Dr O Abdelaal v The University of Manchester: 6023996/2025 Dr O Abdelaal v The University of Manchester: 6023996/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6023996/2025

Between

Dr O AbdelaalClaimant

The University of ManchesterRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Cookson

Ms M Bouffe (instructed by Counsel) for claimant

Mr N Grundy (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 12 September 2025

JUDGMENT

[2]The judgment of the Tribunal is that the claimant’s application for interim relief pursuant to Section 128(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 fails and is dismissed.

[3]Approved by: Employment Judge Cookson 12 September 2025 Judgment sent to the parties on: 8 October 2025 For the Tribunal:

[6]Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal- decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation- practice-directions/

[7]Case Number: 6023996/2025 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Dr O Abdelaal Respondent: The University of Manchester Heard at: Manchester On: 12 September 2025 Before:

REASONS

[1]This was on application for interim relief sought by the claimant who was employed as a graduate teaching assistant by the University of Manchester.

[2]Her employment ended on 30 June 2025. The application for interim relief was submitted in anticipation of that termination on 27 June. What I considered

[3]I was provided with the following documents:a. A bundle of documents from the claimant running to some 436 pages;

b. A bundle from the respondent running to some 155 pages;

c. A 12 page witness statement from the claimant;

d. Skeleton written arguments from both counsel.

[4]I also received oral submissions from both counsel. Case Number: 6023996/2025

The Law

[5]Section 128 Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 provides: 128 Interim relief pending determination of complaint. An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, may apply to the tribunal for interim relief.

[6]The question to be considered upon an application for interim relief is set out in section 129 ERA 1996: 129 Procedure on hearing of application and making of order This section applies where, on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A.

[7]Interim relief can therefore be ordered where the Tribunal finds that it is likely that a final hearing will decide that the reason (or principal reason) for dismissal was that the employee had made protected disclosures contrary to section 103A ERA.

[8]The meaning of the words “likely” for these purposes has been considered in several cases. In Taplin v Chippam

[1978] IRLR 450

EAT, (decided under similar provisions relating to interim relief applications in dismissal for trade union reasons) the EAT held that it must be shown that the claimant has a “pretty good chance” of succeeding, and that that meant something more than merely on the balance of probabilities.

[9]A “pretty good chance” of success was interpreted in the whistleblowing case of Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 562

, EAT, as meaning “a significantly higher degree of likelihood than just more likely than not”. Underhill P stated in Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz that, “in this context “likely” does not mean simply “more likely than not” – that is at least 51% - but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood.”

[10]The claimant must show the necessary level of chance in relation to each essential element of section 103A ERA, see Simply Smile Manor House Ltd and Ors v Ter-Berg

[2020] ICR 570

[11]The claimant must therefore show that it is likely that the Tribunal at the final hearing will find that:(1) She made the relied upon disclosure(s) to the employer

(2) She believed that it or they tended to show one or more of the matters Case Number: 6023996/2025 listed in the ERA 1996 section 43B(1)

(3) Her belief in that was reasonable;

(4) The disclosure(s) was or were made in the public interest; and

(5) The disclosure(s) was or were the principal cause of the dismissal.

[12]“Protected disclosure” is defined in section 43A ERA 1996, In this Act a “ protected disclosure ” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H. “Qualifying disclosures” are defined by section 43B ERA 1996, 43B Disclosures qualifying for protection. (1) In this Part a “ qualifying disclosure ” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following — … (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject … (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered ….

[13]The disclosure must be a disclosure of information, of facts rather than opinion or allegation (although it may disclose both information and opinions/allegations Cavendish Munro Professional Risk Management v Geldud [2010] ICR; and Kilraine v LB Wandsworth

[2016] IRLR 422

[14]The test for “reasonable belief” is a subjective test.

[15]In determining whether the reason for the claimant’s dismissal was her alleged disclosure(s), it is not sufficient for the disclosure to be “in the employer’s mind” or for to have influenced the employer. The Tribunal must consider whether that disclosure was the “sole or principal reason” for her dismissal.

[16]In Al-Qasimi v Robinson there is guidance from Her Honour Judge Eady QC in which she says by its nature an application for interim relief in relation to the context of a s103A claim, has to be determined expeditiously and on a summary basis. The Tribunal has to do its best on such material as the parties have been able to deploy at short notice and make as good an assessment as it felt able and the Tribunal has to do the best it can from the material which has been made available. The employment judge must be careful to avoid making Case Number: 6023996/2025 findings which could tie the hands of the Tribunal ultimately charged with the final determination of the merits of the case, and the task is therefore very much an impressionistic one to form a view on how the matter will be looked at at the final hearing and as to whether the claimant had a pretty good chance and was likely to make out her case, but it is not an over-formulistic way of looking at things. HHJ Eady said an essential gist of reasoning sufficient to let the parties know why the application has succeeded or failed given the issues raised and the test to be applied, and the test of likely to succeed applies of course to all elements of the claim in question.

[17]This was a hearing listed before me as a free-standing claim for unfair dismissal containing an application for interim relief made on 25 August. It was accepted by the Tribunal on that basis, and I have considered it looking at the document which was attached to the ET1 as an application for interim relief. The particulars of claim refer to other complaints and I noted that there is another tribunal claim from this claimant 6007519/2025 but I have not considered that except in the very briefest of terms and to the extent it is relevant to this hearing.

[18]I stress that what I record here are not in any way factual findings, rather his is my assessment of the case. I will add that in terms of the documents I received for this hearing, the claimant appears to have had an unrealistic expectation of what a judge could and would consider at a hearing of this nature listed for half a day, and perhaps had expected there would be a more detailed consideration of evidence which is not part of the process. Could I conclude that the claimant is likely to show that she had made a protected disclosure?

[19]In her pleaded case, the claimant relies on what are said to be disclosures in an email of 24 October, and I have also been referred to what was discussed at a meeting on 14 November.

[20]The email of 24 October is not in my view something which can be said to be obviously a protected disclosure. A protected disclosure must contain a disclosure of information, but it must do more than that. It must, in the reasonable belief of the claimant, tend to show a breach of a relevant legal obligation and the claimant must reasonably believe that the disclosure is made in the public interest.

[21]As noted by Mr Grundy in his submissions, sometimes disclosures are very obviously protected because all of the statutory elements are clearly set out within the e-mail itself, but this is not one of those situations. What I have before me is a document which appears to be about someone’s personal circumstances but which does not obviously point to any legal breach such that it is very likely that the claimant will be able to show that she made a disclosure of information which in her reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, was made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the relevant maters referred to in s43B.

[22]That is not to say that the claimant will not be able to establish at a final hearing that the email was a relevant disclosure, but this will require evidence from her to establish the relevant elements. I agree with Mr Grundy that when Case Number: 6023996/2025 that e-mail of 24 October is looked at in the context of the discussion on 14 November, which is the second occasion relied upon, the claimant’s case that she made a protected disclosure is strengthened and indeed it may be significantly strengthened. However even I accept that the claimant can proceed on that basis bearing in mind how the case is pleaded, there are still questions about whether she will succeed in showing that that is a protected disclosure, because the claimant reasonably believed she was raising matters in the public interest. It was suggested to me by Ms Bouffe that the fact there was a trade union representative at a meeting is something which points to the disclosure meeting the relevant test, but I do not accept that is the case. Trade union representatives may accompany individuals to employer meetings in a range of circumstances, not only those involving matters of public interest, and I do not see that the presence of the trade union assist the claimant.

[23]Within the bundle of documents, I was provided with for this hearing there is an e-mail of 3 December. That refers to notes from the meeting of 14 November being inaccurate and it is alleged by the claimant that that could constitute a breach of the Data Protection Act. It is not clear if this relied upon a protected disclosure. I can accept that the claimant may be likely to show that this was a disclosure of information which tended to show a breach of a legal obligation, but it is still raised in the context of personal circumstances and with an obvious personal interest so I still cannot conclude that the claimant is very likely to establish that this was a disclosure which the claimant reasonably believed was in the public interest. In any event as Mr Grundy points out the claimant’s pleaded case is that it is the disclosure of 24 October which was protected and the reason for her dismissal so a case based on the disclosure will require the claimant to be granted leave to amend her claim.

[24]There is also a grievance letter of 13 December. I considered that it is likely that the claimant will show that this letter was a protected disclosure, but it is a letter which was sent after the letter of 11 December which the claimant relies on as evidence that the reason for her dismissal was that she had made a protected disclosure. That is a letter which the respondent will argue was sent as warning of possible dismissal and the claimant will say was notice of termination. Accordingly whether the grievance letter was protected disclosure or not does not assist the claimant in showing that she is likely to show that the reason for her dismissal was unlawful.

[25]I agree with Mr Grundy that the contents of letter of 11 December highlight the underlying difficulty with an assessment that the claimant is likely to succeed in this case. The claimant was employed on a fixed term contract. Her complaint about dismissal is connected to the expiry and non-renewal of that contract. I accept the weight to Mr Grundy’s submissions. When the claimant was employed on a time limited contract in any event it is likely to become more difficult for her to show that she was the required high degree of likelihood of showing the reason for dismissal was that she made a protected disclosure, although not of course impossible.

[26]The contract of employment with the claimant said this “Your employment will commence on 1 September 2023 extending until 30 June 2025 and will terminate on that date. The reason for the fixed term nature of this post Case Number: 6023996/2025 is because your post has been created specifically to meet a short term demand on conclusion of which funding will be discontinued and work will cease.”

[27]I recognise what the claimant says, that notwithstanding that she was on a fixed term contract which had expressly been provided to be of a short term fixed nature, on expiry the University be required to look at alternatives; to consider whether she could be moved on to a new course or whether there were other alternatives which could be considered. However, can I be satisfied that the claimant has a high degree of likelihood that she will be able to show that the reason for her dismissal was that she had made a protected disclosure in circumstances where, from the very start of her employment, it had been anticipated that her employment may be for a fixed term duration? I conclude that I cannot. In her Particulars of Claim document, the claimant says that the respondent introduced at a late stage a new justification for termination when it referred to the short-term nature of employment and cessation of funding. I understand that to be because the respondent had referred specifically to redundancy, but I find that argument not to be persuasive given the wording in the fixed term contract itself.

[28]In terms of the claimant’s case that her claim is very likely to succeed, she has placed significant weight on the timing of the 11 December letter because of its temporal proximity to the alleged protected disclosure and the meeting on 14 November. She says that the timing of the 11 December letter shows that the reason for dismissal must be that she had made the protected disclosures. However, Mr Grundy points to evidence that the letter is simply a standard one sent to fixed term employees at the university as part of its processes for managing the expiry of fixed term contracts which are commonplace in the sector. The claimant says it is suspicious because it was sent earlier than usual, but on her version of events the letter should have been sent on Christmas Eve. However, it would not be unusual for an institution to anticipate staff leave over Christmas and organise administration accordingly and I do not accept that this is the “smoking gun” or compelling evidence of reason that the claimant suggests.

[29]This is necessarily a broad-brush assessment made on a summary assessment. I have emphasised to the claimant that my assessment of the case recognises that many of these matters are factual disputes which will have to be tested in evidence. It may be that the claimant will succeed when all of the evidence has been considered and tested, but I cannot find on the basis of the information which I have before me at this hearing that the claimant is likely to succeed in her s103A complaint. I accept that Mr Grundy is correct when he says that the claimant’s application for interim relief is weakened to some extent by the fact she has brought other complaints alleging that the expiry of her contract was unlawful discrimination. Ms Bouffe has rightly pointed that the claimant may succeed in saying that she had made a protected disclosure and that that was the reason for her dismissal or the principal reason for her dismissal, and still succeed in showing that she was the subject of unlawful discrimination, perhaps on the ground of more than protected characteristic given the discrimination complaints brought. However, the fact that the claimant herself has claimed other possible reasons for her dismissal does suggest that there are evidential issues to be resolved about the true reason for the termination of her employment. To Case Number: 6023996/2025 succeed under s103A the claimant has to show the protected disclosure was the principal reason and this is case where it is clear that there will be arguments about facts pointing to a range of possible reasons on both sides.

[30]In these circumstances I find it cannot be said that the claimant has a “pretty good chance” of establishing a causal link between any protected disclosure and the reason for her dismissal. The claimant therefore does not meet the threshold of likelihood required for an interim relief application to succeed. I therefore refuse the application. Approved by: