K Smith v Companion Care Services Ltd and CC (Exeter) Newco Ltd: 6045787/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6045787/2025

Between

K SmithClaimant

Companion Care Services Ltd and CC (Exeter) Newco LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Elizabeth Gibson

Mr Gareth Deane (instructed by Counsel) for claimant

Miss Rebecca Thomas (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 21 February 2026

REASONS

[1]By a claim form presented on 10 December 2025 the Claimant brought complaints of: .1. Automatic unfair dismissal for making a protected disclosure pursuant to s103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the "ERA 1996"); .2. Dismissal because of a relevant transfer pursuant to Regulation 7 of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 ("TUPE"); .3. Unfair dismissal pursuant to ss94 and 98 of the ERA 1996; .4. Detriment for making a protected disclosure pursuant to s47B of the ERA 1996; .5. Failure to elect employee representatives and to inform and consult pursuant to Regulations 13 to 15 of TUPE; and .6. Failure to make reasonable adjustments pursuant to ss20 to 21 of the Equality Act 2010.

[2]Her claims also included an application for interim relief in respect of the Claimant's dismissal for having made a protected disclosure pursuant to s128 of the ERA 1996.

[3]It is the application for interim relief which is the subject of this judgment and reasons.

[4]The Claimant commenced employment with the First Respondent ("CCSL") on 27 April 2018.

[5]CCSL is part of a group of companies which provides veterinary services under the brand VetsforPets.

[6]For the purposes of this matter, CCSL has two corporate models: 6.1. A "company owned" model whereby CCSL is the sole owner of another operating company delivering the veterinary services; (a "Company Model") and 6.2. A "practice owned" model whereby an operating company delivering the veterinary services is jointly owned by a CCSL owned company and a practice company (a "Joint Venture Model").

[7]The Claimant worked at an Exeter-based practice called Companion Care (Exeter) Limited (the "Exeter Practice") where she delivered operational services.

[8]The Exeter Practice is an example of where a Company Model changed to a Joint Venture Model. Prior to September 2025, it was jointly owned by CCSL and another CCSL company called Group Care Management Services Limited.

[9]On 26 September 2025 Group Care Management Services sold its shares to the Second Respondent. (the "Corporate Change"). This means that the Exeter Practice became jointly owned by the First Respondent and the Second Respondent.

[10]One of the Second Respondent's directors is Mr Turlough Adley ("TA"). .

[11]The Claimant's responsibilities included supporting the role of the Business Development Partner (the "BDP") in the operations of the Exeter Practice. The BDP for the Exeter Practice is Mr Tony Harvey ("TH") who is employed by CCSL.

[12]Ms Smith was dismissed from CCSL by way of letter dated 04 December 2025 on from TH. The reason given by TH was that the Claimant's employment should be terminated on the grounds of an irreparable breakdown in the working relationship. This could amount to some other substantial reason for the Claimant's dismissal. Interim Relief – the Legal Tests and Approach

[13]Interim relief is a form of order which can be made by an Employment Tribunal ("ET") in limited circumstances and is available for some types of dismissal including, as in this case, for a claim of automatic unfair dismissal for making protected disclosures.

[14]Proceedings for an interim relief order are supposed to be summary proceedings, designed to be conducted quickly so as to preserve an applicant's position pending a full hearing.

[15]The ET can make a number of orders for interim relief including reinstatement to the applicant's former job until a final hearing. If an employer refuses to do this, the ET can order that it carries on paying the former employee's wages.

[16]The relevant provisions governing the determination of an application for interim relief are set out in ss128 and 129 of the ERA 1996. S129(1)(a) of the ERA 1996 provides that an application for interim relief should be granted if: "...It appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find..." that the reason or principal reason for the dismissal was one of the statutory automatically unfair reasons.

[17]The Employment Appeal Tribunal (the "EAT") in Taplin v C Shipham Limited

[1978] ICR 1068

("Taplin") held that the word "likely" means that the claim needed a "pretty good chance" of success.

[18]Taplin was considered in the EAT case of Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 582

("Sarfraz") where Mr Justice Underhill held that "likely" does not mean "more likely than not but connotes a "significantly higher degree of likelihood."

[19]There are policy reasons why this threshold is high as was described by Underhill J in Dandpat v The University of Bath and anor

UKEAT/0408/09/LA

at paragraph 20: "Taplin has been recognised as good law for 30 years...We do in fact see good reasons of policy for setting the test comparatively high...If relief is granted the respondent is irretrievably prejudiced because he is obliged to treat the contract as continuing, and pay the Claimant, until the conclusion of proceedings; that is not [a] consequence that should be imposed lightly."

[20]In London City Airport Ltd v Chacko

[2013] WLR 617799

("Chacko") where at paragraph 23, Mr Recorder Luba said: "In my judgment, the correct starting point for this appeal is to fully appreciate the task which faces an employment judge on an application for interim relief. The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. The employment judge must do the best he can with such materials as the parties are able to deploy by way of documents and argument in support of their respective cases. The employment judge is then required to make as good an assessment as he is promptly able of whether the claimant is likely to succeed in a claim for unfair dismissal based on one of the relevant grounds. The relevant statutory test is not whether the claimant is ultimately likely to succeed in his or her complaint to the Employment Tribunal, but whether.it appears to the tribunal" in this case the employment judge "that it is likely". To put it in my own words, what this requires is an expeditious summary assessment of the first instance employment judge as to how the matter looks to him on the material he has. The statutory regime thus places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance, which must of necessity involve a far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will be ultimately undertaken at the full hearing of the claim."

[21]This summary assessment of the material available was explained by HH Judge Eady in the case of Al Qasimi v Robinson EAT 0283/17. She said the task of an employment judge is: "...very much an impressionistic one: to form a view as to how the matter looked as to whether the claimant had a pretty good chance and was likely to make out her case, and explain the conclusion reached on that basis not in an over-formalistic way but giving the gist of his reasoning."

[22]I must therefore be satisfied that the Claimant is likely to succeed on each necessary element of her claim applying the relatively high threshold of a "pretty good chance" before relief can be granted. Protected Disclosures – the Law

[23]Section 43B of the ERA 1996 provides: "In this Part a "qualifying disclosure" means any disclosure of information which in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure is made in the public interest tends to show one or more of the following -(a) That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed;

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail with any legal obligation to which he is subject,

(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been or is likely to be endangered,

(e) that the environment has been, is being, or is likely to be damaged, or

(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being, or is likely to be deliberately concealed."

[24]Elements (b), (d) and (f) are underlined because these are the matters the Claimant claims she made disclosures about.

[25]In Sarfaz, Underhill J held in whistleblowing interim relief applications the judge had to have decided that it was likely that the ET at the final hearing would find five elements were met which I describe below: 25.1. The claimant had made a disclosure to his or her employer; 25.2. The claimant believed that the disclosure tended to show one or more of the matters set out in (a) to (f) of s43B of the ERA 1996; 25.3. That belief was reasonable (25.2 and 23.3 together the "Reasonable Belief Test"); 25.4. The claimant reasonably believed the disclosure was in the public interest (the "Public Interest Test"); and 25.5. The disclosure was the principal reason for dismissal.

[26]In respect of the Reasonable Belief test, there are two elements to consider, namely whether there is a genuine belief that disclosure tends (my emphasis) to show a relevant failure on any of the five matters set out in s43B(1) of the ERA 1996 (or deliberate concealment of the relevant wrongdoing).

[27]Reasonableness involves applying an objective standard to the personal circumstances of the person making the disclosure. In this case, those of the Claimant who was a lay person.

[28]Where a disclosure has a sufficient degree of factual content and specificity than that belief is likely to be regarded as a reasonable belief (see Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth

[2018] ICR 1850

[29]In respect of the Public Interest Test there are two elements to this question. The first element is whether in making the disclosure the person believed he or she was acting in the public interest (in addition to his or her private interest) at the time the disclosure was made and not with hindsight (See Ibrahim v HCA International plc

[2020] IRLR 224

, paragraph 26).

[30]The second element is that the belief the discloser was acting in the public interest must be a reasonable one.

[31]In the Court of Appeal case of Chesterton Global Limited v Nurmohamed

[2018] ICR 731

("Chesterton") Underhill LJ set out the following relevant factors which could be a useful tool in making a public interest assessment: 31.1. The numbers in the group whose interest the disclosures served; 31.2. The nature and extent of the interests affected; 31.3. The nature of the wrongdoing where disclosure about deliberate wrongdoing is more likely to be regarded as in the public interest than inadvertent wrongdoing; and 31.4. The identity of the wrongdoer, where the larger or more prominent the wrongdoer, the more likely that disclosure would be in the public interest. (together the "Chesterton Guidance").

[32]However Underhill LJ also said ETs should be cautious about concluding that the public interest requirement is satisfied in the context of a private workplace dispute, merely from the numbers of others who share the same interest. Submissions

[33]I had the benefit of skeleton arguments from both Counsel. I was also provided with witness statements from the Claimant and TH.

[34]The parties also provided a bundle of 158 pages of evidence including the Claimant's pleadings, email correspondence, meeting notes, letters and formal grievances raised by the Claimant

[35]Both Counsel also made oral submissions at the hearing.

[36]Before I turn to details of the parties' respective cases, I have considered Miss Thomas' submission that the Claimant's application was fatally flawed from the outset.

[37]Miss Thomas pointed to paragraph 7 of the Claimant's grounds of complaint (at page 18 (pdf) of the bundle) where it was stated the Claimant was employed by either the First or Second Respondent and as part of the overall proceedings she wanted "confirmation of the designation of her employer..."

[38]She said in relation to this interim relief application I could not determine that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of establishing she had been unfairly dismissed pursuant to s103A of the ERA 1996 and that relief should not be granted because the Claimant was not positively asserting who her employer was.

[39]She said this argument was sufficient to prevent me from making an order for relief and it was not good enough for the purposes of Ms Smith's application to simply assert that the First Respondent (CCSL) was her employer as this was contradictory to her claim that TUPE applied as a result of the Corporate Change.

[40]Mr Deane submitted Miss Thomas' argument did not render the Claimant's application fatally flawed because Ms Smith accepted (for the purposes of the interim relief application) that she was formally employed by the First Respondent and consequently it would for the final hearing to identify her present employer.

[41]Miss Thomas' submission was persuasive and I agree that for the purposes of this hearing it is inappropriate to proceed on the basis the First Respondent was the Claimant's employer. This is because if the Claimant is unable to identify who her employer is, I am unable to make as good an assessment as I am promptly able as to whether she is likely to succeed in a claim for unfair dismissal based on one of the relevant grounds (as was said in Chacko).

[42]My impression from the documents and submissions is that the Claimant is claiming she was unfairly dismissed by one of two possible employers. (the "Employer Identity Issue").

[43]This inherent uncertainty as to the identity of her employer means that in my making of an expeditious summary assessment as to how the matter looks to me on the material I have before me, I cannot conclude that it appears to me, at this time, in applying the statutory tests, that the Claimant is likely to succeed in her s103A of the ERA 1996 claim.

[44]This could bring the application to an end. However on the assumption my determination is wrong I have also considered the other elements of the Claimant's complaint. The Claimant's Case

[45]Prior to 2025, the Claimant had a good working relationship with her employer.

[46]This changed when the prospect of a sale of some of the shares in the Exeter Practice arose.

[47]In essence Ms Smith considered TUPE applied to the Corporate Change and at the outset CCSL failed to carry out its statutory duties in respect of consultation and other obligations set out in the legislation.

[48]As a consequence she made a series of disclosures between the end of September and beginning of December 2025.

[49]She was dismissed on 04 December 2025. Her letter of dismissal (at page 154 to 158 (pdf) of the bundle) (the "Dismissal Letter") made no reference to disclosures protected or otherwise.

[50]The Claimant's application for interim relief is based on her claims she made eight disclosures which were qualifying disclosures for the purposes of s43B(1) of the ERA 1996. Please note the passages in quotes (below) are taken from the Claimant's grounds of complaint. These were: 50.1. Statements made in a meeting on 29 September 2025 between the Claimant and TH and TA where she was told TA was the new owner of the Exeter Practice. She asserted that she told TH and TA that she had not been consulted prior "to the transfer and that the statutory TUPE process had not been followed." ("PD1"); 50.2. An email sent to the HR department on 30 September 2025 following the meeting where PD1 was made. In this email the Claimant expressed her concerns over the lack of consultation, the change in ownership of the Exeter Practice and the "implications of any transfer on her employment status." ("PD2"); 50.3. Statements made to TH by the Claimant in Costa Coffee in early November 2025 where she said that there had been a lack of consultation over a TUPE transfer, there were governance irregularities in relation to the transfer and her employment status was unclear. ("PD3"); 50.4. In a formal grievance submitted on 11 November 2025 via email in which she said the organisation had: 50.4.1. Failed to recognise a TUPE transfer and in so doing was in breach of TUPE; 50.4.2. Failed to transfer her employment in accordance with TUPE; 50.4.3. Statements made by a Senior Business Development Partner conflicted with statutory filings; and 50.4.4. There had been a breach of data protection requirements. (together "PD4"); 50.5. An email sent by the Claimant on 12 November 2025 in which it was stated: "...despite the references and descriptions of a 'share sale' there had been a change of control of the economic entity of the Exeter site such that there had been a transfer within the meaning TUPE to the Second Respondent. It reiterated that there had been a failure to comply with TUPE, such as a failure to inform and consult." ("PD5"); 50.6. A protected disclosure (whistleblowing) report and grievance submitted on 27 November 2025 where the following were set out: 50.6.1. That the Exeter Practice had been the subject of a TUPE transfer; 50.6.2. There had been breaches of TUPE, the ERA 1996 and ACAS guidance in respect of organisational change; 50.6.3. These breaches where a matter of public interest; 50.6.4. There were governance inconsistencies in the Respondents' operations including corporate filings, transparency, "clarity of assignment and proper identification at the undertaking receiving her services"; 50.6.5. There had been breaches of data protection legislation; and 50.6.6. the organisation had failed to resolve her concerns, ("PD6") 50.7. An email dated 01 December 2025 sent by the Claimant to Ms Dawn Haughton (head of people at CCSL) stating the Claimant "was beginning to feel unsafe, distressed and unsupported in the workplace." ("PD7"); and 50.8. An email dated 02 December from the Claimant to Ms Haughton claiming breach of the ACAS Code in relation in relation to allegations made against the Claimant stating: "an employee cannot be disciplined or dismissed for requesting disclousure [sic] of allegations, evidence or applicable policy before attending a meeting. Requesting this information is part of a fair process and cannot lawfully be treated as non-engagement." ("PD8").

[51]In support of her application for interim relief it was stated: 51.1. Each of PD1 to PD8 was a disclosure of information; 51.2. Each disclosure (barring PD7) met the Reasonable Belief Test in that it tended to show that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with a legal obligation; 51.3. The information in PD4 and PD6 tended to show that the matters (as provided for in paragraphs (a) to (e) of s43B(1) of the ERA 1996? Had been or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 51.4. PD7 met the Reasonable Belief Test in that it tended to show that the health and safety of an individual (namely the Claimant) has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, and 51.5. Each of PD1 to PD8 met both elements of the Public Interest Test.

[52]In respect of the Public Interest Test it was stated: "Companies with a legal obligation or efforts made by a public company (and well-known brand) to avoid liability under statute is the public interest. The Claimant was setting out her belief of serious wrongdoing on the part of VetsForPets. Similarly and by consequence, efforts to hide or conceal any failures in that respect are within the public interest. ...an employee (the Claimant) being made to feel unsafe and distressed by the conduct of her employer and senior colleagues/managers of a well-known brand is also in the public interest."

[53]Mr Deane submitted that the Corporate Change was so convoluted in nature that this was sufficient to raise questions in respect of corporate governance and lent weight to the Claimant's reasonable belief that that structure was employed to eschew CCSL's legal obligation pursuant to TUPE.

[54]In respect of the Public Interest Test, Mr Deane said VetsforPets was a wellknown brand and it was in the public interest to raise disclosures which demonstrated the structure of the Corporate Change was designed to avoid liabilities under TUPE to inform and consult.

[55]He argued this was "serious wrongdoing" because the Claimant's disclosures suggested the Respondents had deliberately hidden or concealed their failure to properly apply TUPE and therefore such disclosures were in the public interest.

[56]Mr Deane also made the following submissions: 56.1. It was not necessary for me to determine that the Corporate Change had involved a TUPE transfer and the correct test was whether the Claimant could show in making a disclosure she did so with a reasonable belief that such disclosure was in the public interest and that she reasonably believed that her employer was failing to comply with a legal obligation to which it was subject. 56.2. Despite TH's assertion in paragraph 44 of his witness statement that although he had not been copied into formal grievances raised by the Claimant in emails dated 11,12 and 27 November and 1 and 2 December 2025, he was aware Ms Smith had raised grievances but he did not mention that she claimed she had made protected disclosures; 56.3. In fact the email from the Claimant dated 27 November 2025 spelled out she was making a protected disclosure; 56.4. TH was aware of the protected disclosure(s) including PD7 prior to the Claimant's dismissal but did not address them as demonstrated in the Dismissal Letter; 56.5. TH's position was that he appeared not to have read the relevant emails from the Claimant and that he had made the decision to dismiss her without a full appreciation of Ms Smith's concerns and allegations. 56.6. It was very unusual for an organisation to dismiss an individual without the decision maker being aware that the individual had made protected disclosure(s); 56.7. Consequently TH's assertions in paragraph 44 of his witness statement were not credible or he had not read the Claimant's emails because he had no interest in what the Claimant's position was because he was intent on dismissing her; 56.8. Therefore it was the Claimant's case that the fact of her making a series of protected disclosures over a period of two months was the reason or principal reason for her dismissal; and 56.9. The default position was that her employer was intent on dismissing her and the only possible explanation was that the Claimant was dismissed for making protected disclosures. It therefore followed that it was likely that the Claimant would succeed in showing this was the case at the final hearing.

[57]In response to a question from me, Mr Deane said the strongest disclosures in the context of this application were PDs 4, 6 and 8. The Respondents' Case

[58]The application for interim relief was made prior to the Respondents' deadline for presenting their ET3s, given the expedited nature of this application.

[59]It was clear to me from TH's witness statement and Miss Thomas' written and oral submissions that the Respondents substantially dispute the Claimant's version of events between late September and early December 2025.

[60]In summary these disputes were that in relation to: 60.1. The conversations surrounding PD1. Although TH and TA talked about looking to change her employer from CCSL this was to be in the future and that her current package and benefits would not be affected. TH had no recollection about a discussion about TUPE; 60.2. PD2 – TH was aware the Claimant had raised questions about the Corporate Change and was confident Ms Smith's queries would be dealt with; 60.3. PD3 – TH had no recollection of the Claimant making statements in respect of TUPE or other governance irregularities; 60.4. PD4 – TH was not provided with the details or substance of the Claimant's grievance; 60.5. PD5 – TH did not expressly refer to this email but said Ms Smith's employer had been clarified on "multiple occasions" as CCSL and "nothing should change in respect of her role."; 60.6. PD6 which was the "whistleblowing report" and grievance submitted on 27 November (the "Whistleblowing Report") - TH was informed but because he was named in the grievance he was provided with details. 60.7. PD7 – TH was not aware of the specific allegations in relation to the Claimant's feelings and distress; and 60.8. PD8 – TH was not aware of the details.

[61]The Respondents accepted that the Claimant had asked questions about whether her employment had transferred by the operation of TUPE in respect of the Corporate Change.

[62]They submitted the Claimant was repeatedly told this was not the case.

[63]They accepted the Claimant raised a number of grievances.

[64]Matters escalated because despite assurances to the contrary the Claimant would not accept TUPE did not apply and as a consequence of this, Ms Smith asserted she was receiving conflicting instructions which meant she had to delay colleagues' pay reviews, flexible working, branch operations and mobile phone allocation. I note the Respondents assert other staff working at the Exeter Practice were employed by Companion Care (Exeter) Limited.

[65]On 27 November 2025, CCSL (via Ms Haughton) wrote to the Claimant stating that her employment could be terminated due to an "irreparable breakdown of the working relationship" (at pages 121 to 122 (pdf) of the bundle.

[66]This letter stated the Claimant: 66.1. Had sent more than 150 emails across the business concerning the TUPE issue; 66.2. The business had tried to engage with her constructively but emails were met with multiple responses and a refusal to move forward unless previous emails were responded to; and 66.3. "Despite previous discussions, we have observed a continued and a failure to perform your current role within the business. This is a serious matter...Accordingly CCSL believes that there may be an irreparable of the working relationship between you, CCSL, as your employer and the Exeter Practice...Consequently, we are considering termination of your employment as we do not believe there are any other steps we can take to resolve the situation...

[67]Ms Smith was invited to a meeting on 11 December 2025.

[68]The Claimant sent the Whistleblowing Report entitled "Protected Disclousure [sic] (Whistleblowing)" email and further grievance also on 27 November 2025 and this was followed by the email that she was feeling unsafe, distressed and unsupported in the workplace.

[69]The Claimant was asked by Ms Haughton to confirm her attendance at the 11 December 2025 meeting. The Claimant, on 02 December 2025, sent emails including detailed rebuttals of the allegations made by CCSL and confirmed she would attend on condition she received information in respect of her questions as to TUPE and governance matters.

[70]The Dismissal Letter set out in detail the Respondents' chronology of events, that the Claimant was refusing to engage with him or TA and included the following: "Alex Chequer, People Partner, responded to your queries to confirm your employment with CCSL, as there had been no TUPE transfer on the share sale and your existing terms and conditions of employment remained in force. During this time, you were asked to refrain from copying in multiple individuals from the business into your emails however you confirmed you were not willing to do so... This situation is having a severe impact on our day-to-day operations both the Exeter Practice and The Support Office functions...In recent weeks you have not carried out our key tasks aligned to your role.

[71]The Dismissal Letter also included a summary of the Claimant's representations which included TH's responses.

[72]In relation to the Claimant's position as being unwilling to attend the meeting on 11 December 2025 without having her requests for clarification addressed TH said that Ms Smith did not accept CCSL's confirmation of the governance structure of the business which led him to conclude her reason for nonattendance was due to the continued disagreement as to who her employer was.

[73]To this end TH said he could not see a way to resolve the matter and he had to conclude the relationship between employer and employee had broken down irreparably and that he had decided to dismiss the Claimant.

[74]Miss Thomas made the following submissions: 74.1. There were difficulties with PDs 1,2,3,7 and 8; 74.2. The Claimant could not meet either the Reasonable Belief Test or the Public Interest Test; 74.3. In respect of the Public Interest Test the documentary evidence was concerned with the Claimant's personal circumstances which showed this was essentially a private matter rendering the wider public interest on the face of the matter unconvincing; 74.4. In the event I determined the Claimant has a pretty good chance of success of showing any of the eight disclosures relied upon amounted to protected disclosures, I could not go on to conclude that any one of them was the sole or principal reason for Ms Smith's dismissal. 74.5. In terms of this submission, she relied on TH's witness statement that the reason for the Claimant's dismissal was some other substantial reason namely the irretrievable breakdown of the working relationship as described in the Dismissal Letter. The Impression Gained

[75]There were a good many documents in the bundle which had been primarily collated by the Claimant's representatives. Each Counsel helpfully referred me to paragraphs in the witness statements which they considered were important to my consideration of the interim relief application.

[76]The pleadings, email correspondence and witness statements demonstrate there was considerable frustration on the part of both the Claimant, CCSL, TH and TA as well as significant factual disputes.

[77]Prior to the events described in the Claimant's and TH's witness statements my impression was that there were no major problems between the parties. It was only when the plans for the Corporate Change had been implemented that matters soured.

Conclusions

[78]On determining this application, I have made no findings of fact but rely on the material provided and the submissions made by each party. I heard no oral evidence.

[79]I considered whether there was a pretty good chance that at the final hearing: 79.1. The Claimant had made a protected disclosure or disclosures to her employer; 79.2. She reasonably believed that such disclosure(s) tended to show one or more of the things set out in (a) to (f) of s43B(1) of the ERA 1996; 79.3. She believed that the disclosure(s) were made in the public interest and this belief was reasonable; and 79.4. The Claimant's disclosure(s) was the principal reason for her dismissal.

[80]As outlined in my summary of the Claimant's and Respondents' cases there are significant areas of dispute. Whether disclosures were made

[81]The content of the conversations in respect of PD1 and PD3 were disputed by TH. On this basis and given the Respondents deny the Claimant brought up TUPE at all, I cannot conclude Ms Smith has a pretty good chance of succeeding at the final hearing that she made disclosures PD1 and PD3.

[82]In respect of PD2, the email shows the Claimant raised questions as regards TUPE. The questions were prefaced with "In line with TUPE regulations 2006". On this basis I consider that there is a pretty good chance that the final hearing would find this email amounted to a disclosure of information.

[83]In respect of PD4, this was a grievance, admitted by the Respondents, in which she set out detailed reasons why she considered the Exeter Practice had failed to meet its obligations under TUPE among other matters.

[84]I consider that there is a pretty good chance that the final hearing would find PD4 would amount to a disclosure of information.

[85]For PD5 which reiterated the Claimant's allegation of non-compliance with TUPE but to her Union Unite and not her employer, I therefore consider there is not a pretty good chance that the final hearing would find this would amount to a disclosure of information for the purposes of an automatic unfair dismissal claim.

[86]PD6 is the "Whistleblowing Report". I therefore consider there is a pretty good chance that the final hearing would find this would amount to a disclosure of information.

[87]I also consider that there is pretty good chance that the final hearing would find PD7, the Claimant's statement she was feeling unsafe and distressed, would amount to a disclosure of information.

[88]In respect of PD8 alleging a breach of the ACAS guidance I consider there is a pretty good chance that the final hearing would find this amounted to a disclosure of information. The Reasonable Belief Test

[89]Following these determinations I went on to consider whether PDs 2,4,6,7 and 8 met the requirements of the Reasonable Belief Test.

[90]I consider the Claimant would be likely to be able to show the final hearing, that in relation to PDs 2.4 and 6, she genuinely believed the disclosures tended to show the relevant failure by the Exeter Practice and/or CCSL and/or the Second Respondent.

[91]In respect of PD7 I do not consider this is the case. The Claimant, in her witness statement, does describe being stressed but links this to her assertion that the Respondents did not agree with her position on TUPE and this led to her discomfort.

[92]There is little evidence from her as to the nexus between her feelings (in the disclosure) and that such feelings tended to show that her health and safety has been, is being or is likely to be damaged.

[93]In relation to PD8 which related to a breach of the ACAS guidance, I am not clear as to the purported link between the alleged failure to abide by the ACAS guidance and that it tended to show the type of wrongdoing set out s43B(1)(b) of the ERA 1996. I therefore have to conclude that it is not likely that the Claimant will establish at the final hearing this element of the Reasonable Belief Test will be met.

[94]I do consider it is likely the final hearing would find that the Claimant's belief was reasonable in respect of PDs 2, 4 and 6 because each includes comprehensive factual details and specificity, albeit to a varying extent. The Public Interest Test

[95]I now considered the Public Interest Test in respect of PDs 2,4 and 6. I noted these disclosures primarily related to the Claimant's assertions that TUPE applied to the Corporate Change.

[96]In respect of the first element of this test in relation to PDs 2 and 4, it is plainly disputed by the Respondents that the Claimant believed that in making the disclosures she was acting in the public interest (in addition to her private interest) at the time the disclosures were made. The Respondents' case is that this is essentially a private dispute in respect of the Claimant's own employment, there is no question of a wider public interest. This will be an important question for the final hearing.

[97]On this basis my impressionistic view is that the Claimant does not have a pretty good chance of persuading the final hearing that she believed in making PDs 2 and 4 this was in the public interest. This is because on the face of the matter the dispute (at the time) does appear to be a private one in that the Claimant was making representations about her own employment.

[98]This leaves PD6 to consider. The Claimant's belief in the public interest nature of her disclosure was different here because she clearly set out that PD8 was her Whistleblowing Report.

[99]As set out above the second element of the Public Interest is that the belief the discloser was acting in the public interest must be a reasonable one. I have borne in mind the Chesterton Guidance and in particular: 99.1. Whether there was evidence to show the Respondents' alleged wrongdoing in respect of the application of TUPE was deliberate because this was more likely to be regarded as in the public interest than inadvertent wrongdoing; and 99.2. That a sub-category of colleagues who are affected might be enough to satisfy this element of the Public Interest Test;

[100]The evidence in that there was a sub-category of similarly affected colleagues was the Claimant's assertions that this was the case. However the Respondents claimed her colleagues were employed by Companion Care (Exeter) Limited and this did change following the sale of some of the shares in this company.

[101]This is another example of a factual dispute here and although I accept that for the purposes of this application Ms Smith does not have show that TUPE did apply to the Corporate Change, I cannot ignore the difference between the parties.

[102]I note that the Claimant was repeatedly told that the Respondents did not consider TUPE applied to the Corporate Change because it was a share sale but Ms Smith disagreed with this.

[103]The Claimant persisted with her allegations and relied on the fact that the VetsForPets brand was well known in the market and that it was in the public interest to show that the business: 103.1. Was avoiding legal liabilities which could have affected other staff; 103.2. Was not complying with TUPE obligations; and 103.3. Was deliberately trying to conceal statutory wrongdoing.

[104]In coming to a conclusion on this element of the Public Interest Test, I also took into account that Chesterton established a relatively low threshold in relation to public interest.

[105]Therefore I am prepared to conclude that it is likely the Claimant will succeed at the final hearing in respect of the Public Interest Test as applied to PD6. Whether PD6 was the Sole or Principal Reason for Dismissal.

[106]The final test I have to apply is whether the Claimant is pretty likely to show that the sole or principal reason for her dismissal was PD8.

[107]In coming to my conclusion I have taken into account the details in the Dismissal Letter, the Respondents' reason that the Claimant was dismissed was for some other substantial reason and Mr Deane's submission that the only possible conclusion I could draw was that Ms Smith's dismissal was due to the protected disclosures she made.

[108]I have also noted that the letter dated 27 November 2025 sent to the Claimant putting her on notice that CCSL was considering terminating her employment could predate PD8. Determining whether this is the case will be a matter of fact for the full hearing to determine.

[109]Given the level of dispute between the parties and the question whether the Claimant made PD8 after she was on notice she risked dismissal mean I am unable to conclude that in respect of PD8 Ms Smith is likely to show that the sole or principal reason for her dismissal was this protected disclosure.

[110]For all these reasons and the Employer Identity Issue, I dismiss the Claimant's application for interim relief. Approved by: