Mr A O Adebosin v Richan Care Ltd: 6033591/2025
REASONS
Written reasons pursuant to Rule 60(4)(b)(i) and (4B) of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (as amended) A. Introduction and procedural summary Case Number: 6033591/2025 - 2 -[1]The claimant was dismissed on 13 March 2025. The claimant and the respondent’s representative agreed that this was the effective date of termination. The primary limitation period therefore expired on 12 June 2025.[2]The claimant presented his ET1 on 11 September 2025 in which he made a complaint of unfair dismissal.[3]The ACAS Early Conciliation (“EC”) certificate shows notification to ACAS on 12 August 2025 and issue of the ACAS EC Certificate on 13 August 2025. It was common ground that Early Conciliation did not extend time on the facts of this case as the claimant had not contacted ACAS prior to the expiry of the primary time limit.[4]The preliminary issue of time under section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) was taken at the outset of the listed final hearing on 4 March 2026. The claimant appeared in person. The respondent was represented by counsel, Miss Meabh McGee. I heard the claimant’s evidence, and thereafter, I heard submissions from both sides and then gave an oral judgment with summary reasons. B.Issues
[5]The Tribunal records that the sole issues before the Tribunal, the parties being in agreement as to them, were:(i) Whether it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to present his complaint within the primary limitation period ending 12 June 2025; and, if not,(ii) Whether he presented his complaint within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable. C. Summary of evidence and submissions during the hearing The claimant’s case[6]The claimant said that at dismissal he was a skilled worker visa holder sponsored by the respondent. Loss of his job created immediate immigration consequences for him and his family. From around March 2025 he focused on securing lawful employment and clarifying his status; he stated that he was unrepresented, unaware of strict Tribunal time limits, and that he experienced significant stress and anxiety, for which he was prescribed sertraline around May/June 2025 for a period of a couple of months. He said these factors rendered it not reasonably practicable to present his claim in time. He contacted his trade union later; following which he undertook ACAS Early Conciliation on 12–13 August 2025 and then Case Number: 6033591/2025 - 3 - presented his ET1 on 11 September 2025. He accepted that between 13 August and 11 September there was a further delay, which he attributed to his continuing circumstances, financial pressure, childcare responsibilities and the overwhelming nature of events. The respondent’s case[7]The respondent’s representative submitted that the statutory time limit set out at section 111(2)(a) ERA 1996 expired on 12 June 2025, long before any contact was made by the claimant with ACAS. The respondent’s representative submitted that the immigration and visa-related matters relied upon by the claimant did not arise until after expiry of the primary limitation period and therefore could not explain the claimant's failure to present his complaint by 12 June 2025. The claimant was able during that period to appeal his dismissal, conduct job applications, and later to compile a witness statement and schedule of loss unaided, evidencing capacity to act. Furthermore, there was no adequate explanation for the delay between obtaining the ACAS EC certificate on 13 August 2025 and presenting the ET1 on 11 September 2025. On that basis, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to consider the claimant's complaint of unfair dismissal. Documentary context[8]The case file records the claimant’s dismissal from his employment with the respondent on 13 March 2025, the claimant’s ET1 was received 11 September 2025, and that ACAS EC started on 12 August 2025 and that the ACAS EC certificate was issued on 13 August 2025.Relevant law
[9]The relevant law applied by the Tribunal included (but was not limited to) the following:[10]Section 111 of the ERA 1996 provides as follows: “111 Complaints to employment tribunal(1) A complaint may be presented to an employment tribunal against an employer by any person that he was unfairly dismissed by the employer.(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal— (a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or (b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months. (2A) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsection (2)(a).” Case Number: 6033591/2025 - 4 -[11]The question of what is reasonably practicable is explained in a number of authorities, particularly Palmer and Saunders v Southend on Sea Borough Council [1984] IRLR 119, a decision of the Court of Appeal. The following guidance is given: “34. In the end, most of the decided cases have been decisions on their own particular facts and must be regarded as such. However, we think that one can say that to construe the words “reasonably practicable” as the equivalent of “reasonable” is to take a view too favourable to the employee. On the other hand, “reasonably practicable” means more than merely what is reasonably capable physically of being done. … Perhaps to read the word “practicable” as the equivalent of “feasible”, as Sir John Brightman did in Singh’s case and to ask colloquially and untrammelled by too much legal logic, ‘Was it reasonably feasible to present the complaint to the Industrial Tribunal within the relevant three months?’ is the best approach to the correct application of the relevant subsection. 35. What however is abundantly clear on all the authorities is that the answer to the relevant question is pre-eminently an issue of fact for the Industrial Tribunal and that it is seldom that an appeal from its decision will lie. Dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case, an Industrial Tribunal may wish to consider the manner in which and reason for which the employee was dismissed, including the extent to which, if at all, the employer’s conciliatory appeals machinery has been used. It would no doubt investigate what was the substantial cause of the employee’s failure to comply with the statutory time limit, whether he had been physically prevented from complying with the limitation period for instance by illness or a postal strike or something similar. […] Any list of possible relevant considerations, however, cannot be exhaustive, and, as we have stressed, at the end of the day the matter is one of fact for the Industrial Tribunal, taking all the circumstances of the given case into account.”