J Proudman v Savage Cabbage Ltd and Mr J Worton: 6020927/2024
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Tribunal is as follows: All claims arising out of these proceedings against the second Respondent are dismissed. Approved by RESERVED JUDGMENT The judgment of the Tribunal is as follows: Unfair Dismissal[1]The complaint of unfair dismissal is well-founded. The Claimant was unfairly dismissed. The Respondent shall pay the Claimant the following sums:[2]A basic award of £6,830.50 and a compensatory award of £118,223 computing to a total award of £125,053.50. Basic Award[3]The Claimant was paid £2,307.69 gross per which exceeds the current statutory maximum which can be awarded for a week’s pay of £719.00. Accordingly, I shall use a weekly gross salary of £719.00 in assessing the quantum of the basic award in this case. The Claimant had completed 8 years continuous service with the Respondent and was 44 years old at the date of her dismissal. Accordingly, I find that the Claimant worked for 3 years for the Respondent whilst he was 41 or older and 5 years whilst she was under the age of 41, but older than 22 years old. Accordingly, she is entitled to a basic award computed as follows: 1.5 x £719 x 3 = £3,235.50 1 x £719 x 5 = £3,595.00 Total = £6,830.50 Compensatory Award Past Losses 4. 64 weeks (covering the period 4 September 2024 to 27 November 2025) at net pay of £1,507.77 which computes to £96,497.28.[5]Loss of employers contribution to pension 64 weeks covering the period 4 September 2024 to 27 November 2025) £1,625.65[6]Loss of health Insurance valued at £100/week which computes to £6,400. Subject to the following adjustments in the order laid out:[7]Income from work conducted since dismissal £8,000. Total Past Losses = £96,522.93 Future Loss[8]Loss of future earnings for a further 26 weeks computes to 26 x 1,507.77 = £39,202.02[9]Loss of future Employer pension contributions = 660.42[10]Loss of future health insurance premiums = £2,600[11]Total future loss = £42,462.44[12]Total Past and Future Loss = £96,522.93 + £42,462.44 = £138,985.37 nett[13]Loss of Statutory Rights: £500.00[14]Statutory cap on compensatory awards = £118,223[15]Total Compensatory award = £118,223[16]Total award for Unfair dismissal = £6,830.50 + £118,223 = £125,053.50[17]The Respondent was in breach of contract by dismissing the Claimant without notice.[18]The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of £12,062.16 nett, being damages for the breach of contract.[19]Unpaid notice of 2 months nett pay = 8 x £1,507.77 = £12,062.16 nettREASONS
[1]For clarity I should state that this judgment does not seek to address every point about which the parties have disagreed. It only deals with the points which are relevant to the issues which the Tribunal must consider in order to decide if a claim succeeds or fails. If I have not mentioned a particular point or piece of evidence it, it does not mean that I have overlooked it, it is simply because it is not relevant to the issues.[2]Throughout this judgement I shall refer to Mrs Proundman as the Claimant and Savage Cabbage Limited as the Respondent.[3]At the beginning of the proceedings the Tribunal raised the question of whether or not the party identified at that time as the second Respondent, Mr Jon Worton, was a proper party to these proceedings given that the complaint was for unfair dismissal and/or wrongful dismissal. The Claimant asserted that Mr Worton should remain as a party in the proceedings because he was the directing mind and will of the company that had ultimate control of the Respondent. However, she conceded that he was not her employer and, consequently, had no cause of action against him. The Tribunal explained to Claimant that she still would be able to question Mr Worton as a witness appearing on behalf of the Respondent so she would suffer no prejudice as a result of this. Accordingly, a judgement was issued dismissing all claims arising out of these proceedings against Mr Worton.[4]By a claim form submitted on 5 December 2024 the Claimant complains of unfair dismissal and/or wrongful dismissal with an effective date of termination of 4 September 2024.[5]The Claimant asserts she was employed by the Respondent from 1 June 2016 to 4 September 2024 ultimately holding the position of CEO at the time of her dismissal. The Respondent disputed in its grounds for resistance asserting that the Claimant’s employment with the Respondent commenced on 1 September 2023. However, when this issue was raised by the Tribunal the Respondent conceded this point.[6]At the beginning of the hearing the Tribunal was presented with a 21 page bundle prepared by the Claimant plus the employment contract between the Claimant and the Respondent and a copy of the termination letter between those parties provided by the Respondent.[7]The Claimant submitted a witness statement on her own behalf.[8]The Respondent submitted a witness statement from Mr Worton, Executive Chairman of Cannin Group Pty Limited.[9]These statements were provided in advance of the hearing and I took time to read them. Each witness was then questioned about the evidence contained in their statements.[10]At the commencement of the proceedings the Respondent requested permission to adduce evidence from at least one further witness in support of its case. The Claimant objected to this witness evidence being admitted in evidence on the grounds that it had been submitted far too late. After consideration the Tribunal declined the Respondent’s application to adduce this further witness evidence because:a. The Respondent had been in possession of the case management order detailing when witness evidence should be adduced for over six months and the deadline for the exchange of witness evidence had passed almost a month ago. No explanation as to why this evidence was being adduced so late was provided other than it might be helpful.b. No additional witness statement had been provided by the Respondent and consequently neither the Tribunal nor the Claimant had any prior warning of what the new witness was likely to say. This amounted to trial by ambush which is not in accordance with the overriding objective.c. The Claimant is litigant in person who cannot be expected to deal with new evidence at zero notice and prepare effective cross-examination. Consequently, to allow the evidence to be adduced would be severely prejudicial to the Claimant and not in accordance with the overriding objective.[11]Having read the Claimant’s witness statement it appeared that she was attempting to incorporate a claim that she had been dismissed because she had made protected disclosures in the form of two letters dated 8 July 2024 and 1 August 2024. These claims had not been incorporated in her grounds of complaint. It was explained to the Claimant that if she wished to pursue claims related to making protected disclosures she would need to make an application to amend her case. In addition the Claimant was warned that in the event she was able to persuade the Tribunal that it would be just and equitable to allow her to make the amendment it would have serious implications for the future conduct of these proceedings. In particular, it would be necessary to adjourn the current proceedings to allow time for her to amend her claim to incorporate the protected disclosure allegations which would then have to be sent to the Respondent to enable it to provide a response. The matter would then have to be set down for a further hearing which was unlikely to be listed before the spring of 2026. In the light of the potential delays that may be occasioned by an application to amend the Claimant indicated that she did not wish to do so. However, the Tribunal did accept that it would be permissible for her to make reference to the letters in question insofar as she was wishing to allege that the real reason for her dismissal was the sending of these letters rather than the fact that she had allegedly been in breach of the terms of her contract of employment.The Issues
[12]At the commencement of the hearing the Tribunal discussed with the Parties the issues that it would need to reach a decision upon in order to decide this case. The following were agreed: Unfair Dismissal[13]Was the Claimant dismissed? a. There was no dispute between the parties that the Claimant had been dismissed.[14]What was the reason for the dismissal?[15]Was the decision to dismiss a fair sanction, that is, was it within the range of reasonable responses open to a reasonable employer when faced with these facts?[16]Did the Respondent adopt a fair procedure?[17]If it did not use a fair procedure, would the Claimant have been fairly dismissed in any event and/or to what extent and when?[18]If the dismissal was unfair, did the Claimant contribute to the dismissal by culpable conduct?[19]Was the Claimant Wrongfully dismissed?[20]If so, was the Claimant entitled to Notice pay and, if so, for how long and at what rate of pay.Findings of Fact
[21]The following facts were found to be proven on the balance of probabilities after considering the whole of the evidence, both oral and documentary, and after considering the factual and legal submissions made by and on behalf of the respective parties.[22]The Claimant founded the Respondent which is a CBD wellness company on 8 June 2016. Both she and her husband were shareholders and were employed by the business.[23]The was Claimant also the major shareholder in a further business called Setala Limited (“Setala”), which was the parent company of the Respondent and also of a company called Savage Cabbage EU SRO which is a company registered in the Czech Republic.[24]Little Fish Labs Ltd (“LFL”) is a company incorporate by the Claimant and her husband on 27 July 2020 which produces and sells functional nutrition. The Claimant is a director of this company and holds 75% of the shares. In her testimony the Claimant confirmed that, in her role as a director of LFL she took part in board meetings and was involved with the governance of this company albeit, in her estimation, as a mentor for her son who she asserted had day-to-day conduct of the business.[25]Under cover of a share purchase agreement dated 18 September 2023 the Claimant and the other shareholder in Setala, sold all of their shares to Cannim Group Pty Limited (“Cannim”). It was agreed as part of the share purchase agreement that the Claimant would continue as an employee of the Respondent in the role of Chief Executive Officer. A contract of employment drafted by the Claimant to reflect this arrangement was signed by her on 1 September 2023 and on behalf of the Respondent by Mr Stuart Marchant on 30 October 2023. The agreement was effective as from 1 September 2023.[26]The contract included the following material clauses: “7. You can only work for someone else or hold another business interest if we give you advance written agreement. If you break this rule, we can dismiss you without notice or payment…. 41. We can terminate your employment without notice or payment for your notice period:….(b) if you seriously breach your employment obligations (including under this Agreement);…”[27]In the 12 month period following the execution of the contract of employment a dispute arose between the Claimant and the Respondent regarding the terms of the share purchase agreement (“SPA”) and compliance with the same.[28]On 8 July 2024 the Claimant wrote to Mr Andrew Yap, at Cannin, setting out a series of complaints relating to non-payment of sums allegedly due under the SPA, the failure to issue equity in Cannin Group to the Claimant and failure to make cash injections into Satala. The letter alleged the because of the breaches in the SPA, £1,745,000 was payable within seven days to the Claimant and the other former shareholder of the Respondent.[29]Mr Worton confirmed that this letter was shown to him by Mr Yap. He said that his reaction was that they needed to improve their payments to the Claimant, but he did not agree with all was being said in the letter. When asked what he did in response to receiving the letter Mr Worton was vague, but stated that he thought that there had been a telephone conversation with the Claimant on or about 8 July 2024 to discuss its contents. The Claimant vehemently denied that any such conversation ever took place. No reference to this conversation is contained in either the grounds of complaint or the grounds of resistance. In the absence of any corroborating evidence from the Respondent, I prefer the Claimant’s version of events on this issue.[30]On 9 July 2024 the Claimant was removed from the WhatsApp leadership team group by Mr Worton. Mr Worton explained that because Cannim was a global company they used the WhatsApp group to maintain communications between the key leadership personnel. Mr Worton explained that he had decided to remove the Claimant from the group because he wished to discuss concerns about the performance of the Respondent under her management with the other key team players. He strongly denied the letter of 8 July 2024 had anything to do with this decision and I accept his testimony on this issue.[31]The Claimant asserts that following her removal from the WhatsApp group she received no further communication from Mr Worton or anyone else at Cannim. Mr Worton explained that he had not spoken to her directly because their relationship had become somewhat strained by that stage due to the dispute over the SPA. However, he stated that he would have expected that communications with the Claimant would have continued through Mr Stuart Marsh, chief commercial officer of Cannin who was the Claimant’s direct line manager in relation to work with the Respondent. Once again no evidence of any such communication has been adduced by the Respondent and so I prefer the Claimant’s evidence in this regard.[32]On 1 August 2024 the Claimant sent a further letter to Mr Yap expressing concern that unless Cannin provided Satala with sufficient working capital there was the prospect that the company would become insolvent. The letter concluded by her advising Mr Yap that, unless Claimant received confirmation that Cannin was going to be providing funds on a regular basis, she would be forced to commence insolvency proceedings in relation to the Respondent.[33]In his testimony Mr Worton confirmed that this letter would have been shown to him, but he had no recollection of it until it was adduced in evidence in these proceedings. He explained that at that time he was coming under pressure from his board about the funds that were being injected into Setala in circumstances where, for reasons which are not pertinent to these proceedings, Cannin did not have either equity shares or governance/control in the form of directorships. Mr Worton went on to state that it was his recollection that around this time he felt it was necessary to try to carry out some form of investigation as to why the Respondent was not performing as expected.[34]It was Mr Worton’s testimony that a roundabout this time i.e. after the investigation had been commenced, he became aware of the existence of LFL and the Claimant’s 75% shareholding and directorship. The investigation also suggested that the Claimant had engaged two of the Respondent’s employees to work for LFL even though they were employees paid by the Respondent.[35]The Claimant explained that the two employees in question had worked at weekends and during the evenings i.e. outside of their normal hours of employment with the Respondent on a voluntary basis. No resources were taken from the first Respondent. No evidence has been adduced by the Respondent to support the allegation that these personnel were working other than on the basis set out by the Claimant and therefore I prefer her evidence on this issue.[36]On 3 September 2024 the Claimant was removed as a director of the Respondent. It seems by this time the requisite directorships had been created for Cannin which enabled this to take place.[37]On 4 September 2024 a termination letter was sent by Mr Worton in his capacity as a director of the Respondent terminating her employment without notice. The justification for terminating the Claimant was her involvement with LFL in breach of clause 7 of her employment contract.[38]Mr Worton admitted in his testimony that the Claimant was not given any opportunity to contest the decision to dismiss her or adduce evidence in mitigation. It was also conceded that she was not given any opportunity to appeal the decision to dismiss her. Mr Worton very frankly conceded that this was not a fair procedure.[39]The Claimant’s arguments regarding the alleged breach of contract were as follows:a. The Claimant asserted that her interests in LFL were known to several individuals within the Cannin Group. In particular, Mr Lachlan Cameron, Chief Executive Officer, Mr Stuart Marsh, Chief Commercial Officer, Mr Tim Henley, director of the Respondent, Cannim and Setala. Moreover, Mr Cameron actually invested funds into LFL which was subsequently turned into a loan. In the grounds for resistance the Respondent accepts that these individuals were made aware of the existence of LFL before the SPA was executed, but it was disputed whether they knew the true nature of the Claimant’s interest in this company. None of these individuals were called by the Respondent to give evidence as to their actual knowledge of the Claimant’s involvement with LFL prior to or at the time of the employment contract was executed. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary I must accept the Claimant’s testimony.b. The Claimant asserted in her grounds of complaint and in her testimony that she had been assured that Cannim was not concerned with her interest in LFL and did not consider LFL to be in competition with the Respondent. This allegation is denied in the grounds for resistance. Mr Worton was very clear in his testimony that he was not aware of LFL or the Claimant’s involvement with the same until sometime in August 2024. I accept Mr Worton’s testimony in this regard, but his lack of knowledge may not have reflected what was actually known within Cannim at the time the employment contract signed.c. The Claimant asserts that her involvement with LFL was very limited and that she acted purely as a mentor for her son. She received no remuneration for her involvement LFL. In the grounds resistance the Respondent notes that the Claimant’s son was not appointed as a director until 1 July 2023 by which time the company had been running for almost 3 years. There is also reference to the fact that the Claimant is named as a team member on the LFL website. It is suggested that this would indicate that the Claimant had a more significant role in the day-to-day running and governance of LFL and she claimed. Given that the Claimant has admitted that she was a director and took part in board meetings I am satisfied that she did have a role in the governance of LFL.d. During her testimony the Claimant laid great emphasis on the fact that she had drafted her contract of employment with the Respondent. When asked directly she confirmed that she had drafted the wording of clause 7. Her assertion was that it would have been inconceivable for her to draft this clause in the way that she did if she believed that her directorship and shareholding in LFL would have effectively had put in breach of the same exposing her to the risk of summary dismissal.The Law
[40]In the event that I am requested to provide written reasons for my judgement I will set out in more detail the statutory provisions and authorities that I took into consideration when formulating this judgement. However, for the purposes of this oral judgement I shall simply list those judgements and authorities.[41]Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) gives employees the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Enforcement of this right is by way of complaint to an Employment Tribunal under s111 of the ERA 1996.[42]Guidance on whether a dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair is contained in Section 98 of the ERA1996 which provides that: (1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show— (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is … some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— (a) depends on whether in the circumstances … the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.[43]Chartbrook Ltd and anor v Persimmon Homes Ltd and anor 2009 1 AC 1101, HL.[44]Guidance on the amount of any compensatory award is contained in section 123(1) of the ERA which states: “…The amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the Tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal insofar as that loss is attributable to action taken by the employer.”[45]The first issue I have to deal with is whether not the Claimant’s dismissal on 4 September 2024 was potentially fair within the meaning of s.98 of the ERA. The Respondent’s case is that it is potentially fair insofar as the alleged breach of contract by the Claimant permitted her dismissal without notice. Therefore, the reason for her dismissal was some other substantive reason within the meaning of section 98(1)(b) of the ERA.[46]The Claimant disputes this on two bases:a. She asserts that the real reason for her dismissal was her threats to initiate proceedings arising out of the SPA and/or put the Respondent into liquidation as were contained in her letters to Cannim of 8 July 2024 and 1 August 2024. orb. Clause 7 of the contract of employment does not reflect parties understanding of the nature and extent of the Claimant’s involvement with LFL at the time that the contract of employment was executed.[47]Dealing with the first of these allegations, I take note of the fact that the Claimant’s grounds of complaint were drafted with the assistance of solicitors which contained a comprehensive breakdown of events. This includes reference to letters of 8 July and 1 August. However, there is no reference whatsoever in the grounds of complaint to any allegation that the true reason for her dismissal was the fact that she was threatening proceedings and/or the insolvency of the Respondent.