Mr M DalzielClaimantMCP Scotland LtdRespondentDate 5 February 2025
JUDGMENT
No response has been presented to this claim and an Employment Judge has decided to issue the following judgment on the available material under rule 21:[1]The respondent has made an unauthorised deduction from the claimant’s wages and is ordered to pay the claimant the sum of £1672 (gross), that being 88 hours pay at a rate of pay of £19 per hour.[2]The respondent has failed to pay the claimant expenses in breach of contract and is ordered to pay damages to the claimant in the amount of £20.70 (net).[3]The hearing listed on 15 May 2023 is cancelled.
REASONS
[1]The claimant presented complaints of unauthorised deductions from wages (arrears of pay) and breach of contract (expenses) which the respondent denied.[2]A Final Hearing was listed on 09 September 2024. This was a hearing held by Cloud Video Platform (“CVP”) video hearing pursuant to Rule 46. I was satisfied that the parties were content to proceed with a CVP hearing, that it was just and equitable in all the circumstances, and that the participants in the hearing were able to see and hear the proceedings. By consent, and upon the Tribunal being satisfied that it was just and equitable, as he was unable to join by video due to technical issues, I gave permission for Mr McPhail to participate in the hearing by audio only.[3]The parties prepared and filed a number of individual Productions in advance of the hearing consisting of several WhatsApp messages, email correspondences between parties and screenshots (filed by the claimant relating to January and February 2024), claimant’s email dated 04 July 2024 providing a breakdown of the amounts claimed, and further, a copy of the claimant’s statement of main terms of employment dated 07 December 2023, deductions from pay agreement dated 08 January 2024, company vehicle rules and a document titled “MCP Scotland Ltd Submission to the Tribunal” consisting of a narrative of events, a summary and breakdown of deductions made by the respondent, photographs and description of alleged van and stock damage, and photographs and description of alleged poor workmanship relating to two work assignments (filed by the respondent’s representative).[4]The respondent’s representative stated that he had omitted to send copies of the respondent’s documents to the claimant in error. Accordingly, prior to the start of the hearing the claimant was sent copies of the respondent’s four documents referred to above by the Clerk to the Tribunal. By agreement, the Tribunal adjourned the hearing for a period of time in excess of 20 minutes to allow the claimant an opportunity to review the documents and prepare any evidence in rebuttal or cross examination. The claimant indicated that he had seen three of the documents provided previously. The claimant confirmed following the adjournment that he had had sufficient time to review the documents. He did not request any further time to review the documents.[5]Both parties advised the Tribunal that they were prepared to continue with the hearing on the understanding that the Tribunal would consider all of these documents and would hear oral evidence from each witness (including but not limited to oral evidence in response to questions put by either the claimant, the respondent’s representative or the Tribunal relating to the respondent’s documents). Neither party applied for a postponement of the hearing.[6]At the outset of the hearing, following a discussion with the parties in relation to the content of the ET1 and the ET3, the parties were advised that the Tribunal would investigate and record the following issues as falling to be determined, both parties being in agreement with these: 1 “Was the claimant entitled to be paid expenses totalling £20.70 in respect of parking expenses incurred on 15 January 2024, 16 January 2024 and 18 January 2024? 2 Was the claimant entitled to be paid £19 per hour x 8 hours x 11 days wages (£1672 gross amount claimed) between the dates of 08 January 2024 and 22 January 2024? 3 Was the respondent entitled to deduct any monies from those sums pursuant to any terms in the claimant’s statement of main terms of employment, company vehicle rules document and/or deductions from pay agreement?”[7]The claimant gave evidence at the hearing on his own behalf and Mr Jordan McPhail, Sole Director gave evidence on behalf of the respondent.[8]Neither party was legally represented. Both parties made closing submissions.
Findings of fact
[9]Having considered all the evidence the Tribunal has made the following essential findings of fact. Where a conflict of evidence arose the Tribunal has resolved the same, on the balance of probabilities, in accordance with the following findings: Relevant background to employment relationship[10]The claimant was employed by the respondent as a Fabric Engineer between 08 January 2024 and 22 January 2024. The claimant’s duties included attending to and performing the individual assignments that were assigned to him by the respondent. The claimant was required to undertake wide ranging duties as required by the respondent including fencing, gutter cleaning, painting, replacing bins, and gardening.[11]The respondent was a facilities management company. The claimant was assigned to work on jobs for third parties which were business customers such as retail clients.[12]The claimant worked 40 hours per week, comprising 8-hour shifts from Monday to Friday between 08.00am and 04.30pm. He worked five days per week. He was provided with a 30-minute lunch break.[13]The claimant’s hourly rate of pay was £19.00 (gross). This meant that his weekly pay amounted to £760.00 gross (£19 x 8 hours x 5 days). The respondent were responsible for making any required deductions in respect of tax and national insurance from the claimant’s pay.[14]The claimant was due to be paid on the first day of each month. The claimant’s wages in respect of January 2024 was due to be paid to him on 01 February 2024. Claimant’s expenses[15]In terms of the claimant’s expenses claims, the claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in respect of parking expenses incurred whilst he carried out his duties for the respondent upon production of receipts of expenditure. The claimant was advised at the outset of his employment that he was required to send receipts to Josh Wood, Operations Director and the claimant’s line manager.[16]The claimant incurred expenditure totalling £20.70 in respect of parking expenses in relation to 15, 16 and 18 January 2024. He sent receipts relating to these to Josh Wood by WhatsApp messages. On 22 January 2024 Josh Wood stated in a WhatsApp message to the claimant “Just checked, your receipts weren’t attached to the email, that’s likely been the delay. I’ve forwarded these to Jordan to pay for you.” Termination of employment and return of company van[17]On 22 January 2024, Josh Wood contacted the claimant and advised that his employment was being terminated. He advised the claimant to return his company van either on 22 January 2024 or 23 January 2024. The claimant returned his company van on the afternoon of 22 January 2024.[18]No issues were communicated to the claimant in respect of the company van on the day that the claimant had returned the company van, on 22 January 2024. Non-payment of claimant’s wages[19]Between 08 January 2024 and 22 January 2024 the claimant was entitled to be paid in relation to 11 days’ (8-hour shifts) work. The claimant was due to be paid £1672.00 gross (11 days x 8 hours x £19) in respect of the hours he had worked. The claimant did not receive payment in respect of those wages on 01 February 2024 as he expected.[20]The claimant sent an email to Jordan McPhail, Managing Director on 01 February 2024 stating that he had not been paid and had not received a payslip. He asked when he should expect to receive his 11 days wage arrears and parking expenses. Mr McPhail replied by email later that morning advising that they contacted the claimant over a week ago as it seemed that his starter form and P45 were not in the office and the claimant could not be included on the payroll system as a result. He stated that the documents require to be completed and returned and that the respondent could not pay the claimant until they had those documents. By email sent later that morning the claimant advised he had not received a prior email from the respondent relating to this and he requested the same to be resent so he could complete the documents.[21]The claimant sent emails chasing the payments owed to him on 05 and 06 February 2024. The claimant sent a WhatsApp message and a further email to Jordan McPhail on 07 February 2024 stating “Still no resolution to my wages . Can you confirm TODAY when I will be paid.”[22]Jordan McPhail sent a response to the claimant by email on 08 February 2024 stating: “Firstly I suggest you drop the attitude, as it wont work on me. Secondly, having reviewed CCTV it seems as I suspected you left with a bundle of documents on your first day so it looks likely you took the paperwork with other jobs sheets (which were not returned). You also don't demand on me, when something is sorted or when I reply to you. I reply when I have a minute and it will be resolved when the parties involved can do so. Anyway as per the employee handbook, we have no obligation to do a second payment run. Our payroll company has agreed to run it when they get a chance over the next week, when they run it you will then receive your payslip and be paid. It is not my issue that you did not respond in a timely manner to previous emails and lied after saying you had not received anything (claiming you checked junk) and then it appears. So this is your fault whether you like it or not. Lastly if you continue to call me outside business hours, for clarity I work 9:30am - 3pm, I will deem this as harassment and see this as causing me distress and will take this further if need be. Do not call my mobile at the hours you have been, it is unacceptable.” Claimant’s claim[23]The claimant started ACAS Early Conciliation on 06 February 2024. The claimant’s ACAS Early Conciliation Certificate was issued on 01 March 2024.