Mr R P Gill v Group Employment Services Ltd: 8000543/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8000543/2025
Between
Mr R P GillClaimantGroup Employment Services LimitedRespondent
Before
Employment Judge J McCluskeyMr R Lyons for respondentConsultant for respondentDate 28 November 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaint of indirect religion or belief discrimination about an allegation said to have occurred on or around 6 May 2024 was not presented within the applicable time limit but it is just and equitable to extend the time limit. This complaint will therefore proceed.[2]The application to strike out the complaint of direct religion or belief discrimination about non-payment of bonus said to have occurred on or around 10 December 2024 is refused.[3]The application for a deposit order as a condition of continuing to advance the complaint of direct religion or belief discrimination about non-payment of bonus said to have occurred on or around 10 December 2024 is refused.
REASONS
Introduction
[1]There was a case management preliminary hearing on 1 May 2025. At that hearing the case was listed for a public preliminary hearing on 10 July 2025 to determine time bar in relation to the complaint of indirect religion or belief discrimination said by the claimant to have occurred on 6 June 2024 - this was the date noted by EJ Hosie in the note of the case management hearing and sent to parties on 7 May 2025[2]At the same hearing on 1 May 2025, the respondent submitted that the second complaint made by the claimant, of direct religion or belief discrimination, about not receiving a bonus on 10 December 2024 should be struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success or alternatively the claimant should be ordered to pay a deposit as a condition of continuing with this complaint. EJ Hosie directed that these applications should also be determined at the hearing on 10 July 2025.[3]These are the only two complaints made by the respondent in his claim form.[4]The respondent prepared a file of productions extending to 106 pages. The claimant confirmed that he had a copy of the file and he accessed the file during the hearing.[5]At the hearing today the claimant gave evidence on his own behalf about the time bar matter. He was asked questions in cross examination by Mr Lyons. Thereafter, parties made short oral submissions. Mr Lyons referred to written submissions which he had sent to the Tribunal and to the claimant yesterday, which he relied upon. The claimant confirmed he had received these and the Tribunal also has a copy. Mr Lyons gave his submissions first followed by the claimant.[6]I advised that I was reserving my judgment in relation to time bar and would write to parties with my judgment and reasons.[7]After a break the Tribunal considered the respondent’s application for strike out of the second complaint, failing which a deposit order. No evidence was heard from parties about the prospect of this complaint succeeding. Both parties made short oral submissions. Mr Lyons referred to written submissions which he had sent to the Tribunal and to the claimant yesterday, which he relied upon. The claimant confirmed he had received these, and the Tribunal also has a copy. Again, Mr Lyons gave his submissions first followed by the claimant. Again, I advised parties I was reserving my judgment and would write to parties with my judgment and reasons. Findings in fact – time bar[8]The Tribunal made the following findings in fact, necessary to determine the issue of time bar.[9]The claimant is employed by the respondent in a security role. His employment started around April 2023 and is continuing. His place of work is at BP premises in Peterhead.[10]The claimant submitted a written complaint to the respondent on 10 December 2024. In that grievance he alleged that there had been a conversation between the claimant and his manager Mark Murphie by phone earlier that year during which Mr Murphie told the claimant that he would not be allowed to wear a turban on-site. the claimant wrote “Since that conversation, I have noticed a distinct change in my treatment....I have been denied opportunities and bonuses that my colleagues received”. The claimant referred to not receiving a bonus on 10 December 2024.[11]The respondent held a grievance meeting with the claimant on 16 December 2024. The claimant told the respondent he thought the phone call with Mr Murphie was on 28 July 2024, but he was not certain.[12]On 17 December 2024 the respondent wrote to the claimant. His grievance was not upheld.[13]On 23 December 2024 at a grievance appeal meeting, the claimant told the respondent that the date he had given of the phone call with Mr Murphie on 28 July 2024, was not correct. The claimant said the correct date was 5 June 2024. The claimant’s grievance appeal was not upheld.[14]The claimant participated in ACAS Early Conciliation between 17 January 2025 and 24 February 2025. He presented his claim to the Tribunal on 28 February 2025.[15]The claimant believed at the time of the phone call that what Mr Murphie had said to him was wrong and was discriminatory because of his Sikh religion or belief. But he feared being sacked and so decided to do nothing about it. He has a partner and a family to support. When he didn’t receive his bonus on 10 December 2024, he decided that he had to complain about both matters.[16]The claimant contacted ACAS for advice shortly after 10 December 2024. He did not seek any advice about bringing a claim in the Tribunal before then. He had decided to do nothing as he feared being sacked.[17]In the period between the phone call with Mr Murphie and presenting his claim in the Tribunal there were no issues with the claimant’s health. Observations on the evidence[18]At the hearing today, the claimant said he may have been mistaken as to the date previously given on which the phone call with Mr Murphie took place. The claimant checked his mobile phone during the hearing today and said he now believed the date of the call with Mr Murphie was 6 May 2024 but he could not be sure.[19]The 6 May 2024 date is noted here as a record of the date provided by the claimant today. Relevant law – time bar[20]Section 123(1) Equality Act 2010 (EqA) says “Subject to sections 140A and 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of –(a) the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or(b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable”.[21]The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish that it is just and equitable to extend time (Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] IRLR 434 CA).