[12]In Asda Stores Ltd v Kauser UKEAT/0165/07, a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Lady Smith at paragraph 17 commented that it was perhaps difficult to discern how: ““‘reasonably feasible’ adds anything to ‘reasonably practicable’, since the word ‘practicable’ means possible and possible is a synonym for feasible. The short point seems to be that the court has been astute to underline the need to be aware that the relevant test is not simply a matter of looking at what was possible but asking whether, on the facts of the case as found, it was reasonable to expect that which was possible to have been done.”[13]The Tribunal will often focus on the 'practical' hurdles faced by the claimant, rather than any subjective difficulties such as a lack of knowledge of the law or an ongoing relationship with the employer. In the case of Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances [1974] ICR 53, where a claimant stated that they had a lack of knowledge as to the time limits, Scarman LJ found that the Tribunal should ask ([1974] ICR at 64): ''What were his opportunities for finding out that he had rights? Did he take them? If not, why not? Was he misled or deceived? Should there prove to be an acceptable explanation of his continuing ignorance of the existence of his rights, it would be inappropriate to disregard it, relying on the maxim Case Number: 6033591/2025 - 5 - "ignorance of the law is no excuse". The word "practicable" is there to moderate the severity of the maxim and to require an examination of the circumstances of his ignorance'. But what, if, as here, a complainant knows he has rights, but does not know that there is a time limit? Ordinarily, I would not expect him to be able to rely on such ignorance as making it impracticable to present his complaint in time. Unless he can show a specific and acceptable explanation for not acting within four weeks, he will be out of court."[14]The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove that it was not reasonably practicable to present the complaint in time: Porter v Bandridge Ltd [1978] ICR 943, CA at 948. D. Findings and conclusions Primary time limit[15]The effective date of termination was 13 March 2025. The primary limitation period therefore expired on 12 June 2025. The ET1 was presented on 11 September 2025, almost three months out of time. Reasonably practicable[16]I accept the claimant was under genuine stress arising from his immigration position and financial and family responsibilities. I accept his evidence that he was prescribed sertraline for a couple of months in mid-2025. However, I find that these matters did not make it not reasonably practicable for him to present a claim within time. In reaching that conclusion I took into account all the circumstances including but not limited to the following:(i) During the March–June 2025 period the claimant was able to lodge an internal appeal and engage with post-dismissal arrangements, and by his own account he was exploring job opportunities. Those activities demonstrate a functional capacity to take basic procedural steps within the relevant three-month primary limitation period.(ii) The immigration and visa-related uncertainty upon which the claimant principally relied did not crystallise until August 2025, when he received communication from the Home Office regarding his immigration position (he referred to a Home Office letter around the end of July 2025 which he received in August 2025). This was after the primary limitation period had already expired. It therefore does not explain, or adequately explain, the claimant's failure to present his complaint by 12 June 2025. Indeed, the claimant's evidence was that he Case Number: 6033591/2025 - 6 - received no communication from the Home Office regarding his immigration position prior to August 2025.(iii) The claimant did not say that he was incapacitated throughout the relevant period or unable to communicate his claim. He did not suggest that he attempted to present a claim within time but was thwarted by external obstacles. Lack of knowledge of time limits, without more, is not generally a sufficient basis for extending time under section 111(2)(b) of the ERA 1996. On the facts here, the combination of stress, family responsibilities and financial pressure and the claimant’s circumstances as a whole does not, in my judgment, reach the threshold of it not being reasonably practicable for him to present his complaint within the primary limitation period.(iv) The claimant's evidence was that following his dismissal he was able to pursue an internal appeal, apply for alternative employment, contact a lawyer for advice and conduct research in relation to his case. He also subsequently prepared his ET1, witness statement and schedule of loss himself, following his own research. Whilst those documents were prepared later, they nevertheless tended to demonstrate that the claimant retained the capacity to take practical steps in furtherance of legal proceedings. I was not satisfied that any medical condition, immigration issue or other circumstance deprived him of the ability to present a complaint within the primary statutory time limit.(v) The claimant accepted during cross-examination that he read the respondent's appeal outcome letter dated 4 April 2025 which referred him to ACAS should he wish to pursue the matter further. Whilst the claimant stated that he did not then know what ACAS was and was not in the best frame of mind, I nevertheless took that circumstance into account when considering his contention that a lack of knowledge prevented earlier presentation of his complaint. I also took into account that the claimant’s evidence that he was able to conduct internet-based research in relation to his case.[17]Accordingly, I am not satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to present his complaint within the statutory time limit ending on 12 June 2025. Reasonable period thereafter[18]If I am wrong about my conclusion on reasonable practicability at paragraphs 16 and 17, I would in any event find that the claim was not Case Number: 6033591/2025 - 7 - presented within a reasonable period thereafter. The claimant contacted ACAS on 12 August 2025 and obtained an EC certificate on 13 August 2025. He then waited almost one month to present the ET1 on 11 September 2025. He did not provide a sufficiently cogent explanation for that interval beyond the general pressures and circumstances already relied upon in support of his primary argument on reasonable practicability. Given the relative simplicity of presenting an ET1, the absence of any identified obstacle preventing presentation of the claim, and the fact that ACAS EC had already concluded by 13 August 2025, I conclude that the additional delay by the claimant was not reasonable in all the circumstances.[19]For those reasons, the claimant did not have title to present the complaint of unfair dismissal and the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider it. The claim is therefore dismissed. Approved By