Employment Judge S JenkinsIn person for claimantMr A Richardson (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 19 August 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant was not an employee of the Respondent within the meaning of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[2]The Claimant was not an employee of the Respondent within the meaning of section 83 of the Equality Act 2010.[3]The Claimant was not a worker of the Respondent within the meaning of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[4]The Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction to consider the Claimant’s claims and they are dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The Claimant has brought several complaints against the Respondent; unfair dismissal by reason of having made a protected disclosure, detriment on the ground of having made a protected disclosure, wrongful dismissal; discrimination arising from disability; failure to make reasonable adjustments; direct sex discrimination; harassment related to sex; victimisation; and unauthorised deductions from wages. All the complaints require the Claimant to have been an "employee" or “in employment”, whether for the purposes of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) or section 83 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”), or a "worker" for the purposes of section 230 or section 43K ERA.[2]The Claimant contends that she was either or both an employee or a worker, and can therefore pursue her complaints. The Respondent contends that the Claimant was neither an employee nor a worker, but rather was a volunteer political candidate, and the complaint is about political party membership, which is a private law matter.[3]At an earlier preliminary hearing, before Employment
Judge Ryan on 27 March 2025, he directed that a preliminary hearing should take place to consider:
[1]Was the Claimant, an employee of the Respondent, i.e. were they employed under a contract of employment?[2]Was the Claimant a worker of the Respondent, i.e. i. Did they work under a contract to perform work personally; and ii. Was the Respondent something other than a client or customer of the Claimant's professional business?[3]If the Claimant was not a worker of the Respondent, in relation to the protected disclosure complaint only, was the Claimant a worker under the expanded definition in section 43K Employment Rights Act 1996?[4]Should the claim or any part of it be struck out because it has no reasonable prospect of success?[5]Does the claim or any part of it have little reasonable prospect of success? If so, should the Claimant be ordered to pay a deposit of between 1 pound and £1000 as a condition of continuing with it, or separate deposits in respect of certain claims?[6]Subject to the above, general case management. 4. Judge Ryan issued directions relating to the disclosure of documents, finalisation of a preliminary hearing bundle, and witness statements. Issues arose in relation to the bundle which Judge Ryan directed should be limited to 250 pages. Ultimately, I had two bundles, one described as a core bundle spanning 215 pages, and one described as an updated reduced bundle spanning 482 pages, although there was some duplication between the two. 5. I heard evidence only from the Claimant, via a written witness statement and answers to questions from the Respondent's representative and me. I also took into account the parties’ closing submissions. 6. There was insufficient time for me to deliver my judgment orally, and therefore this reserved judgment was produced.
Law
[7]The statutory definitions relevant to the issue of employment status are found in Section 230 ERA and in Section 83 EqA, and these provide as follows 230.— Employees, workers etc.(1) In this Act “employee” means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment.(2) In this Act “contract of employment” means a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing.(3) In this Act “worker”…means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) – (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another other party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual. 83 Interpretation and exceptions (1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part. (2) “Employment” means— (a) employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work;[8]In all cases, there is a fundamental requirement that there must be, or must have been, a contract between the relevant parties.[9]A considerable amount of case law surrounding employment status has developed over the years, up to and including consideration of the issue by the Supreme Court in the cases of Pimlico Plumbers Limited and another -v- Smith [2018] UK SC29, and Uber BV and others -v- Aslam and others [2021] UKSC 5. The foundation of the case law on employment status remains however, the case of Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Limited -v- The Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2QB497. MacKenna J in that case noted that a contract of service exists if three conditions are fulfilled, namely; personal service, control, and that the other provisions of the contract are consistent with it being a contract of service.[10]In Nethermere (St Neots) Limited -v- Gardiner [1984] ICR 612, Stephenson LJ noted that, in his judgement, there must be an “irreducible minimum of obligation on each side to create a contract of service”. He further noted that he doubted that that irreducible minimum could be reduced lower than MacKenna J’s essential conditions in Ready Mixed Concrete.[11]Therefore, in order for there to be considered to be a contract of employment between two particular parties, there needs to be an “irreducible minimum” in relation to three core matters: personal service, control, and mutuality of obligation. In addition, the other factors present within the relationship should be consistent with there being a contract of employment.[12]As can be seen from the specific statutory definition, the concept of personal service is also significant for the purposes of the definition of “employment” under Section 83 EqA, which refers to “a contract personally to do work”.[13]The assessment of personal service often revolves around the question of whether the individual has the right to substitute another person to do the specified work.[14]Control can take many forms, for example; practical and legal, direct and indirect. It is not necessary for the work to be carried out under the employer’s actual supervision or control. Control is a matter of degree, it is rarely a question of whether there is any control at all, but more often a question of whether there is sufficient control, as noted by MacKenna J in Ready Mixed Concrete, to make the relationship one of employer and employee.[15]With regard to mutuality of obligation, there must be a basis of mutuality between contracting parties as part of general contract law. However, as noted by the Court of Appeal in Nethermere, there must be an “irreducible minimum” of obligation on each side. That is usually expressed as an obligation on the employer to provide work and pay a wage or salary, and a corresponding obligation on the employee to accept and perform the work offered.[16]As I have noted, the definition of employment under the EqA includes employment under a contract of employment, i.e. employment under the ERA, but also confirms that it arises under a contract of apprenticeship (which has no bearing on this case), and also a contract personally to do work.[17]That reference to personally doing work bears some similarity to the extended definition of worker in Section 230(3) ERA which refers to “any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual”.[18]The Court of Appeal made clear, in Nursing and Midwifery Council -v- Somerville [2022] IRLR 447, that there was no need, and no purpose served, in seeking to introduce the concept of an irreducible minimum of obligation in the assessment of worker status. In that case, worker status for the purposes of Regulation 2(1) of the Working Time Regulations 1998 was being assessed, but that definition is identical to that set out in Section 230(3) ERA, and, in view of the guidance provided by Lady Hale in Bates van Winkelhof -v- Clyde and Co LLP [2014] UKSC 32, also applies for the assessment of employment status under Section 83 EqA.[19]The Respondent's representative drew my attention to several cases which dealt with applications to become election candidates. One was the House of Lords decision of Watt v Ahsan [2007] UKHL 51, and another was the Employment Appeal Tribunal decision of Triesman v Ali [2002] IRLR 489.[20]Both were of only limited direct assistance to me, as they only confirmed that an application to become an election candidate for a political party involves an allegation of discrimination against members or prospective members of unincorporated associations, which does not fall within Part 5 of the Equality Act 2010, which deals with work, and which is the part of the Act over which the Employment Tribunal has jurisdiction. In this case however, the Claimant had become an election candidate, and her complaints focused on her activities as that candidate, which potentially took her beyond the circumstances of the claimants in Watt and Triesman.[21]The other authority was an Employment Tribunal decision, which therefore was not strictly binding on me, but was nevertheless persuasive. That case, Sutton v Evans (2409536/2023), had more direct relevance, as, although it related to a candidate, the claimant in that case was someone who had entered into a "candidate contract", albeit in relation to an earlier election.[22]In that case, the judge, Employment Judge Dunlop, concluded that there was, in the legal sense, no contract between the claimant and the party, taking into account the Supreme Court decision in X v Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau [2013] ICR 249, that it would be rare for volunteer agreements to be contracts even if they place obligations on both sides.[23]The Judge concluded that, even if there was a contract in existence between the parties, it was not a contract personally to do work. She noted that the activist and campaigning activities which were required by the contract did not amount to "work" in the usual sense, rather they were activities undertaken in furtherance of the aligned political aims of the party and, by implication, the candidate himself. She also noted that election candidates must be un-remunerated in order to comply with section 111 of the Representation of the People Act 1983.
