Ms T Nelson v City of Edinburgh Council: 8000053/2022
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8000053/2022Venue EdinburghHearing 21 March 2023
Between
Ms T NelsonClaimantCity of Edinburgh CouncilRespondent
Before
Employment Judge JonesMs Thomson (instructed by Solicitor) for respondentDate 16 May 2023
JUDGMENT
[1]The respondent’s application to strike out the claimant’s claim in terms of section 43B Employment Rights Act 1996 succeeds and the claimant’s claim in terms of section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is struck out.[2]The case will now be listed for a final hearing to determine whether the refusal to grant the claimant annual leave on 16 March amounted to an act of direct sex discrimination and whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine that matter. Background[1]The claimant presented a claim on 5 September 2022 alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination on the ground of sex and that she had been subjected to detriments because she made a protected disclosure. The claim form was brief in its terms and did not specify the protected disclosure said to have been made or what detriments the claimant had been subjected to as a result. Neither did it provide any specifics of the alleged discrimination on the ground of sex. The claimant was called upon by the respondent in its response form to provide further specification of her claim. The respondent also highlighted that the claimant had raised an internal complaint in terms of the respondent’s Avoidance of Bullying and Harassment Policy.[2]The claimant has continued to represent herself throughout these proceedings.[3]The claimant was further called upon by the respondent on 30 November to provide specification of her claim in a detailed request for further specification. The claimant responded on 1 December.[4]A preliminary hearing for the purposes of case management took place by telephone conference call on 7 December. During that hearing efforts were made to clarify the nature of the claimant’s claims as they remained unspecified.[5]During that hearing the claimant indicated that the protected disclosure she relied upon related to inappropriate recruitment practices by the respondent. She said that the respondent had policies and procedures in place which created a legal obligation and that these had been breached.[6]The claimant was unable to specify the nature of the detriments she alleged she had been subjected to for having made the protected disclosure. She was ordered to provide specification of these detriments.[7]In terms of the claimant’s claim of sex discrimination, she indicated that this related to an instance where male colleagues had been given annual leave to attend a football match and her request was turned down. This was on 16 March 2022.[8]The claimant was ordered to specify any allegations which were intended to be included in her claim and had not been referred to in the Note of the Preliminary Hearing by 13 January.[9]On 9 January 2023, the claimant sent a 6 page densely typed email purporting to provide further particulars of her claim. She referred to the protected disclosure she made as ‘nepotism and cronyism’. She also made reference to allegations of deliberate concealment and ‘danger to health and safety of any individual’. She went on to claim she had been subject to direct and indirect discrimination, bullying, harassment and victimisation. The claimant outlined 37 instances in which she said she had been subjected to detrimental treatment for having raised a protected disclosure. Although she had been ordered to specify why she said that any alleged detriments had been related to her making a protected disclosure, there was nothing in the claimant’s particulars which dealt with this issue. In addition, some of the incidents referred to occurred after the date on which she had lodged her claim.[10]The Tribunal then wrote to the claimant indicating that the further particulars which had been provided did not make clear whether the claimant was simply providing background information or whether she was suggesting all the matters outlined were allegations the Tribunal could determine. In addition there was nothing in the particulars to suggest that she was making an application to amend her claim. The claimant’s failure to provide any information to suggest why any detriment had occurred because she had made a protected disclosure was also highlighted.[11]The claimant then sent a further email which appeared to be a chain of emails which had been forwarded which was not comprehensible. She was informed that any further particulars should be provided in PDF format. The claimant confirmed that no application was being made to amend her claim.[12]The claimant was ordered again on 20 January to comply with the Order to properly specify her claim.[13]The claimant sent a further email on 21 January said to be in compliance with the Order which had been made. It referred again to the protected disclosure as being ‘over nepotism and cronyism’. It did not specify any dates or to whom the disclosure was said to have been made. It did not provide further information as to why the claimant said that she had been subjected to detriments for having made a protected disclosure.[14]The respondent then made an application to strike out the claimant’s claims on 30 January. The application was made on the basis of non-compliance with an Order and also on the basis that the claim had no reasonable prospects of success. The claimant objected to the Order being granted and a hearing was listed to consider the application. The respondent sent the claimant a skeleton submission in support of its application in advance of the hearing.[15]Both parties produced a bundle of documents for use at the hearing. The Tribunal expressed disappointment that the claimant did not co-operate with the respondent to ensure that a joint bundle was produced.[16]In the first instance, I sought to understand the claimant’s claims. Sex discrimination claim[17]The claimant confirmed that her only claim of sex discrimination related to the incident of 16 March 2022, where the claimant was not granted annual leave to attend a football match when male colleagues were given leave. While during the hearing the claimant appeared to suggest that she was making further claims of sex discrimination, she did subsequently confirm that this was the only claim of sex discrimination before the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore proceeded on the basis that this was the only allegation of sex discrimination being advanced.[18]The respondent indicated that it accepted that evidence would be required to be heard in relation to this matter and therefore the application to strike out the claimant’s claim did not extend to this allegation of sex discrimination. That said, the respondent confirmed that it was reserving its position on the question of time bar in relation to that matter. Protected disclosure[19]The claimant confirmed that the protected disclosure she relied upon was in relation to alleged breaches of the respondent’s policies and procedures which were said to confer a legal obligation on the respondent. I sought to clarify with the claimant what policies or procedures she was relying upon and in what way she said that these conferred a legal obligation on the respondent. The claimant referred to ‘management policies’. She said she had read some of the policies but could not say what policy she was relying upon or in what way that conferred a legal obligation.[20]The claimant subsequently referred to an email received by her from the respondent which confirmed that following an investigation ‘there had been a breach of the Recruitment and Selection procedure’. The claimant was not able to say what that breach had been or whether that was the procedure being relied upon. The claimant indicated that her concern related to a family member of another member of staff being appointed to role with the respondent. The claimant said that she was aware that the individual had applied for the position, but remained concerned that there was ‘nepotism’. However the claimant was not able to say in what way there had been any breach of the policy.[21]A compliant regarding this matter had been raised by the claimant in an email of 2 January 2022. It would appear that this may have been what the claimant was relying on as a protected disclosure although the claimant did not herself make this clear. The email itself did not refer to any policies, but members of staff who had been appointed and were related to other members of staff. Detriments[22]In the most recent document provided by the claimant (produced at pp131 – 135 of the respondent’s bundle) which appears to set out the detriments to which the claimant alleges she was subject, the claimant refers to 17 matters. These matters also appear to refer to allegations of discrimination although such matters are not part of the claimant’s claim before the Tribunal.[23]The events complained of refer to a number of individuals with whom the claimant worked, a Mr Taylor, Mr Greenan, Mr Herbert and Mr Calder.[24]The clamant says in that document “I feel that Robert Taylor had exposed my disclosure to my senior management and also managers Joe greenan, gavin Calder keith young andy hunter and this is why I was being subjected to this characteristic discrimination from all unwanted male managers attention to be single out as only female driver with less favourable treatment towards myself as a rightened female who had raised public interest disclosure.”[25]The incidents set out in that document lack specification of the detriment to which the claimant allege she was subject and focus more on how she was feeling or how she reacted to certain events. They make continued reference to ‘no duty of care’ without any specification of what is meant in that regard or what specifically was not done which the claimant believes ought to have been done.[26]The allegations are wholly lacking in specification and give no indication as to how they are related in any manner to the claimant’s disclosure of 2 January 2022 (if indeed that is the disclosure being relied upon). Causation[27]I then sought to explore on what basis it could be said that if any of the matters she alleged amounted to detriments were established, these matters could be said to be related to her having made a protected disclosure. Initially, the claimant indicated that management had told her colleagues that she had made a protected disclosure but when asked to outline on what basis she made this allegation she indicated that she could not prove that management had told her colleagues that she had made a protected disclosure. There was nothing in the particulars which might suggest that even if the various allegations outlined could amount to detriments, these were in any way related to the claimant making a protected disclosure. There was nothing to indicate on what basis the individuals mentioned above were aware of the claimant having made a protected disclosure. Discussion and decision[28]Rule 37 of the Tribunal Rules (Schedule 1 to the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013) allows a claim to be struck out on a number of bases. In the present case, the respondent’s application is made in relation to Rule 37(1) (a) and/or (b).[29]Rule 37 (1)(a) provides that a claim may be struck out where it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success and Rule 37(1)(b) relates to failure of a party to comply with an Order of the Tribunal.[30]Dealing with Rule 37(1)(b) in the first instance, compliance with an order is a matter of form not substance. In the present case, although it is true to say that the claimant did not set out in any coherent manner a number of aspects of the requirements of the Order which was made, she did provide a response in compliance with the Order. Taking into account that the claimant is unrepresented and that while significant criticisms of the claimant’s purported compliance with the Tribunal’s Order can be made, I am not satisfied that it can be said that she failed to comply with the Order. Therefore the application made on that basis is refused.[31]Turning then to the application in terms of Rule 37(1)(a), it is said that the claimant’s claim of detriment for having made a protected disclosure has no reasonable prospects of success. Approach to application[32]In the first instance, the Tribunal had at the front of its mind the fact that the claimant is unrepresented. What can be expected of party litigants in terms of the quality of the pleadings made by them is not what is expected of those who are professionally represented. That said, any party bringing a claim to the Tribunal should be able to set out the claim they are advancing with some degree of cogency. A respondent is entitled to know what the case against them is. That is a fundamental principle of fairness. Further, while a Tribunal should ensure that a claimant is given a reasonable opportunity to put forward their claim, there must be a limit to the number of opportunities given to a claimant in that regard.[33]The Tribunal is also cognisant of the fact that the striking out of a claim is a draconian step. If there are factual matters in dispute then generally evidence will be required to determine a claim. Authorities such as Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2007] ICR 1126 demonstrate that much caution should be taken in such circumstances, more recently highlighted by the EAT in Kaul v Ministry of Justice and others EAT/21/713. Does the claim have no reasonable prospects of success?[34]I then turned to consider whether it could be said that there were no reasonable prospects of success of the claimant succeeding in her claim. In order to do so I considered the constituent aspects of her claim. In approaching this question, I sought to consider the claimant’s case at its highest, that is that she could prove all the matters set out by her in what pleadings had been put forward. Did the claimant make a protected disclosure?[35]Part IVA of Employment Rights Act 1996 sets out the definition of a protected disclosure for the purposes of the legislation. Section 43B provides that a qualifying disclosure means “any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one of more of the following”. The provision then goes on to set out various topics of information which will come within the ambit of section 43B and includes information in relation to where “ a person has failed is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject”. This is the basis on which the claimant alleges she made a protected disclosure.[36]The claimant appears to rely on an email of 2 January 2022 to Mr Kramer, which states “a new employee David Welsh has started within my working department at waste street cleansing Seafield but got an 18 month contract with Edinburgh city council with a transfer over from Pertemps my concern is that David Welsh new member of staff is related to a senior boss from Bankhead Chris orroc who is David Welsh Uncle and this is why David Welsh got contract with city Edinburgh council with transfer from Pertemps agency I have never met chris orroc but I feel with what is ongoing could have an impact on more wrong doing going on with the city of edinburgh council with nepotism and cronyism that I feel knowing this information and not sharing it as an employee with someone in a higher position within the council who I feel I can put my trust in and who can deal with this situation and if there is wrongdoing to put right and this is why I have nominated yourself Mr Kramer to send this email as what is happening within my workplace…” Was there a disclosure of information?[37]The first aspect of the test as to whether something amounts to a qualifying disclosure is whether there is a disclosure of information. It would appear that what the claimant is alleging is that an employee may have been appointed to a position with the respondent or given a particular type of contract because he was related to another more senior employee and that this could have an impact on ‘nepotism and cronyism’ within the Council.[38]When asked by me if the claimant knew whether this individual had applied for the role in question, she indicated that she understood that he had. She could not say what aspect of the respondent’s policies or procedures were not followed.[39]While the distinction between what amounts to information which would come within the ambit of section 43B and what amounts to an allegation which would not is not always clear (see for instance Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld 2010 ICR 325, EAT and Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth 2016 IRLR 422, EAT ), it would appear that what the claimant was doing in her email was making an allegation that an appointment had been made without proper process. The claimant does not in her email provide any information as to the basis of this belief or point to particular procedures which were not followed. The Tribunal formed the view that the claimant was simply making an allegation of inappropriate practices and not providing any information to substantiate that allegation. The Tribunal formed the view that the claimant’s email was an allegation and that it was not an example of a person providing information in relation to matters which could amount to a protected disclosure. Did the information relate to a legal obligation?[40]If the claimant’s email did amount to information, then the next question to consider is whether it related to a failure to comply with a legal obligation. The claimant’s position was that there were policies and procedures which created legal obligations on the part of the respondent in relation to the appointment of staff. The breach of a legal obligation can cover a wide variety of matters. It is possible that the failure to follow a recruitment policy could amount to a breach of a legal obligation if for instance it also amount to a breach of equality legislation. The difficulty for the Tribunal in this regard is that the claimant has not pointed to any policy in particular or any provision within such policy. Indeed it appeared to the Tribunal from what was said by the claimant that she did not have any particular policy or procedure in mind, but simply was of the view that there must be some breach. Her allegations appear to be entirely speculative. While in some cases it may be immediately obvious that the relevant information related to a legal obligation, it did not appear to obvious to the Tribunal in the present case given the lack of information from the claimant about what it was about the recruitment which was said to be inappropriate. Did the claimant make the disclosure to an appropriate person?[41]The next issue is the method of disclosure. On the basis that the claimant is relying on an email to senior manager within the respondent’s organisation, it is clear that the disclosure was made within the terms of the legislation. Was the claimant subject to a detriment?[42]As set out above the claimant has made various attempts to set out the detriments to which she alleges she was subjected. While these appear to have been narrowed down in number, they are still entirely lacking in specification. It would appear that the circumstances narrated by the claimant on the whole narrate how she felt about interactions with colleagues rather than in what way she was subjected to a detriment. She complains of colleagues responding with an emoji in texts regarding her notifying them of her absence, of being dissatisfied as to people attending meetings, of being asked to drive a van in which she’d had an accident but then when she objected someone else was asked to drive it. It appeared that the claimant was aggrieved that her grievance was not handled in exactly the way in which she thought it should be handled.[43]While it is well accepted that there is a low threshold in establishing a detriment, that detriment must be clearly expressed and must be something which was done or not done to a claimant. It is not enough that a claimant feels stress and anxiety through their interactions with colleagues. Although the claimant complained about how her grievance was handled, on enquiry, it was clear that the grievance had been dealt with and indeed to some extent was upheld.[44]The details of the detriments the claimant alleges are vague and simply lacking in substance. As detailed above, while it is appreciated that the claimant is unrepresented, she should be able to say with some degree of conciseness what it is she says was or was not done which amounted to a detriment. She has been given a number of opportunities to do so. Causation[45]Section 48(2) Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that once a claimant has established that they made a protected disclosure and that they have been subjected to a detriment by a respondent, it will be for the respondent to demonstrate that the reason for the detriment was not that the claimant had made a protected disclosure. It will often be necessary in the absence of direct evidence for a Tribunal to draw inferences as to the reason for a detriment.[46]In the present case, even if the claimant establishes that she made a protected disclosure and that she was subjected to any detriments, there is simply nothing in the pleadings as they stand to suggest that any detriments were related in any way whatsoever to the claimant having made a protected disclosure. It is recognised that the person responsible for the detriment may not always be required to know the details of a protected disclosure. However, given the nature of the circumstances outlined by the claimant, whereby she is not alleging that there was a collective failure of management, but is directing her criticism at specific individuals in albeit vague allegations, it follows that there must be some degree of knowledge on the part of the individuals. However the claimant candidly admitted that she did not know if her colleagues knew she had made a protected disclosure. Moreover the allegations she makes are so vague that it is difficult to discern on what basis, even if they amounted to detriments, they could in any way be related to the making of a protected disclosure. Conclusion[47]While the Tribunal is aware that it is not its role to determine the claimant’s claim at present, it has formed the view that the allegations made by the claimant are so vague, lacking in specification, and bereft of any linkage to any protected disclosure which could have been made as to present the claimant with almost insurmountable difficulties in establishing her claim. Moreover, it is very difficult to determine on what basis the claimant can establish that she made a protected disclosure in the first place given that if the Tribunal is correct that she is relying on her email of 2 January 2022, then that appears to be no more than an allegation that something inappropriate may have happened without providing any information to substantiate the allegation.[48]In all these circumstances, the Tribunal is of the view that the claimant’s claim in terms of section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 has no reasonable prospects of success and is struck out.[49]The case will now be listed for a hearing to determine the remaining aspect of the claim namely that the refusal to grant her annual leave on 16 March 2022 was an act of direct sex discrimination.[1]The claimant presented a claim on 5 September 2022 alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination on the ground of sex and that she had been subjected to detriments because she made a protected disclosure. The majority of the claimant’s claim was struck out and the remaining aspect of the claimant was an allegation that the claimant had been discriminated against because of her sex in that she was refused a day’s annual leave when male colleagues were granted the day in question.[2]The claimant has continued to represent herself throughout these proceedings. The respondent was represented at this hearing by Counsel, Mr Gibson who was instructed by Ms Thomson.[3]A joint bundle of documents was produced for use at the hearing. The claimant sought to lodge additional documents on the morning of the hearing, but after discussion accepted that these were not relevant to the issues to be determined.[4]The claimant gave evidence and the respondent led evidence from Mr Calder who was alleged to have refused the claimant’s leave. The claimant made a short oral submission and the respondent made oral submissions supplemented by a written submission on the Law and Application to the facts. Findings in fact[5]Having listened to the evidence, considered the documents to which reference were made and submissions of the parties, the Tribunal made the following findings in fact.[6]The claimant was employed by the respondent at its Seafield Depot as a driver and team leader.[7]The claimant and her colleagues worked in two shifts, a red shift and a blue shift. The claimant worked on the blue shift. Each shift worked 4 days on and 4 days off, from 6am until 5.08pm. Around 15 people worked on each shift. The claimant was the only woman who worked on the blue shift.[8]On 17 March 2022, Mr Calder informed the blue shift that they should make any request for annual leave if they wished to attend the semi-final of the Scottish Cup at Hampden in April.[9]Two male members of staff requested and were granted annual leave for 17 April. Mr Calder did not understand the claimant to have asked for leave for that day.[10]Mr Calder provided those who had asked for leave with a copy of their updated leave sheets. The claimant was unhappy that she had not been provided with any documents and left the workplace. She was then off sick and has not returned to work.[11]On 21 March 2022, the claimant sent an email to the respondent entitled ‘work related stress’. In that email she said that she had been off work on 18 and 1 9 March with work related stress. She went on to say “I had asked Gavin before at lunchtime could I put in for a days holiday on 16 April? When I finished my shift Gavin came into the depot with a piece of paper and told the guys that had applied for holidays that there dates where in he also gave a few guys how many days holiday they had left and when he told me he hadn’t put in my holiday request as there was no paperwork for me whatsoever within council computer.’[12]The claimant was not due to be working on 16 April.[13]The Scottish cup semi-final took place on 17 April. Observations on the evidence[14]The claimant’s evidence was confusing and contradictory. The Tribunal had understood her claim to be that she had asked on 1 6 March if she could have a day’s leave on 16 April. However, in evidence before the Tribunal, she said that in fact she asked for leave on 17 March. When it was highlighted to the claimant that she was not due to be working on 16 April, she then said that it was 17 April that she had requested as leave.[15]The Tribunal had also understood that her position was that she had requested leave because she wished to attend the match. However, her evidence before the hearing was that she had requested leave as she had principal care for her niece and nephew and because her husband wished to attend the match, she required leave for child care.[16]The claimant also said that all the male colleagues on the shift had asked for leave for the day, and were granted it, but when questioned further only named two individuals she knew had taken leave and then named two other individuals she thought might have been granted leave. The Tribunal formed the view that the claimant did not know who had been granted leave at all and was simply speculating.[17]Mr Calder’s evidence was straightforward and credible. He had no recollection of the claimant asking for leave and said he had never refused the claimant leave. He said if she had asked for leave for 17 April, he would have granted it. He said the claimant couldn’t have asked for leave for 16 April as she wasn’t working that day. The Tribunal accepted his evidence. Issues to determine[18]The Tribunal was required to determine whether the claimant had asked for leave on the date specified, if so, whether she had been refused the leave and if she had been refused leave, whether this was because of her sex. In addition, as the allegation related to events on 16 or 17 March and the claimant’s claim was not lodged until 5 September, the Tribunal had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s claim. Relevant law[19]Section 13 Equality Act 2010 (‘EA’) provides that direct discrimination arises when, because of a protected characteristic a person is treated less favourably than someone without that protected characteristic was or would be treated. Sex is a protected characteristic for those purposes.[20]Section 123 EA provides that any claim should be brought within the period of three months after the act complained of, or such other period as the Tribunal considers to be just and equitable. Discussion and decision[21]Until the hearing today, the Tribunal had understood the claimant’s claim to be that on 16 March 2022 her request to take leave on 16 April 2022 was refused. The position had been referred to on a number of occasions by the Tribunal in the notes of various preliminary hearings. It was only during the course of this hearing that the claimant said that the request was not made on 16 March, but 17 March. In addition, the claimant accepted that she was not on the rota to work on 16 April and therefore there was no need for her to take leave on that day. She said in fact she must have intended to ask for leave on 17 April.[22]In any event, the Tribunal found that Mr Calder did not understand that the claimant had asked for leave on either 16 or 17 April. It may be that the claimant did ask for leave and intended to do so for 1 7 April, but the T ribunal finds as a matter of fact, that Mr Calder was not aware that she was seeking leave on either date and that had he been aware of this he would have granted leave.[23]The claimant’s evidence was confusing. She said that all her male colleagues asked for and were granted leave for 17 April. The Tribunal found that to be highly improbable, given that only the claimant would have been left to cover a shift when there were normally 15 people on duty. The Tribunal also noted that the claimant left work on the day she says her request was refused and did not ever follow this up. She did not in fact return to work. There is no suggestion in the email she sent on 21 March that all the claimant’s colleagues were granted leave for a day she had requested. Indeed she refers in that email to having asked for leave on 16 April, a day she was not due to work.[24]The Tribunal therefore had no hesitation in finding that the claimant failed to establish that she had been treated less favourably. In so far as she did make any request for annual leave and understood it to have been refused, that was a misunderstanding. Had she sought to clarify the situation, the Tribunal accepted that the claimant would have been granted leave. It accepted Mr Calder’s evidence that he was surprised at how few of the shift had asked for the day off to watch the football match.[25]Having failed to establish that she was treated less favourably, the claimant’s claim fails.[26]In any event the Tribunal was of the view that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s claim. The relevant date was 17 March 2022, the claim form was not lodged until 5 September. The claimant did not contact ACAS until 9 July. Therefore, her claim was lodged more than three months after the act complained of. The Tribunal considered whether it would have been just and equitable to consider the claimant’s claim. It was not satisfied that it was just and equitable. The claimant accepted that she was aware of the relevant time limits. She also accepted she had previously lodged proceedings at the Employment Tribunal. While it was true that the claimant was not professionally represented, and that the claim lodged originally included other heads of claim, it was clear that she was aware of the procedure of the Tribunal and relevant time limits. The claimant did not advance any cogent reason for the delay in lodging her claim and in the 5 circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the claim.[27]The Tribunal would observe that making sweeping allegations that a witness is not honest or reliable after the conclusion of a hearing is unlikely to persuade a Tribunal that it is in the interests of justice to reconsider its judgment. It is also a serious matter to make such allegations. The claimant alleged that Mr Calder (and obliquely the respondent’s solicitor) had committed perjury. Those are very serious allegations to make particularly against a solicitor which is a regulated profession and where the solicitor did not give evidence and so could not be guilty of perjury. The conduct of the claimant in that respect is entirely unreasonable. The Tribunal is mindful that the claimant is an unrepresented litigant. However, that does not mean that she can make serious allegations against solicitors and witnesses who have given evidence under oath without foundation. All parties, represented or not, are required to have regard to the Tribunal rules of procedure and the consequences of not following those rules.[28]Therefore, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is not in the interests of justice to vary or revoke any aspect of its original judgment.[29]The claimant’s application for reconsideration is therefore refused and the terms of the original judgment of 1 6 May 2023 are confirmed.