[48]I am also cognisant of the evidence from Mr Worton about his reaction to both of these letters. There was no indication in his testimony that he reacted negatively towards the Claimant purely on account of the content of these letters. Indeed he made the point that if the letters had in his assessment given him grounds to fire the Claimant, he would have done so at the time or shortly after receipt of the letters. In fact the Claimant was not dismissed until over a month after the second letter was sent.[49]In his testimony Mr Worton denied that the reason for the Claimant’s dismissal had anything to do with the two letter sent in the months prior to her departure from the first Respondent.[50]Taking all of the above into consideration I am not persuaded that the Claimant was dismissed because she sent the letters of 8 July and 1 August.[51]The second issue really distils down to whether, on its true interpretation, clause 7 of the contract of employment was intended to cover business interests held by the Claimant before or at the commencement of the contract of employment.[52]The so-called “golden rule” of contractual interpretation is that that the words of the contract should be interpreted in their grammatical and ordinary sense in context, except to the extent that some modification is necessary to avoid absurdity, inconsistency or ‘repugnancy’. The wording of clause 7 is, on its face, unambiguous insofar as it states: “You can only work for someone else or hold another business interest if we give you advance written agreement if you break this rule, we can dismiss you without notice or payment.”[53]It is not disputed by the Claimant that she was the owner of 75% of the shares in LFL and that she was a director who took part in the governance of that company. It seems irrefutable that this must constitute a business interest within the meaning of clause 7. However, it is important that the interpretation of contractual provisions should be taken in context. Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd suggested that this would be achieved by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of:a. The natural and ordinary meaning of the clause,b. any other relevant provisions of the contract ,c. the overall purpose of the clause and the contract,d. the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, ande. commercial common sense, butf. disregarding subjective evidence of any party’s intentions.’[54]There are three issues which are pertinent to the interpretation of clause 7.[55]The first of these is the purpose of clause 7 in the contract. Clearly it is not in any employer’s best interests for its senior staff to have business interests in other entities which may distract them from the work which they are being employed to do. However, not all business interests would create such a problem which is why the clause includes a provision permitting such holdings, providing they have been approved by the employer. Thus the overall intention behind the clause is for there to be transparency between the employer and the employee as to what business interests the employee holds. With the further risk that any withholding of information relating to such interests carries the potential sanction of immediate dismissal.[56]In this instance I have determined that the Respondent was aware of the Claimant’s interests in LFL prior to and at the time that the contract of employment was entered into. Given that they had this knowledge, there can be no question that the Claimant was seeking to withhold information about such holdings which is the harm this clause is intended to address. The purpose and intention of this clause is to discourage and/or punish covert holdings and other business interests by employees. It does not seem equitable that it should be used as a basis for dismissing an employee in respect of holdings which she had prior to entering into the contract and which were held with the knowledge of her employer.[57]The second of these are facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time the document was executed. Although the evidence exclusively comprised the Claimant’s testimony, I have accepted that the Respondent was aware of her interests and holdings in LFL prior to and at the time that the contract of employment was executed. The reasons I have stated above this knowledge is material to the interpretation of clause 7.[58]The third is commercial commonsense. Whilst outwardly innocuous, a serious flaw in the drafting of clause 7 is that it does not address the circumstance that the Claimant found herself in in relation to LFL. Clause 7 requires the Claimant to secure advance written permission before holding another business interest. However, the Claimant held her interests in LFL prior to the execution of the contract of employment. In effect this meant that it would be impossible for her to secure advance written agreement and thus rendered it impossible for her to comply with its terms. It makes no commercial sense, in circumstances where this Tribunal has determined that the parties were aware of the Claimant’s interest in LFL, to put her in a situation where as soon as she executed the contract of employment she was effectively in breach of its terms.[59]In the circumstances it seems to me that the only sensible commercial interpretation of clause 7 can be that the requirement to secure written agreement in advance for other business interests can only apply to business interests which may potentially arise after the date of the contract of employment.[60]Applying this interpretation I find that the Respondent was not entitled to dismiss the Claimant without notice under the provisions of clause 7 because of her interest in LFL and, therefore, it was not a fair reason for dismissal under provisions of section 98 of the ERA.[61]Therefore it is not necessary for me to consider further with the dismissal fell within the range of reasonable responses open to the Respondent or whether a fair procedure was conducted in relation to that dismissal.[62]My findings above also mean that the claim for wrongful dismissal must also succeed. The Claimant was dismissed in breach of contract without notice and is therefore entitled to the notice pay provided for in her contract of two months pay.Remedy
[63]Following her dismissal the Claimant explained that she had been attempting to secure alternative positions within the industry. To date she has had eight interviews, but it seems that because the CBD sector is relatively small most prospective employers were aware of her dispute with Cannim in relation to the SRA and the fact that she had been dismissed from her role as CEO of the Respondent. She has been advised by head-hunters that this has tainted her within the sector making extra be difficult for her to secure positions.[64]In addition to this issue the Claimant suffers with health issues requiring fairly frequent hospitalisation. This is hampered both her ability to look for work and her ability to secure new employment. Notwithstanding this she has managed to secure some consultancy work, but this has been short-term and irregular.[65]She has signed up with head-hunters and is active with industry players within the CBD sector including liaison with parliamentary groups. Her intention being to maintain a high profile in the hope that, should opportunities arise, she will be in a position to take advantage of them.[66]She advises that she has an MA in education, but this has actually been an issue for her when applying for new positions because she has been construed as being overqualified to take on the roles that she was seeking to undertake.[67]Due to the lack of success and in securing alternative employment, the Claimant is now of the view that it will be necessary for her to retrain and try and find employment in alternative sectors. What form the training was to take and its duration were not specified.[68]The Claimant asserts that it will take a further 48 months to retrain and to secure employment at a salary equivalent to her former position. Whilst this Tribunal accepts that the Claimant will be facing difficulties for the reasons outlined above, it does not regarded it as just and equitable to impose an obligation on the Respondent to compensate her for her loss of future earnings for such a long period. It is not possible for this Tribunal to assess with any degree of confidence what future employment prospects may arise for the Claimant, but a further period of six months will provide a reasonable period of time for her to secure alternative employment. The judgment of the Tribunal is as follows:[69]The complaint of unfair dismissal is well-founded. The Claimant was unfairly dismissed. The Respondent shall pay the Claimant the following sums:[70]A basic award of £6,830.50 and a compensatory award of £118,223 computing to a total award of £125,053.50. Basic Award[71]The Claimant was paid £2,307.69 gross per which exceeds the current statutory maximum which can be awarded for a week’s pay of £719.00. Accordingly, I shall use a weekly gross salary of £719.00 in assessing the quantum of the basic award in this case. The Claimant had completed 8 years continuous service with the Respondent and was 44 years old at the date of his dismissal. Accordingly, I find that the Claimant worked for 3 years for the Respondent whilst he was 41 or older and 5 years whilst he was under the age of 41, but older than 22 years old. Accordingly, he is entitled to a basic award computed as follows: 1.5 x £719 x 3 = £3,235.50 1 x £719 x 5 = £3,595.00 Total = £6,830.50 Compensatory Award Past Losses 72. 64 weeks (covering the period 4 September 2024 to 27 November 2025) at net pay of £1,507.77 which computes to £96,497.28.[73]Loss of employers contribution to pension 64 weeks covering the period 4 September 2024 to 27 November 2025) £1,625.65[74]Loss of health Insurance valued at £100/week which computes to £6,400. Subject to the following adjustments in the order laid out:[75]Income from work conducted since dismissal £8,000. Total Past Losses = £96,522.93 Future Loss[76]Loss of future earnings for a further 26 weeks computes to 26 x 1,507.77 = £39,202.02[77]Loss of future Employer pension contributions = 660.42[78]Loss of future health insurance premiums = £2,600[79]Total future loss = £42,462.44[80]Total Past and Future Loss = £96,522.93 + £42,462.44 = £138,985.37 nett[81]Loss of Statutory Rights: £500.00[82]Statutory cap on compensatory awards = £118,223[83]Total Compensatory award = £118,223[84]Total award for Unfair dismissal = £6,830.50 + £118,223 = £125,053.50[85]The Respondent was in breach of contract by dismissing the Claimant without notice.[86]The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of £12,062.16 nett, being damages for the breach of contract.[87]Unpaid notice of 2 months nett pay = 8 x £1,507.77 = £12,062.16 nett Approved by