Mr D Salavei v Amazon Web Services EMA SARL, UK Branch: 6028977/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6028977/2025, 2219742/2024

Between

Mr D SalaveiClaimant

Amazon Web Services EMA SARL, UK BranchRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Isaacson

Mr C Price (instructed by counsel) for claimant

Mr G Graham (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 10 September 2025

JUDGMENT

The claimant’s application for interim relief is not successful.

REASONS

[1]The claimant presented his first claim to an Employment Tribunal on 15 May 2025 case number 2219742/2024.

[2]There were two preliminary hearings regarding his first claim before EJ Elliot on 11 October 2024 and 13 August 2025. At the second hearing EJ Elliott decided that the claimant was disabled with severe depression and generalised anxiety but not insomnia. She refused the claimant’s application to amend his claim to include ADHD.

[3]A third case management preliminary hearing has been listed for 3 October 2025 in relation to the first claim and a final hearing is listed for 12 days commencing on 3 November 2025.

[4]The claimant presented a second claim on 5 August 2025 and made an application for interim relief. The hearing today was to decide whether interim relief should be granted.

[5]The claimant had initially sought interim relief for asserting a statutory right under s104 Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) as well as under s103A asserting that the principal reason for his dismissal was because he had made protected disclosures. The claimant agreed at the beginning of the hearing today that interim relief is not available under s104 ERA 1996 and withdrew that part of the application. Evidence before the Tribunal

[6]The tribunal was presented with two versions of the claimant’s bundles, over 300 pages and a respondent bundle over 500 pages. The claimant provided a written witness statement, and the respondent provided a witness statement from their HR Partner, Ms Calleja. The respondent’s counsel also produced a written skeleton argument. Both counsels gave oral submissions, and the claimant was given time to consider the respondent’s skeleton and bundle. I considered both the claimant’s application for interim relief set out in the particulars of claim, the claimant’s witness statement and the submissions from his counsel.

The law

[7]It was agreed that the law was accurately set out in the respondent’s skeleton argument.

[8]In summary Section 129(1) - application should be granted if it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was one of the statutory automatically unfair reasons.

[9]“Likely” in this context means that the claimant must show that the case has “a pretty good chance” of success, which means something better than likelihood on the balance of probability (i.e. better than a 51% chance): Taplin v C Shippam Ltd

[1978] ICR 1068

, as approved and followed in London City Airport Ltd v Chackro

[2013] IRLR 610

at para 10.

[10]The tribunal must be satisfied that the claimant is “likely” to succeed on each necessary aspect of his claim, before relief can be granted

[11]In the case of a s.103A protected disclosure (“PD”) automatic dismissal is “likely” if he made a PD within the statutory definition and that it is “likely” it was the sole or principal reason for his dismissal: MOJ v Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 562

at para 14 per Underhill J.

[12]The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. Submissions

[13]This is a summary of the submissions and not a full repeat of the arguments made.

[14]The claimant referred to a summary of his grievances a p322 and alleges that he made five qualifying protected disclosures: “a) 10 December 2021: Informal grievance to HR regarding discriminatory treatment and bullying, which tended to show breach of legal obligations under the Equality Act 2010; b) 30 November 2023: Formal grievance disclosing failures to comply with equality legislation and breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence; c) 05 February 2024: Following denial of his formal grievance without a hearing where he could be accompanied, the Claimant reported all matters to Business Ethics, disclosing: i) Discrimination contrary to the Equality Act 2010 ii) Health and safety breaches affecting his wellbeing iii) Breach of internal policies and procedures d) The Business Ethics Line is operated by an independent third-party organization, Navex (ethicspoint.com). However, despite being directed to this external service, the response to the Claimant's report was issued by the internal employee relations team (HR); e) The outcome of this Business Ethics report was never disclosed and remains unresolved; f) 15 May 2024 The Claimant's first ET1 claim itself (case 2219742/2024) constituted a significant protected disclosure; g) 7 July 2025: Formal grievance to HR Regional Management disclosing systematic procedural failures and statutory breaches in the capability process managed by HR personnel based outside the UK. The grievance detailed a fabricated procedural history, the formal refusal of reasonable adjustments, and other statutory breaches.”

[15]The claimant alleges each disclosure was made in the reasonable belief that it was in the public interest and tended to show breaches of legal obligations and/or that the health and safety of an individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered. He argued that the public interest is particularly engaged because: a) The Respondent is a major Crown supplier through the G-Cloud framework; b) Public funds are being paid to an organisation systematically breaching its contractual obligations to comply with the Equality Act 2010; c) The Respondent's G-Cloud contract explicitly requires compliance with equality legislation as a condition of receiving government contracts; d) Exposing such breaches by a major government contractor serves the wider public interest in ensuring taxpayer funds only support lawful employers. e) The Respondent being certified as "Top Employer 2025 in the UK" for the second consecutive year by the Top Employers Institute while simultaneously discriminating against disabled employees.

[16]The claimant argued that the principal reason for dismissal was that the claimant had made protected disclosures, rendering the dismissal automatically unfair under section 103A ERA 1996.

[17]The claimant argued he had a pretty good chance of success evidenced by temporal connection, sham reasons, suspicious & tactical timings, immigration coercion, procedural violations indicating bad faith and the respondent’s conduct.

[18]Claimant’s counsel argued that looking at the size of the respondent, the nature of the complaints and the impact on the claimant was evidence to support that the claimant believed that the PDs were in the public interest and referred to the claimant’s disclosure to the business ethics and the fact he ticked the box in the first claim form for the form to be copied to a relevant regulator.

[19]The claimant’s counsel argued that there were the hall marks of a whistleblowing case including fabricated evidence, policies breached, deliberate retaliation, medical evidence ignored and coercive tactics to remove a whistleblower. He also questioned how Ms Calleja could assert she didn’t know about the PDs and referred to various contradictory emails, including that she confirmed she worked alongside the claimant’s line manager, who was the subject of his grievance.

[20]He argued that no case was certain, but this one met the threshold for making an interim relief order.

[21]The respondent’s counsel argued that the claimant cannot establish that any one of the protected disclosures is likely to be a protected disclosure.

[22]In particular, given the personal nature of claimant’s disclosures, which relate to performance management and ill-health, the tribunal will have to consider whether they were made in his reasonable belief in the public interest. He argued, these are matters which will require evidence (and testing of that evidence) so that the tribunal cannot say now that the claimant has established to the requisite standard that it is likely he made protected disclosures.

[23]He argued that some of the disclosures might be a protected act for a victimisation claim but do not fit the category for whistleblowing.

[24]The claimant must also establish that it is likely that the principal reason for his dismissal was because he made those protected disclosure(s).

[25]He argued that the witness statement of Ms Calleja sets out the extensive capability process conducted by the respondent that ultimately led to the claimant’s dismissal.

[26]In circumstances, he argued that where the claimant had remained off work for such a significant period of time, and there was no evidence before the respondent that he would return to work within a reasonably practicable time frame, the claimant simply cannot establish to the requisite standard that it is likely his dismissal was because he made (alleged) protected disclosures.

[27]He also argued that any allegation of fabricated evidence should be considered at a final hearing. The claimant should have been aware of his right to appeal. The fact a senior HR was appointed to deal with the claimant’s capability process was not evidence of any deliberate retaliation. Applying the law to the facts

[28]I concluded that the claimant had not met the necessary threshold to succeed in his interim relief application. Having read the bundles and witness statements I felt I could make an assessment whether the whistleblowing claim was likely to succeed. This was a case where there were two different views on what had happened.

[29]It is arguable that the claimant did make qualifying protected disclosures, especially the first claim to the tribunal and his formal grievance. However, the issue of whether the disclosures were made in the public interest is not clearly obvious and will need to be considered at a final hearing.

[30]In any event it is clear to me that the claimant does not meet the threshold in persuading me that it is likely that the reason or principal reason for his dismissal was because he had made protected disclosures. Whereas there is substantial evidence to support the respondent’s case that the claimant was dismissed due to ill health capability. There is evidence that the respondent went through a detailed procedure and made attempts to engage the claimant in the process.

[31]The medical evidence at p167, on reading it, does not demonstrate that the claimant was on a clear path to recovery and a return to work in the near future. It only talks about proactive steps for the claimant to take to manage his health and medication to improve his sleep.

[32]There is not clear evidence of deliberate retaliation, the fabrication of evidence, deliberate withholding of policies, misrepresentation or the ignoring of medical evidence in the documents I was taken to. Some of the claimant’s concerns may have arisen from communication issues.

[33]This does not mean that the claimant cannot argue these points above at the final hearing. However, based on a summary assessment of the evidence there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in his claim that the reason or principal reason he was dismissed was because he had made protected disclosures. Approved by: