Mr D Sathiaraj v Royal Mail Group Ltd: 6023587/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6023587/2024

Between

Mr D SathiarajClaimant

Royal Mail Group LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Barrett

Not represented for claimant

Mr R Chaudhry (instructed by solicitor) for respondent

Date 15 August 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant’s claims are struck out because they were presented out of time and the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to hear them.

REASONS

[1]The Claimant’s employment with the Respondent ended on 7 March 2024. Following a period of early conciliation between 16 August and 2 September 2024, he presented an ET1 claim form to the Tribunal on 31 December 2024. The Claimant indicated on the ET1 form that he sought to bring claims for race and disability discrimination, whistleblowing and ‘other payments’. In the ‘details of claim’ section, the Claimant wrote: “I know my claim is out of date but I hope someone will speak to me and hear some of the stories before deciding if ACAS can belatedly look into what happened to me there”.

[2]On 18 March 2025, the Respondent submitted a written application to the Tribunal arguing that the Claimant’s claims should be struck out on jurisdictional grounds because they had been presented out of time.

[3]At a preliminary hearing on 27 May 2025, Employment Judge Palmer discussed the Claimant’s claim with him and established that he sought to complain about disability discrimination, race discrimination and protected disclosure detriments. The Employment Judge listed an open preliminary hearing (i.e., today’s hearing) to determine the following issues: 3.1. Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, the entirety of the Claimant’s claim may not have been brought in time. 3.2. Were the discrimination complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide: 3.2.1. The Claimant accepts that the claim was not made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates. 3.2.2. Were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinksb is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide: 3.2.2.1. Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time? 3.2.2.2. In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time? 3.3. Was the complaint in respect of protected disclosures (whistleblowing) made within the time limit in section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide: 3.3.1. The Claimant accepts that the claim was not made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act complained of. 3.3.2. Was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit? 3.3.3. If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period?

[4]Employment Judge Palmer directed the Claimant to send a witness statement to the Respondent by 8 July 2025 containing anything relevant he could tell the Tribunal about the issue of time limitation, including: 4.1. The reason why the claim was not presented to the Tribunal within the time limits; 4.2. The steps the Claimant took between the dates of the act(s) he is complaining about and the date he presented his claim to investigate the steps he needed to take to bring a claim and/or to seek advice; 4.3. Any other information he wishes to rely on in support of his request for an extension of time.

[5]The Claimant was directed to send any evidential documents relevant to these issues to the Respondent by the same date.

[6]On 16 July 2025, the Claimant sent a series of emails to the Respondent, including one titled ‘Updated complaint details’ which set out a narrative of things the Claimant alleged happened to him during his employment, and several emails forwarding or attaching correspondence and other documents relating to his employment. It does not appear that any of the information or evidence the Claimant sent on 16 July 2025 related to the period following the termination of his employment or the reasons for the time it took him to notify ACAS and then to submit his ET1.

[7]The Claimant did not send a witness statement as directed and has not been in contact with the Respondent or the Tribunal since 16 July 2025.

The hearing

[8]The hearing was scheduled to start at 10am. The Respondent’s solicitor attended the Tribunal building but the Claimant did not. At 10.10am the Tribunal clerk twice attempted to call the Claimant, but his phone was switched off. The Tribunal clerk also emailed the Claimant and asked him to get in touch urgently but did not receive a reply. I waited until 10.30am in case the Claimant had problems travelling in and was running late, but he did not arrive.

[9]At 10.30am I opened the hearing and asked Mr Choudhry for the Respondent’s position. He invited me to proceed with the hearing in the Claimant’s absence on the basis that if it later emerged that the Claimant had a good reason for non-attendance, he could apply for reconsideration of the outcome of the hearing.

[10]Rule 47 of the Employment Tribunal Rules 20241 provides that: If a party fails to attend or to be represented at a hearing, the Tribunal may dismiss the claim or proceed with the hearing in the absence of that party. Before doing so, it must consider any information which is available to it, after any enquiries that may be practicable, about the reasons for the party's absence.

[11]Having made all practicable enquiries, I did not have any information available to me about the reasons for the Claimant’s absence. I considered whether to adjourn the hearing, dismiss the claim, or proceed to hold the hearing without the Claimant. I concluded that the fairest course of action would be to proceed in the Claimant’s absence. Simply dismissing the claim for non-attendance was unnecessarily draconian. However, I considered that it would be unfairly prejudicial to the Respondent to adjourn the hearing because it had been awaiting determination of its strike-out application since 18 March 2025 and the Claimant had not provided any evidence relating to time limitation nor given any reason for his non-attendance. Any unfairness to the Claimant caused proceeding in his absence could be mitigated, as the Respondent submitted, by considering a reconsideration application from him if it should later transpire that there was a good reason why he could not attend.

[12]I therefore heard Mr Choudhry’s submissions on strike out on behalf of the Respondent and gave a short oral judgment with written reasons to follow. This document sets out those reasons. 1 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2024/1155/made The Respondent’s submissions

[13]Mr Choudhry relied on the Respondent's written application, which read (in relevant part): ‘The Respondent contends that at the point in which the Claimant contacted ACAS to bring a claim, he was already outside of the statutory time limit to pursue an Employment Tribunal Claim. The Respondent contends that the Claimant’s claim does not contain allegations of a continuing nature that would allow such claim to be considered as being in time. Therefore, the Respondent contends that the Claimant’s claim is out of time and that the Tribunal does not hold jurisdiction to hear the same.’

[14]Mr Choudhry made some further points orally. He submitted that the Claimant had not given any explanation for the length or reasons for the delay in presenting his claim. Although the Respondent conceded that the Claimant was disabled by reason of anxiety during his employment, there was no clarity as to whether his anxiety had affected his ability to submit his claim and no medical evidence to that effect. From the Respondent’s perspective, it had identified two witnesses with relevant evidence to give about the allegations the Claimant had raised, and their ability to recollect the events in question had been impacted by the delay. The Claimant must have had some awareness of his rights by 16 August 2024 when he made the ACAS notification but did not act with promptness thereafter. Employment Judge Palmer had explained clearly to the Claimant what he needed to do and show to justify an extension of time, but the Claimant had not complied with her orders or attended the Tribunal. In his absence, it was difficult to decipher whether the series of emails sent on 16 July 2025 could have any bearing on the issue of time limitation. Relevant law Whistleblowing time limit

Relevant law

[15]Section 48 Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’) provides the right to present a complaint to the Employment Tribunal about being subjected to an unlawful detriment and further provides (as relevant): (3) An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented—(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates or, where that act or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures , the last of them, or

(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months. … (4A) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsection (3)(a).

[16]The onus is upon the Claimant to show why he did not present the complaint on time: Porter v Bandridge Ltd

[1978] ICR 943

, 948.

[17]The Court of Appeal in Palmer v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council

[1984] ICR 372

at [34] held that to construe the words ‘reasonably practicable’ as the equivalent of ‘reasonable’ would be to take a view too favourable to the employee; but to limit their construction to that which is reasonably capable, physically, of being done would be too restrictive. The best approach is to read ‘practicable’ as the equivalent of ‘feasible’ and to ask: ‘was it reasonably feasible to present the complaint to the Industrial Tribunal within the relevant three months?’

[18]In Walls Meat Co Ltd v Khan

[1979] ICR 52

at p.56, Denning LJ held that the following general test should be applied in determining the question of reasonable practicability: ‘Had the man just cause or excuse for not presenting his complaint within the prescribed time limit? Ignorance of his rights – or ignorance of the time limit – is not just cause or excuse, unless it appears that he or his advisers could not reasonably have been expected to have been aware of them. If he or his advisers could reasonably have been so expected, it was his or their fault, and he must take the consequences.’

[19]Where a Claimant is suffering from an illness, particularly toward the end of the limitation period, the Tribunal is entitled to find that it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be brought in time (Norbert Dentressangle Logistics Ltd v Hutton EATS0011/13 and Schultz v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd

[1999] ICR 1202

[20]If the Tribunal concludes that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time, it will go on to consider whether the claim was brought in a reasonable further period. In Nolan v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services

EAT/0109/11

, the EAT held at [30] that this requires the Tribunal to bear in mind “the general principle that litigation should be progressed efficiently and without delay”, and also to consider the circumstances of the particular case, including: “what the claimant did and what he knew about time limits, what he, reasonably, ought to have known about them, and … why it was that the further delay occurred”. Discrimination time limit

[21]Section123(1)(a) Equality Act 2020 (‘EqA’) provides that a claim of discrimination must be brought within three months, starting with the date of the act (or omission) to which the complaint relates. The time limit is extended for the period of early conciliation (s.140B(3) EqA).

[22]The Tribunal may extend the three-month limitation period for discrimination claims under s.123(1)(b) EqA, where it considers it just and equitable to do so. That is a very broad discretion. In exercising that discretion, the Tribunal should have regard to all the relevant circumstances, which will usually include: the reason for the delay; whether the Claimant was aware of his rights to claim and/or of the time limits; whether he acted promptly when he became aware of his rights; the conduct of the employer; the length of the extension sought; the extent to which the cogency of the evidence has been affected by the delay; and the balance of prejudice (Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan

[2018] ICR 1194

[23]There is no principle of law which dictates how generously or sparingly the power to enlarge time is to be exercised. There are statutory time limits, which will shut out an otherwise valid claim unless the Claimant can displace them. Whether a Claimant has succeeded in doing so in any one case is not a question of either policy or law; it is a question of fact and judgment, to be answered case by case by the Tribunal of first instance which is empowered to answer it (Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston

[2010] IRLR 327

per Sedley LJ at [31-32]).

[24]Failure to provide a good excuse for the delay in bringing the relevant claim will not inevitably result in an extension of time being refused (Morgan at [25]). There is no requirement for exceptional circumstances to justify an extension (Pathan v South London Islamic Centre,

UKEAT/0312/13/DM

at [17]).

[25]In the context of discrimination cases, the importance of recalling not only what is done but the thought processes involved make it all the more difficult, and more likely that memory fade will have an impact on the cogency of the evidence (Redhead v London Borough of Hounslow

UKEAT/0086/13/LA

per Simler J at [70]). Application of the law to the facts

[26]I note from Employment Judge Palmer’s case management order that the Claimant accepted his ET1 had been submitted after the primary time limit had elapsed. The issues I must determine solely relate to extension of time.

[27]In relation to his protected disclosure detriment claim, the onus is on the Claimant to show that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim within the primary time limit. Given that the Claimant’s employment ended on 7 March 2024, and he does not make any allegation of post-termination detriment, this would have required him to notify ACAS by 6 June 2024. Instead, it took until 16 August 2024, a period of over 5 months, and over 2 months in excess of the primary limitation date. It is apparent that the Claimant suffered and continues to suffer from anxiety. However, without an explanation from the Claimant or any relevant documentary evidence, I cannot conclude that his anxiety affected him in early-to-mid-2024 to an extent that meant it was not reasonably feasible to contact ACAS at that time. The Claimant has not provided any other explanation for the delay that I could consider.

[28]Even if there were a good reason as to why it was not reasonably practicable for the Claimant to present his claim within the primary limitation period, I would still need to go on to consider whether his claim was presented within a reasonable further period thereafter. It is reasonable to infer that from the period of ACAS conciliation the Claimant would have been aware of the concept of time limitation and the need to act promptly. However, it took almost a further 4 months from the end of the early conciliation period for the Claimant to present his ET1 on 31 December 2024. Absent any explanation or evidence from the Claimant as to what was happening during this period, I could not conclude that this was reasonable.

[29]There is therefore no basis to extend time in relation to the Claimant’s protected disclosure detriment claim and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear this claim.

[30]In relation to the Claimant’s complaints of disability and race discrimination the test for extension of time is whether it would be just and equitable to make an exception to the ordinary limitation period. That is broader than the ‘reasonably practicable’ test, and it would be possible to extend time in relation to the Claimant’s discrimination complaints even where there is no basis to extend time on the whistleblowing detriment complaint. The absence of a good explanation for the delay is a relevant factor but does not automatically exclude the possibility of an extension (Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan at [25]).

[31]The factors I have taken into account are as follow: 31.1. The period of delay is considerable; altogether it took the Claimant almost nine months to present his ET1 claim form in comparison with the usual three-month limitation period. 31.2. I accept that the delay will have some impact on the Respondent’s witnesses’ ability to recall relevant events, especially given that the allegations in the Claimant’s claims largely relate to verbal conversations he had with managers. 31.3. The Claimant has not explained the reasons for the delay. It may be the case that the Claimant’s anxiety affected his ability to comply with time limits, but I do not know whether there was such an impact and if so to what extent the Claimant was affected. 31.4. I infer that from at least the time when he engaged in ACAS conciliation, the Claimant was aware of the time limit or that he could reasonably have found out about it. It does not appear that he acted promptly after this point.

[32]Overall, in the circumstances of this case I conclude that it would not be just and equitable to displace the usual three-month limitation period. The Tribunal therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider the Claimant’s discrimination complaints. Reconsideration

[33]The Claimant has the right to apply for reconsideration of this judgment in accordance with rules 68-70 of the Employment Tribunal Rules.2 The deadline for making a reconsideration application is 14 days from the date this judgment is sent to the parties (see the date at the foot of this document below).

[34]If the Claimant wish to apply for reconsideration, his application should include or enclose: 34.1. An explanation for his non-attendance at the 15 August 2025 hearing, and any evidence (such as a medical letter) to support that explanation. 34.2. A witness statement and documents as directed by Employment Judge Palmer at paragraphs 4 to 9 of her case management order that was sent to the parties on 5 June 2025.