[1]This case called at Edinburgh on 6 March 2026, for Hearing In Person of the claimant’s Application for Interim Relief. The claimant Mr Amelin appeared In Person. The respondent company HAD-FAB Limited was represented by Ms Nicolson, Consultant.[2]Each party lodged documents to some of which they referred in the course of submission; for the claimant two bundles, the first extending to some 40 pages and the second to some 34, and for the respondent bundle extending to some 75 pages. There were contained within the claimant’s bundles some documents which fell within the category of witness statements. At the outset of the Hearing, the Tribunal clarified for the parties;(a) that the Hearing was not an evidential Hearing at which the Tribunal would receive evidence whether orally on oath or on affirmation, or in the form of written witness statements and thus, that no account would be taken of the documents appearing to fall within that category; and(b) that the Tribunal would not make Findings in Fact rather, the Hearing would proceed by each party making submissions and, in the case of the claimant, the exercising, should he wish, of a limited right of reply to the submissions made on behalf of the respondent.[3](In the course of Case Management Discussion conducted at the outset of the Hearing) the Tribunal advised and confirmed parties’ understanding of the following:-(a) That in terms of Rule 94 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 Schedule 1 a Tribunal will not hear oral evidence at a Hearing on an Application for Interim Relief but will seek to be addressed by both the claimant and the respondent, or their representatives on the interim relief issues, in terms of section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and not the merits of the full claim.(b) That that process proceeds by each party, or their representative, making their submissions during which they set out their arguments in support of or in opposition to the Interim Relief Application.(c) Parties may rely on relevant documentary evidence which goes to show whether the claimant is likely to establish at an evidential Hearing on the Merits, that the principal reason for his/her dismissal was that of having made the alleged protected disclosures on which he gives notice of founding.(d) That the Tribunal would take account of such documents only to the extent that they were referred to them by parties in the course of their submissions.(e) That the onus of proof sat with the claimant at the Hearing.(f) That the standard of proof to be met was not the normal civil standard of “on the balance of probabilities” but rather was a higher standard namely, that the claimant must demonstrate that it is likely that in the determination of his claim the Tribunal would find that the reason, or if more than one the principal reason, for the dismissal was that he had made a protected disclosure.(g) That in the leading authority Taplin v Shippam Limited (below) the EAT had defined “likely” as meaning “a pretty good chance of success” and that in Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz (No 2 on the List below) Mr Justice Underhill, then President of the EAT, had commented that the test of a “pretty good chance of success” does not mean simply “more likely than not” but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood, i.e. “something nearer to certainty than mere probability”. “A ‘good arguable case’ is not enough” – Parsons v Airplus (No 6 on the List). The Issues before the Tribunal for Determination[4]The issues which the Tribunal require to determine were:-(a) Whether interim relief should be granted to the claimant, in terms of sections 128 and 129 of the ERA, pending a final determination of the complaint which he directs against the respondent being a complaint that he was automatically unfairly dismissed in terms of section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996, that is for the principal reason that he, the claimant, had made a protected disclosure, and,(b) In the event that interim relief is to be granted, whether the Tribunal should order that the claimant be reinstated on particular terms and or make an Order for the continuation of the claimant’s Contract of Employment. Summary of Submissions[5]The claimant and the respondent’s representative each addressed the Tribunal in submission referring the Tribunal, in the course of making the same, to some certain but not all of the documents within their respective bundles. The claimant addressed the Tribunal first, the respondent’s representative responded and the claimant exercised a limited right of reply. The Tribunal is not under obligation to rehearse verbatim the submissions made by parties which are accordingly summarized here. Summary of Submissions for the Claimant[6]The claimant gives notice of relying upon three alleged protected disclosures. The first contained within an email chain comprising an email of 19 January 2026 timed at 2335 hours and sent by the claimant to Mark McDonald (cc Bobby Waddell and James Graham), a reply from Mark McDonald of 20 January 26, timed at 1634, copied to Bobby Waddell and James Graham a further response from the claimant to Mark McDonald of 23 January at 1245 (cc Bobby Waddell and James Graham).[7]Mark McDonald was the respondent’s Manufacturing Manager.[8]That the terms of that email chain are copied and produced at pages 124 inclusive of the claimant’s first bundle, and are referred to for their terms which are here held incorporated by reference, for reasons of brevity.[9]That the second alleged protected disclosure is said to be constituted by the terms of a Report headed “Personal Opinion: Organisational Learning Failure and Process-Level Response Patterns” dated 25 January 2026 and offered by the claimant and sent to his Managers viz; James Graham (the claimant’s Department Supervisor), Mark McDonald the respondent’s Manufacturing Manager and to the respondent’s Production Supervisor.[10]That the claimant worked weekend shifts only.[11]That the Report tagged by the claimant as “Mango Report 00073 – Organisational Learning Failure and Process-Level Response Patterns (Disclosure 2)” is copied and produced at pages 6 to 15 of the claimant’s first bundle. [The Report is referred to for its terms which are held here incorporated by reference, for reasons of brevity.] That the Report focuses upon lack of accessibility to and lack of functionality of, the “in house” system where Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) were logged, and bears to document limitations of the system being:-• That the system does not distinguish between original work and rework• That the system attaches jobs to the name of whoever created the listing at a particular stage in the software,[12]That the executive summary of the Report is in the following terms:- “Executive Summary This Report documents systematic organisation of failures observed across multiple domains of operation. The evidence demonstrates three critical deficiencies: 1. Absence of systems – level absorption capacity: the organisation lacks functional mechanisms to capture, analyse, or implement systems-level insights. Individual efforts to document systematic issues are acknowledged but not actioned. 2. Fundamental structural absence: systems and processes at their most basic level are neither structured nor functionally organised. Critical capabilities are assigned to individuals based on availability rather than designed as organisational functions. 3. Organisation-wide learned helplessness: personnel at all levels have normalised this function, developed workarounds for broken systems, and ceased escalating issues due to consistent non-response. Core Finding: Solutions are implemented exclusively at the process level (individual workarounds, blame attribution, case-by-case fixes). Process-level solutions cannot address system-level route causes. Without system-level intervention, the same failures recur indefinitely. Analytical Framework: The evidence below is analysed through Just Culture framework, which provides clear insight into how these failures can be understood and classified. The framework listing issues between system design failures, execution errors, and behavioural choices – categories that require fundamentally different responses. Basic principles are explained below.”[13]That in the introductory paragraph of the “Conclusion” section the claimant stated “The evidence demonstrates that the organisation lacks absorption, capacity for systems-level analysis. Individual efforts to document systematic failures are acknowledged but not actioned. Solutions are implemented exclusively at the process level (individual fixes, blame attribution, case-by-case responses) which cannot address system-level root causes.” The Third Alleged Protected Disclosure[14]That the third disclosure given notice of as being relied upon by the claimant is said to be constituted by two pages setting out an “example of process design divorced from system reality (Mango/”let’s capture” proposals) which are copied and produced at pages 16 and 17 of the claimant’s first bundle, is tagged by him as “Mango Report 00074 – Mango Risk/Improvement Capture with point-of-use reality (Disclosure 3)” and was sent by the claimant on 25 January 2026 to the respondent’s Quality Team and his Line Manager James Graham. The terms of that example are held here incorporated by reference, for reasons of brevity.[15]That although the disclosures relied upon do not expressly make mention of risk to the health and safety of any individual in the claimant’s submission they fell to be regarded as qualifying for protection under section 43B(1)(d) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 on the basis that they identified inadequacies and lack of functionality in a reporting system designed to support heavy industrial manufacture and that those inadequacies which, if not addressed, could lead to wrong specifications in relation to manufacture of steel. That that, in turn, could endanger the health and safety of customers and users of products.[16]That the claimant relied upon the same reasoning as going to show that he made the disclosures in the public interest.[17]That the claimant was dismissed by the respondent’s James Graham on 6 February 2026 and the decision to dismiss was upheld, on appeal by Mr R Waddell, the respondent’s Head of Operations on 12 February 2026.[18]That regarding causal connection between one or more of the protected disclosures on the one hand and the decision to dismiss him on the other the claimant pointed to:-• The temporal proximity of the disclosures, 19-25 January 2026, on the one hand, and the date of his dismissal, 6 February 2026, on the other• To the absence of any prior criticism of his performance and to the prior expansion of his responsibilities which demonstrated acts of “operational trust” being reposed in him by the respondent, for example being tasked to work on change management issues and one of the respondent’s largest companies, shortly prior to the date upon which he was dismissed• That on the day prior to his dismissal the respondents continued the implementation of normal employment administration in respect of him, for example enrolling him into a pension scheme and taking steps to make employee contribution deductions from his salary• To what he asserts was knowledge, on the part of the Dismissing Officer of all three of his disclosures, albeit disputed by the respondent• His view that the instances of criticism of his performance which had been cited by the respondents at his dismissal meeting, were insufficient to support the sanction of dismissal and therefore could not have been, in his consideration, the real reason for dismissal and, that, therefore, if the reason for dismissal was not his performance it had to be something else which, in the claimant’s ?, in the circumstances of his having made protected disclosure/disclosures proximate to the date of dismissal resulted in it being likely that the reason for his dismissal was the making of those disclosures. Submissions for the Respondent[19]The respondent’s representative made the preliminary point that the complaint directed against the respondent by the claimant was not one of conventional unfair dismissal in terms of section 98 of the Employment Rights Act, the claimant lacking the requisite period of service set out in section 108 of the ERA such as to confer upon him Title to present such a complaint and upon the Tribunal, jurisdiction to consider it. Accordingly, she submitted in so far as any of the claimant’s contentions may appear to go to the fairness of the procedure followed by the respondent in dismissing the claimant such submissions were irrelevant for the purposes of supporting an Application for Interim Relief.[20]Under reference to the claimant’s Contract of Employment, she submitted that the three alleged protected disclosures which the claimant gave notice of relying upon fell to be described as follows:-(a) First Disclosure – the email chain of 19-23 January 2026 appearing at pages 2 to 5 of the claimant’s first bundle, the subject matter of which related to the implementation of a laser cutting system rather than use of the existing machine(b) The Second Disclosure – the Mango 00073 Report at pages 51 to 52 of the claimant’s first bundle, a Report which related to process and access to systems barriers(c) The Third Alleged Disclosure – the Mango Report 00074 appearing at pages 53 to 55 of the claimant’s first bundle relating to the usability of the systems and access barriers to using the Mango system for the generation of reports[21]Although in the documents produced detail of the alleged protected disclosures appears, for the purposes of today’s Hearing the respondent’s representative pointed out that the ET1 at page 17 did not give notice of the alleged qualifying and protected elements of the disclosure.[22]That regarding the respondent’s knowledge, it was accepted by the respondent that the Dismissing Officer (the claimant’s Line Manager) James Graham had knowledge of the email chain said to contain/constitute the first alleged disclosure, but it was denied that he had knowledge of the terms of either the second and or the third disclosure. There was a dispute of fact between the parties in that regard which required determination at an evidential hearing.[23]That none of the alleged disclosures contained a statement to the effect that the health or safety of any individual is being or was likely to be endangered (section 43B(1)(d) of the ERA), and that the alleged disclosures fell to be regarded, upon a consideration of their written terms, as not amounting to disclosures qualifying for protection in terms of section 43B of the ERA.[24]Separately, that the initiating Application ET1 contained no particulars relating to the “public interest” thus, even if the claimant entertained a reasonable belief as to the matters in respect of which he was communicating the natural, indeed the only, inference arising from the communications was that the claimant wished the system to be more functional for his own usage and not that he was communicating in the public interest.