Dr S Ryland v University for the Creative Arts: 6046479/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6046479/2025
Between
Dr Susan RylandClaimantUniversity for the Creative ArtsRespondent
Before
Employment Judge G. KingIn person for claimantDate 9 January 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s application for interim relief is refused. Approved by
REASONS
[1]This was a summary procedure. An oral judgment dismissing the application was given during the course of the hearing. The Respondent requested written reasons.[2]The Tribunal was assisted by a bundle of 157 pages. Both the Claimant and the Respondent submitted skeleton arguments prior to the hearing. The Respondent also submitted a witness statement of Mr Robert Morris. No live witness evidence was heard during the hearing. The hearing proceeded on oral submissions only. The Respondent also submitted a bundle of authorities of 45 pages. The Claimant’s Case[3]The Claimant’s case is that her dismissal was not a genuine redundancy but was caused by her having made protected disclosures relating to what she considered to be serious financial, admissions and governance irregularities within the University for the Creative Arts International College.[4]She states that she made a series of disclosures between 2023 and 2025. These included concerns raised in November 2023 about tuition fee payments made through a non-standard “hidden link” on the University’s online store, which she says Finance later queried and reallocated [23–26]. Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60 She also raised enquiries in April 2024 regarding six Chinese students who were taught on the Pre-Doctorate course between April and June 2024 but who, according to International Admissions, had never been formally enrolled onto the University’s systems and therefore had no University email addresses or library access [27–32]. She contends that these students’ fees, totalling £28,800, were unaccounted for and that the absence of enrolment raised potential regulatory and financial misconduct concerns.[5]The Claimant further relies on communications in October 2025, during her redundancy notice period. On 7 October 2025 she wrote to Karen Morris, Interim People Transformation Director, questioning the integrity of her redundancy process, raising concerns about the above enrolment and financial issues, and asking whether the six Chinese students were “off-book” and “where the money went” [59–62]. On 21 October 2025 the Respondent confirmed to her that her concerns were accepted for investigation under the Respondent’s whistleblowing procedures [76].[6]She thereafter participated in a whistleblowing meeting with the Executive Director of People and Culture on 15 October 2025 [64–73], and a further meeting with the appointed external investigator, Steve Bolton, on 17 November 2025 [96–108]. During these meetings she raised additional matters, including: her line manager’s instruction in early 2024 to run a compressed version of the Pre-Doctorate course for the six Chinese students on eight days’ notice; her concerns that these students lacked formal enrolment and regulatory compliance; and her belief that her line manager, Peipei Yu, exercised disproportionate managerial control, behaved inappropriately towards her, and may have had conflicts of interest arising from her recruitment of colleagues with prior connections [96–108].[7]The Claimant submits that her dismissal was in truth motivated by these disclosures. She alleges that the redundancy process was a sham, engineered to remove her because her disclosures created reputational and regulatory risk for senior managers. She points to the fact that the Respondent advertised an Associate Lecturer role to deliver the Research Degree Preparation course during her notice period [89], and that plans to relaunch the course under her line manager’s new short-course remit were being developed while her redundancy appeal and the whistleblowing investigation remained unresolved [89, 128]. She contends that this demonstrates that her work continued and that the removal of her post was artificial.[8]The Claimant further alleges that the Respondent refused to pause the redundancy process despite having accepted her disclosures for whistleblowing investigation, and that this refusal was intended to remove her before the investigation could conclude [80–82; 83–85]. She argues that the rejection of the Doctoral College’s counter-proposal to redeploy her [117–124], the absence of documented reasons for that rejection [124], and the construction of a “pool of one” without objective criteria [114], all support her contention that the process was pre-determined and tainted by ulterior motives. Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60[9]Her overall case is that she reasonably believed her disclosures tended to show criminality, breach of regulatory standards, misuse of University funds and conflicts of interest; that she made those disclosures in the public interest; and that the principal reason for her dismissal was the making of those disclosures, not redundancy. The Respondent’s case[10]The Respondent’s case is that the Claimant’s application for interim relief must fail because her dismissal resulted from a genuine redundancy situation and because she cannot demonstrate any real likelihood that her dismissal was caused by the making of protected disclosures.[11]The Respondent emphasises that a large‑scale academic review and restructuring process commenced on 1 July 2025 [40], prompted by a significant reduction in student numbers across the University. Its business case of 14 July 2025 identified a decline of approximately twenty per cent in the University’s overall student population over two years [33], with up to 44.2 full‑time equivalent roles likely to be placed at risk [39]. The Claimant formed part of that cohort. She was issued with an “at risk” letter on 14–15 July 2025 [117], attended an individual consultation meeting on 28 July 2025 [46], and received formal notice of redundancy on 9 September 2025 [57]. Her role, Pre‑Doctorate: Research Degree Preparation Lecturer, was expressly identified for deletion because the course was to cease owing to insufficient student numbers [56].[12]The Respondent submits that the Claimant does not challenge the genuineness of the University‑wide redundancy exercise and indeed explained to the external investigator on 17 November 2025 that she believed the redundancies resulted from student decline and organisational restructuring driven by new senior leadership [104]. Against this background, the Respondent contends that it will plainly meet the statutory burden at the final hearing of establishing redundancy as the true reason for dismissal.[13]The Respondent further argues that the Claimant’s case fails on causation. On the Claimant’s own account, she was formally notified of dismissal on 9 September 2025 [57], whereas she claims to have first been treated as a whistleblower on 21 October 2025 [12]. Any alleged disclosures made after 9 September 2025 cannot have influenced the redundancy decision. The Respondent also points out that none of the disclosures the Claimant now relies upon were pleaded in her ET1 or the subject of an application to amend.[14]With regards to the alleged disclosures, the Respondent argues that:a. The email to Karen Morris on 7 October 2025 [61] post‑dates the dismissal decision and concerns the Claimant’s objections to running a compressed course. The Respondent argues that this email does not disclose information tending to show wrongdoing under section 43B(1) ERA, and contains only questions or expressions of personal Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60 dissatisfaction (for example, “Were these 6 students off‑book and if so where did the money go?”).b. Any disclosures said to have been made during the meeting with the external investigator on 17 November 2025 [96] also post‑date the dismissal decision and cannot constitute the reason for dismissal. These disclosures likewise do not appear in the ET1.c. As to the alleged 2023 disclosure relating to “hidden link” payments, the Respondent states that it has no record of any disclosure by the Claimant at the time, and that the relevant documents [23–26] were only assembled after the Claimant’s interview with the external investigator on 17 November 2025 [101]. The Claimant herself accepted that she had only “recently” pieced together the matters when drafting her grievance on 6 October 2025 [97].d. Similarly, the April 2024 enquiry to International Admissions regarding six students’ email addresses [31] is characterised as an administrative query and not a qualifying disclosure under section 43B ERA.[15]On this basis, the Respondent argues that none of the alleged disclosures relied upon by the Claimant amounts to a qualifying disclosure at law, and none demonstrates a reasonable belief that wrongdoing was being revealed in the public interest. Even if they did, they were either made after the decision to dismiss or were not known to the decision-makers at the relevant time.[16]The Respondent therefore contends that the Claimant cannot satisfy the “likely” test under section 129 ERA, which requires a significantly higher degree of likelihood than the balance of probabilities.
The Law
[17]Section 128 Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 128. Interim relief pending determination of complaint(1) An employee who presents a complaint to an Employment Tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and – a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in – i) section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or ii) paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, or b) that the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was the one specified in the opening words of section 104(1) and the condition in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection was met, may apply to the Tribunal for interim relief. Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60(2) The Tribunal shall not entertain an application for interim relief unless it is presented to the Tribunal before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the effective date of termination (whether before, on or after that date).(3) The Tribunal shall determine the application for interim relief as soon as practicable after receiving the application.(4) The Tribunal shall give to the employer not later than seven days before the date of the hearing a copy of the application together with notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing.(5) The Tribunal shall not exercise any power it has of postponing the hearing of an application for interim relief except where it is satisfied that special circumstances exist which justify it in doing so.[18]The question to be considered upon an application for interim relief is set out in Section 129 Employment Rights Act 1996: “129. Procedure on hearing of application and making of order(a) This section applies where, on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the Tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the Tribunal will find – that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in – section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, or(b) that the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was the one specified in the opening words of section 104(1) and the condition in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection was met”.[19]Interim relief can therefore be ordered where the Tribunal finds that it is likely that a final hearing will decide that the reason (or principal reason) for dismissal was the employee having made protected disclosures contrary to s 103A ERA1996. It is not available to an employee where the Tribunal considers their dismissal is likely to be found to have been unfair pursuant to s105 ERA 1996. S105 ERA is not one of the automatically unfair provisions mentioned in ss128 & 129 ERA 1996 in respect of which interim relief is available.[20]The meaning of the word “likely” for these purposes has been considered in several cases. In Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] IRLR 450, [1978] ICR 1068 EAT, decided under similar provisions relating to interim relief applications in dismissal for trade union reasons, that it must be shown that the Claimant has a 'pretty good chance' of succeeding, and that that meant something more than merely on the balance of probabilities. That approach to the word 'likely' has been followed in subsequent decisions, Dandpat v University of Bath (2009) UKEAT/0408/09 UKEATPA/1284/09 UKEATPA/1285/09 UKEATPA/1391/09 unreported at para 20, Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz (2011) UKEAT/0578/10, [2011] IRLR 562 at paras 16–17 and His Highness Sheikh Khalid Bin Saqr Al Qasimi v Robinson UKEAT/0283/17/JOJ, unreported (Qasimi v Robinson), at paras 8–11.[21]In London City Airport Limited -v Chacko [2013] IRLR610, Mr Recorder Luba QC provided further guidance upon the approach to be taken and in Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60 particular the correct approach to be applied to the meaning of “it is likely”. At paragraph 23 he explains: “The relevant statutory test is not whether the Claimant is ultimately likely to succeed in his or her complaint to the Employment Tribunal but whether “it appears to the Tribunal” in this case the employment judge “that it is likely”. To put it in my own words, what this requires is an expeditious summary assessment by the first instance employment judge as to how the matter looks to him on the material that he has. The statutory regime thus places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance which must of necessity involve a far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will be ultimately undertaken at the full hearing of the claim”.[22]A “pretty good chance” of success was interpreted in the whistleblowing case of Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562, EAT, as meaning 'a significantly higher degree of likelihood than just more likely than not'. In this case, Underhill P stated “in this context ‘likely’ does not mean simply ‘more likely than not’ – that is at least 51% - but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood.” (para 16).[23]There are policy reasons why the threshold should be thus. Underhill P said, in Dandpat v The University of Bath and anor (unrep, UKEAT/0408/09/LA), “If relief is granted the Respondent is irretrievably prejudiced because he is obliged to treat the contract as continuing and pay the Claimant, until the conclusion of proceedings: that is not a consequence that should be imposed lightly.” (para 20)[24]The Claimant must show the necessary level of chance in relation to each essential element of s103A ERA 1996 automatic unfair dismissal, see Simply Smile Manor House Ltd and ors v Ter-Berg [2020] ICR 570.