Ms R Hassey v Catalyst Science Discovery Centre and Museum Trust Ltd: 6034784/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6034784/2025

Between

Ms R HasseyClaimant

Catalyst Science Discovery Centre and Museum Trust LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Ainscough

In person for claimant

Ms Page (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 29 June 2026

JUDGMENT

The claim is struck out because it was not brought within the time limits set out in section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

REASONS

[1]This was a preliminary hearing listed because it appeared that the claim of detriment because of a protected disclosure in accordance with section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 was issued outside of the prescribed time limits in section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[2]The claimant worked in a Visitor Services/Casual Worker role for the respondent, a science discovery centre and museum from 5 May 2020 until 30 March 2025.

[3]The claimant accepted that she was not an employee in accordance with section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[4]The claimant confirmed that she was pursuing the complaint of detriment because of a protected disclosure as a worker.

[5]The claimant complained that after reporting the discovery of mouldy and out of date food in the respondent’s café, there was a reduction in the work offered to her and she was no longer allowed to work in the kitchen. The claimant also complained that her role was eventually terminated.

[6]The respondent denied that the claimant’s concerns about food hygiene caused a reduction in work or termination of the claimant’s role. The respondent submitted that the respondent had carried out a restructure which to led to a reduction in the need for casual workers.

Evidence

[7]The Tribunal heard evidence from the claimant about when she submitted her claim and why she submitted her claim when she did. The Tribunal then heard submissions from both parties on this point.

Issues

[8]The issues for the Tribunal to determine are as follows:(1) Was the claim brought within three months of the act complained of?

(2) If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claimant to bring the claim within the three month time limit?

(3) If not, did the claimant bring the claim within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable? Relevant findings of fact

[9]During the Summer of 2024 the claimant made complaints to the respondent about mouldy and out of date food.

[10]The claimant raised a grievance about the reduction of hours of work offered by the respondent. The grievance hearing took place on 15 January 2025. After this date, the claimant was not offered any hours of work by the respondent.

[11]On 14 April 2025 the claimant received a P45 document. The leaving date recorded in that document is 30 March 2025. The claimant sent an email to her line manager to ask about the meaning of the P45 document but did not receive a response.

[12]The claimant gave evidence that on receipt of the P45 document, she understood that she was no longer engaged by the respondent.

[13]On 23 April 2025 the claimant received an email from the respondent’s CEO in which the claimant was informed that a P45 had been issued, and she was no longer required to work for the respondent. A letter dated 18 April 2025 was attached to this email.

[14]On 25 April 2025 the claimant instructed solicitors to provide advice and correspond with the respondent. The claimant’s solicitors advised the claimant that the time limit for bringing a claim before the Employment Tribunal was calculated from the date of receipt of the P45 document – 14 April 2025.

[15]As a consequence of this advice, the claimant’s solicitors started ACAS Early Conciliation on 10 July 2025.

[16]On 18 July 2025 the claimant’s solicitors sent a letter to the respondent on the claimant’s behalf.

[17]On 21 August 2025 ACAS issued the Early Conciliation Certificate.

[18]On 18 September 2025 the claimant was contacted by her solicitors and told her that she would need to submit the ET1 form to the Tribunal by no later than 20 September 2025.

[19]The claimant submitted the ET1 form to the Tribunal on 20 September 2025. At section 5.1 of the form, the claimant recorded the date her employment had ended as 30 March 2025. At section 8.2 of the form the claimant stated, “I was terminated with no further contact by the end of the financial year.”

[20]The respondent submitted the ET3 response form to the Tribunal on 16 December 2025. The respondent submitted that the last day for submission of the ET1 form was 29 June 2025, without any extension for ACAS Early Conciliation.

[21]The respondent further submitted that because the claimant had only started ACAS Early Conciliation on 10 July 2025, she was not entitled to extension of time to submit the ET1 form and as a consequence the ET1 form submitted on 20 September 2025 was 83 days out of time. Relevant Legal Principles

[22]Section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: “(1A) A worker may present complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been subjected to a detriment in contravention of section 47B. (3) An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented –(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates or, where that or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them, or

(b) within such further period as the tribunals considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.”

[23]In the case of McKinney v Newham London Borough Council

(2015) ICR 495

EAT the Employment Appeal Tribunal determined that in a detriment claim, the date for calculation of the time limit is the date of the act about which the claimant complains and not the date the claimant became aware of that act.

[24]In Marks and Spencer Plc v Williams-Ryan

(2005) ICR 1293

the Court of Appeal reviewed some of the authorities and confirmed in paragraph 20 that a liberal approach in favour of the employee was still appropriate. What is reasonably practicable and what further period might be reasonable are ultimately questions of fact for the Tribunal.

[25]In the case of Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd

(1974) ICR 53

, CA the Court of Appeal established the “Dedman principle”. If a claimant instructs a competent representative and that representative makes a mistake about the calculation of the date for the time limit, despite the mistake, it will be presumed that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to submit the claim in time.

[26]This presumption is made on the basis that a competent representative would know the relevant legal principles for calculation of the time limit – in this case the precedent established in McKinney – such that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to bring the claim in time.

[27]In the case of Walls Meat Co Ltd v Khan

(1979) ICR 52

, the Court of Appeal determined that a claimant’s mistaken belief as to the time limit will not be reasonable if the mistaken belief arises from the fault of a representative in not giving the claimant information as they should reasonably in all the circumstances have given.

[28]In the case of Palmer v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council

[1984] ICR 372

, the Court of Appeal determined that something is “reasonably practicable” if it is “reasonably feasible”.

[29]In University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust v Williams

UKEAT/0291/12

the Employment Appeal Tribunal determined that a Tribunal must assess whether a claim was submitted within a reasonable further time period after the expiry of the original time limit. The test is different to the standard required for compliance with the original time limit which demands the Tribunal assess what was reasonably practicable.

[30]In Locke v Tabfine Ltd t/a Hands Music Centre EAT 0517/10 the Employment Appeal Tribunal reiterated that the Tribunal must focus on what was reasonable for the claimant to do in the circumstances, once the primary time limit had expired.

[31]Section 207B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides the period, starting with the day after early conciliation began and ending with the day on which a claimant receives the early conciliation certificate, will not be counted when working out the time limit for submitting a claim.

[32]Section 207B(2)-(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: “In this section— (a) Day A is the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned complies with the requirement in subsection (1) of section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (requirement to contact ACAS before instituting proceedings) in relation to the matter in respect of which the proceedings are brought, and (b )Day B is the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned receives or, if earlier, is treated as receiving (by virtue of regulations made under subsection (11) of that section) the certificate issued under subsection (4) of that section. (3) In working out when a time limit set by a relevant provision expires the period beginning with the day after Day A and ending with Day B is not to be counted. (4) If a time limit set by a relevant provision would (if not extended by this subsection) expire during the period beginning with Day A and ending one month after Day B, the time limit expires instead at the end of that period.”

[33]Any claim must be brought within three months of the date of the act complained of or within the relevant time limit as extended by the early conciliation process. Submissions Respondent’s submissions

[34]The respondent submitted that the burden of proof was on the claimant to establish that it was not reasonably practicable to submit the ET1 within the prescribed three month time limit. The respondent contended that the claimant had not done this.

[35]The respondent maintained that the claim was out of time because the claimant had been erroneously advised that the calculation of the time limit ran from the date of receipt of the P45.

[36]The respondent submitted that the calculation of the time limit ran from the effective date of termination – 30 March 2025. The respondent relied on the principle set out in the case of Dedman and contended it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to submit the claim within the prescribed time limit.

