Ms N Copeland v Simply Solutions (Europe) Ltd and M McPhillips c/o Simply Solutions (Europe) Ltd: 8000822/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8000822/2025

Between

Ms N CopelandClaimant

Simply Solutions (Europe) Ltd and M McPhillips c/o Simply Solutions (Europe) LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Campbell

Mr B McKinlay (instructed by Solicitor) for claimant

Mr R Russell (instructed by Solicitor) for respondent

Date 4 October 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The complaint of breach of contract and wrongful dismissal at common law is dismissed following its withdrawal.

[2]The complaint of unlawful detriment under section 47C of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is unsuccessful and is dismissed.

[3]The complaint of pregnancy and/or maternity related discrimination under section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 is unsuccessful and is dismissed.

[4]The complaint of automatic unfair dismissal under section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is unsuccessful and is dismissed.

REASONS

Findings of fact

[1]This was a claim by an individual against her former employer, the first respondent (referred to hereafter as ‘the company’) and separately against her former line manager (hereafter ‘Mr McPhillips’). The claimant was dismissed on 7 January 2025 at a meeting with Mr McPhillips. She contends that the reason was that she was pregnant and/or exercised her right to request statutory maternity leave. She alleges other discriminatory acts occurring before her dismissal. The respondent argues that there were other non-discriminatory reasons for dismissal and for any treatment before that, to the extent it occurred.

[2]The hearing took place over four days by video. The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf. On behalf of the respondents evidence was given by Mr McPhillips, Operations Manager, Mr Kerr Wilson, director and Mr Colin Wilson, director and CEO.

[3]The parties had prepared a joint bundle of documents. Numbers in square brackets below correspond to page numbers of the bundle.

[4]The witnesses gave evidence in chief orally. Each witness was found to be generally credible and reliable, making appropriate concessions where invited to do so.

[5]The parties provided submissions orally on the final day of the hearing.

[6]The hearing was to deal with both liability and remedy as appropriate. Legal issues

[7]The parties had prepared an agreed list of issues which is reproduced below with some small amendments to reflect how the claim developed as the hearing progressed. In particular, Mr McKinlay for the claimant confirmed that she was withdrawing a complaint of breach of contract in respect of notice pay, and consented to its dismissal. Detriment – section 47C Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’)/Regulation 19 Maternity & Parental Leave etc (‘MAPLE’) Regulations 1999 1. Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to detriment by way of the following acts:a. The Respondent failed to raise any alleged performance with the issues with the Claimant prior to dismissal;

b. Mr McPhillips ambushing of the Claimant with the probationary review meeting on 7 January 2025;

c. Mr McPhillips’ failure to provide a clear reason for ending the Claimant’s probation;

d. The failure to keep the Claimant updated on the progress of her appeal despite the Respondent stating they would do so;

e. The failure to hold an appeal meeting;

f. The failure to uphold the Claimant’s appeal; and

g. The contents of the appeal outcome letter. 2. Was the reason for the treatment: a. The Claimant’s pregnancy? b. That the Claimant sought to take the benefits of ordinary and/or additional maternity leave? Discrimination – section 18 Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA’) 3. Did the Respondent treat the Claimant unfavourably because of her pregnancy or because of an illness suffered as a result of it? The Claimant relies on: a. The conduct set out in paragraph 1 above. b. The Claimant’s dismissal. Automatic Unfair Dismissal – section 99 Employment Rights Act 1996/Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 1999 4. Was the reason, or principal reason, for the Claimant’s dismissal: a. The Claimant’s pregnancy; b. That the Claimant sought to take the benefits of ordinary and/or additional maternity leave and/or time off for antenatal appointments? Remedy 5. What financial compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances? 6. What award for injury to feelings should be made? 7. What interest should be added to the award? Findings of fact The tribunal made the following findings as relevant to the legal issues it had to decide, based on the evidence presented and on the balance of probabilities.

[1]The claimant was employed by the company between 24 June 2024 and 7 January 2025. On the latter date she was dismissed. The company is a facilities management business based in Livingston. She held the role of Client Relations Manager. As such she oversaw one of two teams at the premises, the other being the Customer Service team which was managed by Jill Hutchinson. Both reported to Mr McPhillips, the Operations Manager. Two of the other more senior employees (also directors) of the company were Kerr and Colin Wilson.

[2]The claimant had worked for the company previously, between around May 2021 and July 2023. She left on good terms to take up an opportunity to work with a friend in Glasgow. However, the commute became more of a challenge and she happened to discuss with some former colleagues when catching up that she might be open to returning to the company. This led to Mr Colin Wilson interviewing her. The manager of the Client Relations team had given notice of resignation and the claimant was offered the role, and accepted. The claimant lives in Livingston and it took her ten minutes to drive to the company’s offices. Mr Wilson stressed to the claimant that she should be punctual as there had been an issue with her timekeeping during her first period of employment.

[3]The claimant was given a written statement of her key terms of employment [101]. She was subject to a six-month probation period and the applicable terms were contained in paragraph 3 of the document.

[4]The company electronically records when employees arrive at and leave its premises. The claimant arrived at late to work on 4 July 2024. Her start time was 9am and she swiped in at 10.30am. She apologised to Mr McPhillips by Teams message and explained in more detail verbally that she had been experiencing personal difficulties.

[5]The claimant was late again on 23 July 2024, arriving at 9.40am. She had slept in and again she apologised to Mr McPhillips. On a further 18 occasions up to the end of December 2024 she swiped in between 9.00 and 9.15am. There were an additional 13 instances where she swiped in at 8.58 or 8.59am. Factoring in the time taken to reach her desk on an upper floor of the building and start up her computer, she was unlikely to have begun her duties by 9am on those days. On the majority of occasions when she started work late Mr McPhillips was present in the office and she apologised to him. On 31 December 2023 the claimant swiped in at 11.32am, but had been attending an antenatal appointment.

[6]On 24 July 2024 Mr McPhillips sent a message to the claimant and Ms Hutchinson [69] which set out concerns about their teams not working effectively, harmoniously or communicating adequately. It its detail and tone it made clear that improvement was required from both individuals as the teams’ managers.

[7]The claimant was encouraged to consider methods of personal development. Mr McPhillips discussed with her details of courses she could complete. She was given access to an online training resource which offered various modules. She believed this was something to consider over and above the requirements of her role, and not something she would be assessed on. She did not take steps to attend any of the courses.

[8]The claimant attended probation review meetings with Mr McPhillips in August and on 31 October 2024. They were intended to be more frequent but Mr McPhillips tended to deprioritise them if more urgent work needed his attention. He took the view that he was providing constant feedback when necessary, and so a meeting would only be required if something more significant needed to be discussed. This was not an issue for the claimant as she assumed that nothing to do with her performance required urgent attention. Ms Hutchinson had been promoted to her role shortly before the claimant joined and was also working within a probation period in the second half of 2024. She had had meetings approximately monthly with Mr McPhillips. Her probation period was extended. The claimant recognised that her own would be due to end on or around 24 December 2024, but had been privy to a management communication that no decisions on probationary staff would be taken during the festive period, and they would be deferred until the new year.

[9]Mr McPhillips made a brief note of the meeting of 31 October 2024 [89]. It mentioned ‘Consistency’, ‘Professionalism’ and ‘Collaboration’ as areas for the claimant to monitor and improve in. The claimant took the points as constructive feedback and she countersigned the note.

[10]In August 2024 the claimant discovered that she had become pregnant. She told Mr McPhillips in October 2024 and he was pleased for her. He provided her with materials and links to guidance on her rights, including maternity leave and pay. She offered to provide evidence of her antenatal appointments but McPhillips told her he did not need to see any. Mr McPhillips could not recall saying so in his evidence, but the claimant recalled that he had, and was more likely to have a clear recollection of such a conversation.

[11]In early January 2025 an appointment was made for the claimant to meet with Mr McPhillips around the 9th or 10th of the month. However, in the afternoon of 7 January Mr McPhillips came to the claimant’s desk and asked if she could come into a meeting with him then. The claimant’s evidence was that he merely asked if he could ‘have a word’ with her whereas Mr McPhillips said that he had told her it was going to be her probation review meeting. The tribunal found that Mr McPhillips did not explicitly say that the meeting was for that purpose beforehand because he believed it had been scheduled for that afternoon, and so the claimant would have known. The claimant understood that the meeting was going to take place later in the week and so did not appreciate that this is what he wanted to speak about when he asked her. Although therefore there was a misunderstanding between the two, it did not make any material difference, principally as Mr McPhillips had made a decision about the claimant’s future and wanted to communicate it to her. He did not intend to ask her for input. Therefore, how much notice she had or how well prepared she was had no effect on the outcome.