[22]In British Coal Corporation v Keeble IRLR 336 the EAT indicated that task of the Tribunal, when considering whether it is just and equitable to extend time, may be illuminated by considering section 33 Limitation Act 1980. This sets out a check list of potentially relevant factors, which may provide a prompt as to the crucial findings of fact upon which the discretion is exercised, such as(a) the length of and reasons for the delay:(b) the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay(c) the extent to which the party sued had cooperated(d) the promptness with which the claimant acted once they knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and(e) the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once they knew of the possibility of taking action.[23]In London Borough of Southwark v Afolabi [2003] IRLR 220 the Court of Appeal confirmed that, whilst that checklist provides a useful guide for Tribunals, it does not require to be followed slavishly. The Court of Appeal in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan [2018] EWCA Civ 640 confirmed this, stating that it was plain from the language used in s123 EqA (“such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just and equitable”) that Parliament chose to give Tribunals the widest possible discretion and it would be wrong to put a gloss on the words of the provision or to interpret it as if it contains such a list.[24]In Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23, the Court of Appeal approved the approach set out in Afolabi and Morgan and, at paragraph 37. Underhill LJ confirmed that rigid adherence to a checklist can lead to a mechanistic approach to what is meant to be a very broad general discretion. The best approach for a Tribunal in considering the exercise of the discretion under section 123(1)(b) is to assess all the factors in the case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time, including in particular “the length of, and the reasons for, the delay”. Discussion/decision – time bar[25]The date of the alleged discriminatory phone call with Mr Murphie is not clear. The claimant said today that he thought the call was on 6 May 2024. This is earlier than the previous dates given of June 2024 and July 2024. For the purposes of assessing the question of time bar I have used the date given by the claimant today of 6 May 2024.[26]The ordinary limitation period for the claimant to bring a discrimination complaint to the Tribunal ended on 5 August 2024. The complaint was presented to the Tribunal on 28 February 2025. The complaint is 207 days late.[27]The claimant’s evidence today, which I accepted, was that he believed at the time of the phone call that what Mr Murphie had said to him was wrong and was discriminatory because of his Sikh religion or belief. But he feared being sacked and so decided to do nothing about it. He has a partner and a family to support. But when he didn’t receive his bonus on 10 December 2024, he decided that he had to complain about both matters. He then raised a grievance, appealed against the outcome of that grievance and presented his claim to the Tribunal. There was no dispute that the second complaint about not receiving his bonus is in time.[28]The claimant’s evidence today was that he had contacted ACAS for advice shortly after 10 December 2024, but he had not sought any advice about bringing a claim in the Tribunal before then for the reason already given, that he feared being sacked. The claimant’s evidence today was also that there were no issues with his health in the period between the phone call and presenting his claim in the Tribunal.[29]In considering whether to exercise its discretion to extend time, the Tribunal had regard to the prejudice which each party would suffer as a result of the decision to extend time, and had regard to the relevant circumstances, in particular the length of the delay and the reason for it, the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay, the promptness by which the claimant acted once he knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action, and the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once he knew of the possibility of taking action (Keeble).[30]The length of the delay is 207 days. The reason given, which I accepted, was that the claimant decided not to seek advice about the call which he believed to be discriminatory or to make a complaint at the time was because he feared losing his job. Once there was a subsequent act, which he also believed was discriminatory on the grounds of his religion or belief, he acted by raising a grievance and then presenting a claim in the Tribunal. He has a partner and family to support and did not want to lose his job.[31]The Tribunal considered the extent to which the cogency of the evidence was likely to be affected because of the delay. It is clear that the claimant is not certain of the day on which the phone call took place. That said, the respondent denies the content of the call in any event. The length of the delay is not significant, and parties have already addressed their mind to the question in the claimant’s grievance raised in December 2024. the Tribunal is not persuaded that the cogency of the evidence is likely to be significantly affected by the delay.[32]It cannot be said that the claimant acted promptly either in taking professional advice or in presenting a claim once he knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action. This was explained by the claimant as due to a fear of losing his job. He took such action promptly once what he believed was another discriminatory act had occurred in not receiving his bonus.[33]The Tribunal considered the respondent’s submission that the complaint of indirect religion or belief discrimination about the phone call is weak and likely to fail. The respondent referred to the case of Kumari v Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust 2022 EAT 132 and submitted that it was not wrong to consider and assess the merits of the proposed complaint in the matrix of determining the time point. He went on to cite what the respondent says are the weaknesses of this complaint suggesting nuances in the comments made by the claimant in the grievance investigation and what Mr Murtrie was likely to have intended in making the comment about wearing a turban, whilst also submitting that the comment was not made.[34]The Tribunal concluded that it had not heard anything today which points to a particular conclusion of weakness on the prospective merits of the indirect discrimination complaint. The Tribunal was unable to make an assessment on merits of this complaint by reference to what it had heard today, particularly given that the claim is one of discrimination, the Tribunal does not have all the evidence before it and is not conducting a final hearing.[35]The Tribunal then considered the prejudice which each party would suffer depending on the decision reached. If the complaint does not proceed the claimant will suffer considerable prejudice in that he would be precluded from pursuing one of his two complaints. The prejudice which the respondent would suffer if time were extended is that it will have to deal with a complaint which has been lodged out with the statutory time limits. However, it remains open to the respondent to defend the complaint.[36]Taking all of the relevant factors into account and considering those factors alongside the prejudice which each party would suffer depending on the decision reached, the Tribunal was satisfied that it was just and equitable to extend the time limit under section 123(1)(b) EqA and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the complaint. Relevant law – strike out and deposit order[37]In Xie v E'Quipe Japan Limited [2024] EAT 176, HHJ Taylor summarised some of the core components of the previous case law guidance in Anyanwu v South Bank Student Union [2001] ICR 391, Mechkarov v Citibank NA [2016] ICR and Cox v Adecco Group UK & Ireland and others [2021] ICR 1307. He referred to rule 37 of the Employment Tribunal Rules 2013 which provided a discretion to strike out a claim if it has no reasonable prospect of success. That provision is now found in rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. The other core components to which he referred are:a. Strike out is a draconian step to be taken only in clearcut cases.b. There is a public interest in discrimination cases being heard on the merits.c. Care should be taken when an application for strike out is made against a litigant in person.d. That said, there is not an absolute prohibition on strike out in discrimination cases, particularly if the claim is contrary to undisputed documentary evidence.e. Where there is a core of disputed fact strike out is generally inappropriate.f. When assessing strike out the case of the party against whom the application is made should generally be taken at its highest.[38]A core of disputed fact can include the reason why a person took a decision: Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2007] EWCA Civ 330[2007] ICR 1126 and Zeb v Xerox (UK) Ltd UKEAT/0091/15/DM at paragraph 20. That is why strike out is generally inappropriate in a case that turns on the mental processes of an alleged discriminator and/or a person who took a decision, such as a decision to dismiss (Xie v E'Quipe Japan Limited [2024] EAT 176).[39]Taking a case at its highest generally requires an assumption that the claimant will establish the facts from which it is contended that discrimination should be inferred: (Romanowska v Aspirations Care Ltd UKEAT/0015/14/SM; Mechkarov; and Xie).[40]When deciding whether to make a deposit order, a broad assessment of the merits is all that is required; it is not necessary for the judge to engage in detailed analysis. Tribunals should be wary of making an assessment of the strength of a party’s case from a review of the documentary evidence where key facts are in dispute, especially in discrimination cases (Spaceman v ISS Mediclean Ltd (t/a ISS Facility Service Healthcare) 2019 ICR 687, EAT).[41]In Sharma v New College Nottingham EAT 0287/11 the EAT held that an employment tribunal had erred in concluding that the claimant’s race discrimination claims had little reasonable prospect of success. This conclusion had been reached solely on the basis that the contemporaneous documentation was inconsistent with the claimant’s account. However, there were underlying factual disputes. The claimant was asserting that, behind the documentation, there was behaviour towards him that constituted acts which, in the absence of an acceptable explanation, the tribunal could conclude were on the grounds of his protected characteristic. Discussion /decision - strike out and deposit order[42]Firstly the Tribunal considered the application to strike out the complaint of direct religion or belief discrimination about the claimant not receiving a bonus in around December 2024. It was common ground that the claimant had received a bonus at around the same time in 2023.[43]The respondent’s application relies upon rule 38(1)(a) Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 which says that the Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim on the grounds that it “has no reasonable prospect of success”.[44]I reminded myself of the guidance from previous case law set out in previous paragraphs of this judgment.[45]This is a discrimination complaint and the strike out application is being made by a litigant in person. There is a public interest in discrimination cases being heard on the merits. Strike out is a draconian step to be taken only in clearcut cases.[46]When assessing strike out the case of the party against whom the application is made should generally be taken at its highest. At its highest the claimant asserts that he had completed the required training and was fulfilling his professional responsibilities for the award of a bonus. The claimant asserts that he was the only one in his team of six people working at the same location as the claimant who did not receive a bonus. The claimant said today that there had been problems with IT log in for online training, but all training had been completed by him. He asserted that others in his team had also experienced problems with IT log in and completing training, and they had been awarded the bonus.[47]The respondent submitted that there is no an absolute prohibition on strike out in discrimination cases, particularly if the complaint is contrary to undisputed documentary evidence. The respondent referred to a bonus matrix in the bundle of productions which showed training knowledge and lateness as criteria for the award of bonus. It also referred to an email sent to another employee telling him he had not received a bonus due to issues with training knowledge. The Tribunal decided that this documentation was insufficient to conclude that the complaint was contrary to undisputed documentary evidence. Plainly there was a core of disputed fact about the application of the award of bonus, particularly to others who, the claimant said, had also experienced IT problems in completing online training but had received the bonus. The claimant also asserted that the lateness, which the respondent says it took into account, was after the time when bonus was assessed.[48]Taking all of the relevant factors into account, the Tribunal was satisfied that it could not be said that the complaint has no reasonable prospects of success. Accordingly, the application to strike out the complaint about the claimant not receiving bonus is refused.[49]Next the Tribunal considered the alternative application for a deposit order as a condition of continuing to advance the complaint of direct religion or belief discrimination about the claimant not receiving a bonus in around December 2024.