[25]The Claimant must therefore show that it is likely that the Tribunal at the final hearing will find that:a. she made the disclosure(s) to the employer;b. she believed that it or they tended to show one or more of the matters itemised in the ERA 1996 s 43B(1);c. her belief in that was reasonable;d. the disclosure(s) was or were made in the public interest; ande. the disclosure(s) was or were the principal cause of the dismissal.[26]“Protected disclosure” is defined in s43A Employment Rights Act 1996: “In this Act a “protected disclosure” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H”.[27]“Qualifying disclosures” are defined by s43B ERA 1996: Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60 “43B Disclosures qualifying for protection In this Part, a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following—(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject…”.[28]The disclosure must be a disclosure of information, of facts rather than opinion or allegation (although it may disclose both information and opinions/allegations), Cavendish Munro Professional Risk Management v Geldud [2010] ICR [24] – [25]; Kilraine v LB Wandsworth [2016] IRLR 422. The disclosure must, considered in context, be sufficient to indicate the legal obligation in relation to which the Claimant believes that there has been or is likely to be non-compliance, Fincham v HM Prison Service EAT 19 December 2002, unrep; Western Union Payment Services UK Limited v Anastasiou EAT 21 February 2014, unrep.[29]The test for “reasonable belief” is a subjective test. The Tribunal should consider whether the belief was reasonable for the Claimant in her circumstances. What is reasonable for a lay person to believe may not be reasonable for a trained professional (see Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board [2012] IRLR 4 at 62).[30]In determining whether the reason for the Claimant’s dismissal was her alleged disclosure, it is not sufficient for the disclosure to be “in the employer’s mind” or for it to have influenced the employer. The Tribunal must consider whether that disclosure was the “sole or principal reason” for her dismissal, Eiger Securities LLP v Korshunova [2017] IRLR 115).[31]Redundancy is defined in s139 Employment Rights Act 1996: “ .. an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to – the fact that his employer has ceased or intends to cease – to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that business – for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was employed by the employer, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish”.[32]By section 105 Employment Rights Act 1996: “Redundancy(a) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if— the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee was redundant, Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60(b) it is shown that the circumstances constituting the redundancy applied equally to one or more other employees in the same undertaking who held positions similar to that held by the employee and who have not been dismissed by the employer, and(c) it is shown that any of subsections [ (2A) to [(7N)]3]2 applies. …… (6A) This subsection applies if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was that specified in section 103A. …… (9) In this Part “redundancy case” means a case where paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of this section are satisfied”.[33]The application of (equivalent Northern Irish provisions to) ss139 & 105 ERA 1996 to interim relief was considered in Bombardier Aerospace v McConnell and ors [2008] IRLR 51. In that case, the Northern Irish Court of Appeal decided that it was not possible for a Claimant to obtain interim relief in a redundancy case, even when they were selected for redundancy on trade union grounds. The Claimant must show that the Respondent’s redundancy process was entirely fabricated for the purposes of dismissing her, or that it was a sham, per LJ Girvan in Bombardier at para. 14 and Campbell LJ at para 9 - 11.[34]Bombardier (Campbell LJ) explains that, if an employee makes the case that, although there was redundancy, the reason why he was selected and not a fellow employee for dismissal, is that he made a protected disclosure, it does not follow that this becomes the principal reason for his dismissal though he is to be regarded as unfairly dismissed. If, in such circumstances, it could displace redundancy as the principal reason for dismissal, the employee would come within s103A ERA 1996 and be regarded as unfairly dismissed. There would be no requirement for s105 ERA 1996 if unfair selection could become the principal reason.[35]If, however, an employer decides to dismiss an employee because of a protected disclosure and creates a sham redundancy for this purpose, the principal reason for dismissal would not be redundancy and the employee would be unfairly dismissed within s103A ERA 1996.[36]S.105 ERA 1996 is intended to cover redundancy situations. Once it is established that there is redundancy within the meaning of s139 ERA 1996 and that this is the principal reason for dismissal, unfair selection may make the dismissal unfair but it does not become the principal reason for dismissal. Deliberation[37]The task of the Employment Tribunal at an interim relief hearing is to take a high level, impressionistic view. It is not a deep forensic dive.[38]The first question for the Tribunal is, was there a genuine redundancy situation? The Tribunal has not heard live evidence but has seen these signed witness statement of Rob Morris. This is supported by documentary Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60 evidence in the form of the table at [39]. The documentary evidence sets out university-wide reductions in recruitment and consequent need to restructure academic provision [33–45]. UCAIC, the school within which the Claimant worked, was significantly affected. The proposal identified that the Claimant’s role (Pre-Doctorate Lecturer) would be deleted because the course would cease due to insufficient student numbers [56].[39]The Claimant acknowledges that there was a downturn and a need to make savings. She said to Steve Bolton during a meeting on 17 November 2025 to investigate her alleged protected disclosure: “In hindsight, I think there might have been 2 factors: new joint vice chancellors looking for reducing staff and I believe PY volunteered the international college for disestablishment a year before, comments made sound like she was offering us up as a sacrifice. Source of some distress for those made redundant that PY got newly created role and promotion off the back of rest of us.” [104][40]The Claimant does not dispute that the Respondent undertook a large-scale academic review and restructuring exercise affecting numerous roles across schools and campuses [39, 52–56]. Her own role was expressly listed for removal, with the work transferred or discontinued [56]. Notices to multiple affected staff are recorded [57].[41]The Tribunal therefore finds that there was a genuine redundancy situation and therefore interim relief is not available as a matter of law.[42]In any event, Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent will, at the final hearing, have good grounds to be able to establish that a genuine redundancy situation did exist. On the material presently available, the Claimant does not have a “pretty good chance” of showing that redundancy was not the true reason for dismissal.[43]If the Tribunal is wrong on that point, however, the Tribunal have gone on to assess the claim further. In order for there to be a claim of automatic unfair dismissal in this situation there needs to be a protected disclosure. What makes a protected disclosure is very clearly defined.[44]The Claimant’s ET1 identifies 21 October 2025 as the date upon which she first obtained “whistleblower status” [12]. That was after her redundancy had been confirmed on 9 September 2025 [57].[45]In her written response dated 31 December 2025, the Claimant identifies four alleged disclosures:a. to Karen Morris on 7 October 2025 [59–62];b. to Steve Bolton on 17 November 2025 [96–108]c. to Finance in November 2023 regarding “hidden link” payments [23–26];d. to International Admissions in April 2024 regarding “off-books” students [27–32]. Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60[46]None of the 2023–2024 matters were referred to in the Claimant’s ET1, and no application to amend has been made.[47]The communication to Karen Morris on 7 October 2025 [59–62] post-dates the decision to dismiss. It consists largely of queries about administrative matters, the compressed course, and questions such as “Were these 6 students ‘off-book’ and if so where did the money go?” [61]. On the material available, it is not likely to be established that this amounted to a disclosure of information tending to show a relevant failure for the purposes of section 43B ERA.[48]Any alleged disclosures to the external investigator on 17 November 2025 [96–108] also post-date the redundancy decision and, furthermore, were not included in the ET1.[49]The November 2023 and April 2024 matters rely on information which was only available later in 2025 [23–26], and the Claimant accepted in her meeting on 17 November 2025 that she did not “piece together” the matters until preparing her grievance in October 2025 [97]. Queries that led to a protected disclosure do not form part of the protected disclosure itself. There is no contemporaneous evidence in the bundle that the Claimant made a protected disclosure at the time. The Claimant is likely to struggle to show that the alleged disclosures that predate her dismissal were actually protected disclosures. She therefore does not have a “pretty good chance” of success at the final hearing.[50]On the limited material available, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Claimant has a “pretty good chance” of establishing that she made one or more qualifying protected disclosures prior to her dismissal.[51]With regard to causation, the Claimant was notified of dismissal on 9 September 2025 [57]. The external investigator meeting took place on 17 November 2025 [96–108].[52]As a matter of causation, disclosures made after the decision to dismiss cannot have been the reason or principal reason for dismissal. The Claimant’s own ET1 recognises this sequence [12]. The Claimant spoke about “pausing redundancy”, but what she really means by this is the pausing of a notice period. The decision to dismiss her by way of redundancy had already been made once she obtained whistleblower status.[53]The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Claimant has a “pretty good chance” of showing that any of the disclosures she now relies upon, whether qualifying or otherwise, were the principal reason for her dismissal.
Conclusion
[54]In circumstances where there are good reasons to believe that there was a genuine redundancy situation, and crucial matters regarding causation and whether the alleged disclosures were protected disclosures, are in dispute, the Tribunal does not find that at this stage, based on the material Case No: 6046479/2025 10.8 Reasons – rule 60 before it, that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of showing that the principal reason for her dismissal was a protected disclosure.[55]Accordingly, the application for interim relief is dismissed. Approved by: