The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that it does not have jurisdiction to consider the claim, it having been presented out with the statutory time limit in Section 123 of the Equality Act 2010.
REASONS
[1]The claimant, an Advocate, who had been appointed as a part -time Sheriff, presented a claim on 3 February 2025 in which he complains that he was discriminated against contrary to Section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 (the EQA) by Lord Carloway, who until February 2025 held the office of Lord President. The protected act relied upon is the service of Employment Tribunal proceedings on Lady Smith, a Court of Session Judge. The act of discrimination alleged against the respondent is that on 25 July 2019 he imposed a Minute of Suspension on the claimant which has prevented him from holding the office of part -time Sheriff.[2]A Preliminary Hearing (PH) for case management purposes took place in May 2025. At that PH the parties identified that there were three preliminary issues. These were:(1) whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the claim on the basis that the respondent has immunity from these proceedings;(2) whether provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (the EQA) apply to the Lord President’s power under Section 34 (1) of the Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008 (the 2008 Act); and(3) whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the claim on the basis that it was presented out with the statutory time limit in section 123 of the EQA. In connection with this matter, the issue turns on from when time runs for the purposes of statutory time limit. There is no reliance on a just and equitable extension of the time limit under Section 123 (1) (b) of the EQA.[3]It was the application of the parties that these issues should be determined at a discrete open PH. It was also their position that the PH should be conducted by way of written submissions. They agreed to produce an Agreed Statement of Facts for the purpose of hearing. The Tribunal was satisfied on the basis of the parties agreed approach, and on the basis that there is no reliance on the part of the claimant on a just and equitable extension of the time limit, that it was consistent with the overriding objective in the Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2024 (the Rules) to proceed in the manner suggested by the parties.[4]A Preliminary Hearing was fixed to take place on 16 and 17 September 2025. The PH was fixed to consider the three issues noted above. The approach which the Tribunal adopted was to consider the issue of time bar first. It did so as the Employment Tribunal is a creature of statue and in terms of the relevant statutory provision (section 123 of the EQA) set out below, proceedings may not be brought out with the specified statutory limitation period. In the event the Tribunal is not satisfied that it has jurisdiction, then it has no jurisdiction to consider the claim or any issues raised in it and that is the end of the matter. On the other hand, if the Tribunal is satisfied that it has jurisdiction to consider the claim, then it requires to go on to consider if the respondent had immunity for the purposes of these proceedings, which are pursued under the EQA.[5]The parties produced an agreed statement of facts. A joint bundle of documents was produced. Both sides produced written submissions. Findings in Fact[6]The parties agreed the following facts in a Statement of Agreed Facts.[7]On 25 July 2019, the respondent was the Lord President of the Court of Session, the most senior judge in Scotland. Section 2 of the Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008 (“the 2008 Act”) provides for and specifies responsibilities of the Lord President as Head of the Scottish Judiciary. The respondent has retired. He demitted office on 3 February 2025.[8]On 25 July 2019, the claimant was a part-time Sheriff, a judicial office holder. The claimant was appointed as a part-time Sheriff by the Scottish Ministers with effect from 21 June 2010. The claimant was reappointed for a further fiveyear period with effect from 21 June 2015. The claimant was reappointed for a yet further five-year period, with effect from 21 June 2020, in terms of section 9 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014.[9]The claimant is and was at all material times an Advocate at the Scottish bar. He was appointed as Lead Junior Counsel to the Scottish (then “Historical”) Child Abuse Inquiry (“SCAI”), established under the Inquiries Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act’) by Ministerial Determination in terms of section 39(1) of the 2005 Act in respect of the claimant dated 28 August 2015; and by letter of appointment dated 4 September 2015 specifying, inter alia, that the claimant’s appointment “will terminate” at the end of the Inquiry, in terms of section 14(1) of the 2005 Act.[10]In May, June and July of 2019 the Claimant made statements in relation to the conduct of Lady Smith, Chair of SCAI, towards the Claimant when, and after, the claimant was diagnosed with cancer in October 2016.[11]The claimant submitted an Employment Tribunal claim against Lady Smith on 23 July 2019. The claimant’s claim was served on Lady Smith on 25 July 2019. The claimant’s claim was for discrimination arising from disability, harassment and victimisation of the claimant by Lady Smith under EA 2010. At all material times since (at least) October 2016 the claimant had, and has, the protected characteristic of disability within the meaning of section 6 and Schedule 1, paragraph 6 (1) of EA 2010.[12]By Minute of Suspension dated 25 July 2019 (Document 17), the respondent suspended the claimant from the office of part-time Sheriff. The suspension was imposed in terms of s.34(1) of the 2008 Act. The claimant was not given the opportunity to be heard before the decision to suspend.[13]The respondent accompanied the Minute of Suspension with a letter dated 25 July 2019 (Document 15) in which he attached an Appendix listing the various statements and tweets from the claimant (Document 16). A copy of the respondent’s letter, with Appendix, is produced. The respondent made no inquiry into the truth of the statements and tweets.[14]The claimant responded to the respondent’s letter by email at 13.28 on 30 July 2019, a copy of which is produced. The email was acknowledged by the respondent’s office on the same day by email at 16.39. (The correspondence is at Document 18)[15]The claimant withdrew his Employment Tribunal claim against Lady Smith in December 2019. The claimant asserts that he was illegitimately threatened by ET Judge Whitcombe with a finding of expenses of the whole action being made against him.[16]The claimant’s name was removed from the publicly available online list of part-time Sheriffs on 20 September 2023. The claimant published a book on 30 August 2023. The title of the Claimant’s book is “A Judicial Monstering: Child Sex Abuse Cover Up and Corruption in Scotland”. The claimant’s book was published by Amazon Global Publishing in the USA.[17]The suspension remained in place pending the outcome of Fitness for Office proceedings concerning the Claimant.[18]On 24 January 2025, the claimant presented prescribed information to Acas in relation to claim 8000275/2025. Acas issued an Early Conciliation certificate on 29 January 2025.[19]On 3 February 2025, the claimant submitted claim 8000275/2025 against the respondent. Submissions[20]Both parties produced written submissions which in the interests of brevity are not reproduced here, but are dealt with below where relevant.[21]For the purposes of the arguments on time bar, the claimant’s submissions referred to the following cases: Somerville v Scottish Ministers (2007) UKHL 44 2008 (HL); and O’Connor v Bar Standards Board (2017) UKSC78 (2017)) WLR.[22]For the purposes of the time bar argument the respondents submissions referred to the following cases: Moore Stephens LLP and Ors v Philip Parr UKEAT/0238/20/OO, §§ 26-38; Amies v Inner London Education Authority [1977] ICR 308; Sougrin v Haringey Health Authority [1992] ICR 650; Calder v James Finlay Corporation Ltd [1989] IRLR 55; Barclays Bank Plc v Kapur and Ors [1991] ICR 208; Owusu v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority [1995] IRLR 574). Hendricks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2002] EWCA Civ 1686); and South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust v King [2020] IRLR 168. Consideration
Preliminary matters
[23]Before determining the issue of time bar the Tribunal considered a number of preliminary matters.[24]Firstly, the Tribunal notes that on 15 August 2025, the claimant sent the Tribunal a document headed ‘Statement of Further Particulars of the claimant’s Claim’ in which he set out details of an amendment to his claim, seeking to introduce a public interest disclosure claim on the basis that statements he made about Lady Smith and a book he published amounted to protected disclosures under the employment Rights Act 1996 ( the ERA). On 28 August 2025, the respondents responded to this, submitting that any consideration of an amendment should be deferred until after the conclusion of the PH already fixed, on the basis that considerable time and expense had already gone into the preparations for this hearing and to air arguments at this stage regarding amending a claim which the Tribunal may find it had no jurisdiction to consider would be a waste it time and expense. The claimant was advised of his right to object to this. He did not do so. The claimant’s final submissions for this hearing were produced on 29 August 2025.[25]The Tribunal was satisfied, taking into account the matters relied upon by the respondents in their unopposed application, that it was consistent with the overriding objective in the Rules to defer consideration of the claimant’s application to amend until after the conclusion of this PH.[26]The second matter the Tribunal dealt with arises from the claimant’s submissions to the effect that his primary motion was that the Tribunal should find at this stage, without the need for further procedure, that he had been victimised contrary to section 27 of the EQA. He submitted that the agreed facts provided the evidential basis for the Tribunal make this finding.[27]Notwithstanding this submission, there may be a dispute on the facts which the Tribunal would have to determine having heard that evidence; there are also outstanding disputed preliminary issues. The merits of the Section 27 claim were not identified as matters to be considered at this hearing. It is therefore not open to this Tribunal at this PH to make a determination of the merits of the Section 27 claim.[28]The third matter arises from the claimant’s submission to the effect that the original basis of claim avers that the respondent victimised him because of the protected act by the claimant, which was raising proceedings in the ET against Lady Smith. The claimant submitted that the respondent’s explanation of matters is a discriminatory explanation. He submitted that the statements he made about Lady Smith have never been evaluated in fact as to whether or not what was said was true. The claimant submitted that therefore there are discrete issues of fact which, in any event in relation to arguments concerning time bar, would require to be determined on evidence before any decision could be made that the claimant’s claim is time barred on the initial basis of fact on which the claim was raised and hearing of evidence is necessary, even on that restricted factual basis.[29]The Tribunal did not understand this submission to mean that the claimant was departing from the position he adopted at the PH in May, which was that it was appropriate for the Tribunal to determine the issue of time bar on the basis of parties written submissions and an Agreed Statement of Facts. He made no application to lead oral evidence at the PH. In any event the Tribunal did not consider that the truth or otherwise of the statements which the claimant made about Lady Smith was relevant to the issue of time bar. For the purposes of this PH it is accepted that the claimant raised proceedings in the Employment Tribunal against Lady Smith as he relies upon in his ET1. The imposition of a Minute of Suspension by the respondent which prevented the claimant from holding the office of part- time Sheriff is the detriment claimed. It is accepted that the respondent imposed a Minute of Suspension on the claimant on 25 July 2019, which has not been lifted, and that the respondent retired on 3 Febuary 2025. These are the matters on which the claimant relies which are relevant to the issue of time bar. The Tribunal was persuaded that it was appropriate to conduct a PH to determine the preliminary issues of time bar on the basis of the Agreed Facts and parties written submissions, and on the basis that this manner of proceeding was proposed by both parties at case management. There is no reliance on the part of the claimant on a just and equitable extension of the time limit, consideration of which would be likely to require oral evidence. The Tribunal therefore proceeded to consider the issue of time bar on the basis agreed by the parties at the case management hearing in May. Time bar[30]Section 123 of the EQA provides as follows: 123 Time limits(1) Subject to 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.(2) Proceedings may not be brought in reliance on section 121(1) after the end of— (a) the period of 6 months starting with the date of the act to which the proceedings relate, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.(3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it.(4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it.[31]The starting point for the Tribunal’s determination of the issue of time bar is to identify the date of the act complained of from which time runs. In order to do this, the Tribunal firstly identified the act complained of.[32]The claimant submitted that his original basis of claim was that the respondent victimised him because of his protected act, which was raising proceedings in the ET against Lady Smith. He submitted that as these proceedings have progressed, he now seeks to hold the respondent to account in these proceedings (as he is lawfully entitled to do even without amendment since it is the respondent who has raised these issues) for unlawful victimisation by summary suspension of the claimant because of the protected acts. These acts are making statements about Lady Smith, based on facts agreed in the agreed statement of facts, particularly paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 and the associated documentation. This, the claimant submitted inevitably arises from the respondent’s explanation for the suspension in respect of which the respondent bears the onus of proof. The claimant submits that the respondent’s victimisation of him in this respect (suspension because of the statements agreed at para 10 of the agreed statement of facts) was a further continuing act of victimisation which ceased on the respondent’s retirement from office on 3 February 2025. He submits that on this additional basis, the present proceedings have clearly been raised timeously.[33]The respondents submitted that what the claimant describes the “original” basis of his action is the only basis. Specifically, the claimant’s claim is that:(a) the raising of the employment tribunal against Lady Smith was his protected act; and(b) that his suspension on that basis was a continuing unlawful act until the respondent retired.[34]The Tribunal had regard to the details of the claimant’s claim set out in the ET1. Paragraph 4 of the paper apart to the ET1 that identifies a claim under section 27 of the EQA. The claimant relies on his bringing of proceedings for disability discrimination in the Employment Tribunal against Lady Smith as the protected act within the meaning of section 27(2)(a) of the EQA. The claimant identifies the respondent's purported imposition of a suspension from office as a detriment to the claimant for doing a protected act. The claimant’s case in the ET1 is that the respondent’s unlawful victimisation of the claimant continued from 25 July 2019, the date of the Minute of Suspension, until the respondent’s retirement from the office of Lord President on 3 February 2025. His position is that respondent’s purported suspension of the claimant was a continuing act of victimisation which endured from 25 July 2019 until it ceased on the respondent’s retirement on 3 February 2025.[35]That then is the claim which is before the Tribunal, to which there has been no amendment. There is no automatic amendment of the claim, or automatic right to amend the claim, as a consequence of maters raised in the response to it. The Tribunal notes that the claimant’s submission appeared to contain reference to his proposed amendment which has not yet been allowed. In any event, the detriment claimed on the basis of a claim under section 27 of the EQA and the proposed protected disclosure detriment claim referred to in the claimant’s submission, are the same. That is the imposition of a Minute of Suspension from 25 July 2019, preventing the claimant from holding the office of part – time Sheriff, which is said to be a continuing act until 3 February 2025.[36]There is no dispute that by a Minute of Suspension dated 25 July 2019 the respondent suspended the claimant from the office of part- time sheriff and that that suspension remained in place as at 3 Febuary 2025. What the Tribunal has to determine is whether the imposition of the suspension was a continuing act, which on the claimant’s case, ceased on 3 February 2025.[37]The claimant submitted that the authorities he cited were Somerville v Scottish Ministers ( 2007) UKHL 44 2008 (HL) and O’Connor v Bar Standards Board (2017) UKSC78 (2017)) WLR support the position that whether a matter complained of is properly to be characterised as a continuing act as opposed to an act with continuing consequences is a matter of fact which cannot be determined without hearing evidence on the matter. He submitted that there is some agreed evidence before this ET, however, standing the range of varying bases of acts of victimisation because of the explanation offered by the respondent and pursued during the currency of these proceedings; and because of the agreed facts in the evidence by itself, there now arises a need for much further reaching and detailed evidence in relation to these matters. His position was that no issue of time bar can be said to arise in respect of this broader range of issues arising from the respondent’s explanation and the evidence now agreed.[38]The claimant’s submission to the effect that the he continues to be subjected to victimisation him on the basis of the response to the claim it is not completely before this Tribunal.[39]What the Tribunal understands the claimant’s case to be both from his ET1 and his submissions is, as indicated above, that the alleged act of discrimination (on any basis) was his suspension from the office of part time sheriff by the imposition of a Minute of Suspension on 25 July 2019, which is said by the claimant to be a continuing act until 3 February 2025, when the respondent retired. The claimant raises in his submission issues about the fairness of how the respondent acted in imposing the Minute of Suspension and why the respondent acted in the manner complained of. These are matters which may to be dispute, however there is no dispute on the facts to the extent that it is agreed that the respondent imposed the Minute of Suspension in July 2019 and that it remained in place as at the date of his retirement on 3 February 2025. That being the case it was unnecessary, on the basis of the relevant matters relied upon by the claimant in his submission, for the Tribunal to hear evidence in order to make a determination as to whether there was a continuing act for the purposes of section 123 of the EQA.