Findings
[24]My findings relevant to the issues I had to determine were as follows. In the event, particularly as the Respondent had not adduced any witness evidence, the findings of fact were not materially disputed.[25]The Claimant joined Reform UK as a member of the party in March or April 2023. At all material times, she ran a small business alongside her activities for the Respondent. The Respondent is the corporate entity which operates politically as the Reform UK Party. For the purposes of these Findings, I use “Respondent” and “Party” interchangeably.[26]Some three months after joining, around June or July 2023, the Claimant applied to become a general election candidate for the Party. She was interviewed and, on 21 July 2023, was told she had made it on to the Approved Candidate List. The email from the Respondent's National Candidate Coordinator, Kirsty Walmsley, sent from the email address of "candidates@reformparty.uk", informed the Claimant that the next stage of the process was to allocate her a seat.[27]Some six weeks later, on 8 September 2023, the Claimant received another email from Ms Walmsley, again from the same email address, with the subject header of "Application Update: Fast Track – Alyn and Deeside". The email congratulated the Claimant on having successfully made her way through the initial candidate assessment process, and noted that M Walmsley was delighted to confirm that the Claimant's application had been fast tracked and that she had been allocated the position of "Constituency Spokesperson for Alyn and Deeside".[28]The email went on to note that candidates would normally be required to attend a training and assessment day before being allocated a seat, but that candidates who were fast tracked were instead offered a combined "Induction and Training session" which would equip the Claimant with "everything you need to kick start your campaign". The email also informed the Claimant that her details had been passed on to her Regional Manager who would be in touch with her to introduce themselves and to offer her support throughout her campaign. That Regional Manager at all relevant times was Caroline Jones.[29]On 13 September 2023, Ms Walmsley sent an email to “Candidates Reform UK”, inviting the Claimant, amongst others, to become a member of a WhatsApp group for her region. Recipients were told that if they did not wish to be included, they could say so.[30]The Claimant had, just prior to that, on 11 September 2023, sent an email to Ms Walmsley raising a query over the length of time the fast track process was taking. Ms Walmsley then wrote to the Claimant again on 15 September 2023, again congratulating the Claimant on being “appointed as the Spokesperson/Candidate for Alyn and Deeside”. She explained the delay, reminded the Claimant that Caroline Jones would be in touch with her shortly if she had not already done so. She concluded her email by noting that the Claimant should have received an email inviting her to a GDPR training session and providing an NDA for her to sign, which would “allow you to have access to the supporter database for your constituency to help aid you in getting your campaign up and running.”.[31]In her witness statement, the Claimant referred to spokespeople being subject to Key Performance Indicators (“KPI”s). She referred to an article from The Guardian from 15 February 2025, in which Zia Yusuf, understood then to have been the Party's Chair, stated that KPIs had been introduced to “spur on Reform’s army of canvassers”.[32]It was not clear what the specific KPIs were or when they were introduced, the article appearing several months after the Claimant’s relationship with the Respondent ended. However, the indications provided by the Claimant were that the Respondent took some steps to ensure candidates worked to develop the Party’s activities in their constituency, in terms of profile-raising activities such as mailshots and social media posts, and membership and fundraising campaigns.[33]The only document the Claimant entered into with the Respondent directly was a Non-Disclosure Agreement dated 15 September 2023. That document focused very much on data protection issues, seemingly on the basis that the Claimant was to be given access to the Respondent's database, known as "Nationbuilder", for the purposes of her campaign.[34]On 8 November 2023, Ms Walmsley, again from the email address of candidates@reformparty.uk, wrote to a generic group of "Candidates Reform UK", which included the Claimant, inviting them to the Respondent's first "Candidate Graduation Event" on 23 November 2023. The email noted that whilst attendance was not mandatory, it was expected. It went on to say that attendance at the event would qualify the attendee to “transition from being a Spokesperson, to a Prospective Parliamentary Candidate”.[35]The only other documents governing the relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent were the Party's Constitution and its Branch Rules. The former related to membership of the Reform UK party, its organisation, and its Board. It contained a section dealing with party discipline, which noted that a disciplinary panel could be formed to deal with matters of discipline and appeal, which would be conducted with proper regard for the rules of natural justice. The Constitution also dealt with the approval of election candidates.[36]The latter document dealt with the formation and regulation of Party branches, including the appointment of Branch Officers of Chair, Deputy Chair, Campaign Manager, Treasurer and Secretary. The document again included a section relating to candidates, noting that, once the election count for a given election was complete, any unsuccessful candidate who was standing for election was no longer a candidate. The document also included a disciplinary procedure, but that was stated to apply exclusively to elected Branch Officers.[37]In her role as Spokesperson, and then as Candidate, the Claimant participated in a number of activities. She attended, and spoke, at a Welsh Spring Conference in February 2024, where she was described as being a "Welsh Candidate". In the lead up to the general election in July 2024, she also attended weekly candidates’ meetings, held via Zoom on Friday evenings.[38]The Claimant also undertook a range of campaigning activities, including attending hustings, both in her own constituency as candidate, and in neighbouring constituencies in order to support other candidates, particularly where they were not as experienced as the Claimant. In relation to many of those she liaised with the Respondent’s Regional Organiser for Wales, Caroline Jones. In an email she sent to the Claimant on 2 November 2023, in which she introduced herself as the Respondent's Regional Manager for Wales, Ms Jones noted that she was a “volunteer (unpaid) and put as much time as is possible for the party".[39]The general election took place on 4 July 2024 and the Claimant was not elected. Notwithstanding the wording of the Branch Rules, the Claimant appeared to have continued as a member, campaigner and spokesperson, attending several events over the summer of 2024.[40]By September 2024 however, issues had come to a head, on which I did not hear detailed evidence, which led to a complaint or grievance being brought by the Claimant against the Party, and to disciplinary action being taken against the Claimant by the Respondent, and the ultimate termination of the Claimant's Party membership.
Conclusions
[41]Taking into account my findings of fact and the applicable legal principles, my conclusions in relation to the issues I had to determine were as follows. Contract[42]In order for the Claimant to qualify as an employee under the ERA, she was required to have entered into, or to have worked under, a contract of employment. The same requirements arose in respect of the assessment of whether the Claimant was employed for the purposes of the EqA, but those provisions are expanded to include circumstances where the Claimant had worked under a contract personally to do work. In order to qualify as a worker, the Claimant again had to have worked under a contract of employment or another contract whereby she undertook to do or perform personally any work or services for the Respondent. In all cases, work by the Claimant under a contract with the Respondent was a prerequisite.[43]In this case, no written contract existed, and nor did I consider that any of the written documents, contended by the Claimant to form part of an overarching contract, involved any form of contract between the parties. The NonDisclosure Agreement simply focused on the Claimant, as a general election candidate, keeping information, largely relating to party membership, confidential and processed in accordance with data protection requirements. The Party Constitution and the Branch Rules simply dealt with membership of the party and, in the case of the latter document, appointment as an officer of a Party Branch, such as Chair, Treasurer or Secretary.[44]In the absence of any materially relevant documentation, my focus therefore, was on the practical arrangements between the Claimant and the Respondent, and the activities the former undertook for the latter.[45]In that regard, it was clear that the Claimant undertook a range of activities, in terms of increasing party membership, raising funds for the Party, and expanding its profile, between March/April 2023 and September 2024. Those were activities undertaken, initially as a member of the party and then as a spokesperson for the constituency of Alyn and Deeside, and then as the Party's general election candidate for that constituency. In that regard, the role of “Spokesperson” appeared always to have been intended to transition into “Parliamentary Candidate”. Indeed, the National Candidate Coordinator’s email of 15 September 2023 referred to the Claimant having been appointed as the “Spokesperson/Candidate for Alyn and Deeside”.[46]The activities continued after the general election in July 2024. Whilst they obviously did not include campaigning for a specific election, the activities undertaken appeared to be very much of a piece with those undertaken before, and were either to be viewed as a return to activities as a member, or as activities undertaken with a view to again becoming a candidate for the party, whether at a forthcoming Senedd election or a forthcoming Westminster Parliament election.[47]No indication of any payment to the Claimant in respect of her activities was ever provided. Indeed, the terms of section 111 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, would appear to have prevented any payment to the Claimant in respect of election campaign canvassing in any event.[48]Whilst there appeared to have been some targets set for the Claimant as a spokesperson and candidate, the particular detail of them was not before me, and it did not appear to me that those targets or KPIs amounted to anything more than an attempt by the Respondent to impose a greater structure on its activities. Indeed, the Claimant, in her witness statement, referenced the KPIs as ensuring that spokespeople controlled volunteers in their area rather than that the spokespeople were themselves controlled. In any event, there was no indication in any of the documentation I was referred to regarding the policing of any targets or KPIs, or the imposition of any sanction for a failure to comply with them.[49]Ultimately, I did not consider that there had ever been any intention to create legal relations between the two parties. Had there been such an intention, then I would have anticipated that at least a bare framework of an agreement between the parties as to core matters such as activities, hours, location, and payment, would have been put in place. No such document was ever put in place, but nor did there appear ever to have been any discussion between the parties about those matters.[50]I also noted that the communications between the Claimant and the Respondent’s other representatives related to her status, first as spokesperson, which, as I have noted, appeared to be a precursor to becoming a candidate, and then as candidate. Within those communications there were references to "your campaign".[51]Even after the election, in exchanges with Caroline Jones, she referred to being pleased that "so many of you have continued as the point of contact in your constituencies and for continued grassroots campaigning.".[52]In my view therefore, the Claimant's case failed due to there not being any form of contract between the two parties. However, even if I had considered that there had been some form of contract between the parties, I would not have concluded that it was a contract of employment. Contract of employment[53]As the appellate authorities have made very clear, in order for there to be a contract of employment between two particular parties there must be an irreducible minimum in relation to the core matters of personal service, control, and mutuality of obligation. Mutuality of obligation[54]With regard to the last of those, whilst there appeared to be a form of expectation that spokespeople and candidates would undertake activities to advance the cause of the Respondent as a political party, that did not, in my view, ever reach the stage of the Respondent being under any obligation to provide duties, i.e. work, to the Claimant or, in relation to any such duties, any obligation on the Claimant to undertake them.[55]There clearly was an expectation that the Claimant would undertake a reasonable amount of development and campaigning activity, as the Respondent was looking for her to become a member of Parliament, but that activity was, in my view, more a matter of collaboration towards a mutually beneficial outcome than an obligation to provide and undertake work. Control[56]I would similarly not have been satisfied that there was any particular degree of control over the Claimant's activities by the Respondent. She undertook a limited amount of training, and took part in party activities in her constituency and beyond, but those were not materially directed by the Respondent, and nor were they controlled by the Respondent in the form of sanctions for not undertaking them.