Mr L Brookes v Executive Telecommunications (UK) Ltd (in creditors voluntary liquidation) and Others: 6022493/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6022493/2024
Between
Mr L BrookesClaimantExecutive Telecommunications (UK) Ltd (in creditors voluntary liquidation) and OthersRespondent
Before
Employment Judge AndersonIn person for claimantMr Grundy (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 19 May 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]It was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to submit his complaints of unfair dismissal, notice pay, holiday pay and wages against the First Respondent within the primary time limit. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider these complaints and they are dismissed.[2]The complaints of disability discrimination were submitted out of time against the First Respondent and the Third and Fourth Respondents and it is not just and equitable to extend time. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider these complaints and they are dismissed.[3]If the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to consider the complaints of disability discrimination against the Third and Fourth Respondents, then these claims would have been struck out under Rule 38(1)(a) and 38(1)(b) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.[4]The application to join a Fifth Respondent is refused.[5]In respect of the claims for a statutory redundancy payment:a. The claim of failure to pay a statutory redundancy payment as provided for in s.164 Employment Rights Act 1996 shall proceed to a full hearing against the First Respondent.b. The claim for failure to pay a redundancy payment as provided for in s.188 Employment Rights Act 1996 shall proceed to a full hearing against the Second Respondent. The Tribunal declines to determine at this stage whether the claim against the Secretary of State has been brought within the primary time limit.c. A hearing to consider the claims for a redundancy payment will be listed as an attended hearing at Manchester Employment Tribunal before an Employment Judge sitting alone with a time estimate of one day. In respect of this hearing, I order that the remaining parties must: i. Produce a single bundle of relevant documents for use at that hearing no later than 30 days prior to the hearing having already disclosed any documents in their possession or control that are relevant to the issues to be determined. ii. Exchange any witness statements no later than 14 days prior to the
REASONS
[1]The Claimant, Mr Lee Brookes, brings proceedings for a range of claims against four named Respondents. There is also an application before me to add a fifth named Respondent. This Public Preliminary Hearing was listed to determine a number of preliminary points, which are detailed below.[2]Although this case only commenced in December 2024, there is a significant history. The exceptional nature of the file in this case needs to be acknowledged at the outset. The electronic file is beyond anything which can be sensibly managed. That would be true at any time but is all the more so in light of the pressure currently facing the Employment Tribunal system. At the time of the commencement of the preliminary hearing, the electronic file contained around 333 items, the significant majority of which, though not all were generated by the Claimant. When the Claimant corresponds or makes an application, the communication together with any attachment, each becomes an item on the file requiring it to be read and responded to. It is clear that this file has taken up significant resources of both the parties and the Tribunal.[3]In order to give some structure to this and also deal with the wide range of points that were before me, I have used sub-headings to enable this Judgment to be more easily understood.[4]In addition, in order to avoid this lengthy Judgment from becoming even longer, it is necessary to state that this Judgment can only be properly understood alongside the two records of Preliminary Hearings that took place before Employment Judge Butler on 16th July 2025 and Employment Judge Holmes on 20th February 2026. At each of these two hearings, the Employment Judges took great care to set out the history and chronology in detail. Given all that has happened, it would disproportionately add to the length of this Judgment to rehearse the majority of what has already been set out in great detail and at length. Employment Judge Buzzard’s directions to the parties of 22nd September 2025 and Employment Judge Shotter’s orders of 5th January 2026 are also essential reading. I have read those documents in full and consider that the events as set out in those documents form part of this Judgment. The fact that I have not replicated these documents in full within this Judgment is not to be taken as anything other than trying to ensure that this Judgment is kept to a manageable length. Indeed, part of the difficulty in managing this litigation is that for each Judge accurately noting the history of the litigation takes up significant resource.[5]I also expressly record that although it is necessary for this Judgment to cover the history of the litigation and the Claimant’s conduct of it, that before me, during the hearing itself, the Claimant was courteous and respectful of the Tribunal. The Issues for Determination Today[6]The issues for determination at this Public Preliminary Hearing were as follows: a) Whether the Claimant’s claims against the first Respondent were presented out of time, and, if so, whether the Tribunal should grant the Claimant an extension of time for the presentation of all or any of them; b) Whether, as a preliminary issue, the Claimant’s claims against the third and fourth Respondents were presented out of time, and, if so, whether the Tribunal should grant the Claimant an extension of time for the presentation of all or any of them; c) Alternatively, whether the order made by the Tribunal at the hearing held on 16 July 2025, sent to the parties on 21 August 2025, joining the third and fourth Respondents as parties should be set aside or varied; d) In the event that the claims against the third and fourth Respondents are allowed to continue, their application made by letter dated 11 February 2026 to strike out the claims against them, and/or for deposit orders to be made; e) Such other applications as the Tribunal deems fit, in the event that any party seeks to add to the foregoing by notifying the Tribunal by no later than 1 April 2026 that determination of any other applications or preliminary issues is sought (it was confirmed at the outset that none of the applications referred to were being pursued at the hearing today). f) The Tribunal will consider further case management of the remaining claims against the remaining parties after the conclusion of this hearing, and the determination of these applications and issues. The Issues in the Case Generally[7]Appended to the CMO following the hearing before EJ Butler in July 2025 is a list of issues. I do not repeat that list of issues in this Judgment to avoid lengthening an already lengthy document. That document can be referred to as necessary.[8]The claims brought in the case are as follows:a. Unfair dismissal – (R1)b. Failure to pay a redundancy payment (R1) (R 2 is said to be liable under s.188 ERA 1996)c. Wrongful dismissal/notice pay (R 1) (if unpaid, may be sought from R2)d. Harassment related to disability (R1, R 3 & R4)e. Discrimination arising from disability (R1, R3 & R4)f. Holiday pay (R 1) (If unpaid, may be sought from R2)g. Unauthorised deductions from wages (R 1) (if unpaid, may be sought from R2) Procedural Matters[9]The hearing took place over two days by way of CVP.[10]The First Respondent is in creditors’ voluntary liquidation and has not submitted an ET 3. The Second Respondent is the Secretary of State who has submitted an ET 3 but has not attended today. The Third and Fourth Respondents were individual directors who have subsequently been added to the proceedings following the Preliminary Hearing before EJ Butler and were jointly represented today by Mr Grundy of Counsel.[11]The evidence was heard on the first day. Mr Grundy then made his submissions on behalf of the Third and Fourth Respondents. Rather than make the Claimant give his submissions at that point, following guidance from the Tribunal as to what was required, the Claimant was given additional time overnight and was able to make his submissions the next day.[12]I had the following documents before me:a. Joint Bundle of Documents – 301 pagesb. Strike Out Bundle – 1939 pages (as updated)c. Parties’ Written submissions and Case Law - 335 pagesd. A bundle of documents titled ‘Bundle of Documents relating to Claimant’s Outstanding Applications he Wishes to Pursue for the Preliminary Hearing on 20 April and 21 April 2026’ – 170 pagese. A bundle of documents titled ‘Additional Stephensons Solicitors LLP Disclosure Documents and Correspondence Bundle. – 171 pages[13]I also had access to the electronic Tribunal file, though as noted above, the navigation of that file is unduly onerous.[14]At the very outset of the hearing, I discussed the documents that I needed before me with the parties. The above bundles were confirmed as the correct ones.[15]It is necessary to record that whilst I was taken to a number of documents during the course of the hearing, I was not taken to the vast majority of documents. Indeed, one of the core challenges of this Preliminary Hearing and Reserved Judgment has involved going through documents which are not relevant to the issues to be determined or are documents which are repeated.[16]Mr Grundy also highlighted to me that I should exercise caution when considering the authorities referred to by the Claimant. AI appeared to have been used in some form. Authorities did not necessarily support the proposition advanced, and he was not able to locate two of the authorities and therefore doubted their authenticity. I took note of this. The Claimant did not dispute this. I don’t repeat the names of such authorities here as current ‘thinking’ is that referencing such authorities in a judgment creates a risk of validating them in a public document and thus replicating their AI use.
Findings of Fact
[17]I made the following findings of fact on the balance of probabilities.[18]It was difficult to place significant reliance on the Claimant’s written and oral evidence. Firstly, some of the positions adopted by the Claimant in writing either in his witness statement or in a document were demonstrably untrue. Secondly, in cross-examination, the Claimant struggled to answer the questions that were put to him. Either the Claimant failed to answer a question and would talk about a different subject, or he would give contradictory answers which at its most charitable left the impression that he was being reckless with his evidence. The result of this is that the Claimant’s evidence lacked cogency.[19]I remind myself that the Claimant’s evidence is that he has had mental ill health and make necessary allowances for that. I also remind myself that cases should be decided on the available evidence rather than an overreliance on generalised findings on credibility.[20]The Claimant commenced employment with the Respondent in November 2005.[21]It is alleged that on the 21st June 2024, the Claimant attended work late.[22]It is agreed that a meeting took place on the 25th June 2024 between the Claimant and the Third and Fourth Respondents. As to what exactly happened at that meeting is in dispute. However, it appears to be common ground that the Claimant’s medication was discussed at this meeting and based on the Claimant’s position today and in his ET 1, it is agreed that the Claimant swore at the Third and Fourth Respondents during this meeting and that he left the room slamming the door.[23]On the 27th June 2024, the Claimant was suspended. A disciplinary meeting was held on the 1st July 2024 which the Claimant did not attend.[24]On the 1st July 2024, the Claimant was dismissed by the Respondent. This was the effective date of termination. The Claimant was informed of his dismissal on this date. The dismissal was without notice. The stated reason was gross misconduct.[25]The Claimant appealed his dismissal the same day.[26]On the 3rd July 2024, the Claimant approached Stephenson’s solicitors to act on his behalf.[27]I have many but not all of the emails between the Claimant and Stephensons Solicitors before me. Privilege has been previously waived by the Claimant. The Claimant was ordered to provide all relevant disclosure on this point for this[28]It is to be noted that the dates on some of the emails in the bundle are Americanised. That is to say, the month and the date are the other way around.[29]On the 9th July 2024, the Claimant’s appeal meeting took place. His appeal against his dismissal was rejected.[30]On the 11th July 2024, there is an email in the bundle from Stephensons to the Claimant. It includes the following: “Thank you for your email. In terms of timeframe, there are strict limitations with employment law matters. Adam will ensure that this gets completed within the allocated time scale, and he will update you with the procedure.”[31]I do not have the email from the Claimant which leads to the above email. It is potentially important because it leads to an immediate response from the solicitor regarding time limits. Mr Grundy on behalf of the Third & Fourth Respondents questioned the Claimant about this. The Claimant was not able to answer why that email had not been disclosed nor was he able to answer what that email contained.[32]It is clear however that as of the 11th July 2024, the Claimant was aware that time limits existed in respect of employment matters.[33]The Claimant continued to correspond with his solicitors, including sending documents in to them. There is a reference in correspondence by the solicitors on the 11th July 2024 to entering into ACAS Early Conciliation to begin the process of settlement negotiations.[34]In the Claimant’s witness statement, he references in relation to August 2024 ‘the Tribunal lost my original claim form’. This is not supported or corroborated by any other document. August 2024 is prior to the commencement of ACAS early conciliation. The Claimant had solicitors instructed at this point in time. It is not corroborated by any of the documents disclosed as a result of waiver of privilege, indeed the documents which indicate attempts at negotiation would not sit with a suggestion that ET proceedings had commenced.[35]On the 30th September 2024, the Claimant commenced ACAS Early Conciliation.[36]On the 15th October 2024, the First Respondent went into creditors voluntary liquidation.[37]On the 30th October 2024, the ACAS Early Conciliation certificate was issued. This was sent to the Claimant by Stephenson’s solicitors the same day.[38]On the 18th December 2024, the Claimant submitted his ET 1. On the 23rd December 2024, a further ET 1 was submitted. Both ET 1’s were allocated the same claim number and at the Preliminary Hearing before EJ Butler in July 2025, the second ET 1 was treated as an amendment application.[39]In the ET 1 submitted on the 23rd December, this contained claims not made in the original ET 1. These additional claims were claims for a redundancy payment, notice pay, holiday pay, arrears of pay and ‘other payments’.[40]In the second ET 1 form, Mr Hoskisson and Mr Brown were referred to. They were not named as Respondents.[41]On the 10th February 2025, there was a stay of proceedings which was issued by the Tribunal in error and lifted on the 17th April 2025.[42]On the 17th February 2025, the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal applying to join Mr Hoskisson and Mr Brown as Respondents. They were not copied in to this application.[43]On the 4th March 2025, Employment Judge Johnson told the Claimant in correspondence not to send documents at this stage. He made the point that it is disproportionate and can affect the Tribunal’s ability to deal with queries on other cases quickly.[44]On the 21st March 2025, the Claimant wrote to Mr Hoskisson (the letter attached to the email had a date of 20th March 2025) informing him that he intended to commence proceedings against Mr Hoskisson and Mr Brown after the conclusion of the Employment Tribunal proceedings.[45]The letter referred to the Claimant being in “constant communication with my legal team, who are confident, with the evidence I have supplied to start these proceedings imminently.” The letter refers to a number of claims, some within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.[46]It also states “My legal team are acting on a no win no fee basis, so any financial impact will be covered by my legal team.”[47]The Claimant was cross-examined as to this communication. The Claimant adopted differing positions. The Claimant was not able to identify a legal team. He referred to a McKenzie friend, whom he was not able to name; he then referred to more than one McKenzie friend whom he was not able to name and then referred to being advised by Citizens Advice but was not able to say which Bureau or give any detail.[48]In addition to whom he spoke to or who was assisting the Claimant, attempts were made to understand the general chronology of events. The Claimant again struggled to do this. In making this finding, I recognise that the Claimant may not have the best memory and do not hold him to a high standard. At the same time, a basic understanding is needed and there is a lack of corroborative documentary evidence from this period.[49]When the inconsistencies were put to him, the Claimant said that he must have ‘typed a thing that he should not have typed’. A number of aspects of this letter were untrue. There was no ‘legal team’. There was no one acting on a no win no fee basis, the Claimant’s agreement with his solicitor ending many months previously and prior to proceedings having been commenced. The letter also referred to future civil proceedings, but it did not inform the recipient that an application had already been made to join him as a party to Employment Tribunal proceedings.[50]The Claimants approach was intentionally misleading in this letter. In his perception, this language was advantageous to him. It was not a situation whereby a lay person was mistakenly using phrases or terminology. The Claimant must have known the contents of this letter were untrue.[51]On the 22nd April 2025, the Claimant emailed Simon Hoskisson. The contents of the email refer to Employment Tribunal proceedings but also includes this “I would like to remind you, if the employment tribunal rule in my favour, I will have the option to instruct my legal team to take civil action against you & Jon Brown.” He refers to there being no defence, the companies act being breached and the directors personal liability as a result.[52]Again, there was no ‘legal team’.[53]On the 6th May 2025, the Second Respondent, the Secretary of State submitted their ET 3 & Grounds of Resistance.[54]On the 16th July 2025, at the Preliminary Hearing an order was made by EJ Butler naming Mr Hoskisson and Mr Brown as Respondents.[55]This order was sent to the Third and Fourth Respondents on the 21st August 2025.[56]On the 3rd September 2025, the Third and Fourth Respondents applied to have the order naming them set aside. This was within 14 days of the order as directed.[57]On the 17th September 2025, the Third and Fourth Respondents submitted their ET 3’s and Grounds of Resistance.[58]On the 22nd September 2025, Employment Judge Buzzard wrote the parties. This correspondence must be read in full. However, by way of summary:a. There was significant criticism of ‘the volume of correspondence on this file’ referring to it as ‘excessive and entirely disproportionate’.b. The parties were ordered to not to send any further evidence to the Tribunal unless they were expressly ordered to.c. Further applications or correspondence were unlikely to be actioned until the next preliminary hearing.d. He warned that the Employment Tribunal was not a cost free environment.[59]The Claimant continued to make applications. Seven were made between the end of October and the 18th December. These are set out in detail at para 17 of EJ Holmes’ note. They are indicative of baseless applications for strike out or for making allegations of criminal conduct. On the face of it, they were totally without merit.[60]On the 12th December 2025, the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First Tier Tribunal held that the Claimant was entitled to the daily living component at the enhanced rate between 20th November 2024 and 13th August 2027. The Claimant was said to have ‘severely limited ability to carry out the activities listed’ and was ‘severely limited in their ability to mobilise’ and qualified for a Personal Independence Payment (PIP).[61]On the 5th January 2026, Employment Judge Shotter wrote to the parties making a number of observations regarding the Claimant’s conduct. Again, this correspondence must be read in full. The Claimant was given an instruction to not make further applications again. He was given a warning of a potential unless order and the risk of his claims being struck out.[62]In a letter dated 28th January 2026, Abigal Holland described as Advanced Clinical Practitioner, NMP, Clinical Lead of the Salford Living Well Team, part of Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust. That letter stated that ‘Mr Brookes does not have any capacity issues which would affect his ability to participate in an employment tribunal. Nor does he have any serious mental health concerns that would affect his ability to participate in the tribunal.”[63]By roughly the 12th February 2026 the file records around 71 applications having been made and around 256 items generated.[64]On 20th February 2026, an Preliminary Hearing took place before Employment Judge Holmes. As this was not a public hearing, EJ Holmes was not able to deal with the strike out applications. EJ Holmes rehearsed the history of the litigation in detail and made orders to progress this matter to a hearing today. This was sent to the parties on the 4th March 2026.[65]Notwithstanding the history of the litigation, the clear statement the Claimant made to EJ Holmes, the Claimant continued to make applications. The file records correspondence/applications with attachments sent to the Tribunal on the 22nd February, 23rd February, 24th February, 6th March, 11th March, 19th March, 21st March, 22nd March, 23rd March, 26th March, 27th March, 30th March, 1st Aprill, 2nd April, 10th April, 13th April, 17th April. The vast majority of these communications continued the previous tone of the Claimant’s correspondence and the unmeritorious nature of the correspondence. I have sought to exclude legitimate matters from this list, for example the claimant’s submission of his skeleton argument.
The Law
[66]In terms of reasonable practicability, the term means what it suggests, reasonably practicable. Whilst this is to be given a wide interpretation (c.f. Marks and Spencer PLC v Williams Ryan [2005] IRLR 562) the test is capable of operating harshly, it is not a balance of prejudice test, it is about the practicability of submitting the claim.[67]Where a Claimant is prevented from making a complaint by serious illness that will normally render it not reasonably practicable. However, the fact of an illness or medical condition does not in and of itself render it not reasonably practicable nor does it automatically follow that any ignorance as to the relevant time limit was reasonable. (c.f. Cygnet Behavioural Health Ltd v Britton [2022] EAT 108)[68]If it is established that it was not reasonably practicable to submit a claim in time, it must then be shown that the claim was submitted within such further period as is reasonable.[69]In terms of just and equitable, section 123 Equality Act 2010 provides as follows: “(1) Proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of –(a) the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or(b) such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just and equitable… (2) … (3) For the purposes of this section – (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it”.[70]The particular act of discrimination must be identified.[71]A continuing course of conduct might amount to an act extending over a period, in which case time runs from the last act in question. The case law on time limits to which we had regard included Hendricks –v- Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2003] IRLR 96 which deals with circumstances in which there will be an act extending over a period.[72]Time may be extended if in all the circumstances the tribunal considers it just and equitable to do so as provided for in section 123(1)(b). The test is less strict than the reasonable practicability test and the tribunal has a wide discretion.[73]The burden of proof is on the Claimant to show that it would be just and equitable to extend time. There is no presumption that an extension of time will be granted.[74]In Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23, Underhill LJ at paragraphs 37 and 38 held that the best approach is for the tribunal to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time. This will include the length of and reasons for the delay. If it checks those factors against the list in British Coal Corporation v Keeble [1997] IRLR 36 all well and good, but he would not recommend taking it as the framework for its thinking. Those factors include the length of, and reasons for, the delay; the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; the extent to which the party sued has co-operated with any requests for information; the promptness with which the Claimant acted once he or she knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and the steps taken by the Claimant to obtain appropriate advice once he or she knew of the possibility of taking action.[75]In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan [2018] EWCA Civ 640, Leggatt LJ, having referred to section 123, stated, at paragraphs. 18-19 of his judgment:[76]"18. … [I]t is plain from the language used ('such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable') that Parliament has chosen to give the employment tribunal the widest possible discretion. Unlike section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, section 123(1) of the Equality Act does not specify any list of factors to which the tribunal is instructed to have regard, and it would be wrong in these circumstances to put a gloss on the words of the provision or to interpret it as if it contains such a list. Thus, although it has been suggested that it may be useful for a tribunal in exercising its discretion to consider the list of factors specified in section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 (see [Keeble]), the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the tribunal is not required to go through such a list, the only requirement being that it does not leave a significant factor out of account: see [Afolabi]. … That said, factors which are almost always relevant to consider when exercising any discretion whether to extend time are: (a) the length of, and reasons for, the delay and (b) whether the delay has prejudiced the Respondent (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh)."[77]In Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care 2024 EAT 2, His Honour Judge James Tayler reviewed the authorities relating to extensions of time on just and equitable grounds and noted that there was a ‘common practice’ among those seeking to argue that time limits should not be extended of relying on the comments of Auld LJ in Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link [2003] EWCA Civ 576, that time limits in the employment tribunal are ‘exercised strictly’ and that a decision to extend time is the ‘exception rather than the rule’, as if they were principles of law. HHJ Tayler stated that the practice of relying on these comments out of context should cease. In the EAT’s view – adopting a similar approach to that taken by Wall LJ in Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston [2010] IRLR 327 – the propositions of law for which Robertson is authority are that employment tribunals have a wide discretion to extend time on just and equitable grounds and that appellate courts should be slow to interfere, and therefore the comments of Auld LJ needed to be viewed in that context. The EAT suggested that a greater focus be placed on some other Court of Appeal authorities – such as Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan (above).[78]In the case of Harden v(1) Wootlif and(2) Smart Diner Group Ltd UKEAT/0448/14 the Employment Appeal Tribunal reminded employment tribunals that the test for just and equitable extension must be applied in respect of each Respondent separately and that a different conclusion in respect of different Respondents was possible.[79]The potential merits of the claim may well be a factor that falls to be considered (Kumari v Greater Manchester Mental Health Foundation Trust [2022] EAT 132) although care needs to be taken not to conflate the determination of a time point and the application of the just and equitable test with the tests to be applied when considering an application for a strike out or a deposit order under the tribunal rules.[80]The Respondent relied upon Galilee v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis [2018] ICR 634 as authority for the proposition that in respect of an amendment, time would run from the date on which the permission to amend was given and not the date of the ET 1 or the application to amend. I accepted this submission. However, given that this question arises in the context of an application which took a number of months to consider, the fact that the application to amend was made when it was is an important consideration. Conclusions Time Limits - Reasonable Practicability
Conclusions
[81]The claims of unfair dismissal, notice pay, holiday pay and unlawful deduction from wages are made against the First Respondent.[82]It is common ground that the claims for unfair dismissal and notice pay are out of time. Time in respect of these claims runs from the effective date of termination.[83]The effective date of termination was the 1st July 2024. Date A was the 30th September 2024 and Date B was the 30th October 2024. The ET 1 should have been submitted by the 30th November 2024. It was submitted on the 18th December 2024.[84]The position is less clear with regards to holiday pay and wages. Time runs from the date of the alleged deduction. The Claimant has not put forward a date in this respect, but if I proceed on the most generous interpretation of the 31st July 2024 then given that the time limit problem in this case is not the time taken to commence early conciliation but the time taken after the EC certificate is generated then the claims remain out of time.[85]Immediately following his dismissal, the Claimant retained solicitors on his behalf. Because privilege has been waived, we have seen many, though not all of the emails between the Claimant and his solicitors.[86]The solicitors were retained to negotiate a settlement for the Claimant on a no win no fee basis. This retainer was limited in this sense. In some cases, the extent of a retainer might have greater significance. However, on these facts, it does not assist the Claimant.[87]The Claimant also says that he had family difficulties. I deliberately do not detail the nature of those family difficulties in this public judgment. I discussed this approach with the Claimant during submissions and in advance of this Judgment and he was in agreement with this.[88]I do not accept that these family difficulties were a barrier to the Claimant commencing his claim in time. The core events are from around March 2023 and pre-date the relevant period, although I accept that the effect of those events may continue to be felt indefinitely. They are naturally distressing. However, they were not causative of the claim not going in on time. I make the same finding in respect of the effect of the Claimant’s mental health on his ability to bring the claim within time. The Claimant does experience mental health problems, but these were not causative of the claim not going in on time. I am able to make these findings because there is clear evidence of significant activity being undertaken by the Claimant relating to this potential case in the period following his dismissal and prior to the expiry of the relevant time limit.[89]It is clear that the Claimant was aware of the existence of time limits. It is also clear that he was aware of the specific time limits that would apply. The correspondence between the solicitors and the Claimant is clear in this respect and there is no ambiguity.[90]The Claimant was also capable of actively corresponding with his instructing solicitors and others post dismissal.[91]It was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to submit his claims for unfair dismissal, notice pay, holiday pay and wages within the relevant time limit. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear these claims against the First[92]If it had not been reasonably practicable, it was not submitted within such further period as was reasonable. Whilst I accept that this would need to be properly understood in light of why it was not reasonably practicable to submit the claim in time, an 18 day extension in these circumstances is a notable period of time and given that the Claimant knew of the time limits, knew he was out of time, taking this length of time is not reasonable. Redundancy Payment – First and Second Respondent[93]A redundancy payment is claimed against the First Respondent. The Secretary of State is the Second Respondent as provided for in s.188 ERA 1996.[94]Further to s.164 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, the claim for a redundancy payment against an employer has a primary time limit of six months. Therefore, with the primary time limit for this claim against the First Respondent expiring on the 31st December 2024, this claim is made within the primary time limit, notwithstanding any ACAS extension of time.[95]In relation to the Second Respondent, the Secretary of State is in these proceedings through the provisions in s.188 ERA 1996. That provides for a three month less one day time limit that runs from the date on which the Secretary of State refused to pay the redundancy payment. That point has not been pleaded by the Secretary of State. Furthermore, that paperwork (the refusal) was simply not before me today, nor was it dealt with in the Claimant’s evidence. On this basis, I have not determined whether the claim against the Secretary of State is out of time. Just and Equitable Extension of Time – Third and Fourth Respondents[96]All parties have proceeded on the basis that time runs from the effective date of termination. I record for the sake of completeness, that even if time were to run from the appeal decision (and the case has not been put on this basis) then this would not impact on the length of the extension sought. As noted above in relation to reasonable practicability, the time limit issue here arises from the excess time taken after early conciliation in bringing a claim.[97]The extension of time sought is between the 30th November 2024 and the 21st August 2025. I accept the Third and Fourth Respondents submission that these are the correct dates as per Galilee (above). However, it is relevant to place weight on the fact that the Claimant applied to amend as of the 17th February 2025 and that his application was granted on the 16th July 2025.[98]As I have noted above, the just and equitable test is much broader than the reasonable practicability test.[99]Having looked at the relevant dates, and the surrounding evidence, I move on to consider the Claimant’s explanation for not submitting the claim sooner.[100]The Claimant had access to legal advice and was aware of time limits. As noted above, I do not consider that he has a reasonable explanation for submitting his claim sooner.[101]As to the joining of the Third and Fourth Respondents to proceedings, the Claimant says that he was not aware of the ability to do this. The Claimant was not able to say whether this was a matter that he discussed with his solicitor. Also, the Claimant was not able to explain what caused him to become aware that he could pursue individual Respondents at the time that he did. I find that there is no good reason as to why the Third and Fourth Respondents could not have been included in the original claim form.[102]The Claimant’s evidence on the chronology of events following his dismissal was poor. I could not rely on it. In cross-examination of the Claimant, it was established that his written correspondence contained matters that were not true and that this went beyond mere difficulties of a lay person. In oral evidence, seeking to explain this, the Claimant was inconsistent, giving differing answers as I record above.[103]I accept that the Claimants mental health and family circumstances are relevant factors, but I also find that they are not causative of why this claim was not being put in when it should have been. The underlying problem was that the Claimant was not taking the necessary steps to progress matters promptly and not having sufficient regard to the importance of time limits of which he was aware.[104]However, Morgan (above) makes clear that it would be wrong to treat the absence of a good explanation for explaining why the claim was submitted when it was as determinative. The just and equitable test is far wider.[105]I am also aware that previously too much reliance has been placed on phrases such as ‘exception rather than the rule’ and the burden of proof. More recent case law e.g. Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2024] IRLR 275 emphasise the broad nature of the test.[106]The Third and Fourth Respondents submit that I should take into account the underlying merits of the case. I accept that is permissible, but again it would be wrong to treat it as determinative. I must also remind myself that no evidence has been heard. I do accept that the Claimant’s case is on the face of it contradictory. Firstly, there is the admitted conduct contained within the ET 1, which accords in part with the Third and Fourth Respondent’s pleaded case as to what was done and said by the Claimant that warranted dismissal. This is indicative of a conduct dismissal. Secondly, there is an obvious contradiction between the allegation that there was a conspiracy to dismiss the Claimant in order to avoid paying him a redundancy payment and also that his dismissal was because of his disability.[107]In submissions, I was also asked by the Third and Fourth Respondent to take into account the Claimant’s conduct of the litigation. It was submitted that this was permissible to take into account when considering a broad just and equitable test because the granting of an extension of time exposes the Third and Fourth Respondents to what on any analysis was litigation that was not being conducted reasonably, with the Third and Fourth Respondents exhausting their resources as a direct result of the Claimant’s conduct and being exposed to a party that was not capable of following direction from the Tribunal. I accept this submission as accurately reflecting the position that the Third and Fourth Respondents have been put in.[108]Where the merits points and the Claimant’s conduct points take this is that they are further factors against a just and equitable extension of time.[109]Finally, I accept the submission that there is forensic prejudice to the Third and Fourth Respondents in that they are no longer Directors and the liquidation means that they do not have easy access to all of the relevant documents. I also accept that there is a gap over one year between the dismissal of the Claimant and Third and Fourth Respondents being joined to the proceedings and that this is particularly relevant to the issue of forensic prejudice.[110]I do not consider that it is just and equitable to extend time against the Third and Fourth Respondents.[111]I have considered whether there is any material difference between the position of the Third and Fourth Respondents. There has been no suggestion of and I find that there is no distinction between the position of the Third Respondent and the position of the Fourth Respondent. Just and Equitable Extension of Time – First Respondent[112]It is necessary to consider the position regarding the claims for disability discrimination against the First Respondent and whether to permit a just and equitable extension of time separately.[113]There are two key differences between the situation regarding the First Respondent and the claims against the Third and Fourth Respondents. These are a) the difference in the crystalisation of dates (the date of the ET 1 as opposed to the date of the amendment) and b) the fact that the First Respondent is in liquidation and has not submitted a defence to the proceedings.[114]The difference in dates means that the extension of time sought is less in that the Claimant is seeking an extension of 18 days between the 30th November when the primary time limit (with the benefit of the ACAS EC extension) expired and the ET 1 being submitted on the 18th December 2024.[115]The absence of a defence is potentially relevant both for and against an extension of time. In not defending the proceedings, the First Respondent is not experiencing prejudice in a way that a defended party would. At the same time, there is little likelihood of the Claimant obtaining any enforceable remedy. Of course, it is right that a declaration, albeit one which, in the circumstances of an undefended case, would be a recognised remedy.[116]I have considered these matters carefully and weighed them up.[117]The position remains that the Claimant had prior access to professional representation, was aware of the relevant time limits and does not have a reasonable explanation for submitting his claim in time. As per Morgan this is relevant but should not be treated as determinative.[118]The position also remains that even on the Claimant’s pleaded case there are problems with the merits of this case as against the First Respondent, even in the absence of an ET3. On the Claimant’s pleaded case, there is at least a basis for finding that gross misconduct occurred.[119]I also generally struggle to see significant prejudice to the Claimant if he were not able to proceed against the First Respondent. If there were a declaration of discrimination would be made in circumstances of it being undefended.[120]The burden of proof is on the Claimant. Extensions of time are not granted as of right. I accept it is a broad test, but I am unpersuaded.[121]In the circumstances, I do not consider it to be just and equitable to extend time between the 30th November and the 18th December so as to permit the Claimant to bring his complaints of disability discrimination against the First Setting Aside the Order to Join the Third and Fourth Respondents[122]I consider this point to be academic. On the face of it, the Order joining the Third and Fourth Respondents was a properly made order under Rule 35. Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the claims against the Third and Fourth Respondents due to time limits has been the subject of separate judicial consideration at this hearing and in this Judgment and has been resolved through the determination of those points.[123]I do not consider it necessary to lengthen this Judgment further on the point. Third and Fourth Respondents Application to Strike Out Due to The Claimant’s Conduct of This Case[124]Having made the above determinations, it is not necessary for me to consider the strike out application made by the Third and Fourth Respondents. However, I consider it in the interests of justice to deal with it in this Judgment. I have heard full submissions on the point and given the events of this case it is in the interests of justice that these matters are judicially recorded so that the challenges faced in this case are a matter of public record.[125]The application to strike out is made under Rule 38(1)(a) and 38(1)(b) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. The basis for the application is set out in the Third and Fourth Respondent’s solicitors’ letter dated the 11th February 2026.[126]The application must be read in full, however by way of summary:a. As of 11th February 2026, the Claimant had sent 422 emails to the solicitors acting for the Third and Fourth Respondents. The point was made to me today that obviously the number was no significantly higher.b. The emails were largely unnecessary, irrelevant and have caused costs to escalate unreasonably.c. The Claimant’s language is often threatening and contains demands for unreasonable actions within unreasonable time limits.d. The Claimant wrote to the insolvency service and the liquidator demanding they issue a statutory demand for £233,000 against the Third and Fourth Respondents within 24 hours. Other correspondence was sent to Members of Parliament, creditors, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, the Insolvency Service, Trafford Council revenue and corporate finance team, the Police, the Equality and Human Rights Commission and HMRC. A feature of this correspondence is the making of criminal allegations.e. The Claimant has made allegations of bias to the Tribunal, the JCIO, his MP and the President of the Employment Tribunal.f. The Claimant has made complaints regarding other third parties in the form of complaining about the Police to the IOPC, the insolvency practitioner to their regulatory body, the solicitor for the potential fifth Respondent to the SRA, and on ‘numerous occasions’ complaints about the solicitors acting for the Third and Fourth Respondent’s to the SRA. In addition the Claimant has also threatened the same solicitors with allegations of criminal conduct, potential applications to the High Court, referrals to the National Crime Agency And a potential referral to the tribunal for contempt.g. The application goes on to detail the correspondence the Claimant sent to the tribunal and the difficulties have been had in the volume of documents sent, the difficulty in agreeing bundles and the additional costs that arise From this, the fact that the Claimant ignores orders made by the tribunal particularly regarding the cessation of correspondence, providing examples of this including following one warning from the tribunal on the 3rd of February 2026 regarding correspondence the Claimant then sending 40 further emails between the 4th and 10th of February 2026.h. The application asserts that the Third and Fourth Respondents have had to seek medical treatment from their GP’s as a result of the Claimants conduct and consider the treatment of them to be harassing in and of itself.i. As of the 11th February £36,090 plus VAT had been billed. During the hearing, I was told that this figure is now much higher and that there are no further fees to fund legal representation.j. The application relied upon Attorney General v Barker [2000] EWHC 453 as to the meaning of scandalous & vexatious in that it is “To subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the Claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.”[127]The leading authority is that of the Court of Appeal in Blockbuster Entertainment Ltd v James [2006] IRLR 630. Based upon this authority and taking into account the overriding objective, I direct myself that:a. Strike out is exceptional. It is a draconian power that must be exercised proportionately.b. Strike out is a high bar.c. It is a basic principle of justice alongside the provisions in the overriding objective that the Tribunal should be accessible to those without legal representation. Those without a lawyer may have greater difficulty in understanding what is required of them, will be unfamiliar with the system and may make errors that a represented party would not. In so far as possible, the Tribunal must take steps to ensure that the parties are on an equal footing.d. Access to justice includes access to justice for people who are rude, demanding and may not comply with social norms.e. There is a strong public interest in cases being determined on their merits rather than procedurally.f. It would be the rarest of cases whereby a fair trial was still possible and it would be permissible to strike out a case.[128]I have considered the application carefully and the submissions made in response and at the hearing in full.[129]In my experience, when considering strike out applications made by represented parties regarding unrepresented parties it is necessary to consider the application with a degree of care and to consider whether there is hyperbole or whether the complaint is being over-egged. This is not such a case. I consider that the application is properly made, refers to matters appropriately and which have not been meaningfully rebutted in any way by the Claimant. I accept the contents of the application made by the Third and Fourth Respondents as substantially correct.[130]The Claimant has been repeatedly told that he cannot continue to conduct litigation in the way that he has. Significant judicial resource has been spent on this case.[131]At the end of the hearing before EJ Holmes it was noted that the Claimant expressed contrition and therefore EJ Holmes did not make a stricter order. However, he did conclude with the following: “The Claimant , however, should be in no doubt , from the Tribunal’s previous extensive correspondence upon the direction of two other Employment Judges, and what he was expressly told in this hearing too, that regardless of whether Unless orders are made , continued applications to the Tribunal, or the continued submission to it and to the Respondents of further unrequested evidence, and of a running commentary upon what actions the Claimant is taking against any other parties , their representatives, or other third parties, is highly likely to be regarded as unreasonable conduct, and to lead potentially to the claims being struck out, and/or other sanctions.”