Mr G Wlochinski v English Lakes Hotels Ltd: 6035029/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6035029/2025
Between
Mr G WlochinskiClaimantEnglish Lakes Hotels LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge DunlopNot represented for claimantMr M Mensah (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 18 November 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s application for interim relief under s.128 Employment Rights Act 1996 fails.[2]The respondent’s cost application will be determined on the papers and the Tribunal will make case management orders in relation to this.[3]The claim continues and a case management hearing will be listed on a date to be notified to the parties in due course.
REASONS
Introduction and today’s hearing(1) This was an application for interim relief under s128 Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”). The claim was presented on 22 September 2025 (the respondent having summarily dismissed the claimant on 16 September). On 1 October 2025 the Tribunal sent notice of a hearing to determine the interim relief application to the parties. The hearing was to take place by video on 20 October 2025.(2) Prior to the hearing, the claimant had applied for a determination of the application on the papers. That application was refused by Employment Judge Buzzard on 16 October 2025.(3) The hearing came on before Employment Judge Eeley. Mr Mensah attended, as did the respondent’s solicitor and two members of managerial staff. The claimant did not participate in the CVP hearing on 20 October. In correspondence, he maintains that this was due to technical difficulties and he could be seen but not heard. Mr Mensah’s recollection is that the claimant did not join at all. Tribunal correspondence to the claimant after the hearing merely states that “We were unable to connect with you”.(4) Employment Judge Eeley directed that the hearing be adjourned and relisted due to technical difficulties. She directed it should take place in person. It is relatively common that one or other party has difficulty in participating in a video hearing, for whatever reason, and re-listing the matter for an in-person hearing is a very standard approach in such circumstances.(5) Subsequently, the respondent sought for the re-listed hearing to be moved from Carlisle to Manchester. By an email dated 21 October 2025 the claimant sought for the hearing to be converted to a video hearing, noting that he was now living abroad. He stated “I am fully prepared to participate remotely, with all technical assurances in place.” The application was granted and the hearing was duly listed to take place today, before me, by video.(6) Prior to this morning’s hearing I reviewed the papers. These are significant. There is a 496-page bundle. This was put together by the respondent but includes a large number of documents produced by the claimant, some of them very lengthy. The respondent also produced a skeleton argument and a witness statement from the dismissing officer. The claimant had produced a 126 page ‘rebuttal’ to the respondent’s case. This extraordinary document is not a supplemental bundle. It is 126 pages of legal submission.(7) Plainly, it was impossible for me to read and absorb all of this information before the hearing. I read the skeleton argument and witness statement. I also read the concluding section of the claimant’s submission (121-126) which was bookmarked as being his submissions on interim relief and was helpful in enabling me to understand the way in which he was putting his case. I picked out documents from the 496 page bundle which appeared to be most relevant including the claim form, the two emails alleged to be protected disclosures (12 and 13 August 20205), the investigation report, meeting invitations and the dismissal letter.(8) The hearing would have provided a vital opportunity for me to speak with the claimant, asking him questions to enable me to better understand his position, and giving him the opportunity to direct me to any key documents, or parts of documents, which might have influenced the outcome of the application.(9) The claimant did not attend. Tribunal staff left a voicemail for him and, at 10.11, an email was received which stated “Due to personal circumstances, I am regrettably unable to attend the hearing in person or by video.” The claimant requested that the matter be determined on the papers, made some further brief submissions and requested written reasons for a decision if it was adverse to him.(10) At 10.25 I convened the hearing with the respondent, which was represented by Mr Mensah. A solicitor and a senior manager were also in attendance. Tribunal staff had forwarded Mr Wlochinski’s email to the respondent’s representatives, as he had failed to copy it to them.(11) Mr Mensah invited me to determine the application, and indicated that he relied on his skeleton argument and, in the absence of any representations from Mr Wlochinski, and did not intend to make any further supporting submissions.