[37]The respondent also submitted in the alternative, that if the Tribunal determined that it was not reasonably practicable, the ACAS Early Conciliation extension was not available to the claimant and that claim was 83 days out of time. Claimant’s submissions

[38]The claimant submitted that she could not have known about the effective date of termination until she was in receipt of the P45 on 14 April 2025.

[39]In support of this position, the claimant relied upon the fact that the respondent only produced the P45 on 14 April 2025.

[40]The claimant maintained that the calculation of the time limit ran from the date of receipt of the P45.

[41]In the alternative, the claimant submitted that she relied on the advice of her solicitors and should not be prohibited from continuing with her claim because of erroneous advice. Discussion and conclusions Was the claim submitted in time?

Discussion and conclusions

[42]The Tribunal has determined that on receipt of the P45 the claimant understood that the respondent had terminated her employment. The claimant was aware that the date given for the date of termination was 30 March 2025.

[43]The claimant recorded this as the date of the last day of employment in section 5.1 of the ET1 form. The claimant also said in section 8.2 that the respondent terminated her employment at the end of the financial year.

[44]Whilst the claimant then subsequently received an email from the respondent’s CEO dated 23 April 2025 enclosing a letter dated 18 April 2025 confirming the termination of employment, it was the claimant’s evidence that she understood the meaning of the P45 and the date given.

[45]However, the claimant should not be criticised for then subsequently accepting the advice of her solicitors that the calculation of the time limit ran from 14 April 2025. It was on the basis of accepting this advice that the claimant instructed her solicitors to submit the ACAS Early Conciliation form on 10 July 2025 and accepted advice that the ET1 form had to be submitted by no later than 20 September 2025.

[46]Unfortunately, the claimant received erroneous advice. In the case of McKinney, the Employment Appeal Tribunal determined that the calculation of the time limit runs from the date of the act complained of and not the date of knowledge.

[47]In response to the claim, the respondent stated that following a restructure the number of casual workers was reduced at the end of the financial year. This was the reason given to the claimant and recorded as the date on the P45 document.

[48]ACAS Early Conciliation should have been started by no later than 29 June 2025. As it was not started until 10 July 2025, the claimant is not entitled to the extension of time provided for in section 207B of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The Tribunal has determined that the time limit for submitting the ET1 claim form was 29 June 2025 and the claim has been submitted out of time. Was it reasonably practicable for the claimant to submit the claim in time?

[49]In accordance with the case of Palmer, the Tribunal has considered what was reasonably feasible.

[50]In so doing, the Tribunal has considered the case of Dedman. In this case it was established that when a claimant instructs a solicitor, the solicitor is expected to be competent in the advice that they give to clients. In the case of Walls Meat Co Ltd, which confirmed the “Dedman principle, it was determined that in particular the solicitor should give advice which is reasonable in all the circumstances to expect them to give, given their professional status and their qualifications.

[51]Based on this presumption, it will then be reasonably practicable for a claimant to submit the ET1 claim form within the prescribed time limits.

[52]The claimant instructed a firm of solicitors who specialise in, amongst other things, employment law. The claimant was entitled to rely upon their professional status and qualifications when considering their advice and the calculation of the time limit.

[53]However, in accordance with the Dedman principle the Tribunal has determined that this meant it was reasonably practicable for the claimant (via her solicitors) to submit the ET1 claim form within the prescribed time limit.

[54]The reason the claimant did not submit her ET1 claim form within the prescribed time limit was because she received erroneous advice.

[55]Unfortunately, the Employment Rights Act 1996 does not provide the Tribunal with a discretion to extend time on this basis. Instead, the claimant’s remedy for the loss of a chance to pursue this claim, is regretfully, against her instructed solicitors.

[56]As a result of this determination, the Tribunal has not determined the final issue as to whether the ET1 claim form was submitted in a reasonable time after the expiry of the prescribed time limit.

[57]The claimant’s claim of detriment because of a protected disclosure is out of time and is struck out. Approved by