P Addo v The Kingsdale Foundation: 6021050/2024 and 6013415/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6021050/2024, 6013415/2025

Between

Pearl AddoClaimant

The Kingsdale Foundation RECONSIDERATION JUDGMENT The claimant’s application dated 10 March 2026 for reconsideration of the judgment given on 9 March 2026 is refused.Respondent

Before

Employment Judge Liz Ord

Date 13 March 2026

JUDGMENT

The claimant’s application dated 10 March 2026 for reconsideration of the judgment given on 9 March 2026 is refused.

REASONS

[1]By Rule 68 of the Employment Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 2024, the Employment Tribunal may, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the judgment may be confirmed, varied or revoked.

[2]The judgment will only be reconsidered where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. This allows the Employment Tribunal a broad discretion, which must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration but also the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation. Reconsiderations are therefore best seen as limited exceptions to the general rule that employment tribunal decisions should not be reopened and relitigated.

[3]If there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked, the application must be refused.

[4]The claimant’s application is set out in her 18 pages of submissions and is made on several grounds. I will address each of them.

[5]The first ground is that there were fundamental irregularities at the hearing. The thrust of the claimant’s argument is that Ms Grennan acted as the respondent’s advocate and the judge engaged with her without informing the claimant of Ms Grennan’s identity or her authority to act. This renders the hearing fundamentally unfair and void.

[6]Ms Grennan was the respondent’s counsel and she was identified as acting for the respondent at the start of the hearing. Whilst it may not have been said that she was the respondent’s barrister, this does not make the hearing unfair. The fact Ms Grennan was acting on behalf of the respondent demonstrates her authority to act. At no time during the hearing did the claimant enquire who Ms Grennan was.

[7]The second ground is administrative failure because the claimant’s case management updates may not have reached the judge.

[8]The claimant had made several applications and sent multiple supporting documents piecemeal to the tribunal. However, the only application before me at the hearing was the claimant’s application to strike out the response. In this regard, the respondent had submitted a 274 page bundle with all the relevant documents included. I gave the claimant the opportunity to inform me of anything additional she wished to rely on, but when she did so, it transpired that the documents were already in the respondent’s bundle. I did not need to see the claimant’s own physical bundles.

[9]The third ground is procedural unfairness in that the claimant attended from the tribunal premises whilst the respondent’s representative and the judge attended remotely. This was because the claimant mistakenly thought that the hearing was in person. The claimant says that this arrangement prevented her from submitting her skeleton argument and bundles.

[10]I explained that hearings were sometimes hybrid and I gave the claimant time to settle down and gather her thoughts before we started. She was given the opportunity of reading out any submissions or arguments that she wanted to make, and to inform me of any documents she wanted to refer to that were not already in the respondent’s bundle. She did not refer me to any such documents. It would have been a disproportionate response to adjourn the hearing when it was possible to adequately proceed on a hybrid basis.

[11]The fourth ground is that there was an error of law in that I failed to apply the binding authority of Force One Utilities v Hatfield [2008] EAT.

[12]I considered Force One Utilities v Hatfield and distinguished it as set out in the written reasons.

[13]The fifth ground is that I failed to apply the binding authority of Szucs v Greensquareaccord Ltd

[2025] EAT 110

, which says that abuse of process principles apply in employment tribunals.

[14]This was not disputed. The strike out grounds were properly considered. There was no abuse of process.

[15]The sixth ground is that I failed to apply the binding authority of Majrowski v Guy’s NHS Trust

[2006] UKHL 24

, which establishes vicarious liability for employee conduct.

[16]The respondent did not deny that it was vicariously responsible for its employees conduct at work. Therefore, there was no need to consider this case.

[17]The seventh ground is that I failed to consider material evidence, namely evidence of non-disclosure in bad faith, including a safeguarding email concerning a student.

[18]This has no bearing on the strike out application. In any event, I considered disclosure and, along with other case management orders, provided for it to take place at the appropriate time in the future. There was no specific disclosure application before me, and such an application would have been premature.

[19]The eighth ground is that I failed to consider the claimant’s unless order application.

[20]This has no bearing on the strike out application and it was not before me at this hearing.

[21]The ninth ground is that I made a wrongful assessment of proportionality in finding that a fair trial was possible. The claimant again refers to Force One Utilities and reiterates parts of her argument for strike out.

[22]I found that there was no intimidation after considering both parties’ submissions and the authority of Force One Utilities. The claimant’s disagreement with the judgment is not a good reason to reconsider.

[23]The tenth ground is inadequate reasoning.

[24]I provided proportionate reasoning orally at the hearing and I have also produced proportionate written reasons.

[25]In summary, there is nothing in the claimant’s application which justifies a reconsideration.

[26]Taking account of the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and fairly, I conclude that it is not necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the original judgment as there is no reasonable prospect of it being varied or revoked. Approved by JUDGMENT having been given orally on 9 March 2026 and the written record having been sent to the parties, subsequent to a request for written reasons in accordance with Rule 60(4) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, the following reasons are provided:

[1]The claimant made an application to strike out the respondent’s response under rule 38(1)(a)(b)(c) and (e) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure rules on the basis it was scandalous and vexatious, the manner in which proceedings had been conducted was scandalous, unreasonable and vexatious, the respondent had not complied with the rules, and a fair trial was no longer possible.

Background

[2]The claimant is still employed by the respondent at their school and, in its capacity as her employer, had been corresponding with her about various work issues and a subject access request. The claimant objected to this and demanded that the respondent only correspond with her through their solicitors.

[3]The respondent explained that their solicitors were only engaged to deal with specific matters concerning her employment tribunal claim, and not the day to day management of the claimant as an employee. The solicitors also explained to her that they were only instructed with respect to the litigation and could not correspondent with her about anything else. Relevant correspondence is at pages 168 to 177 of the bundle.

[4]The claimant had been off work and the respondent wanted to discuss her return to work at a meeting. The respondent wrote to her on 11 December 2025 requesting that she attend work from the following Monday 15 December 2025. The claimant refused to engage with her employer and wrote to their solicitors demanding that they advise their client to cease all direct contact with her. Relevant correspondence is at pages 180 to 189 of the bundle.

[5]The respondent decided they were going to stop the claimant’s pay due to her non-attendance at work and her refusal to engage with them. Due to the claimant’s non-engagement, they asked two school drivers to deliver a letter to her at her home address informing her about the stoppage of her pay. This was to ensure that the claimant received the letter.

[6]On 16 January 2026 the drivers knocked on the claimant’s door and tried to hand the letter to the claimant. The claimant told them they were not welcome and closed the door without taking the letter. One of the drivers telephoned the school to ask what to do, and the school told him to post it through the letter box, take a photo and leave, which he did.

[7]The thrust of the claimant’s submissions was that the correspondence from the respondent and having two men turn up at her home was intimidatory. She cited the case of Force One Utilities v Hatfield [2008]

UKEAT/0048/08

, where the respondent’s response was struck out on the basis of scandalous, unreasonable and vexatious conduct, a fair trial being impossible.

[8]The respondent’s submissions were that there was nothing intimidatory in their correspondence with the claimant and they were only trying to communicate with her on employment matters, which they were entitled to do. The drivers were instructed to personally deliver the letter because the claimant had previously denied receiving communications from the respondent and was not engaging with them. This letter was particularly important because it was informing the claimant about stopping her pay. They were just school bus drivers and did nothing intimidatory.

Conclusions

[9]I will consider each ground of rule 38(1) that the claimant relies on, in turn. Ground (a) – the response is scandalous or vexatious.

[10]The claimant made no submissions as to why she believed the response was scandalous or vexatious. It is not. This ground fails. Ground (b) – proceedings conducted in a scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious manner.

[11]There is nothing intimidatory in the respondent’s correspondence or that of their solicitors. The respondent was entitled to correspond directly with the claimant about work matters and her subject access request.

[12]It was because of the claimant’s behaviour, in not engaging with the respondent on work matters, that the school drivers were asked to personally deliver an important letter about her pay. They did nothing that could reasonably be classed as intimidatory.

[13]The case of Force One Utilities v Hatfield [2008]

UKEAT/0048/08

is distinguishable. In that case one of the respondent’s witnesses threatened the claimant, telling him to be careful how he slept at night, challenged the claimant to a fight, and blocked him in the car park. This is world’s away from the situation the claimant was in, which was of her own making. The respondent has not conducted proceedings in a scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious manner. This ground fails. Ground (c) – non-compliance with rules or orders.

[14]The claimant did not submit which rules or orders she was relying on and I can detect no breaches of any by the respondent. This ground fails. Ground (e) – a fair trial no longer possible.

[15]There is no reason to conclude that a fair trial is no longer possible. This ground fails. Approved by