[24]The claimant presented his Employment Tribunal claim on 04 March 2024. Respondent’s allegations of poor workmanship and damage[25]On 09 September 2024 at 08.00am Mr McPhail sent a document to the Tribunal by email stating that “There where a number of jobs showing poor workmanship, we have only sought to deduct two works – A fence which was repaired and failed within two weeks requiring us to strip it down, replace and compensate clients. The second was a gutter clean which was clearly not done and caused the roofing company warranty issues due to this.” There were two photographs provided in relation to the fencing and two photographs supplied regarding the gutter clean.[26]The claimant’s explanation (which the Tribunal accepted) was that the fence referred to was a fence that the respondent had fitted before the claimant started his employment. The fence had blown down (4 to 5 metres) and it had been secured by timber posts (strong winds had blown down the fences because they were built on an incline). The claimant was asked to carry out repairs. The claimant told Josh Wood he would have relocate the fence away from the incline, and perhaps bring it forward or failing that they would need a drilling machine for bigger posts so they can be firmly fixed into the ground. At that point, Josh Wood said that because they had already done the job, it was not financially viable for the company to do that. It was explained to the claimant that the respondent could not charge the client again so they did not want to take the steps the claimant had suggested. The claimant dug out the posts and put them deeper into same ground and put the fences back up. The claimant had informed Josh Wood that that would not be adequate. That was the claimant’s only involvement in respect of the particular job.[27]The claimant also explained that he was working on another fence when it was snowing badly. The claimant advised Josh Wood that the ground was frozen. Josh Wood told the claimant to make the area safe so that kids were not encroaching on the area. Once the claimant had done this he sent some pictures to show the work he had done via WhatsApp. At that point, Josh Wood telephoned the claimant to advise that Mr McPhail had decided to end the claimant’s employment. The claimant returned the company van that day, on 22 January 2024, and he went home thereafter.[28]In respect of the gutter clean the claimant advised that there were no issues identified or brought to the claimant’s attention in relation to this matter. The work carried out by the claimant had been checked by the client’s own site operator who was in charge of that building and he confirmed to the claimant that he was happy with the work that the claimant had performed. There was a three-monthly check that was conducted on this roof (which appeared to relate to a hotel building). The claimant made sure that the runs were appropriate for the water to leave the (which they clearly had). It was noted that a little amount of remaining debris was normal. The claimant sent photographs of each job he completed via an online portal. Mr McPhail had access to this portal and no issues were raised with the claimant during the course of his employment. Furthermore, the claimant had sent photographs of the completed work to Josh Wood via WhatsApp and no issues had been brought to the claimant’s attention during his employment.[29]The items in the company van suffered damage totalling £45.00 and cleaning of the company van was required at a cost of £40.00. Those issues became apparent to the respondent after the claimant had returned the company van.[30]The claimant’s manager had undertaken a full van check when the company van was returned by the claimant. There were no issues raised with the claimant at the relevant time. The company van registration started with “DN23” (this was from the previous year and it was a hire van). The vehicle was therefore not new. Observations[31]On the evidence it heard and to which it was referred, the Tribunal made the following essential observations:[32]The Tribunal was able to make a number of findings of fact from documents including correspondences to which it was referred.[33]The Tribunal made its findings of fact on the balance of probabilities.[34]In relation to the circumstances in which the claimant’s employment ended, the claimant provided his account in terms that Josh Wood had told him on 22 March 2024 that his employment was being terminated by the respondent. The claimant was still in his probation period at the time. The only parties to the conversation relating to the termination of the claimant’s employment were the claimant and Josh Wood. The respondent did not follow up the conversation with a letter outlining the circumstances of the termination of the claimant’s employment.[35]Josh Wood was not called to give evidence during this hearing. Mr McPhail explained that he did not feel his evidence was relevant, he is the sole director and only witness, and that the deductions decision sat with Mr McPhail. He further advised that Mr Wood had told him the relevant conversations took place via WhatsApp and, in addition, Mr Wood was unavailable to attend today’s hearing. I did not accept that that the respondent provided satisfactory or good reasons explaining why Mr Wood was not called to give evidence and if he was not available, it is not clear why the respondent did not notify the Tribunal previously or apply for a postponement.[36]There were no WhatsApp messages or emails before the Tribunal explaining the circumstances in which the claimant’s employment terminated. Although Mr McPhail stated that his company normally followed formal processes prior to terminating employment, he could not give direct evidence in respect of the relevant conversation between the claimant and Mr Wood on 22 January 2024. In all the circumstances, I accepted the claimant’s account of the conversation on 22 January 2024 in respect of the termination of the claimant’s employment.[37]I did not accept Mr McPhail’s evidence that the claimant was sent a cover letter, a payslip, contractual documents and details of deductions made from his pay by first class post on or during the week commencing 12 February 2024. A copy of the cover letter was not before the Tribunal. There was no reference to this correspondence on the respondent’s ET3 Form, in their email to the Tribunal dated 19 July 2024, or within the email containing their documents which Mr McPhail had indicated were supplied to the Tribunal on 28 July 2024.[38]I noted that In Mr McPhail’s email dated 19 July 2024 he stated “We are also yet to see any parking costs, as I am aware the screenshots previously show he was paid for the ones submitted. So we would be looking to have sight of these and confirm these are relevant in the course of employment he has within MCP Scotland.” This was not consistent with Mr Wood’s WhatsApp message on 22 January 2024 in which he indicated that he had passed on the claimant’s expenses claim for payment.[39]Mr Wood was not called to give evidence in relation to his inspection of the company van. The claimant’s evidence was that no issues were raised by Mr Wood in respect of the company van when it was returned on 22 January 2024. There were no photographs before the Tribunal showing the condition of the company van prior to the vehicle being provided to the claimant. The date and time that the photographs of the company van (and its condition) were taken were not clear. Mr McPhail did not state in his evidence that he personally inspected any damage caused to the van on the day in question. I was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities and on the evidence before me that the claimant had caused the alleged damage to the company van (save in relation to the matters at paragraph 39 below). In any event there were no receipts or invoices provided in respect of any vehicle repairs that were required.[40]It appears that a number of items in the company van suffered from water damage and that the claimant also did not clean the van prior to returning the company van. The claimant did not dispute this in his evidence and he did not challenge Mr McPhail in cross examination in relation to this matter. The value of those items were £45.00 for the damaged items in the van and £40.00 relating to cleaning. I accepted that on the balance of probabilities that that damage is likely to have occurred while the company vehicle was in the claimant’s possession, and that the sum of £85.00 in terms of costs incurred by the respondent was reasonable.[41]The issues relating to the claimant’s workmanship referred to in Mr McPhail’s evidence were not brought to the claimant’s attention prior to the termination of his employment. Mr McPhail advised that the relevant clients had provided feedback after the work had been completed and remedial work had to be carried out at a cost to the company. The Tribunal was not provided with a copy of any documentation relating to the client feedback, the photographs provided were not dated or timed, and the respondent did not provide copies of any relevant invoices or receipts relating to expenditure. In any event the Tribunal were not satisfied on the evidence that the claimant was responsible for poor workmanship or damage in respect of those matters.
