Ms J Reid v Park’s of Hamilton (Townhead Garage) Ltd: 8000350/2026
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8000350/2026
Between
Ms J ReidClaimantPark’s of Hamilton (Townhead Garage) LimitedRespondent
Before
Employment Judge L MurphyMs C Greig (instructed by Solicitor) for respondentDate 8 July 2026
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Tribunal is that:(i) the claimant was not a disabled person for the purposes of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 (EA) at the material time, namely on 9 October 2025.(ii) the claimant’s complaint that the respondent breached section 15 and/or sections 20 and 21 of EA are, therefore, dismissed. The case shall proceed to the final hearing.
REASONS
[1]The claimant (C) brings complaints under section 15 and/or sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA”) (i.e. discrimination arising from disability and a failure to make a reasonable adjustment). She also complains of constructive unfair dismissal under section 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). She avers she was, at the material time, a disabled person for the purposes of EA in respect of the impairment of anxiety. The respondent (R) disputes this. The parties agree that the material time for the purposes of the discrimination complaints is 9 October 2025. A substantive preliminary hearing (PH) took place on 1 July 2026 by CVP, the purpose of which was to decide whether C was a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 of EA at the time of the act about which she complains.[2]Ms Greig helpfully confirmed during her submissions at the hearing that R concedes that, as at 9 October 2025:(i) C had a mental impairment, namely anxiety.(ii) This mental impairment had a substantial adverse effect on C’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities.[3]Ms Greig confirmed that R disputes, however, that the effects of the impairment were long-term. The parties agreed that at the material time on 9 October 2025, the effects had not lasted 12 months. C says that, at that time, the effects were nonetheless likely to last at least 12 months for the purposes of Schedule 1, s.2(1)(b) of EA. R disputes this.[4]Parties agreed that as at 9 October 2025 and indeed as at the date of the hearing on 1 July 2026 the substantial adverse effects of the impairment on C’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities had not ceased. Ms Greig confirmed R’s primary position is that, in those circumstances, s.2(2) of Sched 1 of the EA is not engaged, and the Tribunal need not concern itself with the likelihood of recurrence. In the event that s.2(2) is engaged, Ms Greig said R’s secondary position is that it disputes that, at the material time, the effects were likely to recur. C gave no evidence or submissions in relation to the likelihood the effects would recur in the event of a cessation.[5]I heard evidence from C. A short inventory of productions running to 14 pages was lodged by R. It contained all the documentation on which both parties wished to rely and was referred to during the evidence. Findings in Fact[6]The following facts, and any further facts set out in the ‘Discussion and Decision’ section, are found to be proved on the balance of probabilities or were agreed by the parties. The facts found are those relevant and necessary to my determination of the issues. They are not intended to be a full chronology of events.[7]C was employed as a business manager by Lookers Motor Group Limited from 26 November 2012. Her employment transferred to R on 20 June 2025. Her employment terminated with immediate effect on 10 November 2025 when C resigned without a period of notice.[8]Prior to August 2025, C had never before experienced symptoms of anxiety of the kind which she began to experience in that month. She had never sought medical advice about anxiety and had never experienced anxiety symptoms which had a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. She had a good attendance record at work and had no significant medical history.[9]At some point in August 2025, C experienced what she called an ‘anxiety attack’ while at work. This included a number of symptoms, namely: sweating, heart beating fast, a feeling it would beat out of her chest, a feeling that her throat was closing up and an inability to ‘think straight’.[10]From that point, C experienced symptoms of anxiety on a daily basis. These symptoms did not necessarily take the same form as the initial ‘anxiety attack’ but she experienced a racing heart, feeling ‘on edge’ (a dread that something bad was going to happen particularly when out of the house) and daily difficulty with concentration.[11]C’s social life was affected. She had previously enjoyed being out and about and visiting the gym regularly. She found that she no longer wanted to go out. She became less chatty at work. She stopped posting on social media. She had previously had no issues with concentrating and was fully immersed in her job. She found that she had trouble concentrating on tasks. An example was when signing customers up to finance documentation in the showroom in relation to a car sale, when she found herself unable to concentrate on the task. She eventually got through it but became tearful which caused her embarrassment. She began overeating.[12]On 3 September, C had a telephone consultation with her GP, Dr Alshakhatreh, about her symptoms. He recorded a note of the conversation which accorded with C’s recollection of the call as follows (sic): “has a situation at work making every anxious. with compan for 13 years. july new management. a lot of bullying/intimidation. only 4 of 19 empolyees left. landrover buisnes manager. requeting meds axniety mainly wrok realted. better when off. physical symptoms when about to go to work. palpitions/hyperventilation/swating. feels low. sleeps okay. Overeating. stress. lives alone. fareinds around and in the loop. rearely alcohol/no thoughts. drugs. no sefl harm/scuidal-Discuss the situatin.ageed treat physical sympotms. No astham. start low and increase if required to avoid s/e. - signposted to RAMH”[13]Dr Alshakhatreh prescribed C’s anti-anxiety medication at the consultation, namely Propranolol Hydrochloride tablets (‘propranolol’). The prescription was for 100 tablets with the instruction to take one to four 10 mg of tablets up to four times daily.[14]C began taking the propranolol but did not initially experience improvement. Indeed, her symptoms worsened.[15]She went off sick from 17 September 2025 until her resignation on 10 November 2025. The period of absence was covered by two GP fit notes both of which recorded the reason for her unfitness for work as ‘stress at work’.[16]C had a telephone consultation with her GP, Dr Jenyo, on 17 September 2025. He recorded a note of the conversation which accorded with C’s recollection of the call as follows (sic): “Works for Land Rover as a business manager, was started on propranolol 10mg last week for anxiety, only taking 10mg tds feels not working. Was at work yesterday, but had to work out - bullying / intimidation. New owners came into the company in July - they are trying to get her to change her contract. Anxiety sxs - palpitations, dizzy, shaky. Not ready to return to ***** the moment. Seeking a fit not.”[17]C also explained she was experiencing dizziness/lightheadedness to Dr Jenyo. He signed C off for the period from 17 September to 15 October 2025. He increased C’s propranolol dosage to 40mg three times per day if needed. He discussed with C the possibility of counselling and talking therapies. At the time, C didn’t seek counselling.[18]On or about 18 September 2025, C made an informal complaint to R about her work-related concerns. On or around 30 September, C raised a formal grievance about these concerns.[19]In the period from 17 September to 9 October, C continued to experience symptoms and her day-to-day activities continued to be affected although she was seeing some difference as the propranolol began to have an effect. However, the symptoms did not disappear and, in addition to previous symptoms, C’s sleep started to be affected. C also felt upset about being signed off sick. Her sickness absence in the past over a long period of service had been very good and the fact of her absence itself was a source of upset.[20]At some stage after 17 September 2025, C’s sleeping pattern deteriorated. She was unable to sleep for longer than a couple of hours a night and sometimes at all. This symptom was affecting C prior to and at the time of the alleged act of discrimination on 9 October 2025.[21]On 6 October, C emailed R in the following terms: “… For clarity, my GP has confirmed that I am currently suffering from work related anxiety and stress, which has been formally certified through my medical fit notes. I am currently following medical advice and receiving treatment. While I have not previously been diagnosed as disabled, my condition does meet the definition of a long term mental health condition that has a substantial effect on my ability to participate in work related proceedings. This is why I made my earlier request for a trusted supporter to accompany me, as a reasonable adjustment under the Equality Act 2010.”[22]The alleged act of discrimination about which C complains is R’s refusal to allow C to be accompanied by her chosen companion at a grievance meeting on 9 October 2025.[23]C later consulted Dr Jenyo about ongoing symptoms during a telephone consultation on 16 October 2026. In it she recorded her health concerns over the previous period, including the period up to and including 9 October 2025. Dr Jenyo recorded a note of the conversation which accorded with C’s recollection of the call as follows (sic): “Ongoing anxiety+ - constant worry, irritability, difficulty concentrating, struggling to sleep getting 2 hours per night, broken sleep, stays awake worrying, mainly about her life and her current financial position, crying+ more, feels not depressed, was in a grievance hearing last week which was very intense and felt that she was trembling afterwards. This sounds like a HR issue. Has a union rep supprorting her. Discussed about talking therapies/counselling- seeking out options. Propranolol is keeping her calm. No suicidal ideation/thoughts. Feels that further fit note will allow HR to finalise her current situation. Good communication, Tearful++.”[24]Dr Jenyo issued a further fit note on that date and prescribed insomnia medication (Promethazine Hydrochloride tablets) which C took for a period in addition to her Propranolol. She was prescribed 56 tablets and instructed to take one or two per night. When the 56 tablets were finished, C didn’t seek a further prescription of the sleeping medication. She continued on Propranolol.