Employment Judge Norris, sitting alone (via CVP)Date 22 September 2025
REASONS
[1]Introduction1.1 The Claimant worked from 16 August 2016 until his dismissal on 31 July 2025 as an (Associate) Vice President, Finance, for the Respondent, a private company whose principal activity is trading and investment in steel and allied businesses.1.2 On 6 August 2025, the Claimant submitted a claim to the Tribunal, in which he alleged that the principal reason for his dismissal was that he had made protected disclosures under section 43B(1)(b) Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) (breach of a legal obligation) and that it was thus “automatically” unfair under section 103A ERA as well as “ordinarily” unfair under section 98 ERA. He requested an Interim Relief (IR) hearing.1.3 On 21 September 2025, the Respondent produced its ET3, asserting that the reason for the Claimant’s dismissal was redundancy. The following day, an IR hearing took place before me by remote means.[2]Interim relief hearing2.1 As is usual with IR applications, I have had to take the case on the basis of what is before the Tribunal, which was a bundle in four parts comprising:• Part 1 - Claim form, particulars of claim and witness statements of the Claimant and three Respondent witnesses for the IR hearing;• Part 2 – Exhibits and additional documents;• Part 3 – Respondent’s bundle of authorities• Part 4 – Grounds of resistance, Respondent’s Skeleton Argument, reading and cast lists and chronology.2.2 While I have considered all the evidence before me, I only address what is essential to determine the IR application. I stress that on any matter in dispute, I make no findings of fact that are intended to bind the Tribunal at the full Hearing.2.3 The parties agreed that despite shortness of time they preferred to receive oral judgment on the day, which was duly given with reasons that did not cover in detail the background to the matter, the law or the submissions. A written judgment was signed that evening and promulgated on 29 September 2025, along with Case Management Orders.2.4 On 29 September 2025, the Claimant’s then solicitors requested written reasons for the IR judgment. That request was referred to me on 8 October 2025. I have not been sitting in this jurisdiction since then, which has meant there has been a delay in providing the reasons. I apologise for that delay.2.5 The Respondent, without opposition from the Claimant and with the Tribunal’s permission, used a third-party service to record the hearing and had indicated that a transcript would be provided of the day’s proceedings. However, after the hearing, the recording company (Opus2) first requested the Tribunal’s own recording and then sought to produce a draft judgment. It was explained that this was not necessary as judgment had already been produced and Opus2 had not been engaged to perform that task in any event. No transcript has been uploaded to the MyHMCTS platform or provided to the Tribunal. I have therefore used my own notes in producing these reasons.2.6 On 20 October 2025, the Claimant changed his solicitors. On 4 December 2025, the new representatives repeated the request for written reasons, which are now given below.[3]Relevant law3.1Section 128 Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) entitles a person to make an application for IR.3.2 Section 129 ERA sets out the procedure to be adopted by the Employment Tribunal before considering making an IR order. Section 129(1) says that on hearing such an application for IR, if it appears to the Employment Tribunal that it is likely on determining the complaint to which the application relates, the Employment Tribunal will find that the reason or, if more than one, the principal reason for dismissal is one of those specified, interim relief may be granted.3.3 The Claimant relies on section 103(A) ERA and the making of a protected disclosure, or more than one, which he says led to his dismissal.3.4 In addressing this matter, I have to be satisfied that it is “likely” the full tribunal will find that all the necessary elements are present for the Claimant to succeed. In Taplin v Shipham Limited [1978] ICR 1068, followed in a number of subsequent cases, the higher courts have said that this means “a pretty good chance of succeeding” not merely that the Claimant “could possibly win”; it is a significantly higher degree of likelihood than that. It is a high bar because there is a risk that the employer will be irretrievably prejudiced if it is required to treat the contract as continuing until the conclusion of the full hearing without meeting the remit of the section. However, as Mr Lawson observed before me, no “knock-out point” is required.3.5 An application for IR thus generally requires an “expeditious summary assessment” of the untested evidence before the Employment Judge as to how the matter looks on the material - see for instance London City Airport v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610. The EAT held in that case that the Employment Judge “must do the best they can with such material as the parties are able to deploy”; the Tribunal has to take an “impressionistic” view of what is presented. Although I had four witness statements in the material before me, no evidence has been given on oath and so I have had to conduct the required summary assessment of that material to form a view on whether the Claimant is likely to succeed in each relevant part of his claim.3.6 It is also recognised generally that the timings for submission of the ET1 and the listing of the IR hearing in such a case are very tight, when considering that the case can take many months or even years to be disposed of fully. Often no appeal against dismissal has taken place, and no ET3 submitted by the date of the IR Hearing; in this case, although there was a response to the claim it had only been submitted the day before the IR hearing. So the material before the Tribunal is of necessity much more limited than it will be at a multi-day full merits hearing at which oral evidence will also be heard on oath. The judge at an IR hearing must not determine facts as though he or she was conducting that final hearing (see Raja v Secretary of State for Justice UKEAT/0364/09/CEA).3.7 The Court of Appeal held in Kuzel v Roche Products Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 380 CA that it is for the Claimant to show that there is a real issue as to whether the reason put forward by the Respondent was not the true reason. Further, as the EAT held in Eiger Securities LLP v Korshunova UKEAT/0149/16, it is not enough for a protected disclosure to be in the employer’s mind at the time of dismissal. The question is whether the disclosure was the reason, or if more than one, the principal reason.3.8 Finally, I drew the parties’ attention at the outset of the IR Hearing to the case of Bombardier Aerospace v McConnell & Ors [2008] IRLR 51 in which the Court of Appeal (Northern Ireland) held in terms that it was not possible for a claimant to obtain interim relief in a redundancy case; rather, he must show that the redundancy process was entirely fabricated for the purposes of dismissing him.[4]Basis for the IR application4.1 The Claimant’s position in summary is that he had made disclosures between 2018 and 2022 that did not lead to his dismissal, and thus I do not consider those as being material to my decision. However, the Claimant says that in March 2025, he made a series of disclosures that were qualifying disclosures. Within a week, he claims to have been informed that he was to advise the Respondent about how his contract could be terminated and a replacement for him located, and four months later he was called to be told he was dismissed.4.2 Specifically the Claimant says as follows: a) The Respondent is part of an international group of companies ultimately controlled by the Jindal family - specifically, Mr Sajjan Jindal and Trusts that he controls. b) In addition to the Claimant’s role as Associate Vice President, until April 2021 he was also a director of JSW Global Minerals Trading Limited and JSW International Tradecorp (UK) Limited. The Claimant managed a residential property portfolio for the UK trading companies and another for the Respondent. He reported to the Group CFO, Mr Seshagiri Rao, who is based in Mumbai. c) On 7 March 2025, the Claimant was requested to make a payment, personally or through the UK-based companies, for Patient X to undergo a medical procedure in London. Patient X is an Indian citizen and resident. The instruction came from Anup Sarpotdar, Executive Assistant to the Managing Director of JSW Cement and Anup Sharma, the Respondent’s Deputy Manager/Group Head of Insurance. The Claimant refused to make that payment because he considered it could breach the Indian legal code and in particular the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA). He suggested that instead, the payment should be made via Patient X’s personal credit card. d) On 11 March 2025, Mrs Sangita Jindal (wife of Mr Sajjan Jindal) repeated the request for the Claimant to make the payment but the Claimant repeated his earlier view (i.e. that doing so could breach FEMA). e) On 12 March 2025, a further conversation took place over the phone between the Claimant, Mr Sarpotdar and Mr Mohta (a director of the Respondent). Mr Mohta is also said to have suggested that the Claimant “reclaim the money paid by [Patient X]’s credit card once Mr Mohta had made direct payment to the hospital from another source. The Claimant repeated that personal expenses outside India for an Indian resident should not be concealed from the Indian authorities and should comply with FEMA. f) The legal obligation to which the Respondent was subject was “to comply with FEMA guidelines and not to conceal the transfer of funds abroad for use of Indian residents beyond the permissible limit of US$250,000 without prior approval”. The Claimant contends that by saying what he said in the conversations of 7, 11 and 12 March (paragraphs c) to e) above) he believed that he made disclosures that contained information tending to show the Respondent was failing or was likely to fail to comply with those legal obligations. He further reasonably believed that those disclosures were in the public interest because of the potential illegality of a company failing to meet its tax obligations or breaching legal codes, whether within or outside the jurisdiction. g) Thereafter, payment was made via Patient X’s own credit card. On 15 March 2025, during a phone call with the Claimant, when Mrs Jindal discovered that fact, she became angry and disconnected the call. The Claimant went to the hospital, but Mrs Jindal asked him to leave. h) On 18 March 2025, Mr Pattanyak, Group Head of HR, called the Claimant and informed him that he should advise the Respondent how to terminate his contract and find a replacement for him. The Claimant spoke to Mr Rao the same day. Mr Rao confirmed that Mr Jindal had asked him to find a replacement for the Claimant. The Claimant raised with Mr Rao the issue of payment for Patient X’s treatment and the potential FEMA violation and texted him a chronology of the events during the previous week. Mr Rao said he would try to change Mr Jindal’s mind about the Claimant’s dismissal but then did not answer the phone when the Claimant tried to ring him and, though Mr Rao messaged to say he would call when he had spoken to Mr Jindal, did not call or contact the Claimant again. i) On 8 July 2025, Mr Pattanyak rang and informed the Claimant he was to be dismissed, saying words to the effect of “the Jindal family are no longer comfortable with you”. The Respondent wrote to the Claimant by email informing him that his employment would terminate on 31 July 2025, invoking the contractual right to terminate his employment at any time with immediate effect on payment in lieu of basic salary only for his notice period or its equivalent. There was no formal procedure for the Claimant to appeal and his texts to the Jindal family were not addressed.4.3 As to the reason for dismissal, the Respondent says that: a) The Claimant was a member of senior management within the Group and, since a redesignation of corporate titles in 2022, a Vice President of the Respondent. He was the Respondent’s only employee and the only UK-based Group employee. b) The Claimant’s role reduced in scope from 2019 and his performance declined from around 2020 onwards. By May 2022, the Group began to consider replacing the Claimant with a more “junior, lower-cost employee”. The Respondent assessed nine candidates between May 2022 and March 2023 but did not make any appointment at that stage. c) In January 2025, Group HR was tasked to undertake a costs review as part of the budget-setting for the financial year 2025-6. Group Senior Management decided as a result of that review to close the Group operation in Canada and terminate the employment of its single employee there, and to reduce the costs of the UK operation by restructuring and replacing the Claimant’s role with one at a lower level and considerably lower cost, to be employed by JSW Global Minerals Trading Limited. d) In February and March 2025, Group HR engaged a recruitment agency to identify suitable candidates for the new UK role and at the same time entered discussions with the Canadian employee to inform him of the closure of the Canadian operation. e) On or around 18 March 2025, Mr Pattanayak informed the Claimant, in terms, that his role was at risk of redundancy and offered him an alternative role within the Group in India. f) On 3 June 2025, JSW Global Minerals Trading Limited made an offer to a candidate to work as General Manager – Finance and Investor Relations. The role, which was accepted, bore a remuneration package including discretionary bonus of up to £102,300 compared to the Claimant’s total salary of up to £239,705, and was two levels below the Claimant’s in the Group corporate structure. g) On 8 July 2025, Mr Pattanyak rang the Claimant to inform him of the appointment. The Respondent served notice on the Claimant the same day, paying him to 31 July 2025 and in lieu of the remainder of his notice, as well as 100% of his maximum discretionary bonus to his termination date and a redundancy payment.4.4 As to the claim that the Claimant’s protected disclosures were the reason, or principal reason, for his dismissal: a) The Respondent accepts that Patient X required medical treatment in a London hospital in March 2025. It also accepts that discussions took place with the Claimant about payment for that treatment. It says however that Patient X held a medical insurance policy in India that would ultimately cover the expenses, but the treatment was an emergency and the hospital required an upfront payment. The total amount was around £65,000. Further, it was initially believed that Patient X needed to pay in person at the hospital, but he was not in the UK. Therefore, the Claimant (as the sole Group employee based in the UK) was asked to try to find a practical solution. b) The discussions between 7 and 12 March 2025 therefore were around the possibility of the Claimant asking the hospital to delay the payment request, or making alternative arrangements while funds were transferred from India, or whether the payment demand could be met via Patient X’s personal credit card. The latter solution was initially believed to be impractical because it