The Law
[42]To those facts, the Tribunal applied the law: Unauthorised deductions from wages[43]Section 13 Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) provides: “1. An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless –a. the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker's contract, orb. the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction. 2. In this section "relevant provision", in relation to a worker's contract, means a provision of the contract comprised – a. in one or more written terms of the contract of which the employer has given the worker a copy on an occasion prior to the employer making the deduction in question, or b. in one or more terms of the contract (whether express or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing) the existence and effect, or combined effect, of which in relation to the worker the employer has notified to the worker in writing on such an occasion.”[44]The employer may include an express term in the contract of employment requiring an employee to repay certain costs and expenses (for example in relation to training the employee) in the event that the employee leaves during training or for a period thereafter, and in circumstances where such costs are clearly not a penalty, they may prove recoverable in effect as liquidated damages. The amount claimed must be a genuine pre-estimate of loss or it may be a penalty and unenforceable.[45]Where there is a written term authorising a deduction contained in the staff handbook, the employer must ensure that prior to the deduction the employee has either received a copy of the handbook or been notified in writing about the existence and effect of the term.[46]A deduction authorised by a contractual term may be contingent upon the employer following a certain procedure. If that procedure is not followed, the deduction would be unlawful.[47]In Kerr v The Sweater shop (Scotland) Ltd 1996 IRLR 424 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that for a term authorising a deduction to be valid, the employee must have agreed to it so that it becomes part of his or her contract. The agreement does not need to be in writing and may be implied if the employee continues to work once the term has been brought to his or her notice, either at the commencement of employment or following a variation.[48]Where contractual provisions and written agreements authorising deductions are being relied on, these should be drafted as precisely as possible. In Galletly v Abel Environmental Services Ltd Case No 3100684/98 the contract gave the employer the power to deduct ‘any sums due to the employer from the employee for whatever purpose’. The Employment Tribunal held that this was too widely drawn to constitute a relevant provision.[49]In Newland v Mick George Limited ET Case No 2601456/08 a clause in the contract stated that ‘the company reserves the right to deduct from your wages and salaries any amount that may have been overpaid or any other sums owed by you to the company’. The Tribunal was not satisfied that this clause, without more, was sufficient to enable the company to recoup its insurance excess from individual employees in respect of accidents which may have been caused by them.[50]Any ambiguity is likely to be construed against the employer under the contra preferentem rule - a well-established rule of construction whereby ambiguity will be resolved against the party who seeks to rely on it to avoid obligations under the contract.[51]An employer must have authority to make a deduction from wages in order to satisfy s13 of the ERA 1996. A clause simply providing that the employee will be liable for losses incurred by the employer is unlikely to be sufficient.[52]Where it is established that there is a statutory or contractual provision or a written agreement authorising the type of deduction in question the Tribunal may then go on to consider whether the actual deduction is in fact justified. Breach of contract[53]In respect of breach of contract complaints, Regulation 3 of The Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (Scotland) Order 1994 provides that: “Proceedings may be brought before an employment tribunal in respect of a claim of an employee for the recovery of damages or any other sum (other than a claim for damages, or for a sum due, in respect of personal injuries) if—(a) the claim is one to which section 131(2) of the 1978 Act applies and which a court in Scotland would under the law for the time being in force have jurisdiction to hear and determine;(b) the claim is not one to which article 5 applies; and(c) the claim arises or is outstanding on the termination of the employee’s employment.” Discussion and Decision[54]On the basis of the findings made the Tribunal disposes of the issues identified at the outset of the hearing as follows: Unauthorised deductions from wages complaint (wage arrears)[55]The first question is whether the deductions from wages were authorised by a relevant provision in the claimant’s contract or whether the claimant had previously signified in writing his agreement to the deduction.[56]The Tribunal has considered the terms of the Statement of terms and conditions of employment dated 07 December 2023. That is no authorisation provided therein for the deduction of wages for any sums under s13 of the ERA 1996. The Tribunal also took into account the terms of the Deductions from Pay Agreement dated 08 January 2024 (which was the date on which the claimant signed the agreement), including the fifth, nineth and eleventh paragraphs at page one of the said document. There was authority comprising an agreement by the claimant to allow a deduction from his salary (in relation to some matters) within the meaning of section 13 of the ERA 1996.[57]The company vehicle rules were also considered in this context which were signed by the claimant on the same date. That document provides notification to the employee that as a driver of the van he would be responsible for payment to the respondent for certain damage done when driving the vehicle. However, it does not comprise an agreement by the claimant to allow a deduction from his salary within the meaning of section 13 of the ERA 1996 (except in relation to the return of the company vehicle, and in the context of this case this is not relevant as it is accepted that the claimant returned the company vehicle to the respondent).[58]In relation to the deductions from pay document, the next question is whether the deductions made by the respondent that fell within the scope of that document were justified, and whether they fell within the authority provided therein. Deductions regarding alleged breach of requirement for claimant to give notice[59]In terms of the Tribunal’s findings, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that the claimant’s employment was terminated by the respondent. In those circumstances, the respondent is not able to make any deductions from the claimant’s wages regarding any alleged breach of the requirement for the claimant to give notice. Deductions regarding Company Van[60]I note that the deductions from pay agreement provides that, “Any and all damage to vehicles, stock or property that is the result of your carelessness, negligence or deliberate vandalism will render you liable to pay the full or part of the cost of repair or replacement.” That clause ends with the words, “In the event of failure to pay, such costs will be deducted from your pay or court action.” I consider that this is a term advising the claimant that he was responsible for damage to property caused by his carelessness or negligence and in terms that a deduction would be made from wages to enable the respondent to recoup the cost of repairing the damage. That clause is sufficient to constitute a relevant provision authorising a deduction under s 13 of the ERA 1996 for all and any sums due to the company in respect of damage caused by the claimant to the van driven by the claimant during his employment with the respondent (due to the claimant’s negligence or carelessness).[61]The Tribunal is satisfied that this clause, was sufficient to enable the company to recoup costs paid to third parties or its insurance excess from individual employees in respect of damage which may have been caused by them. The Statement of Terms of Employment does not expressly state that drivers of company vehicles are personally liable for accidents caused by their negligence and/or wrongdoing. There are relevant provisions in the company vehicle rules making an employee liable for repairs to the vehicle due to the employee’s negligence or lack of care.[62]I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the claimant is responsible for water damage in respect of the value of items in the van in the sum of £45.00 and a further amount of £40.00 relating to cleaning. I accepted on the balance of probabilities that that damage is likely to have occurred while the company vehicle was in the claimant’s possession, that such damage was caused due to the claimant’s carelessness or negligence and that the sum of £85.00 in terms of costs incurred by the respondent was reasonable in the circumstances. I am not satisfied that the claimant caused any other alleged damage to the company van on the evidence before me.