[12]The two individuals met alone in a meeting room. Again there was a dispute in evidence over some of the details of the meeting. What is agreed is that Mr McPhillips told the claimant that her performance had not been adequate during her probation period and her employment was going to be brought to an end. The claimant became upset at some point and the meeting ended. She was told she would be given confirmation of the decision in writing and that she would have the right to appeal the decision. It lasted around 30 minutes. The claimant said that Mr McPhillips was being vague and evasive about the reasons for her failing her probation whereas Mr McPhillips said that he had tried to explain his reasons, but the claimant became upset, began to personally criticise the management of the company, and wanted the meeting to come to an end. The claimant said in evidence that she had voiced a suspicion that the real reason for her dismissal was that she was pregnant, and asked Mr McPhillips if this was true. Mr McPhillips’ evidence was that he could not remember her referring to her pregnancy at all. The tribunal noted the claimant’s evidence on this point to be clearer and accepted it, but also that Mr McPhillips had not admitted that was a reason. However, the claimant accepted that Mr McPhillips gave at least two examples of her performance being a concern, which were when she didn’t update Kerr Wilson on the progress of a project and when she authorised a leave day for a team member only for the team to be short of staff that day. The tribunal therefore found that the reason why Mr McPhillips did not give more information about his reasons for failing the claimant’s probation was that she was upset and he felt there was no point in continuing to do so.

[13]The claimant went home and was upset and anxious. The decision had been a surprise for her and she worried about her future and her baby. The claimant continued to believe that the real reason for her dismissal was that she was pregnant. She thought about the expense and effort the respondent would have to go to in covering her role during her leave period.

[14]The claimant emailed Mr McPhillips the day after the meeting to ask him to confirm his reasons for her failing her probation [67]. She said she believed the decision was unfair and incorrect, and was a departure from normal procedure. She added that concerns had not been raised in previous meetings, she received no indication that her performance was unsatisfactory, and that this had led her to believe that her probation had been failed because of her pregnancy rather than her performance. Mr McPhillips replied the next day [66] to say that during her probationary period the areas of communication, professionalism, decision-making, personal development and punctuality had been evaluated. He did not provide further details of how the claimant had performed against those criteria. The claimant was reminded to return any company property and told about how she would receive her final pay.

[15]The claimant felt she still did not fully understand the reasons for failing her probation. She appealed against the decision by email on 14 January 2025 [65] and requested a detailed explanation of the reasons for her dismissal. She said that she believed the decision was unfair and that an appropriate procedure had not been followed. She added that she had not previously been given any warning of her performance being of concern, and that she had been led to conclude that the real reason for her dismissal was her pregnancy.

[16]Mr McPhillips acknowledged the appeal email on 20 January 2025 and said that her appeal would be taken seriously and a thorough review undertaken. He said that Linda Lindsay, who was the company’s Finance Manager, would be dealing with the appeal and would get in touch with further updates.

[17]The next communication the claimant received was a letter from Kerr Wilson confirming that he had decided her appeal, which he had not upheld. The letter was undated but received around 13 February 2025. He gave reasons for the company’s decision over three pages. He mentioned that the claimant’s performance had been discussed at a number of regular Operational Management Team meetings (which the claimant also attended). Concerns were detailed under the subject headings of punctuality, decisionmaking, communication, general duties, inability and inconsistency to work under clear instruction, supply chain management and professionalism. The claimant was further criticised in relation to an occasion when, having left a meeting with Colin Wilson after becoming upset, she did not return, confirm to him what she had done or make efforts later on to resume the discussion. The letter ended by saying that the claimant could make contact if she needed further information.

[18]The claimant was upset on reading the letter, which she felt was a contrived personal attack on her with the motive of diverting attention from her pregnancy being the true reason for her termination. She did not contact the company further regarding the reasons for her dismissal.