(12) I informed those present that I would proceed to determine the application and that, on the basis of what I had already read (and having regard to the ‘impressionistic’ nature of the assessment I have to make), I was satisfied that there were no grounds for granting interim relief, but that I would produce a written Judgment given Mr Wlochinski’s absence.(13) I make no bones about the fact that I had not (and have not) read every word of Mr Wlochinski’s rebuttal document nor, indeed, of the underlying documents in the bundle in reaching that decision. Much of what is contained in his correspondence, and in his rebuttal document, comprises bombastic legal hyperbole with little reference to the substantive facts of this case. Whilst superficially erudite, it lacks reasoning and is endlessly repetitive. I suspect – although of course I have been unable to ask Mr Wlochinski – that it results at least in part from a use of AI generated material with little attempt to edit or filter the result. It is not a proportionate use of Tribunal resources for a Judge to spend the hours and hours that it would take to engage with such a document on a line-by-line basis.(14) Following my indication that I intended to give a written Judgment refusing the application, Mr Mensah then made an application for a costs order in favour of the respondent. I reserved my decision on that application. Interim relief - Legal principles(15) There is no dispute that this is a case in which interim relief is potentially available. The claimant has made a claim of ‘automatic’ unfair dismissal under s.103A ERA and the relevant formalities have been complied with.(16) S.129 ERA provides as follows: 129.— Procedure on hearing of application and making of order. (1) This section applies where, on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find— (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in— (i) section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or (ii) paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, or (b) that the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was the one specified in the opening words of section 104F(1) and the condition in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection was met.(17) As is made clear by the remaining subsections, if this test is satisfied, the claimant is entitled to be granted interim relief.(18) It is now well-established that in assessing ‘likelihood’ I am looking for something beyond the balance of probabilities. I must be satisfied that there is a “pretty good chance of success” (Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1068).(19) The ‘likelihood’ test applies to all matters which would be relevant to determining whether the claimant will ultimately be successful in his claim under s103A.(20) The ingredients for a s.103A unfair dismissal case are conveniently summarised, in the context of an interim relief application, at para 14 of the case of Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562: Thus in order to make an order under ss 128 to 129 the Judge had to have decided that it was likely that the tribunal at the final hearing would find five things: (1) that the Claimant had made a disclosure to his employer; (2) that he believed that that disclosure tended to show one or more of the things itemised at (a) to (f) under s 43B(1); (3) that that belief was reasonable; (4) that the disclosure was made in good faith (which, for our purposes, must be amended to that the claimant had reasonable believe his disclosure was made in the public interest); and (5) that the disclosure was the principal reason for his dismissal. In respect of the fourth limb, for our purposes we must, of course, amend that to consider whether the claimant had a reasonable belief that his disclosure was made in the public interest, reflecting the statutory changes which have taken place subsequent to the Sarfraz judgment.(21) Finally, in reaching the conclusions set out below I have had regard to the guidance in London City Airport v Chacko [2013] IRLR 61 and Al Qasimi v Robinson EAT 0238/17 as to summary nature of the exercise, and the fact that I should be careful to make a broad and impressionistic assessment. Where I have stated matters of fact below, these are matters which appeared not to be in dispute between the parties. Where factual matters are in dispute, I have identified that dispute and set out my views insofar as they are relevant to this application only. The factual findings set out below are provisional and not intended to bind any future Tribunal. Analysis and conclusions(22) The claimant worked as a kitchen porter. His employment with the respondent started in January 2022. He benefitted from tied accommodation.(23) In the weeks and months before July 2025 there had been issues between the claimant and the respondent. Concerns had been identified on both sides.(24) On 22 July 2025 the claimant was invited to an investigation meeting, which took place on 25 July 2025 and was chaired by Heather Baker. This related to a specific incident said to have taken place on 19 July involving the claimant making threats to “get your resignation” to another member of staff. Ms Baker found there was a case to answer.(25) However, before this could proceed another investigation was launched, this time to be conducted by Lina Markstedt. In a letter dated 5 August 2025, which invited the claimant to an investigation meeting to take place on 13 August, further allegations were identified including allegations of leaving shift without permission, failing to complete tasks, failing to comply with reasonable requests of management and of disruptive conduct. In a detailed investigation report, Ms Markstedt subsequently concluded there was a case to answer in respect of each of the allegations.(26) Mr Wlochinski did not attend the meeting on 13 August. Instead, he wrote two emails on 12 and 13 August. The first was addressed to the Board of Directors. There are several headings. Under the heading “Lawful refusal to participate” Mr Wlochinski indicated that he would not attend the meeting on 13 August because the allegations against him fail to meet the BHS v Burchell test for reasonable belief. He sets out reasons for this in respect of several allegations by number. In relation to Allegation 1 he states that this “concerns lawful sanitary breaks and authorised waste disposal, both protected under ERA 1996 s.44 & s.100 and the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992.”(27) The second email is said to be without prejudice, although neither side have taken any point on that. It is not clear who it was sent to. Ms McGuiness (who provided a witness statement) believes it was only sent to Ben Berry, the Group Managing director, although I make no finding and nothing turns on that for today’s purposes. Again, in this email, Mr Wlochinski indicates he will not attend the investigation meeting. The email contains the same text in relation ‘Allegation 1’ as I have set out above. There is also a reference to an “unlawful gagging instruction” which I understand to be a reference to earlier correspondence from the respondent asking the claimant to refrain from sending emails to certain people. Both emails assert that there are serious defects in the disciplinary procedure.(28) I have spent some time on these emails because, as I understand from the claim form and the closing section of the rebuttal document, those are the communications which Mr Wlochinski says amount to protected disclosures and which led to his dismissal. Further, as best I understand it, it is the matters within those emails which I have referred to (in particular the reference his alleged absences during shifts being accounted for by lawful breaks and waste disposal tasks) that are said to be the actual disclosure of information relied on. There is scattered reference elsewhere in the documents to other emails perhaps amounting to disclosures. Had Mr Wlochinski attended I would have been able to engage with him directly on where he said he had disclosed information, either within these emails or elsewhere. Of course, that was not possible.(29) Is it ‘pretty likely’ that Mr Wlochinski will establish at a final hearing that he has made protected disclosures? The putative disclosures are made to his employer, so there is no issue on that point. Without further assistance from Mr Wlochinski, I am less than convinced that a Tribunal would find that there is a disclosure of information in relation to matters falling within s43B, as opposed to just vague and generalised allegations aimed towards intimidating the respondent into dropping its investigation. It may be that there is a context to these emails, set against the voluminous prior correspondence, that might be relevant and helpful to Mr Wlochinski, but on the face of what I have read I cannot assess it as “pretty likely” that a Tribunal will find that these emails contain the substance of a protected disclosure. Separately, I have real doubts as to whether Mr Wlochinski will be able to establish that he had a reasonable belief his disclosure (if there was one) was made in the public interest. This is a straight-forward employment dispute about whether a kitchen porter was doing what he was meant to be doing and (potentially) whether he was receiving the breaks etc that he was entitled to. Subsequently, it is a dispute about whether the employer was legally compliant in the way it attempted to address those issues. The question of when an employee can reasonably take a view that making a disclosure about their private employment dispute can be in the public interest in a complicated one, particularly in view of case law which draws a relatively generous interpretation of the test. However, on the basis of the summary exercise I have to undertake today I cannot say it is “pretty likely” that Mr Wlochinski will succeed on that point.