X v University of Manchester and Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd: 8000677/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 8000677/2024

Between

XClaimant

University of Manchester and Universities Superannuation Scheme LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Barker

Date 19 December 2025

JUDGMENT

The claim is struck out under rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 on the ground that it has no reasonable prospect of success.

REASONS

[1]I have written my decision and reasons in as much plain English as I am able. The claimant is neurodiverse by reason of autism and refuses to read documents if they contain legal terminology. He refers to them as “gibberish”. I have included a section at the end of the judgment that is in as plain a form of English as possible. He will hopefully understand the practical consequences of the decision by reading the end section, but if he and the respondents want to understand how the law has been applied to the parties’ arguments, the whole of the reasons will need to be read.

[2]This claim was begun by the claimant approaching ACAS to begin early conciliation against both respondents on 16 February 2024, which lasted until 29 March 2024. The claimant sent a claim form to the Tribunal on 17 May 2024 in which he alleged that both respondents had discriminated against him by reason of his belief in ethical veganism.

[3]The discrimination was said to have taken the form of neither respondent making an ethical vegan pension fund available to the claimant at the time he was employed by the first respondent. He says that this is indirect discrimination on the grounds of his belief in ethical veganism. In the claim form, the claimant asked that the Tribunal award compensation for lost employer pension contributions plus interest plus compensation for any tax advantage lost and also that the Tribunal make recommendations that the respondents be required to facilitate a vegan suitable pension provision, or alternatively provide a taxefficient payment in lieu, or an appropriate third party vegan-suitable pension.

[4]The claimant noted that the second respondent was the largest pension scheme in the country and that although vegans are approximately 2% of the population, that nevertheless related to approximately 10,000 members of the second respondent’s pension scheme. The claimant drew a comparison with the second respondent’s Sharia pension fund, which according to him had approximately “0.047%” of the second respondent’s pension fund’s total assets.

[5]It is the respondents’ case that the claim is misconceived and has no reasonable prospect of success.

[6]There was a case management preliminary hearing before Employment Judge Cookson on 16 December 2024. At this hearing, the claims were discussed, and the matter was listed for a one-day public hearing to consider the respondents’ applications for strike out of the claim, or deposit orders in the alternative. This was the hearing before me that is the subject of this judgment. Also considered by me was the claimant’s application for an anonymity order under Rule 49 Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 (“ET Rules”), which was granted to him in a judgment which was sent to the parties on 4 December 2025.

[7]The factual background to the case is that the claimant was employed by the first respondent from 6 June 2023 to 18 January 2024, and at the start of his employment he was auto-enrolled in the second respondent’s pension scheme. Very shortly after this, the claimant objected to the terms of the second respondent’s scheme and opted out of it. He was treated as if he had never been a member of the scheme. It is the claimant’s case that he is not able to join the USS scheme on the basis of his ethical veganism, because the USS makes investment decisions which he and other vegans cannot accept.

[8]The respondents have applied under Rule 38 of the ET Rules that the Tribunal strike out the claim on the ground that it has no reasonable prospect of success. Alternatively they have applied under rule 39 ET Rules that the claimant be required to pay a deposit to be allowed to continue with his claim, on the basis that the claim has little reasonable prospect of success. As I have struck out the claim, I have not dealt with the application for a deposit order as this was not necessary.

[9]At the hearing on 18 July 2025 I heard argument from the claimant and both respondents. All parties also discussed the claimant’s application for anonymity. The respondents had provided written submissions in support of their applications. The claimant was given the chance to make further submissions in writing after the end of the hearing, which the second respondent replied to. The claimant’s refusal to engage with legal language, concepts and terminology

[10]The claimant had refused to engage with the respondents’ submissions, and he objected to the presentation of an authorities bundle. Although this is the claimant’s third ET claim, he still considers the use of legal terms, legal argument and case authorities to be offensive and objectionable, on the basis that these are not written in plain English. The claimant is in his manner and presentation an articulate and thoughtful individual and my understanding of his objections is not that he would not be unable to follow a legal argument, but that he objects to it because it is not something that he is readily and straightforwardly able to follow.

[11]Courts and Tribunals are not the only area of society where technical language is used; science and technology and medicine are examples of disciplines where some use of non-plain English is necessary, in order to describe situations, phenomena and concepts with enough clarity and precision to allow those disciplines properly to function. Law is the same. Parties are required to cooperate with the Tribunal to ensure that claims are dealt with effectively. Plain English is to be used wherever possible, but I reminded the claimant that on occasion, plain English can over-simplify a technical concept so as to remove the specific meaning or classification associated with that concept and necessary for it to be properly understood. On occasion it is therefore unavoidable, although it is possible to translate legal terminology so that a lay person can follow what is being said. In relation to these claims, the legal arguments are highly technical. The Tribunal cannot simply avoid engaging with such technical arguments without undermining the fairness of any decision. The claimant was urged to engage with the respondents’ arguments also, with little success during the hearing. His written submissions after the hearing ended did engage with the legal arguments made.

[12]This is particularly an issue in this case, as the issues in relation to the respondents’ applications are more legal than factual. Also, indirect discrimination is a notoriously difficult and technically complex area of the Equality Act 2010. The second respondent’s submissions to this hearing were particularly technical and presented in legal language, despite the parties’ awareness of the claimant’s neurodiversity and strong preference for plain English. I therefore asked the second respondent’s counsel to pause periodically during his submissions so that I could “translate” what was being said into plain English so far as was possible. The parties’ arguments on whether the claim has no reasonable prospect of success

[13]Applications for a strike-out of a claim under rule 38 ET Rules are made on the basis that a claim has no reasonable prospect of success at a final hearing. To assess this, the claimant’s case must be taken at its highest. Therefore, the question for the Tribunal is if the claimant succeeds in persuading the Tribunal to find in his favour on any disputed issues, or matters of evidence, what would his chances be of winning based on the legal tests to be applied.

[14]The Tribunal is told to be very careful in striking out cases, particularly where discrimination is alleged. It is only where cases are essentially hopeless, that is, have no reasonable prospect of success, that they should be struck out (Anyanwu v South Bank Student’s Union

[2001] IRLR 305

, HL.) This is because it is not in the interests of justice to allow cases that are clearly hopeless to proceed to a final hearing, taking up Tribunal time and resources. The background facts and issues for the Tribunal to decide.

[15]As noted by the first respondent, by law every employer in the UK must automatically enrol eligible job holders into a workplace pension scheme and contribute to it (because of s3 Pensions Act 2008). The first respondent uses the second respondent’s Universities Superannuation Scheme (“the Scheme”) to fulfil that requirement.

[16]The second respondent is the corporate trustee of the Scheme which is the largest private sector occupational pension scheme in the UK, of approximately £78 billion. It is governed by a trust deed and trust rules of 19 November 2015 (“the Rules”) and is a hybrid pension scheme which provides defined benefit and defined contribution pension benefits within the one trust. Members therefore accrue separate benefits from the one scheme.

[17]USS Investment Management Limited (“USSIM”) is a subsidiary of the second respondent and is the principal investment manager and adviser to the Scheme and oversees the investment and management of the Scheme’s assets.

[18]As the first respondent is a participating employer of the Scheme, it has to comply with the exclusivity provisions in the Rules, which means that it cannot both participate in the Scheme and also participate in, or offer, another pension scheme to eligible employees.

[19]As the claim is one of indirect discrimination against ethical vegans, the Tribunal at a final hearing will consider what the practice of the respondents was that put ethical vegans, including the claimant, at a particular disadvantage when compared with those who are not ethical vegans. The practice identified by the claimant is that the second respondent “makes non-ethical investment decisions”. The claimant asks that the second respondent be required to provide a vegan-suitable alternative, “at the very least for the defined contribution but also for the defined benefit.” During the hearing the claimant appeared to limit his requirement for a vegan suitable alternative to the defined contribution part of the scheme only, for the first time in the proceedings. The second respondent’s application for strike out

[20]Taking the second respondent’s application first, it argues that s191 Equality Act 2010 when read in combination with Schedule 22 paragraph 1(1) of that Act mean that a person is deemed to have not discriminated against another person if it is doing anything it has to do because of a “requirement of an enactment”. The second respondent’s case is that it is required by s36 Pensions Act 1995 (the Pensions Act being the “enactment” and section 36 being the “requirement” in question) to exercise its investment powers in line with the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005.

[21]The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005 at Regulation 4 essentially oblige trustees to invest in assets in the best interests of members and beneficiaries, and where there is a potential conflict of interest, in the sole interest of members and beneficiaries. Their investment decisions must be made to ensure the “security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole”.

[22]Therefore, taking these provisions together, trustees are obliged to invest and secure the trust assets in the best financial interests of the members and beneficiaries – this is what is meant by the “security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole”. As they are required to do so by law (by the requirement of an enactment”), Schedule 22 of the Equality Act 2010 means that they cannot be acting in a discriminatory way in relation to (in this case) employees by following the requirements of the Pensions Act 1995 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005.

[23]The second respondent acknowledges that there are limited circumstances in which trustees may consider non-financial factors (and even then they are not obliged to consider the non-financial factors). Two things must be present for them to consider non-financial factors – the first is that the trustees must have good reasons for thinking that all scheme members share the non-financial concern (Butler-Sloss v Charity Commission

[2022] Ch 371

) and the second is that there would be no significant risk of a financial disadvantage as a result of the nonfinancial factors being considered (Harries v Church Commissioners for England

[1992] 1 WLR 1241

[24]Taking the claimant’s case at its highest, he puts the number of vegans eligible for the Scheme at about 2%, based on the prevalence of vegans in the general population. He has conducted his own survey which demonstrates that vegans he has been able to speak to are very concerned about the compatibility of their pension funds with ethical veganism. That demonstrates that ethical vegans (i.e. the circa 2% identified) are concerned. Even if this were to be extrapolated to the whole of the pension scheme, and even if it were to be multiplied four-fold to allow for any population variation (that is, more vegans amongst those who work for universities and therefore more vegans amongst those eligible to join the Scheme) this is still far from meeting the standard required that all scheme members share their concern.

[25]Also, the claimant admitted that there exists no ethical vegan pension fund at present. They are in the process of being established. It is therefore not possible for the second respondent, even if it felt able to, to offer employees the chance to invest in such a scheme as none currently exist. It would therefore be impossible to calculate how financially risky such a scheme may be, and therefore impossible to satisfy the other test for non-financial concerns to be taken into account which is that the non-financial factor would not cause a significant risk of financial detriment. (Harries v Church Commissioners for England

[1992] 1 WLR 1241

[26]I therefore conclude that the case against the second respondent has no reasonable prospect of success. The second respondent does not discriminate (so far as the Equality Act is concerned) against the claimant or other ethical vegans by following the provisions of the Pensions Act 1995 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005. It must follow these provisions. The very limited circumstances in which it may choose to depart from financial concerns have no reasonable prospect of being established in the claimant’s case.

[27]For completeness, I also agree with the second respondent that “ethical” and “non-ethical” investment decisions are not clearly understood or universally agreed terms, but are value judgments that mean vastly different things to different people. This is therefore not a neutral “practice” or “provision” capable of being a PCP as is required by an indirect discrimination claim.

[28]Finally, I also agree with the second respondent that auto-enrolment in a pension scheme by them is not a PCP that was “applied” to the claimant. As soon as an individual such as the claimant becomes an employee of the first respondent, they are automatically enrolled because of the Pensions Act 2008. This is not the application of a PCP by the second respondent and so the second respondent cannot be liable for indirect discrimination. The first respondent’s application for strike out

[29]The first respondent applies on the basis that the claim is primarily out of time in that the claimant opted out in July 2023 but did not approach ACAS until 16 February 2024 and presented his claim on 24 May 2024. His claim is therefore substantially outside the three-month time limit and I agree with the first respondent that the relevant date from which time should run should be July 2023, not as an ongoing act (as the claimant alleges), in that he says he had to implicitly opt-out with every pay cheque. It is not an ongoing act, but an act with ongoing consequences and so time starts to run from the date of opt-out, not the date of the last of the monthly consequences.

[30]However, it would be possible for the Tribunal to consider whether to allow the claimant an extension of time to bring his claims on a “just and equitable” basis. Part of any such consideration involves the Tribunal looking at the potential merits of the case, as there is no point in extending time if a claim is bound to fail.

[31]Considering the merits of the claim against the first respondent, they state that the justification defence will be made out. Therefore, the claim is bound to fail. This is because the Scheme allows a binary choice only – universities must use the Scheme only for their employees or not use the Scheme at all. It is not possible to offer pension provisions to employees using any other schemes or else none of the university staff would be able to use the Scheme. Leaving aside the separate point as to whether ethical vegan pension schemes exist at present, the first respondent says that denying approximately 98% of its staff the benefit of enrolling in the Scheme to satisfy the approximately 2% of vegans who may want a different scheme is not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Even then, the first respondent’s Equality Impact Assessment results suggest that some of the first respondent’s employees who are ethical vegans do not share the claimant’s objections to the Scheme investment policies and therefore the proportion of affected employees may be even smaller than 2%.

[32]The first respondent points to the benefit to its staff of membership of the Scheme, given the size of the Scheme and its affordability to the first respondent. It was said during the hearing that “the first respondent could not prudently go anywhere else than the second respondent” for its workplace pension provision. The claimant’s reply to the respondents’ applications

[33]The claimant has conducted his own survey and has obtained a statistician’s letter as evidence. However, the statistician’s letter is not limited to university employees and so does not assist in showing group disadvantage amongst those who are members of the Scheme. The claimant has also requested that the respondents provide statistical information as to why people (either from the first respondent’s workforce or from the second respondent’s Scheme membership) opt out or move away from the Scheme. The data disclosed by both respondents does not assist him - in fact it appears to show that only the claimant has left the scheme because of ethical veganism. Also the survey conducted privately by him does not assist in showing group disadvantage to ethical vegans amongst the first respondent’s workforce in that it asks the question of members of the public whether they want a “plant based pension”. This is not the same as asking whether members of the first respondent’s staff feel unable to participate in the Scheme.

[34]The claimant has researched whether any “plant based” or other schemes suitable for ethical vegans are available. They are currently not. What is available is a SIPP, a self-invested personal pension fund, but this would offend the Scheme exclusivity rule. The claimant speculates as to whether a suitable fund may become available in the future and referred to the “VEGM” fund that would appear to be in development. However, even if his claim is limited to the defined benefit part of the Scheme, if no such fund existed at the time he was an employee of the first respondent it is impossible to see how such a fund could have been offered to him, or how (even if they had the discretion to) the trustees could have devised such a scheme for him to use.

[35]The claimant was given time after the hearing concluded to respond to the point made by the respondents about Schedule 22 of the Equality Act 2010. He provided me with a set of written arguments, which I have considered. The second respondent provided a short reply, which I have also considered. The claimant argues that the second respondent, because its trustees had some discretion (i.e. in the limited circumstances set out above) then the “defence” in Schedule 22 falls away. Respectfully I do not agree with this interpretation. The discretion that the second respondent’s trustees have is extremely limited, as is described above.

[36]The claimant relies on s61 Equality Act 2010 in his reply, and London Fire Commissioner and others v Sargeant and others

[2021] All ER 75

where it was held that schedule 22 of the Act did not provide the employer with a defence to the employees’ claims for age discrimination in the operation of the pension scheme. This held that if there are provisions in the pension scheme which oblige them to act in a discriminatory way, s61 is to be prioritised as an obligation over those other provisions in the pension scheme such that the discriminatory provisions do not apply.

[37]However, the application of s61 is not as straightforward as this in the claimant’s case. There is no provision of the Scheme that requires the trustees to commit an act of discrimination against ethical vegans and furthermore, the claimant’s request is that the trustees create an alternative pension scheme that is outside the trustees’ powers in the existing scheme. Finally, the requirement of the Scheme that the trustees prioritise financial matters over non-financial matters is not something that equates to an act of discrimination against ethical vegans per se.

[38]The claimant refers to the existence of the Sharia fund demonstrating the “feasibility…. of offering funds that conform to belief-based criteria, removing practical escape routes R1 and R2 might otherwise allege”.

[39]The Sharia fund is only part of the smaller defined contribution part of the Scheme offered by the second respondent which is comprised of several existing schemes already available on the general investment market and selected by the second respondent to be offered as an “Investment Builder” option as part of the defined contribution element of the scheme.

[40]Furthermore, the ability of the second respondent to offer a vegan-suitable scheme is dependent on the fact that there is simply no vegan pension scheme available on the market for the second respondent to offer and the second respondent does not, as part of its function, create defined contribution schemes to offer to members. It would therefore not be able to offer an existing vegan scheme (as there are none) nor create one itself. The “feasibility” of offering such a fund is therefore an entirely theoretical concept at present. The claimant says “I am asking that the Trustees set up a fund to meet my needs”. This is not part of their function.

[41]Finally, the second respondent notes, if the claimant’s complaints are now limited to the failure to provide a vegan pension as part of the defined contribution element of the scheme, any disadvantage by such a failure could have been avoided by the claimant by withdrawing his contributions to the “Investment Builder” part of the scheme (the defined contribution element) and by leaving his contributions in the defined benefit section of the scheme, to which he does not now appear to object.

[42]The claimant told me that the key point in this case was not statistical evidence, or legal argument, but “the morality of the issue”. I told him, and I repeat that here for the record, that this is not the primary consideration. The Tribunal must apply the law as it currently stands, not as a claimant may wish it to be. If the claimant wishes to see a change in the law, it is for him to approach his MP or consider another way of influencing those who make the law. Summary and conclusion – in plain English

[43]As the law currently stands, and as I must apply it, the claim has no reasonable prospect of success as against the first respondent or the second respondent. It is therefore struck out. It has no hope of success. I understand that the claimant feels very strongly about this issue. That is unfortunately not of itself a strong enough reason to reach a different conclusion about how the law applies to his case.

[44]The Scheme does not provide a vegan fund as part of the defined contribution “Investment Builder” section. This is because one does not currently exist, and the trustees’ function does not include setting up pension schemes as part of the Investment Builder section.

[45]In relation to the first respondent, to offer the claimant a vegan pension scheme or the ability to invest himself (through a SIPP) would mean that none of the rest of the first respondent’s staff would be able to join the Scheme, due to the exclusivity rule in the Scheme rules. The first respondent’s evidence suggests that the claimant is the only member of its staff to have withdrawn from the Scheme due to ethical veganism. Taking his case at its highest, even if there are 2% or more members of the first respondent’s staff who think as he does and withdraw from the Scheme because it is not suitable for vegans, it is still a disproportionate measure to exclude the other 98% or so of the workforce on that basis. There is therefore no reasonable prospect of him being able to establish that the first respondent’s continued enrolment of staff into the Scheme, despite the lack of a vegan suitable scheme, was unreasonable (that is “not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”).

[46]In relation to the second respondent, its investment duties in relation to the Scheme are heavily prescribed by law and its discretion is very narrow and limited. The circumstances in which trustees may consider non-financial factors in investment decisions do not arise in the claimant’s case. If they are acting in accordance with statutory obligations (as they are in the Scheme’s case), they cannot be acting in a discriminatory manner due to the operation of Schedule 22 of the Equality Act 2010. Furthermore, no vegan-suitable fund is offered as part of the Investment Builder section of the Scheme as no such fund exists, and the trustees’ function does not extend to creating pension schemes from scratch. The case is therefore dismissed. Approved by:

[1]The claimant applied for reconsideration of the dismissal judgment on 16 January 2026. As set out in Rule 70(1) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 (“the ET Rules”), the Tribunal must consider any application made for reconsideration. As set out in Rule 70(2), if the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked, the application must be refused.

[2]The claimant’s application for reconsideration runs to 19 pages and 103 paragraphs. There are fifteen grounds of reconsideration. I have used the claimant’s descriptors for each but have used a numerical identification system for clarity. They will be dealt with in turn.

[3]There is a public policy principle that there should be finality in litigation. Reconsiderations are exceptions to the rule that employment tribunal decisions should not be reopened and relitigated. It is not a way in which a disappointed party can simply have a second attempt at success. In Stevenson v Golden Wonder Ltd

1977 IRLR 474

, EAT, reconsideration is ‘not intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence can be rehearsed with different emphasis, or further evidence adduced which was available before’.

[4]Under rule 68 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, a judgment will only be reconsidered where it is ‘necessary in the interests of justice to do so’. This does not mean that in every case where a litigant is unsuccessful, they are automatically entitled to a reconsideration. A tribunal must consider the overriding objective to deal with cases ‘fairly and justly’ (rule 3) in the interests of both parties.

[5]Reconsideration of a judgment may be necessary in the interests of justice if there is new evidence that was not available to the tribunal at the time it made its judgment. In order to justify the introduction of fresh evidence, it is necessary to show:a. that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the original hearing

b. that the evidence is relevant and would probably have had an important influence on the hearing; and

c. that the evidence is apparently credible (Ladd v Marshall

1954 3 All ER 745

, CA). Ground 1 - Failure to use the Latest Formulation of the PCPs

[6]The list of issues for the Tribunal to decide were set out in a List of Issues by EJ Cookson following the case management preliminary hearing on 16 December 2024. The claimant told EJ Cookson that the list was full of “legalese”, and he did not agree to it. He submitted his own document on 11 July 2025. I considered both the Tribunal’s list of issues and the claimant’s document as part of the decision on strike out.

[7]The claimant claimed indirect discrimination on the basis of his belief in ethical veganism against both respondents. - The PCP against the first respondent, the University of Manchester (R1)

[8]The provision, criterion or practice (“PCP”) said in the List of Issues to have been applied by the first respondent to the claimant is “All eligible UoM employees are auto-enrolled in the same pension scheme (USS)” and that the substantial disadvantage suffered was that “ethical vegans are at a particular disadvantage when compared with non ethical vegans in that the claimant alleges that the second respondent makes non-ethical investment decisions forcing him to make the decision to opt out of the occupational pension.”

[9]In a document submitted on 11 July 2025 the claimant clarified the PCP against R1 as being: "University of Manchester employees are required to participate in the USS pension scheme, which does not offer an option to avoid investments in companies or sectors whose activities conflict with ethical vegan beliefs."

[10]The claimant’s reconsideration request at paragraphs 6-10c argues that the strike out judgment failed to use this later formulation of the PCP because it describes the PCP as containing “vague, subjective concepts incapable of being a PCP” (paragraph 6).

[11]Paragraph 27 of the strike-out judgment says (in relation to the claims against R2 (not R1) that, although the strike-out was ordered for other reasons (set out at paragraphs 24-26) “for completeness, I also agree with the second respondent that “ethical” and “non-ethical” investment decisions are… value judgments that mean vastly different things to different people. This is therefore not a neutral “practice” or “provision” capable of being a PCP…”

[12]In relation to the claim against the first respondent, this was struck out (as summarised at paragraph 45 of the strike-out judgment) because there was no reasonable prospect of R1 not being able to show that requiring all of its workforce to participate in R2’s scheme is a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of providing R2’s pension opportunities to R1’s staff – were they to allow some staff to join other schemes, none of R1’s staff would be able to participate. This takes the claimant’s initial case at its highest as it assumes that the claimant’s case succeeded on the allegation that the PCP against R1 puts ethical vegans at a particular disadvantage.

[13]Therefore in relation to R1 there is no reasonable prospect of the decision being varied or revoked, on the basis of the formulation of the PCP as argued by the claimant in the reconsideration application. This was not the reason for the strike-out of the claim against R1. - The PCP against the second respondent, the Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited (R2)

[14]The provision, criterion or practice (“PCP”) said in the List of Issues to have been applied by the second respondent to the claimant is “Rule 45 of the USS Scheme Rules contains an exclusivity provision which means the First Respondent cannot offer alternative occupational pension provision to eligible staff” and that the substantial disadvantage suffered was that “the claimant alleges that the Second Respondent makes non-ethical investment decisions.”

[15]In the document submitted on 11 July 2025 the claimant clarified the PCP against R2 as being: "USS contractually require exclusivity with the university – the university cannot offer other pension provisions” and “the Defined Contribution (DC) section of the pension scheme does not offer an investment option that excludes companies involved in animal exploitation thereby making it unsuitable for members with a belief in ethical veganism”

[16]The claimant’s reconsideration request at paragraphs 6-10c argues that the strike out judgment failed to use this later formulation of the PCP because it describes the PCP as containing “vague, subjective concepts incapable of being a PCP” (paragraph 6). As set out above, paragraph 27 of the strike-out judgment says in relation to the claims against R2 that, although the strike-out was ordered for other reasons (set out at paragraphs 24-26), “for completeness, I also agree with the second respondent that “ethical” and “non-ethical” investment decisions are… value judgments that mean vastly different things to different people. This is therefore not a neutral “practice” or “provision” capable of being a PCP…”

[17]Therefore in relation to R2 there is no reasonable prospect of the decision being varied or revoked, on the basis of the formulation of the PCP. This was not the reason for the strike-out of the claim against R2. The reason for the strike out against R2 was summarised in paragraph 46 of the judgment, which states: “In relation to the second respondent, its investment duties in relation to the Scheme are heavily prescribed by law and its discretion is very narrow and limited. The circumstances in which trustees may consider non-financial factors in investment decisions do not arise in the claimant’s case. If they are acting in accordance with statutory obligations (as they are in the Scheme’s case), they cannot be acting in a discriminatory manner due to the operation of Schedule 22 of the Equality Act 2010. Furthermore, no vegan-suitable fund is offered as part of the Investment Builder section of the Scheme as no such fund exists, and the trustees’ function does not extend to creating pension schemes from scratch.” Ground 2 – “Fund vs Scheme – Mischaracterising the Scope of the Complaint”

[18]This ground for reconsideration is, in summary, that the Tribunal did not appreciate that the claimant’s request was for “a vegan friendly fund – not to be confused with the veganising of the entire pension scheme”.

[19]The claimant states in his reconsideration application that the Tribunal has misunderstood his complaints “and treated it as a challenge to the entire scheme and DB [defined benefit] section, when my case was focused on DC fund-level options and other workable alternatives.”

[20]The claimant wrote in his document of 11 July 2025 “the failure of the pension scheme to offer a vegan friendly fund – not to be confused with veganising the entire pension scheme – means I cannot exercise my right as an employee to invest in the scheme for my retirement.”

[21]This appears to be misconceived. As was noted by R2’s counsel during the hearing, it is possible to leave an individual’s entire pension savings in the DB scheme and to make no investments in the DC schemes. If the claimant’s complaint is not with the DB section, but only with the DC section, investing in the DB section must therefore be acceptable to the claimant, despite it being inherently not a “vegan friendly fund”. The claimant’s argument in this regard appears to be inherently contradictory. Therefore, the claimant’s assertion that “the failure… means I cannot exercise my right as an employee to invest in the scheme for my retirement” cannot be correct. He can invest for his retirement in the DB scheme, which he has no issue with. The apparent acceptability of the DB scheme contradicts the assertion that the claimant was obliged to withdraw from auto-enrolment altogether and if the DB scheme was acceptable all along, it is entirely unclear why he did withdraw from it.

[22]This is why both the Tribunal, and the respondents did not understand the claimant’s case to be only that the absence of a “vegan friendly” DC fund was a problem, as it is somewhat counter-intuitive when considered in the context of the rest of the claim.

[23]Nevertheless, even if the case proceeded only on the basis that the absence of a “vegan friendly” DC scheme was indirect discrimination, the problem nevertheless remains that no fund exists which clearly meets the definition of “vegan”. No such fund exists which is capable of being objectively identified as being acceptable to vegans or certified for example by the Vegan Society. This was already considered in the strike-out judgment.

[24]The claimant says on reconsideration that seemingly a more general “low risk” scheme would be acceptable, but this was not an argument before the Tribunal at the hearing. This is not new evidence – this argument could have been put to the Tribunal at the hearing. However, even if this is considered by the Tribunal, this still leaves the issue of what exactly constitutes a low-risk veganfriendly fund, and how it would be defined. For example, low-risk investments include corporate bonds (that is, loans to established companies). But not all established companies are vegan-friendly. Some profit from factory farming, animal testing and so on. How “vegan friendly” would the companies need to be? Which industry sectors would need to be avoided? This is not clear, and it is not self-explanatory.

[25]The claimant refers to gilts as being another acceptable investment vehicle, but these are government bonds and do not differentiate between different government sectors. They are used to finance general public spending and so may be involved in funding, for example, grants or loans to those involved in factory farming.

[26]The claimant objects to being required to be specific in this way, both in his claim, at the first case management hearing, in his further pleadings and in his reconsideration request. But without such specificity, assessing whether or not what he says the respondents should do is proportionate and reasonable is extremely difficult to assess. He cannot name any particular funds in existence that would meet his requirements. He cannot be more specific about what such a fund would need to avoid, or need to include, to meet his requirements. R2’s trustees’ function does not extend to creating pension schemes from scratch.

[27]In relation to this ground, there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked. Ground 3 – “Fundamental Error 2 – Misapplication of EQA 2010 Sch 22 and Pensions Legislation to R2 – Over-Broad Use of Schedule 22, Paragraph 11 EQA 2010”

[28]The claimant’s application for reconsideration on this ground is based on the assertion that the statutory investment framework that R2’s trustees must abide by is nevertheless still subservient to the requirements of the Equality Act 2010. The reconsideration request notes at paragraph 20 “they do not relieve trustees from equality and human-rights norms when designing optimal funds where members bear the consequences of their own choice.”

[29]Firstly, R2’s trustees have no obligation to “design… funds” for the DC section of the scheme.

[30]Secondly, “equality and human-rights” issues, which fall within the category of “non-financial factors”, can be considered (as per Butler-Sloss v The Charity Commission) but only if enough scheme members share the non-financial concern and only if the trustees’ financial investment obligations are not compromised.

[31]Therefore the “equality and human rights” issues are indeed secondary to financial factors, according to the statutory regime. The claimant makes the argument again, but this issue was addressed in the hearing and in Tribunal’s judgment and I am provided with no new information or argument that was not before the Tribunal prior to the judgment being issued.

[32]In relation to the argument that R2 is not prohibited from “offering additional belief aligned funds, provided they meet standard financial criteria”, this was addressed by the judgment. It was not denied by R2 that a Sharia fund is offered as part of the DC section of its scheme and which meets “standard financial criteria”. No comparable fund exists that is clearly defined as meeting “vegan criteria”, nor has a definition of “vegan criteria” been provided to the Tribunal or the respondents.

[33]The claimant also alleges that the Tribunal did not address s61 Equality Act 2010 in the judgment, however the Tribunal’s reasoning on this is at paragraphs 36 and 37 of the judgment.

[34]There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked on Ground 4 – “No Vegan Fund Exists” and “Impossible to Calculate Risk”

[35]The claimant states at paragraph 25 of his application that it is “factually wrong” that no “vegan pension fund” exists. The claimant expressly told me during the strike-out hearing that no bespoke vegan pension fund existed. This is recorded in paragraph 34 of the judgment. He also expressly told the Tribunal that the vegan “VEGM” fund was in development, which is also recorded in paragraph 34.

[36]With respect to the claimant, he seeks in paragraphs 24-28 to change the factual basis of his claim from the claim that was before the Tribunal at the strike-out hearing. His claim did not at any point refer to this prior to this reconsideration application. He now says that he does not require a bespoke “plant friendly” or “vegan” pension scheme, but that he would be satisfied with “implicitly vegan-compatible funds” such as gilts or other low-risk investments. This is not what was understood by EJ Cookson, or what was contained in is document of 11 July 2025, which makes repeated reference to establishing a vegan-friendly fund.

[37]The claimant makes an assertion in paragraph 25 of his reconsideration application that “both a DC option using existing low-risk assets or a mainstream ESG/exclusionary fund that meets vegan criteria would be compatible with those duties” meaning the trustees’ duties not to expose members to financial risk by their investments (as discussed in Harries v Church Commissioners for England

[1992] 1 WLR 1241

). However, this is an assumption not supported by any evidence or argument other than this bare assertion. That argument was also not before the Tribunal at the hearing, but could have been.

[38]The claimant continues at paragraph 28 to say that the question for the Tribunal should have been whether R2 “could” offer a fund that would satisfy ethical vegans, saying “it is clearly arguable that such a fund could exist and that trustees could at least examine it”. This would appear to return to an acknowledgement that the claimant cannot say that such a fund as would satisfy his ethical vegan beliefs exists in any more than a speculative or theoretical way, which was an issue already before the Tribunal at the last hearing.

[39]There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked on Ground 5 “Fundamental Error 3 – Mishandling of Time Limits, Continuing Acts and Just and Equitable Extension”.

[40]The claimant repeats his argument that the Tribunal should have classed his opt-out from the R2 pension scheme as an ongoing act rather than a single act with ongoing consequences. However, the issue of whether or not the claim was in time was taken at its highest by the Tribunal in the strike-out judgment. Had the Tribunal considered that the claims had any prospect of success, it would have considered the issue of time limits and jurisdiction. This is clarified in paragraph 30 of the strike-out judgment. In the circumstances, as the Tribunal concluded that the claims were bound to fail on the merits, it did not go on to consider the issue of time limits.

[41]There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked on Ground 6 “Fundamental Error 4 – Ignoring or Mischaracterising Alternatives and Proportionality (R1 & R2)”

[42]This ground of reconsideration seeks to question the existence and lawfulness of R2’s exclusivity provision. He says that “contractual arrangements between R1 and R2 cannot lawfully extinguish my Equality Act and Human Rights”.

[43]The lawfulness of R2’s scheme in the context of discrimination on the basis of religion and belief has already been addressed in paragraphs 20 to 23 of the judgment. The claimant repeats the arguments that were already before the Tribunal in this ground of reconsideration.

[44]The argument about “special circumstances” in R2’s pension scheme was said to be used by the Tribunal in its reasoning, but this point is not understood and no such argument was included in the judgment.

[45]The claimant seeks to put the responsibility on R1 and R2 to invoke the special circumstances exemption by saying in his document of 11 July “the onus is on USS to ensure its scheme is compliant with equality law and to have mechanisms for accommodating protected beliefs. A member should not be required to navigate opaque or burdensome processes to secure basic nondiscriminatory treatment”. R2’s grounds of resistance note that R2’s trustees could in theory have used a “special circumstances” exemption, but the claimant did not put them on notice of his concerns at the time he withdrew from the pension scheme. Furthermore, as was already before the Tribunal at the last hearing, in any event discretion remains with the trustees as to what discretion they exercise in line with their fiduciary duties, even had the claimant put R2’s trustees on notice of his concerns at the time he withdrew from the scheme.

[46]The alternatives he suggests were already before the Tribunal. The SIPP option was taken into account in paragraphs 34 and 45. The “tax efficient cash in lieu alternative” is substantively the same as a SIPP and if not, the claimant does not specify what or how this would function any differently from a SIPP.

[47]Taking all these issues into account, there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked based on this ground of reconsideration. Ground 7 – Group Disadvantage and Survey Evidence

[48]This ground of reconsideration disagrees with the conclusions reached by the Tribunal in paragraph 33 of the judgment.

[49]It contains no new argument or evidence that was not before the Tribunal at the hearing.

[50]There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked on Ground 8 – Failure to take the case at its highest and overuse of strike out

[51]This ground of reconsideration disagrees with the conclusions reached by the Tribunal in paragraphs 43-46 of the judgment.

[52]It contains no new argument or evidence that was not before the Tribunal at the hearing.

[53]There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked on Ground 9 – Error in Paragraph 41 – Tribunal Treating the Discriminatory Outcome as a “Solution”

[54]This ground of reconsideration appears to relate to being deprived of the benefit of participating in the DC section of the scheme due to the absence of “vegan friendly” DC options.

[55]Paragraph 41 was not a finding of the Tribunal but was a description of submissions by R2 in response to the claimant’s arguments that are set out before paragraph 41. This is therefore not an “error” of the Tribunal.

[56]The Tribunal’s reasoning regarding placing the claimant’s pension contributions in the DB section of the scheme, was said in relation to the claimant’s argument that the lack of any “vegan friendly” fund meant that he could not participate in the scheme at all. This is discussed in this judgment in relation to Ground 2.

[57]The claimant’s ground 8 of reconsideration at paragraph 52 of his application appears to repeat the argument in relation to Ground 2, which is that because there was no DC vegan-friendly option, he was forced to withdraw from the pension scheme altogether. Paragraph 41 records that the respondent identified that this was factually incorrect. Paragraph 53 of the claimant’s application suggests that he has either misunderstood the operation of R2’s scheme or misunderstood paragraph 41, or possibly both. He states: “the suggestion that I could simply withdraw [my] contributions essentially says that I could avoid discrimination by accepting the disadvantage – ie by choosing the option (loss of contributions) that constitutes the less favourable treatment.”

[58]Paragraph 41 refers to not investing in the DC section of the scheme. Any contributions into R2’s scheme as a whole, made by the claimant, or by R1 on the claimant’s behalf, would not be lost if no investment was made in the DC section of the scheme. On the contrary, the contributions would all be put into the DB section of the scheme, to which the claimant does not seem to object.

[59]In any event, the conclusions of the Tribunal were not affected by this issue, which was that R2 was not obliged to consider non-financial investment factors in relation to the claimant, including in relation to beliefs otherwise protected by the Equality Act, and in any event would have been prevented from providing him with what he wished for, given that no such fund exists and there was no obligation to create one for him.

[60]There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked on Ground 10 – Rule 45 Exclusivity/Waiver is itself a PCP applied to me

[61]The claimant again asserts that the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 should be given prominence over the rules of R2’s scheme. This was an argument that was before the Tribunal at the hearing. The claimant repeats it in his reconsideration application.

[62]As has been established, R2’s exclusivity rule, and indeed other rules of R2’s scheme regarding investment decisions, are subject to a framework of statutory and fiduciary obligations on R2’s trustees. The claimant refers to s61 Equality Act 2010 and the London Fire Commissioner case which is dealt with in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the judgment. I repeat here for the purposes of clarity – the London Fire Commissioner case concerned provisions of a pension scheme that required trustees to act in a discriminatory way in relation to the provision of pension benefits at certain ages. This is not the same as trustees being obliged to prioritise financial considerations over non-financial considerations in relation to investment decisions. The Equality Act does not act in a way that fetters trustees’ investment decisions, unless the limited circumstances in the Butler-Sloss and Harries cases apply (as discussed in paragraph 23 of the decision).

[63]It is therefore a misconceived argument that the exclusivity provision of R2’s trust deed is a PCP that is applied to the claimant. There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked on the basis of this ground of reconsideration. Grounds 11-15 inclusive

[64]The following grounds of reconsideration cover a number of different issues. Most of these issues relate to the fairness of the hearing. It is apparent that the claimant feels that he has not been given a fair hearing.

[65]Strike out of a claim is a permissible case management action under the Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024, rule 38. A decision to strike out a claim is not automatically evidence of unfairness or bias. There are a number of strong arguments in favour of R1 and R2 in this case that taken together mean that, in layman’s terms, the respondents’ defence of the claimant’s claims is unusually robust. This does not mean that the claimant’s arguments have not been carefully considered, or that he has not been given a fair hearing. The claimant’s status as a litigant in person

[66]I am aware of the provisions of the Equal Treatment Bench Book (“ETBB”) concerning litigants in person. The Introduction, paragraph 15, notes the following: “Judges should try to put themselves in the position of those appearing before them. An appearance before a court or tribunal is a daunting and unnerving experience. As a result, parties and witnesses may appear belligerent, hostile, rude, confused or emotional. A possible consequence is that they may not give a good account of themselves. The court or tribunal should endeavour to put them at their ease to enable them to do so. The more information and advice that is available before the hearing, the easier this will be to achieve.”

[67]Paragraph 18 also states: “Lay people may not understand legal jargon and technical terms (“disclosure”, “directions”, “application for permission to apply”), so judges should keep language as simple as possible, and should give clear explanations where required.”

[68]During the hearing and also in the written judgment, I tried to accommodate the claimant’s request for plain English as far as possible, where this was compatible with a properly reasoned judgment. I also tried to take a proportionate approach to the claimant’s hostility towards the respondents’ representatives.

[69]Chapter 1 of the ETBB notes the following, in paragraph 18, “Ways to help” “The aim is to ensure that LIPs understand what is going on and what is expected of them at all stages of the proceedings. This means ensuring that:• The process is (or has been) explained to them in a manner that they can understand.

• They have access to appropriate information (eg the rules, Practice Directions and guidelines – whether from publications or websites).

• They are informed about what is expected of them in ample time for them to prepare and comply.

• Wherever possible, they are given sufficient time for their needs.”

[70]Paragraphs 1,10, 11 and 12 of the judgment describe the issues in the hearing that were considered by me. As noted, the claimant did not want to listen to, or read, the respondents’ applications for strike-out. He had received them and a bundle of documents and a bundle of authorities in advance but told me he had not engaged with them at all. I informed him that he did not need to read the authorities and I would not have expected a litigant in person to do so, and he would not be prejudiced by not having done so. However, I urged him to consider what the respondents were saying in their applications, so that he could let me know what he wanted to say in response. He did not do so. He had brought this claim and it was important that he engaged with the respondents’ arguments about it. It was not possible for me to do so on his behalf – I cannot act as his legal representative. Despite his nervousness, it was important that he at least tried to engage with the arguments being made and I tried to facilitate that he did so.

[71]For this reason, during the hearing I invited the respondents’ representatives to make their submissions orally to the Tribunal (so that the claimant could listen to them) and asked them to be mindful of the claimant’s requirement for plain English. R1’s counsel’s submissions were (in my view) expressed in a straightforward way, without legal language and did not require any further explanation from me. R2’s submissions contained far more legal language and I did intervene to try as far as possible to re-phrase these in plain English. This is not to criticise R2; their arguments were primarily jurisdictional and inevitably involved more legal language than R1’s. Neurodiversity

[72]There is also extensive guidance concerning litigants who are neurodiverse in the ETBB, including in relation to autistic people, and what adjustments might be helpful. This claim has had somewhat complicated case management, which was done to accommodate the claimant’s neurodiversity. EJ Cookson attempted to draw up an agreed List of Issues with the claimant at the previous case management hearing and he refused to agree to it because it contained legal language. EJ Cookson had given the claimant a clear explanation of why legal language may be required nonetheless and this is recorded in her case management orders.

[73]The claimant had been told in detail by EJ Cookson as part of her case management orders following the hearing on 16 December 2024, what would happen at the next hearing. The respondents were ordered to set out in writing full details of their strike out applications in good time (by 28 March 2025).

[74]He had notified EJ Cookson at the case management hearing on 16 December 2024 that he would make an application for anonymity, and she had given him a clear explanation of what such an application would involve and what evidence he may need to present, including medical evidence. The claimant strongly objected to the respondents being able to make representations on his application for anonymity and referred to this as bullying. He also strongly objected to being asked to provide medical evidence as to why the order was necessary.

[75]At the hearing on 18 July 2025 the claimant applied for an anonymisation order, without medical evidence. He disagreed again in the strongest terms that he should have to provide any medical evidence. He refused to allow the respondents to see it, if even if he were to provide it. The claimant told the Tribunal that the need for medical evidence was offensive to him and that this requirement was a debasement of him.

[76]Complex and careful case management orders were made to allow the claimant to submit medical evidence in the case management orders of 20 August 2025. The claimant was allowed to submit the evidence to me first. If I did not consider that the respondents needed to see it and comment on it, it would not be sent to them. If they did need to see it, I would write to the claimant first to allow him to consider whether to withdraw his application instead. Only then would any decision be made. The claimant was informed that the process being adopted was unusual. The respondents made no objection to this approach, for which the Tribunal was grateful.

[77]I understood during the hearing on 18 July 2025 that the claimant was extremely anxious. I also understood that the claimant (because he had written this in his ET1 claim form) had a “very low tolerance of bureaucracy” and an intolerance of legal language.

[78]The claimant was allowed to make written submissions after the hearing for me to consider, which he did. He wrote to me a number of times after the hearing, not copying in the respondents to the correspondence. His correspondence dealt in part with the claimant’s broader views on the legal profession and the courts and tribunals system, and I considered that given that this did not amount to any applications or submissions in relation to the instant case, the respondents did not need to be asked to comment on it.

[79]Turning to the remaining grounds for reconsideration in turn:

[80]Ground 11 – “Ethical Veganism, Morality and the Scope of the Tribunal’s role”. The issue of the relevance of morals and morality has already been addressed in the judgment at paragraph 42.

[81]Ground 12 – “Impact of representation imbalance on case progression”. The claimant alleges that the Tribunal allowed the respondents to skew the presentation of the case into a “narrower, more strike-out friendly characterisation of the case”. Another perspective on the same issue may be to say that the respondents responded to the pertinent legal issues in the claim and did not engage with the wider, non-legal arguments. The claimant hints that this may have been due to collusion by the Tribunal in paragraphs 72 and 73 of his application. The Tribunal must conduct cases in accordance with Rule 3 of the ET Rules of Procedure 2024, which states: Overriding objective 3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable— (a)ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, (b)dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues…. [………………..]”

[82]Parties and their representatives have a duty to the Tribunal to assist with this. Where the respondents have identified the relevant legal issues (for both the claimant and the respondents) and addressed the Tribunal on them, this is not an act of collusion to deprive the claimant of all of his issues (including nonlegal/ “moral” issues) being addressed, if they are not issues for which the Tribunal can provide him with a remedy.

[83]Ground 13 – “Systemic barriers, tactics and access to justice”. The claimant disagrees with the conclusions reached by the Tribunal in his case. That is understood. In this ground of reconsideration, he seeks to assert that the Tribunal failed to provide him with a fair hearing or with access to justice because the respondents provided him with a bundle of authorities, applied for strike out of his claims, and engaged in the tactic of “running a technical out of time point” against him.

[84]As was explained to the claimant during the hearing, the respondents are entitled to legal representation and are entitled to address the Tribunal on points arising in the claim. They are entitled to put forward a defence of the claim in relation to time limits, and they are entitled to apply for strike-out in the way they did.

[85]Ground 14 – Failure to ensure equality of arms and effective participation. The claimant takes issue with the Tribunal noting that earlier in the proceedings, and at the hearing, he had refused to read, comment on or otherwise engage with materials or arguments that contained any legal language. However, this is a factual statement of what happened.

[86]It is important that it was recorded in the judgment because it is important that anyone reading the judgment understands that this presented potential difficulties during the hearing and it explains why certain adjustments were made to accommodate this. It is also important to note that the lack of engagement was not because of a lack of an ability to engage, because if the issue was the claimant’s capacity to understand, different adjustments would have been made. The Tribunal notes that the claimant’s intellectual ability to engage with legal arguments is demonstrated by the quantity of legal arguments in his reconsideration application and the depth of analysis provided by him in that document.

[87]Ground 15 “Duty to assist with neutral PCP formulation for a self- represented claimant”. The issue of the PCP and its relevance to the strike- out decision has already been discussed earlier in this judgment in relation to Ground 1. Had the PCPs been critical to this decision, or had the claim continued to another hearing, these would have been discussed further with the claimant.

Conclusion

[88]Having considered all of the points raised in the claimant’s reconsideration application, there is no reasonable prospect of the strike-out decision being varied or revoked against either respondent and for that reason, the application is refused. Approved by