[57]For example, the email of 13 September 2023, in which the Claimant, amongst others, was invited to become a member of a WhatsApp group for the region, did not require participation; the Claimant, along with other spokespeople, were told that if they did not wish to be included, then they could say so. Also, the invitation to the Candidate Graduation Event in 2023 indicated that whilst attendance was expected, it was not mandatory.[58]I also noted that Caroline Jones, in her email to the Claimant of 2 November 2023, in which she introduced herself as the Respondent's Regional Manager for Wales, noted that she was a “volunteer (unpaid) and put as much time as is possible for the party". That did not strike me as someone who was intended to have a controlling or directive role with regard to the Claimant’s activities.[59]The Claimant, in her witness statement, although it was in a section which read more as making submissions than providing evidence, queried why disciplinary action was taken to remove her as a party member rather than summary removal. However, the Party’s constitution contained provisions relating to the disciplining and sanctioning of members, and I did not see that utilising those provisions involved any evidence of control of the Claimant other than as a member of the party. Personal service[60]Finally, with regard to personal service, most of the appellate authorities relating to personal service revolve around the ability or otherwise to introduce a substitute, which was not a particular factor in this case.[61]More generally, whilst it appeared to me that it was always anticipated that the Claimant would undertake a large number of activities herself, there did not seem to be any requirement that she undertake any specific activities herself, other than any relating to her role as a candidate in her specific constituency. Equality Act employment and worker status[62]Turning to the application of section 83 EqA, my conclusions above relating to personal service would, had I considered that a contract existed between the parties, have meant that I would not have concluded that any such a contract would have involved the Claimant being employed under a contract personally to do any work.[63]The same assessment would then have arisen in relation to the question of worker status under section 230(3) ERA, on the basis that my conclusions on personal service would have meant that it could not have been said that the Claimant undertook to do or perform personally any work or services for the Respondent.[64]The extended definition of worker set out in section 43K ERA did not have any bearing on the Claimant’s status. In her witness statement she referred to section 43K(1)(a)(ii) and the substantial determination of the terms of engagement, but did not provide any evidence as to how her terms of engagement were substantially determined. In addition, she overlooked that sub-section (ii) is conjunctive with sub-section (i), such that sub-section (a) only applies where the person was introduced or supplied to do work by a third person and the terms of engagement were determined not by the individual but by the person for whom they worked, the third person, or both. There was no evidence that the Claimant was ever introduced to the Respondent by a third party, and therefore section 43K ERA had no application.[65]Overall, in my view, the activities, the Claimant undertook for the Respondent could be described in the same manner as the potential activities of Mr Sutton were described by Employment Judge Dunlop in the Sutton case, in that the activities to be undertaken by the Claimant did not amount to work in the usual sense, but rather were activities undertaken in furtherance of the aligned political aims of the Respondent and the Claimant, as a candidate, herself. Authorised for issue by
Background
[1]In the Judgment, I concluded that the Claimant had not been an employee or worker of the Respondent, under either or both of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Equality Act 2010, such that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider her claim.[2]The Claimant applied for reconsideration of the Judgment by way of a document submitted on 30 September 2025, setting out her application over eighteen pages. She also submitted eight appendices containing just short of a thousand pages. Issues and Law[3]Rule 68 provides that reconsideration of a judgment will take place where the Employment Tribunal considers that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.[4]Rule 69 provides that applications for reconsiderations of judgments should be presented in writing within 14 days of the date on which the written record of the judgment was sent to the parties, and should set out why reconsideration is necessary. In this case, the Claimant submitted her application within the stipulated time period, and I was satisfied that her explanation of why she considered reconsideration was necessary had been fully set out.[5]Rule 70(1) notes that the Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69, and Rule 70(2) notes that if the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked then the application must be refused, and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. Alternatively, rules 70(3) to (5) set out the process that is then to be followed for further consideration of the application.[6]In Outasight VB Ltd v Brown 2015 ICR D11, EAT, HHJ Eady QC (as she then was) indicated that the wording “necessary in the interests of justice” in Rule 701 allows employment tribunals a broad discretion to determine whether reconsideration of a judgment is appropriate in the circumstances. She confirmed that that discretion must be exercised judicially, “which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation”. The Application[7]The bulk of the Claimant’s reconsideration application was taken up with a point by point analysis of the 65 paragraphs of the Judgment. In relation to many paragraphs the Claimant noted her agreement or confirmation, but in relation to several paragraphs, particularly those in which I recorded my conclusions, she noted that they were disputed or refuted.[8]In addition, at the outset of her application, the Claimant had set out three specific reasons for her request: “Mental and Physical State at Tribunal”, “Limited Evidence Presentation”, and “Short Preparation Time”.
