B Doherty v Alexander Mann Solutions Ltd and others: 6024279/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6024279/2025

Between

B DohertyClaimant

Alexander Mann Solutions Ltd and othersRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Ayre

Date 17 August 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant is not an employee of any of the respondents within the meaning contained in section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[2]The claimant is not a worker of the First Respondent within the meaning contained in section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[3]The claimant is not employed by the First Respondent within the meaning set out in section 83 of the Equality Act 2010.

[4]The First Respondent is not a principal within the meaning set out in section 41 of the Equality Act 2010.

[5]All of the claims against the First Respondent are dismissed.

[6]The claimant did not have a contract of employment with the Second Respondent or the Third Respondent. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear complaints of breach of contract against the Second Respondent or the Third Respondent and the claim of breach of contract is therefore dismissed.

[7]The claimant was a contract worker of the Second Respondent and a worker of the Third Respondent.

[8]The Second and Third Respondents’ application for strike out of the claim is refused.

[9]The claim for unauthorised deductions from wages is not well founded. It fails and is dismissed.

[10]The claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments is out of time and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear it.

REASONS

The hearing

[1]The claimant presented her claim to the Employment Tribunal on 29 June 2025. The claim arises out of a short period in January 2025 when the claimant worked for the Second Respondent.

[2]Early conciliation against the First Respondent and the Third Respondent began on 17 February 2025 and ended on 31 March 2025. Early conciliation against the Second Respondent began on 17 February 2025 and ended on 7 March 2025. All of the respondents defend the claim.

[3]A Preliminary Hearing took place on 24 September 2025. At that hearing it was clarified that the claimant is bringing complaints of: Breach of contract / wrongful dismissal; Unauthorised deductions from wages; and Failure to make reasonable adjustments.

[4]The claimant says that she is disabled due to ADHD. The respondents do not admit that the claimant is disabled within the meaning set out in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. The hearing Adjustments for the claimant

The hearing

[5]At the very start of the hearing, we discussed reasonable adjustments for the claimant. The claimant told the Tribunal that the adjustments she sought were: For someone else to share the bundle online;

[2]Permission to pause to look at documents when she was being cross examined; Access to her notes; A family member present with her; and Breaks if she needed them.

[6]It was explained to the claimant that the bundle would not be shared online, and that each of the parties would look at their own copy of the bundle. The claimant had a copy of the bundle with her. It was also explained to the claimant that she could access her notes during cross examination of other witnesses and when making submissions, but not when she was giving evidence herself.

[7]All of the other adjustments were agreed. During the hearing we took regular breaks, including whenever the claimant asked for one. Documents

[8]There was a bundle of documents running to 761 pages. The claimant also introduced an additional bundle of disputed documents which ran to 55 pages. At the start of the hearing the parties were informed that the Tribunal would only read the documents that were referred to in the witness statements or which we were taken to during the evidence.

[9]On the fourth day of the hearing two additional documents were introduced into evidence by consent. The first document was a screenshot of the Third Respondent’s portal log of an email sent to the claimant on 11 February 2025 and was introduced at the request of the Third Respondent. The second document was an email from Charlie Excell of the Third Respondent to the claimant on 4 February 2025 with two attachments and was introduced at the request of the claimant. Witness evidence

[10]The Tribunal heard evidence from the following witnesses: 1. The claimant; 2. Nicole Bright, Talent Acquisition Lead for the Second Respondent; 3. Kate Collister, Head of Talent Development for the Second Respondent; and 4. Adam Yates, Head of Operations for the Third Respondent

[11]A witness statement was prepared for Wiktoria Michorzewska, Lead Recruitment – Contingent Workforce Administration for the First Respondent. Ms Michorzewska did not give evidence at the hearing because the claims against the First Respondent were dismissed on the second day of the hearing. As a result, we have placed limited weight upon her statement in reaching our decision. First day of the hearing: 5 May 2026

[12]The morning of the first day of the hearing was spent discussing the issues in the claim and dealing with an application to amend the claim. The claimant did not attend the hearing after lunch, and, for the reasons set out below, the Tribunal adjourned the hearing for the rest of the day. Application to amend the claim

[13]On the first day of the hearing, during a discussion about the claims being made and the issues which will need to be decided, the claimant indicated that she wished to pursue a complaint about a ‘discriminatory dismissal’. The claimant said that she wished to bring this claim under sections 39 and 41 of the Equality Act 2010. It was explained to the claimant that sections 39 and 41 do not give rise to free standing rights to bring a claim, and that she would need to identify which type of discrimination she wished to pursue, for example, a complaint of direct discrimination under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 or for discrimination arising from disability under section

[15]The claimant maintained that she wished to pursue her claim under sections 39 and 41. She told the Tribunal that she did not believe that she was dismissed because of her ADHD, but because of something arising from her disability, namely her need for very specific information about the rate of pay, and the fact that she had informed the respondents how overwhelming the information she was receiving was. 14. As the draft list of issues prepared at the Preliminary Hearing did not include a complaint about the claimant’s dismissal, the Tribunal treated this as an application to amend the claim and invited submissions from all parties before adjourning to make its decision. 15. It was the unanimous decision of the Tribunal that the application to amend the claim should be refused for the following reasons: 1. The Tribunal has a broad discretion to allow amendments at any stage of the proceedings, either on the Tribunal’s own initiative or if a party applies for leave to amend. The Tribunal must carry out a balancing exercise taking account of all of the relevant factors, of the overriding objective and the interests of justice, and of the relative hardship that would be caused to the parties by granting or refusing the application to amend. 2. When deciding whether to give a party leave to amend its pleaded case, the Tribunal may take account of the guidance given by Mr Justice Mummery in Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore

[1996] ICR 836

. He set out relevant factors which include: 1. The nature of the amendment; 2. The applicability of time limits; and 3. The timing and manner of the application: an application should not be refused just because there has been a delay in making it, although delay is a relevant factor. 3. More recently, in Vaughan v Modality Partnership

[2021] ICR 535

the EAT confirmed that the most important question when deciding applications to amend is the balance of injustice and hardship of allowing or refusing the application. The Tribunal may consider what the real, practical consequences of allowing or refusing the amendment will be. 4. There is no free standing right to bring a claim under either section 39 or section 41 of the Equality Act 2010. Rather, those sections describe who can make a claim of discrimination. Both sections refer to discrimination, and discrimination must be as defined elsewhere in the Equality sections 13 to 27 of the Equality Act. A complaint purportedly made purely under sections 39 and 41 is bound to fail because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear it. 5. The Tribunal has, in the alternative, considered the application to amend as one to pursue a complaint under section 15 of the Equality Act, namely the suggestion that the claimant was dismissed because of something arising from her disability. 6. In reaching our decision we took account of the Selkent factors. The nature of the amendment that the claimant is seeking to make is to introduce entirely new factual and legal allegations. Moreover, the potential of a section 15 claim was discussed at the Preliminary Hearing on 24 September 2025 and EJ Wade refused permission to add such a claim because it did not appear arguable. 7. In relation to time limits, we note that the application to amend was made on 5 May 2026, approximately 15 months after the email in early February 2025 which the claimant says amounts to the dismissal. The application was made substantially out of time, and no explanation has been provided for the delay. 8. On the question of the timing and manner of the application, the application was made very late in the day on the morning of the first day of a final hearing which has been listed since September 2025. It was not made in writing. 9. The practical consequences of allowing the amendment are that the hearing could not proceed because no one has adduced evidence to deal with it, including the claimant. All of the respondents are legally represented and have incurred legal fees preparing for this hearing. If the hearing were adjourned because of the late amendment to the claim, those fees would be wasted. The amended Responses and witness statements have been prepared on the basis that there is no s15 claim for discrimination arising from disability. 10. There would be substantial prejudice to the respondents if the amendment were allowed. This prejudice outweighs the prejudice to the claimant of refusing the amendment application as the claimant will still be able to pursue her remaining claims. Application for adjournment

[16]Shortly before the hearing was due to resume on the afternoon of the first day, the claimant sent an email to the Tribunal stating that she was required to attend hospital immediately due to a family emergency, namely that her great grandfather, aged 92, had broken his hip in a fall and was waiting to see a surgeon. The claimant asked to be excused for the remainder of the day.

[17]The claimant did not attend the hearing when the Tribunal resumed after lunch. A member of Tribunal staff telephoned her and was able to speak to her. She said that she was on her way to hospital and would not be attending the hearing until the following morning.

[18]The hearing resumed briefly to enable the Tribunal to invite comments from the respondents on the claimant’s application for a postponement of the hearing. None of the respondents objected, although the Third Respondent indicated that it would like to see evidence of the medical emergency, and that it expressly reserved its position in relation to costs.

[19]In the circumstances the Tribunal adjourned the hearing until the following day. Second day of the hearing: 6 May

[20]On the second day of the hearing the Tribunal finalised the list of issues that needed to be decided in the claim. The list contains a number of preliminary matters, namely employment status, time limits, disability and knowledge of disability. The parties were asked for their views as to whether the preliminary issues should be dealt with separately before the substantive issues in the case. The respondents were all of the view that at least some of the preliminary issues, particularly status, should be considered separately. The claimant’s preference was for all of the issues to be dealt with together.

[21]The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that the question of status should be dealt with separately, as if the Tribunal found that the claimant was neither a worker nor an employee of the First Respondent all the claims against the First Respondent would be dismissed, and there would be no need for the First Respondent to attend the rest of the hearing. It was, in the Tribunal’s view, proportionate to deal with matters in this way.

[22]On the afternoon of the second day, having heard evidence and submissions on the question of status, the Tribunal delivered its decision on employment status. It found that the claimant was not an employee of any of the respondents and was not a worker of the First Respondent. As a result, all of the claims against the First Respondent were dismissed and the claim for breach of contract was dismissed against the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent. The First Respondent then left the hearing and did not attend the subsequent days.

[23]Summary reasons for the judgment on employment status were given orally at the hearing. The parties were informed that written summary reasons would not be provided unless a party asked for them at the hearing or a party makes a written request which is received by the Tribunal within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. Third day of the hearing: 7 May 2026

[24]The third day of the hearing was spent hearing evidence from the claimant. Fourth day of the hearing: 8 May 2026

[25]On the morning of the fourth day of the hearing, we concluded the evidence of the claimant. The claimant became distressed and we took regular breaks.

[26]We then began to hear the evidence of the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent. The claimant told the Tribunal that she had no questions for any of the respondents’ witnesses. Earlier in the hearing, when the Tribunal was discussing timetabling, the claimant had indicated that she did have questions for the respondent’s witnesses and anticipated questioning each of them for approximately one hour. It had been explained to her that she would have the opportunity to put questions and that, if she had not already done so, she should prepare some questions.

[27]We took several adjournments and the Tribunal encouraged the claimant to reconsider the position. The claimant was clearly upset and told the Tribunal that she had ‘hit a wall’ and did not have the capacity to put questions to the witnesses.

[28]It was suggested to the claimant that we should adjourn the hearing and reconvene on another occasion. The claimant told the Tribunal that she wanted to continue rather than to adjourn.

[29]The claimant asked no questions of any of the respondents’ witnesses.

[30]At the end of the respondents’ evidence Ms Sharratt told the Tribunal that she wished to make a strike out application on behalf of the Third Respondent. The Tribunal discussed with the parties whether to hear the strike out application and submissions at the same time or separately.

[31]The claimant was visibly distressed, and the Tribunal was concerned that she was in no fit state to continue. The Tribunal asked the claimant whether she would prefer to do written submissions. In making this suggestion the Tribunal was cognizant of the fact that litigants in person can be at a disadvantage when it comes to written submissions, but also of the fact that one of the adjustments that the claimant was seeking as part of her claim was for communication to take place in writing. It was also clear to the Tribunal, from the evidence before it, that the claimant was very capable of producing detailed written documents which refer to the relevant legal principles. This was demonstrated, for example, by a letter she sent to the respondents on 7 February 2025 in which she referred to a number of relevant statutory provisions.

[32]The claimant told the Tribunal that her preference was to do written submissions. The respondents had no objection to written submissions. Case Management Orders were therefore made for all parties to provide written submissions, with the respondents going first so that the claimant could consider and respond to their submissions.

[33]It was agreed that the parties would make written submissions in relation to the strike out application, because the claimant was in no fit state to continue the hearing. Fifth day: 6 August 2026

[34]The Tribunal reconvened in chambers to make its decision. We had before us written submissions from the claimant, the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent.

[35]The Tribunal decided that the respondents’ application for strike out of the claim would be considered first during its deliberations. We had before us detailed written submissions from the Third Respondent in support of the application made on day four of the hearing, which was supported by the Second Respondent. We also had written submissions from the claimant opposing the application for strike out.

The issues

[36]A draft list of the issues that fell to be determined at this hearing was identified at the preliminary hearing. Following the preliminary hearing, the claimant supplied further information about the PCPs she relied upon for the reasonable adjustments claim.

[37]At the start of the hearing, we spent some time discussing the issues that fell to be decided. The Employment Judge produced a draft list of issues which was sent to the parties on the afternoon of the first day of the hearing. When the hearing resumed on the second day, the draft list of issues was discussed. The First and Third Respondents applied for sections to be removed from the draft list in relation to the claims for breach of contract and remedy. The claimant objected to them being removed.

[38]Having heard from the parties, the Tribunal decided to remove some of the issues in relation to the breach of contract claim, and that the remedy issues would be reviewed at the start of any remedy hearing.

[39]The following paragraphs reflect the final list of issues identified on the second day of the hearing: 1. Employment status1.1 Was the claimant an employee of any of the respondents within the meaning of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996?

1.2 Was the claimant an employee of any of the respondents within the meaning of section 83 of the Equality Act 2010?

1.3 Was the claimant a worker of any of the respondents within the meaning of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996?

1.4 Was the claimant a contract worker of any of the respondents within the meaning of section 41 of the Equality Act 2010? The First Respondent denied that the claimant was an employee or a worker. It also denied that it employed the claimant within the meaning set out in section 83 of the Equality Act 2010 and also that it was a principal within the meaning in section 41 of the Equality Act. As a result, the First Respondent submitted that all of the claims against it should be dismissed. The Second Respondent and the Third Respondent admitted that the claimant was a ‘limb b’ worker under section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 but denied that the claimant was an employee. 2. Time limits

2.1 Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint against the Second Respondent about something that happened before 12 March 2025 and any complaint against the Third Respondent about something that happened before 16 February 2025 may not have been brought in time.

2.2 Were the discrimination complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? In particular:2.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

2.2.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

2.2.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

2.2.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:2.2.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

2.2.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time?

2.3 The Third Respondent accepted that the complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages was made in time. The Second Respondent’s submissions were silent on the issue.

2.4 In light of our conclusions that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear a complaint of breach of contract, we have not had to consider time limits in relation to the breach of contract claim. 3. Wrongful dismissal / breach of contract 3.1 In light of the Tribunal’s conclusion that there was no contract of employment between the claimant and any of the respondents, it has not been necessary for us to consider the substantive issues in the wrongful dismissal / breach of contract claim. 4. Unauthorised deductions

4.1 Which respondent was responsible for paying the claimant’s wages?

4.2 Were the wages paid to the claimant on any occasion less than the wages that should have been paid?

4.3 Was any deduction required or authorised by statute?

4.4 Was any deduction required or authorised by a written term of the contract?

4.5 Did the claimant have a copy of the contract or written notice of the contract term before the deduction was made?

4.6 Did the claimant agree in writing to the deduction before it was made?

4.7 How much is the claimant owed? 5. Disability 5.1 Did the claimant have a disability as defined in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 at the time of the events the claim is about? The Tribunal will decide:

5.1.1 Did she a physical or mental impairment: ADHD?

5.1.2 Did it have a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities?

5.1.3 If not, did the claimant have medical treatment, including medication, or take other measures to treat or correct the impairment?

5.1.4 Would the impairment have had a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities without the treatment or other measures?

5.1.5 Were the effects of the impairment long-term? The Tribunal will decide:5.1.5.1 did they last at least 12 months, or were they likely to last at least 12 months?

5.1.5.2 if not, were they likely to recur? 6. Reasonable Adjustments (Equality Act 2010 sections 20 & 21)

6.1 Did the respondents know or could they reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant had the disability? From what date? The First Respondent and the Third Respondent deny having any knowledge of the claimant’s ADHD until the claimant’s letter of 7 February 2025. The Second Respondent admits knowing about the claimant’s ADHD from a date which is not clear but which could be the date when the claimant was first interviewed on or around 5 December 2024.

6.2 A “PCP” is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondents have the following PCPs:6.2.1 A practice of relying on phone / verbal explanations and fragmented, multi-party email chains for complex pay/ contract information, despite the claimant’s request for written communications and clear, consolidated explanations?

6.2.2 A practice of starting assignments before the issuing of a written contract and later pressuring for signature on altered terms and providing late / complex onboarding documentation without tailored explanation or adjustment to the communication style?

6.2.3 A practice of failing to provide an explanation of the specific payment models or provide KID documents which would help me understand.

6.2.4 A practice of failing to honour a request by the claimant for written only communications and for clear, consolidated written explanations?

6.2.5 A practice of referring the claimant to a different respondent rather than issuing a single, accessible breakdown?

6.2.6 A practice of not providing a single accountable contact for pay, contract and adjustment issues?

6.2.7 A practice of operating dense, stacked, onboarding and pay processes concurrently and/or out of sequence?

6.2.8 A practice of steering candidates towards the Third Respondent and providing Key Information Documents labelled “examples only”, preventing a neutral like-for-like comparison before acceptance?

6.2.9 A practice of presenting Public Sector Resourcing as an operative legal entity rather than a framework?

6.3 Did the PCPs put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without the claimant’s disability, in that:6.3.1 The claimant experienced confusion and an increased risk of errors;

6.3.2 The claimant found it difficult to get organised under time pressure, had difficulty processing shifting terms and suffered anxiety and decision fatigue;

6.3.3 The claimant experienced a high cognitive load and numerical parsing fatigue; and

6.3.4 The claimant struggled with concentration, sustained attention and memory;

6.4 Did the respondents know or could they reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage? All of the respondents deny having any knowledge of the alleged disadvantage until the claimant’s letter of 7 February 2025.

6.5 What steps could have been taken to avoid the disadvantage? The claimant suggests:6.5.1 Written only communication for complex / important matters, with clear, consolidated breakdowns;

6.5.2 A single, named point of contact with authority to coordinate responses across the respondents and PSR;

6.5.3 Early, tailored Key Information Documents and rate comparisons before acceptance;

6.5.4 A freeze on mid-process rate / terms changes pending written agreement;

6.5.5 Logical staging of administrative steps; enabling time-booking once work had commenced;

6.5.6 Neutral supplier wording without any steering towards one supplier, and an explicit statement of which entity sets rates and why; and

6.5.7 Complaint handling via one empowered handler issuing a single plain language outcome.

6.6 Was it reasonable for the respondents to have to take those steps and when?

6.7 Did the respondents fail to take those steps? 7. Remedy for discrimination

7.1 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?

7.2 Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

7.3 If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?

7.4 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

7.5 Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

7.6 Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should her compensation be reduced as a result?

7.7 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

7.8 Did the respondents or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it?

7.9 If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant?

7.10 By what proportion, up to 25%?

7.11 Should interest be awarded? How much?

Findings of fact

[40]The following findings of fact are made on a unanimous basis. In making these findings of fact we have accepted the witness evidence of the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent which was not challenged by the claimant.

[41]The First Respondent is an employment business and a provider of managed recruitment services. The Second Respondent is a non-ministerial department of Government, and the United Kingdom’s tax, payments and customs authority. The Third Respondent is an umbrella and payroll company.

[42]The First Respondent manages the introduction and supply of temporary workers to clients, including the Second Respondent. The First Respondent operates the Public Sector Resourcing (PSR) Framework for the Second Respondent and supports it with the onboarding of new workers. The PSR Framework is used by public sector bodies, including the Second Respondent to hire contingent workers in the UK.

[43]The First Respondent has a contract with the Third Respondent under which the First Respondent provides temporary workers to the Third Respondent and the Third Respondent provides payroll, management and PAYE services for temporary workers.

[44]In late 2024 the Second Respondent placed an advert for the role of Talent and Capability Lead within its Human Resources team. The role was a temporary one working on a specific project and the Second Respondent wanted a contractor, or ‘contingent labour’ to fill the role. It was anticipated that the role would last for between 6 and 12 months.

[45]The claimant applied for the role and on 5 December 2024 she was interviewed by Kate Collister, the Second Respondent’s Head of Talent Development. During the interview the claimant told Ms Collister that she had been diagnosed with ADHD. Ms Collister’s response was a positive one and appears to have reassured the claimant.

[46]On 6 December the Second Respondent sent a written offer to the claimant which included the following: “The details of the Temporary Assignment are: ….• Day rate: £400 per day

• IR35 Determination: Will be advised when payment option is chosen …. Public Sector Resourcing At HMRC we avail of the services of Public Sector Resourcing (PSR) who will perform your vetting and contract management functions. It is therefore important to note that HMRC will not be your employer for this temporary assignment. Upon agreement of assignment details and actions within your candidate portal, we will share your application data with PSR. PSR will then contact you within 3 working days with a welcome email and an offer email… Preferred Payment Option As part of your onboarding you should also consider your preferred payment option. There are three choices: 1. Umbrella Company: If you prefer to work under an umbrella company, PSR will provide you with the necessary details and instructions to get started. 2. PAYE (Pay as You Earn): If you prefer the convenience of being paid through the PAYE system, please inform PSR accordingly. 3. Limited (LTD) Company: If you operate your own limited company and wish to be paid through that entity, please communicate your preference to PSR. ”

[47]The claimant was therefore offered three options for the work with the Second Respondent: 1. Working through an umbrella company; 2. Becoming a worker of the Third Respondent and paid through PAYE; and 3. Contracting via her own limited company.

