Dr J Alnasir v University College London: 6027931/2025 Dr J Alnasir v University College London: 6027931/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6027931/2025
Between
Dr J AlnasirClaimantUniversity College LondonRespondent
Before
Employment Judge JoffeRepresented himself for claimantMs A Greenley (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 29 August 2025
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s application for interim relief is not upheld and is dismissed
REASONS
[1]This matter came before me to consider the claimant’s application for interim relief. Findings
The hearing
[2]I was provided with an electronic bundle running to 1483 pages. This included pleadings and correspondence, much documentary evidence relevant to the proceedings and the claimant’s written submissions. I also had a recently provided further submission from the claimant entitled ‘Supplementary Causation Note’ and a skeleton argument from Ms Greenley. I had a witness statement from Ms Sara Collins, director of operations for the Faculty of Engineering Science, for the respondent. Ms Collins did not give live evidence. There was insufficient time in the half day listing to give full oral reasons and I therefore reserved these Reasons. The proceedings[3]The claimant had issued another claim against the respondent under case Number 2203344/2025 bringing claims of public interest disclosure detriment.[4]This claim and the application for interim relief were presented on 17 April 2025. It is a claim for automatically unfair dismissal due to having made public interest disclosures.[5]The claimant said inter alia that: He made a series of protected disclosures to UCL management, the Deans, HR, Legal Services, the Provost, and external regulators (UKRI, NAO, ICO); these disclosures tended to show: o Misuse and misreporting of public research infrastructure funding (e.g. £608k RCIF misallocation); o Failure to implement OH recommendations (RA105018/1); o Procedural manipulation in governance and disciplinary systems; o Data protection breaches and failure to comply with SARs (GDPR Art. 15);.[6]The respondent’s case is that the claimant was dismissed due to a breakdown in trust and confidence caused by his refusal to carry out his duties, his refusal to be line managed and his wide ranging complaints against a large number of the respondent’s employees.
The evidence
[7]The following account of the evidence does not contain findings of fact, which would not be appropriate at an interim relief hearing. Many of the matters referred to are uncontroversial or a matter of record.[8]The claimant commenced employment with the respondent in November 2023 as a senior research infrastructure developer for Social Sciences based within the Information Services Division, Faculty IT & Partnering Group. The respondent has a Centre for Advance Research Computing (‘ARC’), which provided funding for the claimant’s role.[9]The scope and duties of the claimant’s role became an area of dispute between the parties and a feature of the claimant’s internal complaints. In particular, the claimant’s role in relation to the Condenser research platform and indeed the issues which arose in relation to that platform are matters of dispute between the parties. The respondent says that the claimant’s role was to build applications to sit on top of Condenser and provide support for the applications.[10]On 18 April 2024, the claimant emailed Dr James Hetherington, director of the ARC: In light of the recent meetings and discussions surrounding the Condenser project, it has become clear that ARC has a vision of providing a dynamic research platform that is flexible, using, for example, infrastructure-as-code model to achieve this, offering a positive experience to researchers. That said, since I joined in November and have proactively been speaking to researcher stakeholders, the ones I've spoken to are repeatedly communicating to me that their immediate research needs are yet to be met. Hence, there is a clear gap between the vision and what is urgently required. With this in mind, in addition to the requirements catalogue that was created about a year ago, Fatima and I have been actively compiling feedback and requirements from senior researchers across multiple faculties — SHS, A&H and IOE. Given the urgency we sought to clarify and define an actionable priority list for the initial phase of the Condenser platform. This list hasn’t really changed since the requirements catalogue was created, but we have prioritised them in conjunction with the researchers who have requested them: [The list follows] From the perspective of enabling quality research, it seems that the way for us to succeed here is to ensure that these priorities are addressed as swiftly as possible. That is, to provide a functional and efficient HPC and GPUenabled Research platform to our researchers, who have been anticipating the launch of Condenser for quite a while now. Moving forwards, It is crucial that ARC adjusts the Condenser roadmap to focus on delivering these core functionalities by the projected live date in November.[11]There then followed some correspondence about the claimant’s email.[12]On 23 May 2024 the claimant wrote to Dr Hetherington: I hope my email finds you well. I'm writing with regards to significant issues over the direction and progress of the Condenser project, in particular the responsibilities outlined in the Service Commitments document and recent the onboarding sessions. My intention is not to criticise ARC, but rather to provide some direction to get us back on track to deliver Condenser. UCL Social Science Research Computing - ARC Service Commitments.docx Despite over a year in development, Condenser remains largely undeveloped beyond foundational infrastructure, akin to a building site with only basic utilities such as Storage, and virtualised GPUs. Fatima and I have recently participated in onboarding sessions where we were shown how to spin up VMs, but this is incongruous with the original plan. The onboarding sessions create the impression that we are now responsible for building the entire infrastructure, which ARC's team was supposed to develop over the past two years. That is unrealistic. I have looked at the Service Commitments document created between ARC and Social Sciences and it is unambiguous in outlining specific responsibilities: ARC was expected to develop the infrastructure, configure the hardware, and set upcore services like VMs, HPC clusters, and essential software environments (e.g.,Jupyter, RStudio). ARC also committed to provide us with initial training, comprehensive documentation, and ongoing support. ISD/Faculties IT Support (Myself and Fatima) are to provide first-line support, configuration tweaks, and user training — not to build the core infrastructure. The current situation is that, despite significant funding and time in development, no VMs, HPC services, or user services have been developed, leaving us unable to meet researcher's expectations or even begin onboarding pilot users. We have compiled small groups of expert users who are eager to pilot the system and provide feedback, but these systems and services have not yet been developed. Understandably, Researchers, frustrated by these delays, are considering alternatives such as relocating the hardware to Computer Science or using AWS. To address the delays, earlier this year, I created an MVP based on the captured user requirements, aiming to realign Condenser's development. This intervention prioritised essential tasks to put the project back on track. A lot of focus has been placed on the onboarding sessions that myself and Fatima have attended. Whilst we were glad to be able to log-in, I have already explained that this is incongruous with the original plan. Moreover, it will not be a fruitful direction to take given the outstanding work to be completed by ARC. Given the already compiled requirements catalogue and the pressure myself and Fatima have been put under, feeling responsible for delivery, we believe the best way forward is to focus on developing and providing two main services, initially: a general-purpose web-accessible VM with Jupyter and RStudio and a nonvirtualised HPC cluster using bare-metal nodes and SLURM. This will provide the compute for installing the highest priority applications that have been requested and enable us to onboard the pilot users. Going forwards, in order to manage stakeholder expectations, ARC needs to prioritise these tasks, providing clear timelines for their completion. Also needed are realistic, detailed milestones with specific dates for delivering the remaining services promised. A clear plan is urgently needed to align the work with the commitments made, and to restore confidence in Condenser. This plan should be presented at the upcoming meeting with stakeholders. When you can provide this plan, I am happy to present it at the meeting.[13]On 31 October 2024, the claimant submitted a grievance. He said that his role had been misrepresented to him and raised issues about the impact this was having on his health.[14]The respondent proposed a meeting to discuss how concerns about the role could be addressed. The claimant preferred to proceed with his grievance.[15]On 8 November 2024, the claimant brought a grievance against Dr Hetherington and against his own line manager. He summarised the grievance: This grievance addresses systemic failings and deliberate misrepresentations by key individuals responsible for the delivery of the Condenser platform for Social Sciences. The physical core infrastructure for the Condenser platform was installed by Summer 2023, providing state-of-the-art machines for use in UCL. However, the specific provision for Social Sciences/SLASH, despite the faculties £600,000 investment, has been virtually non-existent, with users unable to have access until a limited VM pilot of a handful of users this October. This grievance highlights systemic failings and deliberate misrepresentations by key individuals, who initially positioned me to support researchers on the platform but later deceptively expected me to single-handedly deliver the Social Sciences components, a shift that has significantly impacted my health.[16]On 3 December 2024, the claimant wrote to extend his grievance, so it was also brought against Mr Alan Harper, director of faculty, IT and partnering.[17]The claimant’s grievances were considered as three separate grievances as they concerned three individuals.[18]Allegations about delivery failure in relation to the Condenser platform were separately reviewed by the respondent.[19]On 4 March 2025, the claimant made a formal complaint to the responsible officer for public interest disclosures (‘PIDs’), Ms Aimie Chapple, vicepresident (operations). In his attached submission, he said by way of introduction: I am formally raising concerns under UCL’s Public Interest Disclosure Policy, as I believe that the Advanced Research Computing (ARC) department has seriously mismanaged over £600K of public funds from the Research Capital Infrastructure Fund (RCIF), which was allocated to support essential research infrastructure. This disclosure is not a private employment dispute. It concerns the financial integrity of a publicly funded institution and the deliberate misrepresentation of a £608,531.24 research investment. The affected parties include multiple faculties at UCL and UK public research stakeholders, making this a clear matter of public interest. ARC’s failure to deliver the Condenser for Social Sciences Research platform — despite receiving substantial funding — combined with deliberately misleading assurances about project readiness to Social Sciences stakeholders has resulted in significant detriment to UCL’s research community. This is not a routine IT project delay but a fundamental failure of financial stewardship and institutional accountability.[20]On 10 March 2025, there was a hearing of the grievance against Dr Hetherington. That grievance was not upheld.[21]The claimant did not attend the two further grievance hearings and these proceeded in his absence.[22]From 12 March 2025, there was correspondence with Ms Dighton about the scope of the claimant’s role, which the claimant was asking HR to confirm. Ms Dighton said that matter was being considered as part of the claimant’s grievance.[23]On 17 March 2023., the claimant wrote: I must stress that it is HR’s responsibility to ensure that the terms of my contract and job description are being properly observed. This is a fundamental HR function. It is not the role of grievance panels to adjudicate on breaches of contract or to clarify the scope of a job description that HR itself has approved and issued. To suggest otherwise is wholly unacceptable and places me in a position of ongoing contractual breach, unresolved distress, and career jeopardy. It is also deeply disingenuous to suggest that UCL or HR are concerned about my mental health, whilst forcing me to endure three grievance panel hearings — nearly nine hours of cumulative proceedings — that could have been avoided had HR fulfilled its responsibility to clarify my role from the outset. I am entitled to a clear, unequivocal statement of my role and responsibilities in accordance with my job description and contract, without distortion or retrospective re-interpretation. Instead, HR has allowed senior staff to openly distort my role, causing profound harm to my career, professional reputation, and well-being.[24]On 18 March 2025, Ms Dighton wrote: I note from the email trail that you shared from November last year, you were given the opportunity to work through the concerns about your job description and day-to-day role with Katy Hamilton and Sanjay Karia. However, you instead requested that your concerns be investigated through the formal grievance process. Even if you had not initiated this process, HR would not have been able to make determinations about your role and responsibilities without input from the department.[25]On 19 March 2025, the claimant emailed this chain of correspondence with Ms Dighton to Ms Chapple: I wanted to ensure you were aware of the serious issue regarding UCL’s failure to provide contractual clarity on my job role, despite multiple formal requests. As outlined in the email below, HR is continually refusing to confirm my job description in writing, in clear breach of Section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. This ongoing refusal to clarify my role has not only created significant professional uncertainty but has also had a direct impact on my well-being, causing additional stress and harm. I have now been left with no choice but to escalate this externally if the issue remains unresolved. I trust that you will recognise the seriousness of this situation and ensure that appropriate action is taken.[26]On 23 March 2025, the claimant presented a grievance against Ms Dighton for “repeated and deliberate refusal to clarify or confirm the contractual scope of [his] role”.[27]The claimant submitted the first of several DSARs.[28]On 25 March 2025 the claimant made a further formal complaint to Ms Chapple about the grievance outcomes. He mentioned the ‘worsening psychological impact’ of what he described as unresolved issues and procedural inaction.[29]On 26 March 2025, Ms Chapple wrote to the claimant: I have considered your submission under the Public Interest Disclosure Policy carefully, and the points that you raised in relation to the delivery of the Condenser Project and the communications and time frames relating to the same. I understand that a Root Cause Analysis has been carried out by Ben Hine (Executive Director of Information Services Division (CIO)) to consider issues arising during the Condenser Project (which had been raised by you), and a post-implementation review is also due to be carried out. I will ask that as part of the review the issues you have raised as identified above are considered. I will ask to be provided with the outcome of this review following which I will decide whether any further investigation is then needed. My view is that the concerns you have raised which relate to your job description would be more properly dealt with in the grievance process which is underway. I encourage you to fully engage with that process.[30]On 27 March 2025, the claimant raised his concerns to the leadership of the Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences.[31]On 31 March 2025, the claimant received a detailed grievance outcome from Mr T Pearce, director of education and student experience. That grievance was not upheld.[32]The claimant raised new concerns about the handling of his grievance with Ms Chapple and she wrote to say that the new points were outside of her remit and were for the ER team. Alleged PID5 – 2 April 2025 to Dr M Spence[33]On 2 April 2025 the claimant wrote to Ms Chapple to say that he had raised a PID with the provost. The claimant also wrote to the provost repeating his PID concerns and complaining about the grievance process, copying in Protect. On 10 April the provost referred the claimant back to the responsible officer, Ms Chapple.[34]On 3 April 2025, the claimant received a further grievance outcome. That grievance was not upheld.[35]The claimant appealed the three grievance outcomes.