[25]It is agreed that between the first anxiety attack in August 2025 and 9 October, C’s symptoms of the mental impairment of anxiety had a substantial adverse effect on C’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. It is agreed that these effects had not ceased by 9 October 2025 (or indeed by the date of the preliminary hearing on 2 July 2026).[26]C herself did not know as at 9 October 2025 how long the effects of her impairment were likely to last. At some point or at several points, C undertook internet research into anxiety including in relation to actions and treatments she could take to try to manage and reduce its effects. At some stage, in the course of these investigations, C formed a view from material she looked at that the severity of the effects of her condition (including of the effects as they had been on or before 9 October 2025) were of such severity that it was predictable that those effects would likely last for 12 months or more.[27]It is not established that this research was undertaken or that this perception of C’s was formed specifically by 9 October 2025. It is not established which internet sites and sources C consulted in the course of her investigations. It is not established what content specifically led C to perceive that the nature of the effects she was experiencing made it likely that they would continue for at least 12 months. Observations on the evidence[28]I found C to be a credible witness. She gave her evidence in a straightforward way and I did not assess that she had any intention of misleading the Tribunal or of exaggerating any aspects of her illness to further her claim. I accept C has experienced a difficult period in relation to her health and commend the candid and forthright way in which she answered questions put.
Relevant Law
[29]The burden of proof is on C to show, on the balance of probabilities, that she was disabled within the meaning of the EA at the material time.[30]Under s.6 EA 2010: “(1) A person (P) has a disability if –(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and(b) The impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities.”[31]Schedule 1, section 2 of the EA is in the following terms so far as relevant: “2 (1) The effect of an impairment is long-term if— (a) it has lasted for at least 12 months, (b) it is likely to last for at least 12 months, or (c) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected. 2(2) If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, it is to be treated as continuing to have that effect if that effect is likely to recur.”[32]Further guidance is provided in the ‘EA 2010 Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of disability’ (“the Guidance”) and in Appendix 1 to the Code of Practice on Employment published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (‘EHRC’) (‘the Code of Practice’).[33]As mentioned, by paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 1 to the EA 2010, the effect of an impairment will be long term if:(a) it has lasted for at least 12 months; or(b) is likely to last for at least 12 months, or is likely to last for the rest of a person’s life. In considering whether the effects are likely to last for at least 12 months, the Tribunal must consider matters as at the date of the alleged discriminatory act, and must not take into account anything only known or occurring after that time (All Answers Ltd v W [2021] IRLR 612) (paragraph C4 of the Guidance). It should consider what the effects of the impairments were at the material time and whether there is information before it which shows, viewed at that time, that it could well happen that the effects would last for more than 12 months (Nissa v Waverly Education Foundation Ltd UKEAT/0135/18).[34]Section C4 of the statutory guidance states: “C4. In assessing the likelihood of an effect lasting for 12 months, account should be taken of the circumstances at the time the alleged discrimination took place. Anything which occurs after that time will not be relevant in assessing this likelihood. Account should also be taken of both the typical length of such an effect on an individual, and any relevant factors specific to this individual (for example, general state of health or age).”[35]‘Likely’ means “could well happen” and is not to be equated with ‘more probable than not’ (Guidance at paragraph C3 and Boyle v SCA Packaging Ltd [2009] ICR 1056, HL). Submissions[36]Both Ms Greig and C gave oral submissions. The entire content of both submissions has been carefully considered and taken into account in making the decisions in this Judgment. Failure to mention any part of these submissions in this Judgment does not reflect their lack of consideration by this Tribunal.[37]It having been conceded that C had a mental impairment at the relevant time and that this was having a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day to day activities, Ms Greig’s submission focused on the key disputed issue of whether C’s condition was ‘long-term’ for the purposes of the EA. She said it was not. She said it was for C to establish disability (including all limbs of the test). She said the effects of C’s impairment had not lasted 12 months on 9 October 2025 and nor were they likely to do so for the purposes of s.2(1)(b) of Sched 1. I return to her submission on this question below.[38]I first record that Ms Greig also dealt with the following matters. She submitted there was no evidence before the Tribunal that the effects of C’s impairment were likely to last the rest of her life for the purposes of s.2(1)(c) of Sched 1. She confirmed R’s position that section 2(2) of Schedule 1 was not engaged because C’s impairment had not ceased to have a substantial adverse effect at the time of the alleged discrimination in October 2025 (or indeed since). She said that, if she was wrong in that, they were not ‘likely to recur’. She cited Richmond Community College v McDougall [2008] ICR 431 at para 21 where it was observed that sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 2(1) introduce ‘a predictive element’. It was held that it is on the basis of evidence as to circumstances prevailing at the time of the decision complained of that the employment tribunal should make its judgment as to whether unlawful discrimination by the employer has been established. The CA acknowledged that this predictive exercise may be a difficult one. Ms Greig referred to section C6 of the statutory guidance. She noted it refers to certain types of impairment with sporadic effects or effects which can recur beyond 12 months and that anxiety was not mentioned. Ms Greig acknowledged that the list in section C6 was expressly not exhaustive.[39]On the issue of whether the effects were likely to last for at least 12 months, Ms Greig noted that (like the likelihood of recurrence) this question must be assessed at the time of the alleged discriminatory act (Richmond) para 23 and 24. It was not, said Ms Greig, the correct approach to look at evidence of the subsequent period after the alleged discrimination. Ms Greig also referred to Tesco Stores v Tenant 2020 IRLR 363 as authority that for this proposition.[40]Ms Greig suggested that C’s oral evidence to the Tribunal about the likelihood of the effects lasting 12 months contradicted the contemporaneous documentary evidence in the bundle. She said C’s email of 6 October suggested that at that time she was already of a mindset that her condition was likely to be long term, before her grievance was even heard. Ms Greig said C’s evidence fluctuated in relation to how long she thought her symptoms might last as of October 2025. Ms Greig noted that at one stage, C conceded it might have been a few months but at the other extreme C made reference to it probably lasting for years. Ms Greig made clear she was not criticising C in this regard and acknowledged it was difficult to give evidence of circumstances at the time when you have hindsight.[41]Ms Greig said neither of the GP visits before 9 October referred to anything long term. She said the symptoms and medication were very much treated as being related to C’s situation at work. She pointed out this was not a case where C was saying she had long term depression or a bereavement. If the situation at work had been resolved, in Ms Greig’s submission, it was reasonable to assume the effects were not likely to last 12 months. She suggested support was lent to this contention by the fit notes which referred specifically to ‘stress at work’.[42]The claimant disagreed with Ms Greig that there was any inconsistency in her evidence; she said that her evidence was that she didn’t know in October 2025 how long her symptoms would last. C observed that, although her GP had not referred to her condition as being long term, nor had he referred to it as temporary. She said her symptoms were severe both in and out of work and she had been prescribed medication. She said the absence of a prediction it would last 12 months is not the same as an expectation that it would not, or that it would resolve in the near future. She submitted she had a condition with no identified recovery date. She invited me to conclude that it was likely to be long term for the purposes of the EA. Discussion and decision[43]I agree with Ms Greig’s submission that, as the adverse effects of C’s condition had not ceased on or before the date of the alleged discrimination (or as it happens at all at the time of the hearing), section 2(2) is not engaged and the Tribunal does not require to assess whether the effects were likely to recur.[44]The question, therefore is confined to whether the effects were ‘long-term’ for the purposes of s.2(1)(b) or (c). On the facts of this case, there was no evidence to suggest this was a life-long condition. To succeed, C needs only to meet the lower threshold that the effects were likely to last for at least 12 months. The burden lies with her to establish on the balance of probabilities that as at 9 October 2025, it could well have happened that the effects would last for at least 12 months.[45]The assessment I require to make is a predictive one based only on the facts as they stood on 9 October 2026. It is a difficult one by its nature and particularly difficult in this case where the only relevant medical evidence before me which pertains to the material time is the notes of two GP consultations and two fit notes. (Strictly only one consultation and one fit note happened before 9 October but the subsequent GP contact on 15 October referred back to symptoms C had been experiencing in the prior period). In making this assessment I have had regard to this evidence and to all of the objective facts available to me as to C’s condition at that time. I had regard to the statutory guidance (section C4). This was a case where no empirical evidence was adduced to the Tribunal by either party regarding the typical or average duration of symptoms of the impairment or regarding any factors that might tend to be associated with shorter or longer durations.[46]C herself gave evidence to the effect that she considered, based on her research, was that the effects were likely to endure more than 12 months based on the severity of her symptoms. I did not doubt the claimant’s honesty about her beliefs and perceptions. However, I am unable to give significant weight to that evidence in circumstances where none of the material she had read to reach this view was produced to the Tribunal. The claimant did not identify what sources she consulted or quote any particular information or evidence from her sources to support such a conclusion. I could not undertake any meaningful assessment of whether the conclusions C drew about the likely longevity of her condition were well founded in the absence of such evidence.[47]Ms Greig suggested C might be being slightly disingenuous to ‘retro-fit’ to the requirements of the legal test. I did not find that to be so. Though at different moments in her evidence C may have spoken of entertaining different expectations or indeed fears about the likely length of the effects when questioned on this, she was ultimately plain that at the material time she didn’t know their likely duration. That is understandable; C does not have and does not purport to have any medical qualification or expertise. She had received no advice from the medical professionals treating her as to the likely duration, save that the fit note of 17 September signed her off as unfit to work for a 4-week period until 15 October. In undertaking my asessment of ‘likelihood’ I have not rejected or ignored C’s evidence about her view of the likely longevity of the effects, but it has not weighed heavily in the predictive exercise I have carried out. That assessment has been based on the objective facts available, as opposed to perceptions which have not been supported by objective evidence.[48]I allow of course that, in relation to mental health and possibly other impairments, an individual’s own attitude and belief about their prospects of recovery may itself be an objectively relevant factor in longevity of the impairment’s effects. However, again, that is not a matter which was the subject of any evidence in the context of anxiety symptoms. Certainly, there was no evidence to indicate that the attitude or approach of C to her own health as at 9 October 2025 might have complicated or delayed her recovery. C showed impressive resillience in the face of a very challenging set of symptoms. She was motivated at the material times to contact her doctor to seek treatment and to take the medication prescribed. She was motivated to make efforts towards trying to resolve her work concerns by raising an informal complaint then a formal grievance in late September 2025. She managed these actions despite the difficulties she was having with concentration and feeling on edge at the time in question.[49]I took into account C’s general state of health and age in accordance with the statutory guidance. There was no evidence before me that C was in poor physical health or that, prior to the symptoms beginning in August 2025, she had any significant medical history. In particular, there was no evidence she experienced poor mental health or a susceptibility to mental health conditions which might complicate or prolong the impairment which developed that August. C’s previous work attendance had been strong by her own unchallenged account for many years. Likewise there was no evidence to before me to suggest that C’s age might be an exacerbating factor in relation to the likely length of the impairment’s effects.[50]As mentioned, no prognosis was given to C by her doctor by 9 October and the fit note of 17 September was for a 4-week period. There was nothing in the notes of the consultations which might encourage me to infer that either of the GPs C spoke to on 3 or 17 September had formed a view that it could well happen that C’s symptoms would continue for at least 12 months. The propranolol medication prescribed on 3 September, based on the proposed dosage, would be expected to last between 25 and 100 days if taken as initially directed. I take on board C’s comment that the absence of a prediction it would last 12 months is not the same as an expectation that it would not, or that it would resolve in the near future. That is undoubtedly correct. However, it is ultimately C who has the burden of establishing that as of 9 October 2025, it could well have happened that the effects would last 12 months. Such medical documentation as there is doesn’t particularly support that contention even if it does not go so far as to disprove it.[51]Taking all the circumstances at the time of the alleged discrimination into account, I conclude that C has not discharged the burden of proving that on 9 October 2025 the effects of the impairment were likely to last for at least 12 months or for the rest of her life. It is a difficult, predictive exercise but the assessment must be based on objective evidence to support the ‘likelihood’. The objective evidence before me in this case does not sustain such a prediction. I conclude, therefore, that C was not a disabled person within the meaning of s.6 of EA at the material time.