[63]The sum of £85.00 was the actual cost of the remedial work to the respondent, in relation to which the claimant was liable. This was not a penalty.[64]In these circumstances the Tribunal finds that a deduction from wages relating to the damage to the company van arising from the claimant’s negligence or carelessness was authorised within the meaning of s13 of the ERA 1996 (limited to the costs incurred by the respondent in the amount of £85.00). However, except in relation to the deduction of £85.00, I find that any further deductions made by the respondent were an unlawful deduction from wages. Deductions regarding alleged poor workmanship[65]Although there are no relevant provisions that apply to this matter within the claimant’s written Statement of Terms and Conditions, the same clause referred to above within the Deductions from Pay Agreement is a term of the claimant’s contract of employment whereby the deduction from wages for property damage (due to carelessness, negligence, or deliberate vandalism on the part of the claimant) repair costs were authorised. There was also reference made to the claimant’s liability for costs incurred as a result of unsatisfactory standard of work. Thus unsatisfactory standard of work is provided as a specific example of liability for the sums of full or part of the cost of the loss. As stated above that clause ended with the words “In the event of failure to pay, such costs will be deducted from your pay or court action.” Therefore, the claimant could be held liable for any costs occasioned by unsatisfactory standard of work and if the claimant failed to pay the same, the relevant amount could be deducted from the claimant’s pay.[66]It is not clear from the provisions of that agreement, how, when and by whom any determination would be made in terms of whether the claimant’s standard of work was unsatisfactory and how any damage or costs were to be assessed. The claimant was not notified about any alleged unsatisfactory standard of work during the course of his employment with the respondent.[67]The Tribunal did not have any evidence to show that the respondent had brought the allegations relating to unsatisfactory standard of work to the claimant’s attention prior to the start of the Employment Tribunal claim.[68]Having assessed the evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal did not find that the claimant’s standard of work was unsatisfactory, negligent, or careless, and further and in any event, the Tribunal did not accept that any damage was caused, or costs were occasioned as a result of the same.[69]In these circumstances the Tribunal finds that a deduction from wages relating to repayment of unsatisfactory standards of work (or any alleged damage occasioned by the claimant) was not authorised within the meaning of s13 of the ERA 1996. Any deductions made in relation to this matter by the respondent were an unlawful deduction from wages in the circumstances.[70]The claimant’s final salary was due to be paid to the claimant on 01 February 2024 in the amount of £1672.00 gross. The respondent was entitled to deduct the amount of £85.00 from that payment (as indicated above). I find that any further amounts deducted by the respondent were unauthorised deductions from the claimant’s wages. The claimant is therefore owed the amount of £1587.00 (£1672.00 - £85.00 = £1587.00) less any required deductions in respect of tax and national insurance. Breach of contract (expenses)[71]Furthermore, the claimant was entitled as a matter of contract to reimbursement in respect of parking expenses incurred in the course of his employment with the respondent. The claimant incurred expenditure totalling £20.70 in respect of parking expenses in relation to 15, 16 and 18 January 2024. The claimant sent receipts relating to these expenses to Josh Wood by WhatsApp messages. The claimant followed the correct and proper procedure in relation to claiming his expenses. The respondent indicated to the respondent that the claimant’s expenses would be paid to him.[72]In the circumstances and on the evidence before me, I find that the respondent was in breach of contract in terms of their failure to pay the claimant’s expenses. There was no right by the respondent to set off any amount in respect thereof. I therefore award the claimant the amount of £20.70 in respect of his breach of contract (expenses) complaint.
Conclusion
[73]In respect of the claimant’s complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages (wage arrears) the claimant is awarded the amount of £1587.00 less any required deductions in respect of tax and national insurance.[74]In terms of the claimant’s complaint of breach of contract (expenses), the claimant is awarded the sum of £20.70. B. Beyzade[1]This case called before the Tribunal on 05 February 2025, for an in chambers Reconsideration Hearing, with the Employment Judge sitting alone in chambers (in private). This was appropriate having taken account of the matters contained in the Senior President’s Practice Direction on Panel Composition (“the Practice Direction”) along with the Presidential Guidance on Panel Composition which came into effect on 29 October 2024. It is noted in this regard that the Practice Direction provides, “6. In respect of any other matter an Employment Tribunal is to consist of a judge. This includes consideration of whether a party’s application for reconsideration discloses a reasonable prospect of a judgment being varied or revoked.” The Presidential Guidance indicates at paragraph 16 that post-hearing matters in respect of a reconsideration application (including when deciding whether or not such an application discloses a reasonable prospect of a judgment being varied or revoked under Rule 72 of the ET Rules 2013) will always be decided by an Employment Judge sitting alone. In addition, I am satisfied that this decision in respect of panel composition furthers the interests of justice and accords with the Tribunal’s overriding objective, taking account that the Original Judgment was promulgated following a hearing before an Employment Judge sitting alone.[2]The respondent made an application dated 18 December 2024 for reconsideration. At the date the application was made, the rules for reconsideration were set out at Rules 70 and 71 of Schedule 1 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 (“the ET Rules 2013”) [the Rules relating to reconsideration of Judgments are, as at today’s date, contained in Rules 68 to 70 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (“the ET Rules 2024”)].[3]The Employment Judge considered the respondent’s application under Rule 70 of the ET Rules 2024 (the legal test under Rule 70(2) of the ET Rules 2024 is in the same terms as Rule 72(1) of the ET Rules 2013). The Employment Judge decided that there is no reasonable prospect of the Original Judgment being varied or revoked because of the reasons set forth below.[4]The reconsideration application arose out of the Tribunal’s Judgment on 03 December 2024 (issued to parties on 04 December 2024) [“the Original Judgment”] that: “1.1 the complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages in respect of arrears of pay between 08 January 2024 and 22 January 2024 is well founded and the respondent is ordered to pay the claimant the sum of £1587.00 (gross) from which tax and national insurance requires to be deducted, provided that the respondent intimates any such deductions in writing to the claimant and remits the sum deducted to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. 1.2 The claimant’s complaint of breach of contract (expenses) is wellfounded and the claimant is awarded the amount of £20.70 in respect thereof.”[5]After receipt of the respondent’s reconsideration application which was referred to the Employment Judge, and thereafter, following the Employment Judge’s directions, the Clerk to the Tribunal, sent correspondence to the parties dated 20 January 2025 advising that the respondent’s application had been referred to the Employment Judge for consideration in accordance with Rules 68-70 of the ET Rules 2024, which will be issued to parties in due course. 6. 05 February 2025 was the earliest convenient date for the Tribunal to consider the respondent’s application, on account of other commitments, including annual leave, the date of receipt of the respondent’s application, and other judicial commitments. The Tribunal’s Original Judgment[7]By a Reserved Judgment, following a listed Final Hearing in public that took place as CVP a hearing held in Glasgow on 09 September 2024 and having heard and considered evidence and detailed submissions from parties, the Tribunal, determined that the claimant’s complaints were well founded and awarded a sum of money in respect of each of the complaints (as detailed below), and it did so for the reasons given at the time in the Tribunal’s written Reasons dated 03 December 2024 that were issued to parties dated 04 December 2024.[8]The issues that the Tribunal were required to investigate and determine during the Final Hearing in Public, were set out at paragraph 6 of the Original Judgment.[9]For present purposes, it will suffice to note here the specific terms of the Tribunal’s Judgment only, issued in writing on 04 December 2024 (“the Original Judgment”), as follows: “1.1 the complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages in respect of arrears of pay between 08 January 2024 and 22 January 2024 is well founded and the respondent is ordered to pay the claimant the sum of £1587.00 (gross) from which tax and national insurance requires to be deducted, provided that the respondent intimates any such deductions in writing to the claimant and remits the sum deducted to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. 1.2 The claimant’s complaint of breach of contract (expenses) is wellfounded and the claimant is awarded the amount of £20.70 in respect thereof.” Respondent’s reconsideration application[10]On 18 December 2024, by way of an email sent that day to the Tribunal at 08.00AM, the respondent, applied to the Tribunal, for reconsideration of the Original Judgment that was sent to parties in writing following the Final Hearing on 09 September 2024 (the Judgment was issued to parties in writing on 04 December 2024).[11]The respondent’s application did not appear to have been copied to the claimant by way of cc into the said email and there was no confirmation within the email that the claimant had been copied into the email. Therefore, the respondent failed to comply with the requirements of Rules 31 and 90 of the ET Rules 2024. Notwithstanding this, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the application pursuant to Rule 70 of the ET Rules 2024.[12]The respondent’s reconsideration application, which was sent to the Tribunal by Mr Jordan Burns McPhail, Company Owner acting on behalf of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the respondent”) states as follows: “1. A considerable portion of the evidence presented consists of hearsay. The claimant did not provide verifiable proof for several key events; however, the judge relied on this hearsay in reaching the ruling. 2. We did not receive a complete bundle of evidence nor were we informed of the specific claims in detail prior to the hearing. For example; We were unaware that the claimant was disputing the damages to the van, which hindered our ability to submit relevant evidence. The claim presented to us pertained exclusively to nonpayment of wages. The claimant had been provided with a breakdown of deductions and could have raised any disputes regarding these deductions, thus allowing us to provide further evidence. 3. We were not given the opportunity to request the attendance of Mr. Wood, as we were uninformed of the disputed events that led to the claimant's departure. 4. We contend that the Employment Judge lacks the requisite technical knowledge and business knowledge to make a ruling on issues related to poor workmanship or the associated costs incurred. 5. It is unreasonable for the Tribunal to state that they "did not find that the claimant's standard of work was unsatisfactory." The judge does not possess the technical expertise necessary to render judgments on the quality of work, and surely it is the Tribunal's responsibility to determine whether the deductions were lawful in accordance with the contractual agreements. The Tribunal is not equipped to assess the adequacy of the claimant's work as they are not qualified and competent tradespersons. 6. We believe that the Employment Judge did not give sufficient consideration to the Deductions to Pay Agreement and other documents that clearly indicate the claimant's contractual acceptance of these deductions. 7. The judge dismissed several of our arguments on the basis of a "lack of evidence," despite the fact that essential evidence had not been able to be submitted prior to the hearing due to our unawareness of the claimant's arguments. In contrast, the claimant's verbal accounts were accepted as credible, while our version of events was rejected, which raises concerns of bias. There was also bias whereby the Judge sided with the Claimant in regards to explanations around works quality, even after in depth explanations from the respondent and images showing clear debris which was agreed by both parties to be there, yet the Judge still favoured the claimant. 8. Regarding our claim for poor workmanship, the judge noted that "the respondent did not provide copies of any relevant invoices or receipts relating to expenditure." However, we clarified that, as a company utilizing in-house labor, we would not possess invoices from external parties. This still constitutes a loss of income while our personnel were engaged in that job, thereby resulting in lost revenue. Our explanation was thorough, and we find the judge's decision perplexing in light of the information provided. In conclusion, we assert that had we been furnished with the correct details prior to the hearing, we would have been able to submit sufficient evidence. Additionally, we were unable to request a postponement, as the relevant arguments became clear only during the hearing. We also believe that a substantial amount of evidence was not submitted due to a lack of awareness on our part regarding its necessity, and that the judge appeared to favor the claimant based on hearsay without factual substantiation. This situation presents new evidence, as we are now aware of the claimant's arguments and are prepared to submit the relevant documentation that will support our case.” Issues for determination by this Tribunal[13]The only live issue for determination by the Tribunal at this Reconsideration Hearing was the respondent’s application for reconsideration of the Original Judgment dated 03 December 2024 and issued on 04 December 2024, as per the respondent’s application of 18 December 2024.[14]Accordingly, the case file was referred to the Employment Judge thereafter for further directions. The Employment Judge was provided with copies of all correspondences received from parties since 09 September 2024 (in addition to correspondences prior to 09 September 2024 which were accessible within the Tribunal file that were before the Tribunal at the Final Hearing and had been forwarded to the Employment Judge thereafter).[15]The Employment Judge also reviewed all correspondences on the Tribunal file between the parties and the Tribunal up to and including today’s date, 05 February 2025. Relevant law: reconsideration[16]The ET Rules 2024 in relation to the reconsideration of judgments are at Rules 68 – 70. Those provisions are as follows: “Principles 68.—(1) The Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.(2) A judgment under reconsideration may be confirmed, varied or revoked.(3) If the judgment under reconsideration is revoked the Tribunal may take the decision again. In doing so, the Tribunal is not required to come to the same conclusion. Application for reconsideration 69 - Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration must be made in writing setting out why reconsideration is necessary and must be sent to the Tribunal within 14 days of the later of— (a) the date on which the written record of the judgment sought to be reconsidered was sent to the parties, or (b) the date that the written reasons were sent, if these were sent separately. Process for reconsideration 70.— (1) The Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69 (application for reconsideration). (2) If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. (3) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the Tribunal must send a notice to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application must be received by the Tribunal, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may also set out the Tribunal’s provisional views on the application.(4) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any written representations provided under paragraph (3), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice.(5) If the Tribunal determines the application without a hearing the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations in respect of the application.”[17]I noted that the ET Rules 2013 set out the Rules of Procedure in Schedule 1, and those in relation to the reconsideration of judgments were at Rules 70 – 73.[18]When considering such an issue regard must also be had to the Tribunal’s overriding objective in Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024 (previously Rule 2 under the ET Rules 2013). The Tribunal’s “overriding objective” under Rule 3 is to deal with the case fairly and justly. The precise terms of Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024, are as follows: “3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable— (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, (b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, (c) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings, (d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and (e) saving expense.(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules, or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction.(4) The parties and their representatives must— (a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.”[19]A reconsideration application requires to be dealt with as per Rules 68 to 70 of the ET Rules 2024. I have set out its full terms above for ease of reference. As this was an application for reconsideration by the respondent, Rule 71, relating to reconsiderations by the Tribunal on its own initiative, does not fall to be considered further. Further, as always, there is the Tribunal’s overriding objective, under Rule 3, to deal with the case fairly and justly.[20]The previous Employment Tribunal Rules 2004 provided a number of grounds on which a judgment could be reviewed (now called a reconsideration). The only ground in the ET Rules 2024 is that the judgment can be reconsidered where it is necessary “in the interests of justice” to do so. That means justice to all parties.[21]However, it was confirmed by Her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she then was, now Mrs Justice Eady, the EAT President 01 February 2022 to 01 February 2025) in Outasight VB Limited v Brown [2014] UKEAT/0253/14/LA, reported at [2015] ICR D11, that the guidance given by the EAT in respect the previous Rules is still relevant guidance in respect of the ET Rules 2013 (the legal test under Rule 70(2) of the ET Rules 2024 remains unchanged) and, therefore, I have considered the case law arising out of the 2004 Rules.[22]The approach to be taken to applications for reconsideration was also set out more recently in the case of Liddington v 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust [2016] UKEAT/0002/16/DA in the judgment of the then Mrs Justice Simler, then President of the EAT, and now Lady Simler in the Supreme Court. The Employment Tribunal is required to: “1. identify the Rules relating to reconsideration and in particular to the provision in the Rules enabling a Judge who considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked refusing the application without a hearing at a preliminary stage; 2. address each ground in turn and consider whether is anything in each of the particular grounds relied on that might lead ET to vary or revoke the decision; and 3. give reasons for concluding that there is nothing in the grounds advanced by the (applicant) that could lead him to vary or revoke his decision.”[23]In paragraph 34 and 35 of the Judgment, the learned former EAT President, the then Mrs Justice Simler (now Lady Simler, a Justice of the Supreme Court), stated as follows: “34. In his Reconsideration Judgment the Judge identified the Rules relating to reconsideration and in particular to the provision in the Rules enabling a Judge who considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked refusing the application without a hearing at a preliminary stage. In this case, the Judge addressed each ground in turn. He considered whether was anything in each of the particular grounds relied on that might lead him to vary or revoke his decision. For the reasons he gave, he concluded that there was nothing in the grounds advanced by the Claimant that could lead him to vary or revoke his decision, and accordingly he refused the application at the preliminary stage. As he made clear, a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to re-litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered. Tribunals have a wide discretion whether or not to order reconsideration, and the opportunity for appellate intervention in relation to a refusal to order reconsideration is accordingly limited. 35. Where, as here, a matter has been fully ventilated and properly argued, and in the absence of any identifiable administrative error or event occurring after the hearing that requires a reconsideration in the interests of justice, any asserted error of law is to be corrected on appeal and not through the back door by way of a reconsideration application. It seems to me that the Judge was entitled to conclude that reconsideration would not result in a variation or revocation of the decision in this case and that the Judge did not make any error of law in refusing reconsideration accordingly.”[24]There is a public policy principle that there must be finality in litigation and reviews or reconsiderations are a limited exception to that principle. In the case of Stephenson v Golden Wonder Limited [1977] IRLR 474 it was made clear that a review (now a reconsideration) is not a method by which a disappointed litigant gets a “second bite of the cherry”. Lord Macdonald, the EAT Judge in Scotland, said that the review provisions were “not intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence can be rehearsed with different emphasis, or further evidence produced which was available before”.[25]The Employment Appeal Tribunal went on to say in the case of Fforde v Black EAT68/80 that this ground does not mean “that in every case where a litigant is unsuccessful is automatically entitled to have the Tribunal review it. Every unsuccessful litigant thinks that the interests of justice require a review. This ground of review only applies in even more exceptional cases where something has gone radically wrong with the procedure involving the denial of natural justice or something of that order.”[26]“In the interests of justice” means the interests of justice to all parties. The EAT provided further guidance in Reading v EMI Leisure Limited EAT262/81 where it was stated “when you boil down what it said on [the claimant’s] behalf it really comes down to this: that she did not do herself justice at the hearing so justice requires that there should be a second hearing so that she may. Now, “justice”, means justice to both parties. It is not said, and, as we see it, cannot be said that any conduct of the case by the employers here caused [the claimant] not to do herself justice. It was, we are afraid, her own inexperience in the situation.”[27]I consider that any guidance on the meaning of “the interests of justice” issued under the 2004 Rules (and the earlier Rules) is still relevant to reconsiderations under the ET Rules 2024. I also remind myself that the phrase “in the interests of justice” means the interests of justice to all parties.[28]Further, I have also reminded myself of the guidance to Tribunals in Newcastle upon Tyne City Council – v- Marsden [2010] ICR 743 and in particular the words of Mr Justice Underhill when commenting on the introduction of the overriding objective (now found in Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024) and the necessity to review previous decisions and on the subject of a review: “But it is important not to throw the baby out with the bath-water. As Rimer LJ observed in Jurkowska v Hlmad Ltd. [2008] ICR 841, at para. 19 of his judgment (p. 849), it is “basic” “… that dealing with cases justly requires that they be dealt with in accordance with recognised principles. Those principles may have to be adapted on a case by case basis to meet what are perceived to be the special or exceptional circumstances of a particular case. But they at least provide the structure on the basis of which a just decision can be made.”[29]Further, I have also considered the further guidance on the ET Rules 2013 from Her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she then was, now Mrs Justice Eady, former EAT President) in her judgment in Outasight VB Limited –v- Brown [2014] UKEAT/0253/14. I have considered that guidance and in particular have noted what is said about the grounds for a reconsideration under the ET Rules 2013: “In my judgment, the 2013 Rules removed the unnecessary (arguably redundant) specific grounds that had been expressly listed in the earlier Rules. Any consideration of an application under one of the specified grounds would have taken the interests of justice into account. The specified grounds can be seen as having provided examples of circumstances in which the interests of justice might allow a review. The previous listing of such examples in the old Rules - and their absence from new - does not provide any reason for treating the application in this case differently simply because it fell to be considered under the “interests of justice” provision of the 2013 Rules. Even if it did not meet the requirements laid down in Rule 34(3)(d) of the 2004 Rules, the ET could have considered whether it should be allowed as in the interests of justice under Rule 34(3)(e). There is no reason why it should then have adopted a more restrictive approach than it was bound to apply under the 2013 Rules”.[30]In considering matters in the present case, I also reviewed the EAT judgment in Wolfe v North Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust [2015] ICR 960; [2015] UKEAT/0065/14, and I have noted, from that judgment, at paragraph 75, what the EAT judge, His Honour Judge Serota QC, stated: “There is now a long line of authority to the effect that where a would be Appellant believes there has been a material omission on the part of an Employment Tribunal to deal with a significant issue or to give adequate reasons in respect of significant findings, the proper course is not to lodge a Notice of Appeal, but to go straight back to the Employment Tribunal and ask that the omission be repaired. If reasons are given orally, this should be done as soon as practicable on the completion of delivery of the judgment, and if Written Reasons are later handed down as soon as practicable after the Judgment is received. I would like to make clear that it is the duty of advocates to adopt this course in litigation in the Employment Tribunal.”