[132]In addition to what was said during the hearing itself, this was sent to the parties on the 4th March 2026. Unfortunately, this did not deter the Claimant and he continued to correspond.[133]The applications & correspondence sent in by the Claimant have common features. They contain bold assertions. They can be lengthy. They make allegations. They proceed on the basis that the other parties are acting in bad faith. They are repetitive. They misstate the situation.[134]By way of example, on the 8th February 2026, the Claimant asked for the responses entered to be struck out as an abuse of process. He also asked for indemnity costs against the Respondent and its legal representatives. He alleged that they had been engaged in criminal conduct. He suggested that ‘This conduct is so egregious that it strikes at the heart of justice and warrants the ultimate sanction of strike out’.[135]I asked the Claimant for his submissions as to his conduct of this case and the effect on the third and fourth Respondent’s. The Claimant referred to the fact that he did not know what he was doing and that he was fighting for his life. I have taken into account what the Claimant has submitted in writing in addition to this.[136]I do not consider that there is any reasonable explanation for this conduct, both in terms of the frequency of correspondence but also the nature of the correspondence. It goes far beyond someone being a difficult party, engaged in emotional litigation exercising poor judgment. I find that this conduct is serious, it is prejudicial and it must make the lives of those on the receiving end of it more difficult than it needs to be. Such behaviour is a barrier to access to justice for the Third and Fourth Respondents alongside all of the other litigants whose cases are not being dealt with because of the resource being allocated to the Claimant.[137]At the end of the hearing before me and having informed the parties that I would be reserving Judgment and explaining what was meant by that. I did tell the Claimant that I would be writing the Judgment following the hearing, that it would be sent out and to send no further emails in the meantime. His answer was that he would not be sending further emails. Notwithstanding this, whilst I was in the process of writing this Judgment, I was referred by the administrative staff of the Tribunal a further communication sent by the Claimant to the Tribunal on the 21st April, hours after the hearing had ended. There were two emails to the Tribunal and three attachments. The emails contained further submissions by the Claimant. In the normal course of events, the fact that an unrepresented party does this once a hearing has ended might be the subject of some criticism – it is unfair to the other party that has not had the opportunity to respond during the hearing, but in the context of the warnings given to the Claimant, the fact that he had listened to detailed submissions seeking a strike out on the basis of the volume of his correspondence, means that this cannot be overlooked.[138]Indeed, it is sufficiently difficult to comprehend that it requires stating in bold terms. The Claimant was defending a strike out application. That application was made in writing and verbally on the basis that a fair trial was not possible because of the continued volume of correspondence. In addition, the Claimant has expressly stated to the Employment Judge that there would be no further correspondence whilst Judgment was awaited. Yet, within hours, further correspondence was entered into.[139]This additional correspondence sought to draw my attention to the fact that Employment Judge Batten had mistakenly imposed a stay on the proceedings against the First Respondent as detailed in the findings of fact above. However, I was already aware of the fact of the stay and the documents imposing and lifting the stay were already in the bundle of documents. The Claimant had already had the opportunity to address me on them if he had wished to do so. In short, this additional correspondence did not assist the Tribunal but was of all the more concern because it came mere hours after the Claimant had promised to send no further correspondence whilst awaiting this Reserved Judgment.[140]I find that the Claimant’s conduct against the Third and Fourth Respondents would continue. The Claimant has been told a number of times and in various ways that his conduct of the litigation was unacceptable. He has been given repeated judicial direction which has not been followed.[141]I consider that the threshold for strike out has been met under Rule 38(1)(a) & (b) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. The basis for this is:a. This is an exceptional case in which the Claimant’s conduct of the litigation and breaches of orders are sufficiently prejudicial to the Third and Fourth Respondent that it would justify strike out.b. This is not a situation in which a party has simply been difficult or non compliant and on balance the overriding objective and the law favours allowing matters to proceed. The conduct of the Claimant directly impacts on the ability of the Tribunal to determine the case against the Third and Fourth Respondent on its merits.c. In addition, a fair hearing against the Third and Fourth Respondents is no longer possible. It cannot be right that a party continues their conduct having been warned in this way having received the severe warnings that the Claimant has received. Having found that this conduct would continue, it is not reasonable to expect the Third and Fourth Respondents to be faced with this situation and to simply expect them to proceed to a hearing and defend their position.d. The prejudice and the effect on the Third and Fourth Respondents has occurred already. Their resources have been spent in a matter of months progressing this matter to a preliminary hearing. Whilst the Third and Fourth Respondents could represent themselves before the Tribunal and whilst the Tribunal is not here to safeguard the rights of employers to be represented in a system where employees cannot afford legal representation, it is right to record that what resources the Third and Fourth Respondents had have been used up in a short period by the conduct of the Claimant. This is litigation by attrition rather than litigation which permits the Tribunal to determine the case on its merits. But for the unreasonable conduct of the Claimant, the Third and Fourth Respondents would have been in a position to have legal representation at any final hearing. It also goes beyond the issue of loss of representation, it is also about having a process in which the Tribunal is able to fairly determine the issues on the merits in a proportionate way. The Claimant is preventing that.e. I have considered alternatives to strike out. None were suggested to me, but of my own volition, I considered the following: i. An award of costs against the Claimant would not resolve the prejudice. Firstly, the scale of the costs involved would likely involve satellite litigation being needed and Secondly, the Claimant is clear that he does not have any means to pay. He is on Universal Credit and does not have any savings. Therefore a costs award is of limited effect as it would be near impossible to enforce and would not mitigate the prejudice. ii. Making some form of draconian order that would otherwise avoid strike out. For example, I have considered ordering that the Third and Fourth Respondents are not required to reply to correspondence. I have determined that this is not practicable. There are many reasons for this. I consider that such an order would be difficult for the Third and Fourth Respondent to comply with, they would be at risk of receiving correspondence, still having to read it because there is ongoing litigation and ignoring correspondence in litigation in the form of not reading it could be detrimental to your own position. If solicitors remain instructed, solicitors have professional duties to the Court and to their lay client and this would conflict with receiving correspondence and not reading it. I also consider that such an order infantilises the Claimant as an adult with capacity. It is being too lenient in circumstances whereby he has been given clear direction and refuses to conduct the litigation reasonably to the detriment of other parties.[142]Having found that the threshold for strike out has been met, I retain a residual discretion. I exercise that discretion in favour of strike out. I accept that the result of this means that the Claimant will not be able to continue with his claims against the Third and Fourth Respondent and that this is prejudicial to him. I consider that the Claimant is the party responsible for this prejudice. I consider this to be an appropriate case in which the Claimant has caused clear prejudice to the Third and Fourth Respondents to the extent that a fair trial is not possible and that the only appropriate way to remedy this is to strike the claims out against these Respondents.[143]Therefore, had I not dismissed the claims against the Third and Fourth Respondents based upon time limits and jurisdiction, I would have struck them out. The Application to Join a Fifth Respondent[144]The Claimant seeks to join Mr Steve Kelly as Fifth Respondent. Mr Kelly was a Director of the company. The application is made in relatively broad terms.[145]An application to add a Respondent is made under Rule 35 but it also engages the principles that are to be applied to amendment, including Selkent factors and the overriding objective.[146]I refuse the application to join a Fifth Respondent. My reasoning is as follows:a. The application was made after the applications to join the Third and Fourth Respondents. On any analysis any claim against Mr Kelly is significantly out of time. Whilst the issue of just and equitable extension as regards the Third and Fourth Respondents must be considered separately to that of Mr Kelly, there is no factor which would cause there to be a different outcome.b. There is no reasonable explanation for the application not being made sooner.c. It is plainly prejudicial to bring a further party into litigation which commenced in 2024.d. If Mr Kelly was joined, the case would need even more case management. The list of issues would require re drafting. At least one more preliminary hearing would be needed and given the history of this litigation, possibly more than one.e. It would be a significant prejudice for that individual to face litigation that has been conducted by the Claimant in the way that it has to date. There is reference in the papers to referring the solicitors acting for the potential Fifth Respondent to the SRA. Even prior to the Tribunals decision on joining a Fifth Respondent, the Claimant’s conduct has caused prejudice.f. Whilst the Fifth Respondent may be a potential Respondent within the meaning of Rule 35, the application is light on why he should be joined and the majority of discretionary factors point away from permitting such an application. The Claim for Redundancy Payment - The Position Regarding the First and Second Respondents[147]A claim for a redundancy payment remains against the First Respondent as it had a primary time limit of six months.[148]The claim as against the Second Respondent has not determined the question of time limits.[149]During submissions, I raised with the Claimant the possibility of a deposit order and also enquired as to the Claimant’s means.[150]This is a somewhat unusual situation. There is no ET 1 by the First[151]Section 163(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 states: “For the purposes of any such reference, an employee who has been dismissed by his employer shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been so dismissed by reason of redundancy.”[152]At the final hearing of this matter, the Tribunal will not be hearing evidence from the First Respondent. Therefore, there is no employer either a) pleading a reason for dismissal or b) calling evidence to discharge that burden of proof.[153]The Claimant submits that his length of service, his previous disciplinary record and the fact that the company went into subsequent insolvency all indicate that his dismissal was a ruse to avoid paying him a redundancy payment.[154]What I do know is the following: a. There is a dismissal letter expressly dismissing the Claimant for conduct[155]There is also a pleading from the Third and Fourth Respondents asserting the Claimant’s conduct. Even if these individuals are not giving evidence because they are no longer part of the proceedings, the pleadings still remain available to the Judge.[156]On the face of it, the claim is weak. I have given serious consideration to making a deposit order. The threshold for little reasonable prospect of success is met. However, the language within Rule 39 is ‘may’. I retain a discretion as to whether or not to make a deposit order and I have decided not to. The Claimant would not be deterred by such an order. The fact that the Claimant is on state benefits with no savings means that had I made an order, it would be nominal. The Claimant told me that if I did make a nominal order, he would pay it. It would not have the desired effect of making a party pause and think carefully about their case.[157]The Claimant should not take comfort from the absence of a deposit order. This claim has real problems.[158]I make it clear to the Claimant that nothing in this section of the Judgment in any way mitigates the seriousness of his conduct of the case to date. The position is different with regard to the First and Second Respondents and the Third and Fourth Respondents. The First and Second Respondents have not made an application to strike out on the basis that a fair hearing is no longer possible. Furthermore, in relation to the First Respondent, no ET 3 has been submitted and therefore the prejudice to them through the Claimant’s conduct is different. The Secretary of State has submitted an ET 3 but has otherwise had limited participation and has not attended today. In contrast, there is specific prejudice in allowing these proceedings to continue against the Third and Fourth Respondents as outlined above to such an extent that any hearing involving them would not be fair.[159]I accept that given the Claimant’s conduct of the litigation to date, the plain weakness in the claim for a redundancy payment and the likely difficulties that will be caused in allowing the claims for redundancy payments to proceed, the most simple and straightforward answer would be to bring an end to this litigation in full. It is my reluctant conclusion that I cannot do that.[160]Nonetheless, the Claimant must not continue with his conduct of taking up the scarce resources of the Tribunal. The Claimant is on notice that a future Employment Judge may consider of their own motion to strike out the remaining case because the resources of the Tribunal can no longer be allocated to the detriments of other litigants in other cases. Simple case management orders will be made and a hearing will take place.[161]The claim for a redundancy payment will proceed to a full hearing against the First Respondent. The Second Respondent also remains in the proceedings. It will be an attended hearing. I would normally place a three hour time estimate on such a hearing, but the size of the file alone means that the Judge may need additional time just to read this Judgment and work out that the hearing is on a narrow point and therefore I list the hearing for a period of one day.[162]The issues for determination will be:a. Having regard to s.139 and s.163 Employment Rights Act 1996, what was the reason or principal reason for the dismissal of the Claimant?b. If the dismissal was by reason of redundancy, what redundancy payment is payable to the Claimant?c. On what date did the Secretary of State communicate to the Claimant that they would not be making a redundancy payment?d. Was the claim presented within three months of beginning with the date on which the decision was communicated to the Claimant?e. If it was presented outside that three month period, was it reasonably practicable for the Claimant to submit the claim within time?f. If it was not reasonably practicable for the Claimant to submit his claim, was it submitted within such further period as was reasonable.[163]In preparing for that hearing, I direct that the remaining parties must:a. Produce a single bundle of relevant documents for use at that hearing no later than 30 days prior to the hearing having already disclosed any documents in their possession or control that are relevant to the issues.b. Exchange any witness statements no later than 14 days prior to the[164]In accordance with the overriding objective, I have not sought to provide detailed orders or more complicated orders. I have simply stated the above in the hope that they will be complied with and that the role of the next Judge will be made more straightforward. The remaining parties should produce a bundle of documents Postscript[165]I recognise that this Judgment will not be welcome to the Claimant. During the hearing, he used phrases such as ‘fighting for my life’. He also appears to view the case as being of significant value. The Schedule of Loss is suggested to be many hundreds of thousands of pounds. The Claimant referenced his being registered as a creditor of the First Respondent. As I sought to explain, it is unlikely that there is any money left in the company. Furthermore, the Claimant was dismissed in July and the Company went into voluntary liquidation in October. As Mr Grundy submits, compensation would not continue past this date.[166]The Claimant appears to be placing significant hope, investing inordinate amounts of time in this litigation in circumstances where the litigation appears to be causing him distress. I would simply say to the Claimant that there is value in putting this behind him and moving on rather than seeking to deal with matters in the past which do not appear to have the potential outcome that he seeks.