Ms E Panama v Lifeways Community Care Ltd T/a The Lifeways Group: 8001004/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8001004/2025Venue GlasgowHearing 16, 17, 18 and 19 September 2025
Between
Ms E PanamaClaimantLifeways Community Care LimitedRespondent
Before
Employment Judge M SutherlandDate 14 October 2025
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Tribunal is that the complaints of race discrimination do not succeed and are accordingly dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The claimant has made complaints of direct race discrimination and harassment related to race including a discriminatory dismissal which are denied by the respondent.[2]The claimant relies upon the racial group of being black Nigerian which is not in dispute.[3]A final hearing was listed to determine liability and remedy. The claimant appeared on her own behalf and the respondent had professional representation.[4]Parties lodged a joint bundle of documents to which additional items were added during the hearing.[5]Parties made written and oral submissions. The respondent gave submissions first to assist the claimant as a litigant in person.[6]The following initials are used by way of abbreviation in this judgment – Initials Name Job Title CS Carol Shea Support Worker EP Ejovwoke Panama Support Worker (claimant) GW Grace Wright Service Manager (dismissal) MF Mary Fasoyin Support Worker RM Ryan McCrory Area Manager (appeal) SO Stacy O’Hara Support Worker
List of Issues
[7]It was agreed with the parties that the issues to be determined were as follows – Direct Race Discrimination (Section 13 Equality Act 2010) 1. Did the respondent treat the claimant less favourably than it treated or would treat others because of her race in respect of the following acts ?a. On 23 December 2024 Carol Shea - i. Instructed the claimant not to use a taxi and to take the bus ii. Shouted at the claimant and said she should fuck off iii. Said to the claimant that she would make sure she never worked in 49 Carrick Drive again iv. Said to the claimant that she does not speak to the likes of me v. Forcibly removed her from the taxib. In late December / early January 2025 Grace Wright - i. Failed to consider a statement provided by Mary Fasoyin ii. Failed take a statement from Mary Fasoyinc. On 7 February 2025 Grace Wright - i. Dismissed the claimant 2. In respect of the acts on 23 December 2024, did Carol Shea treat the claimant less favourably than she treated Stacy O’Hara and is there any material difference between their circumstances? Harassment (S26 Equality Act 2010) 3. Did the Respondent engage in the following conduct? a. See above for direct discrimination a., b., and c. 4. Was that conduct unwanted and related to her race? 5. Did that conduct have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant? When considering effect: What was the Claimant’s perception, what were the other circumstances of the case, and was it reasonable for that conduct to have that effect? Remedy (Section 124 Equality Act 2010) 6. What compensation should be awarded to the claimant? Was there an unreasonable failure to comply with the ACAS Code on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures? Findings in fact[8]The Tribunal makes the following findings in fact:[9]The respondent provides supported living services including residential care for adults with mental health conditions. The claimant (‘EP’) was employed by the respondent as a probationary Support Worker from 19 November 2024 to 7 February 2025. Under her contract her employment could be terminated on 1 week’s notice during her probationary period. The disciplinary policy provides that a probationer may be dismissed for a first breach.[10]EP worked at a residence CD which had 3 service users. During the day shift there were 3 support workers. The support workers reported to a Team Leader or Service Manager who were not always on duty at CD. EP was the only permanent support worker at CD who is black, the rest are white. There are sessional support workers at CD who are black including MF who works occasionally for the respondent.[11]The support worker’s duties are to provide physical and emotional support to service users in a residential setting enabling them to live as independently as possible. Their work is regulated by the Scottish Social Services Council. Support workers receive training on the policies and procedures which are relevant to their roles and includes dignity at work training. The respondent aims to provide person-centred care and the training emphases that support workers should act in the best interests of a service user and involve them in every decision that affects their lives whenever possible. The training states that if you can improve something then do it – do not wait for others.[12]On 23 December 2024 EP was on day shift working with three other support workers (CS, MF, and SO). EP was allocated that day to support service user LO. LO had an appointment to meet her mother at a local shopping centre. SO gave EP money from LO’s funds for a taxi. SO was taking a different service user out in a taxi who required to use a taxi because of her care needs.[13]CS was aware that EP intended to take LO in a taxi and she was concerned that it was not in LO’s best interest. CS suggested to LO taking the bus rather than a taxi which she agreed. CS then advised EP to take LO on the bus rather than in a taxi. CS did not initially know that SO had given EP the taxi money.[14]CS has worked as support worker with the respondent for 10 years. She is studying for an SVQ level 2 qualification in social care. LO’s care plan provides that LO can travel on public transport with support, and staff are to ensure she takes her bus pass because this allows staff to travel with her at no cost to LO. LO regularly takes the bus and enjoys the social aspect of doing so. LO sometimes took a taxi but it was difficult for LO to travel in a taxi without a seatbelt extender which was not then available. LO relies upon state benefits and her funds were low. LO has a bus pass which allows her and a companion to travel for free. LO had been cared for in CD since November.[15]Subsequently CS was surprised to notice EP putting LO in a taxi. CS went outside and asked EP was she was doing and instructed her to leave the taxi. EP challenged that instruction and insisted that CS remove LO’s seat belt herself. EP became increasingly angry during the interaction repeating her challenges in a raised voice. LO was increasingly upset at the confrontation.[16]Once back inside CS sought to manage the situation by suggesting LO spend time in her bedroom. CS asked MF to take LO to meet her mother and MF refused citing a sore knee. CS responded saying “what good are yous two working here when yous aren’t fit for the job, if it is was up to me none of yous would work in CD again” and noted that they were both refusing to take LO by bus to meet her mother.[17]CS was concerned about LO and went to check on her. EP subsequently followed and sought to continue the confrontation with CS in the doorway of LO’s bedroom. EP refused to leave when asked by CS. Unknown to either CS and EP, LO had phoned her mother who overheard the interaction and was concerned. When CS realised, she reassured her mother that LO was fine, and after the meeting with GW, CS took LO to see her mother.[18]After the interaction in the bedroom, EP and then CS called GW, Manager asking her to attend the CD residence which she did shortly thereafter. GW met with CS, EP and MF to discuss matters and she told them they were wrong to argue in front of a service user. She asked each of them to prepare a written statement which she received from EP and CS in early January 2025. She spoke with LO’s mother about what she overheard which confirmed what CS had said. GW did not receive any statement from MF and she could not find one despite searching the residence. She texted and repeatedly called MF seeking a copy of a statement without reply until 21 January.[19]EP and CS continued to work together on shifts at the CD residence after the incident.[20]Having considered the statements GW decided to conduct a formal investigation into the incident of 23 December which commenced on 15 January. On 15 January she held investigation meetings with CS, then EP and SO. She was unable to get hold of MF.[21]Following the investigation EP prepared an investigation report which articulated the investigation process, summarised the investigation findings and applied the relevant policies to those findings in order to reach a conclusion. Her conclusion was that EP did not act professionally and did not take into account the person we support by having a disagreement and raising voices causing them to be upset and failed to treat a staff member with dignity and respect.[22]On 21 January MF replied to GW advising she had not been well and had been away and she wrote statement on the day and put it in the rota folder. GW searched the residence but did not find the statement.[23]On 7 February EP attended a meeting with GW to discuss the outcome of the investigation. She was not told in advance what the meeting was to be about. GW informed EP that in light of her conduct on 23 December she had not passed her probationary period and her employment was terminated with a payment in lieu of notice. On 7 February she was issued with a written outcome of that meeting which confirmed the reasons given at the meeting. The claimant was very upset at losing her job.[24]On 10 February the claimant appealed the decision to dismiss. She provided further grounds of appeal on 13 February. The appeal hearing was held by RM on 18 February. At the appeal hearing the claimant asserted that the decision to dismiss amounted to race discrimination because no statement was taken from MF whom she described as being of the same race as her. On 21 February RM refused the appeal and upheld the decision to dismiss. He concluded the investigation was fair and satisfactory, there was no substantial evidence to support the allegations of race discrimination, and the decision to dismiss was upheld.[25]During her employment with the respondent the claimant earned around £2k a month. The claimant secured alternative employment which started in February 2025 from which she earns around £1.8k a month. Observations on the evidence[26]The standard of proof is on balance of probabilities, which means that if the Tribunal considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of an event was more likely than not, then the Tribunal is satisfied that the event did occur. Facts may be proven by direct evidence (primary facts) or by reasonable inference drawn from primary facts (secondary facts).[27]EP was not considered a wholly credible or reliable witness for the reasons noted below.[28]EP stated in evidence that service user LO never took the bus. CS stated in evidence that LO regularly took the bus. LO had a free bus pass and her care plan expressly referred to her taking the bus. It was considered likely that LO regularly took the bus.[29]Both EP and CS stated in evidence that MF had been present for most of the interaction between them once they had returned to the house on 23 December. MF repeated in evidence (sometimes regardless of the question) that she heard a noise at the door, when they all came inside both CS and EP were on the phone to the manager, 5 minutes later a manager came in. However both EP and CS gave evidence that these phones calls had occurred after the encounter in LO’s bedroom. GW repeatedly tried to contact MF about a statement without reply until 21 January. It was considered more that MF had been present for most of the interaction but had not wanted to write a statement during the investigation or to give evidence that his hearing. EP stated in evidence that MF (who is a sessional worker) had been blacklisted from work (i.e. not given shifts) but MF herself did not assert this explaining that she was offered work but she had been on holiday and then unwell and she undertook work thereafter.[30]EP stated in evidence that CS said “she does not speak to the likes of me”. CS denied this. The claimant said she had raised this at the dining table meeting in December and CS also thought she had raised this and she had denied it but GW did not include this in her brief summary of that meeting included in the investigation report in February and the claimant did include this in her initial statement. At no point did EP state the words used and instead always described the interaction in the third person. During the disciplinary investigation EP had stated the CS kept talking and talking and sometimes I don’t understand her accent. During the investigation meeting CS responded to EP’s statement by saying that’s a lie - she is wary about how she speaks to the black girls because she’s see the racist card brought out. She stated in evidence that she had worked with someone who described everything as racism but never reported it and this made her wary. It was apparent that on 23 December CS had spoken to EP at length. In all the circumstances it was considered likely that CS had not used the phrase “she does not speak to the likes of me” or words to that effect.[31]EP stated in evidence that CS said “I’ll make sure you never work in CD again”. She was unsure exactly what CS had said, caveating her description with “I think that’s what she said” and later with “words like that”. EP accepted that sometimes she didn’t understand what CS had said and that she talks quickly. EP explained in evidence that English is not her first language. EP said in evidence the CS had said this phrase on four occasions during their interaction on 23 December. That did not tally with her initial statement but she did assert this in the investigation meeting. It was considered more likely than not that CD did not say this but that the claimant had inferred this sentiment from CS’s statement “what good are yous two working here when yous aren’t fit for the job, if it is was up to me none of yous would work in CD again”.[32]EP stated in evidence that CS was screaming and shouting at her and that she did not shout. Her initial statement notes that CS “was screaming at me”. CS accepted that she was frustrated but denied that she had shouted and had instead tried to defuse the situation by taking LO to her room but EP followed her. When the interaction continued in LO’s bedroom it had been overheard my LO’s mother who advised that it was EP and not CS who was shouting and that CS was polite. It was considered likely that CS had not shouted at EP but EP had shouted at her.[33]EP stated in evidence that CS was swearing. EP did not mention this either in her initial statement or at the investigation meeting and only raised this for the first time on appeal. When this was put to EP in cross examination she said for the first time that the notes of the investigation meeting were inaccurate. In the circumstances, including the finding that CS was not shouting and was trying to diffuse the situation, it was considered likely that CS had not sworn at EP.[34]EP stated in evidence that CS had forcibly removed her from the taxi. EP did not mention this in her initial statement or at the investigation meeting or on appeal. When asked if CS had physically removed her EP said it was the force of her words. It was considered unlikely that CS had forcibly removed her from the taxi.[35]EP stated in evidence that she and MF were excluded from a personal whatsapp group. Some but not all of the staff were part of the group, GW was not aware of it and there was no evidence as to who administered it .[36]EP stated in evidence that she had not received any earnings after losing her job until she started a new job at end April 2024. EP lodged one payslip from her new job issued 6 June which pertained to her earnings in May. That payslip confirmed her evidence that she had monthly earnings of under £2k from her new role but it was also apparent from that payslip that she had previously earned c£5k from that role. It was therefore considered highly likely that she had started that role in February and accordingly the claimant was not being candid when she stated that she started her new job at the end of April.[37]CS was considered a wholly credible and reliable witness for the following reasons. She readily proffered that she had been frustrated that day and accepted without hesitation that she no longer liked EP under explanation that she had made what she considered to be unfounded accusations against her. It was apparent from her evidence that CS was a highly professional and competent support worker and that the best interests of service users were at the heart of her support work.[38]GW was also considered a wholly credible and reliable witness for the following reasons. There was no reason to doubt her evidence that she had repeatedly tried to contact MF for a statement which was consistent with the text messages. She received two conflicting versions of events and she had a reasonable basis for believing CS rather than EP given the evidence she received from LO’s mother. In the circumstances she had a reasonable basis for believing that CS had tried to act in the best interests of the service user by challenging the failure to take the bus and by trying to defuse the situation when the service user became upset. She also had a reasonable basis for believing that EP had not acted in the best interest of the service user by pursuing the confrontation despite the service user’s obvious distress. The law Discrimination at work (Equality Act 2010)
The law
[39]Under section 30 an employer must not discriminate against an employee as to their terms, etc, by dismissal or by subjecting them to any other detriment.[40]A detriment is construed widely and arises where a reasonable worker might take the view that they had been disadvantaged by the acts complained of. Direct Discrimination[41]Section 13(1) EA 2010 provides: “A person(a) (A) discriminates against another(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.”[42]Direct discrimination requires consideration of whether the claimant was treated less favourably than others and whether the reason for that treatment was because of a protected characteristic.[43]The Tribunal may consider firstly whether the claimant received less favourable treatment than the appropriate comparator and then secondly whether the less favourable treatment was on discriminatory grounds. However, and especially where the appropriate comparator is disputed or hypothetical, the less favourable issue may be resolved by first considering the reason why issue. “It will often be meaningless to ask who is the appropriate comparator, and how they would have been treated, without asking the reason why” (Shamoon v The Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] ICR 337) Less favourable treatment[44]The claimant must have been treated less favourably than a real or hypothetical comparator. If there is no less favourable treatment there is no requirement to consider the reason why.[45]Under Section 23 EA 2010 there must be no material differences between the relevant circumstances of the claimant and their comparator. The comparison must be like with like (Shamoon).[46]The Tribunal may consider how an actual real person has been treated in the same circumstances or, if necessary, consider how a hypothetical person would have been treated in those circumstances. In determining how a hypothetical comparator would have been treated, it is legitimate to draw inferences from how an actual comparator in non-identical but not wholly dissimilar cases has been treated. The reason why[47]The reason for the treatment need not be the main or sole reason but must have at least a significant (or more than trivial) influence on the treatment to amount to an effective cause of it. In “reason why” cases the matter is dispositive upon determination of the alleged discriminator’s state of mind. In “criterion cases” there is no need to consider the alleged discriminator’s state of mind when the treatment complained of is caused by the application of a criterion which is inherently or indissociably discriminatory (R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2AC 728, SC).[48]Direct discrimination may be intentional or it may be subconscious (based upon stereotypical assumptions). The tribunal must consider the conscious or subconscious mental processes which caused the employer to act. This is not necessarily a question of motive or purpose and is not restricted to considering ‘but for’ the protected characteristic would the treatment have occurred (Shamoon). Burden of proof[49]Section 136(2) EA 2010 provides that “(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravenes the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provisions”.[50]The burden of proof provisions apply where the facts relevant to determining discrimination are in doubt. The burden of proof provisions are not relevant where the facts are not disputed or the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence (Hewage v Grampian Health Board [2012] UKSC 37, SC).[51]The burden of proof is considered in two stages. If the claimant does not satisfy the burden of Stage 1 their claim will fail. If the respondent does not satisfy the burden of Stage 2, if required, the claim will succeed (Igen v Wong [2005] ICR 935) Stage 1 – prima facie case[52]It is for the claimant to prove facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably because of a protected characteristic (‘Stage 1’ prima facie case).[53]Having a protected characteristic and there being a difference in treatment is not sufficient (Madarassy v Nomura International Plc [2007] ICR 867). The claimant must also prove a Stage 1 prima facie case regarding the reason for difference in treatment by way of “something more”.[54]It is unusual to have direct evidence as to the reason for the treatment (discrimination may not be intentional and may be the product of unconscious bias or discriminatory assumptions) (Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] 4 All ER 65). Evidence of the reason for the treatment will ordinarily be by reasonable inference from primary facts.[55]At Stage 1 proof is of a prima facie case and requires relevant facts from which the tribunal could infer the reason. Relevant facts in appropriate cases may include evasive or equivocal replies to questions or requests for information; failure to comply with a relevant code of practice; the context in which the treatment has occurred including statistical data; the reason for the treatment (Madarassy). “In so far as this [information] was in the hands of the employer, the claimant could have identified the information required and requested that it be provided voluntarily or, if that was refused, by obtaining an order from the Tribunal” (Efobi v Royal Mail Group [2019] EWCA Civ 19, CA).[56]Assessment of Stage 1 is based upon all the evidence adduced by both the claimant and the respondent but excluding the absence of an adequate (i.e. non-discriminatory) explanation for the treatment (which is relevant only to Stage 2) (Madarassy). All relevant facts should be considered but not the respondent’s explanation, or the absence of any such explanation (Laing v Manchester City Council [2006] ICR 1519, EAT and Efobi). (The respondent’s explanation for its conduct provides the reason why he has done what could be considered a discriminatory act.) “Most cases turn on the accumulation of multiple findings of primary fact, from which the court or tribunal is invited to draw an inference of a discriminatory explanation of those facts” (Madarassy). “In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts” (Igen; Hewage). Stage 2 – rebutting inference[57]If the claimant satisfies Stage 1, it is then for the respondent to prove that the respondent has not treated the claimant less favourably because of a protected characteristic (Stage 2).[58]The employer must seek to rebut the inference of discrimination by explaining why he has acted as he has (Laing). The treatment must be “in no sense whatsoever” because of the protected characteristic (Barton v Investec 2003 IRC 1205 EAT). The explanation must be sufficiently adequate and cogent to discharge the burden and this will depend on the strength of the Stage 1 prima facie case (Network Rail Infrastructure Limited v Griffiths Henry 2006 IRLR 865).[59]The Tribunal may elect to bypass Stage 1 and proceed straight to Stage 2, if they are satisfied that the reason for the less favourable treatment is fully adequate and cogent (Laing). Harassment[60]Section 26(1) EA 2010 provides that “A person(a) (A) harasses another(b) (B) if - (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic [or of a sexual nature], and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of - (i) violating B’s dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B”. A person also engages in harassment if they treat B less favourably than they would have if they had not rejected or submitted to conduct of a sexual nature amounting to harassment.[61]The tribunal must determine whether the person engaged in the conduct; whether the conducted related to the protected characteristic; whether the conduct was unwanted; and whether that conduct had the purpose, or the effect, of violating the claimant’s dignity, or creating the offensive, etc environment.[62]Conduct is related to a protected characteristic if it is connected with it without necessarily being because of it.[63]In deciding whether the conduct has that purpose the tribunal must consider the person’s intentions. The burden of proof provisions apply as for direct discrimination. Where the conduct has a prohibited purpose it does not also require to have the prohibited effect.[64]In deciding whether the conduct has that effect the tribunal must take into account “the perception of B; the other circumstances of the case; and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect” (Section 26(4) EA 2010). This entails both a subjective question (what did B perceive?) and an objective question (was it reasonable, etc?) (Pemberton v Inwood [2018] EWCA Civ 564, CA) Where the conduct has the prohibited effect the person does not have to have intended it. However it is relevant to consider whether it was reasonably apparent that the conduct was not intended to have that effect (Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal 2009 ICR 724, EAT). An offensive environment means a state of affairs such that a one-off incident may amount to harassment if sufficiently serious to have a continuing effect. Submissions[65]The claimant’s written and oral submissions were in summary as follows:a. CS and GW were inconsistent about whether the claimant had accused GW at the dining table meeting of saying the two phrases (she doesn’t talk to the likes of me and she would not work here again).b. GW failed to consider the statement provided by MF.c. The dismissal was procedurally and substantively flawed.d. The claimant repeatedly raised issues of racism.e. Saying ‘the likes of me’ is explicitly exclusionary and inherently racistf. SO was in materially similar circumstances (seniority, duties, conduct) but she was not instructed to take the bus, forcibly removed from a taxi, subjected to abusive statements, the only difference was her race.g. The failure to consider or record MF’s statement indicates a less favourable and selective investigation.h. The causal chain runs from the racially infected treatment through to the dismissal.i. The conduct of CS and then GW had the effect of violating the claimant’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile and degrading environment for her.j. The conduct was public and included physical interference meriting an award in the middle band.k. There should be an uplift of 25% because of an unreasonable failure to follow the ACS Code on grievance and disciplinary procedures.[66]The respondent’s written and oral submissions were in summary as follows:a. The claimant’s version of events changed from her initial statement to the investigation meeting and then in evidence and as such her testimony was not credible.b. She appeared to have issues with interpreting language and accents and as such her testimony was not reliable.c. She did not tell the truth about her earnings prior to end April 2025.d. There was no basis upon which the tribunal could draw an interference that CS instruction to take the bus was because of race and CS had a cogent reason for the instruction.e. The tribunal should prefer CS evidence that she did not say she would not speak to the likes of her and she did not shout at her and tell her to fuck off.f. CS did not tell her she would ensure she never worked in CD again but instead said if it was up to me then none of yous would work in CD again. There was no basis upon which the tribunal could draw an interference that CS said this because of race and CS had a cogent reason her frustration because both the claimant and MF were refusing to take LO by bus to meet her mother.g. The assertion of use of force is evidence of the claimant’s tendency to exaggerate.h. GW repeatedly sought a statement from MF but it was apparent that MF did not want to be involved and that her statement would be of no evidential valuei. It is not about reasonableness or fairness but about whether race was a factor. Nonetheless GW had reason to believe CS over the claimant and conclude that EP had engaged in misconduct which was the for her dismissal.j. There was no basis upon which to infer that the conduct was related to her race.k. Although not relied upon as a compactor the claimant asserted that an inference should be drawn the failure to dismissal CS. CS but she was not in the same circumstances because there was no finding of misconduct and she was not a probationer. Discussion and decision Direct race discrimination[67]On 23 December 2024 Carol Shea (‘CS’) instructed the claimant not to use a taxi and to take the bus instead. There were no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that CS, who is white, issued this instruction to the claimant, who is black, because of the claimant’s race. The claimant submits that Stacey O’Hara (SO), who is white, was in the same circumstances as her but she did not receive the same instruction from CS. However CS did not initially know that SO had given the claimant the taxi money and furthermore it was the claimant and not SO who was taking the service user LO in a taxi. SO was not accordingly in the same circumstances as the claimant. In any event there was a cogent and adequate explanation for the instruction to take the bus which was that CS considered it to be in the best interests of LO for her to take the bus and she sought to challenge the claimant’s insistence upon taking a taxi. It was apparent that the claimant’s race played no part whatsoever in CS issuing that instruction to her.[68]Contrary to the claimant’s assertions, CS did not say to the claimant that she does not speak to the likes of me, did not shout and swear at her, and did not forcibly remove her from the taxi.[69]CS did not say to the claimant that she would make sure she never worked in CD again. CS, who is white, did say to the claimant and MF, who are black, “what good are yous two working here when yous aren’t fit for the job, if it is was up to me none of yous would work in CD again”. However there were no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that this was because their race. In any event there was a cogent and adequate explanation that this was said because both the claimant and MF were refusing to take service user LO by bus.[70]Contrary to the claimant’s assertions, in late December / early January 2025 Grace Wright (GW) did not fail to consider a statement provided by MF (because no such statement was in fact received by GW) and she did not fail to take a statement from MF (instead she repeatedly contacted MF with a view to her receiving a statement without success).[71]On 7 February 2025 GW dismissed the claimant. There were no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that GW, who is white, dismissed the claimant, who is black, because of the claimant’s race. The claimant submits that an inference can be drawn from the failure to dismiss CS who is white. CS was not in materially same circumstances as the claimant. GW believed the claimant had raised her voice in front of a service user causing them upset whereas CS had not. Furthermore, the claimant was a probationer whereas CS was not. In any event there was a cogent and adequate explanation of the decision to dismiss because GW formed a genuine belief in the claimant’s misconduct following a reasonable investigation that was commensurate with her probationary status. It was apparent that the claimant’s race played no part whatsoever in the decision to dismiss. Harassment related to race[72]CS instructed the claimant not to use a taxi and to take the bus. This instruction was not inherently related to her race and there were no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that it was so related.[73]CS did not say to the claimant that she does not speak to the likes of me, did not shout and swear at her, did not forcibly remove her from the taxi, and did not say to the claimant that she would make sure she never worked in CD again. CS said to the claimant and MF “if it is was up to me none of yous would work in CD again”, etc. That statement was not inherently related to their race and there were no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that it was so related. It was apparent from the full sentence that she was commenting on their lack of fitness for the job. In any event there was clear and cogent evidence that it related solely to their refusal to take service user LO by bus.[74]There were no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that GW’s dismissal of the claimant related to her race. In any event there was a cogent and adequate explanation that the decision to dismiss related solely to GW’s genuine belief in the claimant’s misconduct following a reasonable investigation that was commensurate with her probationary status (and as noted above, GW did not fail to consider or take MF’s statement).
Conclusion
[75]In conclusion the complaints of race discrimination do not succeed and are accordingly dismissed.