[48]The claimant had very little experience of working as an external contractor prior to being offered the work for the Second Respondent. She did however take advice from her accountant in relation to the different payment options.

[49]On 19 December PSR contacted the claimant by email. PSR is not a legal entity, as it is a framework operated by the First Respondent, and communications were sent to the claimant from a PSR email address operated by the First Respondent – primarily by Wiktoria Michorzewska who was employed by the First Respondent as Lead Recruitment – Contingent Workforce Administration.

[50]In the email of 19 December, the claimant was asked to provide certain information and informed that upon receipt of that information they would “Release out your Provisional Offer out for this role”. Attached to the email was a Key Information Document which set out information about the PAYE and umbrella company options, including examples of gross and take home pay for each option.

[51]The claimant replied to the email on 20 December providing the information requested and stating that her chosen payment type was “Ltd inside IR35 via Giant Business Connect”.

[52]On 23 December Wiktoria Michorzewska sent a further email to the claimant from the PRS email address. The email contained “details of the provisional offer of the assignment” which included a day rate of £400. It also stated that “this role has been assessed as inside Off-Payroll Working Rules (IR35) , and consequently any rates of payment quoted will reflect the gross assignment rate paid to the intermediary (Personal Service Company (PSC) and will be subject to the applicable statutory deductions….”

[53]On 23 December 2024 at 14.55 the claimant sent an email to PRS in which she wrote “Please can I change my payment preference from ‘Paid to Ltd company’ to ‘PAYE’ instead? I have done some research and there is little point in it going into my LTD company as it will not be classed as earnings…” Ms Michorzewska replied to the claimant the following day informing her that a new PAYE offer had been sent to her. This offer was different to the original offer because it was based on the claimant being paid through PAYE rather than through her own limited company.

[54]On 24 December 2024 Ms Michorzewska wrote to the claimant setting out the terms of a new provisional offer for the assignment to HMRC, using the PAYE payment model. The offer included the following: “Day Rate (prior to Giant’s deductions) £296.42 Please note that as you have chosen the PAYE pay type, you will become a worker of Giant who is our provider of payrolling services. The contract rate quoted is gross pay to you after the employer’s statutory, Giant will then apply your employee’s deductions under PAYE. Please refer to attached KID document for approximate figures on the deductions that Giant will make. The pay does not include your holiday and this will be accrued and paid to you when you take your holiday.”

[55]On 30 December the claimant wrote to PRS to query the payment rate. In her email she wrote : “I am writing to seek clarification on the payment process as per the terms we’ve discussed. I am relatively new to this payment structure and would appreciate your guidance. We had initially agreed on a day rate of £400. However, the calculations provided indicate a day rate of £296.42 before Giant’s fees are applied. Could you please explain the discrepancy between these two figures? Is this difference due to the employer’s contribution to National Insurance being deducted from my date rate? I have used the attached document to attempt to understand however I have found the information overwhelming and thought better to ask my query….”

[56]The claimant sent a second email to PSR on 30 December purporting to accept the original offer that had been made, which was under the limited company model of engagement. Ms Michorzewska replied on behalf of PSR the following day. In her response she informed the claimant that she needed to respond to the PAYE offer of engagement. She explained that: “….the PAYE pay rate is lower in the system because it excludes Employer’s costs. The pay rate is still a subject to Employee deductions made by Giant. Under the Umbrella/Off-payroll Ltd model, the pay rate includes the Employer costs and therefore seems higher in the system (£400) Then, for Umbrella/Off-payroll Ltd model, the Employer and Employee deductions are processed by the Umbrella company/Giant. The Statutory Employer costs are as per below: -NI – national insurance; -Holiday (can be reimbursed with Giant after the conclusion of your assignment); - Apprenticeship levy: employers are required to pay an apprenticeship levy to the Government; Pension contribution (can be opted out from with Giant): employers are required to pay pension contribution for the Worker. The above are statutory deductions for the PAYE type and cannot be changed…”

[57]On 3 January 2025, after an exchange of emails about which option would be more beneficial for her, the claimant wrote to PSR that: “I will go ahead with the PAYE option.”

[58]The claimant accepted, in cross examination, that she had, on 3 January, accepted an offer to work via PAYE on a day rate of £296.42.

[59]The claimant began working for the Second Respondent on 10 January 2025. Vetting had not yet been completed, but she was permitted to commence work under a waiver. The claimant worked for the Second Respondent until 28 January 2025.

[60]On 21 January 2025 the Third Respondent was informed by email of the claimant’s appointment. An email, sent from the PSR email address, provided details of “a new candidate requiring your attention”. The Third Respondent was asked to ‘release’ a contract for the claimant. The email stated that the engagement model chosen was PAYE and that the PAYE Worker Rate was £296.42 a day.

[61]The Third Respondent sent an email to the claimant on 21 January explaining that it had been asked by PSR to contact her to set her up for payroll and asking her to send them certain information. The Third Respondent was not aware, at that stage, that the claimant had already begun working for the Second Respondent. The claimant sent an email to the Third Respondent the following day in which she asked if she would have an issue with payroll because she had started on 10th January and had not been able to submit a timesheet.

[62]On 24 January the Third Respondent wrote to the claimant informing her that a new assignment had been created for her in the portal used by the Third Respondent, and asking her to log in, check the content of the assignment, and accept it. The claimant replied raising a query about her rate of pay. In an email sent to the Third Respondent on 24 January the claimant wrote: “Please can you clarify something before I sign the document as I am still unclear on deductions prior to Tax and NI. My day rate was agreed at £400 per day – it is £296.42 after your deductions but prior to my tax and NI? Can you also confirm what these deductions are (I think one is the apprenticeship levy?)”

[63]The Third Respondent replied promptly, explaining that “This is the rate that was given by PSR. This will be excluding holiday pay, the rate at 400 might have been including holiday pay when you got it from PSR” and suggesting that the claimant may query the rate with PSR. The claimant then asked whether the day rate of £296 was before or after the deduction of her tax and national insurance contributions, and the Third Respondent explained that it was before, so that she would still be taxed on that day rate.

[64]On the afternoon of 24 January the claimant accepted the worker engagement terms supplied by the Third Respondent. These terms did not contain a rate of pay, as that was set out in a separate contractual assignment schedule.

[65]On 28 January 2025 at 16.21 the claimant sent an email to Nicole Bright and others at the Second Respondent in which she wrote that she was temporarily pausing her assignment “while I work to address some confusion and discrepancies regarding my pay structure and engagement terms.” In the email she complained that she had been offered a day rate of £400 “with no suggestion that this rate might include employer costs or be subject to significant deductions”, and that there was a discrepancy between the £400 originally offered and the day rate of £296 under the PAYE structure.

[66]On 29 January, the First Respondent asked the Third Respondent to contact the claimant to explain the different payment models and the differences between them. The Third Respondent telephoned the claimant but she did not answer the phone,.

[67]At approximately 17.54 on 29 January 2025 the claimant sent an email to Nazmul Ahmed at the Third Respondent in which she wrote: “….I also noticed a missed call from your team shortly after I sent my email. I appreciate the effort to reach out, and I would be happy to arrange a call tomorrow. However, I believe it would be most productive if I first receive responses in writing from Laura at PSR and any clarification you are able to provide on the points outlined in my email. This will help ensure that I fully understand the details beforehand and limit any further confusion. Given that I have now had to pause my assignment after establishing that I have been working without an employment contract in place, I want to ensure that everything is formally clarified before moving forward. I have also attached the email I sent to HMRC yesterday, informing them of my temporary pause in services. Please let me know if you are able to provide any information that can help to resolve my issue, after which I would be happy to schedule a call….”

[68]On 30 January the Third Respondent telephoned the claimant to try and resolve her queries, and to explain that the day rate of £296.42 was correct. The Third Respondent tried to contact the claimant several times over the next few days to explain the position to her.

[69]On 4 February 2025 Nicole Bright of the Second Respondent sent an email to the Third Respondent in which she wrote: “Can someone speak with Bernie today as we really need this resolved asap. If she doesn’t want to accept the charges then we will need to move on and try and find a candidate for the critical work we need to deliver. She just needs a clear explanation as to what she is being charged and from where…”

[70]The claimant did not see this email until it was disclosed to her during the Tribunal proceedings, so was not aware of it at the time.

[71]Later on the 4 February, Charlie Excel, Welcome Team Executive with the Third Respondent sent a detailed email to the claimant in which he sought again to explain to her the difference between the different payroll models. Attached to the email were two net income estimates. These were bespoke to the claimant and based upon her working 5 days a week. The first was headed “Bernadette PAYE Net income estimate” and was calculated on £296.42 a day. It showed an example net pay of £1,063 a week after tax and employee’s national insurance, plus accrued holiday pay of £179 which would be paid to her when she took holiday.

[72]The second was headed “Bernadette UMB Ltd Net Income estimate’ and showed two calculations – one using an Umbrella company and one as an ‘IR35 Fee Payer (inside IR35). It took assignment income of £400 a day, which it explained was the Third Respondent’s income and not the claimant’s gross pay, and showed what deductions were made from it. It specifically set out the percentages and amount of deductions for employer’s national insurance (13.8%), apprenticeship levy (0.5%) and the Third Respondent’s margin of £25 (£30 in the IR35 example). It showed that the example weekly net pay to the claimant, after further deductions for income tax and employee national insurance, would be £1,217 including holiday pay using the Umbrella method, and £1,203 (including holiday pay) using the IR35 method.

[73]The claimant was still unhappy with the explanation provided. During her evidence to the Tribunal the claimant referred to having been provided with different and contradictory explanations by each of the respondents. When asked what the difference was in the explanations of each of the respondents however, the claimant was unable to answer the question.

[74]On 7 February 2025 she sent an email to all three respondents headed “Important: Immediate Payment Demand & Investigation into Unlawful Wage Deduction”. The email contained the following wording: “Please find attached a formal demand regarding the immediate payment of outstanding wages and an investigation into unlawful wage deductions. Despite multiple requests, I have yet to receive a satisfactory explanation or resolution regarding the discrepancies in my pay and contractual mismanagement. I expect a prompt response and immediate action regarding the outlined demands. As this matter remains unresolved, I have already initiated formal escalation to ACAS, EASI and legal proceedings….”

[75]Attached to the email was an 8 page letter. In the letter the claimant set out in detail her complaints about the way that she considered she had been treated. She referred specifically to a number of pieces of legislation : the Employment Agencies Regulations 2003, the Employment Rights Act 1996, the Equality Act 2010 and GDPR.

[76]The heading of the letter was “Immediate Payment Demand & Investigation into Unlawful Wage Deduction” and in the letter the claimant asserted that there had been an unlawful deduction from her wages under section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, that there had been a breach of contract and of section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, a failure to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010, and breaches of the Employment Agencies Regulations 2003 and of P:AYE regulations.

[77]The tone of the letter is assertive and uncompromising. The letter contains a number of demands, including “full payment of my outstanding wages today”. She suggested that “Despite repeated requests, AMS, PSR and Giant have failed to provide a legal explanation as to why my agreed pay rate of £400 per day was reduced to £296.42 per day without my prior consent….” The letter finished with: “Regardless of your response, I will proceed with formal escalation to ACAS, EASI, HMRC Enforcement, and legal action to recover my financial losses, including damages for breach of contract and unlawful wage deductions. Additionally, I will invoke the Equality Act to address any potential discrimination or unfair treatment in the handling of my payments and deductions.”

[78]The Third Respondent acknowledged receipt of the claimant’s email the same day, and sent a substantive response to her on 10 February. In the substantive response they explained again that the difference between the assignment rate for her assignment and the PAYE rate was due to statutory employment costs, and wrote that: “Your pay rate for your engagement with Giant is £296.42 per day, not the £400.00 per day that you have mentioned. There has been no unlawful deduction of wages nor a breach of your employment rights….Please can you advise what the reasonable adjustments were that you have requested and who you advised on these at Giant and I can look into this further for you…. In regards to payment for time worked, we would not be able process any payroll until you have accepted the assignment schedule on your Giant portal. Once that has taken place you will be able to submit your timesheets for time worked via PSR’s timesheet system, and Giant will receive instruction from PSR to process payment for those days…”

[79]The Third Respondent did not hear anything further from or about the claimant until 8 April 2025 when the First Respondent instructed the Third Respondent to pay the claimant for the 13.5 days she had worked. The reason for the delay was that the claimant initially refused to sign the assignment terms that had been provided to her by the Third Respondent, and the Third Respondent will not make payments without having a signed assignment schedule.

[80]On 8 April 2025 the Third Respondent contacted the claimant to inform her that it had been instructed to pay her for the 13.5 days she had worked, that her day rate was £296.42, and that the claimant was required to log on to the portal and accept the assignment schedule in order to be paid. The assignment schedule contained a pay rate of £296.42.

[81]On 9 April 2025 the claimant accepted the assignment schedule, whilst also stating that she was doing so under protest.

[82]The claimant worked a total of 13.5 days for the Second Respondent. On 11 April 2025 the Third Respondent paid the sum of £2,400 to the claimant as an advance payment. On 22 April the Third Respondent made a further payment to the claimant in respect of earnings and holiday pay. A further payment of two pence was made on 6 May 2025 in respect of holiday pay.

[83]The payslips in the bundle showed that the claimant was paid for the 13.5 days that she worked at the rate of £296.42 a day, a total of £4,001.67 gross; plus holiday pay of £601.83 gross. Deductions were made from those payments for tax, employee national insurance contributions and a student loan.

[84]The claimant issued her claim in the Employment Tribunal on 29 June 2025. She began ACAS early conciliation against all of the respondents on 17 February 2025. The ACAS early conciliation certificate was issued against the Second Respondent on 7 March 2025 and against the Third Respondent on 31 March 2025.

[85]In her evidence to the Tribunal the claimant said that she had had access to support and had looked up deadlines. She also took advice from her accountant on the different payment options.

[86]By 7 February she clearly asserted a claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments, and a claim for unauthorised deduction from wages. She had researched the relevant legal principles and formed a clear intention to take legal action. She took the first step towards issuing legal proceedings on 17 February by contacting ACAS. She then appears to have taken no further steps to progress her claim until 29 June, more than four months’ later.

[87]Even after she received her final payment from the Third Respondent, she waited approximately two months before issuing her claim. The Law Strike out

The Law

[88]Rule 38 of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 provides that: “(1) the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds –(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;

(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious;

(d) that it has not been actively pursued;

(e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim or response…” (2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing.

[89]In Emuemukoro v Croma Vigilant (Scotland) Ltd

[2022] ICR 327

, EAT, the EAT held that when considering whether a fair trial is still possible, the Tribunal can consider whether a fair trial is possible within the allocated trial window. The EAT rejected an argument that the question of whether a fair trial is still possible must be determined in absolute terms, and held that where a party’s unreasonable conduct means that a fair trial is not possible within the allocated trial window, the power to strike out is triggered.

[90]Strike out is a draconian sanction and not one that should be applied lightly. Tribunals should be particularly cautious about exercising their power to strike out badly pleaded claims brought by litigants in person who are not familiar with articulating complex arguments in written form on the ground that they have no reasonable prospect of success (Mbuisa v Cygnet Healthcare Ltd EAT 0119/18).

[91]The Employment Appeal Tribunal, in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board v Ferguson

[2013] ICR 1108

commented that whilst in some cases strike out may save time, expense and anxiety, in cases that are fact sensitive, including discrimination claims, the circumstances in which a claim is likely to be struck out are rare.

[92]In Cox v Adecco and ors

[2021] ICR 1307

the Employment Appeal Tribunal gave guidance to Tribunals dealing with strike-out applications against litigants in person. It held that when considering strike out of claims brought against litigants in person, the claimant’s case should be taken at its highest and the Tribunal must consider, in reasonable detail, what the claims and issues are.

[93]In Anyanwu and anor v South Bank Student Union and anor

[2001] ICR 391

the House of Lords stressed the importance of not striking out discrimination claims except in the most obvious cases as they are generally fact-sensitive and can only be determined after evidence has been heard. Time limits in discrimination claims

[94]Time limits for bringing discrimination claims are set out in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010, with the relevant provisions being the following: “(1) ….proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of –(a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or…

(b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. …. (3) For the purposes of this section - (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it.

(c) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something – (a) When P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) If P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might treasonably have been expected to do it.”

[95]Tribunals have a wide discretion as to whether to extend time in discrimination claims. There is however no principle or assumption that a Tribunal should exercise that discretion: Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link

[2003] IRLR 434

. The burden of proving that it would be just and equitable to extend time rests with the claimant.

[96]More recently, in Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care

[2024] EWCA Civ 1568

the Court of Appeal found that an Employment Tribunal had acted perversely when it decided it would not be just and equitable to extend time in a race discrimination complaint. The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal should have set out in its decision the extent of the claimant’s delay in issuing proceedings and the reasons for the delay. The Court also found that the Tribunal should have made findings about whether the delay had prejudiced the respondent and that a highly relevant factor was that the respondent had sought to hide information which could have caused the claimant to consider that he had a valid discrimination claim.

[97]When Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care

[2024] EAT 2

was before the EAT, His Honour Judge Tayler commented that: “30. It remains a common practice for those who assert that the primary time limit should not be extended to rely on the comments of Auld LJ at paragraph 25 of Bexley Community Centre (t/a Leisure Link) v Robertson

[2003] EWCA Civ 576

[2003] IRLR 434

, that time limits in the Employment Tribunal are “exercised strictly” in employment cases and that a decision to extend time is the “exception rather than the rule” as if they were principles of law. Where these comments are referred to out of context, this practice should cease. Paragraph 25 must be seen in the context of paragraphs 23 and 24”.

[98]Factors that are relevant when considering whether to extend time can include: 1. The length of and reasons for the delay in presenting the claim; 2. The extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; 3. The extent to which the respondent cooperated with any requests for information; 4. How quickly the claimant acted when she knew of the facts giving rise to the claim; and 5. The steps taken by the claimant to obtain professional advice once she knew of the possibility of taking action.

[99]Time limits for presenting claims are a jurisdictional issue (Rodgers v Bodfari (Transport) Ltd 1973 325 NIRC) and if a claim is out of time, the Tribunal must not hear it. Unauthorised deductions from wages

[100]Section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 states that: “(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless –(a) The deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or

(b) The worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction… (3) Where the total amount of wages paid on any occasion by an employer to a worker employed by him is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion (after deductions) the amount of the deficiency shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a deduction made by the employer from the worker’s wages on that occasion.”

[101]Section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 gives workers the right to bring complaints of unlawful deduction from wages to the Employment Tribunal. The time limit for bringing such claims is contained within Sections 23(2), (3) and (4) which provide as follows: “(2) Subject to subsection (4), an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with – (a) In the case of a complaint relating to a deduction by the employer, the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made…. (3) Where a complaint is brought under this section in respect of – (a) a series of deductions or payments… the references in subsection (2) to the deduction or payment are to the last deduction or payment in the series or to the last of the payments so received. (4) Where the employment tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under this section to be presented before the end of the relevant period of three months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.”

Conclusions

[102]The following conclusions are reached on a unanimous basis, having considered carefully the written submissions of the parties and the evidence before the Tribunal. Application for strike out

[103]The Third Respondent applied for strike out of the claim in its entirety. In summary, the grounds for the application were that: 1. The claim has no reasonable prospect of success; 2. The manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by the claimant is unreasonable; 3. The claim has not been actively pursued; and 4. It is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim.

[104]Ms Sharratt submitted that the claimant’s failure to challenge by cross examination any of the respondents’ witnesses was a serious procedural irregularity resulting in the claimant not being able to impugn the respondents’ witness evidence. She referred us to the case of Griffiths v TUI (UK) Ltd

[2025] AC 374

which upheld the principle that “a party is required to challenge by cross-examination the evidence of any witness of the opposing party on a material point which he or she wishes to submit to the court should not be accepted.” [para 70(i)]. The Court also held in that case however that “The rule should not be applied rigidly. It is not an inflexible rule and there is bound to be some relaxation of the rule….Its application depends upon the circumstances of the case as th4e criterion is the overall fairness of the trial”. [para 70(vii)].

[105]As a result, Ms Sharratt submitted that the evidence of the Third Respondent’s witness Mr Yates, which is crucial to the claim, is unchallenged and the Third Respondent has a complete defence to both claims. Whilst the claimant is a litigant in person, the overriding objective requires consideration of fairness and justice for all parties. The claimant’s claim, Ms Sharratt submitted, therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.

[106]Ms Sharratt also submitted that it was no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claims, due to the claimant’s failure to advance a positive case against the respondents in cross examination.

[107]In the alternative, she submitted that the manner in which the claimant has conducted her claim has been unreasonable because the respondents were put to the cost of defending a claim which, on the final day of the hearing, the claimant failed to positively pursue.

[108]The Second Respondent supported the Third Respondent’s application for strike out.

[109]The claimant opposed the application for strike out. She submitted, in summary, that: 1. Strike out is a draconian step of last resort; 2. The reason she had not been able to cross examine the witnesses was a manifestation of her disability, which the Tribunal accommodated; 3. The respondents have suffered no unfairness or prejudice; and 4. The application for strike out is inconsistent with concessions already made and with the nature of the evidence on which the claims rest.

[110]In reaching its decision on the question of strike out the Tribunal noted that the claimant was informed at the start of the hearing that she would be able to put questions to the respondent’s witnesses and that, if she had not yet prepared any written questions, she should do so. The claimant did put questions to Nicole Bright on the issue of employment status, on the second day of the hearing.

[111]It was clear to the Tribunal that when the claimant indicated on the fourth day of the hearing that she did not want to put any questions to the respondents’ witnesses, she was in a state of distress. The Tribunal asked whether she would like an adjournment, given her distress, and she declined, telling the Tribunal she preferred to continue. The Order for written submissions was made subsequently because the claimant was not in a position to make oral submissions that day, and was not in any way a replacement for cross examination.

[112]The Second Respondent submits that because of the lack of cross examination the claim has no reasonable prospect of success. Whilst we accept that there are some claims in which that may indeed be the case, we do not find it to be so here. Whilst we have every sympathy for the submission made by Ms Sharratt, it is not uncommon in Employment Tribunal proceedings where a party is representing themselves, for that party not to fully understand what is required of cross examination or of the significance of cross examination. Moreover, this is not a case which turns on disputed witness evidence. The more important evidence in our view is the documentary evidence.

[113]The claimant’s decision not to cross examine the respondents’ witnesses was not premediated or planned in any way. At the start of the hearing, she told the Tribunal that she would be putting questions to the witnesses. It was only on day four, after she had been giving evidence for approaching two days, and when she was clearly distressed, that the claimant told the Tribunal she had hit a wall and had no capacity to cross examine the respondent’s witnesses.

[114]On the second day of the hearing the claimant put questions to Nicole Bright on the issue of worker status for a period of approximately 20 minutes. It cannot therefore be said that there was a total failure by the claimant to cross examine the respondent’s witnesses.

[115]The lack of cross examination on the substantive issues on day four of the hearing does not in our view mean either that the claimant’s case has no reasonable prospect of success. Nor does it mean that a fair trial is no longer possible, or that the claim has not been actively pursued. All parties have had the opportunity to present their claim, have their evidence heard, and make submissions. The respondents had the opportunity to challenge the claimant’s evidence and did so through cross examination of her.

[116]It is clear that throughout these proceedings the claim has been actively pursued by the claimant. After the conclusion of the hearing she submitted written submissions running to 37 pages, together with medical evidence relating to her ill health immediately following the hearing, and her non-attendance on the afternoon of the first day. We find that the claimant’s decision not to cross examine the respondent’s witnesses on day four of the hearing is more likely to be due to her distress on the day and is not an indication that she was not actively pursuing her claim. Nor is it, in our view, unreasonable conduct of the proceedings. The claimant is a litigant in person who was on day four of a final hearing in which there were three respondents who were all represented by counsel. Conducting litigation is a stressful experience for those who have the benefit of legal representation, and even more so for a litigant in person. The claimant appeared very stressed on the final day of the hearing.

[117]We have considered the fit note submitted by the claimant, dated 11 May 2026, which certifies her as unfit to work from that date. It makes no comment however as to her fitness to participate in Tribunal proceedings and is not retrospective. In any event, we have based our decision on our observations of the claimant during the hearing and the Tribunal’s notes of proceedings.

[118]We accept the claimant’s submission that her failure to cross examine the respondents’ witnesses on the final day of the hearing does not cause any prejudice to the respondents. If anything, the failure to cross examine assists the respondents, because their witness evidence is unchallenged and as such is accepted by the Tribunal.

[119]Strike out is a draconian sanction, and not one which should be applied lightly.

[120]For the above reasons, whilst we have considerable sympathy for the respondents’ application, it would not in our view be appropriate in this case to strike out the claim. The application for strike out is therefore refused. Time limits

[121]Having refused the application for strike out, we have gone on to consider the question of time limits in relation to the complaint of failure to make reasonable adjustments. The Second and Third Respondents admit that the claim for unauthorised deductions from wages is in time as the claimant issued her claim within three months of the date upon which the Third Respondent made payments to her. They submit that the discrimination complaint is out of time.

[122]In light of the dates of ACAS early conciliation and the date upon which the claim was presented, complaints against the Second Respondent about anything that occurred before 12 March 2025 are out of time, and complaints against the Third Respondent about anything that occurred before 16 February 2025 are out of time.

[123]The claimant’s submissions on time limits are, in summary, that: 1. Conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; 2. The failure to make reasonable adjustments was not a single act on a single date, but was an ongoing situation or state of affairs; 3. The claim was in time because correspondence with the respondents continued until 11 April 2025; 4. In the alternative it would be just and equitable to extend time because: 1. the claimant is a litigant in person with a “documented disability affecting the very executive functions engaged by litigation deadlines”; 2. throughout February to June 2025 the dispute was “still in motion”; 3. the claimant reasonably pursued resolution before litigating; 4. the claimant was confused by having three respondents with separate conciliation processes; 5. the respondents have not been prejudiced by the date upon which the claim was presented; 6. the unauthorised deduction from wages claim, arising from the same facts, was in time; and 7. the balance of prejudice falls decisively in favour of extending time.

[124]The Second Respondent’s submissions on time limits are, in summary, the following: 1. The Second Respondent only had a duty to make reasonable adjustments between 10 January and 29 January 2025; 2. Any duty that the Second Respondent had to make reasonable adjustments for the claimant ended on 29 January 2025; 3. The claimant’s claim for reasonable adjustments was at least 44 days out of time against the Second Respondent; 4. The claimant has not presented any reason as to why it would be just and equitable to extend time.

[125]The Third Respondent’s submissions, in summary, are that: 1. A failure to make reasonable adjustments is in its nature an omission, such that limitation starts to run from the end of the period during which the respondents might reasonably have made the adjustment (Kingston upon Hull City Council v Matuszowicz

[2009] EWCA Civ 22

and Abertawe Bro Morgannwy University Local Health Board v Morgan

[2018] EWCA Civ 640

); 2. In Scottish Ministers v James Blair

[2025] EAT 74

, the EAT held that the Tribunal was wrong to list a catalogue of alleged failures to make reasonable adjustments and find this to be a continuing course of conduct. Rather, the EAT held that: “20. A failure to make reasonable adjustments is not a continuing act. Absent a decision not to make an adjustment, or an act inconsistent with making an adjustment…the time limit for bringing a reasonable adjustments claim start to run on the expiry of the period within which the employer might reasonably have been expected to make the adjustments…. 21. The findings made by the ET in this case demonstrate no decision not to make an adjustment or act inconsistent with making an adjustment. They present as a catalogue of failures by the appellant to make adjustment…” 3. In cross examination the claimant’s case was that adjustments should have been made from January 2025 when she asked for written communications; 4. It would not be just and equitable to extend time because: 1. No good reason has been offered for the delay; 2. The claim concerns an omission, not a continuing act and there are no later acts that might render the claim in time; 3. The claimant threatened legal action under the Equality Act on 7 February 2010. The content of that letter makes clear she could have brought her claim on time; and 4. Whilst the claimant is a litigant in person, she is capable of researching the relevant heads of claim so could have researched time limits; and 5. The prejudice to both parties must be balanced.

[126]The first question we have to consider is when it is alleged that discrimination occurred. The only discrimination claim before us is for failure to make reasonable adjustments. The claimant relies upon 9 alleged PCPs in support of this claim. We note that the respondents deny applying the PCPs. We also note that the PCPs are not clearly articulated or clear dates identified. Most of the alleged PCPs appear to relate to the period prior to the claimant ceasing work on 28 January 2025.

[127]In her claim form the claimant did not set out any PCPs or identify the dates of the alleged discrimination. In a document filed on 15 October 2025 pursuant to a Case Management Order, the claimant identified a number of PCPs and gave the dates for some of them as follows: 1. PCP1 – Communication Modality and Fragmentation : January – February 2025; 2. PCP 2 – Contracting and Documentation Timing : December 2024 – January 2025; 3. PCP 3 – Pay Transparency and decision pressure : December 2024 – February 2025; 4. PCP 4 – Adjustment Requests and Disability Handling : January – February 2025; 5. PCP 4A – Complaint-Handling Practice / Split Accountability : no date provided, 6. PCP 4B – Discrimination Arising from Disability : no date provided; 7. PCP 5 – Coordination and Single-Point Ownership : November 2024 – March 2025; 8. PCP 6 – Procedural Overload (Administrative Intensity) : December 2024 – February 2025; 9. PCP 7 – Choice Architecture / Supplier Steering : December 2024; 10. PCP 8 – Accountability Clarity (Branding/Identity Ambiguity) : November 2024 – March 2025

[128]The way in which the PCPs have been framed by the claimant in the document dated 15 October 2025 is not entirely clear. She has used overly complex language which makes the allegations difficult to understand. Only two of the alleged PCPs set out in the 15 October 2025 document applied beyond February 2025, the PCP headed “Coordination and Single-Point Ownership” and the one headed “Accountability Clarity (Branding/Identity Ambiguity).

[129]In her disability impact statement, the claimant described the impact of her ADHD on her in January and February 2025, suggesting that she considered the discrimination to have occurred during that period.

[130]In her submissions the claimant alleges that the failure to make reasonable adjustments constituted conduct extending over a period and that, in line with section 123(3)(a) of the Equality Act, conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period. We do not accept that submission. We prefer the submission of the Third Respondent, in line with the decision of the EAT in Scottish Ministers v James Blair and find that a failure to make reasonable adjustments is not a continuing act. We accept that a series of failures to make reasonable adjustments is capable of being a continuing act, but there is no evidence before us to suggest that in this case there was a series of such failures.

[131]Similarly, there is no evidence before us to suggest that either of the Second or Third Respondents decided after the expiry of the primary time limit (11 March 2025 in the case of the Second Respondent and 15 February 2025 for the Third Respondent) not to make reasonable adjustments or did any acts which were inconsistent with making an adjustment. On the claimant’s own evidence, as set out in her witness statement, the last contact she had with the Second Respondent was an email from Jessica Ellis on 7 March confirming that the agreed daily rate was £400 (paragraph 29 of the claimant’s witness statement). She has adduced no evidence to suggest any unlawful actions on the Second Respondent after that date.

[132]In relation to the Third Respondent, the only evidence of actions after 15 February 2025 was the communication in April about the claimant being asked to sign the assignment schedule so that she could be paid, and the Third Respondent making the payment. It cannot in our view be said that the Third Respondent did anything inconsistent with making adjustments or decided not to make adjustments after the 15 February 2025.

[133]The last substantive communications with the claimant were in early February 2025. At least one of the alleged PCPs relied upon was only capable of being applied prior to 10 January 2025 when the claimant began working for the Second Respondent, namely the PCP of “starting assignments before the issuing of a written contract”.

[134]The claimant submitted that time began to run on 11 April 2025, because communications between the parties continued until then. The Second and Third Respondents submit that it began to run from 29 January 2025, the date upon which the claimant, having ceased providing services the day before, wrote to the Third Respondent asking for responses in writing, whilst at the same time indicating that she would be happy to have a telephone call the following day.

[135]As the primary time limit began to run on 29 January 2025, the claim against the Second Respondent is approximately six weeks out of time, and the claim against the Third Respondent is two and a half weeks out of time.

[136]The claimant has adduced very little, if any, evidence of the reason for the delay, although she does put forward a number of reasons in her written submissions. We note that the claimant did not carry out any work after 29 January 2025 for any of the respondents.

[137]The claimant had, by 7 February, been provided with several explanations for the rate of pay and the different pay options. The email of 4 February clearly answers the questions raised by the claimant and, in our view, it was that that prompted the claimant to send the letter of 7 February and to contact ACAS.

[138]Although the claimant is a litigant in person, she was clearly contemplating litigation from 7 February 2025 at the latest. In the letter that she sent that day, which runs to 8 pages, she set out in great detail what she alleged had gone wrong, and what she wanted to happen to put it right. She referred to sections 1 and 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, Regulation 13A of the Employment Agencies Regulations 2003, section 20s of the Equality Act 2010 and , Article 15 of GDPR and concludes by writing that “regardless of your response, I will proceed with formal escalation to ACAS, EASI, HMRC Enforcement, and legal action…”

[139]We do not accept that the letter of 7 February 2025 was seeking resolution. The claimant was clearly stating that, whatever the response from the respondents, she was going to issue proceedings. The claimant knew very well by 7 February what the respondents’ position was in relation to her rate of pay. She chose not to accept that position, despite having agreed on 3 January to work through PAYE on a day rate of £296.42.

[140]The letter of 7 February demonstrates that, by that date, the claimant had a good understanding of the claims that she wanted to bring and of the relevant statutory provisions that she would rely upon. Ten days later, on 17 February, she commenced early conciliation.

[141]The claimant has not adduced any evidence as to why her ADHD prevented her issuing her claim until 29 June but did not prevent her from sending the detailed letter on 7 February and contacting ACAS on 17 February.

[142]The issue in this case primarily was that the claimant had not worked as an independent contractor before and was struggling to understand the financial implications of the different payment options. She was not assisted by the initial reference to a £400 day rate, which may well have caused her to believe that she would be paid £400 a day.

[143]By the time of 7 February however, the claimant was well aware of the respondents’ position in relation to pay, and the three different arrangements under which she could continue with the assignment and had been provided with bespoke examples. She chose to pursue proceedings against all three respondents rather than to continue with the assignment. The claimant is clearly an intelligent and articulate individual who had acquired a good understanding of the relevant legal principles, one of which is time limits, and the process to follow in order to enforce her rights.

[144]It cannot in our view be said that the respondents would not be prejudiced by granting an extension of time, as they would lose the benefit of an absolute defence to the claim.

[145]For the above reasons we find that the claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments is out of time and it would not be just and equitable to extend time. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint of failure to make reasonable adjustments. Unauthorised deduction from wages

[146]The first question we have had to ask in relation to this claim is which respondent was responsible for paying the claimant’s wages. We have no hesitation in finding, on the evidence before us, that the Third Respondent was responsible for making the payments to the claimant. The claimant’s contract was with the Third Respondent, and she did not have a contract with the Second Respondent. It was the Third Respondent who made the payments to the claimant in April and May 2025.

[147]The second, and most important question, we have had to determine, is whether the wages paid to the claimant were on any occasion less than the wages that should have been paid to her. The claimant says that she should have been paid at the rate of £400 a day rather than £296.42 a day, and that her holiday pay should have been calculated on the higher rate.

[148]In her evidence to the Tribunal the claimant accepted in cross examination that on 3 January 2025 she had accepted an offer to be paid through PAYE at a rate of £296.42 a day. By the time she started work on 10 January 2025 therefore there was an agreement in place that she would be paid £296.42 per day.

[149]The claimant was paid at that rate for all of the days that she worked. She was also paid holiday pay calculated on that rate.

[150]The claimant has not established any right to be paid at the rate of £400 a day. Whilst the reference to a day rate of £400 in the original offer to her was unfortunate because it appears to have caused her to believe that she would be paid and receive that amount, in fact there was never any agreement that she would be paid and receive £400 a day.

[151]The offer letter sets out the three different payment options and, at the time she started work, the claimant had chosen a payment option in the knowledge that would result in her being paid £296.42 a day.

[152]The wages paid to the claimant were not less than the wages that should have been paid. The claim for unauthorised deduction from wages fails and is dismissed. Approved by: