal with any objections to the application as soon as possible.(2) If this order is not complied with, the Tribunal may make an order under Rule 76(2) for expenses or preparation time against the party in default.(3) If this order is not complied with, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the claim or response under Rule 37.(4) Any person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with this order shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of £1,000.00.