[40]The claimant submitted that the relevant authoritative case law provides that time bar commences in the case of a continuing act (rather than one or more acts with continuing consequence) when the wrongful act ceases.[41]The claimant submitted that there was only a single act of victimisation on the claimant’s principal basis of claim in this case: namely, the summary imposition of suspension from judicial office on 25 July 2019. He submitted that that single act of suspension continued until the respondent’s retirement; it was agreed as a matter of fact that the suspension did not cease between at least 25 July 2019 and 3 February 2025. The claimant submitted that this was a continuing single act on a proper analysis of the facts applying the law. The relevant case law was entirely consistent with the terms of section 123 (3) EA 2010. The single act of suspension, with its continuing adverse consequences and detriments, must be viewed in law as a single continuing act which ceased at the end of the suspension. The claimant contended that this was on the retirement of the respondent. He submitted that the respondent’s attempt to present the circumstances as a failure to lift the suspension is unsound.[42]The claimant referred to Lord Hope’s reasoning in Somerville v Scottish Ministers (2007) UKHL 44 2008 (HL) at paras 50 and 51 in which it was submitted he suggested that the one year time bar set out in section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of complaints of Convention incompatible action commences only once the Convention Incompatible Act has cased. The claimant also referred in this connection to O’Connor v Bar Standards Board (2017) UKSC78 ( 2017) 1 WLR (Lord Jones paragraph 30).[43]The claimant submitted that in Somerville, Lord Hope made explicit reference (at para [51]) to the First Division’s reasoning that time began to run for the purposes of the relevant one-year time bar when the single continuing act of segregation ended, not when it began; and he highlighted that the practical effect of the continuing, enduring act was of significance. Lord Hope went on, at para [51] to agree with the First Division’s reasoning on this specific issue. In the case of a continuing (enduring) act to which a person is subjected, such as being subjected to a continuing regime of segregation; or a suspension from judicial office, the law on time bar should be interpreted and applied as requiring that time bar runs from the date when the continuing act ceased because, otherwise, the complainer (here, the claimant) would be time barred while still subject to the ongoing, continuing and enduring detrimental and otherwise actionable wrong.[44]The claimant submitted that the respondent’s attempt to convert the single continuing act of suspension into a time barred failure to act (on account of the claimant’s threat to raise proceedings on 30 July 2019) is illogical, at odds with the approach in law adopted in Somerville and O’Connor (in the House of Lords and UKSC, respectively) and typically unfair in its approach and the Tribunal should place no reliance on its misguided logic. A failure to act, by definition, arises where there is no act. In the present circumstances it is agreed that the act of suspension happened.[45]The claimant submitted that the respondent’s reliance on the cases predicated on the decision in Moore Stevens LLP v Parr UKEAT 0238/20/00 is misconceived. It is a decision of the EAT. It is not concerned with an enduring, continuing act in the nature of a disciplinary suspension from judicial office or the imposition of a regime of segregation in prison which (ex hypothesi) must both have a date of imposition and a date when it is ended. The very nature of the exercise of a discretionary decision, as in Moore Stevens, is a one-off act with continuing effects. The EAT in Moore Stevens specified that the claimant’s situation was not the application of a discriminatory rule or policy. A single, one-off decision may, but may not, necessarily constitute a single continuing act. The essential distinction to be made is in the qualitative and enduring nature of the act in question.[46]The claimant submitted that the present case clearly falls within the analyses, for time bar purposes, set out in Somerville and O’Connor.[47]The claimant submitted that on the evidence contained in the agreed statement of facts and associated material, the conduct of the respondent extending over a period, for the purposes of section 123(3) EA 2010, is the single, continuing and enduring act of suspension. The single, enduring and continuing act began on 25 July 2019 and ended, for present purposes, on 3 February 2025.[48]The claimant submitted that for the purposes of the three-month time bar period in section 123(1) (a) EQA 2010, the “date of the act to which the complaint relates” is 25 July 2019 until 3 February 2025. The reason for this date is identified by application of section 123(3)(a) EQA 2010 which provides that “conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period”. Thus, for the purposes of the three-month time bar specified in section 123(1)(a) EQA 2010, “the 3 month period starting with the date to which the complaint relates” is to be treated as 3 February 2025. This is the date the continuing act ceased for present purposes because that is the date that the respondent retired .[49]On the claimant’s submission there was victimisation by a single, continuing act of suspension from judicial office, which continued from 25 July 2019 until at least the retirement of the respondent on 3 February 2019. He submitted that his complaint of the act of victimisation is not predicated on continuing consequences. Continuing consequences are relevant to the statutory criterion of detriment. The claimant submitted it was clear that, as a matter of law, time begins to run when a single continuing act (in this case suspension constituting victimisation) ended, and not when it began. Accordingly, the claimant’s claim was commenced within the relevant three-month time bar period which following the respondent’s retirement on 3 February 2025.[50]The claimant submitted that the three-month statutory time limit began to run on 3 February 2025. That date is to be treated as the date when the respondent’s act in question, conduct extending over a period since 25 July 2019, was “done” for the purposes of the time limit in section 123(1)(a) EA 2010.[51]The respondent’s position is that the imposition of the Minute of Suspension was a single act. The nature of any ongoing financial loss suffered as a result of that did not change that. There was no further act which caused a change in the loss.[52]The Tribunal accepts the position contended for by the claimant to the extent that in considering the application of time limits under section 123 of the EQA, conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of that period, not the beginning. That position reflects the terms of section 123 (3) (a ) of the EQA.[53]The contested point is however whether the act complaint of, the imposition of a Minute of Suspension, suspending the claimant from holding the office of part- time sheriff, was a single act or was conduct extending over a period which ended for the purposes of section 123 (3) (a) on 3 Febuary 2025.[54]To address this question the Tribunal began by considering the guidance in Barclays Bank plc v Kapur and ors, referred to by the respondents. In that case the House of Lords drew a distinction between a continuing act and an act that has continuing consequences. It was held that where an employer operates a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle, then such a practice will amount to an act extending over a period. Where, however, there is no such regime, rule, practice or principle in operation, an act that affects an employee will not be treated as continuing, even though that act has ramifications which extend over a period of time.[55]This reasoning was followed in Sougrin v Haringey Health Authority, where the Court of Appeal held that a decision not to regrade an employee was a one-off decision or act, even though it resulted in the continuing consequence of lower pay for the employee who was not regraded. This reasoning was also adopted in Owusu v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority 1995 IRLR 574, EAT, referred to by the respondents, where the EAT held that a specific failure to promote or shortlist was a single act , despite its continuing consequences ,and drew a distinction with the situation where the act (a failure to promote) took the form of ‘some policy, rule or practice, in accordance with which decisions are taken from time to time’.[56]The Tribunal also had regard to Parr v MSR Partners LLP and ors 2022 ICR 672, CA. The Court of Appeal in that that case considered that the authorities drew a distinction between a rule or policy which inevitably led to the rejection of the application, such as that in Kapur and a rule or policy which involved the exercise of discretion, such as that in Sougrin.[57]Lastly the Tribunal also considered (Hendricks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2002] EWCA Civ 1686 which provides guidance to the effect that tribunals should look at the substance of the complaints in question, as opposed to the existence of a policy or regime and determine whether they can be said to be part of one continuing act by the employer.[58]Regardless of the basis on which the alleged unlawful discriminatory act is said to have occurred, the substance of the act of discrimination complained of is that the claimant was suspended from the office of part time sheriff by a minute of suspension in July 2023 and that suspension continued in place at least until the respondent left office in February 2025. This is not therefore a case, like Hendricks, where there are allegations of numerous separate incidents of discrimination, which the Tribunal have to take into account in in order to determine whether the separate instances alleged form an act extending over a period.[59]The Tribunal notes from the Agreed Statement of Fact that the claimant’s suspension remained in place pending the outcome of Fitness for Office proceedings concerning the claimant. There is however no reference to those proceedings either in the ET1 or in submissions, and therefore the Tribunal did not understand these proceedings to be a matter which is relied upon.[60]What is said by the claimant is that his suspension was a single, continuing and enduring act .[61]The Tribunal was satisfied that the imposition of the Minute of Suspension was a single act at the instance of the respondent, which was discretionary in nature, and which was done on 25 July 2019. In reaching this conclusion it takes into account that there is nothing in this case to suggest that there was in operation of a policy of regime, such as operated in Kapur. The Tribunal considered that the claimant conflated a ‘continuing and enduring act’ with the continuing consequence of the Minute of Suspension. The continuing consequences of the Minute of Suspension was that the claimant was suspended from holding the office of part -time sheriff. The claimant’s suspension from the office of part -time sheriff cannot be properly categorised as a continuing act on the part of the respondent. The respondent took the step of imposing the Minute of Suspension in July 2019; it was the imposition of that Minute of Suspension which suspended the claimant from the office of Sheriff. There is no suggestion that the respondent took any further action with regard to the Minute of Suspension or otherwise which suspended the claimant from office between July 2019 and the respondent’s retirement from the Office of Lord President in Febuary 2025. The Agreed Findings in Fact contain a finding to the effect that the claimant’s name was removed from the publicly available online list of part-time Sheriffs on 20 September 2023. There is however no indication in those findings as to who is said to be responsible for this, which in any event also occurred out with the limitation period. Further, is clear that the act which the claimant complains about is the imposition of the Minute of Suspension. The claimant does not argue a section 123 (4) (b) omission. In his submission he rejects the respondent’s suggestion that he is relying on the respondent’s omission to recall the Minute of Suspension when asked to do so, reliance on which in any event would not bring the claim on time.[62]The Tribunal’s took into account the claimant’s submission to the effect that that the end date of the conduct complained of on 3 February 2023, the date of the respondent’s retirement. Nothing however changes on the respondent’s retiral and the claimant was still subjected to the ‘continuing and enduring act’ he complains about. There was no further act on the part of the respondent in February 2025 other that that he retired.[63]In reaching its conclusions the Tribunal had regard to the claimant’s submissions on the Judgment of Lord Hope in Somerville and on the case of O’ Conor, however neither case is concerned with the application of the statutory provisions on time bar in the EQA, which limited their assistance. Further in Somerville ,as submitted by the respondents, Lord Hope’s dicta states that Section 7(5) (a) ‘means, in the case of what properly may be regarded as a continuing act of incompatibility, time runs from when the date when the continuing act ceased.’ This does not assist in determining what is or is not a continuing act, but is premised on that analysis already having been made.[64]Having regard to the facts found, the relevant statutory provisions and the authorities referred to, the Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s complaint is about is a single act; the imposition of the Minute of Suspension. That act has continuing consequences; that the claimant is unable to hold the office of part -time sheriff. The effect of that conclusion is that time runs from 25 July 2019, which was the date of the Minute of Suspension and therefore the date of the act complained of. The effect of that conclusion in turn is that the complaint is lodged out with the statutory time limit in section 123 of the EQA and therefore this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it.[65]Having reached that conclusion , it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to consider the two remaining issues.