[50]When deciding whether to make a deposit order, a broad assessment of the merits is required; it is not necessary for the judge to engage in detailed analysis. Tribunals should be wary of assessing the strength of a party’s case from a review of the documentary evidence where key facts are in dispute, especially in discrimination cases (Spaceman v ISS Mediclean Ltd (t/a ISS Facility Service Healthcare) 2019 ICR 687, EAT).[51]As already stated, the Tribunal is satisfied that there are key facts in dispute in relation to this discrimination complaint. Whilst the respondent asserts that the contemporaneous documentation is inconsistent with the claimant’s account, there remain underlying factual disputes. Additionally, the allegation about Mr Murphie telling the claimant he could not wear a turban on-site is a disputed fact. The claimant appears to seek to make a link between the alleged comment and non-payment of bonus in his claim form when he says “Since that conversation, I have noticed a distinct change in my treatment”.[52]Whilst the burden of proof starts with the claimant, once there are facts from which a tribunal could decide that an unlawful act of discrimination has taken place, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to prove a nondiscriminatory explanation. The Tribunal makes no comment about how and if the burden of proof may shift in relation to the bonus complaint once evidence is led. The disputed comment made by Mr Murphie, if it is found to have been made, may or may not have a bearing on the determination of the second complaint about the claimant not receiving his bonus. It is another disputed fact. The Tribunal reminded itself again that it should be wary of assessing the strength of a party’s case from a review of the documentary evidence where key facts are in dispute, especially in discrimination cases (Spaceman).[53]Taking all of the relevant factors into account, the Tribunal was satisfied that it could not be said that the complaint has little reasonable prospects of success. Accordingly, the application for a deposit order as a condition of continuing to advance the complaint of direct religion or belief discrimination about an allegation said to have occurred on or around 10 December 2024 is refused.[1]The Claimant’s claim of direct discrimination under ss.13 and 39(2) of the Equality Act 2010 because of the Claimant’s religion and/or religious beliefs is not well founded and is dismissed. NOTE[2]Judgments are published online and publicly available on the internet after they have been[1]For reasons given orally, by a Judgment approved on 27 November 2025 the Tribunal dismissed the Claimant’s claim against the Respondent under s.13 of the Equality Act 2010 of direct discrimination because of his Sikh religion and/or Sikh religious beliefs because it found that claim not well founded. The Claimant having requested written reasons, this document provides those reasons. Claim[2]By an ET1 presented on 28 February 2025, as clarified at a PHCM on 1 May 2025 and further clarified at the final hearing, the Claimant presented two claims against his employer, Group Employment Services Ltd. (GES), alleging the following acts were direct discrimination against him because of his Sikh religion and/or Sikh religious beliefs:[3]First, a claim that during a telephone call on 2 May 2024 (the date the Claimant finally settled on as being the correct one) the Claimant asked Mr. M. Murphie for permission to wear a turban on site, which he refused, citing in his response the client and the site. GES accepted the Claimant and Mr. Murphie spoke on the phone that day (for 1 minute, 11 seconds), but denied that on the call(a) the Claimant had asked Mr. Murphie for permission to wear a turban on site(b) Mr. Murphie had denied the Claimant permission to wear a turban on site (Claim #1).[4]Second, a claim concerning GES’s non-payment of an annual bonus to the Claimant in December 2024, in circumstances where some (but not all) of his colleagues were awarded a bonus. GES accepted the Claimant was not awarded a bonus when some colleagues were, but said(a) the reason why was because the Claimant had not qualified for it whereas colleagues awarded the bonus had qualified for it(b) non-Sikh colleagues in materially the same circumstances as the Claimant had also not been awarded the bonus (Claim #2). Final hearing[5]The final hearing was on 24 and 26-27 November 2025. It was meant to be held in person, but a water supply problem at the Tribunal building on the first day meant all ‘in person’ hearings that day had to be abandoned. With the parties’ consent, the final hearing was converted to a remote hearing, and the hearing resumed via CVP on 24 November (afternoon) and 26 - 27 November 2025. A bundle was provided, to which additional documents were added by both sides during the hearing. The Tribunal heard from 4 witnesses: the Claimant, and for the Respondent Mr. Murphie (Contract Manager), Mr. H Costa (Claimant’s line manager), and Mr. C. Finney (Regional Manager). The Tribunal was satisfied all Respondent witnesses sought to assist by giving their honest, best recollection of events. Their evidence was both credible and reliable. In contrast, the Tribunal had reason to doubt the credibility and reliability of the Claimant’s evidence:a. the Claimant was not willing to make concessions when concessions were plainly due, eg, his acceptance that Mr. Murphie had decided to exclude the Claimant from the 2024 bonus scheme by no later than 30 April 2024 but refused to accept this meant the call he had with Mr. Murphie on 2 May 2024 (even if it happened as he alleged) did not cause or influence Mr. Murphie’s decision to exclude him from the 2024 bonus scheme;b. the Claimant changed key parts of his evidence. On the issue of whether the Claimant had completed Cyber Security e-training on time (which INEOS initially required to be completed by 29 March 2024), the Claimant canvassed every possibility: he said he had completed this training on time; he said he did not complete this training on time, but was unable to do so because he had been locked out of his account; he said he was not aware until April 2024 (after the initial 29 March 2024 deadline had passed) that he had to complete Cyber Security training; he said he had completed the training by 8 April 2024, which was outside the deadline but still somehow in time. It was not clear to the Tribunal that the Claimant appreciated these plain inconsistencies in his evidence;c. the Claimant was reluctant to answer relevant questions at the first, and sometimes second, time of asking. The Tribunal notes this giving regard to the fact the Claimant was a litigant in person, and may not have had the importance of answering all questions asked explained to him.[6]Where disputed questions of fact arose which depended on witness recollection and credibility, the Tribunal preferred the Respondent’s witness evidence to that of the Claimant.
Findings of fact
[7]The following findings of fact (and any findings contained in other sections of this document) were made on the civil balance of probabilities, and are limited to those findings required in order to decide the Claimant’s claims.[8]From 1 April 2023, GES provided security-related services to INEOS at INEOS oil and gas sites in Scotland including Cruden Bay. GES employed (and still employs) the Claimant and other staff (INEOS Staff) to provide security services to INEOS at those sites (the Claimant’s employment contract having ‘TUPE transferred’ to GES following its successful tender for the contract). The Claimant worked at the Cruden Bay site, and compares himself to others working there.[9]Part of GES’s contract with INEOS required GES to provide security training to the INEOS Staff. To incentivise staff to attend training, an annual bonus scheme was in place – funded by INEOS, overseen day-to-day by GES – one of the elements of which was a requirement for INEOS Staff to timely attend that training in order to be eligible for the bonus.[10]The INEOS bonus scheme had four elements: first (absence), the employee had to have no more than 2 reports of uncertified sickness/absenteeism; second (lateness), the employee had to have no more than 2 reports of lateness not approved by the supervisor; third (knowledge), the employee had to complete all site-mandatory e-learning training within 1 month of the relevant e-learning module being issued by INEOS; fourth (performance and conduct), the employee had to have no official written warnings for performance or conduct. The bonus assessment period ran from 1 December to 30 November, with the award paid to qualifying employees in December. The assessment of whether an employee was eligible for the award, and consequent decision whether or not to pay it, was made by GES, but the criteria themselves were set by INEOS. All monies payable under the scheme originated from INEOS – if an employee did not receive the bonus, GES returned the bonus money to INEOS, who used such monies for further investment at the relevant site. The structure and financing of the bonus scheme meant GES had no financial incentive not to pay a bonus to a qualifying employee – GES derived no financial benefit from not doing so. The bonus scheme was not discretionary – only those not at work for a legitimate reason (eg, certified ill-health) were not required to satisfy its requirements in order to qualify for the bonus. The time limit for completing e-learning was the initial time limit INEOS set, which INEOS notified employees of by email, plus any extra time INEOS granted.[11]As noted, on 1 April 2023 the Claimant became an GES employee providing security at the Cruden Bay site. The Claimant is a Sikh. Before May 2024, the Claimant had never worn a turban at work, and never requested permission to do so. At all relevant times in 2023 and 2024, the Claimant’s line manager was Mr. Costa. Mr. Costa was the obvious person for the Claimant to direct any request to wear a turban at work to. He did not do so at any point. Mr. Costa reported to Mr. C. Finney. Mr. Finney did not report either directly or indirectly to Mr. Murphie, who was the Contract Manager. Telephone conversation on 2 May 2024[12]The Claimant alleges that during a telephone call on 2 May 2024, the Claimant asked Mr. Murphie for permission to wear a turban on site, which Mr. Murphie refused, citing in his response the client and the site.[13]The parties agree that on 2 May 2024, the Claimant and Mr. Murphie did have a conversation lasting 1 minute 11 seconds on a telephone call. The Tribunal finds as a fact that during this call, the Claimant did not mention a turban or raise the issue of wearing a turban on site with Mr. Murphie (Mr. Murphie’s denial that a turban was mentioned was more credible than the Claimant’s allegation that it was). The Tribunal finds more credible Mr. Murphie’s evidence (and finds as a fact) that the call was a short conversation to discuss an IT password issue the Claimant had been having, contemporaneously documented on 1 May 2024. The following matters are also relevant to these findings:a. the Claimant described Mr. Murphie as “shrugging his shoulders” during the call – an unfortunate turn of phrase, since it was a telephone call (not a video call) in which the Claimant could not see Mr. Murphie at all;b. there was no evidence which corroborates the Claimant’s disputed account of what he alleges he said to Mr. Murphie during this call;c. the Claimant accepted not complaining to anyone at the time about this alleged conversation – not to friends, or family, or work colleagues, or Mr. Costa. His explanation was that he was ‘heartbroken’ at the time. The Tribunal finds the more likely explanation to be that nothing happened on this phone call relating to a turban;d. the Claimant accepted not complaining about this conversation or mentioning it to anyone in the next 7 months (2 May – 30 November);e. the first time the Claimant alleged this conversation took place was in December 2024, after he lodged a grievance complaining about the fact he had not been awarded the 2024 bonus. The Tribunal infers the most likely reason the Claimant raised this allegation then was to buttress his claim that the refusal to award him the bonus was because of religious discrimination – without this allegation, there was no basis for that claim;f. the Claimant mooted 5 different dates on which his alleged conversation with Mr. Murphie in which he requested to wear a turban on site took place – 28 July 2024, 6 June 2024, 5 June 2024, 6 May 2024, and finally 2 May 2024 (after GES voluntarily disclosed Mr. Murphie’s phone records);g. the Claimant mooted two different times of day for this conversation – after 9am in the morning, and in the afternoon;h. the Claimant gave two different days of the week on which the conversation occurred – a Sunday, and 2 May 2024 (a Thursday);i. the Claimant gave inconsistent accounts of what he said to Mr. Murphie on the call: in his grievance, the Claimant alleged he told Mr. Murphie he intended to start wearing a turban at work as it was an essential expression of his Sikh faith. At the final hearing, however, the Claimant alleged he asked Mr. Murphie for permission to wear a turban on site.j. while the Claimant was always consistent that it was Mr. Murphie he spoke to, the Claimant also said at times it was his manager he spoke to. The Claimant’s line manager at all relevant times was Mr. Costa, not Mr. Murphie. Had the Claimant wanted to wear a turban at work, it is far more likely the Claimant would have raised that request with Mr. Costa (at least in the first instance). The Claimant never raised wearing a turban at work with Mr. Costa before he submitted his December 2024 grievance. Mandatory training #1: Cyber Security[14]On 28 February 2024, INEOS emailed the Claimant and INEOS Staff colleagues a link to mandatory Cyber Security training, which it required them to complete by 29 March. One of the Claimant’s colleagues completed the training the next day, and notified Mr. Murphie by email of that fact. The Tribunal infers completing this training cannot have been a particularly burdensome task. The Claimant did not complete the Cyber Security training by the initial 29 March deadline. By email on 29 March 2024, Mr. Murphie asked the Claimant whether he had completed this training. The Claimant did not reply.[15]By email on 2 April 2024, INEOS’ R. Ferrier notified INEOS’ A. Ferguson of the names of the INEOS Staff who had not completed the Cyber Security training. The Claimant was one. On 2 April 2024, INEOS’ D. Cowie forwarded that email to Mr. Murphie, and asked whether those 6 staff accounts should be cancelled (because they had left GES, as one in fact had done) or why they had not done so. Mr. Murphie replied by email explaining the situation. Those staff were given another 48 hours to complete the training.[16]By email on 3 April 2024, Mr. Cowie asked Mr. Murphie for an update. By reply email, Mr. Cowie explained(1) staff member JM had not yet completed it (this was one of the reasons why JM was also not awarded the 2024 bonus)(2) staff member PR had not completed it but had been on long-term sickness absence since November 2023 (a valid reason for not completing it on time)(3) staff members HC and AR had now completed it(4) staff member GA’s account was pending deletion (he had left GES’s employment)(5) the Claimant had spoken to his Area Manager, and would complete the training.[17]By 5 April 2024, the Claimant had still not completed the Cyber Security training. Mr. Murphie brought this to Mr. Costa’s attention, and asked him to address this with Mr. Gill before more concerns were raised.[18]By email on 8 April 2025, Mr. Murphie asked the Claimant whether he had now completed the Cyber Security training. The Claimant did not reply, but did finally complete the Cyber Security training that day, and was duly sent a certificate of completion issued on 8 April 2024. Although the Claimant had finally completed this mandatory training, he had not done so on a timely basis, ie, within either the initial 1 month time period INEOS set or the extra time INEOS had given to do so. Under the terms of the bonus scheme, the Claimant had not satisfied the requirement to complete all site-mandatory e-learning training programmes within 1 month of the module being issued. Mandatory training #2: Email Attack Methods[19]Another mandatory training course INEOS required the Claimant and INEOS Staff to complete was called Email Attack Methods (EAM). Although the Tribunal was not given the deadline INEOS gave to complete this training, the Tribunal found (on the balance of probabilities) it would been a month and by 30 April 2024 the Claimant had not completed it within that period.[20]By email on 30 April 2024 (at 1.15pm), INEOS’ S. Boyle brought to Mr. Murphie’s attention the fact that the Claimant and work colleague PR (as noted, on longterm sickness absence) had failed to complete the EAM training, and as a result had been locked out of INEOS’ IT systems. Mr. Boyle asked Mr. Murphie to discuss the importance of IT security compliance with them and contact the IT helpdesk to reinstate their accounts.[21]At 1.23pm that afternoon, Mr. Murphie forwarded Mr. Boyle’s email to Mr. Costa. His email stated: “Not sure what progress was made with Rajinder Gill, but he doesn’t seem to quite understand the importance of completing this course or notifying anyone if he can’t access it. Apart from no longer included in the bonus scheme, do you think additional action is required?” At 4.09pm on 1 May 2024, Mr. Costa replied: “A letter of concern has been sent to [G]ill today, I copied you in the email as a deadline was given to him.” By email on 6 May 2024, Mr. Murphie forwarded a message from INEOS IT to Mr. Costa stating the Claimant had had opportunities to complete the EAM training previously and been locked out of his account numerous times due to this.