Mr A Modi v Redcloud Technologies Ltd: 6030959/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6030959/2025
Between
Mr A ModiClaimantRedcloud Technologies LimitedRespondent
Before
Employment Judge E BurnsRepresented himself for claimantDaniel Northhall KC for respondentDate 13 October 2025
JUDGMENT
The Claimant’s application for interim relief brought pursuant to Section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 against the Respondent was not well founded and is dismissed. CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION Under Rule 67, the judgment and written reasons
REASONS
[1]The Claimant presented a claim form to the tribunal on 21 August 2025 consisting of an application for interim relief under section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[2]It was not in dispute that the Claimant was an employee of the Respondent and that the application for interim relief had been presented in time.[3]In summary, the Claimant said he had made protected disclosures and that these were the principal reason for his summary dismissal on 16 August 2025. The Respondent did not concede that the Claimant had made any qualifying protected disclosures under section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996. It said that the principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal was gross misconduct.[4]I did not hear any evidence at the hearing. I made my decision based on the written documentation available at the hearing and the oral submissions made.[5]Both parties had prepared helpful written skeleton arguments and produced bundles for the hearing. The Claimant’s bundle two witness statements for him and a further witness statement for Richard Brenchly, Senior Vice President of Engineering. The Respondent provided a written witness statement for Gillian Hinton, Chief People Officer.[6]In these written reasons, I refer to key documents from those bundles by page numbers in round brackets, distinguishing between them with a C or R.[7]Having read the relevant documents and heard submissions, I found against the Claimant. I delivered an oral judgment with reasons. The Claimant asked for written reasons at the end of the hearing. THE LAW Interim Relief
THE LAW
[8]Section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 enables an employee to apply for interim relief where the employee presents a complaint that he has been unfairly dismissed and the reason (or if more than one, the principal reason) is that he made a protected disclosure pursuant to section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[9]Section 103A says: “An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure.”[10]The statutory provisions dealing with what constitutes a protected disclosure and to whom they must be made to qualify for protection are found in sections 43A – 43L of the Employment Rights Act 1996. I have set out the relevant legal tests below.[11]An application for interim relief must be submitted within 7 days of the date of termination of employment (section 128(2) Employment Rights Act 1996).[12]When dealing with an application for interim relief, the key question is found at section 129(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. I must consider whether it appears that is it likely that the tribunal will, on final determination of this claim, find that the principal reason the Claimant was dismissed was because she made a protected disclosure.[13]“Likely” in this context means that there is a “pretty good chance of success” at the final hearing (Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1086, EAT). A pretty good chance is more than simply on the balance of probabilities and requires a significantly higher likelihood (Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562, EAT).[14]This test applies to all elements of the claim (Simply Smile Manor House Ltd and ors v Ter-Berg [2020] ICR 570, EAT). Protected disclosures[15]According to section 43A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), a “protected disclosure” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H ERA.[16]Section 43B(1) ERA says a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following—(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject,(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. Disclosure of Information – the Sufficiency Test[17]There must be a disclosure of information. In Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] IRLR 38, the EAT held that to be protected a disclosure must involve the disclosure of information that shows a matter set out in section 43B(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and not simply voice a concern or raise an allegation.[18]The Court of Appeal subsequently cautioned tribunals against treating the categories of "information" and "allegation" as mutually exclusive in the case of Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] EWCA Civ 1436. At paragraphs 30 -31, Sales LJ said: “I agree with the fundamental point …….. that the concept of “information” as used in section 43B(1) can cover statements which might also be characterised as allegations. …….Section 43B(1) should not be glossed to introduce into it a rigid dichotomy between “information” on the one hand and “allegations” on the other. …… On the other hand, although sometimes a statement which can be characterised as an allegation will also constitute “information” and amount to a qualifying disclosure within section 43B(1), not every statement involving an allegation will do so. Whether a particular allegation amounts to a qualifying disclosure under section 43B(1) will depend on whether it falls within the language used in that provision.”[19]He went on to say at paragraph 35: “In order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure according to this language, it has to have a sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in subsection [43B](1).”[20]Whether a disclosure meets the sufficiency test should be considered in all the circumstances and take into account the context. It is important that we consider what was said as a whole, rather than take a fragmented view of individual communications (Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw 2014 ICR 540, EAT). Whether two communications are to be read together is a question of fact for the tribunal (Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe [2021] ICR 695).[21]A disclosure may contain new information, in the sense that it involves telling a person something of which they were previously unaware, or it can involve drawing a person's attention to a matter of which they are already aware (section 43L(3), ERA 1996). Genuine and Reasonable Beliefs[22]The requirement for reasonable belief requires the tribunal to identify first what the claimant genuinely believed and then to consider whether it was objectively reasonable for the Claimant to hold that belief. We must consider this question considering the circumstances including the Claimant’s level of knowledge (Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board [2012] IRLR 4, EAT).[23]The test to be applied is whether a claimant reasonably believed(a) whether the information he disclosed showed a relevant failure had occurred, was occurring or was likely to occur and(b) whether his or her disclosure was made in the public interest.[24]A claimant does not need to demonstrate that the relevant failure actually occurred, was occurring or was likely to occur or that the disclosure was in the public interest. The focus is on the claimant’s beliefs. That said, the factual reality is not entirely irrelevant. It can be taken into account when considering the objective reasonableness of a claimant’s belief (Darnton v University of Surrey 2003 [ICR] 615, EAT; Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] ICR 1026, CA).[25]The assessment should be made of the claimant’s beliefs at the time of making the disclosure and not with the benefit of hindsight (Jesudason v Alder Hey Children’s NHS trust [2020] ICR 1226). Public Interest Test[26]The leading case dealing with when the public interest test is met is Chesterton Global Ltd & Anor v Nurmohamed & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 979. The Court of Appeal confirmed that where a disclosure relates to a breach of a Claimant’s own contract of employment, or some other matter under where the interest in question is personal in character, there may nevertheless be features of the case that make it reasonable to regard the disclosure as being in the public interest as well as in the personal interest of the worker. Each case will depend on its own facts and context.[27]Factors that may be helpful to consider include:(a) The numbers of people whose interests may be impacted by the disclosure;(b) The nature and extent of the interests involved and the impact(c) The nature of the wrongdoing disclosed(d) The identity of the alleged wrongdoer Dismissal for making a protected disclosure[28]The test in a dismissal case is whether the protected disclosure was the principal reason for the employer’s decision to dismiss the claimant. The burden of proof is on the claimant. This requires the tribunal to consider what is in the mind of the person who made the decision to dismiss.[29]Because what is in the mind of the decision maker is key, it is usually necessary for a successful claimant to establish that the decision maker had knowledge of a claimant’s protected disclosure.[30]There is an exception to this that arises in very limited circumstances. The exception arises where there is evidence that a dismissing manager, without knowledge of any protected disclosure, has been manipulated and misled into dismissing the employee for a different reason by someone more senior than they are in the hierarchy of the employer. If the reason for the manipulation is the claimant’s protected disclosure, this can be held to be the reason for dismissal (Royal Mail Group v Jhuti [2019] UKSC 55).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[31]An interim relief hearing requires a summary assessment of the material before the tribunal. The evidence is therefore untested in the usual ways. In light of this, it is important to note that that none of the following should be treated as findings of fact that bind any other tribunal.[32]The Respondent is a business which provides a commerce platform connecting manufacturers, distributors and retailers in emerging markets. It is a subsidiary of a holding company listed on the US Nasdaq exchange.[33]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as its Chief Technology Officer between 9 April 2024 and 15 August 2025, when he was summarily dismissed.[34]The Claimant asserts that the real reason for his dismissal was because he made a number of protected disclosures. All he said about the protected disclosures in his claim form was that they were made between January and August 2025 to members of the senior leadership team at the Respondent, namely the CEO, CCO/CPO, SVP Ops and General Counsel and concerned:(i) consent/data sharing defects on the RedCloud platform;(ii) unmanaged security exposures on RedTag operated outside SSDLC;(iii) attempts to bypass procurement/IT Security (incl. an “auto approve after 10 days” proposal); and(iv) a mismatch between public/investor facing statements (2024–25) and internal reality, creating market/regulatory risk. The Claimant did not provide dates for when the disclosures were made or say how they were made. He also did not specify, beyond the four points set out above, what information he claimed to have disclosed or how this information constituted a qualifying disclosure.[35]Ms Hinton said in her witness statement that the Respondent had considered terminating the Claimant’s employment in April 2025 due to receiving complaints from staff in his team. According to her, a termination letter dated 28 April 2025 was drafted, but not sent to the Claimant because another senior member of staff was dismissed at that time and it was felt that it would be destabilising to dismiss them both.[36]The Respondent’s bundle contained the draft termination letter (R69 – 70) and further evidence of the Claimant’s possible termination of employment being discussed between Ms Hinton and a member of her team (R68). The Claimant said this evidence was fabricated, but my impression of it was that it was genuine.[37]On 14 May 2025, solicitors acting for the Claimant submitted a grievance letter to the Respondent on his behalf. Within the grievance letter it was said that the Claimant had “raised multiple Protected Disclosures in the form of internal objections regrading false public claims, contract risk, and product readiness” and had been subjected to detriments as a result. The letter did not specify when the Claimant had made his earlier disclosures, to whom they had been made or what it was he was claiming to have said. The Claimant had, however, provided an evidence pack of 100 pages as an appendix to the letter. This was not included in either the of the bundles at the interim relief hearing.[38]Within the letter, the Claimant’s solicitors alleged that in the period preceding the Respondent’s IPO, various people within in the company had misrepresented the Respondent’s viability. It was said that the Claimant had raised this and as a result, the Respondent had failed to award him EMI options he had been previously promised. The letter also raised other concerns about the Claimant’s remuneration and that areas of work for which he was responsible were being reassigned to the COO.[39]The Respondent undertook an investigation into the matters raised in the grievance. It was delayed initially because the Claimant raised concerns about who should deal with it. A non-executive director of the Respondent, Nikolaus Senn was appointed to deal with it. He met with the Claimant to seek to understand his concerns as well as the Respondent’s CEO and COO/CPO.[40]Between the date of the Claimant’s grievance and the outcome report, on 15 July 2025, the Claimant became aware of a data security flaw. He says he raised this internally, but when his concerns were ignored, he reported it to the Information Commissioner himself. He provided evidence in his bundle that he had reported this breach to the Information Commissioner’s officer on 30 July 2025 (R72-73). In his written witness statement, Mr Brenchley confirmed that he believed there was a “major, reportable data breach”.[41]Mr Senn produced an outcome report which was shared with the Claimant on 8 August 2025 (R50 – 55). He did not uphold the Claimant’s grievance.[42]In the outcome report, Mr Senn said that he had reviewed the evidence pack and found nothing within it that he considered would amount to formal whistleblowing. His conclusion was that the Claimant had failed both in his documentation and at their meetings to clearly establish that he had made qualifying protected disclosures. Regarding the concerns raised in the letter itself, he noted that the Respondent’s lawyers and auditors had been fully involved in scrutinising the position of the Respondent prior to the IPO and had raised no concerns.[43]Mr Senn also found that the Respondent had not promised the Claimant any EMI options or increase in remuneration. He noted that the Claimant’s reporting line had been changed so that he would report into the COO, but did not think this was to his detriment.[44]After giving the Claimant the grievance investigation outcome report on 8 August 2025, the Respondent suspended the Claimant on 8 August 2025 (C 35 – 37).[45]According to Ms Hinton’s written witness statement, the concerns about the Claimant’s performance that had led the Respondent to consider dismissing him in April had continued. Two important members of his team resigned citing strong criticism of his leadership style. In addition, negative Glassdoor reviews referencing the Claimant’s incompetence also began to appear.[46]She explained in her statement that ongoing doubts about the Claimant’s capability led the Respondent’s Chief Customer Officer to query whether thorough background checks had been completed on the Claimant. When Ms Hinton checked the position, she discovered a discrepancy between the job titles he had given on his CV and the job titles he actually had in two earlier roles. She said, this together with the complaints, led the Respondent to question the Claimant’s integrity and therefore it decided to suspend him pending an investigation and disciplinary hearing.[47]No separate investigation meeting was held. Ms Hinton invited the Claimant to attend a disciplinary hearing with her on 13 August 2025, to answer eight allegations of misconduct.[48]The Claimant attended the hearing accompanied by Mr Brenchley. A note taker was also present and the minutes were at pages 80 – 88 of the Respondent’s bundle).[49]According to Mr Brenchley’s written witness statement, the hearing was hostile from the outset. His view of it was that there was “minimal appetite to test the evidence and a clear drive to reach a pre-decided conclusion.” Ms Hinton’s written witness statement painted a different picture. Her version was that “The disciplinary hearing lasted for 2 hours 25 mins and was mostly the Claimant speaking at me - often in an aggressive, patronising and/or rude manner.”[50]Ms Hinton decided that the Claimant should be summarily dismissed for gross misconduct and wrote to him to confirm this on August 2025 (C 40- 43). She said in her letter to him that the reason or the Claimant’s dismissal was gross misconduct based on her finding that all eight allegations of misconduct were proven. She also added a ninth allegation relating to his behaviour at the disciplinary hearing. Some of the evidence on which she based her findings was included in the bundle.
ANALYSIS
[51]For me to be able to grant the Claimant’s application for interim relief I needed to be satisfied that there was a pretty good chance that the tribunal making the final determination of this claim would conclude both that:• at least one of the purported disclosures that the Claimant says he made was a qualifying protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act 1996; and• the principal reason for his dismissal was the relevant disclosure(s) and not a different reason. Did the Claimant make any qualifying protected disclosures?[52]I first considered the disclosures the Claimant was relying on. Although the Claimant had an opportunity to list these in his claim form, skeleton argument, two witness statements and additional note it remained unclear to me exactly what the Claimant was relying on by way of qualifying disclosures. During the hearing, he did not take me to any pages in his 95 page bundle to show me letters or emails which he said amounted to qualifying disclosures.[53]Having reviewed the Claimant’s grievance letter, it did not appear to me to contain any obvious qualifying protected disclosures with the required level of specificity that would be needed to meet the legal tests.[54]It seemed to me likely that the communication to the ICO may amount to a qualifying disclosure. It seemed likely that the public interest test would be met, given the subject matter, but I noted that he would need to satisfy the tribunal at the final hearing that all the requirements found in section 43B Employment Rights Act 1996 were satisfied and, as this was a disclosure to a regulator, the additional requirements in section 43F Employment Rights Act 1996 were also satisfied.[55]The Respondent said it needed the Claimant to better particularise what he said were his protected disclosures before it could confirm its position. What was the reason for dismissal?[56]I next considered what the tribunal at the final hearing would be likely to find was the Respondent’s genuine reason for dismissing the Claimant. I decided, based on the information available to me, that the tribunal was more likely to find that this was the Claimant’s conduct rather than any protected disclosures he may have made.[57]The relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent appears not have been a flourishing one. The Respondent was contemplating terminating the employment of the Claimant in April so clearly had concerns about his performance. In turn he raised a grievance in May.[58]When I first read the Claimant’s grievance, and before I learned about the possible termination in April 2025, it suggested to me that it was written on behalf of senior employee who had insight into the fact that his job security was fragile. The letter gave the impression of someone taking steps to be seen to make protected disclosures in an effort to make it difficult for the Respondent to remove him without a substantial exit payment. The Claimant’s subsequent actions, particularly in relation to what he says was a security flaw, have reinforced this view.[59]The Claimant argued that the timing of his dismissal, both that it was straight after the outcome of his grievance was delivered and that it was a rushed process, was indicative of a retaliatory motive. I did find this argument persuasive. The Respondent was under no obligation to follow a fair process in relation to the Claimant’s dismissal because he did not have sufficient service to qualify to bring an unfair dismissal claim.[60]In addition, the concerns about the Claimant’s honesty and integrity in connection with his CV and job title seemed to me to have some genuine foundation, as did the concerns about complaints made about him.
CONCLUSION
[61]My conclusion was that the test for awarding interim relief was not met. In other words, I was not satisfied that the Claimant had a pretty good chance of succeeding in his claim of automatic unfair dismissal.[62]I emphasised to the Claimant that I was only making a provisional assessment of his claim for the narrow purpose of deciding the interim relief application, based on the information available at this very early stage of the proceedings.