Ms L O’Hara v The Royal Zoological Society of Scotland and Others: 8001011/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8001011/2025

Venue Edinburgh

Hearing 25 – 28 November; 1 – 3 December 2025; and 2 – 6 February 2026

Between

Ms L O’HaraClaimant

The Royal Zoological Society of Scotland and OthersRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Campbell

Ms M Maclean (instructed by Solicitor) for respondent

Date 20 April 2026

JUDGMENT

Each of the claimant’s complaints is unsuccessful on its merits and is dismissed.

REASONS

Findings of fact

[1]This was a claim made by a former employee of the company which operates the Edinburgh Zoo. The claimant is an experienced zoologist who worked for the respondent for around nine months, but who resigned after her probation period was extended a second time.

[2]The hearing took place over 12 days in person in Edinburgh. The claimant represented herself and gave evidence. She called her sister, Louise O’Hara Bathgate as a witness. Ms Maclean represented the respondents. She called the following as witnesses:a. Ms Kenna Valles, Zookeeper and the fourth respondent,

b. Ms Roslin Talbot, Senior Zookeeper,

c. Ms Deborah Mason, People and Culture Manager and the third respondent,

d. Mr Callum Gibson, Animal Team Leader and the second respondent,

e. Mr Donald Gow, Operations Manager.

[3]Although the claimant named three individuals as additional respondents she did not clarify at any point which complaints were pursued against them as opposed to, or in addition to, those alleged against the first respondent. It was taken that any allegation against one of them was a complaint against both the individual and the first respondent. As none of the complaints were ultimately upheld it was not necessary to apportion liability or compensation between respondents.

[4]For ease of reference, ‘the respondent’ when used below denotes the first respondent and each of the individual respondents is referred to by their surname.

[5]A joint bundle was prepared for the hearing and numbers in square brackets below correspond to pages within it.

[6]Most of the first hearing day was taken up dealing with preliminary matters, particularly agreeing the list of issues. By discussion and agreement those were identified, coming partly from a draft the claimant prepared and partly from one drawn up by the respondent. It is not reproduced in this judgment because it would add significantly to the length of what is already an extensive document. The issues, and where they originated, are discussed in the course of dealing with each legal complaint.

[7]The legal complaints were as follows:a. Detriment on the ground that protected disclosures were made – section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA);

b. Automatically unfair dismissal on the grounds that protected disclosures were made – section 103A of ERA;

c. Direct disability discrimination under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA);

d. Discrimination arising from disability – section 15 EqA;

e. Indirect disability discrimination – section 19 EqA;

f. Failure to make reasonable adjustments – sections 20 and 21 EqA;

g. Harassment – section 26 EqA; and

h. Victimisation – section 27 EqA.

[8]The parties were given the opportunity to provide closing submissions on the final hearing day. Those were delivered orally and noted.

[9]It has taken longer than the target period of 28 days to prepare this judgment, mainly due to the volume of evidence and large number of distinct legal complaints made. Findings of fact Commencement of employment

[1]The claimant was engaged by the respondent between 29 April 2024 and 2 February 2025. She resigned with immediate effect on the latter date. She was engaged throughout as an Experienced Keeper, reporting to Team Leader Callum Gibson. The respondent owns and operates the Edinburgh Zoo. The claimant was based in two sections of the zoo, named ‘Bundongo’ and ‘Living Links’ which contained, among other animals, squirrel monkeys and capuchins. The team also had responsibility for other animals such as goats and gibbons.

[2]The responsibilities of the claimant’s team included cleaning animal enclosures, providing food and ‘enrichment’ – additional stimulation for animals, and when necessary providing additional animal care.

[3]The zoo has an arrangement with the University of St Andrews, whereby its students are allocated time to carry out research in relation to the monkeys. The students have designated staff space and rights of access.

[4]The claimant has the condition ADHD, which is referred to below as the ‘condition’. It was diagnosed by a medical practitioner in Jersey in 2023. This diagnosis was not automatically recognised by NHS Scotland, but the claimant was diagnosed by a Scottish medical professional in January 2025. The respondent accepted for the purposes of this claim that she had the protected characteristic of disability by virtue of the condition for her whole period of employment. The question of when the respondent had or ought to have had knowledge of the condition, and if so from when, was a matter to be decided on the evidence. Initial probation

[5]The claimant signed and returned an employment contract on 26 March 2024. She was subject to a probationary period of six months, which was capable of extension. She was given an initial set of objectives for her first month, including completion of e-learning modules and learning to identify one particular capuchin. She completed those with no other issues in relation to matters such as timekeeping, attendance and quality of work.

[6]Mr Gibson met with the claimant three months into her probationary period to review her performance [582-584]. She had made further progress but he noted that she needed to ensure she completed daily cleaning tasks within their allocated time and to improve in identifying further capuchins, with the objective of recognising them all by the six-month point. Timekeeping was recorded as ‘fair’ rather than ‘excellent’ as previously as the claimant had been late in arriving to work a small number of times. This had a knock-on effect for colleagues, as each keeper needed to use a set of keys which were provided to them each morning by a senior keeper from a lock box by the entrance at 8.00am. Anyone arriving late would need to locate a senior keeper who by them would have gone to another part of the zoo to begin their daily tasks. The senior keeper would need to return to the front gate from wherever they were and obtain a set of keys for the latecomer.

[7]The quality of the claimant’s work was marked down from ‘excellent’ to ‘good’. This reflected that she was not managing to carry out all of her daily tasks, particularly cleaning, in the allotted time and had a tendency to be distracted by less important tasks. Mr Gibson noted that the claimant could at times be seen as ‘stressed’ or ‘flustered’ which impacted on her ability to manage her time.

[8]Either at this meeting, on 29 July 2024, or within a week, the claimant told Mr Gibson she had ADHD. This is the point at which the respondent was deemed to have knowledge of the condition. Reporting of concerns

[9]The claimant reported a number of concerns with her working environment throughout her period of employment. It was part of her duties to do so as it was for other keepers and the respondent had a system whereby matters would be entered into a job sheet to be actioned by colleagues in another department of the zoo, such as ‘Estates’ or Health and Safety, depending on the nature of the issue. Alternatively, keepers could report a matter to their Team Leader who would complete a job sheet for them.

[10]In particular, the claimant observed and reported:a. On 4 May 2024, an exposed nail within a wooden platform in the goat enclosure. The claimant rectified this herself immediately;

b. A difficulty in testing the operation of part of an electric fence around one of the monkey enclosures. The claimant improvised a method of testing it along with site electricians and the fence was found to be working;

c. Concerns about the practice of using ladders to clean enclosure windows. The claimant considers that comments she made amounted to protected disclosures and that she suffered detriment as a result. This is dealt with in more detail below;

d. On 29 June 2024, the appearance of a hole under the fence surrounding the gibbon enclosure, which the claimant feared could have been, or become, big enough to allow a gibbon to escape. The claimant covered the hole as a remedial measure and it was later filled in by the Estates team;

e. On 25 July 2024 the claimant notified a Senior Keeper, Ms Talbot, of a door leading from the public viewing gallery being left unlocked by contractors. Immediately behind it was a drop of over two metres to ground level;

f. On 31 July 2024, she reported to a Senior Keeper Ms Starbuck that a telegraph pole forming part of a climbing frame had broken. She suggested this posed a risk to the animals as well as any people who entered the enclosure. She also considered that had a collapsing pole hit a fence, it may have allowed capuchins to escape, although that did not happen on this occasion;

g. In August 2024, she told Ms Talbot about broken shingle under the gibbon public viewing space which left protruding nails or screws exposed and allowed access to the mesh of the enclosure;

h. On 11 August 2024 she sent photographs to Ms Starbuck of a broken light post with exposed wiring on a stretch of public path. Ms Talbot submitted a job request and the area was repaired;

i. Also on 11 August 2024, she sent video clips to Ms Starbuck of sections of the monkey frame which she believed were worn or degraded, causing a risk of falling. This was partially addressed on 30 August 2024 with the addition of reinforcing supports and replacement of the poles was planned;

j. On 8 September 2024 she reported to Mr Gibson

(a) some broken conductors on an electric fence surrounding one of the enclosures which she viewed as an escape risk and

(b) an unsecured floorboard in the Living Links viewing area which she believed to be a trip hazard. Both were acknowledged by Mr Gison and fixed;

k. On 13 September 2024 she reported to Mr Gibson some branches from a tree outside one of the enclosures which had grown to the point that they overhung its perimeter, which she considered an escape risk. Her recollection was that she submitted a job sheet to have the tree trimmed back and this was done;

l. On 20 September 2024 she raised with Ms Talbot and Mr Gibson that an unacceptable amount of fecal matter was being allowed to build up in the goat enclosure, posing a risk to their health in terms of their feeding practices and parasite infection;

m. On 25 September 2024 she reported a broken enclosure door handle to Ms Starbuck. She believed that this made it more difficult to secure the enclosure where monkeys were contained;

n. On 7 October 2024 the claimant again raised with Mr Gibson a concern about pest levels among the animals and illness risk. There were mouse or rat faeces in the capuchin enclosure. She asked of some holes in the fence could be filled in to prevent rodents entering; and

o. On 14 November 2024 that a piece of signage was broken, exposing the screws which attached it to a wall, reported to Ms Starbuck. Ladder practice comments

[11]The claimant made comments about the use of ladders at various times between May 2024 and January 2025. Specific recollection and interpretation of what she said varied between her and Mr Gibson, to whom her comments were made. The claimant’s view was that she was bringing to her employer’s attention serious risks to health and safety caused by the practices used. Mr Gibson understood, at least until October 2024, that she was merely explaining a personal aversion to working up ladders.

[12]Ladder use was discussed in emails between the claimant and Mr Gibson or raised with him verbally on 13 June, 29 June, 26 July, 19 October, 5 November and 5 December 2024.

[13]The claimant also told Mr Gibson verbally on 1 June 2024 that she did not feel safe working up ladders and would not sign the respondent’s ladder policy, which was a requirement for any staff member using ladders. Mr Gibson accepted her position. Other members of the team had similarly requested not to work on ladders, including one in June 2024, and were therefore not required to sign the policy.

[14]The claimant said to Ms Nicol on 26 July 2024 that she believed the use of a pressure washer by the latter to clean monkey climbing frames whilst on a ladder was dangerous. Slightly later when Mr Gibson arrived she repeated her concern to him. He replied that whilst it was not an ideal arrangement it was a means to an end, particularly as inspectors were soon scheduled to visit. Two days later he thanked Ms Nicol for the job she had done in an email to the team. He added that he and other senior managers were ‘coming up with a more long-term plan’ for cleaning the frames. Raising concerns about treatment by colleagues

[15]The claimant raised with Mr Gibson that she believed colleagues were treating her unfairly on 11 October, 5 November (also with Ms Mason present), and to Ms Mason alone on 13 and 17 December 2024.

[16]She also reported to Ms Mason on 20 January 2025 that internal procedures, primarily the handling of her probation, had not been properly followed by Mr Gibson. She raised a formal grievance on 27 January 2025, addressed to Mark Haddow, Director of People and Culture. Early experience with team colleagues

[17]At the outset of her employment the claimant mentioned to some of her fellow keepers, including Kenna Valles, that she had ADHD.

[18]Within weeks the claimant began to believe that some of her colleagues were less civil to her, less patient, or excluding her. She connected this perception with her ADHD and the effects she understood that it had on her behaviour generally, and her ability to carry out her work.

[19]On 22 May 2024 the claimant sent a WhatsApp message to a colleague group, asking them if they were taking a break. She did not receive a response.

[20]In late May 2024 Mr Gibson spoke to the claimant about a matter raised by a student supervisor at the University. The claimant had challenged one of the students on whether they were permitted to lock up research cabins. She did not know that students had that permission. He explained that they did and could be trusted to do so.

[21]Around the same time, when discussing the respondent’s internal employee representative body, Mr Gibson asked the claimant if she was a member of a union. The claimant wondered as to his motive.

[22]Also in late May 2024, the claimant perceived that Ms Valles, with whom she spent a lot of time working, was becoming less tolerant of her timekeeping. On 30 May 2024 she said via the team radio system ‘Yeah, just waiting on Lisa’ and later rolled her eyes when Mr Gibson commented that the claimant was spending more time than necessary on cleaning tasks. Ms Valles further commented to the team via radio ‘We’ll be down shortly, still waiting on Lisa to finish’ on or around 10 June 2024.

[23]On 14 June 2024 the claimant had understood her team were meeting during their lunch break at a newly refurbished café on the zoo premises. She sent a message to her team group at 1.10pm whilst waiting there, asking if people were coming along. A colleague replied at 1.29pm to say that she had only obtained a Wi-Fi service, and had gone to the canteen instead. Mr Gibson arrived to meet the claimant shortly afterwards.

[24]On various days from June 2024 onwards Ms Valles consciously minimised non-work-related interaction with the claimant.

[25]In June 2024 Mr Gibson asked the claimant to chop up animal food into larger pieces, as was the normal practice at the zoo. The claimant had suggested to two colleagues that they chop the food smaller. Mr Gibson did not criticise her intention but explained that this was the method which was consistently to be used. They ended by agreeing on the position.

[26]In late June 2024 the claimant suggested a minor change to the practice of cleaning and feeding in the gibbon enclosure. He said there was no issue, provided the claimant had time to carry out her other tasks. She emailed him a guide to analysing gibbon faeces which she had acquired from her time working at other zoos. He did not email back a response, but thanked her verbally. The chart was used from that point onwards.

[27]Some time in June 2024 the claimant asked a colleague, Ms Nicol, how she coped at work. Ms Nicol replied that she didn’t wish to discuss her mental health with anyone. The claimant apologised for any discomfort she had caused, which was unintended. Holiday requests

[28]From July 2024 the claimant requested to take annual leave on a number of occasions.

[29]Requests for leave on 22 July and 2, 5, 12 and 19 August 2024 were rejected. They were made at short notice and Mr Gibson did not have sufficient staff to cover for the claimant. In doing so he treated the claimant the same way as he had done, and would do, other staff in his team. The claimant did not consult the team holiday planner when requesting holidays.

[30]In July 2024 Mr Gibson changed his own working days to allow the claimant time off to travel to a wedding. On 26 July and again on 18 October 2024 Mr Gibson sent her a list of potentially free dates to consider. She replied to say ‘Thank you I really appreciate that’ and ‘Those are all perfect’.

[31]When trying to arrange cover over the Christmas and New Year period Mr Gibson consulted his team by email, seeking that everyone work either Christmas Day or New Year’s day. The claimant offered to work both and Mr Gibson accepted, scheduling her to cover both days. Other events July 2024 onwards

[32]On 15 July 2024 the claimant was discussing with Ms Valles how to compare the lipomas of squirrel monkeys with some photographs taken previously. The claimant did not know how to upload any photographs that she would take. Ms Valles said that she would do it if the claimant sent them to her. The claimant perceived Ms Valles’ to be frustrated at the claimant not being able to carry out the process herself.

[33]In late July 2024 Mr Gibson suggested to the claimant that she apply for a permanent role in the Carnivore section of the zoo. He did so because he was aware that would involve working fewer weekends, something the claimant had made known she would prefer. The claimant perceived the suggestion negatively, viewing it as Mr Gibson trying to be rid of her.

[34]On 1 August 2024 the claimant shared some materials about ADHD with Mr Gibson by email. She followed up with him verbally the next day. Mr Gibson suggested the two have a meeting to discuss the matter. He emailed her on 4 August 2024 to suggest an in-depth meeting on his return from annual leave. He attached forms for seeking an Occupational Health (‘OH’) screening.

[35]In early August 2024, in response to reservation the claimant expressed about passing her probation, a team colleague told the claimant that nobody had ever failed through inability to identify all of the capuchins, that she herself had only finished learning them, and that Ms Talbot, who was a Senior Keeper, still did not know all of them.

[36]On 22 August 2024 Ms Talbot and Ms Valles attended a meeting held by a staff representative who was discussing matters recently intimated by management. The claimant had been unable to attend and her colleagues had said they would record it for her. When the claimant listened back to the recording she heard a comment made by Ms Valles which made reference to her. The context was that the representative was discussing whether staff may need to reconsider the standard they applied to some tasks to ensure they were completed on time. Ms Valles appeared to be heard saying to Ms Talbot, ‘It sounds like they are bitching about Lisa.’

[37]The claimant met with Mr Gibson on 30 August 2024 to discuss her ADHD and any adjustments she required. She believed that he made ‘ableist, dismissive and diminishing’ comments, such as saying that people generally experienced some of the challenges she was describing.

[38]In the meeting the claimant asked for a number of adjustments as follows:a. Extra sets of uniform, to assist with her weekly planning and organisation. This was agreed and implemented;

b. Notification of changes to working schedule – the section rota was an online document. The claimant struggled to access it. Mr Gibson agreed to send her personal updates to the rota by electronic messaging. This was implemented although later varied as explained below;

c. To be allowed flexibility in how she undertook work tasks, provided the required outcome was reached. This was agreed, albeit a more vague measure than others;

d. Scheduling of training. The claimant was uncomfortable asking more experienced colleagues to help her practice learning capuchin IDs, and so Mr Gibson agreed to schedule time for this on a more structured basis;

e. Additional training sessions. Mr Gibson said this could not be accommodated. Two other staff members were learning capuchin IDs at the time and the available time of more experienced keepers to spend with them was limited;

f. An alternative objective involving identification of animals. Rather than learn to distinguish between the capuchins, the claimant asked to learn chimpanzees. Mr Gibson denied this request. He wished the claimant to learn the animals she was working with rather than ones she was not. He believed that the original objective was achievable given that this was a standard probationary objective which was normally achieved within six months;

g. A five-minute arrival ‘window’ each morning. All staff began their working day at 8.00am. The claimant sought permission to start as late as 8.05am if she needed, citing time-blindness as a symptom of her condition. Mr Gibson denied this request for operational reasons and because the claimant’s timekeeping was satisfactory. The operational reasons were that the claimant would either need her own set of work keys, or a Senior Keeper would require to either wait for her or return to the front gate from wherever they were working to provide her with her keys from the lock box. For security reasons the respondent had a policy of only allowing Senior Keepers take keys off the premises. This was to ensure that they could gain access in emergencies, but also to reduce the risk of keys being lost. This meant that the claimant could not take a set of keys home with her;

h. To raise team awareness of neurodivergent conditions. The claimant suggested delivering a short talk to her team. Mr Gibson declined as he was conscious of the concerns other members had raised about the claimant’s interaction with them, and did not think such a meeting would achieve the desired outcome. He was also aware that the claimant was not the only neurodiverse person, or individual experiencing personal challenges, in the team. Instead he agreed to deliver a more general briefing to the team about tolerance of others’ circumstances, which took place on 11 November 2024.

[39]Following this meeting Mr Gibson sent the claimant an email summarising the points covered and actions agreed [741-745]. The claimant replied, saying ‘That’s all spot on’ and thanking him for his help and support. Ms Mason from the HR department arranged an OH referral for the claimant, scheduled for 24 October 2024.

[40]On 20 September 2024, and after having to clear a large quantity of goat fecal matter, the claimant hurt her back whilst emptying a large bin into a skip. She was in pain and late for her lunch break. She was also upset at what she saw as a failure to provide adequate living conditions for the goats. She became distressed and raised her voice when discussing the situation with Ms Talbot. She then went to speak to Mr Gibson. She referred to another colleague, Ms Wallace, not cleaning the enclosure adequately the time before and said that it should be cleaned more frequently to reduce parasite infections. Mr Gibson undertook to look into the issue. He asked to speak to the claimant later that day and said that she had wrongly assumed whose turn it last was to clean the enclosure. The claimant apologised, but felt that Mr Gibson had taken on an intimidating tone with her. She attributed her forthright manner to her ADHD, particularly emotional dysregulation, inability to filter, lowered stress tolerance and justice sensitivity. She felt that Mr Gibson had not appreciated this, and simply viewed her behaviour as minor misconduct.

[41]On 30 September 2024 the claimant reacted defensively to being asked by a colleague Ms McCarvill to check and change mouse and cockroach traps. She acknowledges that she perceived she was being criticised for not doing so when Ms McCarvill was merely indicting how important Mr Gibson considered the task. She said that Ms McCarvill appeared taken aback at her interruption and would not speak to her for the rest of that day. Ms McCarvill said to Mr Gibson in an email that the claimant had cut in on her defensively, that she felt taken aback by this, and that she tried to ‘bring the conversation to a more chatty level’ again. Various meetings, interactions and other events in October 2024

[42]On 2 October 2024 the claimant and her colleague Ms Nicol discussed the recent death of a cheetah at the zoo. They speculated as to the potential reasons. The claimant said that she hoped the postmortem results were published, as a lack of information can sometimes cast the veterinary team in a less complimentary light. On another date in October 2024 the claimant asked Ms Valles if she knew whether the University students ever published their research, saying that she hoped so because that would help make all the accommodations made for them worthwhile.

[43]The claimant and Mr Gibson agreed to hold monthly meetings to discuss the claimant’s specific needs arising from her condition. There was a meeting on 7 October 2024 between the two, lasting around an hour. Matters discussed principally included:a. The claimant’s arrival time to work, which was noted to have improved;

b. The timing of her morning cleaning schedule, which had improved;

c. Her probation objective of capuchin identification, which had not significantly progressed, and alternative approaches and support methods were discussed;

d. Various people’s recent interactions with the claimant, which they had raised with Mr Gibson, namely: i. The impact of the claimant’s chosen method of cleaning the gibbon enclosure on 30 September on the duties of a colleague; ii. The claimant’s interaction with Ms McCarvill on the same day (narrated above); and iii. A conversation between the claimant and a University Research Manager named Kate around the latter being given access to one of the research rooms, which was put down to a misunderstanding by each about what the other was saying. The Research Manager later set out her account in an email of 14 October 2024 [788-780] in which she said that she and her colleagues felt that the claimant did not recognise and respect their designated spaces within the zoo.

[44]The claimant became upset by the end of the meeting and believed Mr Gibson was running out of patience with her. He emailed her later that day with a summary of the discussion [774-779]. The claimant proposed three factual additions or corrections in response. She said in her email that she believed her reaction was caused by Injustice Sensitivity alongside RSD (rejection sensitive dysphoria), and now acknowledged that there was more context to some of the situations he had raised, and thanked him for his understanding. The claimant later described this meeting as ‘punitive’ but there is no indication in her response that she viewed the meeting that way on the day.

[45]The claimant requested a further meeting with Mr Gibson on 11 October 2024 in which she sought to revisit some of the matters discussed at the previous meeting, and explain in more detail some of the symptoms of her condition and how they could manifest in a work context. She believed that he also made this discussion punitive, for example by raising that Ms Wallace had reported to him her concerns at the tone the claimant took with her on one occasion. Mr Gibson said he raised this as an illustration of how the claimant’s demeanour could change when she came under stress, and as part of a discussion about steps which might be taken to prevent that happening. He suggested that the claimant review and complete a ‘Wellness Action Plan’ template which the respondent used. The claimant acknowledged that she was not always aware how she could come across when stressed, and could appear short-tempered or accusatory. She also voiced that she felt she had been experiencing hostility from other team members for the last six months. She mentioned that jokes had been made by others about the time it took her to complete tasks. She referred to the comment made by Ms Valles during the ECB briefing meeting on 22 August 2024. She did not name any colleagues and said she did not wish Mr Gibson to look into the matter further. He told her that if she felt others were continuing to speak to her inappropriately she should raise this with him.

[46]Mr Gibson again emailed the claimant after the meeting with a summary of the conversation [785-786]. Among other things he said that he recognised the challenges of her condition, but that interactions such as the one with Ms McCarvill were not acceptable. He attached the Wellness Action Plan document and a related guidance note.

[47]On 14 October 2024 Mr Gibson reported to colleagues in the HR team that he was considering extending the claimant’s probationary period. Mr Haddow agreed this was appropriate and recommended holding a conversation with the claimant to try to understand better some of the issues which were preoccupying her.

[48]Ms Valles verbally raised with Mr Gibson on 18 October 2024 that she had difficulty with some of the claimant’s behaviour and interactions with her from May onwards. On 21 October 2024 she emailed a bullet point record of those in which she described the claimant as ‘often rude or aggressive’ [799-801]. There were thirteen points, including in relation to comments the claimant had made about the cheetah death, other concerns expressed about animal welfare, criticism of the arrangements with the University for research purposes, negative comments about other zoos where she had worked, and that she ‘continuously disregards instructions’ in relation to matters such as food preparation and cleaning. Ms Valles also criticised her time management which she said led to herself having to take on extra work. She said that she had been witness to rude and aggressive behaviour by the claimant, such as ‘an aggressive outburst of shouting and swearing over a miscommunication on the radio’ which made her nervous to work alongside her. She also said the claimant had been rude to and critical of other team members and the University researchers. Occupational Health referral and report

[49]Ms Mason sent an OH referral form to the respondent’s chosen third party OH provider on or around 23 October 2024 [806-810]. A section titled ‘additional background information’ was completed by Mr Gibson. This included details of some of the issues which had been identified at the first probationary review meeting and adjustments which had been identified.

[50]The claimant did not get to see the text before the form was submitted. After the consultation which followed she saw a copy. She took issue with the appropriateness or fairness of some of the comments included, such as references to her as being at times ‘flustered by change’ and ‘snappy, stressed, grumpy and difficult with other staff members’.

[51]A report was provided on 24 October 2024 [823-826]. The claimant approved its release to the respondent. She believed it was a fair and accurate representation of the consultation she had attended.

[52]Among other things the report confirmed that the claimant had been taking medication in connection with her condition when she first joined the respondent, but that as that ran out she was unable to obtain further prescriptions in Scotland and had stopped. The consultant recommended seeking counselling and also support via the public Access to Work scheme. The consultant believed that the claimant’s symptoms since ceasing medication were impacting on her performance and behaviour at work. It was recommended that awareness of the condition be raised with her team, but no adjustments in addition to those already in place were suggested. It was thought that the claimant would continue to struggle with her symptoms until she was able to receive a diagnosis of the condition in Scotland, leading to resumption of prescribed medication. It was recorded that the claimant felt a sense of injustice linked to her perception that she was managed more stringently than others. Without medication it was anticipated that improvement may be achieved over a period of months. All of the concerns raised in the referral form were believed to be linked to the claimant’s condition.

[53]On 5 November 2024 the claimant met with Mr Gibson and Ms Mason to discuss the OH report. Ms Mason provided a summary of the discussion by email on 7 November 2024. The claimant outlined some of the steps she had initiated such as seeking external coaching and contacting Access to Work. Ms Mason discussed the option of enrolling with an external health and wellbeing support package named Health Shield. The claimant raised concerns about the safety of ladder practices used by the team. Mr Gibson agreed to ask the Health and Safety team to review them. He suggested an interim adjustment which he suggested might help with her concerns. There was discussion about the duration of claimant’s cleaning practices and it was agreed that Mr Gibson would demonstrate the process to her the following weekend. The claimant raised the comment made by Ms Valles at the ECB meeting. Ms Mason said she would investigate this as a grievance if the claimant wished her to.

[54]Mr Gibson followed up by email the next day with some comments. He allocated times for completion of the Wellness Action Plan and demonstrations of the cleaning tasks. He said he would create a document setting out the details of the process (this was sent on 13 November 2024). He confirmed that he had discussed ladder practice with his own manager, Mr Gow, and sent comments to Health and Safety and HR. He confirmed a change to window cleaning routine which meant that the claimant would not need to accompany any colleague who was using ladders. He clarified that he would continue to communicate with the claimant by text message rather than radio, but only for the daily ‘check in’ call before lunch, as that was personal to her. Otherwise communication would be by general announcements to the whole team by radio. He asked the claimant to respond promptly to any text he sent, as he had begun to experience that on some days she did not reply, or replied some time later. This was primarily from a safety perspective.

[55]Mr Gibson clarified in this email that his previous understanding of the claimant’s position regarding the use of ladders was that she had a personal aversion and not that she was saying the practice generally was unsafe. He asked the claimant to confirm that the way of operating he was now proposing would be one she could work to.

[56]The claimant replied to Ms Mason’s and Mr Gibson’s email on 9 November 2024. She thanked them for their comments. She said that a switch back to use of radios for general team communications was acceptable. She said that the adjustment to ladder practice proposed was ‘great and much appreciated, [my] responsibility is the main contributing factor, so thank you. I feel this will help.’ She provided an update on the timing of some external appointments.

[57]The claimant was given access to Health Shield on 7 November 2024. The claimant thanked Ms Mason for her help and support. Six-month probation review

[58]On 24 October 2024 Mr Gibson held the claimant’s six-month probation review meeting. He confirmed that the period would be extended until 29 January 2025, and that if probation was not passed at that point her contract would be terminated.

[59]After the meeting Mr Gibson emailed the claimant the review form. The claimant replied to say that all of the details were understood, and if he had any questions she would reach out.

[60]Separately on 24 October 2024 Mr Gibson emailed a summary of some of the issues discussed in the probation meeting [813-816]. He provided a copy of the Wellness Action Plan and details of an Employee Assistance Programme. He asked her to check with him before making any changes to routines which could impact on the work of others. He raised again that she should be conscious of how her behaviour could change, and be perceived, when she became frustrated or uncomfortable. He noted that she had reflected on how her comments about animal welfare could be taken as implied criticism of her colleagues. He also recorded that the claimant had said she did not prefer the species she was working with to carnivores and apes, on which she wished to practice identification. He explained that he could not accommodate that at the time because of the additional risks and procedures associated with working with those species. November and December 2024

[61]On 9 November 2024 the claimant sought assistance from Ms Mason to prepare an email to Mr Gibson, which Ms Mason approved. It was sent on 18 December 2024 and referred to below.

[62]On 10 November 2024 Mr Gibson had a discussion with Ms Valles about her interactions with and observations of the claimant. He followed this up with a summary by email to her the next day. In particular, he raised:a. That the claimant felt that at times Ms Valles did not acknowledge her presence, and believed others had observed this;

b. That he expected her to be more inclusive to the claimant moving forwards in an attempt to create a better working environment;

c. That the claimant had felt uncomfortable with some questions Ms Valles had asked about her previous roles in other zoos or countries;

d. The recorded comment that Ms Valles had made at the ECB meeting, which Mr Gibson could not properly make out but which he acknowledged had been interpreted by the claimant as critical of her;

e. That Ms Valles had recognised upon hearing the recording that it could have been perceived as critical, that it was unwise, and that she apologised to the claimant for it;

f. That the claimant had asked if there were particular behaviours of hers which caused Ms Valles frustration, and that Ms Valles had said in response that her timekeeping in relation to work tasks and a tendency to interrupt her when speaking to others were examples; and

g. That Mr Gibson would speak to the claimant further about these matters.

[63]Ms Valles responded to say she agreed with the summary save one minor detail and added some further thoughts. In particular she added that she would not treat a person differently because they had ADHD, and that she had experience of the condition via previous co-workers, friends and family members.

[64]On 11 November 2024 Mr Gibson emailed the claimant with an update on some ongoing actions and to give her access to the working live document. He mentioned that leave days would be scheduled monthly to prevent the claimant experiencing burnout, and that he would use the team meeting the following day to address all members on the importance of mutual respect.

[65]On 13 November 2025 Mr Gibson emailed the claimant to take various matters forward. He attached a guide to the different cleaning tasks. He confirmed he had discussed with Ms Valles the comment she had made at the ECB meeting, and told her not to make comments which could be perceived negatively to prevent further discomfort or upset. He also mentioned that another team member had noticed tension between the claimant and Ms Valles, and that he had also asked Ms Valles to make more effort to engage with the claimant. He passed on the aspects which Ms Valles had said she found frustrating in a sympathetic and balanced way, conveying also that Ms Valles appreciated that the claimant was making genuine efforts to improve. He ended the email by recognising that the last month had been ‘fairly intense’ but hoping there would be improvement on all sides and a better working environment.

[66]Mr Gibson held a further one-to-one meeting with the claimant on 26 November 2024. He noted improvements in the claimant’s cleaning tasks and interaction with colleagues and said there were no issues with timekeeping. He noted that the claimant had supported a colleague on a small stepladder and said he would prefer she did not do that if it might trigger stress and as she had not signed the ladder safety policy. The claimant mentioned seven dates when she had been given help with capuchin identification but raised other occasions when scheduled training had not gone ahead.

[67]The claimant replied to Mr Gibson’s email summarising this discussion on 5 December 2024. She wished to more cleaning tasks unaccompanied and said she felt she had improved on capuchin identification. She said that on 6 of 11 rostered days there had not been someone to accompany her. She said that she was comfortable using A-frame ladders and stepladders, but not taller ladders.

[68]Mr Gibson updated the team by email on 6 December 2024 to reinforce expected practices using ladders. He mentioned that he would be meeting with the Health and Safety team the next week. He said that ladders had to be secured by a colleague at ground level from that point on.

[69]The claimant met Mr Gibson again on 10 December 2024. He summarised the meeting in an email the next day. He acknowledged that the claimant was feeling uncomfortable and vulnerable at that time. He said he believed the adjustment of checking in with the claimant by text rather than radio was not working, as the claimant had not responded to him, and did not in any event appear to be necessary as the claimant now seemed comfortable using radios. He mentioned that he had asked the Health and Safety team to prioritise their review of ladder practices and noted that the claimant had said she could use A-frame ladders but not tall ladders. He noted that she had signed the ladder safety policy to confirm this. He clarified that although the claimant may have been concerned that inability or unwillingness to use ladders could be used to fail her probation, this was not the intention and there now appeared to be a solution. He referred to the claimant’s late arrival to work the previous day. He had understood her to have arrived at 8.03 am. She maintained she arrived at 8.01 am. He subsequently checked CCTV covering the gate which confirmed his own understanding. He said that it was important for her timekeeping not to slip again. He acknowledged the progress she had made with completing morning cleaning on time, and said that she should continue to practice this. He added that he had rostered her on for as much capuchin identification training as he could, but sometimes circumstances caused late changes and effectively no session could be guaranteed. He took a previous email from the claimant to suggest that she believed such a guarantee had been given, and emphasised that ‘I am not saying I will schedule training for all your rostered days.’ He also said that he believed the claimant should take more responsibility for the sessions happening and ‘meet me half way and start communicating and asking for help’ by reminding those keepers who were allocated to assist with the training when they may be busy, and not merely wait until a session had been missed before raising it. He mentioned that he had moved the identification sessions from mornings to afternoons to ensure she had time for them as well as the daily cleaning duties. He attached a table showing all of the sessions she attended and those which had not gone ahead. Mr Gibson indicated that he believed it was no longer feasible for him to update the claimant individually about changes to the staff rota because they were so frequent and could occur at the last minute.

[70]On 18 December 2024 the claimant asked Mr Gibson to provide a list of the goals he wished her to achieve before the end of her extended probationary period. She also asked him to revisit the question of allowing her five minutes of leeway over her morning arrival time.

[71]On 24 December 2024 Mr Gibson sent an updated version of the claimant’s probation review form in which he had added revised objectives for the continuation period. He listed those in his email [878-882]. They comprised capuchin identification, following established processes and only departing from them after consultation, improved communication and interaction with colleagues, early identification and response to frustrations or stress, and timekeeping in relation to tasks. He reiterated why he believed he was unable to give the claimant a five-minute extension to her daily start time. He said ‘the odd occasion of being a few minutes late is okay’. His observation at this point was that the claimant had been routinely arriving to work on time until shortly before. He explained the logistical difficulty in extending the claimant’s start time.

[72]Mr Gibson and the claimant also met on 24 December 2024. He noted that the claimant’s arrival at work was once more satisfactory. Both recognised that the claimant had improved in her morning cleaning procedures. The claimant had no work-related triggers or issues with colleagues to raise. The claimant provided an update on her Access to Work sessions. She also said she was gaining in confidence in capuchin identification. She had been using the online live rota to a small extent.

[73]On 26 December 2024 Ms Valles emailed Mr Gibson to describe the feeding and locking up of monkeys that day, in which she said the claimant had poor time management and caused her to be frustrated. She explained the various tasks each had undertaken that afternoon. She felt the claimant was avoiding some tasks and was ‘sceptical’ that the claimant followed the correct feeding practice. January 2025

[74]A counsellor appointed under the Access to Work scheme emailed Ms Mason on 8 January 2025. She suggested the time given to the claimant to identify the capuchins should be extended to 30 minutes. Providing supplementary materials was also suggested, as well as guidance on managing the time allotted. Ms Mason forwarded the email to Mr Gibson and asked him to adapt the test and learning sessions accordingly.

[75]On 11 January 2025 Mr Gibson emailed his team to draw their attention to a number of policy documents he wished them to read and sign, including the ladder safety policy. He also mentioned that the Health and Safety team were arranging in-house training for everyone.

[76]On 12 January 2025 the claimant and Mr Gibson spoke again about capuchin identification. Mr Gibson asked her how she would feel about being assessed. He personally did not think that approach would work for the claimant, but let her give her view. He suggested that a better approach would be for a senior keeper to be present when she identified the capuchins, but not offer any prompts. This approach was tried the following day by the two, but the claimant became flustered and Mr Gibson suggested reverting back to the previous approach, where it was confirmed after each identification whether the claimant had named the capuchin correctly or not.

[77]Also during the conversation on 12 January 2025, Mr Gibson said that the claimant’s arrival times to work continued to be satisfactory, but that two issues with colleague communication had been raised.

[78]On 13 January 2025 the claimant received a formal diagnosis of ADHD from a Scottish qualified medical practitioner. She told Mr Gibson who said he was ‘so pleased for you. What a huge win.’

[79]On the same day Mr Gibson sat in with the claimant as she practiced identifying the capuchins. She could not proceed without him telling her after each identification whether it was correct. Notification of probation not being passed and final review meeting

[80]On 16 January 2025 Mr Gibson briefly met with the claimant to notify her that he had decided she had not passed her extended probation. He had not given her notice of the meeting, but had asked her whether she would prefer to discuss the matter there and then at the beginning of the working day, or later that day. The claimant had preferred the former. He had wished to give her more notice but had been informed by HR that he had to communicate his decision early enough to allow time for the claimant to appeal against it, and for any appeal to be determined, before the end of the extension period on 29 January 2025. He was about to go on annual leave for nine days. He had never taken the decision to fail a colleague’s probation before and was unaware of the process. The claimant took from what Mr Gibson said that she had been immediately dismissed, although he did not say that. He indicated that she would be able to appeal the decision to a more senior manager. She understood that to be a process about appeal against dismissal rather than the decision to fail probation.

[81]Mr Gibson had decided that the claimant had failed on two objectives, capuchin identification and colleague communication. He had passed her on her other objectives. There was brief discussion about this and details were added to her probation form [588-591].

[82]On 17 January 2025 Mr Gibson asked Ms Starbuck and Ms McCarvill to continue training the claimant in capuchin identification. He had decided not to go on carrying them out himself as he sensed that his presence could cause the claimant to be distracted. He asked them to carry out a test and provided a table which could be populated with the results.

[83]On 20 January 2025 Ms Mason contacted the claimant to outline the process of reviewing Mr Gibson’s probation decision. She said that Mr Gow would oversee that and asked for the claimant’s consent to share relevant documents with him, which the claimant gave. The claimant mentioned that she believed she had been dismissed by Mr Gibson, and Ms Mason explained that that meeting was to ‘close out the extension period’ and that only a more senior manager could terminate her contract, which could only be decided upon after the meeting she was now seeking to arrange. An invitation letter was then sent on 21 January 2025. Unfortunately, in error it contained a reference to the process being ‘disciplinary’ rather than relating to the probation process, which caused the claimant some unnecessary confusion and concern.

[84]The formal probationary review meeting with Mr Gow took place on 28 January 2025. Ms Mason also attended and the claimant was accompanied by a trade union representative. The claimant had asked in advance to record the meeting using a transcription app and to have short breaks. Ms Mason said that breaks could be accommodated but the meeting could not be recorded. She said that she herself would take notes and prepare minutes, as well as providing guidance on the respondent’s policies. In the meeting she also commented that the claimant’s representative would be able to take their own notes.

[85]A minute of the meeting was prepared which the claimant later signed following some minor edits, and it is accepted as a suitably accurate summary of the discussion [601-605].

[86]The claimant accepted Mr Gow as a suitably impartial manager. She was allowed to speak about the progress she believed she had made towards achieving her probation objectives, with particular focus on the failed criteria in relation to capuchin identification and colleague communication. Following around an hour of discussion, Mr Gow adjourned the meeting to consider what had been covered. He reconvened and confirmed that he had decided to extend the claimant’s probation for a further three months. The claimant would move to a different department and so report to a new manager named Alison. Mr Gow advised the claimant to remain off work on illness grounds until arrangements were in place for the claimant to join her new department. This was anticipated to be the following Monday, 3 February 2025. In saying this his understanding was that the claimant was certified as medically unfit to attend work at the time. She was not recorded as challenging this proposal in the meeting.

[87]Before the claimant could start working in her new department she submitted a resignation letter by email to Mr Gow, on 2 February 2025 [1010-1011]. Mr Haddow replied to her by letter of 5 February 2025 to say, in summary, that the respondent was sorry to receive the letter, that it took allegations of unfairness seriously, that it wished her to reconsider her decision and that it wished to explore steps which would allow her to return to work. Some administrative aspects of her status as a leaver were covered in the event that she did not wish to change her decision. Formal grievance

[88]The claimant submitted a grievance by email to Mr Gow on 27 January 2025 [990-997]. It was agreed that this would be put to one side pending the probation review meeting which was scheduled for the following day. A response to the grievance was also superseded in the event by her resignation.

[89]As the claimant had resigned by the time her grievance was processed, it was suggested that it be determined based on written submissions, which the claimant agreed to. Mr Haddow sent her a set of questions on points he wished her to expand on and the claimant replied, adding in her answers [1016-1050].

[90]An outcome to the grievance was issued by Mr Haddow on 1 April 2025. Discussion and decision

[91]As a general comment, the claim comprised a number of legal complaints. Within those there were a larger number of events or actions which were said to be relevant, whether as a protected disclosure, a detriment, a discriminatory act, or more than one of those. The original particulars of claim attached the ET1 form comprised a narrative account and a table, together amounting to 48 pages. The claimant later provided a note of further particulars of her claim which covered nearly 200 paragraphs of detail over 81 pages. She also produced a table of alleged protected disclosures and resulting detriments which covered 13 pages. This is by no means a criticism, but in order to deal with all of this material consistently with the tribunal’s overriding objective, a proportionate approach had to be taken. Did the claimant make protected disclosures

[92]Consideration was given first to whether the claimant made any protected disclosures. She alleged 27 disclosures between May 2024 and January 2025 as set out in her disclosure table and further particulars. The respondent’s primary position was that she did not make any protected disclosures. They are considered below. Ladder safety

[93]The claimant maintained that she had made disclosures about the respondent’s practice of using ladders, primarily to clean windows. She raised concerns in May, 13 June, 26 July, 19 October, 5 November, and 5 December 2024 about ladder safety. She said that each time she was conveying to her employer, in the form of a more senior colleague, information about a reasonable belief she held in relation to a risk to health or safety of others, namely her colleagues, and that she reasonably believed she was doing so in the public interest. The information said to have been conveyed was that there was a sufficiently serious risk of a colleague falling from a height and being injured or even killed.

[94]The claimant genuinely believed that the respondent’s practice created a serious risk to health and safety. She conveyed information rather than a more generalised sense of grievance or unhappiness, as she was able to point out which aspects of the practice caused her concern, and why. It was also accepted that her belief was reasonable. It was based on her experience of working in other zoos, where other approaches such as the use of harnesses had been used. This does not mean that the respondent’s practice was in fact unacceptably risky, as it is not necessary nor realistically possible for this tribunal to make such a finding. The evidence suggested that the respondent’s Health and Safety team were content with it. But the legal test focusses on whether it was reasonable for the claimant to hold her belief, with the knowledge she had at the time. Based on her experience her belief was a reasonable one for her to hold.

[95]The final consideration was therefore whether she believed her disclosure was in the public interest, and if so was that belief reasonably held. Again, it was found that the claimant held a reasonable belief. She genuinely feared for her colleagues’ safety, and by extension the implications for the zoo itself and the public were there to be an accident of the severity she believed possible.

[96]The claimant made her disclosures to more senior colleagues whose status and/or responsibilities would qualify them as the ‘employer’ for the purposes of this legal test. It is recognised that the evidence of Mr Gibson, at least until November 2024, was that he interpreted the claimant’s comments as indicating only a personal aversion to working with ladders or at heights using the respondent’s normal practice. Had that been what the claimant said, it is doubtful that she would have made protected disclosures. His evidence is not questioned on this, but it was considered that the claimant’s own evidence was more likely to be a reliable and accurate recollection, particularly given that the concern was hers.

[97]It was therefore found that the claimant’s alleged disclosures about ladder safety were protected disclosures. Additional alleged disclosures

[98]As set out in her disclosure table (sent to the tribunal on 12 September 2025), the claimant believed that she had made further protected disclosures in relation to other matters. Those were reporting the following:a. a potential weakness in an electric fence surrounding a monkey enclosure – May 2024;

b. broken monkey enclosure furniture resulting in an exposed nail on 5 May 2024;

c. a hole under the fence of the gibbon enclosure on 29 June 2024;

d. an unlocked door leading to a drop on 25 July 2024;

e. Degraded telegraph poles in a monkey enclosure on 31 July and 11 August 2024;

f. Missing shingle in the gibbon public viewing area in August 2024;

g. A broken lamp with exposed wiring on 11 August 2024;

h. An unsecured floorboard in a public viewing area on 8 September 2024;

i. Broken electric fence conductors on 13 September 2024;

j. Risk to welfare of goats on 20 September 2024;

k. A broken door handle on 25 September 2024;

l. A threat posed by rodents to monkeys on 7 October 2024;

m. Breach of the Equality Act 2010 or other employment law obligations by Mr Gibson and/or team colleagues on 11 October, 5 November and 13 and 17 December 2024 and 20, 27 and 29 January 2025; and

n. Broken signage with exposed screws on 14 November 2024.

[99]Alleged disclosures (c), (d), (f) and (h) were accepted to be protected disclosures. In each case the claimant conveyed sufficient information about her concern to her employer and had a genuine belief either of something dangerous to people (staff or visitors) or which was in breach of a legal obligation. The hole under the fence could have permitted the escape of a gibbon, in breach of section 1A(d) of the Zoo Licensing Act 1981, as well as posed a risk to public customers. The unlocked door leading to an unexpected drop could clearly have caused injury to a member of the public unwittingly opening it. The missing shingle in the gibbon viewing area left exposed nails or screws at child height and also allowed members of the public to put an arm into an area where gibbons could reach. The unsecured floorboard was a tripping hazard for staff and the public.

[100]The claimant also held a reasonable belief that each disclosure was being made in the public interest. In each instance she was concerned for the safety of her colleagues, the owners of the zoo and the public who visited it.

[101]Alleged disclosures (a), (b), (g), (i), (k) and (n) did not qualify as protected disclosures. This was primarily because, to the extent that the claimant believed that there was either a belief in endangerment to health or safety of people, or a breach of a legal obligation, that belief was not reasonably held. This in turn was because the matters reported were too minor in seriousness and not realistically at the level of being a danger to staff or the public, or otherwise amounting to a breach of a statutory duty (under the Health and Safety at Work (etc) Act 1974) or other duty of care. In relation to the claimant’s concerns over electrical equipment ((a), (g) and (i)) she did not know enough about electrical systems to hold a real or reasonable belief. Her evidence was that she had at best a concern or suspicion, but that was not enough. The respondent’s counter-evidence was that there was no risk.

[102]Alleged disclosures (e), (j) and (l) could not qualify as putative endangerment to health and safety of ‘any individual’ because the concerns pertained only to animal and not human welfare. They could however amount to believed breaches of a legal obligation. The claimant cited the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006, sections 2(1) and 19(1) and the Zoo Licensing Act 1981, schedule 1, paragraph 4.

[103]Section 2(1) of the 2006 Act is a provision amending the earlier Animal Health Act 1981 using wording that had no obvious applicability to the situation the claimant was relying on. Section 19(1) of that Act creates an offence of causing a protected animal unnecessary suffering by an act when it was known or reasonably should have been known that the act would have such effect. ‘Protected animal’ is defined in section 17 of that Act and can include vertebrates under the control of man on a permanent or temporary basis. This would therefore appear to extend to vertebrates in the zoo.

[104]The Zoo Licencing Act 1981 does not have a any schedules currently. However, section 1A specifies that any licensed zoo must ’accommodat[e] [its] animals under conditions which aim to satisfy the biological and conservation requirements of the species to which they belong’, including by ‘providing each animal with an environment well-adapted to meet the physical, psychological and social needs of the species to which it belongs’ and ‘providing a high standard of animal husbandry with a developed programme of preventative and curative veterinary care and nutrition’. There is a separate duty to ‘prevent[…] the intrusion of pests and vermin into the zoo premises.’

[105]It was accepted that the claimant held a belief that she was reporting information about a breach of one or more of these legal obligations, whether or not she knew the specific statutory provision which applied. Whether that belief was reasonable was a more nuanced question, particularly because the precise standards which zoos are required to maintain in order to comply with their statutory obligations is a relatively technical matter and not realistically within judicial knowledge. However, considering the substance of the claimant’s concerns and the sincerity with which she expressed them against the particular statutory wording, it was found that her belief was reasonable. Again, this does not mean that her belief was indisputably correct or that the respondent had breached a condition of its licence or any other duty upon it. Merely that the claimant was entitled to consider that it had at the time of voicing her concerns, and with the information she possessed.

[106]The alleged disclosures within (m) are all similar in that they are said to be about breaches of the claimant’s rights as an employee. It was accepted that these met the test for a protected disclosure although again this involved asking what was the claimant’s reasonable belief and not what was the true position from an entirely objective viewpoint. Did the claimant suffer detriment on the grounds of making protected diclosures?

[107]The burden of proof falls initially on the claimant to show that protected disclosures were made and that detriments were suffered. If she can do that, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove that the detriment did not occur on the grounds that the disclosure was made. If it cannot do so, the relevant complaint will succeed.

[108]In her detriment table the claimant alleged 63 separate detriments. She gave dates for each but did not link them to specific alleged disclosures. Her position was taken to be that any detriment could be on the grounds of any disclosure made at an earlier point.

[109]The term ‘detriment’ is not defined in ERA and Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] IRLR 285

tends to be cited for assistance. In short, it is something which a reasonable employee would consider to be disadvantageous in the context of their work, and excludes any unjustified sense of grievance. There is therefore an objective part of the test, and not everything considered to be detrimental by an employee, however genuinely, would meet the legal test.

[110]Applying Shamoon, the following events outlined in the claimant’s table were found not to be detriments, either because they did not happen as described, or at all, or because a reasonable employee would not view them as sufficiently disadvantageous. Some of these matters are discussed, and the tribunal’s evaluation of them explained, in more detail within later legal complaints.a. D1 – break time exclusion – this was an innocuous omission by colleagues;

b. D2 – chat with Mr Gibson – this was a necessary, instructive and essentially supportive discussion about the practices of the University students;

c. D3 – CG enquiring whether the claimant was a trade union member. This was an innocuous question and within context;

d. D5 – Ms Valles saying over team radio that she was ‘just waiting on’ the claimant. This was an innocuous and valid comment in context. The claimant’s sense of grievance was not objectively justified;

e. D6 – colleagues not joining claimant on a break – this appeared to be an innocent error in not informing the claimant about a last-minute change of plan;

f. D8 – chat with Mr Gibson. This again was a supportive and constructive conversation which was necessary as part of his management responsibilities towards the claimant;

g. D9 – Mr Gibson ignoring a gibbon chart she provided – he thanked her verbally for doing so and put it to use in the department;

h. D12, D14 and D18 – rejection of holiday requests – this involved following standard practice of not granting holidays requested at short notice when there was inadequate cover;

i. D15 – Mr Gibson’s description of the claimant at times being stressed and flustered – this was accurate, consistent with how the claimant described herself and done with the purpose of aiding the claimant in the OH process;

j. D17 – Mr Gibson asking the claimant to consider applying for a role in another team. This was not an attempt to be rid of her but rather Mr Gibson trying to be helpful as the role had a work schedule more consistent with the claimant’s preference;

k. D19 – allegation that Ms Valles ignored a WhatsApp message and had a ‘cold’ demeanour – this was not directed at the claimant, merely something she observed or perceived;

l. D21 – Mr Gibson clarifying the date of the claimant’s diagnosis. It was a justified question in the context of a meeting at which the subject of discussion was which adjustments the respondent could make to accommodate her condition;

m. D22 – CG allegedly dictating holidays – Mr Gibson proposed future dates for her to choose from which he assured her would be available and she thanked him for doing so;

n. D23 – CG failing to recognise emotional dysregulation and treating it as misconduct – Mr Gibson spoke discreetly and calmly to the claimant and was entitled to do so in that manner given the claimant’s public outburst;

o. D25, D26, D31, D34, D39, D40, D44, D46, D49, D51, D52 – ‘weaponising’ of one-to-one meetings by Mr Gibson. These meetings, all alleged to have been used in this way, were not. They were necessary and appropriately handled as described in more detail under other claims within this judgment. Frequently the claimant raised no issue at the time, or even thanked Mr Gibson;

p. D27 – working both Christmas and New Year’s day – the evidence clearly showed the claimant volunteering to do so;

q. D28 – negatively mischaracterising the claimant’s position on the use of ladders – this simply was not established on the evidence;

r. D29 – excessive scrutiny by Ms Valles and negative reporting to Mr Gibson – the evidence showed only that Ms Valles had genuinely raised legitimate concerns with Mr Gibson;

s. D30 – denial of training opportunity by Mr Gibson – as explained in more detail relative to other legal complaints, there was no such denial;

t. D31 – intrusive questions by Ms Valles about the claimant’s previous work experience – this was a normal conversation between work colleagues;

u. D33 – ignoring of her emails – there was no evidence to support this;

v. D35 – ue of the phrase ‘not just you’ by Mr Gibson – this is dealt with in more detail under other legal complaints;

w. D36 – team meeting on 11 November 2024 – there was no evidence of anything detrimental to the claimant at this meeting;

x. D37 – Ms Mason directing the claimant to Mr Gibson to resolve a matter – this seemed to be normal practice given the nature of the matter;

y. D38 – Mr Gibson conveying to the claimant some of Ms Valles’ concerns – Mr Gibson was entitled to do so as the manager of both and did so in an appropriate way;

z. D41 – pressure to sign the ladder safety agreement – the claimant was asked to do so because she had offered to work with ladders in a limited way. As such the request was appropriate. She was not pressured as it was she who made the proposal, and could have objected; aa.D42 – comments about changes to ladder practice in team email – this was an appropriate briefing to the team; bb.D45 and D47 – Mr Gibson’s emails of 11 and 24 December 2024 – for reasons given below in relation to other complaints, these emails were measured and permissible; cc. D48 – this was a description of the claimant’s state of health rather than an allegation of a detrimental act by or on behalf of a respondent; dd.D50 - Mr Gibson changing format of capuchin ID testing – this involved him trying out a temporary alternative to see if it worked better for the claimant. When it became clear that it did not it was stopped; ee.D55 – Mr Gibson allegedly misrepresenting to Ms Nicol what the claimant said – this was not established on the evidence; ff. D56 – Mr Gibson allegedly not helping the claimant with capuchin identification – Mr Gibson wished to see how much the claimant had progressed with the end of her probation period approaching. He was entitled to do so. He agreed to step back from personally providing the training or testing so that the claimant would not feel under additional pressure; gg.D57 – handling of the probation review meeting with Mr Gow – as detailed elsewhere in this judgment, this was a positive meeting which was advantageous to the claimant, allowing her probation to continue and a new start offered in another department; hh.D58 – email from Mr Gow on 31 January 2025 – this was described as hostile and punitive but it is nothing of the sort. It responded to points she had raised in a sensible manner, whether it was what she wished to hear or not; ii. D59, D60, D63 – disclosure of the claimant’s probation extension and ‘health status’ outside of immediate management – part of this allegation was detrimental in the legal sense and part was not. It was permissible, and the claimant accepted this in evidence, for her colleagues to be told that she was moving to a new department. It was not necessary however for it to be disclosed to people in her team that she was absent from work on grounds of illness or that her probation period had been further extended; jj. D61 – notification of members of the claimant’s new team that she had resigned. They were entitled to know this given that they would have anticipated working alongside her and now no longer would be. This was simply a fact and was not sensitive or confidential; kk. D62 – asking the claimant to reconsider her resignation in bad faith. On the evidence the request was not made in bad faith; ll. D63 – facebook message from Morna Coughlan in which she was told that another employee heard that ‘someone had been let go for ADHD’. The claimant was receiving this information three steps removed from those allegedly making it. There was no clear indication that it was about her. It was not an act of her employer under any proper interpretation.

[111]The above allegations were therefore not detriments by the standard of Shamoon – they did not occur, at least as described, or the threshold of what a reasonable person would consider to be a work-related disadvantage had not been crossed. The remaining detriments alleged were found to meet the requirements of Shamoon. They occurred and would be viewed by a reasonable employee as disadvantageous in relation to their work in some way and not merely be at the level of an unjustified grievance. Were any of the proven detriments ‘on the grounds’ that protected disclosures had been made

[112]As stated, the onus of proof falls on the respondent to show that there was no sufficiently material connection between any disclosure and a detriment.

[113]Whether a detriment occurred on the ground that a disclosure was made does not merely involve looking at whether the detriment would have occurred had the disclosure not been made – Chatterjee v Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Trust [2019] 9 WLUK 556. The detriment must essentially be because the disclosure was made.

[114]A disclosure does not have to be the sole or even the main reason for a detriment being applied. It merely has to have a material – i.e. more than trivial - influence - NHS Manchester v Fecitt and others

[2012] IRLR 64

[115]Of the established detriments, none were found to have been on the ground that the claimant made any protected disclosures. Firstly, the disclosures which the claimant made were largely matters which many people reported routinely and were actioned under processes which were in place for them and essentially anticipated them. The claimant was not acting in any way out of the ordinary by flagging up the issues which she did. Matters such as animal welfare, colleague safety and protection of the public were respected as important. Regarding her particular stance on ladder use, Mr Gibson accepted and accommodated this as he had done for other colleagues who had similar reservations.

[116]Secondly, the evidence which existed pointed to each detriment which occurred being for completely unconnected reasons. Those included Ms Valles and other keepers finding the claimant occasionally difficult to work alongside on a personal level, Mr Gibson being entitled if not required to evaluate her against certain standards whilst under probation, him also being justified in checking CCTV evidence when the claimant disputed his own observation of her arrival time, and the disclosure of information about the circumstances of her probation extension in February 2025.

[117]Accordingly no finding could be made that the claimant had been subjected to a detriment on the ground that she had made protected disclosures. Direct disability discrimination – section 13 EqA

[118]The claimant relies on her condition, qualifying as a disability, under this claim. Her comparator is a hypothetical colleague who would have started in the same role within the same team at the same time, with the same previous experience and abilities, but who did not have the same disability.

[119]The claimant had suggested in a draft list of issues she prepared that her comparator would ‘not exhibit disability-related behaviours’ but that was not sufficiently clear. Non-disabled employees could well exhibit some of the behaviours she attributed to her condition, such as difficulty in timekeeping, retaining information or multitasking.

[120]The detrimental treatment claimed was ‘micromanagement and excessive scrutiny because of [the condition]’ from 30 August 2024 onwards. Mr Gibson’s management responsibility for the claimant ended on or around the meeting of 28 January 2025 when Mr Gow informed her that she would report to a new manager. Despite this, when in her further particulars document the claimant indicated which acts or events were believed to form part of this continuing act, the first contributing act was in May 2024. The treatment complained of was therefore said to be a continuing act over a period of up to eight months. It was agreed at the beginning of the hearing that the specific acts making up this continuing act were as listed in the respondent’s list of issues.

[121]The onus of proof falls on a claimant to show the existence of the protected characteristic relied on, the treatment said to be unfavourable and ‘something more’ by way of at least some ‘primary facts’ which provisionally suggest a link between the two – see for example Madarassy v Nomura International plc

[2007] EWCA Civ 33

. Unless they can do so the complaint will fail. If they can establish those things then the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to prove an alternative and non-discriminatory reason for the treatment.

[122]The specific acts which were said to form part of a discriminatory act were as follows:a. Ms Valles expressing annoyance with the claimant’s condition and mocking her on 30 May 2024;

b. Ms Valles not acknowledging the claimant in the kitchen area on 21 June 2024;

c. Mr Gibson denying the claimant the opportunity to train on 22 and 24 October 2024;

d. Ms Mason saying to the claimant ‘It would be great if you could mask’ in a meeting on 5 November 2024;

e. Mr Gibson being dismissive of the claimant’s feelings and concerns on 10 November 2024;

f. Mr Gibson minimising the severity of the claimant’s complaint about Ms Valles on 13 November 2024;

g. Mr Gibson imposing a ladder restriction on the claimant without prior discussion, and singling her out on 26 November 2024;

h. Mr Gibson expressing frustration in relation to the claimant’s support needs, saying that she made others uncomfortable and ‘weaponising’ her mental health by saying that she had turned down training opportunities on 11 December 2024.

[123]These allegations were considered as follows:a. Did they happen, as described or at all?

b. If so, should they be considered as an act on a single date only or part of a continuing act?

c. If not, were they time-barred?

d. If they were time-barred, is it just and equitable to extend time by an amount required to bring them within the tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine?

e. Did any act considered amount to direct discrimination according to the legal principles above?

[124]It was determined that on 30 May 2024 Ms Valles said over the team radio system ‘yeah, just waiting on Lisa’ and that she laughed and rolled her eyes when the claimant mentioned that Mr Gibson had criticised her timekeeping but said her cleaning standards were high, and if anything too high. It was also accepted that Ms Valles did not properly acknowledge the claimant’s presence in the kitchen on 21 June 2024. These were not however part of the continuing act the claimant sought to establish. This was particularly because they came very early in the claimant’s period of service, there was then a gap of some four months before the next act, and that subsequent act (and the majority of later acts relied on) was on the part of another person, Mr Gibson. No other acts of Ms Valles were specified.

[125]Therefore, the acts of Ms Valles were not sufficiently connected to later acts to form part of a continuous act. In any event there were apparent nondiscriminatory motives for them, namely that Ms Valles personally found it difficult to work with the claimant. This was not ‘because of’ her condition, which Ms Valles respected and had experience of in other context, but related to the personal effect of the claimant’s behaviour on her own disposition. It would not have been just and equitable to extend time by several months to determine these issues as free-standing complaints given all of the above factors and their weak merits.

[126]The claimant alleged that she had been denied ID training by Mr Gibson on 22 and 24 October 2024. No such thing happened which could reasonably be described in that way. On the first of those dates Mr Gibson had to ask the claimant to switch from capuchin vaccinations to squirrel monkeys out of expediency in a developing situation. On the second, in a meeting, he explained, with justification, why he would not change the subject of her species identification objective from capuchins to chimps. The reason validly related to the fact that Mr Gibson wished her to be able to identify the animals she was working with from day to day rather than carry out an abstract exercise. Had this amounted to denial of a training opportunity there was no evidence that it related in any way to the claimant’s condition, or that a nondisabled comparator would have had the request granted.

[127]The claimant alleged that she had said in the meeting on 5 November 2024 that she had coped at times in previous roles by masking neurodivergent traits, and that Ms Mason had said in response, ‘It would be great if you could mask’. The implication was that Ms Mason wished the claimant to mask any neurodivergent behaviour or traits as a way of minimising issues with her colleagues. Ms Mason denied doing so. Mr Gibson, also present in the meeting, denied hearing the comment. There was therefore a clear and direct conflict in the evidence. It appeared unlikely that Ms Mason, an experienced HR professional, would make a comment using those words in such a meeting. She would appreciate the purpose of the meeting and why it was taking place. A comment as alleged would be obviously counter-productive. It would have been less likely still that she would have made it with Mr Gibson also present. Most likely the claimant misheard Ms Mason. It was found that, on the balance of probability, the comment was not made.

[128]The next allegation was that Mr Gibson had been dismissive of her feelings and concerns in an email dated 10 November 2024. The context was that the claimant had submitted her Wellness Action Plan with her comments included, and he was providing observations in response. She took objection to his comment that it was ‘important for the whole team to recognise [the importance of treating each other with compassion, empathy and dignity] not just towards you but others who could be struggling – team meeting on Monday 11th to address this.’ This comment was balanced and fair in the context of a team where other members had raised concerns about struggling with the claimant’s behaviour or inability to fully meet the requirements of the role in relation to tasks such as cleaning. It was not dismissive of the claimant’s own circumstances, which were fully recognised. Had this been unfavourable treatment of the claimant, there was no evidence of it being ‘because of’ her condition and nor would a comparator have been treated more favourably. A comparator in this situation would have been a nondisabled colleague who had requested to be shown empathy, compassion and understanding for a different set of personal circumstances, such as for example a recent bereavement which had affected their health.

[129]Much the same can be said about the allegation against Mr Gibson on 13 November 2024, when he was accused of minimising the seriousness of a complaint the claimant made about Ms Valles. This related to her recorded comment at the ECB meeting. Mr Gibson had met with Ms Valles, asked for an explanation and considered what she said. She apologised for the comment she had made. Mr Gibson relayed that back. The way forward he wished to emphasise was through reflection and reinforcement of mutual respect rather that sanctions. He felt it appropriate to share some of the difficulties Ms Valles had experienced, which were within the same context. His approach did not minimise the seriousness of the single comment Ms Valles had made, in confidence, to a colleague about the claimant’s timekeeping. His approach to the issue was not because of, or influenced by, the claimant’s condition. Had the situation arisen involving a similar remark being made about a non-disabled colleague, it was difficult to see how Mr Gibson would have approached it any differently.

[130]The claimant said that Mr Gibson had imposed ladder working restrictions on her without prior discussion, and singled her out on 26 November 2024. This was said to have come up in one of the regular catch-up meetings focussed on reviewing the effectiveness of the claimant’s adjustments. The restriction was that Mr Gibson said he preferred the claimant not to support ladders when other colleagues were working on them. He said that she had not signed the ladder safety policy and that he did not want her to be triggered by such proximity to a colleague working at height. The claimant said she felt this took away her autonomy. This is inconsistent with the evidence, all of which showed that she feared for the safety of anyone working on the ladders under the policy the respondent adopted. She had, quite explicitly, told him previously that she feared having to speak to family members of a deceased colleague who had suffered a fatal fall. Mr Gibson’s measure could only reasonably be interpreted as a positive one designed to help the claimant. It was not any kind of ‘less favourable’ treatment.

[131]The final event in the alleged sequence was that Mr Gibson was said on 11 December 2024 to have expressed frustration in relation to the claimant’s support needs, saying that she made others uncomfortable and had weaponised her mental health by saying that she had turned down training opportunities. This was by way of an email referring to a discussion between them the day before.

[132]This was clearly a difficult meeting. The claimant was self-conscious particularly because she was not making as much progress with capuchin identification as she would have liked, and to a lesser extent she felt that she was being criticised in relation to her progress against other objectives such as daily cleaning even though objectively she was not. The viewpoints of both individuals were by necessity different – the claimant was to a degree defensive and considered only her own needs whereas Mr Gibson was trying to achieve a balance between what support he and other team members could provide her in line with their other responsibilities and priorities. An example of the tension which arose was when Mr Gibson said the claimant needed to ‘meet [him] halfway’ in ensuring her scheduled training went ahead by checking with those involved in providing it at the time if they were still available rather than allowing the moment to pass and raising it some time after. He also said that he had not promised, and could not guarantee, a specific number of training sessions at fixed times because of other priorities which arose, but would try to ensure that any cancelled session was rescheduled. He raised that the claimant herself had at times been unable to attend training sessions because she had said she was not in the right ‘head space’.

[133]The claimant perceived Mr Gibson’s comments particularly negatively and as an attack on what she saw as some of the traits of her condition. However, the comments were ones which Mr Gibson was fairly entitled to make as part of the particular discussion taking place. He was responding to what he took to be an erroneous understanding on the claimant’s part that he had promised more than he could accommodate. He also used illustrations of other reasons why certain training sessions did not go ahead. He was not attacking the claimant in doing this, but rather demonstrating that for them to go ahead every person involved had to play their part. As such they could scarcely be viewed as unfavourable comments, and much less were they less favourable comments than those which Mr Gibson would have made to a hypothetical non-disabled colleague who was struggling to meet their objectives or who challenged him on a measure he had agreed to provide using partial or erroneous information.

[134]The above considerations led to a conclusion that on none of the individual occasions cited was there less favourable treatment of the claimant because of her disability. When they were considered as a potential continuous act the outcome was the same.

[135]The complaint of direct discrimination was therefore not upheld. Indirect discrimination – section 19 EqA

[136]The claimant specified 16 provisions, criteria or practices although some were stated more than once. Those were found in either her original particulars of claim or her further particulars document. They were as follows:a. The use of generic probation criteria for all zookeeping staff;

b. Imposition of inflexible working hours, particularly around morning start time (this was specified as a PCP twice);

c. The use of the capuchin identification criterion as part of probation, which valued speed, multitasking or rapid decision making under high pressure time constraints (this was specified as a PCP twice);

d. Only senior keepers being allowed to take keys home;

e. Automatically assuming or perceiving neurodivergent behaviour as wrongdoing – viewing communication as confrontational;

f. Only issuing staff with two sets of uniform;

g. Requiring staff to log into and use an electronic rota which was subject to change at short notice;

h. Requiring adherence to standard operating procedures in relation to daily enclosure cleaning;

i. Delivery of training inconsistently, in an ad hoc way, on a first-comefirst-served basis with staff being expected to request training sessions rather than in a structured way (this was specified as a PCP three times);

j. Providing inadequate or ineffective disability awareness training to staff;

k. Requiring all staff to perform a safety check-in by radio at break times;

l. Inconsistently applying standards of acceptable communication among staff;

m. As a matter of policy, not allowing probation review meetings to be audio recorded.

[137]Judicially, the term ‘provision, criterion or practice' has been interpreted widely. For example, it can refer to something less formal than a written policy such as a general expectation, if clear and sufficiently consistently applied. In certain cases a one-off decision can qualify as a ‘provision’ even if not a ‘practice’, which implies a degree of repeated application. Some individual decisions may not be provisions, for example when taken quicky, in isolation or without ongoing consequences.

[138]With the exception of (a), (e), (j) and (l) it was accepted that the claimant had generally identified validly framed PCPs which were applied by the respondent. Those four exceptions were not proven to have been applied. They were merely her perception of the respondent, extrapolated from some specific experiences she had with colleagues, primarily Mr Gibson. There was no evidence that they existed at a cultural or institutional level, or beyond a one-off situation. Furthermore they were not made out on the evidence against Mr Gibson, and so could not credibly be re-framed as a PCP involving only him. In relation to (a), there were some generic objectives for new keepers but also others which were tailored to the individual and the specifics of the role and department where they were assigned. The main generic criteria in the claimant’s case were identification of individuals within a species, completion of cleaning tasks according to standard procedures and timekeeping, but those were more distinctly identified as PCPs in their own right.

[139]For the claimant to go on to show indirect discrimination had occurred, she needed to prove that each PCP:a. Was or would be applied to employees who shared her protected characteristic and those who did not;

b. Put or would put persons sharing her protected characteristic at a particular disadvantage compared to others not sharing it – i.e. a ‘group’ disadvantage; and

c. Put or would put the claimant herself to that disadvantage – i.e. a ‘personal’ or ‘individual’ disadvantage.

[140]What is a ‘disadvantage’ is not defined in EqA but has been held to be similar to a detriment – Williams v Trustees of Swansea University Pension and Assurance Scheme

[2018] UKSC 65

. Therefore, it is largely objectively tested but the individual circumstances of the employer should be taken into account so far as relevant, and an unjustified sense of grievance will not qualify.

[141]A group disadvantage need not affect everyone with the claimant’s protected characteristic. It should ‘disproportionately’ affect that group. Group disadvantage

[142]The claimant did not provide specific statistical or other empirical evidence about the nature and extent of any disadvantage likely to have been suffered at group level, i.e. involving employees with ADHD other than herself. Group disadvantage could therefore only be based on more general evidence.

[143]She relied on the imposition of fixed or inflexible working hours, particularly in relation to morning starting times. The respondent required all zookepers to start at 8.00am in order to ensure procedures such as animal welfare checks, feeding and cleaning were completed before the public were admitted. There was the additional restriction of requiring all keepers to uplift their personal set of keys at that time so that the senior keepers, who gave them access, could begin their own duties on time. The claimant did not provide evidence to prove that employees with ADHD were, or would have been, put to a disadvantage by having a fixed start time of 8.00am as opposed to, say, a five minute window. However, it is generally known and medically established that many individuals with ADHD struggle with time blindness and disruption to planned routines such as in relation to travel. It was therefore accepted that a fixed 8.00am start would likely cause a group disadvantage.

[144]It was not accepted that the use of capuchin identification created a group disadvantage. This was partly because the PCP did not exist quite in the way the claimant portrayed it. Whilst identification was necessary for all keepers wishing to pass probation, it was not a requirement that it be carried out at speed or under time pressure, or in a way which required multitasking. The claimant was given adequate time to learn over her probation period and during the training sessions themselves. The PCP was more properly described as a requirement to identify each capuchin by its appearance within a reasonable period of time but before the end of the probation period. As such the claimant did not establish that persons sharing her protected characteristic were or would be disproportionately disadvantaged. Whether or not ADHD tends to affect visual recognition ability over such a period of time is not within judicial knowledge.

[145]The practice of only senior keepers being allowed to take keys home had no obvious difference in effect on persons with ADHD as opposed to those without. The issue the claimant had with this was tied to her desire to be able to start work after 8.00am on occasion. That was the PCP which caused her difficulty.

[146]The issuing of two sets of uniform as standard to keepers could be seen to cause a group disadvantage given that they needed regular, if not daily, washing and that it is commonly known that individuals with ADHD are more likely to struggle to maintain the necessary routine for this, whether due to time blindness, executive dysfunction, fatigue or difficulty in general organisation. However, the respondent’s practice more accurately was to issue two sets initially, but provide further uniform on request. Mr Gibson confirmed that this routinely happened, and it is what happened with the claimant. That practice did not create a disadvantage because staff could have as many sets of uniform as they would reasonably need.

[147]The claimant next referenced the practice of keepers working to an online staff rota which was prone to change in response to events occurring from day to day. It was less clear how the use of an online rota in itself could cause a group disadvantage, since there are not sufficiently clearly recognised links between ADHD and an inability to use technology or online resources. However, the dynamic nature of the rota itself more obviously created a group disadvantage given that it is commonly known that frequent changes to routine can cause stress, concentration and memory challenges, and be fatiguing.

[148]No group disadvantage was established in relation to adherence to daily cleaning routines and methods which all keepers had to follow. There was no evidence that the particular tasks would disproportionately challenge a significant enough number of those with the claimant’s condition compared to those who did not. There was no particular complexity or other demand which had that effect.

[149]The claimant said that the way capuchin identification training was provided initially caused a group disadvantage. This was because there tended to be more than one person in the team (during the claimant’s probationary period there were three including her for at least some of the time), and each had to essentially approach the more senior keepers to ask them to devote some of their working time to training. The claimant felt reluctant to do so as she felt she was imposing on their time and had a sense that she would be negatively perceived. It was challenging for her to have to do this every time she had to undertake training. It is sufficiently well documented that individuals with ADHD face challenges in interacting with others and in particular in asking for help due to social fatigue, executive dysfunction or a perceived sense of lacking in self-worth. As such, a group disadvantage was established. Again it is noted that the initial practice was adapted for the claimant once Mr Gibson became aware of it being challenging for her.

[150]There was a practice of team members checking in throughout the day via radio to ensure they were safe. The claimant did not establish how it would have created a group disadvantage. It was a simple process. The claimant’s personal aversion to it was because she perceived that Ms Valles had made a mocking comment on an earlier occasion but that was specific to her and did not translate to the larger group.

[151]The respondent had a policy of not allowing colleagues to record internal meetings such as the final probation review the claimant attended on 28 January 2025. It was not clear why the claimant wished to record, and immediately transcribe, the discussion other than to have a full record of the conversation to refer back to at a later date. That did not help her represent herself in the meeting itself. Additionally, both her own representative and Ms Mason made notes. In the event there was not a dispute over the contents of Ms Mason’s minute. The claimant proposed some minor corrections to it and those were accepted. There was no impact on the essential aspects of the discussion, which were that Mr Gow considered the claimant’s representations about her progress during probation and was satisfied that a further extension was merited. In this context it could not be seen how the policy impacted disproportionately on individuals sharing the claimant’s condition as opposed to others. Individual disadvantage

[152]Taking forward the provisions, criteria or practices which created a group disadvantage, it was next considered whether they caused that particular disadvantage to the claimant. It was found as follows:a. Imposition of fixed working hours, i.e. an 8.00am start time – although the claimant only occasionally was late, it was accepted that it was challenging on at least some of her working days to adhere to that, requiring additional planning and adjustments to her home routines;

b. Working to the dynamic staff rota was also personally disadvantageous to the claimant as well. She found it difficult to navigate the online application and to check and adapt to changes in people’s duties and working schedules;

c. The claimant clearly was disadvantaged by the initial method of providing species identification training for the reasons stated above in relation to group disadvantage. She needed more clarity and structure.

[153]Consequently, there were three instances of potential indirect discrimination which, subject to any time-bar challenge, would be unlawful unless they were objectively justified by the respondent – i.e. shown to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Were any disadvantages justified

[154]The onus falls on a respondent to show that a provisionally discriminatory provision, criterion or practice serves a legitimate aim in a proportionate way. The evidence led by the respondent was as follows:a. Imposition of a fixed 8.00am start time – for security reasons, staff had to leave their keys within the zoo when not working. They could not take them home. The keys could be used to open secure areas such as animal compounds. There was a risk if keys were lost or fell into the wrong hands. They would be expensive to replace wholesale and both security and animal safety could be compromised. There was a legitimate aim in protecting security of the zoo and its animals, as well as avoiding the cost of potentially replacing a number of locks and sets of keys if a staff member lost their personal set. Therefore, only senior keepers were allowed to take keys off the premises. This ensured that someone could respond to an out-of-hours emergency at the zoo. To ensure that keys were accounted for each day they were kept in a lock box next to the entrance. Senior keepers had the key to that box and so could provide other keepers with their keys at the beginning of each day, and lock them up at the end. As a result of this practice, the claimant was not allowed to take her keys home and needed to report at 8.00am sharp to collect them. Once the relevant senior keeper handed out keys at that time they would begin their own duties, which could be at a part of the zoo some walking distance away from the entrance. It would therefore be disruptive to require them to wait behind until the last person arrived, or to go back to the entrance from wherever they had begun working. Given that those were the restrictions the respondent was operating under, and that the claimant was very infrequently late, the system operated was a proportionate means of achieving the relevant aim. The claimant had not shown that the fixed start time was so challenging that the respondent should require to take further measures which would create risk, cost money and/or disrupt the duties of others to accommodate an extension to it. Mr Gibson had confirmed that being a few minutes late ‘on the odd occasion’ was not a problem. The balance between any occasional inconvenience to her and the potential disruption to operations at the zoo was fair.

b. Using the online staff rota – the claimant was expected to use an online rota app to tell her where she and others in her team were working throughout each day. It was necessary to use a team rota in that format because the zoo was a dynamic workplace and demands were arising and changing constantly. There was therefore a legitimate aim in using an online rota which could be updated quickly and accessed to show the current position in real time. The claimant found the rota difficult to navigate and its constantly changing nature caused her difficulty. Mr Gibson agreed in the meeting between the two on 30 August 2024 that he would provide her with the key information which related to her by text message. As such, it was only the practice between the end of April 2024, when the claimant started working, and 30 August 2024 when the meeting took place that was capable of criticism as being indirectly discriminatory. The next matter to consider therefore was whether this complaint was time-barred, and if so whether the period for it to be raised should be extended to allow it to be decided. The complaint clearly was out of time by some five and a half months (ACAS Early Conciliation having commenced on 12 February 2025). It was not part of a continuing act extending beyond the end of August 2024. Given particularly that Mr Gibson had sought to rectify the disadvantage immediately upon it being raised with him at that time, and the duration of the revised practice for the remaining months of the claimant’s service, it was not considered just and equitable to extend time and allow the complaint to be decided;

c. Unstructured system for undertaking capuchin identification training – this was another practice Mr Gibson changed after the meeting on 30 August 2024. The respondent’s evidence was that normally there would be more than one member of a given team who needed to train on identification of a particular species within that department. They would need the assistance of a more experienced keeper who already had those skills to spend time with them as they learned. This took those experienced individuals away from their normal duties, and so a balance had to be struck between the training time which could be offered and the need for other duties to continue to be performed. This was a legitimate aim. The changing nature of the work at the zoo made it difficult to schedule such sessions, and realistically it fell to those seeking the training to approach their experienced colleagues and identify together suitable windows of opportunity as they arose. Others appeared to find this easier to do than the claimant. Mr Gibson was unaware of this until the claimant discussed it in the meeting. From that point on he scheduled times for her to receive training, although she would be expected to remind the nominated trainer at the appointed time if it looked like they had forgotten or been held up elsewhere. For the reasons given above in relation to use of the online rota the complaint was time-barred and it was not just and equitable to extend time by some months.

[155]Consequently, the various complaints of indirect discrimination were either unsubstantiated on the evidence, were met with a successful ‘justification’ defence or were out of time. Failure to make reasonable adjustments – sections 20 & 21 EqA

[156]The claimant suggested provisions, criteria or practices said to have operated to put her at a substantial disadvantage compared to persons not sharing her disability, as set out in her list of issues, paragraph 18. Twelve were articulated. No physical features of the respondent’s premises or absences of an auxiliary aid were relied on. There was a large degree of overlap with the PCPs alleged as part of her indirect discrimination complaint. They were as follows:a. The use of generic probation criteria for all zookeeping staff;

b. Imposition of inflexible working hours, particularly around morning start time;

c. The use of the capuchin identification criterion as part of probation, which valued speed, multitasking or rapid decision making under high pressure time constraints;

d. Only senior keepers being allowed to take keys home;

e. Providing inadequate or ineffective disability awareness training to staff;

f. Requiring staff to log into and use an electronic rota which was subject to change at short notice;

g. Requiring adherence to standard operating procedures in relation to daily enclosure cleaning;

h. Delivery of training inconsistently, in an ad hoc way, on a first-comefirst-served basis with staff being expected to request training sessions rather than in a structured way;

i. Requiring all staff to do a safety check-in by radio at break times;

j. Applying inconsistent and unequal timeframes to staff learning capuchin identification – this was clarified to mean that the claimant had to fulfil the objective in order to complete her probation period whereas other keepers had not needed to do so;

k. Inconsistently applying standards of acceptable communication among staff; and

l. As a matter of policy, not allowing probation review meetings to be audio recorded.

[157]This complaint was approached as follows, applying the principles of Royal Bank of Scotland v Ashton

[2011] ICR 632

:a. Was the alleged PCP genuinely a provision, criterion or practice?

b. If so, did it put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with those who are not disabled? Who are the comparators and what was that disadvantage?

c. If so, what adjustment(s) if any could have been made and when? How would the adjustment been likely to have helped? This will involve consideration of when the respondent had (or ought to have had) knowledge of both the disability and the substantial disadvantage caused - Newham Sixth Form College v Sanders

[2014] EWCA Civ 734

[158]As with complaints under section 19, what amounts to a PCP should be ‘construed broadly, having regard to the statute's purpose of eliminating discrimination against those who suffer disadvantage from a disability. It includes formal and informal practices, policies and arrangements and may in certain cases include one-off decisions.’ - Lamb v The Business Academy Bexley

UKEAT/0226/15

[159]Applying this permissive approach, each alleged PCP was deemed to constitute a provision, criterion or practice with the exception of (a), (c), (e) and (k), which were not established on the evidence, the onus of doing so falling on the claimant. That is to say, it was not shown that(i) all new joiners were given the same probation criteria although some were similar (the most problematic for the claimant was in any event identified as a separate PCP, namely the requirement to complete species identification),

(ii) capuchin identification training and the passing of an identification test had to be performed in an environment involving speed, multitasking or rapid decision making under high pressure time constraints – this was not found to be an accurate description of the requirement as discussed in relation to the section 19 complaint above,

(iii) staff, including managers, had been given ‘inadequate’ training in relation to disabilities or that

(iv) standards of communication were inconsistently applied - the claimant perceived that she was being more stringently managed in relation to her communication with colleagues than they were in relation to her, but in reality Mr Gibson dealt individually with differing situations as they arose on their own merits and that did not amount to a provision, criterion or practice.

[160]Dealing therefore with the remainder and the question of comparative substantial disadvantage, the analysis was similar to that in relation to individual disadvantage under the section 19 complaint. There was no separate hurdle of establishing a group disadvantage, however. ‘Substantial’ has been held to mean ‘more than minor or trivial’. That is not a particularly high threshold.

[161]The claimant was found to have been put to a comparative substantial disadvantage by an established PCP in the following ways:a. A strict 8.00am start time was more difficult for her to adhere to on daily basis than colleagues who did not have ADHD, as executive dysfunction and time-blindness made it more likely that she would be late. She had to introduce routines into her home life to ensure she complied. This at times (but not always) could be fatiguing and caused an additional degree of stress. Although the claimant managed to comply substantially with the requirement, the effect was more than minor or trivial;

b. The rule allowing only senior keepers to take keys away from the premises put the claimant to a similar disadvantage as the fixed 8.00am daily start time. It effectively allowed little or no leeway in when she could arrive at work;

c. Requiring staff to use an electronic dynamic rota put her at a substantial disadvantage in terms of both the format and its constantly changing nature;

d. Adherence to daily cleaning routines put the claimant to a comparative and substantial disadvantage, at least initially, as she found it difficult to complete the tasks required within the finite time allocated due to time management challenges and a degree of perfectionism; and

e. The relatively unstructured way in which training took place put her at a substantial disadvantage, as explained in the context of the section 19 complaint.

[162]The claimant was unable to show that she was put to a substantial disadvantage because of her disability, in comparison to people without that disability, in the following ways:a. Requiring staff to check in by radio for safety purposes – the reason the claimant was averse to using a radio was that she perceived Ms Valles had made a critical comment to the team on one or, at most, two occasions early in her period of service. The claimant felt that Ms Valles was implying her timekeeping was not good enough. It was questionable at best whether Ms Valles comment or comments could reasonably be interpreted in that way. There was too tenuous a connection to the claimant’s disability even if so.

b. Needing her to pass the capuchin identification requirement before completing probation when others were not similarly required – this was an allegation distinct from her concern about how training was scheduled and provided. It was about the requirement for her to complete the objective before, and as a condition of, passing probation. This did not put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage because she had several months to reach that level of awareness and she could not show that this period of time was inadequate. Generally, and at the time the claimant was going through probation, new colleagues were subject to the same requirement. Those who were not were not properly comparable to the claimant because they were more longstanding keepers who had passed probation years earlier, or who had transferred from other departments, or who worked fewer hours, or who had taken breaks in their employment; and

c. Preventing her from recording her formal probation review meeting – as explained in relation to the section 19 complaint, this did not place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage given the negligible assistance recording the meeting would have provided in light of its outcome and it being adequately minuted by Ms Mason.

[163]Considering next whether a duty to make reasonable adjustments fell on the respondent, it was concluded as follows:a. Strict 8.00am start time – Mr Gibson became properly aware of the claimant wishing this in their meeting on 30 August 2024. Before that, knowledge of both the disability and any substantial disadvantage to the claimant was not known and could not reasonably have been known by the respondent. The only solution which the claimant could identify was raised at the stage of making her closing submissions and not while she was employed by the respondent. It was to provide a separate lock box inside the zoo entrance where her work keys could be kept overnight. She would need a separate key for this which she would take home with her. The respondent disagreed – again in closing submissions as it had not been raised before – that this would still have caused risk had the claimant lost those keys. Someone finding them could gain access to her lock box. There would be a cost to set up the lock box, and if the lock ever had to be changed or the box replaced. Mr Gibson had observed the claimant leaving her keys unattended within the zoo. It was not unrealistic to envisage her losing them again or them being stolen. Balanced against the fact that the claimant was rarely late it was argued that such an adjustment was not reasonable. There were other ways for the claimant to ensure she could receive her keys each day, by arriving to work on time and she was utilising them;

b. The rule only allowing senior keepers to retain keys was closely linked to the above issue. The claimant appeared to be arguing less strongly that this rule should have been changed for her. The respondent was entitled to limit those able to take keys off the premises to more senior employees. They carried the responsibility of having to attend the premises out of hours during emergencies and so had a greater need for them. With their seniority came a greater degree of trust on the part of the respondent;

c. The respondent only reasonably had knowledge of the requirement to use the electronic rota causing a substantial comparative disadvantage to the claimant on 30 August 2024. Mr Gibson agreed that the claimant would not be required to consult it, and that he would directly tell her about any important information which applied to her. This was a reasonable adjustment which was implemented at an appropriate time. The evidence suggested that it appeared to work. The claimant did not provide any substantial evidence of continuing to be at a disadvantage after she was permitted not to use the rota. No further requirement to make adjustments to address this disadvantage arose;

d. The disadvantage to the claimant as a disabled individual caused by the requirement to maintain cleaning routines (in terms of process followed and time taken) was similarly only known, actually or constructively, on 30 August 2024. Mr Gibson had begun supporting her before that point, informally at first and then more formally in the probation review meeting on 29 July 2024 as detailed in the review form. This was revisited at subsequent one-to-one progress review meetings and the claimant was given further guidance and instruction. The claimant did not explain how this was insufficient. She was deemed to have passed this objective by mid-January 2025;

e. Regarding the lack of structure in species identification training, this only fairly came to the respondent’s attention as being a substantial disadvantage caused to the claimant as compared with non-disabled persons at the end of August 2024. Mr Gibson made the adjustments discussed in relation to the section 19 complaint above. No further adjustments were reasonable or necessary. The claimant was given a fair opportunity and reasonable time to learn to identify the capuchins but was simply unable to meet that requirement.

[164]The claim of failure to make reasonable adjustments was therefore unsuccessful. Discrimination arising from disability – section 15 EqA

[165]Section 15 of EqA prevents a worker being subjected to a detriment ‘because of something arising in consequence of [their] disability’. This extends protection of disabled workers by making it unlawful for them to be treated unfavourably because of effects or symptoms related to their disability, such as reduced functioning at work or increased absences.

[166]If a worker has been so treated the employer may be able to argue that its actions are a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’. As with indirect discrimination therefore, unfavourable treatment may be justified.

[167]The claimant’s list of alleged occasions of unfavourable treatment was contained in paragraph 24 of her original draft list of issues and there were 32 of them, listed from (a) to (pp). They are considered below. Some are considered together as they are similar in nature and have been evaluated in the same way.

[168]Allegations (a) to (e), (g) to (j), (n), (o) were all against Ms Valles. With one exception they are said to have occurred between May and 22 August 2024, more than five months before the claimant resigned and then began Early Conciliation. The exception so to speak is that within (a) she said that Ms Valles’ excessive scrutiny, expressions of frustration and negative reports continued to January 2025, but no further specific details were given beyond those in other itemised allegations against Ms Valles, which are dealt with below. The complaints are all similar in nature, accusing Ms Valles of making gestures or comments which showed her frustration at the claimant’s behaviours said to have been caused by her condition, such as poor timekeeping, communication differences, oversharing, interrupting, and injustice sensitivity.

[169]The evaluation of these allegations is similar in some ways to that conducted when they were made as part of the direct discrimination complaint under section 13 EqA. That is to say, they came early on in the claimant’s period of service and do not have a substantial connection to later allegations against other individuals. They are not identifiable as part of a continuing act, but instead are free-standing occasions to the extent that they happened. In terms of their substance, they were accepted by the tribunal to have occurred generally as the claimant described them. They were provisionally more likely to have taken place because of something arising from the claimant’s disability – the test under section 15 – than because of the disability itself as section 13 requires. But it was not just and equitable to extend time to determine those complaints. This was particularly because Ms Valles had consciously modified her behaviour as best she reasonably could and it was still not clear that she was reacting to behaviours which were products of the claimant’s disability rather than a more general incompatibility in their personalities or working styles. The claimant could not claim blanket immunity from any type of conduct on her part which others might find challenging or wish to avoid and there was evidence suggesting that her behaviour did at times go beyond what might objectively be considered tolerable in a work setting, and that Ms Valles was legitimately frustrated and at times even upset or intimidated by it.

[170]Allegation (f) is similar in nature but made against another keeper colleague, Ms Nicol. The claimant said she was met with a ‘hostile reaction’ after asking for disability related advice and experienced a change in treatment. Ms Nicol denied responding in that way. The claimant could not prove that Ms Nicol had behaved in any particular way which was hostile and nor was there sufficient evidence of a link between the behaviour as alleged and the claimant’s disability. This was also an isolated event which was time-barred.

[171]Allegations (k) and (l) related to Mr Gibson’s actions on 29 July 2024, both in how he viewed and documented the claimant’s performance at the threemonth probation review stage and how he completed the OH referral. Although these allegations were out of time when viewed as free-standing incidents, the tribunal accepted that there was a stronger argument that Mr Gibson’s management of the claimant – compared to more isolated actions or comments by fellow keepers - could amount to a continuing act which carried on potentially up to the end of her employment. The various allegations against him were viewed as potentially part of such a course of conduct and considered on their merits.

[172]Those two allegations were that firstly Mr Gibson described the claimant’s demeanour as ‘stressed and flustered’ at times and that he lowered her probation ratings from those given after a month in her role. The former is discussed below in relation to allegation (y) which referred to the same matter.

[173]Reducing the claimant’s ratings at her three-month review was capable of being viewed as unfavourable. It did not automatically follow that this happened because of the effects of characteristics arising from her disability, but it was accepted on the balance of probability that it did, in the sense that the claimant struggled with the respondent’s increased expectations and requirements of her because of things such as poor time awareness and management and lack of focus. However, Mr Gibson’s comments served the legitimate aim of providing clear and honest communication about the claimant’s performance so that she could make adjustments and improvements and become fully competent in the role by the end of her probationary period. They were provided in a proportionate way – they were honest as they needed to be but encouraging and accompanied by offers of support.

[174]The claimant alleged (m) that Mr Gibson ‘weaponised monthly ADHD support meetings’ resulting in excessive micromanagement, scrutiny and criticism of her. This is simply factually untrue given the evidence. He set aside significant amounts of time to both meet with her, follow up with written confirmation of the matters discussed and explore measures to assist her. She frequently thanked him for his time and effort. Without his doing so she would have been likely to fall further short of achieving her probation objectives.

[175]Mr Gibson was said to have ‘treat[ed] [a] disability related symptom as misconduct’ on 20 September 2024 – (p). This was a reference to him speaking to the claimant about her behaviour and manner of speaking about her fellow keeper Ms Wallace in relation to the state of the goat enclosure. The claimant did not establish that Mr Gibson speaking to her in a way which she considered to be unfavourable was because of anything arising from her disability. The evidence showed that he was making the point that she had placed blame on a colleague based on inaccurate information, and asking her to come to him if she had concerns rather than openly air them in a public space.

[176]Allegation (q) relates to another keeper, Ms McCarvill. The claimant alleges that there was a misunderstanding over a job list which caused the claimant to react because of injustice sensitivity, and this led to Ms McCarvill being hostile from then on. There was a lack of evidence as to how Ms McCarvill had treated the claimant negatively or when. This appears at its highest to be another isolated event which is out of time and which it would not be just and equitable to bring within time based on its apparent lack of substance.

[177]Items (r), (s), (t) and (u) all related to actions attributed to Mr Gibson in October 2024. They are further suggestions that he weaponised meetings and issued ‘punitive’ emails, reprimanded the claimant and belittled her symptoms. Again this perception is not consistent with the facts. The claimant was perceiving negatively necessary comments Mr Gibson had to make as her manager (and the manager of her colleagues) to ensure their appropriate day to day performance and conduct. He was also trying to identify and implement adjustments to accommodate the claimant’s difficulties, within realistic boundaries.

[178]The claimant alleged (v) that Ms Valles and Ms Nicol negatively mischaracterised her remarks in October 2024 about the passing of a cheetah in the zoo when describing the conversation to Mr Gibson. This was not established on the facts. They merely gave a description of the conversation from their own perspective. That could not be said to amount to mischaracterising the claimant.

[179]The claimant said that Mr Gibson had denied her opportunities for further training, including in relation to identification of chimps, in October 2024 – (w) and (x). It was tenuous at best to describe Mr Gibson’s decisions as unfavourable treatment because the claimant had no legitimate expectation of the further training she described. In particular there were safety reasons why she was not allowed to enter the chimp enclosure, where there was greater risk to staff, additional procedures applied and clear communication was essential. Mr Gibson believed that it was not appropriate to begin with that until the claimant showed sufficient competence in her core objectives. His decisions were not because of her symptoms, but because she required to focus on her original tasks and daily duties.

[180]Allegations (y), (z), (aa) and (bb) are linked to the process of the claimant meeting with Mr Gibson and Ms Mason to discuss the OH report. The claimant referred to a section of text Mr Gibson had added to the referral document. The precise words he used appeared in a section headed ‘additional background information’, in which he had provided a degree of detail about the issues the claimant had encountered and adjustments which had already been made. He went on to summarise concerns raised by the claimant’s colleagues, in which he said, ‘when flustered by change, including staff schedule, daily plans or unable to carry out tasks due to research Lisa can become snappy, stressed, grumpy and difficult with other staff members. It has been highlighted that the tone in which she speaks to people can be perceived as accusatory, rude and exasperated creating a difficult and uncomfortable working environment.’ On the basis of the evidence as a whole, that was a suitably representative description of the claimant’s conduct and perception by colleagues. Whilst the choice of language was in some ways direct, and the claimant may not have used the same words, the text fairly conveyed what the issue was. Given also that Mr Gibson was not addressing the claimant directly, and that the more detail which was provided, the better the resulting advice was likely to have been, it is not found that the claimant was treated ‘unfavourably’ by Mr Gibson’s wording of the OH referral form. Had she been, and because of matters arising from her disability, it would have been a proportionate means of serving the legitimate aim of obtaining expert advice on supporting the claimant to say what he did.

[181]The claimant said that the meeting to discuss the report, held on 5 November 2024, was discriminatory and offensive. She said her behaviours were challenged as wrong and her own concerns were dismissed. Her evidence was directly challenged by both Ms Mason and Mr Gibson. They described a meeting which was necessarily difficult because of the subject matter being discussed but which was nevertheless supportive. There was no reason to disbelieve them in order to accept the claimant’s recollection. They came across as credible and having sufficiently clear recollection. This extended to the allegation that Ms Mason suggested to the claimant that it would be helpful if she could mask her neurodivergent behaviour, which has been discussed above. It also applied the reasons given by Mr Gibson for not bringing the claimant to the chimp enclosure for training, also covered above.

[182]The claimant said that Mr Gibson had diminished her condition by using the words in an email on 10 November 2024 that it was ‘not just you’ – (cc). The email was sent to provide the claimant access to her Wellness Action Plan. The comment was made that Mr Gibson recognised the claimant’s request to be treated with compassion and dignity. He then said that this was important for the whole team to apply, ‘not just towards you but others who could be struggling – team meeting on Monday 11th to address this.’ In so doing he was merely making the point that others in the team might be facing personal challenges of their own and everyone deserved respect and empathy. As manager of the whole team it was appropriate for him to do so. This was not to diminish the claimant’s circumstances. It was not ‘unfavourable’ treatment of her.

[183]The claimant took issue with an email Mr Gibson sent her on 13 November 2024 - (dd) and (ee). She believed he had not dealt adequately with Ms Valles for the comments she made in the ECB meeting. In that email Mr Gibson reported that he had spoken to Ms Valles and asked her not to discuss the claimant in a way which could be perceived as negative, ‘to prevent further discomfort or upset’. He noted that the claimant had said this was sufficient. He also said he had asked Ms Valles if she found any aspects of the claimant’s behaviour challenging because the claimant had asked him to do so. He said that Ms Valles had mentioned the claimant’s timekeeping and its knock-on effect for other staff, but that Ms Valles appreciated that the claimant was trying to improve, and that the claimant could interject in conversations which made it difficult to concentrate and be heard. This was delivered in a placatory way and was not, in context, unfavourable to the claimant. Had it been, it would have been a proportionate way of achieving the legitimate aim of managing the team by encouraging mutual respect and understanding among its members.

[184]The claimant considered a further email from Mr Gibson on 2 December 2024 ‘hostile and punitive’ – (ff). That described a meeting on 26 November 2024. It was not unusual that he sent the email as both had agreed a practice of him documenting their discussions in this way. The claimant replied with her own comments in a measured way which did not convey such a negative viewpoint as she now takes about it. Mr Gibson’s email is not hostile and punitive. It is civil and supportive throughout. Nor does it treat the claimant unfavourably other in the most general sense of documenting improvements which she knew she had to make in performing her role. That falls below the legal threshold.

[185]Two matters on 9 December 2024 are raised – Mr Gibson using CCTV to check the claimant’s arrival time and her being ‘subjected to a section timing test due to timekeeping difficulties arising from my disability’ – (gg) and (hh). It is accepted that these could legitimately be considered unfavourable by the claimant. Whether the treatment was because of something arising from the claimant’s disability was less clear. She maintained that she was late because of the effects of her condition on her organisation and time management. This is accepted, as it has been in other parts of the claim. The same could be said about the reason for Mr Gibson measuring how long it took her to complete her cleaning duties. Both actions were however within the realms of appropriate management. The claimant had challenged Mr Gibson’s observation about her late arrival and so he checked available evidence. And it was appropriate in terms of monitoring the claimant’s progress towards completing her cleaning duties within their allotted time that he measured this. As such both were proportionate acts serving the legitimate aim of managing the claimant appropriately as part of Mr Gibson’s team.

[186]The claimant described a meeting with Mr Gibson on 10 December 2024 as ‘hostile, defensive, discriminatory, retaliatory and punitive’ – (ii). Again the evidence did not support this retrospective view. He had asked to discuss with her the response she had made to the above email of 2 December 2024. He acknowledged that the meeting had been uncomfortable but there were matters he had to raise as the claimant’s manager, such as the practice of her checking in by text not working, lateness arriving at work, and what accommodations could reasonably be offered to assist with improving recognition of the capuchins. His comments on the last of those the claimant took particularly badly and she perceived that he was criticising her for not being assertive enough in asking for help from others. However, Mr Gibson was entitled by this point to explain frankly what could be done for the claimant and what was expected of her in return. As with other communications above, this was only unfavourable treatment in the most general sense. It was clearly serving the legitimate aim of managing the claimant properly by communication the contribution she needed to make to pass probation. The comments, whilst frank, appropriately served that aim.

[187]Mr Gibson was alleged to have done two things on 11 December 2024 by sending an email which summarised the meeting the day before – (jj) and (kk). Firstly that he again acted in the same way as in the meeting, and secondly that he removed reasonable adjustments. The email does not meet the description which the claimant attaches to it and falls to be evaluated in the same way as the meeting itself, in other words as in the paragraph above. The allegedly removed adjustments were(i) ending safety check-ins by text, and

(ii) no longer agreeing to inform the claimant of every rota change directly. The claimant agreed that text check-ins were not happening satisfactorily and that she would check in by radio. Mr Gibson explained why it had proved infeasible to communicate each change to the rota when it was being updated so regularly. He had found himself unable to do that relatively soon after agreeing to make the change. A more ad hoc approach was adopted. By this point the adjustments had been tried for three months and Mr Gibson found that they were not working or not necessary. Removing the text check-in process did not involve treating the claimant unfavourably because of something arising out of her disability, since the adjustment did not alleviate a disability-related issue in the first place. It was agreed to provide extra assurance to the claimant that comments would not be heard from others that could be viewed as personal criticism. Ceasing to provide rota updates was because of something arising from disability, namely the claimant’s challenges in managing changing information. This step was justified because of how onerous it was and because it was possible for the claimant to work without being told of every change. It was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of ensuring she knew where she should be working at a given time.

[188]The claimant next referred to an email from Mr Gibson on 24 December 2024 in which he denied her a 5-minute window in which to arrive at work – (ll). The circumstances, including the restrictions which applied, and the rationale for this have been discussed above, principally in relation to the reasonable adjustments complaint. Not to vary an employee’s agreed contractual hours is not in itself treating them unfavourably. If it had been in this situation, then the cost and disruption which would have been occasioned to provide something that the claimant statistically rarely needed would not have been justified and the status quo was a proportionate means of serving the legitimate aim of operating the zoo with sensible regard to security risk and cost. She was rarely late and Mr Gibson had no issue with her being late ‘the odd time’ provided it did not become a regular occurrence.

[189]The claimant referred to a further meeting on 12 January 2025 with Mr Gibson (mm) as punitive. She said he reprimanded her for not providing accurate information to a colleague on her return to work from illness. This was again an unduly negative reading of the conversation which was within the normal scope of management. Mr Gibson asked the claimant to clarify some apparent inconsistencies in relation to her report of a fall at work. He also raised comments colleagues had relayed about the claimant not communicating which tasks she was carrying out. These were not of a level of criticism which would qualify as unfavourable.

[190]A further meeting with Mr Gibson on 14 January 2025 was described as punitive (nn). At this, Mr Gibson asked the claimant to consider communicating more clearly with colleagues she worked alongside. This again was prompted by apparently real concerns raised by colleagues about completing tasks relating to the securing of animals. As with the issue immediately above, Mr Gibson was merely managing the claimant within the scope of his own responsibilities and not treating her unfavourably.

[191]The claimant similarly characterised her next meeting with Mr Gibson on 16 January 2025 – (oo). This was when he confirmed to her that he had decided she had failed her probation. He was required to convey that to her in some way. She had indicated that she would rather receive the information at the start of the day than later on. An employee being told that they had not passed probation is undoubtedly unfavourable in the legal sense, but Mr Gibson did not do so because of something arising from the claimant’s disability. He did it because the claimant had not reached two of her probationary targets and effectively time had run out.

[192]The final alleged example of unfavourable treatment was that on 22 January 2025 Mr Gibson had misrepresented what Ms Nicol had told him about an incident in which the claimant was accused of snatching a pen from another colleague – (pp). This allegation was confusing to follow but appeared to be that Mr Gibson recorded the matter in the claimant’s probation review form as a clear-cut case of the claimant snatching a pen, whereas Ms Nicol had been less definitive when explaining to the claimant or Mr Gibson what she had said. Regardless, there was no evident connection between Mr Gibson’s description of the incident and anything arising from the claimant's disability.

[193]None of the allegations under section 15 met all of the required tests to succeed. They were either unsupported in fact, not significant enough to qualify as unfavourable treatment, not related to her disability, or objectively justified. Harassment - section 26 of EqA

[194]Harassment is prohibited under section 27 of EqA. The conduct complained of must be ‘related to’ a protected characteristic. The test of whether a particular act is related to a protected characteristic is wider than the test for direct discrimination, which requires treatment ‘because of’ a protected characteristic. Harassment need not be consciously aimed at the person experiencing it.

[195]There is no justification defence as there is for other complaints within the EqA. However, the test of whether harassment has occurred involves both a subjective and an objective element – section 27(4) requires account to be taken of the complainer’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable that the conduct complained of amounts to harassment.

[196]The claimant alleged a number of acts of harassment in her proposed list of issues. The first began in May 2024 and the last was said to be on 17 March 2025. As such they spanned almost the entire period of her employment.

[197]A number of accusations were made against Ms Valles, herself an additional respondent in the claim. The alleged behaviour was said to manifest by outward expressions of impatience and frustration, and a tendency to restrict or avoid communication with the claimant so that she felt excluded. These are described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c), (e), (f), (h), (i), (k), (o) and (p). The last of those falls on 22 August 2024. The evidence suggested that some time after that time Ms Valles modified her behaviour so that whilst she did not engage with the claimant as fully as with other colleagues, she interacted with the claimant in a more tolerant and civil way.

[198]Ms Valles was also accused of asking ‘intrusive’ questions about the claimant’s previous experience in zoos in October 2024 – (cc). This was not related to disability (or any other protected characteristic) and could not amount to harassment on that basis alone. It would also not have been reasonable for the claimant to perceive it as having a harassing effect as it was too innocuous a conversation.

[199]Other allegations are made against Ms Valles as follows –a. she was also accused of contributing to (aa) in October 2024 by negatively reporting matters to Mr Gibson which he later raised with the claimant; and

b. in (qq) she is accused of reporting the claimant’s timekeeping, pace of work and interruptions to Mr Gibson in November 2024. Those are however different types of behaviour in two particular ways. First they are reports made to Mr Gibson rather than conduct directly towards the claimant. Secondly, they are reports about legitimate concerns. They do not constitute conduct of the type which it would be reasonable for the claimant to consider as satisfying section 26(1)(b) – violating her dignity or creating an unacceptable environment. It would not be reasonable for the claimant to perceive them as harassment.

[200]The consequence of this was that the earlier allegations against Ms Valles were time-barred. For the same reason as time-barred allegations against her under other complaints were not determined, it was not just and equitable to extend the time limit – in some cases by several months – to decide these harassment complaints.

[201]The claimant made allegations about Ms Nicol as she had done under section 15. These were fewer and significantly weaker on their merits. For example, that Ms Nicol had become ‘hostile’ without further detail after the claimant asked her for advice in June 2024. Ms Nicol reported genuine concerns to Mr Gibson around October 2024 and gave an account of the so-called pen snatching incident to Mr Gibson in January 2025. The claimant further accused Ms Nicol of being hostile on 23 January 2025, the day after the incident. Those actions did not amount to harassment as they were not shown to be ‘related to’ the claimant’s disability, and nor was it reasonable for the claimant to consider that they qualified under section 26(1)(b). It was not just and equitable to decide the former June complaint so long after the event in question and when it appeared to have such poor prospects. The claimant had a large number of other complaints to rely on and could hardly be said to have been denied a remedy in that situation.

[202]The claimant alleged that on 18 January 2025 Nialah Ali mocked her disability related reactions. However, no evidence was led on this point.

[203]A large number of accusations are made against Mr Gibson. Many are similar in nature and have been considered above as complaints under other provisions of EqA, albeit subject to the particular wording of the relevant test within each.

[204]Many complaints against Mr Gibson are, as discussed above, negatively perceived experiences of him simply acting within his role as her manager, and by extension the manager of a team of individuals each with their own challenges, needs and rights. The negativity of the perception appears greater with the passing of time than it did when the events were occurring. It was recognisable from the evidence that the claimant felt she was struggling to meet the requirements of her role and became more pessimistic as time went on and the prospect of failing her probation became more real. By her own admission this could be a product of her condition. Her level of personal sensitivity was greater than the objective threshold which exists within section 26(4).

[205]The following complaints against Mr Gibson fell into that category:a. Asking her to clarify at various times when her condition had been medically diagnosed in Jersey given that he did so in order to gain a better understanding of what adjustments she had received in the past and which might now be made for her – (d), (n) and (q);

b. Describing the claimant as being at times ‘stressed and flustered’ in her probationary review in July 2024, when she accepted as much herself – (l);

c. Lowering the claimant’s initial probationary evaluations at the threeand six-month point in July and October 2024 and extending the probationary period with valid reasons for doing so – (m), (ff);

d. Not allowing the claimant a ‘five-minute window’ for her daily start time when for the majority of time her timekeeping was compliant and given the logistics of accommodating the change – (q), (ee), (aaa);

e. Generalised accusations that he ‘weaponised’ meetings which were designed to provide relevant feedback on progress against objectives, gain better understanding of the claimant’s circumstances and offer support, and in which he raised valid management issues – (r), (v), (w), (dd), (mm), (ss), (tt), (ww), (ccc), (ddd), (eee);

f. Allegedly treating the claimant’s agitated and heightened behaviour in relation to goat welfare as misconduct when he asked her to consider how her behaviour would be perceived by others, and to try to approach him for help before matters went that far – (s) and (u);

g. His email of 11 October 2024, which she misquotes, in which he recorded a conversation between the two, in which the claimant accepted she had spoken to Ms McCarvill inappropriately and did not wish to suggest that this was a product of her condition (x);

h. Being rostered to work on both Christmas Day and New Year’s Day when she had agreed to do so – (y);

i. His comments to the claimant on 19 October 2024, which appear normal and unrelated to disability – (z);

j. Allegedly denying the claimant training opportunities, for example by not allowing her to attend another animal enclosure or lowering the requirements of the capuchin ID recognition objective - (bb), (ee), (nn);

k. The language he used to describe the claimant’s difficulties in the OH referral form, which was frank but accurate – (gg);

l. Allegedly ignoring a request for disability support when support was being given – (hh);

m. Repeatedly making inaccurate or exaggerated representations about the claimant when the evidence suggested he diligently and fairly documented the issues – (ii);

n. Being ‘dismissive’ about various grievances she raised when there is substantial evidence that he spent considerable time responding to issues she raised – (jj);

o. Making the meeting on 5 November 2024 discriminatory and offensive. Of necessity difficult issues were discussed but this did not objectively tip over into harassment – (kk);

p. Stating that it was not only the claimant whose rights should be respected – (oo);

q. Discussing daily tensions with Ms Valles in an email of 13 November 2024 – this was done in a measured and sympathetic way, seeking to find balance between both individuals’ experience – (qq), (rr);

r. Checking CCTV records after the claimant disputed her arrival time – (uu);

s. Carrying out a spot test of the claimant’s progress in capuchin recognition – (vv);

t. Discussing in an email of 11 December 2024 ongoing issues and arrangements relating to daily aspects of the role such as use of radios, ladders, cleaning and timekeeping – these were within his remit as a manager and they were not dealt with punitively as suggested – (xx), (yy);

u. Including in the claimant’s probation record in January 2025 that she had been involved in a situation with colleagues in which she had been accused of snatching a pen from one of them – given the ongoing discussion and documentation of relationship-building as an objective this was a valid event to note – (ggg).

[206]The claimant made further allegations against Ms Mason, either alone or in conjunction with Mr Gibson or Mr Gow whom she worked alongside. Either the facts alleged were not found to be established, such as the masking comment, or the claimant was taking issue with discussions and processes which were warranted by the circumstances, such as suggesting she discuss matters with Mr Gibson or declining to instruct a further occupational health report. There was also a lack of clear linkage to the claimant’s disability. Although the ‘related to’ test is more liberal than the ‘because of’ test, it does not extend to cover every meeting, interaction or other act between the claimant and others which the claimant found to be upsetting or unwanted merely because her condition was in the background, which was the nature of many of her complaints.

[207]The same applies to the residual allegations of harassment, such as those against Ms McCarvill her fellow team member with whom she had a disagreement over a list of jobs to be done and Mr Keen who disclosed to her on 2 February 2025 that he had been told her probation was being extended and she would be moving to another section of the zoo. The claimant took this to be a breach of confidence and privacy, but Mr Gibson viewed it as information which colleagues would shortly come to know and it would assist the team in relation to shared tasks to know that the claimant would no longer be a part of those. The claimant alleged that information about her health was shared when there was no evidence of that, and said that she sustained reputational harm which was not supported by the facts. Those were not found to be acts ‘related to’ her condition (the absence being related to a migraine) and it would not have been reasonable for her to adopt the perception that they took on the character of harassment as defined in section 26(1)(b).

[208]The harassment complaint was therefore not successful when the relevant legal test was applied to the evidence. Victimisation – section 27 of EqA

[209]A victimisation complaint under section 27 of EqA essentially is made up of two parts – the worker must carry out a ‘protected act’ as defined, and then they must be subjected to a detriment by their employer because they did so. Workers subjected to a detriment because their employer believed they did a protected act are also covered. Section 27(2) is a closed list of things which can be a protected act, namely raising a claim based on the provisions of EqA, giving evidence in such proceedings, ‘doing any other thing for the purposes of or in conjunction with’ EqA or making an allegation that a person (the employer or someone else) has contravened EqA.

[210]The claimant relied on four alleged protected acts as follows:a. Allegations of harassment and other conduct in contravention of EqA she made in a meeting with Mr Gibson on 11 October 2024;

b. Further allegations of a similar nature in her meeting with Mr Gibson and Ms Mason on 5 November 2024;

c. Raising similar issues in a meeting with Ms Mason on 17 December 2024; and

d. In the formal grievance she raised on 27 January 2025 she repeated and made similar complaints.

[211]Five resulting detriments were relied on:a. Denial of training opportunities by Mr Gibson on 22 and 24 October 2024;

b. His removal of reasonable adjustments on 26 November and 24 December 2024;

c. Ms Mason making a comment about masking on 28 January 2025;

d. Ms Mason producing biased and inaccurate notes of the meeting on that day; and

e. Ms Valles making negative reports about the claimant’s disabilityrelated ‘unclear communication’ on 26 December 2024.

[212]This complaint was approached as follows:a. Did each act occur and if so was it protected by falling within section 27(2)(a) to (d)?

b. If so, was the claimant subjected to a detriment as alleged?

c. If so, was that because of carrying out one or more of the protected acts?

[213]Dealing with the alleged protected acts in order:a. The claimant raised in the meeting on 11 October 2024 that she was experiencing hostility and mocking from colleagues over her timekeeping and inability to complete tasks. In doing so she was alleging harassment in breach of EqA. The remainder of the discussion did not qualify as a protected act. It was a conversation about the claimant’s behaviours and the concerns expressed by others about them.

b. The claimant raised similar concerns in the meeting of 5 November 2024;

c. Likewise in the meeting with Ms Mason on 17 December 2024; and

d. Similarly in her written grievance dated 27 January 2025.

[214]As such, each was a protected act under section 27(2)(d).

[215]Moving to the alleged detriments:a. The claimant was not ‘denied’ training opportunities on 22 and 24 October 2024. On the earlier date Mr Gibson required the claimant to undertake a more urgent task. This was not denial of a training opportunity in the wider context, where the claimant was given many opportunities for training. There was no clear evidence that he had denied her a training opportunity on the later date at all. There was a lack of any link between what Mr Gibson had done, or not done, on either date and the claimant’s protected act. In other words, the ‘because’ part of the test was not satisfied.

b. The position as regards to how Mr Gibson approached adjustments is explained in detail within the discussion of that complaint above. The changes made by Mr Gibson were as a result of experience having tried them and based on whether they were having a sufficiently positive effect against the additional effort or disruption they caused. They were not shown to be driven or influenced by any of the claimant’s protected acts.

c. As it was found that Ms Mason did not make a comment about masking in the way the claimant alleged, it follows that this could not be a detriment because of her undertaking a protected act.

d. Nor was it shown that Ms Mason prepared a biased and inaccurate minute of the meeting, or that this represented a detriment to the claimant, or that the way in which the minute was prepared was influenced by any protected act. The claimant approved the minute with minor corrections.

e. The claimant did not provide any evidence of the conduct of Ms Valles specifically on 26 December 2024, although it is appreciated that she did speak about comments made by Ms Valles, both to her directly and to Mr Gibson, on other dates around this time. Of that evidence, it was found that Ms Valles’ comments were genuinely and reasonably held. She found it difficult and stressful to work alongside the claimant. She also recognised that she was being accused of unfair behaviour and wished to put her account across. This was not a detriment to the claimant in any meaningful sense given that she remained within the reasonable boundaries of her right to do so.

[216]The tribunal did not therefore find that any detriment occurred as claimed. No act of victimisation had therefore taken place. In any event it was not possible to link any of the events alleged as detriments to the protected acts in question to the extent that it could be said that one of the former was ‘because of’ the latter. Automatic constructive unfair dismissal – section 103A ERA

[217]The claimant alleged that she was forced to resign because she had made protected disclosures. She did not have sufficient service to make a complaint of constructive dismissal under sections 94 and 95(1)(c) of ERA.

[218]It was an accepted fact that the claimant did resign, which she communicated by letter dated 2 February 2025. This was sent as an attachment to an email which commented on an email Mr Gow had sent her on 31 January 2025. There had been exchanges between the two before that, all arising out of the meeting between the two on 28 January 2025.

[219]The claimant said in her further particulars of claim that the ‘final straw event’ came via a WhatsApp message from a fellow keeper, Mr Keen, who told her that he had found out from two other keepers that the claimant’s probation had been extended a further time and that she would be moving to the carnivores section once she returned to work. The claimant saw this as a breach of her trust, confidence and privacy by whoever had disclosed the information outside of management. In her evidence she accepted that colleagues should know that she was moving departments, but not that her probation had been extended.

[220]As the claimant had resigned and because her complaint of unfair dismissal was brought under section 103A rather than sections 94 and 95, this meant that she had to establish that:a. She had made one or more protected disclosures;

b. Because of one or more of those disclosures the respondent had materially breached her contract of employment – in this case breaching the obligation of mutual trust and confidence specifically;

c. She had resigned promptly because of the breach rather than affirming it (whether positively or by delay in acting).

[221]In terms of the evidence, the claimant attended the planned meeting with Mr Gow on 28 January 2025 and this was positive. Very significantly, he agreed to extend her probation period a further time rather than confirm her employment would be terminated. A move to another team was agreed in principle also. However, any agreement on the way forward began to unravel in the emails which followed. The claimant asked for paid leave until she was ready to start working in her new department, a meeting involving her trade union representative to discuss a return-to-work plan, adjustments to her role in the new department and the involvement of an HR advisor who was ‘impartial’.

[222]Mr Gow replied to raise that it would be difficult to formulate a return-to-work plan whilst the claimant would not allow him to share personal information with the manager of her new team. He also noted that the claimant had been recorded as absent through illness due to a migraine. He said that if she was well enough to work then she should return, but if she felt she was not yet ready to move to her new department then she could remain at home, but that would be treated as unpaid leave. He provided the name of an alternative HR contact to Ms Mason who would be available to assist in any future meetings.

[223]The claimant’s response to this email was her resignation. In the covering email she replied to Mr Gow on the same issues as they had been discussing earlier in the exchange.

[224]The claimant’s resignation letter overlapped with the issues in these emails, but also covered other matters. She said that throughout her tenure she had been subjected to discrimination including failure to make reasonable adjustments and victimisation after making protected disclosures about ladder practice safety. She also referred to the perceived breach of trust and confidentiality by way of disclosure to colleagues of the extension of her probation and the fact that she was absent from work on health grounds. She went on to say that her mistreatment had continued by having to move to another department which did not allow for a fresh start, for example because her new manager would have knowledge of some of the issues which had occurred whilst in Mr Gibson’s team. She was also concerned that a colleague with supervisory responsibility in the new department was in a relationship with Mr Gibson, ‘making any expectation of fair treatment untenable’.

[225]The claimant said that it was ‘the culmination of these actions’ which had left her with no alternative but to resign, and that ‘my resignation should therefore be regarded as constructive dismissal’.

[226]The claimant was clearly aware of the legal concept of constructive unfair dismissal when drafting her resignation letter and its covering email. She took some time to put into the letter the matters which she said led her to take the decision. The majority of them were unrelated to the protected disclosures which she made. The only type of protected disclosures she said she had made were about ladder safety. It was accepted, as explained above, that those disclosures were protected disclosures, but that the claimant did not suffer any detriment as a result of making them. It seemed even more tenuous therefore that those same disclosures had caused the respondent to materially breach the duty to maintain mutual trust and confidence. The claimant did not explain, in her evidence or any written document submitted to the tribunal, how that came about. The legal onus was on her to show that on the balance of probabilities there was a link.

[227]Nor was any protected disclosure connected to the last straw relied upon by the claimant. There was no connection between her raising concerns over ladder safety, which she last did in early December 2024, and disclosure by whoever it was outside of senior keepers in her team that she had been absent from work on grounds of health and would be transferring to a new team. Nor were those disclosures in any detectable way connected to the other matters the claimant was debating with Mr Gow between their meeting and her resignation.

[228]In short, the claimant had not explained how she could have been automatically constructively dismissed for the sole or main reason that she made protected disclosures, there was no clear evidence to support such a finding and the most relevant evidence appeared to show that she resigned as a result of a combination of different factors, all but one unrelated to the making of protected disclosures. It appeared to the tribunal to be that she felt she would continue to experience difficulty meeting the requirements of the role in another team and wished to pre-empt that happening.

[229]In those circumstances the complaint could not succeed.

Conclusions

[230]When applying the relevant legal tests to the evidence in each of the complaints it was determined that they were unsuccessful. There was therefore no requirement to consider remedy. The claimant had clearly experienced a negative effect on her health as a result of her time working with the respondent even though it and the individual respondents were found not to be liable in a legal sense. This is regrettable and it is hoped that there may still be scope for her to pursue her chosen career in a different setting.