[25]That thus, the claimant required to rely upon his analysis to the effect that since the reporting system was difficult to access and to use, reports which might otherwise have been made on it may not be made on it resulting in its accessibility and lack of functionality being a barrier to health and safety.[26]That the two Reports said to constitute disclosures 2 and 3 were investigated, not by the claimant’s Line Manager but rather by the respondent’s Quality Manager Mr Bartos Szumielewicz who likewise investigated the second Mango Report. That the respondent denies that Mr Graham, the Dismissing Officer, had any knowledge of the second or third alleged disclosures. There was a dispute of fact at large between the parties relating to alleged knowledge, not only of the Dismissing Officer but of the other member of management present at the dismissal meeting who, in the respondent’s submission, was a joint decision taker of the decision to dismiss.[27]On an esto basis the respondent’s representative submitted that, in the event that the matters given notice of as relied upon by the claimant with a view to establishing the necessary causal link between any of the alleged disclosures on the one hand and the reason for his dismissal on the other was the temporal proximity of the respective events coupled with the claimant’s assertion that the matters relied upon by the respondent as the reason for his dismissal were insufficient to justify the sanction of dismissal, that, in reality, the claimant’s case was one of speculation.[28]That the proposition which he advanced was speculative viz, that because he did not believe that the reasons of performance given by his Line Manager for dismissing him were sufficient reasons to justify his dismissal, that his dismissal must accordingly have been for another reason which, he contended, given its temporal proximity to the disclosures relied upon was probably the fact that he had made those disclosures. It could not be said, based entirely upon such speculation that the claimant was likely to establish his case at Hearing.[29]Under reference to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Fecitt v NHS Manchester 2011 EWCA Civ 1190, she reminded the Tribunal that unlike in the case of having suffered detriment other than dismissal where it may be sufficient that the disclosure had “influenced” a decision, in section 103A complaints of automatic unfair dismissal, a claimant required to show that their having made a protected disclosure was the sole or principal reason for the dismissal. The respondent’s position was that the claimant was dismissed for reason of his performance, a reason which had nothing whatsoever to do with either the email chain or the two Reports relied upon by him.[30]The respondent denied the claimant’s assertion that no issues of performance had previously been raised with him prior to the dismissal meeting. In the dismissal letter paragraph 45 the respondent made reference to these. There was a factual dispute between the parties in that regard.[31]In conclusion, the respondent’s representative submitted that the claimant’s dismissal had been substantively fair and was for a reason which was wholly unrelated to the alleged disclosures relied upon that there was and would be, at a hearing on the merits evidence before the Tribunal that went to support a Finding in Fact that the sole or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal were issues with his performance.[32]That the onus was on the claimant to establish, at today’s Hearing, that he was likely to succeed at a substantive Hearing in establishing that the sole or if more than one the principal reason for his dismissal was that he had made one or other of the alleged disclosures relied upon, let it be assumed that he was also likely to establish that they were disclosures qualifying for protection and that the standard of proof which the claimant required to meet for the purposes of his interim relief application was not that of on the balance of probabilities but was significantly more than 51%.[33]Taking the claimant’s case at its highest it might be regarded as an arguable case but not more than plausible. That there were already focused between the parties issues of credibility and factual dispute regarding the extent to which prior concerns about the claimant’s performance had been brought to his attention, all of which required to be tested in evidence. There was no admission or concession on the part of the respondents that any of the alleged disclosures were protected disclosures. That the issue “Public Interest” had not been pled by the claimant in his initiating Application ET1 and that it was on the basis of that pleaded case that he must establish likelihood of success. That the respondent’s case, of offering to prove at an evidential hearing that the principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal was one wholly unrelated to the claimant’s making of any disclosure was equally if not more arguable than the claimant’s case and thus, that an award of interim relief would not be appropriate.[34]Finally, if interim relief were to be granted it was not appropriate that a Reinstatement Order be made or an Order requiring continued payment of salary until the end of the claim. There were no extraordinary circumstances at play in this case which the claimant could pray in aid. Further Submission for the Claimant in response[35]In exercising his limited right of reply, the claimant affirmed that he was not presenting an argument as to procedural unfairness but rather gave notice only of a complaint of automatic unfair dismissal in terms of section 103A of the ERA.[36]That at page 53 of the respondent’s bundle the respondents had acknowledged the assistance of the observations which he had made about the Mango system.[37]In the claimant’s submission his concerns were valid concerns to raise.[38]That the fact that he had not set out in the ET1 the full detail of the disclosures did not invalidate the fact that the disclosures had been made by him or the substance of them.[39]In his submission, the matters referred to in the email chain (First Disclosure) were matters that might lead to a danger or poor quality of structure of steel if not addressed the same was true of the terms of the second and third disclosures.[40]The claimant submitted that a lack of access to or problems which created barriers accessing what was designed to be a health and safety reporting system should be viewed as a hazard and should be regarded as falling within the terms of section 43B(1)(d) of the ERA. The claimant submitted that the “actions taken” report entry of 30 January 2026 which read “Evaluate with James G” led the claimant to “find it very difficult to believe that the Dismissing Officer, James G was not aware of the detail of the Reports at the point when he took the decision to dismiss the claimant on 6 February”. He rejected the respondent’s proposition that his case depended chiefly on the temporal proximity of the alleged disclosures on the one hand and the date of the decision to dismiss him on the other. He reiterated that he relied also on the fact that, in his assertion, the decision maker would have had knowledge of the content of his Mango Reports, that it was his contention that there had been no previously disclosed concerns about his performance raised with him.[41]That the respondents had, at a time proximate to the date of his dismissal and prior to his making the alleged disclosures, taken action which should be regarded as their reposing operational trust in him, and that what appeared to be new allegations regarding concerns over his performance had only emerged after he had raised proceedings in the Employment Tribunal.[42]That at the dismissal meeting he had responded to and, in his assertion effectively disposed of, all of the criticisms made about his performance and that it followed therefore that it was likely that the respondents hadn’t dismissed him for reason of those criticisms.[43]The claimant made no reply to the respondent’s submissions as to the inappropriateness of particular remedies in the event that an award of interim relief was to be made.
The Applicable Law
[44]There was no dispute between the parties as to the applicability of the statutory provisions contained within sections; 103A, 128 and 129, 43A, 43B(1) and 43C to 43H of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”). Neither was there dispute between the parties as to the meaning and effect of those sections which are referred to for their terms and which, for reasons of brevity, are held incorporated here. The terms of those statutory provisions are accordingly not set out at length in this determination.[45]Guidance as to the applicable law on the interpretation and application of the relevant statutory provisions is to be found in the following instructive case authorities: -(1) Taplin v Shippam Limited [1978] IRLR 450, EAT(2) Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562, EAT(3) His Highness Sheikh Khalid Bin Saqr Al Qasimi v Robinson, UKEAT/0283/17/JOJ, Judgment paragraph 59(4) Wollenburg v Global Gaming Ventures (Leeds) Limited, EAT/0052/18 per Richardson J (penultimate paragraph)(5) London City Airport v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610 at page 23 per Mr Recorder Luba QC(6) Parsons v Airplus, UKEAT/0023/16/JOJ4 March 2016 at paragraph [8](7) Dandpat v University of Bath, UKEAT/04/08/09 10 November 2009 unreported(8) Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] ICR 185(9) Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] ICR 1026(10) Chesterton Global Limited v Nurmohamed [2018] ICR 731(11) Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust v Wyeth, EAT/0061/15(12) Fecitt v NHS Manchester [2011] EWCA Civ 1190[46]Rule 94 of the Employment Tribunal Rules 2014 provides that for procedure on an Application for Interim Relief the Hearing should be conducted as a Preliminary Hearing within Rules 52 to 54. The leading authorities combined in giving guidance which indicates that the Judge hearing the Application should make a quick Summary Assessment based on the relevant material available.[47]Such hearings are intended to be short with broad assessments made by the Employment Judge who cannot be expected to grapple with vast quantities of material (see Wollenburg – No 4 on the above List).[48]The circumstances in which an Application for Interim Relief can be made are set out in section 128 of the ERA; viz: - “(1) An employee who presents a complaint to an Employment Tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and – (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in – (i) section … 103A, … may apply to the Tribunal for interim relief”[49]Such an Application may be brought within 7 days of the date of dismissal as it is accepted by the respondents it has been in the instant case.[50]In order to succeed in an Application for Interim Relief, a claimant must demonstrate that it is likely that in determining his or her claim a Tribunal will find that the reason, or if more than one, the principal reason for the dismissal was the one prescribed by section 103A of the ERA, namely that the claimant had made a protected disclosure.[51]The leading authority is Taplin (No 1 on the List) where the Employment Appeal Tribunal further defined “likely” as meaning “a pretty good chance of success”. The test is that the claimant has “a pretty good chance of success” in establishing that the reason he/she was dismissed was that he had made a protected disclosure. In Taplin the EAT expressly ruled out alternative tests. According to the EAT the burden of proof in an Interim Relief Application was intended to be greater than at a full hearing, where the Tribunal need only be satisfied on the “balance of probabilities” that the claimant had made out his case.[52]In Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz (No 2 on the List) Mr Justice Underhill, then President of the EAT, commented that the test of a “pretty good chance of success” does not mean simply “more likely than not” but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood, i.e. “something nearer to certainty than mere probability”. “A ‘good arguable case’ is not enough” – see Parsons v Airplus (No 6 on the List) at paragraph 18.[53]The threshold for succeeding in an Interim Relief Application is accordingly a high threshold, complementing what is “an exceptional form of relief” (see Taplin at page 19).[54]In Danpat v University of Bath UKEAT/0408/09 (10 November 2009 unreported) (No 7 on the List) the EAT stated at paragraph 20: - “20 … we do in fact see good reasons of policy for setting the test comparatively high, in the way in which this Tribunal did, in the case of applications for interim relief. If relief is granted the respondent is irretrievably prejudiced because he is obliged to treat the contract as continuing, and pay to the claimant, until the conclusion of proceedings: that is not [a] consequence that should be imposed likely”.[55]A Tribunal is not to be criticised for concluding that matters are not sufficiently clear cut at the interim relief stage for it to have sufficient confidence in the eventual outcome such as to grant interim relief (see Parsons – No 6 on the List at paragraph 18).[56]In approaching the task: - “The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. The Employment Judge must do the best he can with such” [relevant] “material as the parties are able to deploy by way of documents and argument in support of their respective cases … what this requires is an expeditious summary assessment by the first instance Employment Judge as to how the matters look to him on the material that he has. The statutory regime thus places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance which must of necessity involve a far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will ultimately be undertaken at a full hearing of the claim” (see London City Airport – No (5) on the List at paragraph 23).[57]In Parsons v Airplus – (No (6) on the List) the EAT offered the following guidance as to approach: - “On hearing an application under section 128, the Employment Judge is required to make a summary assessment, on the basis of the material then before her, of whether the claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding on the relevant claim. The Judge is not required (and would be wrong to attempt) to make a summary determination of the claim itself. In giving reasons for her decision, it is sufficient for the Judge to indicate the essential gist of her reasoning”: this is because the Judge is not making a final Judgment and her decision will inevitably be based to an extent on impression and therefore not susceptible to detailed reasoning; because, as far as possible, it is better not to say anything which might prejudice the final determination on the merits.”[58]In Al Qasimi v Robinson (No (3) on the List) at paragraph 59, the EAT said the following regarding approach: - “Noting that the Tribunal is only to make a summary assessment of the strengths of the case the EAT said that it was: - “Very much an impressionistic one: to form a view as to how the matter looked, as to whether the claimant had a pretty good chance and was likely to make out his case, and to explain the conclusion reached on that basis; not in an overformulistic way but giving the essential gist of his reasoning sufficient to let the parties know why the application has succeeded or failed giving the issues raised and the test to be applied.”[59]The burden of proof sits with the claimant throughout who must succeed in each element of the claim. As Underhill P (as he then was) expressed the position in Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz (No (2) on the List):- “In order to make an Order under section 128 and 129 the Judge had to have decided that it was likely that the Tribunal, at the Final Hearing, would find 5 things:-(1) That the claimant had made a disclosure to his employer;(2) That he believed that the disclosure tended to show one or more of the things itemised at paragraphs (1)(a) to (f) under section 43B;(3) That that belief was reasonable;(4) That the disclosure was made in good faith; and(5) That the disclosure was the principal reason for his dismissal.[60]Since the decision in Sarfraz, the good faith test is one which is now only relevant to remedy. It has been replaced with the test of whether the applicant reasonably believed the disclosure to be in the public interest.[61]It is the requirement that the disclosure is of information and not simply the making of an allegation or statement of opinion, albeit that the distinction is not always an easy one to draw and a disclosure of information may be made alongside the making of an allegation.[62]It is a requirement that the claimant reasonably believes the disclosure to be made in the public interest, albeit that this does not have to be his or her predominant motive for making it.[63]Under section 43A of the ERA a “protected disclosure” is defined as a “qualifying disclosure” which is disclosed in accordance with sections 43C to 43H of the Act. Section 43B(1) of the ERA defines a qualifying disclosure as follows: - “43B Disclosures qualifying for protection. (1) In this part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, [is made in the public interest and] tends to show one or more of the following – (a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.[64]Disclosure of information should be given its ordinary meaning, which revolves around conveying facts. It is possible that an allegation may contain information whether expressly or impliedly. In Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] ICR 185 (No (8) on the List), the English Court of Appeal said that in order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure, it had to have sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in sub section (1) – (of section 43B). There is no rigid distinction between allegations and disclosures of information. Discussion and Determination[65]In terms of Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz, the first question to be subjected to the test incorporated in sections 128 and 129 of the ERA as further defined in the case authority is:- (1) That the claimant had made a disclosure to his employer. It was a matter of concession on the part of the respondent that the email chain relied upon by the claimant as containing/constituting the first disclosure identified as relied upon by him, was an email chain passing between the claimant and his Managers on the dates shown and in the terms set out in the copy emails produced by the claimant. The respondent denies however the claimant’s assertion that those emails constituted/contained a disclosure qualifying for protection in terms of section 43B(1)(d).[66]There was no dispute between the parties that the two Mango Reports 0073 and 0074 which the claimant asserts contained/constituted the second and third asserted protected disclosures, were the reports that they bear to be, were communicated by the claimant to his Managers and were in the terms set out in the copies produced in the claimant’s bundle.[67]The respondent however also denies that these reports contain/constitute a disclosure qualifying for protection in terms of section 43(1)(d) of the ERA.[68]None of the three alleged disclosures relied upon contain on their face any express reference to the health or safety of any individual being or being likely to be, endangered.[69]There is a dispute in fact and in law between the parties as to whether the inference, which the claimant asserts the wording in those respective documents give rise to, does so arise both upon an application to them of the normal rules of construction and subject to oral evidence of the parties as to the claimant’s intentions at the time.[70]While the respondent accepts the Manager who dismissed the claimant on 6 February had knowledge of the email chain said to constitute the first disclosure, the respondent denies the claimant’s assertion that the Dismissing Officer had knowledge of the content and import of the two Mango Reports said to constitute the second and third disclosures.[71]There is a factual dispute between the parties as to the extent and quality of the Dismissing Officer’s knowledge at the material time such as to inform the question of whether it would or would not have been possible for him to have taken the decision to dismiss on the grounds that the claimant had made either of those two alleged protected disclosures.[72]On the material before the Tribunal at the Hearing including, the terms of notice contained within the initiating Application ET1, the claimant has thus far not pled the case that any or all of the disclosures were made by him in the public interest.[73]In his submissions made to the Tribunal at the Hearing the claimant asserted that they were providing a chain of reasoning whereby, if accepted, they might be held to have been so made. While, of itself it is not determinative of the Application before the Tribunal, and regardless of what may or may not be done by way of amendment at some point in the future, it is, in respect of the case before the Tribunal at this Hearing (the case given notice of in the initiating Application ET1), that the Tribunal must be satisfied that the claimant is likely to succeed (has a pretty good chance of succeeding) in establishing at a full evidential hearing. The relative temporal proximity of the alleged disclosures on the one hand and communication of the decision to dismiss on the other (of 12 to 16 days) may, or may not, upon evidential enquiry be seen to be potentially relevant. The mere fact of that relative proximity, however, does not, of itself, give rise to any presumption in law, rebuttable or otherwise, of causal connection between any of the alleged disclosures on the one hand and the decision to dismiss the claimant on the other, the establishing of which connection is essential if the section 103A ERA complaint of automatic unfair dismissal is to succeed.[74]The claimant’s position in submission is that he relies not only on that temporal proximity but also on what he offers to prove will be the Dismissing Officer’s knowledge of the content and import of all three alleged disclosures, the lack of any prior communication to him of dissatisfaction with his performance, and his asserted rebuttal, in the course of the dismissal meeting, of all of the criticisms cited to him such as to result in these being insufficient to support a sanction of dismissal.[75]On the other hand, those are all matters at large between the parties and in respect of which there is factual dispute with the respondent, offering to prove, at a full evidential hearing, that the real reason for their decision to dismiss the claimant was one related to his performance and thus wholly unrelated to any of the three disclosures made by him, whether all or any of these are established as qualifying and or protected disclosures, that being a matter in respect of which they make no concession and positively contend that upon their proper construction none fall to be seen in law to be regarded as disclosures qualifying for protection in terms of section 43B(1) of the ERA.[76]I am able to accept, on the material before me and on the submissions made, that the case outlined by the claimant (subject to his addressing the lack of pleaded good faith) if taken at its highest can be regarded as an arguable case. I am equally satisfied that on the face of the material presented the respondent’s offer to prove that the real reason for the claimant’s dismissal was one wholly unconnected with any of the three asserted disclosures is an arguable case.[77]It may be that at a Final Hearing the claimant may succeed in establishing that one or other of the alleged disclosures relied upon met the requirements of section 43B such as to result in its being a disclosure qualifying for protection, that the fact and import of one or other of the disclosures relied upon was known to the Dismissing Officer/s and that the respondent’s evidence in reliance upon which they offer to prove that the real reason for dismissal was one relating to the claimant’s capability, will be rejected. However, I consider that matters, as before me at this Hearing, are not sufficiently clear cut at this interim relief stage for the Tribunal to have sufficient confidence in the evidential outcome such as to meet the burden and standard of proof necessary to result in the granting of interim relief.[78]On the material and apparent circumstances presented, I am unable to form the view that the claimant is likely, that is to say has a pretty good chance (Taplin v Shippam Limited), that being something nearer to certainty than mere probability (Ministry of Justice v Sharfraz), of successfully establishing each of the 5 things set out by Underhill P (as he then was) in The Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz. The onus sits with the claimant to discharge that burden of proof to the required standard. On the materials available to it at hearing and on the submissions made, the Tribunal has been unable to form the view the claimant has discharged that onus and met the applicable standard of proof. Accordingly, the Application for Interim Relief is refused.