[19]A number of matters were known to Mr McPhillips when taking the decision that the claimant would not pass probation, and that it would not be extended. Those included the following:a. Each occasion when the claimant was late to work or arrived in the building within two minutes before 9am – i.e the information in pages 98 and 99 of the joint bundle, but viewable directly on the company’s internal system. On the majority of those occasions he was present and the claimant apologised to him. Before reaching his decision he reviewed the system to note all of the occasions of lateness;

b. The fact that the claimant’s timekeeping during her first period of employment with the company had been problematic, and that Colin Wilson had stressed to her on engaging her for the second time that poor timekeeping would not be tolerated;

c. Some of the content of a statement given by employee Aimee McCaffrey in April 2025 [59] and a statement given by employee Jordan Finlayson on 25 April 2025 [60], namely that Ms Hutchinson had expressed unhappiness at what she perceived as the claimant acting outside the scope of her role by exercising authority over members of her own team and causing them upset;

d. That the claimant had upset two other members of Ms Hutchinson’s team to the extent that they were tearful, as communicated to him by Ms Hutchinson [71]. Mr McPhillips considered this and the issues in (c) above to demonstrate poor communication between the managers of both teams and to raise doubt about the claimant’s professionalism;

e. What he and Colin Wilson told the claimant, as well as other managers, in management meetings from October 2024 onwards. This included: i. Further comments at a meeting on 15 October 2024 about teams not co-operating, and ii. A new member of the claimant’s team not having adequate support when the claimant was on leave, raised on 12 November 2024;

f. That he believed the claimant had not managed the return of a team member to work following a three-month illness-related absence, which another staff member had to pick up;

g. That the claimant had decided to grant a team member a leave day at short notice despite his advice not to do so, the issue that caused by the team being short of staff and the claimant’s acknowledgement that she had made a bad decision;

h. That the claimant had not produced a personal development plan or utilised any online training made available to her;

i. The evidence which led him to tell the claimant and Ms Hutchinson on 27 July 2024 that a division between the two teams had emerged, as explained and discussed in a Teams communication [69]; and

j. The circumstances which led him to send a further briefing to both individuals in August 2024 about conduct of certain individuals in both teams and ongoing issues around the teams not collaborating. Discussion and decision

[20]I noted the parties’ oral submissions but for the sake of brevity they are not repeated here. Where relevant, specific points made are referred to below in relation to the relevant legal complaint. Pregnancy related discrimination and detriment – section 18 EqA, section 47C ERA

[21]The claimant alleges that the respondents:a. treated her ‘unfavourably…because of [her] pregnancy’ contrary to section 18(2)(a) EqA;

b. treated her unfavourably because she was ‘exercising or seeking to exercise … the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave’ contrary to section 18(4) EqA; and

c. subjected her to a detriment under section 47C(2)(a) of ERA as provided for in regulation 19(2)(a) of MAPLE, by doing or not doing eight things set out in a list of further particulars provided on 8 July 2025 [36] and reflected in the list of issues. Those are dealt with in turn before addressing the separate complaints in relation to the dismissal itself. They are considered

(i) first in terms of whether the alleged acts or omissions occurred in fact, then

(ii) if so whether in terms of Igen Ltd and others v Wong

[2005] IRLR 258

(CA), there are primary facts from which the tribunal could conclude on the balance of probability, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the respondents (or either of them) had committed an unfair act (therefore transferring the onus of proof to the respondents) and then, if so,

(iii) whether the relevant respondent(s) prove, again on the balance of probability, that the established treatment is in no way whatsoever because of her pregnancy.

[22]Failing to raise any performance issues before 7 January 2025 and instead proceeding with the meeting on that date, denying the claimant the opportunity to address them – on the evidence the first part of this allegation was factually unsustainable. The claimant’s timekeeping, professionalism, ability to manage and to work as part of a team, collaboration with other areas of the business, organisational abilities and communication skills were all relevant matters and were raised with the claimant during her probationary period. It could be said that the claimant was denied an opportunity to address those concerns in the wider sense, because although she could have done so in the meeting on that date, the reality was that Mr McPhillips had made up his mind and was not realistically going to be persuaded to change it whatever she said. In this sense she was denied an opportunity to address the concerns in the meeting. However that was not a primary fact which, on the balance of probability, suggested discrimination. It was more likely that Mr McPhillips took stock of the numerous issues and concerns which he was aware of at this time and decided that the claimant’s return to the business in a more senior role had simply not worked out.