[22]Thus by no later than 30 April 2024, Mr. Murphie had made the decision that the Claimant would not be eligible to receive the December 2024 bonus because he had failed to complete two mandatory e-learning training courses – Cyber Security, EAM - within the time frame set by INEOS. That was his reason for that decision. That decision was consistent with the plain terms of the INEOS bonus scheme, and was – to the extent relevant – reasonable, given the Claimant was at work at the relevant time and had time to complete both courses. Mandatory training #3: Social Media Auditors[23]A further mandatory e-training course INEOS required the Claimant and INEOS Staff to complete was Social Media Auditors (SMA). By email on 4 September 2024, Mr. Murphie asked the Claimant and INEOS Staff to complete the SMA training by 30 September. By email on 18 September 2024, Mr. Murphie sent a reminder to complete the course. In the event, the Claimant did not complete the course by the 30 September 2024 deadline.[24]By email on 1 October 2024, Mr. Murphie told the Claimant he had not completed the SMA course, and asked him to complete it tonight when on shift. The Claimant did not do so. By email on 9 October 2024, Mr. Murphie asked the Claimant why he still had not completed this course. By email on 9 October 2024, the Claimant replied asking whether this was just the one course he needed to complete. Mr. Murphie spoke verbally to the Claimant on his shift that evening, and gave his reasons for not completing the SMA training on time. By email on 10 October 2024, Mr. Murphie sent an email to Mr. Costa updating him on the situation. On 12 October 2024, the Claimant finally attended the SMA course, and was duly issued a certificate of completion that day.[25]Although the Claimant’s failure to complete the SMA training course on time would have been clear grounds for not awarding him the 2024 bonus under the terms of the INEOS bonus scheme, in practice this had no material effect as the decision not to award him that bonus had already been made by 30 April 2024. Lateness at work[26]A disputed (albeit tangential) dispute in this case is whether the Claimant always showed up at work on time in 2024 (relevant to the second factor in the bonus scheme). INEOS’ systems logged when staff electronically ‘clocked on’ at the start of their shift. Those records show – the Tribunal finds accurately - that the Claimant did not start his shifts on time on 21 March 2024 (18:33), 22 March 2024 (18:44), 28 March 2024 (18:34), 29th March 2024 (18:49) and 30 March 2023 (18:33). Although those late starts were not the reason why the decision was made in April 2024 not to pay the Claimant the 2024 bonus, they would have provided a further independent valid reason for deciding not to do so. Grievance[27]By email on 3 December 2024, Mr. Murphie notified the Claimant he would not be awarded the 2024 bonus: “As part of the annual review process, eligibility for the INEOS FSP bonus is assessed based on the criteria outlined at the beginning of the year. After a thorough evaluation, it has been determined that all criteria for the 2024 bonus scheme have not been met in your case. I understand this may be disappointing news, and I want to emphasise that this decision was made following careful consideration of the established criteria. To support you in meeting future goals, I would be happy to discuss any feedback or areas for development and we can look at how to ensure success at the next review period. Please let me know if you would like to discuss this further.”[28]By email on 3 December 2024, the Claimant replied asking whether it was just him who was not getting the bonus (the Tribunal notes the Claimant did not ask perhaps the more relevant question - why he had not got the bonus). By reply email, Mr. Murphie replied he wasn’t able to discuss other staff members bonus eligibility with the Claimant, and did not see how it was relevant.[29]By email on 10 December 2024, the Claimant submitted a grievance complaining (amongst other things) of being denied the bonus paid to his colleagues. In that email, he claimed that earlier that year, he had “informed his manager Mr. Murphie via phone that I intended to start wearing a turban at work, as it is an essential expression of my Sikh faith. Unfortunately, during that conversation, my manager informed me that I would not be allowed to wear a turban on site. This decision not only infringes upon my religious freedom but also goes against the principles of equality and inclusion that our organisation values.”[30]A grievance hearing was held on 16 December 2024, which the Claimant attended. By email on 17 December 2024, the grievance decision maker (Mr. R. MacIvor) did not uphold the grievance on two grounds: first, there was no evidence to prove the Claimant’s alleged conversation with Mr. Murphie had occurred; second, upon review it was clear the Claimant did not meet the criteria required to receive the bonus, and there was no evidence to suggest the Claimant’s line manager had treated him differently.[31]The Claimant appealed. A grievance appeal hearing was held on 23 December 2024, in which the Claimant made a clear threat to “take it further even to ACAS and maybe Tribunal”. By email on 23 December 2024, the appeal decision maker (Mr. A. Hamilton) rejected the appeal, holding that the correct grievance process had been followed and the Claimant had submitted no new evidence.