[36]On 12 April 2025, the claimant wrote to the provost complaining that, in redirecting his complaint, the provost had mishandled his disclosures: Dr Spence, as Provost, you are the senior institutional guardian of due process. This disclosure was addressed to you because your delegated PID handler has failed — and is now part of the complaint. To decline to engage directly, or to allow this matter to be deflected to a conflicted party, would signal institutional complicity. To be clear, I will: 1. Submit this communication as evidence to the Employment Tribunal as further support of UCL’s failure to handle protected disclosures lawfully 2. Continue to escalate to external regulators and, if necessary, the media, as I have consistently acted in the public interest — something UCL's senior leadership has failed to do. Yet, I am still open to resolving this without further public exposure or litigation. A professional, dignified resolution remains possible. But this requires UCL to finally acknowledge the seriousness of what has occurred — not just procedurally, but ethically.[37]On 15 April 2025, the grievance appeal chair asked for further information. The claimant declined to provide it and said he had lodged an Employment Tribunal claim: I am writing to confirm that I will not be providing further information to this appeal panel at this stage. As you may be aware, I have now submitted a formal claim to the Employment Tribunal, which includes detailed evidence concerning UCL’s handling of my role, formal protected disclosures, and the internal grievance process — which is itself part of the subject of the claim. The submission is supported by extensive documentary evidence In these circumstances, I do not believe it would be appropriate — or procedurally sound —to continue engaging with an internal process that is under active legal scrutiny. I reserve all rights in relation to this matter and will continue to cooperate fully through the appropriate external legal channels.[38]On 6 May 2025, the claimant wrote to the respondent’s legal services team and the provost and copied in a number of external organisations and public bodies: Protect, the National Audit Office, UK Research and Innovation and the Information Commissioner’s Office. The email reiterated previous complaints.[39]On 8 May 2025, the claimant wrote to UK Research and Innovation, copied to the National Audit Office and the Office for Students, about his concerns.[40]On 11 May 2025, the claimant sent a number of emails to the respondents’ Secretariat and Governance Office raising the complaints he had raised before, making formal complaints about a number of individuals and asking these be investigated. Further complaints were sent to various recipients on 12 May 2025.[41]On 13 May 2025, the respondent’s legal services team wrote to the claimant to say that the concerns he raised had been dealt with in the internal grievance process and now formed the basis of his Employment Tribunal claim, a response to which would be submitted in due course. They also noted that some complaints were being dealt with under the PID policy. They encouraged the claimant to engage with the ongoing processes.[42]The claimant then wrote further to the Secretariat and Governance Office and others saying that the respondent was refusing to deal with his complaints and asking for his email to be circulated to the Chair of Council and Chair of the Audit and Risk Committee.[43]On 13 June 2025, Ms Denise Gordon, the claimant’s line manager wrote to Mr Harper: Unfortunately, Jamie is not prepared to attend 1:1 meetings with me going forward and consequently my line management of him has become completely unworkable. …As you know, I had taken a very gentle approach during the grievance process enabling him to carry out a small proportion of his duties, given that he had raised concerns that he had been asked to undertake work which was beyond the scope of his role. However, after the process concluded and the scope of his role was confirmed, I have been taking steps to try to engage him in all aspects of his role. Unfortunately, Jamie has been unwilling to carry out certain tasks I have set him, and continues to argue that these tasks are outside his remit. On 20 May, I advised Jamie that he needed to confirm whether he was prepared to carry out the tasks set for him and if not that there would need to be a consideration of next steps, including the possible application of UCL’s disciplinary policy. Following that discussion, Jamie refused to attend our next 1:1 scheduled for 22 May and then again on 6 June. He has advised me that he does not consider me to be a suitable line manager and has instead requested that I communicate with him through UCL Legal or ACAS while his Employment Tribunal case is ongoing. Clearly, this isn’t appropriate or workable and would not be an effective way to manage him. I have no clear oversight of what work he is doing, although I believe that his output and attendance at meetings is very limited. He continues to state that his job remit does not extend to key tasks which are required for us to carry out our work for the social science faculties. This is impacting on our ability to deliver in relation to the project and is becoming time critical.[44]Mr Harper referred the matter to Mr Hine, who referred it to Ms Dighton, head of ER.[45]On 20 June 2025, Ms Dighton wrote to Ms Juthani, head of HR- president and provost’s office, vice presidents’ offices: I have earlier this week taken receipt of an email from Ben Hine, the Chief Information Officer, who is seeking advice on how to proceed with what has become a complex situation where line management of Dr Alnasir has become unworkable, the function has no oversight of work being done, and this is impacting the ability of the function to deliver in relation to a time critical project.[46]She asked Ms Juthani, as someone not previously involved in the matter, to undertake a review.[47]Ms Juthani decided that it would be appropriate to hold a formal hearing to consider the breakdown in the working relationship between the claimant and his colleagues in the ‘category of SOSR, as opposed to misconduct’.[48]On 3 July 2025, the claimant was sent an invitation to an SOSR meeting to consider whether there had been a breakdown in the relationship of trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent making the employment untenable.[49]He was told that the meeting would consider: Specifically:• That you have made numerous allegations against multiple individuals within the department, including your line manager, their manager, and the Director of ARC;• You have had relationships with three different managers since November 2023 (including the two who were named in your grievances) break down and now refuse to engage with them directly;;• You have made accusations of bias in respect of the internal grievance process, including allegations that the process was a sham to protect senior leadership, but failed to provide any evidence of such allegations;• You would not accept that the grievance panel had fully assessed the evidence available to them, which demonstrates a lack of faith on your part in any UCL employee relations procedure;• Although you did not accept the grievance outcomes and maintained that the matter remains unresolved, you declined to participate in the internal appeal process;• You have a fundamental difference of opinion with the department with regard to what the remit of your role is and what your responsibilities are, which has resulted in a deadlock where the department need you to perform tasks, but you do not consider that these tasks are reasonable. This is notwithstanding the outcome of the grievance process confirming the remit of your role. In addition to the above, your further correspondence to various departments within UCL has also:• made allegations that senior staff have failed to act on protected disclosures whilst not allowing such processes to run their course;• made allegations that staff involved in the various procedures you have invoked are conflicted, and have therefore invalidated said procedures; You have complained about and persistently attempted to escalate various procedures which you have initiated, without permitting existing processes to be completed, or accepting when internal procedures have concluded. You have also raised similar concerns with external bodies. For example, you recently published information about your complaints on the website whatdoyouknow.com. This post was subsequently removed for breaching the site’s rules. Therefore, that there is a case to answer that the impact of the above is:• the creation of an unacceptable and untenable working environment for staff within ISD due to the views expressed by you concerning colleagues, as outlined above;• an inability for the University to manage and address your concerns, due to your lack of faith in any of its procedures, as demonstrated by your repeated allegations that the internal grievance process was flawed and biased and seeming inability to move on in line with its outcome;• a distrust by you of the University as a whole, not only of ISD but more broadly of central UCL departments; and• a breakdown of trust and confidence between you and the University. That such a matter would fall into the category “some other substantial reason” for dismissal (as that term is used in section 98(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and referred to as “SOSR”).[50]In correspondence the claimant declined to attend the meeting.[51]On 4 July 2025, the ICO wrote to Mr R Stephen, deputy chief privacy officer at the respondent, about the claimant’s DSARs. The ICO was critical of the respondent for bringing SARs together and for exceeding the statutory timeframe for a response.[52]Ms S Collins, director of operations for the faculty of engineering sciences, was appointed to chair the hearing to consider whether there had been a breakdown of trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent. She was not in the same faculty as the claimant and said that she did not know him or know of him prior to being appointed to this role. She said that she did not have any prior knowledge of the issues to be considered at the hearing. She knew Amie Chapple but Ms Chapple was not her line manager and they did not have day to day contact.[53]Ms Collins was provide with a bundle of nearly 900 pages, which was reproduced in the bundle I had. She said that she read the bundle twice and prepared questions to ask the claimant, She said in her statement that: I approached the matter with an open mind, looking for anything which might help me to see a path to resolution and what it was that Dr Alnasir or UCL might need in order to come to some sort of reconciliation or way to move beyond the present position. My first impressions of reading the documents were that Dr Alnasir had been with UCL for a relatively short period of time during which matters had escalated enormously. I formed the view that the initial cause of Dr Alnasir’s unhappiness was his job description . I could see from the documents that the multiple attempts by UCL to address Dr Alnasir’s concerns about this had led to further complaints and increasingly emotive and litigious language and it had become impossible to address these through UCL’s processes. I could see that Dr Alnasir was dissatisfied and untrusting of those who were attempting to resolve his complaints and did not accept that any of them were going to act in good faith. I could also see that these complaints by Dr Alnasir were taking up a lot of his and UCL’s time and were generating a huge volume of emails.[54]On 25 July 2025, the hearing was held. The claimant did not attend. He did not request a postponement, OH assessment, or say that he was not well enough to attend. His objection to attending was that he objected to the process as a whole; he also said that the hearing should be postponed pending the outcome of his Employment Tribunal proceedings. Ms Collins decided it was appropriate to proceed. The claimant had been offered the opportunity to make written submissions and Ms Collins took into account emails the claimant sent on 16 and 21 July 2025.[55]Ms Collins said that, apart from considering the evidence in the bundle, she ‘enquired with Employee Relations whether Dr Alnasir was satisfactorily undertaking his job role at the current time to gauge how engaged Dr Alnasir remained with his role and wider team. It was explained to me by Employee Relations that Dr Alnasir was not undertaking his job role and was not attending 1-2-1s with his line manager which was of considerable concern and not a sustainable situation.’[56]On the morning of the hearing, the claimant had sent Ms Collins an email with eight attachments. She said: ‘Having previewed the documents they appeared to repeat the content of those I had already seen and I did not read any of the attachments in full before the hearing or before making my decision’ . The attachments included (per the claimant’s email): ‘Statement of Protected Disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA), together with copies of my formal and supplementary protected disclosures, and early whistleblowing emails from April and May 2024.’ The claimant wrote: ‘This submission ensures that the SOSR panel has formal and contemporaneous notice of my whistleblowing disclosures. In the event that the panel proceeds with a dismissal recommendation, this record confirms that the risk of unlawful detriment under Section 47B ERA 1996 has been explicitly raised and documented.’[57]Ms Collins made a number of findings including:a. that the claimant had made numerous allegations against multiple individuals;b. That he tended to seek to override internal processes while they were still underway.[58]She said that she ‘found that the nature, breadth and persistence of Dr Alnasir raising allegations internally in UCL, in a variety of ways after his grievances have already been considered and concluded, was unreasonable and had a significant impact on working relationships and trust within the team.’[59]Ms Collins considered that there was clear evidence of a breakdown in relationships with three different line managers and that there would be difficulty in the department continuing to allocate managers to the claimant. She found that it was clear the claimant lacked trust in the impartiality of anyone involved. He did not engage with the grievance appeal process and she ‘found that his approach and his use of increasingly emotive and litigious language suggested an intention to frustrate or bypass internal mechanisms for resolution as well as opening multiple lines of internal complaint which spread across UCL. I found it also showed a lack of willingness to engage meaningfully with the processes available at UCL, a breakdown of working relationships and a lack of trust and confidence between Dr Alnasir and UCL. in his complaints. ‘[60]Bearing in mind all of the evidence she had, Ms Collins said that she concluded that there was a breakdown or trust and confidence. She did not believe the claimant would change his behaviour. She considered whether there was any alternative to dismissal and concluded there was not. Mediation did not seem possible given the number or people the claimant took issue with and his refusal to engage with internal processes. Redeployment was not practicable given that the claimant’s role was very specific to the Information Services Division and given the number of people about whom the claimant had complained.[61]Ms Collins said that she was aware of the alleged PIDs from reading the documents but she did not consider them relevant and did not consider their substance.[62]The claimant appealed his dismissal on 27 July 2025. Amongst his reason for appeal was that Ms Collins should have recused herself since she had been aware of his alleged PIDs on the morning of the hearing. Submissions[63]I summarise some salient features of the parties’ submissions, which I took into account in their entirety. Claimant[64]Some of the claimant’s submissions were convoluted, repetitive and difficult to understand. The claimant relied on the proximity in time between his disclosures and various detriments he suffered and between his disclosures and the dismissal as evidence of causation. He pointed to a variety of matters which he said pointed to causation, including the lack of concerns being raised about his performance prior to his disclosures. He said that it was clear that relevant decision makers had knowledge of his disclosures.[65]He said that the Tribunal should find that the alleged breakdown in trust and confidence was constructed by the respondent.[66]He described the legal wrongs he believed had been committed in his written submissions. Respondent 65. The claimant was dismissed for the sole reason that his relationship with the respondent had become untenable. He was not carrying out his role, refused to engage with the respondent’s processes and accused everyone who was involved with him of orchestrating sham processes and unlawful conduct. Ms Collins did not consider the substance of the claimant’s protected disclosures. She was only aware that she had seen PIDs 3 and 5 . She had no professional connection with the claimant or view on his allegations; her evidence was that the content of the alleged PIDs was not relevant to her decision. 66. The first alleged protected disclosure did not tend to show any category of wrongdoing. It was a routine email about an ongoing project and the claimant could not reasonably have believed it was in the public interest. The same points were made about the second alleged PID.[67]In relation to the third alleged PID, the claimant could not reasonably have believed it showed any breach of a legal obligation. The only matter complained about was delay.[68]There was no information disclosed in alleged PID4; it did not tend to show any category of wrongdoing and it was not in the public interest.[69]Alleged PID5 was in part a repeat of PID3 and otherwise contained allegations but not information.
Law
[70]The relevant statutory provisions governing interim relief applications are contained at sections 128 – 132 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[71]Section 129(1) provides that an application for interim relief should be granted if ‘it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find’ that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was one of the statutory automatically unfair reasons.[72]The EAT has held that ‘likely’ in this context means that the claimant must show that his or her case has ‘a pretty good chance’ of success, which means something better than likelihood on the balance of probability (in other words this is a higher threshold than a 51% chance): Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1068, as approved and followed in London City Airport Ltd v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610 and His Highness Sheikh Bin Sadr al Qasimi v Robinson UKEAT/0283/17.[73]The Tribunal must be satisfied that the claimant is “’ikely’ to succeed on each necessary aspect of his claim (Robinson), applying that high threshold, before relief can be granted, ie that it is ‘likely’ that he made a protected disclosure within the meaning of the statute and that it is ‘likely’ it was the sole or principal reason for his dismissal. Procedure[74]At interim relief hearings the default position is that there will be no oral evidence unless the Tribunal directs otherwise. 74. The EAT in Chacko gave further guidance on the approach to be taken by the Tribunal at paragraph 23: In my judgment the correct starting point for this appeal is to fully appreciate the task which faces an employment judge on an application for interim relief. The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. The employment judge must do the best he can with such material as the parties are able to deploy by way of documents and argument in support of their respective cases. The employment judge is then required to make as good an assessment as he is promptly able of whether the claimant is likely to succeed in a claim for unfair dismissal based on one of the relevant grounds. The relevant statutory test is not whether the claimant is ultimately likely to succeed in his or her complaint to the Employment Tribunal but whether “it appears to the tribunal” in this case the employment judge “that it is likely”. To put it in my own words, what this requires is an expeditious summary assessment by the first instance employment judge as to how the matter looks to him on the material that he has. The statutory regime thus places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance which must of necessity involve a far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will be ultimately undertaken at the full hearing of the claim. Public interest disclosure dismissals[75]Section 43B(1) ERA 1996 defines a qualifying disclosure as a disclosure of information which in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure is in the public interest and tends to show one of a number of types of wrongdoing. These include ‘(b)that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject’ and ‘(d) that the health and safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered.’[76]To be a protected disclosure, a qualifying disclosure must be in circumstances prescribed by other sections of the ERA, including, under section 43C, to the worker’s employer.[77]Guidelines as to the approach that employment tribunals should take in whistleblowing detriment cases were set out by the EAT in Blackbay Ventures (trading as Chemistree) v Gahir (UKEAT/0449/12/JOJ):77.1 each disclosure should be identified by reference to date and content77.2 the basis upon which the disclosure is said to be protected and qualifying should be addressed77.3 if a breach of a legal obligation is asserted: each alleged failure or likely failure to comply with that obligation should be separately identified; and the source of each obligation should be identified and capable of verification by reference for example to statute or regulation77.4 the detriment and the date of the act or deliberate failure to act resulting in that detriment relied upon by the claimant should be identified77.5 it should then be determined whether or not the claimant reasonably believed that the disclosure tended to show the alleged wrongdoing and, if the disclosure was made on or after 25 June 2013, the claimant reasonably believed that it was made in the public interest.[78]The burden of proof is on the worker to show that he or she held the requisite reasonable belief. The tribunal must look at whether the claimant subjectively held the belief in question and objectively at whether that belief could reasonably be held. The allegation need not be true: Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] IRLR.[79]The reasonableness of the worker’s belief is determined on the basis of information known to the worker at the time the decision to disclose is made: Darnton v University of Surrey [2003] IRLR 133.[80]Factors relevant to the issue of whether a worker reasonably believed that a disclosure was in the public interest include:80.1 the number in the group whose interests the disclosure served (the larger the number, the more likely the disclosure is to be in the public interest)80.2 the nature of the interests affected (the more important they are, the more likely the disclosure is to be in the public interest)80.3 the extent to which those interests are affected by the wrongdoing disclosed (the more serious the effect, the more likely the disclosure is to be in the public interest)80.4 the nature of the wrongdoing disclosed (the disclosure of deliberate wrongdoing is more likely to be in the public interest than the disclosure of inadvertent wrongdoing)80.5 the identity of the alleged wrongdoer (the larger and more prominent the alleged wrongdoer, the more likely the disclosure is to be in the public interest)(1) Chesterton Global(2) Verman v Nurmohamed [2017] IRLR 837.[81]For the claimant to succeed in an automatically unfair dismissal claim, the disclosure must be the sole or principal reason for the dismissal, it is not enough for it to have materially influenced the dismissal: Eiger Securities LLP v Korshunova [2017] IRLR 115. Where a claimant lacks sufficient service to bring a claim for ordinary unfair dismissal, he or she will have the burden of proving there was an automatically unfair reason: Ross v Eddie Stobart Ltd EAT 0068/13.[82]There are limited circumstances in which the motivation of someone other than the decision maker can be attributed to the decision maker for the purposes of determining the reason for dismissal in an unfair dismissal claim: Royal Mail Group Ltd v Jhuti [2020] ICR 731, SC. If a person in the hierarchy of responsibility above the employee determines that, for reason A, the employee should be dismissed but that reason A should be hidden behind an invented reason B which the decision maker adopts, it is the court’s duty to penetrate through the invention.
Conclusions
[83]I gave consideration to whether the claimant was likely in the required sense to establish that he had made public interest disclosures. PID1 - 18 April 2024 to Dr J Hetherington In circumstances whether there is no suggestion in the email itself of any relevant form of wrongdoing, I could not say at this point that the claimant is likely to show a reasonable belief that this information tended to show a relevant type of wrongdoing Alleged PID2 – 23 May 2024 to Dr Hetherington This was similar to PID1. There is more detail here and the claimant may ultimately be able to establish that he had a reasonable belief in wrongdoing but I certainly could not say on a summary assessment that he is likely to do so. Alleged PID3 – 4 March 2025 to Ms A Chapple, It seemed to me that the claimant is likely to show he believed that the information tended to show a breach of some legal obligation even if that obligation is not fully defined. As to whether that belief was a reasonable one, I could not say that this was likely on an impressionistic view of the evidence. It appears that there are fundamental disputes about the extent of the issues with the Condenser platform and responsibility for those issues which would need to be explored in detail at trial to provide the context in which the claimant formed his beliefs. Alleged PID4 – 25 March 2025 to Ms A Chapple Again, it seemed to me that the detailed context was required. I could not say on the evidence before me that the claimant was likely to show he had a reasonable belief in relevant wrongdoing. Alleged PID5 – 2 April 2025 to Dr M Spence For the same reasons, I am not able to conclude that the claimant is likely to show that he had a reasonable belief in a relevant type of wrongdoing.[84]In relation to all of the above alleged disclosures it seemed to me that it would be necessary to consider the detailed context to form a view as to whether they could reasonably be considered to be in the public interest. It was not possible to form a view as to whether that outcome was ‘likely’ on the basis of a broad assessment of the evidence. Causation[85]Even if I assumed in the claimant’s favour that he was likely to establish that he made one or more protected disclosures, I would also have to be satisfied that he was likely in the required sense to succeed in showing causation, ie that the disclosures were the sole or principal reason for his dismissal.[86]In this case, there is a plausible competing reason for the dismissal for which there is extensive documentary support. There is the as yet untested evidence of Ms Collins that she was not involved with the faculty or with the PIDs themselves, that she was looking for a solution if possible and that she was not influenced in her decision by the contents of the alleged PIDs. Her evidence is not undermined by any of the documentary evidence I have seen. There was no evidence before me that she had been influenced in a Jhuti type way.[87]The claimant points to the timing of his dismissal in relation to his PIDs, but that is not sufficient, certainly not given the other evidence in this case, to point to a conclusion that he is likely to show that PIDs were the reasons for dismissal. There is no smoking gun.[88]The claimant has pointed to detrimental treatment he says was connected with his PIDs in support of his case on dismissal:• Occupational Health advice obstructed repeatedly despite long-term conditions;• SAR rights infringed, with ICO confirming unlawful conduct;• Exclusion from research and platform role following protected disclosures;• SOSR dismissal process initiated after Provost disclosure, without meaningful investigation or consultation;• Dismissal confirmed on 25th July 2025, four days after final escalation;• P45 issued 28 July 2025 confirming dismissal; appeal invitation and invitations issued post-dismissal (7th, 12th, 19th August 2025).[89]So far as OH advice being obstructed, the allegation was not particularised nor evident in documents which I had.[90]As to the delay in the claimant’s DSARs, it appeared that the DSARs were handled by a different team. The Tribunal would need to scrutinise evidence very closely to ascertain whether there was any influence over that team being exerted by any relevant person involved in the claimant’s PIDs who knew about the DSARs.[91]In respect of the claimant’s exclusion from his role, the respondent’s evidence is that the claimant was refusing to perform his role. I certainly cannot conclude that he is likely to show that he was in fact being excluded on the basis of the evidence which I have seen.[92]The other points raised by the claimant essentially relate to timing but the matters which the respondent relied on as the reason for his dismissal were taking place in the same timescale. The timing of the P45 and appeal invitation were not in themselves unusual and did not themselves seem to me to give rise to any inference which would make the PIDs the likely reason for dismissal.[93]Other points which were relied on by the claimant were: - The lack of previous process for conduct or performance; This seemed to me to be not necessarily surprising in the particular circumstances and was not of itself likely to lead to any inference that the reason for the dismissal was other than what the respondent had asserted; - The scrutiny which must be given to dismissals for alleged relationship breakdown / loss of trust and confidence SOSR. The claimant said that in this case the breakdown is of respondent’s own making. These seemed to me to be matters which required detailed assessment of the evidence at trial. - The raising of the PIDs with Ms Collins on the morning of the SOSR hearing. This was simply an aspect of the claimant’s timing argument which I did not consider compelled a conclusion that the PIDs were likely to have been the sole or principal reason for dismissal. - The respondent’s alleged unwillingness to investigate disclosures. From the evidence I saw there appeared to be a difference of views as to the appropriate channels for some of the concerns. I could not conclude on the basis of the evidence in front of me that the claimant was likely to show that the respondent was reluctant to investigate his disclosures.[94]The claimant pointed generally to what he said were procedural anomalies. The Tribunal would have to draw inferences from very detailed findings about the handling of the various processes and the individuals involved; it was not possible to draw any such findings from a broad summary assessment of the evidence.[96]For all of these reasons, I did not make an order for interim relief.