[23]Ambushing the claimant on 7 January 2025 with her probationary review meeting – there was a conflict in evidence between the claimant and Ms McPhillips over whether firstly the meeting was originally scheduled for that date, or two or three days later at the end of the same week, and secondly whether on the day he told her before the meeting began that this was its purpose. The claimant’s evidence is preferred about the date when the meeting was originally scheduled, on the basis that her recollection in evidence was clearer, and she was more likely to remember if the meeting had been brought forward and she had not been given notice, because she was the one put at a disadvantage as a result. Mr McPhillips erroneously believed either that it had been scheduled for 7 January 2025, or simply understood that it had been left to take place at any time that week when convenient to both individuals. Bringing the meeting forward and not giving notice was disadvantageous to the claimant to a small degree in the sense that she may have prepared in some way for the meeting after 7 January, and so had been denied doing so. However, on her evidence she did not anticipate the meeting being a challenging one and it is difficult to see what preparation she would have felt the need to carry out, whether the meeting was on 7 or, say, 10 January. The position was therefore that, again, Mr McPhillips had made up his mind what he wanted to say, was not going to be persuaded to change it, and therefore the timing of the meeting made little or no difference. He would have delivered the same message and the claimant would likely have reacted in the same way. This was not an ‘ambush’ but caught the claimant off guard to a degree. However, that was not a primary fact which was more likely than not to involve discrimination. It was done out of expediency by Mr McPhillips who had a message he wished to deliver and merely wanted to have it done. There appeared to be no reason connected to the claimant’s pregnancy why doing so on that day, as opposed to later the same week, was chosen.

[24]Failing at the meeting to provide a clear reason for failing probation – the evidence on this matter led to a conclusion that Mr McPhillips wished to give brief reasons, to the extent that the claimant wished to hear them, and confirm the position in writing afterwards. On the first one or two areas he sought to explain the claimant challenged him and became upset. This was not a criticism of her as it was accepted she was genuinely taken aback at hearing what he had to say. However, it led him to cut short any discussion about his reasons. As discussed, he did not view the meeting as a two-way discussion in any event, but rather for the purpose of him conveying that the claimant had failed her probation. In terms of facts, he did not provide a full and detailed explanation for his reasons but this was not a primary fact going towards discrimination. It was because he only ever intended to give his reasons briefly, he was not opening them to debate, and the claimant by her words and demeanour made it clear she did not wish him to continue at that time.

[25]Between 20 January and 13 February 2025, failing to keep the claimant updated on the progress of her appeal despite stating that this would happen – the claimant was no longer an employee, but continued to be protected as she was within her protected period per section 18(6) of EqA, having informed the company of her pregnancy but not yet having given birth. The evidence in relation to this period showed that the company’s Finance Manager had originally been identified to consider the appeal, then she had been replaced as she was deemed to be too new an employee to be able to give it proper consideration, leading to Kerr Wilson taking the matter on. For part of the period he was on annual leave, and on returning he spoke to Mr McPhillips, Ms Hutchinson and Colin Wilson about the issues. He also scrutinised the company’s electronic systems to view the claimant’s Teams conversation history. All of this would have taken an amount of time equivalent to the gap between the two dates, or not much less. Mr Wilson certainly could have provided the claimant with an update during that time, even if simply to say the process was taking longer than he anticipated, or than she might have expected. However, there was nothing to suggest that this was because of the claimant’s pregnancy. The claimant did not discharge the onus of showing that the lack of communication was connected to that protected characteristic. Had she done so, the evidence would have rebutted that provisional assumption.

[26]Between the same two dates, failing to hold an appeal meeting – the evidence in relation to the company’s approach to meetings was that it did not normally allow an employee with less than two years’ service a right of appeal against dismissal at all. That much the claimant was granted. It followed from that policy that an appeal hearing would not normally be held. In that way the claimant was treated no differently from any other employee who had failed their six-month probation (or been dismissed at any time within two years of starting employment). Kerr Wilson, on his evidence, read the appeal as a request for more detailed reasons for failing probation. He therefore investigated that and provided further information in his outcome letter. It could have occurred to him to invite the claimant to a meeting to discuss her position but he saw the nature of the issue to be about lack of a detailed explanation of the company’s position. If he consciously opted not to offer the claimant a meeting, it could not be seen why that would be connected to her pregnancy. Again therefore, the decision could not meet the threshold to become a primary fact, and had it done so, the evidence pointed to the reason being that a meeting was not considered necessary given the nature of the appeal.

[27]Failing to pay the claimant in lieu of her notice period on 28 January 2025 – this was not covered in evidence nor addressed in submissions, and so no findings could be made as to whether the claimant was or was not paid in lieu of her notice entitlement around that time. As the onus falls initially on the claimant, it has not been satisfied. It appears to be connected to the withdrawn wrongful dismissal complaint.

[28]On or around 13 February 2025 Kerr Wilson highlighted in the appeal outcome letter a number of alleged performance concerns which had not been raised with the claimant before, and suggested a lack of professionalism on her part, with a view to obscuring the true reason for her dismissal and distracting from the respondents’ discriminatory motives – this was not accepted as fact based on the evidence presented. As with the first allegation above, a number of performance concerns were raised with the claimant throughout her probationary period. The letter refers back to those occurrences. In any event, and appreciating that the claimant was upset to read the letter’s contents, they were nevertheless a justified response to her request for a more detailed explanation of the reasons why she had failed probation.

[29]In conclusion therefore, the claimant was only able to establish primary facts from which discrimination could provisionally be assumed in a limited way, and to the extent that she could, the evidence rebutted the presumption that discrimination had actually occurred. For completeness and clarity this involves consideration of whether a discriminatory (i.e. pregnancy- or maternity-related) motive was even part of the overall reason or reasons for treating the claimant as alleged, because any onus shifting to the respondents requires them to show that in no sense whatsoever did pregnancy play a part. This is supported by the evidence, particularly that other colleagues had been accommodated during pregnancy and on at least one occasion a pregnant employee passed probation, and the evidence of Mr McPhillips that pregnancy was not a factor at all in his decision and that he had not got as far as considering the logistics or any challenges involved in covering the claimant’s maternity period when it came. The company had been in the situation of having to arrange maternity cover before and Mr Phillips was not concerned with or influenced by the need to do so again.

[30]It follows that none of the claimant’s detriment complaints could succeed on the evidence. Pregnancy-related dismissal – section 18 EqA, section 99(1) ERA

[31]The claimant separately alleged that her dismissal was discriminatory and automatically unfair, therefore removing the respondent’s ability to justify it and the requirement to have completed two years’ continuous service.

[32]Reading section 99(1) ERA in conjunction with regulation 20 of the MAPLE Regulations, dismissal of an employee for the sole or main reason of their pregnancy is automatically unfair. That dismissal could also be an act of pregnancy related discrimination by being a detriment under section 18(2)(a) of EqA. In that scenario the claimant’s pregnancy would only have to have had a significant influence on the decision to dismiss, and thus not necessarily be the only or main reason.

[33]On the findings the tribunal made, the sole reason for the claimant’s dismissal was that she had not performed well enough during her probationary period to satisfy the company that she was suitable for the position she had been engaged for. In brief this included timekeeping (against a background of having been explicitly warned how important punctuality was), communication, collaboration, team management, self-development and decision making. She had returned to the company in a more senior position than the one she had held before, with management responsibilities. There was sufficient evidence on which to reach a conclusion that she was not suited to the position.

[34]Although none of the claimant’s legal complaints required her to show that she was less favourably treated than a comparator, it could not be ignored that Ms Hutchinson had been the subject of many of the same criticisms from management and was also under probation for the latter half of 2024. She was not pregnant and, rather than be dismissed, had had her probation period extended before later passing it. It appeared relevant to explore the reasons why she was treated differently from the claimant. The evidence included that she was a more longstanding employee. She was on probation for the team manager role as a promotion rather than because she had newly joined. She demonstrated a better work attitude and willingness to attain the standards required of her role than the company believed the claimant showed. The claimant rejoined the company as someone who already had management experience. Ms Hutchison had not been accused of upsetting colleagues in either team and had a good timekeeping record. The extension of her probation period in those circumstances did not point to the claimant being discriminated against as a pregnant employee. There were other more relevant differentiating factors.

Conclusions

[35]The claimant’s various legal complaints were not supported by the evidence when the relevant statutory tests were applied. They therefore must be dismissed. Accordingly, there was no need to consider remedy.

[36]Although the claim was raised against two respondents, as none of the complaints were upheld it was not necessary to consider separately which respondent was liable in respect of any given complaint.