Relevant law
[32]Under s.13(1) of the Equality Act 2010, a person(a) (A) discriminates against another person(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. Under s.4 of the Equality Act 2010, religion or religious belief is a protected characteristic.[33]When considering whether a respondent breached s.13 of the Equality Act 2010, the Tribunal must determine whether the respondent, by subjecting the claimant to a detriment, discriminated against them by treating them less favourably than it treated or would have treated someone else because of a protected characteristic. A detriment is anything a reasonable person in their place would or might consider to be to their disadvantage. Shammon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11.[34]Under s.23(1) of the Equality Act 2010, on a comparison for the purposes of s.13 there must be no material differences between the circumstances relating to each case.[35]In some circumstances, separating the question of whether there has been less favourable treatment from the issue of why that less favourable treatment occurred will be artificial or cumbersome. In such cases, the Tribunal may consider both questions together – essentially asking whether an employee was treated less favourably because of a protected characteristic.[36]Direct discrimination is not necessarily conscious or deliberate. The Tribunal must decide ‘what, consciously or unconsciously, was the reason for the treatment. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] UKHL 48. For there to be direct discrimination it is sufficient that the protected characteristic be a material influence on the reason for the treatment. It does not need to be the sole or even main reason for the treatment.[37]Under s.136(2) of the Equality Act 2010, if there are facts from which the Tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the relevant provision concerned – in this case s.13 of the Equality Act 2010 – the Tribunal must hold that the contravention occurred (ie, that there was a breach). However, s.136(3) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that s.136(2) does not apply if person A shows that A did not contravene that provision. Putting this in plain English, if a claimant (on whom the initial burden of proof rests) proves (on the balance of probabilities) primary facts from which the Tribunal could decide in the absence of any other explanation that a respondent breached s.13 of the Equality Act 2010, the Tribunal must hold that the respondent did breach s.13 unless the respondent (on whom the burden of proof now rests) proves that it did not. Claim #1: Discussion / Conclusions[38]The first issue is whether the relevant conduct occurred. This claim fails at this stage because the Tribunal has found as a fact that the conduct on which this claim rests – that during a telephone call on 2 May 2024 the Claimant asked Mr. Murphie for permission to wear a turban on site, which he refused, citing in his response the client and the site - did not occur. See paras. 12 - 13 above. Claim #2: Discussion / Conclusions[39]The first issue is whether the relevant conduct occurred. The Tribunal finds it did – the parties agree the Claimant was not awarded a bonus in December 2024.[40]The second issue is whether by that conduct GES treated the Claimant less favourably than his comparators. In this case, the Claimant relies upon his INEOS Staff colleagues at Cuden Bay also potentially eligible for the 2024 bonus.[41]On this issue, the Tribunal finds the following:a. one of those comparators – PR – was not in the same circumstances as the Claimant. PR had been on sickness absence since November 2023, putting him in a very different situation to that of the Claimant, who had been healthy and attending work in the relevant period (December 2023 – November 2024). PR was not an appropriate comparator;b. the Claimant was not treated less favourably than comparators JM and GA, neither of whom were awarded the 2024 bonus. GA was not awarded the bonus because he left GES’s employment long before (on a date unknown but before 3 April 2024). JM was not awarded the bonus because, like the Claimant, JM failed to complete mandatory INEOS etraining on time;c. the Claimant was treated less favourably than comparators HC and AR, both of whom were awarded the bonus in December 2024;d. the Claimant failed to identify any further relevant comparators.[42]The third issue is whether, because of the Claimant’s Sikh religion and/or Sikh religious beliefs, GES treated the Claimant less favourably than it treated HC and AR by paying them but not him the 2024 bonus. For the following reasons, the Tribunal’s conclusion on that question is that it did not:a. the documentary evidence is compelling that Mr. Murphie’s decision that the Claimant would not be eligible for the 2024 bonus was made by 30 April 2024 (the Claimant accepted this in cross-examination), and the contemporaneous documentary evidence shows that decision was directly linked to the Claimant’s failure to complete mandatory e-training on time – a valid reason under the terms of the applicable bonus scheme;b. the Tribunal accepted the Respondent’s evidence that HC and AR satisfied the bonus scheme criteria hence qualified for the bonus, unlike the Claimant who had not;c. the Claimant failed to prove any primary facts which had the effect under s.136(2) of the Equality Act 2010 of shifting the burden of proof on the ‘causation / because’ issue from claimant to respondent – the Tribunal does not accept the Claimant ever raised the issue of wearing a turban with Mr. Murphie at any point prior to December 2024, and the first time the Claimant alleged a link between his Sikh religion and beliefs and the non-award of the 2024 bonus was after he was denied the bonus;d. there was no evidence that GES as an organisation, or Mr. Murphie as an individual, were concerned by the fact the Claimant was a Sikh (or religious) or would have objected to the Claimant asking to wear a turban when working on site at Cruden Bay;e. the Tribunal accepted Mr. Murphie’s unchallenged evidence that before joining GES he had a varied career in the UK and abroad, bringing him into contact with different cultures and religions without problem or difficulty;f. the Tribunal accepted Mr. Murphie’s unchallenged evidence that he had received training on diversity, equality and inclusion values/practices – there was no basis to infer or suspect that unconscious bias on Mr. Murphie’s part might have been a factor;g. the Tribunal accepted as credible Mr. Murphie’s evidence that the reason he decided in April 2024 that the Claimant would not be eligible for the 2024 bonus was because the Claimant had not completed mandatory INEOS e-training on time in circumstances where he had been given adequate time and opportunity to do so;h. the Claimant’s own case was that when he raised the issue of wearing a turban on site with Mr. Murphie on 2 May 2024, Mr. Murphie’s response referred to the client and the site, not to the Claimant’s religion;i. a comparable comparator – non-Sikh INEOS Staff member JM – was denied the bonus for the same reason the Claimant was. The Claimant had no explanation for that fact, even though it undermined his case that the non-payment of the bonus was linked to his religion.[43]If the Tribunal has erred, and the burden of proof did shift to GES, the fourth issue is whether GES has shown it did not breach s.13 of the Equality Act 2010. The Tribunal found Mr. Murphie to be a wholly credible witness, and accepted his explanation that his decision not to award the Claimant the 2024 bonus was made because the Claimant had not completed mandatory e-training on time, not because of the Claimant’s religion or religious beliefs.[44]For these reasons, the Claimant’s claims are not well founded and are dismissed.