[31]Further, in considering this reconsideration application, I have also taken into account the helpful judicial guidance provided by Her Honour Judge Eady QC, then EAT Judge, and now former EAT President, in her judgment in Scranage v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2018] UKEAT/0032/17, at paragraph 22, when considering the relevant legal principles, where she stated as follows: - “The test for reconsideration under the ET Rules is thus straightforwardly whether such reconsideration is in the interests of justice (see Outasight VB Ltd v Brown UKEAT/0253/14 (21 November 2014, unreported). The "interests of justice" allow for a broad discretion, albeit one that must be exercised judicially, which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.”[32]At Outasight VB Ltd v Brown, at paragraphs 27 to 38, the learned EAT Judge (now Mrs Justice Eady, former EAT President) reviewed the legal principles. The EAT President, then Mr Justice Langstaff, in Dundee City Council v Malcolm [2016] UKEATS/0019-21/15, at paragraph 20, states that the current Rules effected no change of substance to the previous Rules, and that they do not permit a party to have a second bite of the cherry, and the broader interests of justice, in particular an interest in the finality of litigation, remained just as important after the change as it had been before[33]Further, I have also taken into account the Court of Appeal of England and Wales’s judgment, in Ministry of Justice v Burton & Another [2016] EWCA Civ.714, also reported at [2016] ICR 1128, where Lord Justice Elias (now a retired Lord Justice of Appeal), himself a former EAT President, at paragraph 25, refers, without demur, to the principles “recently affirmed by HH Judge Eady in the EAT in Outasight VB Ltd v Brown UKEAT/0253/14.”[34]Specifically, at paragraph 21 in Burton, Lord Justice Elias had stated that: “An employment tribunal has a power to review a decision "where it is necessary in the interests of justice": see Rule 70 of the Tribunal Rules. This was one of the grounds on which a review could be permitted in the earlier incarnation of the rules. However, as Underhill J, as he was, pointed out in Newcastle on Tyne City Council v Marsden [2010] ICR 743, para. 17 the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open-ended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR 395) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily…” Discussion and decision[35]I have now carefully considered the respondent’s written application, and all correspondences up to and including 05 February 2025, including all references to evidence within the respondent’s reconsideration application, my own notes of the evidence and submissions made at the Final Hearing (including any documents, oral evidence, submissions and authorities referred to by parties), the Judgment and written reasons issued to parties following that hearing, and also my own obligations under Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024, being the Tribunal’s overriding objective to deal with the case fairly and justly.[36]I consider that the respondent has been given a reasonable opportunity, in advance of this Reconsideration Hearing, to make their application for reconsideration of the Original Judgment and to put forth any grounds in respect thereof.[37]On the test of “in the interests of justice”, under Rule 68 of the ET Rules 2024, which is what gives this Tribunal jurisdiction in this matter, there is now only one ground for “reconsideration”, being that reconsideration “is necessary in the interests of justice.” That phrase is not defined in the ET Rules 2024 (unlike the position upon which a Tribunal could “review” a Judgment under the former 2004 Rules).[38]While there are many similarities between the former 2004 Rules and the ET Rules 2024, there are some differences between the current Rules 68 to 70 of the ET Rules 2024 and the former 2004 Rules 33 to 36. Reconsideration of a Judgment is one of the two possible ways that a party can challenge an Employment Tribunal’s Judgment. The other way, of course, is by way of an appeal to the EAT.[39]Rule 68 confers a general power on the Employment Tribunal, and it stands in contrast to the appellate jurisdiction of the EAT. In most cases, a reconsideration will deal with matters more quickly and at less expense than an appeal to the EAT.[40]Here, in the present case, according to the information on the Tribunal file, the respondent has not chosen to pursue both routes. If the respondent decides to appeal to the EAT (if so advised), the EAT will decide on next steps in that appeal after it, and parties, have given consideration to this my Reconsideration Judgment. Disposal Grounds of respondent’s application – is it necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the Original Judgment?[41]Having assessed the submissions and representations made by the respondent, I am of the view that this reconsideration application in respect of the grounds of the respondent’s application should be refused because it is not necessary in the interests of justice to grant the respondent’s application.[42]The Tribunal is of the view that it is not in the interests of justice to allow the respondent’s application in respect of any of the grounds set out within the respondent’s application, and nor would it be in accordance with the Tribunal’s overriding objective to deal with the case fairly and justly to grant the respondent’s application on any of the grounds within the respondent’s application.[43]In reaching this view, I have again reviewed the documents in the substantial file of papers provided at the Final Hearing (documents referred to by parties in evidence during the Final Hearing, the evidence before the Tribunal and my notes), all relevant correspondences on the Tribunal file, the relevant statutory provisions and case law authorities, the parties’ representations made at the hearing, and I have taken account of all of the relevant circumstances in doing so.[44]I do not believe that the Tribunal have made any error of law, as suggested by the respondent, but I do recognise that if an appeal is pursued to the EAT, that matter is ultimately a matter for the EAT to decide upon, and not for this Tribunal.[45]As I see things, in considering the closing arguments of the parties, following the evidence provided to the Tribunal at the Final Hearing, the Tribunal thereafter took all their evidence and submissions into account relating to the grounds within the respondent’s application, during their private deliberation in chambers, taking into account all relevant considerations, and the Tribunal did not have regard to anything irrelevant.[46]The Tribunal sought to take into account all of the circumstances of the case, and the correspondences, documents and submissions before the Tribunal. The Tribunal applied the facts to the law, and it reached the conclusions that were reached in the Original Judgment.[47]Now, on reconsideration, the Tribunal do not consider it is necessary in the interests of justice to vary the Original Judgment and allow the respondent’s application. Put simply, the respondent’s arguments put within the reconsideration application have not established for me that it would be necessary in the interests of justice for the Original Judgment to be varied or revoked on reconsideration.[48]My view remains essentially the same as it was expressed in the Reasons given at the time in the Tribunal’s written Judgment and Reasons ruling on 03 December 2024 and sent to parties on 04 December 2024.[49]As the EAT has made clear, in many other instances, when reviewing any Judgment of an Employment Tribunal, parties should know why they have won or lost, but the Tribunal’s decision is not required to be an elaborate formalistic product of refined legal draftsmanship – it must give adequate reasons for its decision, and failure to do so can amount to an error of law giving rise to an appeal to the EAT.[50]The Tribunal gave adequate reasons at the time, when the written Judgment and Reasons were delivered but, in light of the respondent’s reconsideration application suggesting that incomplete or inadequate reasons have been given for certain matters, I take the opportunity to amplify those earlier reasons here in the Reasons for this Reconsideration Judgment.[51]I am satisfied that the Tribunal did not fail to take into account relevant considerations, and further, that the Tribunal did not have regard to irrelevant considerations.[52]For completeness, I confirm that prior to reaching the Tribunal’s conclusion in the Original Judgment the Tribunal reviewed all the documents to which it were referred including but not limited to the matters within the respondent’s reconsideration application that were before the Tribunal during the Final Hearing.[53]I have included below brief observations in respect of the grounds within the respondent’s reconsideration application: 53.1. The respondent sets out their position in respect of a number of events relating to the evidence before the Tribunal. By way of example the respondent states in their application that a considerable amount of the evidence was hearsay and the claimant did not provide verifiable proof for several key events. The Tribunal heard evidence from the claimant’s and the respondent’s witnesses on the relevant matters, and reached their conclusions based on the oral evidence, the documents to which the Tribunal was referred and parties’ submissions. The respondent’s references to there being a considerable portion of hearsay evidence that formed the basis of the Original Judgment is not accepted. The claimant gave evidence which was on the whole based on their own experience of the relevant events and by reference to documents (including documents produced by the respondent). The Tribunal refers to their findings of fact and conclusions relating to this matter within the Original Judgment. 53.2. The respondent levels criticism that they did not receive a complete file of evidence nor were they informed of the specific complaints in detail (including that the claimant was disputing damage to the van). The claimant stated in their ET1 Form that they were owed a number of days’ wages and the sum of money claimed in respect of expenses. The respondent intimated in their ET3 Form that deductions from the claimant’s wages had been made and that those deductions were lawful. The respondent advised at the outset of the hearing that they had failed to send the claimant copies of the respondent’s supporting documents (please see paragraph 4 of the Original Judgment). By agreement the Tribunal adjourned the hearing to allow the claimant a period of time (20 minutes) to review the respondent’s documents. Although it is not clear what further evidence the respondent wished to present in relation to any alleged damage to the company van, the claimant had only been given an opportunity to review the respondent’s supporting documents during the hearing. I accepted in the Original Judgment (paragraph 40) the respondent’s evidence to the extent that £85.00 damage had been sustained to the company van. As recorded at paragraph 5 of the Original Judgment, both parties were prepared to continue with the Hearing and neither party applied for a postponement of the hearing. The Tribunal refers to their findings of fact and conclusions relating to this matter within the Original Judgment. 53.3. The respondent refers to not being given the opportunity to call Mr Wood to give evidence. The respondent was at liberty to produce any relevant witness evidence but it elected not to call Mr Wood. The Tribunal set out their observations in respect of Mr Wood not giving evidence at paragraph 35 of the Original Judgment. Furthermore, the application does not set out what issues Mr Wood would have spoken to had he been called to give evidence. 53.4. It is difficult to decipher the contention that the Employment Judge lacks the technical knowledge and business knowledge to make a ruling on issues related to poor workmanship or the associated costs incurred. The respondent did not raise any such concerns prior to or during the Final Hearing. It was open to the respondent to make an application to call professional evidence on matters requiring opinion evidence (if appropriate). The respondent made no such application and no explanation is proffered in the application in respect thereof. The Tribunal made its decision based on the oral evidence, the documents to which it was referred and parties’ submissions. 53.5. The Tribunal considered the terms of the Deductions to Pay Agreement and other documents to which it was referred. The relevant findings relating to the same are set out in the Original Judgment. 53.6. In relation to the respondent’s contention that they utilised in house labour, the respondent did not establish relevant matters relating to liability and quantum that they had asserted in respect thereof and I refer to the findings in the Original Judgment. 53.7. In terms of any evidential matters that were referred to within the respondent’s oral evidence and any documents referred to therein, the Tribunal took account and considered the same prior to reaching their conclusion. The respondent does not appear to make any proper application to rely upon fresh evidence, I do not accept that any purported fresh evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence by the respondent for use during the Final Hearing (or that the respondent did not have the opportunity to apply for a postponement) and no proper particulars of any proposed fresh evidence have been provided in any event. 53.8. The Tribunal’s findings of fact and observations were set out in the Original Judgment. The Tribunal also reached conclusions on each point within the List of Issues thereafter. 53.9. The Tribunal took account of and considered the respondent’s evidence, along with the other evidence, and it reached the conclusions on any relevant evidence before the Tribunal in terms of the matters contained in the List of Issues (as set out in the Original Judgment).[54]Moreover, having considered all of the respondent’s points made in respect of the reconsideration application, I consider the Final Hearing was conducted both in accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair trial) and the Tribunal’s overriding objective set out in Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024. The List of Issues in this case was clearly set out in the Original Judgment, the Tribunal considered evidence before it from both parties’ witnesses, it considered any oral representations from parties, and the Original Judgment was delivered to parties thereafter which disposed of all the matters within the List of Issues. Ultimately, the claimant’s claim succeeded following the Final Hearing and the relevant sum of money was awarded in respect of each of the claimant’s complaints. The respondent’s allegations relating to bias are not well founded.[55]The Original Judgment remains unaltered having taken a step back to consider the respondent’s application in light of the full factual matrix, the evidence and the submissions that were before the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not accept the respondent’s position that it is in the interests of justice to reconsider the Original Judgment. In my judgment, it would not be appropriate or proportionate to revisit or to reconsider the Original Judgment (or to list a reconsideration hearing in public), in circumstances in which there is no reasonable prospect of the Original Judgment being varied or revoked.[56]On the whole, the respondent’s application appears to be a challenge in terms of the oral evidence, documents and submissions taken into account by the Tribunal and the weight afforded to the same which is a matter for the Tribunal, and which was carefully considered prior to reaching the Tribunal’s decision. If the respondent disagrees with the Tribunal’s approach in terms of the same, the proper way to challenge this is by way of an appeal (if so advised) and not a reconsideration application.[57]The Tribunal’s conclusions were reached after having considered all the evidence and submissions before the Tribunal, including in terms of any witness evidence, documents, the Tribunal’s notes of the oral evidence and submissions (and the matters contained within the documents to which the Tribunal were referred).[58]In any event, a perversity appeal, which is essentially a complaint about a Tribunal’s conclusions (if so advised) should be pursued at the EAT. In reaching this decision on the respondent’s reconsideration application, consideration has been given to the leading case in terms of the threshold for a perversity appeal, Yeboah v Crofton [2002] IRLR 634 at paragraph 93, in which Mummery LJ said: “Such an appeal ought only to succeed where an overwhelming case is made out that the Employment Tribunal reached a decision that no reasonable tribunal, on a proper application of the evidence and the law, would have reached. Even in cases where the appeal tribunal has ‘grave doubts’ about the decision of the employment tribunal, it must proceed with ‘great care,’ British Telecommunications PLC v Sheridan [1990] IRLR 27 at para 34.”[59]Having carefully considered the points made by the respondent in this reconsideration application, the Tribunal does not consider that it is necessary in the interests of justice to revoke or vary the Original Judgment in respect of any of the grounds of the respondent’s reconsideration application, and the Tribunal adheres to the Original Judgment, for the reasons given then with the Original Judgment, and as now amplified in these Reasons. As such, the Original Judgment stands, and the Tribunal does not set it aside. Conclusion[60]The respondent’s application dated 18 December 2024 for reconsideration of the Judgment and Reason dated on 03 December 2024 (Judgment and written reasons sent to the parties on 04 December 2024) is refused. There is no reasonable prospect of the Original Judgment being varied or revoked for the reasons set out above.[61]Accordingly, the Tribunal does not vary or revoke the Original Judgment in respect of any of the grounds of the respondent’s reconsideration application, as the Tribunal confirms the Original Judgment, that being the appropriate disposal having refused the respondent’s reconsideration application. Further procedure[62]The reconsideration application made by the respondent having been refused, no further consideration shall be given to the same and no further directions shall be issued. As the Original Judgment has not been varied or revoked, the Original Judgment is confirmed. There are no further or other applications that have been made in the Employment Tribunal that remain extant. B. Beyzade Employment Judge 05 February 2025 Date of Judgment I confirm that this is my Reconsideration Judgment and Reasons in the case of 8000241/2024 Mr Mark Dalziel v MCP Scotland Ltd and that I have signed the Reconsideration Judgment and Reasons by electronic signature.