Mr G Drummond v Kelburne Construction Ltd: 8000859/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8000859/2025
Between
Mr. G. DrummondClaimantKelburne Construction Ltd.Respondent
Before
Employment Judge TinnionDate 31 March 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal under ss.94-98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is dismissed on its withdrawal at the PHCM on 17 October 2025.
REASONS
[1]The claimant lodged a claim in the Employment Tribunal on 10 April 2025 claiming automatic unfair dismissal under Section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”). There was originally a claim for ordinary unfair dismissal in addition, but this was withdrawn by the claimant and dismissed on 18 October 2025 (claimant acknowledged he did not have the requisite service for such a claim).[2]The claimant attended the hearing in person and represented himself. The respondent was represented by Mr Parsons-Munn, Counsel.[3]The background to the claim is that the claimant alleged that he was automatically unfairly dismissed on 21 February 2025 and the reason or principal reason for the dismissal was that he had made one or more protected disclosures to the respondent.[4]The respondent had lodged amended grounds of resistance and sought leave to have these grounds allowed. I confirmed that they would be allowed.[5]There was a Joint Bundle of 395 pages (“the Bundle”).[6]The claimant gave evidence. For the respondent Mr Alan Gaw, Operations Director (“Mr Gaw”); Mr Andrew Glover, Transport Manager, (“Mr Glover”) and Mr Campbell Beaton, Managing Director (“Mr Beaton”) gave evidence.[7]On the morning of the third day of the hearing after both the claimant and Mr Glover had concluded their evidence the claimant produced a further document – a copy of whatsapp messages on 24 and 27 January 2025 from Mr Glover to the claimant. After hearing from both parties I allowed this document to be received and for both the claimant and Mr Glover to give evidence in relation to it. The respondent accepted that the whatsapp messages in the document were genuine and there was thus no need to recall the claimant. Mr Glover was recalled and gave evidence in chief and was cross examined in relation to these messages [396] of the Bundle.
Issues
[8]The issues in dispute were clarified at the preliminary hearing before Judge Tinnion on 17 October 2025. The issues are as set out below.[9]Did the claimant make the following disclosures:a. On 1 October 2024, the claimant verbally stated to Mr Gaw (initially on a telephone call, later that day face-to-face) that the claimant’s vehicle SF18 WNG had broken down while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate;b. On 2 October 2024, the claimant verbally stated to Mr Gaw (initially on a telephone call, later that day face-to-face) that the claimant’s vehicle had broken down again while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate;c. On 2 October 2024, the claimant stated to Graeme Winters (phone call, later face-to-face) that the claimant’s vehicle had broken down while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate;d. On 5 October 2024, the claimant stated to Campbell Beaton (face-to- face) that the claimant’s vehicle had broken down while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate;e. On 10 October 2024, during a face-to-face lorry safety meeting at the respondent’s Kilmarnock premises attended by Campbell Beaton, Mr Gaw, Graeme Winters, and Yvonne Breckenridge, the claimant verbally stated: i. the claimant’s vehicle had broken down while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate; ii. the recurring engine fault was causing dangerous power loss; iii. the tipping gear were corroded, presenting a risk of mechanical failure during tipping operations; iv. there were multiple high-pressure leaks, posing serious safety and environmental hazards; v. there was an absence of safety equipment, including crane gantry handles, loading area rails, and side cape springs, making the vehicle non-compliant and unsafe to operate.f. On 17 October 2024, in the lorry team WhatsApp group chat, the claimant stated the vehicle’s stabilising leg had retracted while the claimant was carrying out a lift;g. On 18 October 2024, the claimant stated to Graeme Winters by telephone (voicemail message) and messaged him (WhatsApp) that the vehicle had lost power in a live lane of the East Kilbride Expressway and the claimant had managed to get the vehicle moving again;h. On 29 October 2024, the claimant stated to Graeme Winters (via the WhatsApp team chat and a phone call) that the vehicle had lost power on the M80, causing the claimant to coast to an unintended exit via a slip road;i. On 27 January 2025, the claimant told Mr Glover (face-to-face in the yard at the Respondent’s Kilmarnock premises) that he had serious concerns regarding ongoing safety risks, the claimant felt unsafe driving SF18 WNG, he had driven trucks for years, and the truck was not safe.[10]If he did, did the claimant thereby disclose information (not mere allegations)?[11]If he did, did the claimant genuinely and reasonably believe the disclosure of the information tended to show:a. the health and safety of any individual had been, was being, or was likely to be endangered;b. the environment had been, was being, or was likely to be damaged.[12]If he did, did the claimant also genuinely and reasonably believe the disclosure of the information was made in the public interest?[13]If he did, was the disclosure made to the respondent?[14]Was the respondent’s reason (or principal reason if more than one) for dismissal that the claimant had made one (or more) protected disclosures?[15]In relation to the relief sought by the claimant there were a number of further issues identified. I have not detailed these here as they only arise if the claimant succeeds on liability.
The Law
[16]Section 43B ERA sets out the definition of what will amount to a protected disclosure: “(1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following—(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject,(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is immaterial whether the relevant failure occurred, occurs or would occur in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and whether the law applying to it is that of the United Kingdom or of any other country or territory.”[17]Section 43C goes on to set out to whom a protected disclosure may be made: “(1) A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure —(a) to his employer, or(b) where the worker reasonably believes that the relevant failure relates solely or mainly to— (i) the conduct of a person other than his employer, or (ii) any other matter for which a person other than his employer has legal responsibility, to that other person. (2) A worker who, in accordance with a procedure whose use by him is authorised by his employer, makes a qualifying disclosure to a person other than his employer, is to be treated for the purposes of this Part as making the qualifying disclosure to his employer.”[18]Section 103A of ERA states that: “An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure.”[19]As the claimant does not have the qualifying service for an ordinary unfair dismissal claim the burden of proof to establish that the reason, or the principal reason, for the dismissal was that the claimant made a protected disclosure is on the claimant.
Findings of Fact
[20]The claimant is qualified as a HIAB truck driver (a truck that has an attached hydraulic crane).[21]The claimant commenced employment with the respondent on 30 September 2024 as a HIAB truck driver/operator.[22]The claimant’s duties included loading and unloading of his vehicle, transport of materials to and from construction sites and the respondent’s yard.[23]The respondent operates as a civil engineering and construction contractor across central Scotland. It employs 42 people based at premises in Kilmarnock.[24]The claimant signed a written contract of employment on 30 September 2024. At Clause 38 of his contract, the claimant acknowledged he had read and understood the terms and conditions of his employment contained in the contract and the Employee Handbook.[25]The Employee Handbook contains ‘The Vehicle and Driving Policy’, which states, inter alia: ‘Prior to driving for business purposes, you are responsible for ensuring that your vehicle is roadworthy. You may also be responsible for completing any checklist relating to the vehicle as instructed by management. Under no circumstances should you drive a vehicle that is not roadworthy, does not have a valid MOT or is illegal to drive;’ ‘You must not use a mobile phone or any other hand-held device, including a hands-free phone, while driving for any purpose including calls, text messages, photos and videos, scrolling though playlists and playing games. Mobile phones should only be used when the vehicle has been parked in a safe place and the engine has been switched off;’ ‘If your vehicle is fitted with a Tachograph, you must familiarise yourself and comply with Tachograph regulations and the operation of the Tachograph unit. Digital Cards or Tachograph charts will be regularly analysed. Failure to comply with the Tachograph regulations is a serious offence that will result in disciplinary action. Interference with a Tachograph unit is a serious disciplinary offence and will normally result in dismissal without notice’ ‘In the event that you breach this policy or the procedures to be followed, this may result in disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal without notice.’[26]At the time the claimant started work with the respondent it had two lorries, registration numbers SF16 VJG and SF18 WNG. SF16 VJG was a four-wheel lorry. SF18 WNG was a six-wheel HIAB lorry. Both lorries had up to date MOT certificates and were the subject of a repair and maintenance contract which the respondent had with the manufacturer Volvo. Under this contract each vehicle had a safety check every six weeks and any urgent repairs would be carried out as and when an issue arose. The claimant was initially allocated SF18 WNG.[27]The respondent had two drivers working for them in the period from October 2024 to February 2025, the claimant and Yvonne Breckenridge. Yvonne Breckenridge predominantly drove vehicle SF16 VJG.[28]The respondent had ordered a new lorry, SF74 YAE, and took delivery of this new lorry on or about 11 November 2024. Between 30 September 2024 and 12 November 2024 the claimant exclusively drove SF18 WNG. From 13 November 2024 to the end of his employment the claimant drove SF18 WNG on five occasions only – 21 November 2024; 3 January 2025; 27 January 2025; 3 February 2025 (only for two minutes) and 13 February 2025. The claimant also drove a hire vehicle, RK22 FUA, in the period from 26 November 2024 to 23 January 2025 whilst repairs were carried out to the new lorry, SF74 YAE. In the period from 13 November 2024 to 21 February 2025 when not driving SF18 WNG or RK22 FUA the claimant drove SF74 YAE.[29]The claimant was required to complete, and sign, daily driver checks before driving his vehicle.[30]On 1 October 2024, the claimant verbally stated to Mr Gaw (initially on a telephone call, later that day face-to-face) that the claimant’s vehicle, SF18 WNG, had broken down while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate.[31]On 2 October 2024, the claimant verbally stated to Mr Gaw (initially on a telephone call, later that day face-to-face) that the claimant’s vehicle, SF18 WNG, had broken down again while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate.[32]On 2 October 2024, the claimant stated to Graeme Winters (phone call, later face-to-face) that the claimant’s vehicle, SF18 WNG, had broken down while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate.[33]On 5 October 2024, the claimant stated to Campbell Beaton (face-to-face) that the claimant’s vehicle, SF18 WNG, had broken down while in operation due to a fault that caused loss of power where the vehicle would drop to idle and fail to accelerate.[34]On 10 October 2024, the respondent arranged a meeting, including the claimant, to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of both vehicles, SF18 WNG and SF16 VJG, to decide which one should be sold in light of the arrival of the new vehicle, SF74 YAE. In attendance at that meeting were the claimant, Yvonne Breckenridge, Mr Gaw, Graeme Winters, Liam Smith and Mr Beaton. During the meeting the claimant raised a number of concerns regarding the operation of vehicle SW18 WNG. These included:a. The fact that the vehicle had twice lost power in the previous week.b. That the tipping gear of the vehicle was corroded.c. That there had been multiple high-pressure hydraulic leaks causing serious safety hazards.[35]On 17 October 2024, in the lorry team WhatsApp group chat, the claimant stated that vehicle SF18 WNG stabilising leg had retracted while the claimant was carrying out a lift.[36]On 18 October 2024, the claimant stated to Graeme Winters by telephone (voicemail message) and messaged him (WhatsApp) that the vehicle, SF18 WNG, had lost power in a live lane of the East Kilbride Expressway and the claimant had managed to get the vehicle moving again.[37]The respondent arranged for vehicle SF18 WNG to be examined by Volvo in relation to the power fault. Volvo could not find the cause of the fault.[38]Mr Glover was appointed as Transport Manager for the respondent and commenced employment on 5 January 2025. The claimant reported to Mr Glover as his line manager. Mr Glover reported to Mr Gaw. Mr Glover had over 20 years’ experience as both an HGV driver and transport manager.[39]Mr Glover undertook analysis of the respondent’s tachograph records shortly after commencing employment with the respondent in January 2025. He noted that the claimant had not downloaded any of his tachograph records since the claimant commenced employment. Mr Glover arranged for the claimant to download his tachograph records shortly after Mr Glover commenced employment.[40]The tachograph records for the claimant disclosed that on a number of occasions the claimant had driven his vehicle without the tachograph card inserted. Each driver has their own personal tachograph card. The claimant had his own tachograph card. It is an offence to drive a vehicle without the tachograph inserted. In certain limited circumstances a driver may drive without the tachograph card inserted but must retain a manual signed note explaining why. Mr Glover did speak to the claimant about the need to have his card inserted and what to do as regards a manual record.[41]The claimant drove his vehicle without his tachograph card inserted on the following three occasions:- on 16 December 2024 for 304 km; 20 December 2024 for 55 km and on 1 February 2025 for 96 km.[42]The respondent’s tachograph system automatically produces a list of driving infringements which are sent to the driver and require to be signed off by the driver and his line manager. For the period from 31 October 2024 to 19 December 2024 the system highlighted 12 infringements in relation to the claimant. Mr Glover discussed these with the claimant and the form was signed off on 14 January 2025 by the claimant and on 15 January 225 by Mr Glover. For the period from 28 January to 30 January 2025 the system highlighted 7 infringements in relation to the claimant. Mr Glover discussed these with the claimant and the form was signed off by the claimant on 31 January 2025 and by Mr Glover on 3 February 2025. For the period from 2 February 2025 to 17 February 2025 the system highlighted 5 infringements. Although sent to the claimant these were not signed off by the claimant or Mr Glover.[43]The respondent’s vehicle tracking system can generate what is known as a Harsh Driving Report. This is a report that records incidences of harsh cornering, breaking, acceleration and speeding. This accords every vehicle a safety score based on a %. The vehicle driven by the claimant had a safety score of 50%. The vehicle driven by Yvonne Breckenridge had a safety score of 90%. The respondent had a graphic report for vehicle SF74 YAE for the period 7 to 14 February 2025 (when driven by the claimant) and a graphic report for vehicle SF16 VCG (when driven by Yvonne Breckenridge). The report in respect of SF74 YAE recorded substantially more instances of harsh driving.[44]Mr Glover spoke to the claimant in January 2025 about the location of the claimant’s mobile phone holder in the truck. Mr Glover asked him to move it as he considered it could block the claimant’s view. The claimant stated at that time he needed it for satellite navigation. Mr Glover was concerned that the claimant was using his mobile phone whilst driving. Mr Glover believed he could hear the vehicle engine revving when the claimant left voice notes. Mr Glover carried out an analysis of the tachograph records for the claimant’s vehicle and the whatsapp message time of voice notes being left. This appeared to disclose occasions when the claimant was driving according to the tachograph whilst leaving a voice note on his phone.[45]On 27 January 2025 Mr Glover spoke with the claimant about his mobile phone use whilst driving. Mr Glover also suggested that in light of the claimant’s lack of experience he might benefit from a further period on the older lorry - SF18 WNG to which the claimant threatened to leave if he was made to drive that lorry. The claimant told Mr Glover that he did not consider that SF18 WNG was safe to drive. The claimant in this discussion also raised a complaint about his overtime rate.[46]In late 2024 the respondent received a complaint from Breedon Quarry in Ratho. They advised that they would not allow the claimant back on site as he had disobeyed the clearly marked exit signs, to the main road, when exiting the quarry.[47]On 27 January 2025 Mr Glover instructed the claimant by Whatsapp message to uplift materials from Breedon Quarry.[48]The respondent had a yard in Fullerton Street, Paisley. This was in a residential area around the corner from the respondent’s main yard and premises at Inkerman Place. The respondents had applied for a change of use in respect of the premises at Fullerton Street and were sensitive to any complaints by members of the public or the local authority regarding their use of Fullerton Street. The respondents had received complaints from the local authority about the use of the Fullerton Street yard outside of normal business hours. On 4 February 2025, the respondent notified the claimant and Yvonne Breckenridge that there should be no loading or unloading in the bottom yard (Fullerton Street) before 7.30 a.m.[49]On or about 18 February 2025 the claimant parked his vehicle in Fullerton Street at 05.55 a.m. and accessed the yard to retrieve a spanner.[50]The claimant omitted to hand in a delivery line for scrap metal to the respondents for a value of approximately £200.[51]Prior to 20 February 2025 Mr Glover raised with Mr Gaw concerns that he had about the conduct of the claimant. In particular he raised concerns about his driving performance – as evidenced by the tachograph reports; the failure by the claimant to insert his tachograph card and his attitude to others. With regard to attitude Mr Glover raised with Mr Gaw that the claimant had threatened to leave if CCTV was used to film inside the cab and that there had been occasions when the claimant was shouting and swearing in the yard at others who he considered were blocking his access. Mr Gaw had shared with Mr Glover copies of the tachograph reports.[52]Mr Glover also raised concerns regarding the claimant at management meetings prior to 20 February 2025. Mr Gaw and Mr Beaton attended these management meetings.[53]On or about 20 February 2025 Mr Glover met with Mr Gaw and Campbell Beaton and Liam Smith (both directors of the respondent) to discuss the conduct of the claimant. The meeting was called to discuss a number of conduct issues that Mr Glover had raised with Mr Gaw up to that date. It was agreed, based on the information provided by Mr Glover, that the claimant was a health and safety risk and that he should be dismissed. It was agreed that this could be done on one week’s notice. The meeting was satisfied that Mr Glover had raised the concerns with the claimant, there had been no sign of improvement and there was no need to go through a formal process.[54]Prior to meeting with the claimant Mr Gaw wrote down a list of the reasons for terminating the employment of the claimant.[55]Mr Gaw met with the claimant, in his office, on Friday 21 February 2025. He advised the claimant that the respondent had decided to dismiss him, with one week’s notice. Mr Gaw began to explain the reasons for this decision; however, the claimant left the meeting before Mr Gaw could finish. Mr Gaw followed the claimant out to the yard but the claimant left.[56]The claimant was dismissed on 21 February 2025 with immediate effect. He was paid for one week’s notice in lieu.[57]Following his dismissal the claimant sent an e mail to the respondent on 24 February 2025 at 11.50 a.m. setting out grounds for an appeal (“the Grounds of Appeal”). The claimant listed four grounds for an appeal:- that there were procedural failings in the conduct of his dismissal (no advance notice and no right to be accompanied); that he had received no previous warnings; that his refusal to drive SF18 WNG was based on legitimate safety concerns; that the damage to the vehicles was not due to his negligence and was duly reported.[58]Following receipt of the Grounds of Appeal the respondent issued a letter to the claimant dated 24 February 2025 confirming that the claimant’s employment was terminated on 21 February 2025 and setting out the reasons (“the Dismissal Letter”). The respondent also sent an e mail on 25 February 2025 at 11.18 a.m. to the claimant in response to the Grounds of Appeal. That e mail set out identical grounds for dismissal. The nine grounds for dismissal in the Dismissal Letter were as follows (and these were the items on the list prepared by Mr Gaw in advance of the meeting on 21 February 2025):-a. Frequent driving infringements highlighted on Tachomaster, some fairly minor, some more serious. Very little improvement shown in this regard after these issues being highlighted.b. General attitude to others and the company – for example witnessed anger when van(s) parked in your way in the yard; threatening to leave the company if CCTV cameras were installed inside the lorry cab; threatening to leave if you were given the 6 wheel lorry to drive; complaining about overtime rate of pay after this being explained and clear on Contract of Employment.c. Safety concerns due to several incidents with lifting and grab operations, some resulting in damage to both the 6 wheeler and 8 wheeler lorries.d. Parking on footpath, leaving lorry running and entering the yard area at 1 Fullarton Street to collect something, around 6am one morning, after being told not to enter this area early morning, due to a complaint from a neighbouring resident. A further complaint was received following this incident, from East Ayrshire Council, resulting in a threat of further action from them.e. Failing to hand in a delivery line for scrap metal. The company needed this line to submit an invoice for the materials.f. Driving on two occasions without Tacho card inserted.g. Daily harsh cornering and braking incidents according to both the tracker system and tacho software.h. Phone and tablet usage whilst driving.i. Breedon Quarry at Ratho made contact to say that you were not allowed back in the quarry because you had disobeyed the exit signs for the route to the main road, when exiting the quarry.[59]The Appeal Hearing took place on 27 February 2025 before Campbell Beaton with Mr Glover as his witness and note taker. The claimant’s appeal was not upheld.[60]The claimant was dismissed for the reasons set out in the Dismissal Letter.[61]The claimant commenced work with Imrie Tree Care as a Tree Surgeon on 2 April 2025. Discussion & Decision[62]For the respondent Mr Parsons-Munn urged me to deal with the issue of the reason for dismissal first on the basis that If I upheld his submission that the claimant had not established that the sole or principal reason for dismissal was that the claimant had made a protected disclosure then there was no need for me to consider the issue of whether protected disclosures had been made. However, I prefer to deal with the issues in the order in which they were set out in the list of issues as detailed below. Did the claimant make the disclosures that he alleges?[63]On this point the respondent accepts that the disclosures referenced at paragraph 9 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) were made by the claimant. The respondent also accepted the terms of the whatsapp messages at [154] of the Bundle in respect of (g) and [157] of the Bundle in respect of (h). In relation to (i) the respondent accepted that the claimant told AG that he would not drive vehicle SF18 WNG but did not accept that the claimant raised any other safety concerns during that conversation. I find that the only disclosure made on 27 January 2025 was that SF18 WNG was not safe to drive. In relation to (e) I have taken the respondent as accepting that some of the points that the claimant alleges he made at the meeting on 10 October 2-24 were made. The claimant alleges he made references to some specific safety failings. In his evidence he claimed that he stated that he mentioned missing safety bars on the crane platform, missing grab handles on the ladder up to the platform and a barrier between the operator and the crane turret. However, none of these are mentioned in the minutes of that meeting. Other items relating to the gear box problem (loss of power) and the state of the tipper are referenced. Mr Gaw in his evidence did not recall any safety issues being raised. Given that there was no reason at the time for the respondent not to keep an accurate minute I am not satisfied that the lack of safety features was referenced by the claimant at this meeting. I do however accept that he most likely raised issues relating to the loss of power, the tipping gear and the hydraulics.[64]Having regard to the evidence from the claimant and the concessions made by the respondent I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claimant did make the disclosures as set out in the list of issues at paragraph 9 (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g) and (h). In relation to (e) I am satisfied that the disclosures were made as set out in finding in fact at paragraph 34 above. In relation to (i) I am satisfied that the claimant told AG that he would not drive vehicle SF18 WNG as it was not safe to do so but I am not satisfied that he referenced other safety concerns at that time. Did the claimant disclose information and not merely allegations?[65]I am satisfied that in relation to (a) through to (h) that on each occasion there was a disclosure of information. In each instance the claimant provides information about either a specific fault in the vehicle or in the case of (e) a series of faults. However, in relation to (i) there is no disclosure of any information. There is just a statement that the claimant will not drive the vehicle as it is not safe. Accordingly (i) is not a protected disclosure. Did the claimant genuinely and reasonably believe the disclosure of the information tended to show the health and safety of any individual had been, was being, or was likely to be endangered; or that the environment had been, was being, or was likely to be damaged?[66]The respondent submitted that this is really the nub of the issue on the disclosures. Mr Parsons-Munn submitted that the claimant was responsible under his contract of employment for the roadworthiness of the vehicle. He carried out a vehicle inspection check every day. On no occasion did he refuse to actually drive it when he was due to take it out. He signed off the vehicle as fit to drive on each occasion. The vehicle was being maintained under contract with Volvo who consistently signed it off as fit to drive. However, the test here is partially subjective. It is based on the belief of the claimant – albeit that that must be a reasonable belief. I accept that the claimant did believe that the vehicle was not safe to drive. He stated that on a number of occasions. It was not disputed that there was a problem with the vehicle in that it had a tendency simply to lose power whilst driving. Mr Glover stated in his evidence that he did not consider that to be a safety issue. I find that a little surprising. For a vehicle of that size and weight simply to lose power whilst driving in what might be congested traffic would I think strike the reasonable individual as representing a health and safety risk to the driver and other road users. It may well be that it can “glide” safely to a stop but the ability for it to manoeuvre and react must be compromised with no power. Mr Beaton in his evidence accepted the issue was a potential safety issue. In my opinion it would be a reasonable belief for the claimant to consider that his health and safety and/or the health and safety of other road users was likely to be endangered. I also accept that the issue with the stabilising leg retracting when the crane was being operated was a safety concern and that the claimant would have a reasonable belief that this was likely to endanger health and safety. There was very little evidence in relation to damage to the environment although there was some reference to the oil leakage on the hydraulics for the crane. But the evidence suggested this was minimal and I do not consider it could be said on any reasonable basis to represent a risk of damage to the environment.[67]Accordingly in respect of the disclosures at (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) I conclude that it was reasonable for the claimant to believe that the disclosure of the information tended to show the health and safety of any individual had been, was being, or was likely to be endangered – insofar as it related to the loss of power of the vehicle and the retraction of the stabiliser leg. Did the claimant also genuinely and reasonably believe the disclosure of the information was made in the public interest?[68]It was not disputed by the respondent that the public interest test would be satisfied here. The safety of a vehicle on the public road is clearly something that does fall within the public interest. Was the disclosure made to the respondent?[69]It was also not disputed that the disclosures were all made to the respondent.[70]I am accordingly satisfied that the claimant did make a number of protected disclosures. The key issue in the case is whether the reason or principal reason for dismissal was the protected disclosures. Was the respondent’s reason (or principal reason if more than one) for dismissal that the claimant had made one (or more) protected disclosures?[71]The claimant’s position is that the real reason that he was dismissed was because of the protected disclosures that he made. The respondent disputes this. The respondent submitted that the reasons for dismissal were the reasons set out in the Dismissal Letter.[72]It is not disputed that the actual dismissal meeting held on 21 February 2025 was relatively short. The claimant alleges that not all of the matters that were set out in the Dismissal Letter were actually raised with him at the meeting on 21 February 2025. The respondent accepted that. It was put to the claimant that he “stormed out” and the claimant accepted that. There was some confusion as to what was actually mentioned at the meeting on the 21 February 2025. Both the claimant and Mr Gaw gave slightly different versions as to what was specifically raised at the meeting itself. I accept that since no notes were kept of that meeting that it is difficult to assess what was said. However, I do not think that it matters greatly. I accept the evidence of Mr Gaw that he had a note of the points he intended to raise and that that note found its way into the subsequent Dismissal Letter. Clearly, he did not cover all of these points at the meeting itself. The claimant maintained that Mr Gaw did raise the refusal by the claimant to drive SF18 WNG at the meeting. I think it likely that Mr Gaw did raise that as the claimant specifically references it in his Grounds of Appeal and there is a clear reference to threatening to leave if you were given the 6 wheel lorry to drive in the Dismissal Letter.[73]If I am to accept the position of the claimant that the true reason for dismissal was the protected disclosures then there would need to be something to suggest that the grounds given by the respondent for dismissal were not genuine. I will deal with these in turn using the numbering in paragraph 58 above.[74]In terms of the decision to proceed to dismissal Mr Glover in his evidence stated that it was when he ran the tachograph report on 18 February 2025 that he saw there had been a third occasion when the claimant had driven without his tachograph card inserted – on 1 February 2025. It was at that point that he spoke with Mr Gaw and recommended dismissal. Mr Glover stated that for him the main issues were the Harsh Driving Report, the tachograph infringements, the mobile phone use whilst driving and the driving without a tachograph card inserted.[75]Ground (a). Frequent driving infringements highlighted on Tachomaster. There was clear evidence of this presented by the respondent and I am satisfied that this was an issue for the respondent. Although the claimant highlighted that on several occasions he had left his tachograph card in the vehicle for too long and that this might have impacted some of the results there is still evidence of quite consistent non-compliance.[76]Ground (b). Attitude to others. There was evidence that these were issues that were raised prior to the dismissal meeting. Mr Glover raised with Mr Gaw an issue about the claimant’s attitude to others blocking his access in the yard and his threat to leave if internal CCTV were used. At the meeting on 27 January 2025 between Mr Glover and the claimant the claimant had threatened to leave if required to drive SF18 WNG and had complained about his overtime rate of pay. Whatever the rights and wrongs of these particular issues they do seem to have been concerns that the respondents genuinely held.[77]Ground (c). The claimant accepted in his evidence that the issue of damage to vehicles was raised with him at the meeting by Mr Gaw. He stated that he accepted responsibility for damage to the side barrier of SF19 WNG. He stated that during the meeting on 21 February Mr Gaw had pointed out damage to the back door of SF74 YAE – and that he had refuted liability for that. Again whatever the rights and wrongs of the position damage to the vehicles does appear to be an issue that the respondents took into consideration.[78]Ground (d) – Fullerton Street. It was not disputed that the claimant had been told not to enter the yard at Fullerton Street before 7.30 a.m. in the morning and that he disregarded this by parking his lorry in Fullerton Street around 5.55 a.m. The claimant did not see this as an offence since he did not drive into the yard. He did however drive into and park up in the street at 5.55 a.m. and it did occasion a complaint. By itself this is not a particularly material issue.[79]Ground (e) - Scrap Metal line. Mr Gaw gave evidence that the claimant failed to hand in a delivery line for scrap metal to a value of about £200. This was found so no loss was actually incurred. There is no evidence to suggest that this was anything but an error and would appear to be a minor issue.[80]Ground (f) – No Tacho card inserted. This was also accepted by the claimant – although he did not consider it a serious matter. The respondents in evidence indicated that they did see this as a serious matter. There was clear evidence it occurred on three occasions (although the Dismissal Letter only references two) and on the last occasion after the claimant had previously been spoken to. I accept that the respondents had grounds to see this as a material issue. The claimant raised lack of training as an issue in respect of the use of the tachograph generally. However as a qualified HGV driver the claimant should have been aware of the requirements around the use of the tachograph and in any event that would not detract from the fact that the respondent still considered it a reason to dismiss – the fairness of the dismissal not being relevant for these purposes.[81]Ground (g) – the Harsh Driving Report. There was evidence to support this. The claimant maintained that these were all minor infractions and there was no evidence to substantiate each issue. However, there was evidence to support a view that the claimant’s driving was less safe than that of his colleague.[82]Ground (h) – Mobile phone use while driving. With regard to the allegation of use of a mobile phone whilst driving I am satisfied that this was a concern for Mr Glover and that he identified this as an issue in January 2025. He spoke to the claimant about it on 27 January 2025. At that time he had a concern about the mobile phone mount location and the attitude of the claimant which was that he could use the phone in that location when stopped. I accept the points made by the claimant that there was no direct evidence of him using the phone whilst driving and that the tachograph records mean that he could have been stopped for 29 seconds in a minute and it would still show as driving – and therefore he could have made the call in that 29 second window. However, the tachograph and whatsapp records do indicate a strong prima facie case that the claimant was using his mobile phone whilst driving. This is not a standard unfair dismissal case. The issue here is what was the reason for dismissal. I am satisfied that Mr Glover was genuinely of the view that the claimant was using his mobile phone whilst driving and that that was a factor he relayed to Mr Gaw.[83]Ground (i) – Breedon Quarry. I accept that Breedon Quarry did issue this instruction but it does not appear to have been taken to be a particularly serious issue by the respondent prior to the decision to dismiss as it is clear that on 27 January 2025 Mr Glover instructs the claimant to go to Breedon Quarry. I consider that this is an issue that has been put in to bolster the overall case and would not by itself give grounds for dismissal.[84]In overall terms I do think it preparing the list of issues the respondent has included what might be called material and non-material matters. I accept that the issues (a), (f), (g) and (h) are material issues. These were the issues Mr Beaton referenced as the primary reasons for not upholding the appeal. They are also the issues that Mr Glover saw as material.[85]I understand why the claimant may consider that his dismissal was unfair in a general sense. It is not disputed that he was called to a meeting to be dismissed with no warning; that he had no right to be accompanied and that in respect of a number of the issues there may well have been less than full investigation. However, this is not a standard unfair dismissal case. The only issue here is whether the claimant can establish that the reason or principal reason for dismissal is the protected disclosures made by him. I am not satisfied that he has been able to establish that on a balance of probabilities. The evidence clearly shows that the respondents had concerns regarding the claimant. Specifically in relation his repeated failures to follow the requirements of record keeping with the tachograph, his Harsh Driving Record, his use of a mobile phone whilst driving and his failure to drive with the tachograph card inserted. The evidence shows that these were matters considered by Mr Glover and discussed with Mr Gaw and others prior to the dismissal. The Employee Handbook clearly stipulates that failure to comply with tachograph requirements and the prohibition on mobile phone use whilst driving are potential disciplinary matters.[86]The dismissal occurred on 21 February 2025 and the last protected disclosure was made at the end of October 2024. The primary safety issue that the claimant raised about vehicle SF18 WNG was the power loss. This was recognised from the outset by the respondent and attempts were made to get it fixed by Volvo. SF18 WNG was not in use for most of early 2025. There was no reason why the respondent should be concerned about the claimant raising this issue about SF18 WNG. I accept that the respondents do reference as an attitude issue the refusal of the claimant to drive SF18 WNG however the claimant’s refusal to drive SF18 WNG was not a material issue for the respondent as he was driving a different vehicle by January 2025 in any event. Although I do note that in any event the claimant did drive SF18 WNG on two occasions in February 2025. Mr Glover was not employed until 5 January 2025. He was not employed at the time the protected disclosures were made. Mr Glover was an experienced transport manager and it was he who began to assess the tachograph records in January 2025.[87]There is no need for the respondent to establish that there was any gross misconduct here. I accept it is arguable that some of the issues relied upon might be seen as minor – however I do accept that the view that both Mr Glover, Mr Gaw and Mr Beaton came to was that in overall terms the claimant was, for the reasons set out in the Dismissal Letter, not someone they wished to continue to employ. I am satisfied that that was their genuine view. The protected disclosures played no part in their coming to that view. On that basis it has not been established that the reason or the principal reason for dismissal was the protected disclosures. The claim must accordingly fail.