was thought Patient X needed to be physically present to swipe the card. These solutions all having been discarded, the Claimant was asked to explain to the hospital that there would be a delay, but allegedly, he refused. c) In the event, Patient X paid using his personal credit card processed via remote link provided by the hospital and was reimbursed via the insurer.4.5 The Respondent contends that the Claimant did not disclose any “information” even taking the events on which he relies at their highest. It says it was not reasonable for the Claimant to believe that FEMA applied to a personal credit card transaction outside India or that anything the Claimant said in the conversations tended to show the Respondent was failing or likely to fail to comply with its legal obligations. Nor could the Claimant have believed that the Respondent was intending to conceal the transfer of funds overseas. The Respondent does not accept that the Claimant made any disclosure in the public interest or that he reasonably believed he had. Finally, it says he did not make any protected disclosure to his employer or a responsible person as required by section 43C ERA.[5]Discussion and Conclusions5.1 As the Respondent says, the first requirement for a qualifying disclosure is a disclosure of information. I have considered the contemporaneous notes and messages as well as the pleaded case and the Claimant’s witness statement. I remind myself that to the extent the Claimant says he has made protected disclosures (and/or to have been treated to his detriment as a result) in the past, he relies in his application for interim relief exclusively on three alleged disclosures, all of which are said to have been made in March 2025. Specifically, and as also set out above:• During the call on 7 March 2025, the Claimant is said to have stated that issues “could be created” under FEMA if payment for a medical procedure - to be undertaken in London, by an Indian resident and citizen - was made through either the Claimant personally or through the Respondent. He then says that he “suggested” Patient X make the payment himself via his own credit card;• On 11 March 2025, the Claimant is said to have been asked to make the payment himself and says that he “repeated his earlier view” i.e. (I infer) that issues “could be created” if he did so; and• On 12 March 2025, the Claimant “repeated the same position” and gave as his “view” that “personal expenses for a resident Indian outside India should not be concealed from Indian authorities and should be in compliance with FEMA”.5.2 What I have been unable to ascertain from the pleaded case is what “information” the Claimant says he disclosed. It is not argued that the Respondent (or Patient X) had failed with legal obligations to which they were subject. The claim must be put on the basis that the information tended to show that they were “were failing” or were “likely to fail to comply”. However, what the Claimant appears to be saying in his witness statement is that, when asked, he advised that if the payment was made by him personally, or if it was done via the Respondent in London or its Singapore office, that could give rise to a breach of FEMA obligations among other accounting, legal and tax issues. In other words, in line with Goode v Marks & Spencer UKEAT/0442/09/DM, all he had done was to express (in this case when he was specifically asked to do so), an adverse opinion of what was being proposed, saying that issues “could” be created, and to propose a second option, which in the event was followed.5.3 Indeed, that is borne out by what Mr Sarpotdar wrote as a summary of the conversation in an email to Patient X on 7 March and by what the Claimant himself wrote nearly two weeks later on 14 March: Mr Sarpotdar to Patient X: “I spoke to [the Claimant] and Mr Anup Sharma from our insurance team on a conference call. Option 1 Payment by your credit card and then get the reimbursement. This is the best option to get the reimbursement easily. Option 2 Payment from London office or Singapore office. But getting reimbursement from an insurance company might be complicated. Insurance companies can remit the refund money to a company in India and in an Indian Bank account in Indian Rupees. If we pay from London or Singapore we can get refund in India bank account and then we will have to send it to London or Singapore bank account. This can attract critical things relating to FEMA regulations etc. Please advise.” (emphasis in the original). Claimant to Mr Rao: “I suggested that it might not be appropriate for me to pay personally and paying via London companies and then reimbursing in India and subsequent transfer to London might create accounting, legal, tax and FEMA complications [emphasis added]. I suggested that if we want the cost to be reimbursed by the insurer the best way is to pay by [Patient X’s] personal card. They both agreed and advised the same to [Patient X].”5.4 I accept the Respondent’s submission that at this stage, it does not appear to me “likely” that the Claimant will be able to show that he disclosed information, or that if he did, such information tended to show that the Respondent (or any other person) was either “failing” or “likely to fail” to comply with any legal obligation to which they were subject.5.5 I am mindful that I did not hear oral evidence about these conversations and that, as the Respondent acknowledges, the Claimant may be able to give a more detailed explanation on this point, but without a discernible disclosure of information (in the sense of facts rather than just opinions and/or advice), the Claimant’s application for interim relief does, as Ms Sen Gupta submitted, fall at the first hurdle. Without such “information”, I am unable to say that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of showing that this was a protected disclosure.5.6 Second, it is unclear from what the Claimant has said how he believed the advice he was giving to be in the public interest. I accept what Mr Lawson said about the standards of ordinary reasonable people in ensuring that large corporations and high net worth individuals pay the taxes that are due from them. It is not apparent to me at this stage that the Claimant had those standards – and thus the public interest – in mind when he gave his advice not to follow one route and made the suggestion to follow another, though again it is something which may become clearer once the Claimant gives his evidence at a full hearing.5.7 Once more, it is not enough that the Claimant might have been right both in his assessment of the risks involved in following the options proposed and/or the assertion that right-thinking individuals agree about the correctness of paying one’s taxes. He has to have held – at the time - a reasonable belief that he was making a disclosure in the public interest. I am not persuaded that he has demonstrated he is likely to succeed in that aspect of the claim.5.8 Third, as to the reason for the dismissal, it is correct to say that one can only have one “principal reason”. It seems to me that the sole or principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal in this case can only be ascertained after hearing all the evidence.5.9 I accept there is a superficial attraction in saying that the Claimant raised these matters on 7, 11 and 12 March and then, on 18 March, was told that the Respondent did not need him in London and was considering terminating his contract (taken from his witness statement). Taking that chronology entirely on its own, there might well be an inference of cause and effect. However, the whole context has to be taken into account: the Respondent says that it had already decided following the January 2025 budgeting round that not only the Claimant’s position (as the sole London employee) but also the position of the sole Canadian employee could be made redundant as part of a wider cost-saving exercise. It also says that it had already engaged in discussions with a recruitment consultant in February 2025 to replace the Claimant’s position with that of a more junior employee (and in another group company) on a considerably reduced salary, i.e. well before any disclosure by the Claimant.5.10 While there has been disclosure of some items such as the Claimant’s contract of employment and termination letters to both the Claimant and the Canadian employee in question, there has been nothing as between the Respondent and the recruitment agent that pre-dates the alleged disclosures, nor has there yet been disclosure of the budgetary material or Group HR rationale that I anticipate will be available for the full Hearing. However, the issue of disclosure is, as Ms Sen Gupta points out, something for a case management hearing and further directions and these items cannot be expected to have been included in the bundle before me given the shortness of time between the Respondent’s receipt of the claim and this IR hearing.5.11 In the circumstances, had I considered the issues in a different order, the Claimant’s application for IR would again fail at the first hurdle because, as he has failed to show there is a pretty good chance that the Tribunal will find the redundancy was fabricated to remove him from post, IR is not available to him. In Bombardier, the Tribunal explained that this is because where an employer has ceased to carry on business due to redundancy (by analogy, as in the present case, where the employee’s role has ceased to exist due to redundancy) the remedy of continuation of employment would be of no value.5.12 Given the Claimant’s length of service, it will be for the Respondent to show at the final Hearing what the reason for dismissal was. At this stage however, the application fails either because the Claimant has not shown the redundancy was fabricated or because he has not shown it is likely that the Tribunal will find the dismissal was because he had made a protected disclosure, or more than one.[6]Application refused Overall, therefore, on the evidence that I have seen, I am not in a position to say that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in a claim that the reason or the principal reason for his dismissal was the making of a protected disclosure. The application for interim relief is therefore refused.