Miss A Hussain v Chief Constable of Hampshire and Isle of Wight: 6023045/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6023045/2024

Between

Miss A HussainClaimant

Chief Constable of Hampshire & Isle of WightRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Cuthbert

Date 30 June 2025

JUDGMENT

ON RECONSIDERATION The judgment of the Tribunal is that the claimant’s application for reconsideration is refused because there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked.

REASONS

[1]Under Rule 68 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (“the Rules”) a Tribunal may reconsider a judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the judgment may be confirmed, varied or revoked.

[2]The “interests of justice” provide a Tribunal with a broad discretion to determine whether reconsideration is appropriate in the circumstances. The discretion must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration but also the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation. It is unusual for a litigant to be given a "second bite at the cherry" and the jurisdiction to reconsider should be exercised by employment tribunals with caution (see Outasight VB Ltd v Brown

UKEAT/0253/14

& Ebury Partners Ltd v Acton Davis

[2023] EAT 40

[3]The procedure following a reconsideration application is for the Employment Judge who heard the case to review the application and determine if there are any reasonable prospects of the judgment being varied or revoked (Rule 70(2)). Reconsideration cannot be ordered simply because the applicant party disagrees with the judgment.

[4]If the Judge considers that there is no such reasonable prospect then the application shall be refused. Otherwise, the Judge shall send a notice to the Page 1 of 5 parties setting a time limit for any response to the application by the other party and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing (Rule 70).

[5]My role therefore, upon the considering the claimant’s application based upon the papers initially, is to operate as a filter to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of my decision being varied or revoked were the application to be further considered at a reconsideration hearing. Process

[6]I heard the claimant’s claim for interim relief at an in-person, public interim relief hearing on 28 February 2025. I gave an oral judgment and dismissed her claim for interim relief (the claims to proceed to a final hearing to be decided). A written judgment was sent out to the parties on 13 March 2025. Written reasons were not requested at any stage by either party.

[7]By way of an email dated 7 March 2025, the claimant sent a four-page letter to the Tribunal seeking to “appeal” my decision on interim relief.

[8]For reasons which are unclear to me from the Tribunal file, but which I suspect are due to a general administrative backlog and limited Tribunal resources, the letter from the claimant was seemingly not considered by a judge until around early June 2025, when it was decided by a judge to treat the letter as a reconsideration application by the claimant (letter from Tribunal to claimant dated 5 June 2025).

[9]The reconsideration application was then, in error, regrettably referred to a judge other than myself, resulting in further delay, who then in turn directed it to me.

[10]I have now considered the reconsideration application as below. Interim Relief decision – 28 February 2025

[11]At the interim relief hearing, the claimant represented herself and the respondent was represented by counsel. I was provided with over 200 pages of documents, a witness statement from the claimant, a witness statement from the senior officer who dismissed the claimant, a 17-page skeleton argument on behalf of the claimant (drafted by counsel) and a four-page skeleton argument on behalf of the respondent. Both parties also made oral submissions.

[12]In summary (and in the absence of written reasons having been requested), the basis of the interim relief application and my conclusions in respect of it were as follows: 12.1. The application arose from the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal which she alleged had been on the ground of having made various protected disclosures. She had been a probationary police constable and made complaints during her service, primarily of race discrimination. 12.2. The respondent denied that she had made protected disclosures and contended that its reason for dismissing the claimant was unconnected with any complaints she had made. Rather, it said she was dismissed because Page 2 of 5 her attendance was unsatisfactory due to high and prolonged levels of sickness absence. 12.3. My task at the interim relief hearing was to make a broad summary assessment on the material available, doing the best I could with the untested evidence from both parties, to enable me to make a prediction about what was likely to happen at the eventual hearing before a full Tribunal. In particular had the claimant demonstrated (the burden being upon her) that there was a pretty good chance that her complaint of automatic unfair dismissal would be successful? 12.4. I decided that it was likely that the claimant would be found to have made some protected disclosures – she had a pretty good chance of establishing this aspect of her claim at the final hearing. 12.5. I concluded, however, on the issue of causation, that the claimant had not established, that she had a pretty good chance at the final hearing of showing that the alleged disclosures were the principal reason for her dismissal. In particular: 12.5.1. The issue of the reason for the claimant’s dismissal was strongly contested. There were detailed and multiple arguments which would be advanced by both sides (which I summarised in my oral decision in more detail). The claimant claimed that the issue of her attendance levels was a pretext and alleged that the real reason was the alleged disclosures she made; the respondent said in response that it had long-standing concerns about the claimant’s attendance, that the levels of absence were very high and that was the reason why the claimant was dismissed. 12.5.2. I concluded that each side’s arguments on causation had potential weight on the face of it, and the underlying documentary evidence (of which I had only seen a small amount for the purposes of the interim relief application) and the evidence of the relevant witnesses would need to be examined and tested at a full hearing. There was a lengthy chronology of events and the extent to which the claimant’s sickness absence was or was not the reason for her ultimate dismissal was vigorously contested. The degree of knowledge, on the part of the senior officer who dismissed the claimant, of the claimant’s alleged disclosures was also seemingly contested. What was in the mind of that officer when she decided to dismiss the claimant was a key issue in dispute and one which would need to be explored and tested during oral evidence. 12.6. The claimant had therefore not established that it was “likely” that she would succeed at the final hearing in her claim for automatic unfair dismissal. Her application for interim relief therefore failed and was refused. The claimant’s application for reconsideration Page 3 of 5

[13]The claimant said as follows in her four-page letter to the Tribunal dated 7 March 2025 (in summary): 13.1. She alleged (page 1 of the letter) that the respondent had not followed its procedures in various respects and that this was evidence that the real reason for her dismissal was the disclosures she had made. I observe in response that a failure to follow procedure does not necessarily or automatically lead to a conclusion that the employer must have had an ulterior motive for acting as alleged. 13.2. She refers to various detailed aspects of the evidence (her interpretation of it) which she considers support her claim (pages 2 - 3 of her letter). This part of the letter reads in places like a further witness statement. Such is the level of detail, it is difficult to fully understand the significance (or otherwise) of the points in the context of the summary assessment of the case which I undertook, as was required for the interim relief application. Such factual matters simply reinforce the view I took at the interim relief hearing that the evidence as to the reason for the claimant’s dismissal is likely to be factually complex and will need to be tested during the final hearing. 13.3. Finally, she goes into some detail on the issue of the respondent disputing whether she had made protected disclosures (pages 3 – 4 of the letter). However, as noted earlier, in the outcome of the interim relief application, I concluded in her favour in that it was likely that she would be found to have made some protected disclosures. It was the issue of causation where her application fell down. These points are therefore irrelevant to the reconsideration application. Conclusion on the claimant’s application

[14]I have considered the claimant’s application with reference to what occurred at the previous hearing, the outcome of that hearing, and against the legal position on reconsideration, summarised at the start of these reasons.

[15]I have concluded that the application in part seeks, impermissibly, to re-open matters on which both sides had the opportunity to make submissions at the original hearing. Achieving finality in litigation is part of a fair and just process and that includes finality in respect of interim relief applications.

[16]In any event, none of the matters raised by the claimant would be likely to cause me to change or vary my previous decision on causation and the principal reason for her dismissal, in the context of relevant the “likely/pretty good chance” test for interim relief. More specifically, the claimant’s letter/reconsideration application simply reinforces my view that the causation issue is likely to be firmly disputed, in some detail, between the parties at that final hearing. This is a long way short of the claimant establishing, at interim relief stage, as she needed to do, that she was likely to succeed on causation Page 4 of 5 at the final hearing, She may succeed, she may not, but that was not sufficient for me to grant interim relief in her favour.

[17]It is therefore not necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider my earlier decision on interim relief. There is no reasonable prospect of the original judgment being varied or revoked in the circumstances. So, the claimant’s application for reconsideration is refused under Rule 70(2).