Conclusions
[9]I deal with the elements of the Claimant’s application in turn. Disputation/Refutation[10]As noted above, in Outasight, the EAT noted the public interest in the finality of litigation. The Claimant was given every opportunity to advance her case at the hearing on 11 August 2025, and it is not appropriate for a Tribunal to revisit its conclusions simply on the basis that a party disagrees with them, as that would simply give a claimant a “second bite at the cherry”. I did not therefore see any basis for reconsidering the Judgment arising from the Claimant’s understandable disagreement with my conclusions. Mental and Physical State at Tribunal[11]The Claimant noted that she had not been in a suitable physical or mental state to appear at the Tribunal. She referenced that the Respondent’s failure to comply with the Tribunal’s orders had prevented her from compiling a clear and focused argument to support her case. She also 1 Rule 70 in the previous iteration of the Rules was the same as the current Rule 68. commented that she had request postponements on multiple occasions due to undergoing treatment for a cancer scare. That was indeed the case, but it might help for me to set out some of the progress of the case by way of context.[12]The claim was issued at the end of December 2024, and the usual case management hearing, scheduled whenever a case involves complaints of discrimination or whistleblowing, was listed for 27 March 2025. At that hearing, the status point was identified, and Employment Judge Ryan directed that a preliminary hearing should take place to address that matter. He did not list that hearing, but directed that the parties should, by 11 April 2025, provide dates on which they were unavailable in the period between 23 June and 31 December 2025. A notice of hearing was then issued on 19 May 2025, listing the hearing for 1 August 2025.[13]In his Case Management Orders, Judge Ryan directed that the parties should undertake disclosure of documents for the preliminary hearing by 25 April 2025, that a bundle, containing no more than 250 pages, should be finalised by 16 May 2025, and that witness statements should be exchanged on 30 May 2025.[14]Whilst Judge Ryan had not given any direction about doing so, the Claimant submitted a four-page skeleton argument on 23 April 2025, in which she set out her position that she was an employee and worker, referring to several appellate cases.[15]A lot of correspondence ensued between the Claimant and the Respondent’s representative throughout May, June and July about disclosure, much of which was copied to the Tribunal. That led to the Respondent’s representative making an application, on 19 May 2025, supported by the Claimant, to increase the size of the bundle, and for an extension of time for the finalisation of it. It was noted that the Claimant’s documentation alone extended to approximately 1,600 pages.[16]On several occasions the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal to complain about the disclosure made by the Respondent, principally on the basis that more documents should have been disclosed and that the formatting of disclosure was difficult to follow. The Respondent’s representative consistently replied taking issue with the points raised by the Claimant.[17]On 2 June 2025, the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal asking for the bundle size to be increased to 2,000 documents (I presume she meant 2,000 pages) and for the length of the hearing to be increased beyond one day as that would not be enough for a judge to “read all the 2000 documents submitted alongside the witness statement”. I pause to observe that that was an accurate observation; it would be likely to have taken a judge some two to three days to read that volume of material.[18]The earlier application by the Respondent’s representative was refused by Employment Judge Sharp on 4 June 2025. She directed that the parties were, “reminded of the over-riding objective and the requirement to be proportionate. It is not proportionate to seek to rely on a bundle over 1600 pages in length in such circumstances. If the parties cannot co-operate to agree a bundle of no more 250 pages or make a more proportionate proposal, then they must accept that the bundle must contain the statements of case, the orders of the Tribunal and split the remaining available pages between them and select their documents likely to be of most relevance”.[19]As already noted, communication between the Claimant and the Respondent’s representative continued in June and July 2025, albeit without the bundle being fully resolved between them. The Respondent’s representative made some further disclosure of four documents on 2 June 2025, and it does not appear (although the Tribunal file may not contain all the correspondence between the parties) that any further disclosure was made after that date.[20]The first application for a postponement on medical grounds was made by the Claimant on 9 July 2025. In that, she noted that she had had one “preop”, and was due to undergo another on 11 July 2025. She noted that she would probably be in hospital for a couple of days, and, after that, would not be able to drive for 14 days or to sign legal documents for 14 days. She commented that that extended through to 6-8 August 2025, beyond the date of the hearing. I observe that the Claimant seems to have added the two 14-day periods together, whereas it would seem to be more likely that the advice related to one 14-day period and not to a 28-day period.[21]In response to the Claimant’s request, the hearing on 1 August 2024 was postponed, and a revised notice of hearing was sent to the parties on 11 July 2025, noting that the hearing would take place on 11 August 2025.[22]On 18 July 2025, the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal asking for a postponement, not in relation to her health, but in relation to what she described as the Respondent’s delays in complying with the Tribunal’s orders.[23]The Respondent was asked for its comments on the Claimant’s application, and, on 28 July 2025, its representative provided a letter taking issue with the Claimant’s assertions, together with a seven-page chronology of the parties’ communication in relation to the bundle between 23 April 2025 and 18 July 2025, noting that 39 separate communications had taken place between them, Copies of those communications were enclesed.[24]Employment Judge Brace then directed on 1 August 2025 as follows: “The Preliminary Hearing remains listed for one day on 11 August 2025 and the parties have been directed to agree a Bundle no more than 250 pages. Such a Bundle should contain only documents that are relevant and necessary for a fair disposal of the preliminary issue and should generally only include documents that are referred to in witness statements, in crossexamination or in summing up as the Tribunal will not read and will not have time to read all documents. The Claimant must work with the Respondent to achieve this. The Bundle that has been agreed should be uploaded as directed by Judge Jenkins2 and any additional documents, which only the Claimant seeks to rely on should be in a separate Bundle which the Claimant must prepare and copy to the Respondent and she will need to be aware that if she wishes to increase the size of the Bundle, an appropriate application should be made explaining why the additional documents in her additional Bundle are relevant and necessary.”[25]The Claimant then applied again for a postponement later that day, “until at least the end of August to give me adequate time to prepare the witness statement regarding the core bundle received on July 19, 2025, as well as prepare my bundle chronologically”. She also asked that she be allowed, “the extended bundle of 200 documents which will help demonstrate that I was employed/worker and not a volunteer.”[26]On 5 August 2025, the Respondent’s representative wrote resisting the Claimant’s postponement application. Prior to that however, on 4 August 2025, the Claimant had sent a further email to the Tribunal, noting: “I was surprised to receive a confirmation of the hearing date without consideration of my request for an adjournment on medical grounds. As you are aware, I am currently signed off for medical reasons following a procedure. I have provided you with all relevant medical documents and guidance from my doctor, and I have raised this matter on several occasions. I would greatly appreciate your support during this stressful time. Additionally, I received some unfortunate news this afternoon regarding my health. The results were not favourable from the investigation and procedure, and I have a follow-up appointment scheduled for August 26, 2025, to discuss the next steps, as below.” Attached was a letter confirming an outpatient appointment on 26 August 2025.[27]The Claimant wrote again on 5 August 2025, presumably in response to the Respondent’s representative’s communication of that date. In that, she repeated her application and attached a chronology of relevant events.[28]The correspondence was referred to Judge Brace who directed as follows: “Directions have already been given on the application and there is no basis for a variation of the order already given. The hearing remains listed and the C has provided no medical evidence to support her application for a postponement.”[29]The Claimant sent a further email to the Tribunal on 7 August 2025 to which was attached a document in which she again provided copies of all her hospital appointment letters. That email was sent after hours, at 17:43, and no further consideration was given to postponement of the hearing, I 2 I had previously issued a direction that that should be done by 4 August 2025. presume because of lack of judicial availability, on Friday 8 August 2025, and the hearing then went ahead on 11 August 2025. Over the weekend prior to the hearing, the Claimant submitted a witness statement spanning 63 pages.[30]Returning to the Claimant’s reconsideration application, as I have noted, the bulk of the disclosure was undertaken by the Claimant, with the Respondent’s disclosure appearing to have been completed by early June 2025. Whilst there were disputes between the parties about the make up of the bundle, such that a single bundle was never finalised, the Claimant was in possession of all material relevant to the issues to be determined comfortably in advance of the hearing. Indeed, most of the documentation was disclosed by the Claimant herself, so she would always have been in possession of it.[31]Ultimately, as I noted in the Judgment, I had two bundles of documents at the hearing. One was described as a” Core Bundle” and had been uploaded to the Tribunal’s portal by the Respondent’s representative on 19 July 2025. The other was described as an “Updated Reduced Bundle” which was uploaded by the Claimant on the morning of the hearing. Also, as I have noted, the Claimant produced a lengthy witness statement in advance of the hearing.[32]In terms of any failure by the Respondent to comply with Tribunal orders was concerned (and I make no comment either way as to whether there were any failures, as I note that he Respondent has consistently maintained that it was the Claimant who was preventing the agreement of a bundle), I did not see that the Claimant had been prevented from compiling a clear and focused argument to support her case.[33]The Claimant had produced a skeleton argument outlining her case as far back as April 2025, had been in possession of all the documentation relevant to her case for several weeks, and had been able to produce a comprehensive witness statement. If there had been failures by the Respondent to compile a bundle as directed, the Claimant had not been materially impacted by that.[34]With regard to the Claimant’s request for postponements on medical grounds, the Claimant had made requests and one postponement had been granted. As I have noted in relation to that request, the Claimant appears to have miscalculated the period of time in which she was advised not to drive or sign legal documents (which I presume she is contending was the period during which she would have had difficulty in addressing her claim), but the postponement was granted as the Claimant had herself requested.[35]The Claimant then made a further request for a postponement on 18 July 2025, but that did not reference any medical issues but returned to the Claimant’s concerns over disclosure and the bundle. It did not appear therefore, at that stage, that the Claimant’s recent periods of hospitalisation required any postponement.[36]Whilst the Claimant did then make several requests for postponement in the lead-up to the hearing, the only evidence she produced in support of those applications were appointment letters noting that she had had hospital appointments in July and was due to have an outpatient’s appointment later in August. That evidence did not satisfy the requirements of the Presidential Guidance on seeking a postponement and, whilst I was not involved in considering any of them, it seemed to me that her postponement requests were correctly refused.[37]Regardless of that, I do not consider that the Claimant was materially impacted by the refusal of her requests. She was able to put lengthy arguments forward in support of her postponement requests, and was ultimately able to produce a lengthy witness statement for the hearing. Similar to my observation about the impact of any bundle issues on her, I did not consider that the Claimant’s health, or the refusal of her postponement applications, materially affected her ability to present her case at the hearing on 11 August 2025. Limited Evidence Presentation[38]I can address this quite briefly, as many of my observations above apply equally here. The parties were, quite properly, directed to agree a limited bundle for the preliminary hearing, but nevertheless, between them, ended up adducing documentation approaching three times the initially directed quantity. As I have noted, the Claimant herself produced a bundle of 482 pages, although I was only referred to a fairly small number of those pages at the hearing on 11 August 2025.[39]I have not read the near 1,000 additional pages the Claimant submitted in relation to her reconsideration application, but I have quickly scrolled through them on screen, and there did not seem to be anything which would have materially impacted on my decision. In any event, it was the Claimant’s duty to disclose relevant material, and had she considered that there were specific documents which she considered were important, she had the opportunity to bring them to my attention at the hearing on 11 August 2025. Short Preparation Time[40]I can also address this point quite briefly, as, again, many of my observations above apply equally here. As I have observed, the Claimant appears to have converted medical advice not to undertake two types of activity over a 14-day period into a 28-day period, which I doubt was the intention. I have also observed that the Claimant’s postponement request on 18 July 2025 related to concerns over the bundle and not to concerns arising from her health.[41]Regardless of the position in July however, Judge Ryan had originally directed that statements be exchanged at the end of May 2025 and the Claimant had been in possession of all relevant material, even if it may not have been in the bundle format she would have liked, by early June. Indeed, as I have noted, the bulk of the documentation was disclosed by the Claimant and she therefore had always been in possession of it. There did not seem to have been anything which had prevented the Claimant from working on her statement before July.[42]Even after that however, as I have noted, the Claimant did produce a lengthy witness statement for the hearing. Any lack of time did not therefore ultimately impact on the Claimant’s ability to present her evidence and her case generally. Overall[43]Overall, having reviewed the Judgment in the context of the Claimant's reconsideration application, I did not consider that there was a reasonable prospect of the decision being varied or revoked, and I therefore refused the application. Authorised for issue by