(30) Even if Mr Wlochinski was to succeed in showing that the emails of 12 and 13 August contain protected disclosures, a Tribunal at final hearing would then have to find that those disclosures were the sole or principal reason for dismissal in order for a claim under s.103A to succeed. Is that conclusion “pretty likely” on the information before me?(31) The respondent emphasises that the chronology is against Mr Wlochinski here. By the time these protected disclosures were made the investigation process was well in train. The respondent has a credible alternative reason for dismissal in simply pointing to the allegations which had been raised against Mr Wlochinski before he made the disclosures. There is no way in which I can assess the merits of those allegations – I understand Mr Wlochinski’s position is that they were ‘trumped up’. But I cannot possibly make an assessment of the likelihood of Mr Wlochinski establishing that. Further, even if he did, the difficulty presented by the chronology remains in terms of pinning down a causative link between the putative disclosures and the dismissal.(32) There are other points raised by the respondent around who knew about the putative disclosures and their involvement in the disciplinary process. Those may well be important points for the final hearing, but I do not need to go that far to be satisfied that that I cannot say that it is “pretty likely” that Mr Wlochinski will be able to show causation. Interim relief - conclusion(33) For all the reasons I have set out above I cannot say the claimant is ‘likely’ to succeed in establishing the matters set out at s.129(1) in a final hearing. I dismiss the application. Costs Application(34) Rule 74 Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 provides as follows: 74.—(1) The Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on its own initiative or on the application of a party or, in respect of a costs order under rule 73(1)(b), a witness who has attended or has been ordered to attend to give oral evidence at a hearing. (2) The Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that— (a)a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted, (b)any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success, or (c)a hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins. (3) The Tribunal may also make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on the application of a party where a party has been in breach of any order, rule or practice direction or where a hearing has been postponed or adjourned.(35) I heard submissions from the respondent as to whether a costs order should be made in respect of the claimant’s failure to attend this hearing, his nonattendance at the last hearing (attributed to technical differences but the respondent submits that I can infer, in all the circumstances, that the claimant chose not to attend) and his pursuit of the interim relief application generally. I reserved my decision and intended to determine the application and explain my determination as part of this Judgment. However, following the hearing I directed myself to Rule 75(2) which provides as follows: The Tribunal must not make a costs order or a preparation time order against a party unless that party has had a reasonable opportunity to make representations (in writing or at a hearing, as the Tribunal may order).(36) On one view, Mr Wlochinski has had such an opportunity, as the respondent previously made an application in writing. Mr Wlochinski had the opportunity to attend this hearing, where he could have put his position forward.(37) However, I am conscious that the application made is now wider than the application previously made in writing and, further, that although the Tribunal file records EJ Eeley directing that the costs application would be dealt with at today’s hearing, it does not appear that any correspondence was sent to the parties notifying them that that would be the case. In circumstances where I consider (being clear that I have not pre-judged it) that the application for costs potentially has merit, and there is a real risk of a costs order being made against the claimant, I am satisfied that I must give Mr Wlochinski the opportunity to respond, both in order to comply with Rule 75(2) and as a matter of natural justice. Having reserved my decision on this matter I am now therefore deferring that decision and I will require the respondent to set out the grounds of its application, and the sums claimed, in order that the claimant can have an opportunity to respond if he wishes to do so. Approved by: COSTS JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1]The claimant is ordered to pay costs incurred by the respondent in the sum of £3,000.00 (inclusive of VAT).
Introduction
[1]A hearing took place in this matter on 10 November 2025 to determine the claimant’s application for interim relief. The claimant did not attend and the application was unsuccessful. The respondent made a costs application. I reserved Judgment on that application.[2]On 18 November 2025 I approved a written Judgment, which was provided to the parties on 19 November 2025. That Judgment gave my reasons for refusing the interim relief application and explained that, upon reflection, I considered it appropriate to invite further written submissions on the costs application, following which that application would be determined on the papers. This Judgment should be read in conjunction with that earlier Judgment.[3]In a letter accompanying the Judgment, I made the following Orders as to the costs application:[1]If the respondent wishes to pursue its application, it must write to the Tribunal and the claimant by no later than 14 days from the date of this letter setting out the grounds of its application and enclosing a schedule of the costs claimed.[2]The claimant must thereafter provide any response to the application within a further 14 days. His response must be sent to the Tribunal and the respondent and must comprise the following:(a) Any written representations as to why a costs order should not be made. The written representations are limited to 10 pages of A4, in 12- point print, double-spaced. (That is a limit not a target, a much shorter submission may be more than adequate).(b) A signed witness statement, with a statement of truth, setting out his financial means to include monthly income and outgoing and details of any assets (property, investments etc) and any debts, whether in the UK or another jurisdiction. The statement is limited to 3 pages of A4, in 12-point print, double-spaced. The statement need not be provided if the claimant does not wish the Tribunal to take his financial means into account in making any award.(c) Any supporting documents (i.e. screenshots of bank statements etc) limited to 20 pages combined into one indexed pdf file. There is no need to provide copies of any legal authorities which may be relied upon.[3]Within a further 14 days the respondent must write to the tribunal, copying the claimant, making any further submissions it wishes to make in relation to the evidence provided by the claimant.[4]Each party must indicate on their correspondence that it is for the attention of Employment Judge Dunlop. 4. The prescriptive nature of the order reflects the fact that (as outlined in my previous Judgment) the claimant had previously sought to rely on very lengthy submissions (extending into the 100s of pages) which appeared to be AI-generated, had little relation to the facts of this specific case and which were of no assistance to me in determining the issues I had to determine.[5]By email dated 9 December 2025 the respondent wrote, as directed, to set out its costs application and provide its schedule of costs. That schedule totaled £16,896.60 and related solely to work connected with the interim relief application. The letter was a few days late due to a portal issue.[6]On 16 December 2025 Tribunal staff, acting on my direction, wrote to the parties to accept the application in view of the explanation given for the delay, and to confirm that the claimant now had 14 days to provide any submissions/documents in response. In view of the upcoming holiday period, I also directed in that letter that, should the 14 days fall prior to the 31 January (which is what happened) the period for response would be extended to 9 January 2026.[7]A case management hearing in relation to the on-going claim took place before a different Judge on 7 January. The hearing was ineffective due to apparent difficulties with the claimant’s CVP connection, despite the history of such problems set out in my earlier Judgment.[8]On or around 6 January the claimant provided a close-typed 218-page document.[9]On 9 January 2026, on my direction, Tribunal staff wrote to the claimant informing him that the document he had provided was in breach of the Orders made, and would not be read by the Judge. The letter gave a final deadline of 23 January 2026 for the claimant to provide a compliant response, and notified the parties that an in chambers hearing (i.e. a hearing where the parties do not attend) had been arranged for 25 February 2026, when the costs application would be determined. (The claimant later confirmed that the document had not been intended as a rebuttal to the costs application, but as a submission for the case management hearing on the 7th).[10]On 16 February 2026 the respondent made an application to strike out the claim. That application has not yet been dealt with by the Tribunal, and I record it only as a matter of chronology.[11]On 23 January the claimant uploaded an 11-page document setting out his representations as to the costs application. This included 7 pages of submissions and 4 pages of attached documents. Two of the documents were screenshots of correspondence to/from the Tribunal administration related to the postponement of earlier hearings. The penultimate page was a statement of means in which the claimant asserted that he had ‘zero’ means and was living in Poland due to his financial situation. It gives no indication of his actual incomings and outgoings. The final page was a bank statement for a £ sterling account with a British bank which showed transactions (all payments out) between 16 and 23 January 2026 and an account balance which decreased from £970 to £900.[12]I considered that the length of this document was proportionate, and substantively in accordance with the order I had made, even if not technically fully compliant (for example, the submissions were not doublespaced and would have extended significantly before 7 pages if they had been). I read it carefully and have had regard to it in reaching my conclusions. Law, submissions and conclusions[13]The respondent’s application is pursued under three of the available ‘costs gateways’ set out in Rule 74(2) Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024. Specifically:(a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted.(b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success.(c) a hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins.[14]The rule sets out a three-stage process. I must consider whether the claimant’s conduct falls within the descriptions contained in the rule i.e. the gateways. If so, the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction is engaged, but this does not necessarily mean that an order will be made. I have a discretion, and I must decide whether it is appropriate to exercise that discretion. Finally, if it is appropriate, I must decide the amount of any award in accordance with Rule 76.[15]I remind myself that costs are the exception in this jurisdiction and that there is a high threshold in establishing unreasonable behaviour: Gee v Shell UK Ltd [2003] IRLR 82 and Salinas v Bear Stearns International Holdings Inc [2005] ICR 1117.[16]One question which arises in almost every costs application is the extent to which the costs claimed are attributable to the gateway conduct identified. The claimant’s submission asserts (repeatedly) that the tribunal must identify costs which are “incremental” to the conduct. That submission is not correct in law. Yerrakalva v Barnsley Metropolitan Council [2012] ICR 240 establishes that costs awarded need not be directly attributable to the impugned conduct, but that I must take into account the nature, gravity and effect of the unreasonable conduct, and ensure that I am looking at the whole picture. Gateway - Unreasonable conduct[17]The respondent argues that the claimant has acted unreasonably in bringing an Interim Relief application and in the way it has been pursued, specifically in his ‘failure to engage’ with both hearings, his failure to copy the respondent into correspondence and his lengthy submissions and email attachments. (The respondent says, and I have no reason to doubt, that one email attachment which I have not seen reached 888 pages).[18]With a degree of hesitation in view of subsequent events, my view is that I cannot class the claimant’s non-attendance at the initial CVP hearing on 20 October as being, or contributing to, unreasonable conduct. I consider it would be wrong of me to go behind the Tribunal’s recording at the time that this was a case of technical difficulties. As I said in my previous Judgment, it is relatively common for this to happen on a first hearing and a party cannot necessarily be expected to know that they will experience difficulties prior to attempting to join the platform. In view of the claimant’s repeated ‘failures’ the respondent’s belief that this is, in fact, deliberate refusal to engage on the claimant’s part rather than genuine technical difficulties becomes harder to resist. However, I remain unprepared to make such a finding on the evidence I have, particularly in respect of a hearing which was a first hearing, and at which I was not present myself.[19]The claimant has acted unreasonably in failing to copy correspondence to the respondent on numerous occasions (as set out in the respondent’s application) and by relying on the extremely lengthy and unhelpful submissions documents which I have discussed elsewhere. Both of those are matters which have no doubt put this respondent (and indeed the Tribunal) to considerable extra work than an interim relief application which had been appropriately and sensibly pursued would have done.[20]Finally, the claimant also acted unreasonably by failing to attend the 10 November interim relief hearing. In reaching this conclusion I have regard to the background I have referred to, the lateness of his correspondence, and the absence of any substantive explanation for his non-attendance in his email. Indeed, I have still had no explanation from the claimant as to why he says he could not join the hearing. I am drawn to the unavoidable conclusion that the claimant chose not to attend. The claimant submits that he should not be penalised as he asked for a determination on the papers and provided written submissions, which (he asserts) is a cost-effective method of determining disputes. However, it is not for the claimant to dictate to the Tribunal how an application should be determined. It is for the Tribunal to decide if a hearing is required. In determining the interim relief application I would have very much benefitted from being able to speak to the claimant, as indicated in my previous Judgment. He chose to deprive the Tribunal of that opportunity, whilst still seeking to pursue a type of application which, by its nature, requires much of the Tribunal administration as well as the other party. That is the epitome of unreasonable conduct. Gateway - No reasonable prospects of success[21]The respondent’s application under this head relates to the prospects of the interim relief application, not to the case as a whole.[22]It is true that that application was determined in the respondent’s favour (and also true that the vast majority of such applications are unsuccessful). I consider that it is impossible to analyse whether the application may have had some prospects of success if the claimant had engaged with the process, presented his case in a sensible way and attended the hearing. I am not prepared to make a finding, in those circumstances, that it had no prospects of success from the outset. Gateway - Short notice adjournment of 20 October hearing[23]The respondent’s application under this head is a ‘belt and braces’ application, making the same points in relation to the 20 October hearing as it made in relation to unreasonable conduct (Rule74(2)(a)). I do not consider that this rule is engaged in circumstances where the claimant did not actually make an adjournment application but, rather, the case was adjourned in circumstances where he failed to connect to CVP. Discretion[24]I next ask myself whether, in principle, it is appropriate to award costs in respect of the unreasonable conduct I have identified.[25]In relation to the claimant’s defaults regarding correspondence and production of lengthy documents, I have concluded that it is not. I take account of the fact that the claimant is a litigant in person and that it appears highly likely that English is a second language for him. The use of technology allows many litigants to produce documents which must appear to be vastly superior to what they could achieve on their own. It is to be hoped that problems with relying solely on such documents, and not taking steps to ensure that they are tailored and proportionate, will become widely known in due course. But it certainly is not widely known now. By producing costs submissions which at least broadly complied with what was required, the claimant has shown an ability to take heed of what the Tribunal has told him and to learn. The claimants error in failing (repeatedly) to copy correspondence to the other party is one which is common amongst litigants in person.[26]Although I have disregarded these matters in decided what costs, if any, should be awarded today, the claimant must take heed of the finding that his conduct has been unreasonable in this respect. If it continues, there may well be grounds for a further costs application, which, in view of this warning having been given, might be successful.[27]Moving onto the 10 November hearing, I am entirely satisfied that it is appropriate to make a costs order in respect of the claimant’s conduct around his non-attendance at that hearing. I will not repeat the reasoning I have set out above as to why his actions in that respect are particularly concerning. In my judgment any claimant who brings an interim relief application and fails, without good reason, to attend the hearing of that application, can expect to be penalised in costs given the “high stakes” nature of the application and the commitment which it requires from both sides. Claimants, of course, have a choice about whether to enter into that commitment, in contrast to respondents. Amount of award[28]The respondent’s schedule sets out all of its costs associated with defending the interim relief application. Given the conclusions I have reached, I do not consider that it would be appropriate to award all of those costs. That would (in the event the sums were actually recovered) represent a windfall in favour of the respondent. It is unhelpful that the schedule does not distinguish between the fees and disbursements related to the separate hearings. However, I remind myself that, as per Yerrakalva, I am concerned with the whole picture. I appreciate that, to some extent, it will be impossible for the respondent to distinguish precisely which costs would not have been incurred if the claimant had attended the second hearing and also that the very task of drawing up costs schedules and so forth adds to the respondent’s costs.[29]Taking everything into account, I have decided that an appropriate sum to award, absent any consideration of the claimant’s means, would be one third of the amount claimed on the schedule. That would amount to £5,632.20.[30]The claimant has me to reduce any amount awarded to a token amount in view of his reduced means. I am unimpressed with the evidence the claimant has offered as to means. The statement he has provided is worthless – it gives no account at all of his income and outgoings as I have said. I am also concerned that the bank statement provided covers only part of a month. I therefore cannot see whether there is income coming into the account at the start/end of the month. If it includes all of the claimant’s outgoings then it supports the proposition that he is living frugally (spending approximately £70 in two weeks), but I have little confidence that it is a full account.[31]In view of those difficulties, I considered disregarding the claimant’s means altogether. However, there remains the fact that, whilst working for the respondent, the claimant was engaged in low-paid hospitality work, living in tied accommodation, as an immigrant. It would fly in the face of reality to assume that he is now a man of significant means. That leads me to give the claimant some credit for the likelihood that his financial means are limited, albeit not to the extent that I might well have done if a fuller and more credible account of his circumstances had been given.[32]Having regard to all of the matters set out above, I have concluded that it is appropriate to make an order for costs against the claimant and in favour of the respondent in the sum of £3,000.00. Approved by: