Mr M Ramzi v Great Harvest Foods Ltd: 6020540/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6020540/2024

Between

Mr M RamziClaimant

Great Harvest Foods LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Hallen- sitting alone

In person for claimant

Mr P. Ward (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 29 August 2025

JUDGMENT

It is the judgment of the Employment Tribunal that: -

[1]The Claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal for making a protected disclosure under Section 103(a) Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) contrary to Section 47(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is unfounded and dismissed.

[2]The Claimant’s claim for unpaid holiday is unfounded and is dismissed.

[3]The Claimant’s claim for unpaid notice pay is unfounded and dismissed as he was justifiably dismissed for gross misconduct.

[4]The Claimant’s claim for unlawful deduction of wages under Section 13 of the ERA succeeds and he is awarded £1,435.00.

REASONS

[1]This matter came in front of Employment Judge Moor on 23 April 2015 in a Closed Preliminary Hearing at which Judge Moor listed the issues for hearing and gave directions for preparation for the substantive hearing which was listed before a judge sitting alone (pursuant to the presidential guidance on panel composition of 2024) on 17 and 18 June 2025 which was subsequently extended by one day to 28 August 2025.

[2]In the Case Summary provided by Judge Moor to the parties on 30 April 2025 she confirmed that the Claimant’s claims were automatic unfair dismissal for having made protected disclosures, unlawful deduction of wages due to unpaid wages, breach of contract relating to unpaid notice pay, and unpaid accrued but untaken holiday pay on termination.

[3]In relation to the claim for automatic unfair dismissal she set out the issues for me to determine and at the outset of the hearing, the parties agreed that the issues were as set out by Judge Moor at paragraph 5 of her case management summary. I had to decide if the Claimant made one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 verbally to Mr Irudayaraj, his manager:3.1 at about the beginning of September 2024, saying to him on 2 occasions that no VAT had been charged on all the sales taking place.

3.2 at about the beginning of September 2024, about a week after the first disclosures, saying to him that sales were not shown in the accounting book and that no clear book-keeping for sales was taking place on the site.

3.3 at least three times from the beginning of his employment, the last time being 2 weeks before dismissal, saying to him that staff were not given any basic food training and there was no health and safety record keeping.

3.4 Judge Moor noted that in clarifying the claim the Claimant told her he was concerned about staff not being paid the minimum wage but did not rely on this as something he disclosed to the employer.

[4]Did the Claimant believe at the time the disclosure was made in the public interest? The Claimant will say as follows: -4.1 that it is the public interest to pay VAT because not to do so defrauds the tax authorities that are public authorities; the lack of accounting meant that the restaurant was hiding the fact that VAT wasn’t being paid and it was in the public interest for VAT to be paid.

4.2 the Claimant had read about fatalities caused by lack of food hygiene and witnessed negligence by staff in relation to a nut allergy and was concerned about the safety of members of the public to whom the Respondent was offering its service.

4.3 Was that belief reasonable?

4.4 Did the Claimant believe it tended to show (‘the relevant wrongdoing’) that: -

4.5 In relation to issue

3.1 — that the legal obligation to charge VAT was being broken.

4.6 In relation to

3.2 — that the breach of the above obligation was being deliberately concealed.

4.7 In relation to

3.3 — that the health or safety of any individual had been or was likely to be endangered by the failure to follow food hygiene standards and give accurate information to those who had food allergies.

4.8 Was that belief reasonable?

4.9 If the Claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected disclosure because it was made to the Claimant’s employer.

[5]The issues for me to determine in respect of the automatic unfair dismissal claim were as follows: -5.1 What was the reason or principal reason for dismissal?

5.2 The Claimant says the reason (or principal reason) was because he made public interest disclosures, see below (‘blew the whistle’). If so, the Claimant will be regarded as unfairly dismissed.

5.3 The Respondent says it was conduct, namely that the Claimant misappropriated funds from a catering event on 5 October 2024. The Tribunal will need to decide whether the Respondent genuinely believed the Claimant had committed misconduct.

5.4 If the Claimant does not succeed with his protected interest disclosure dismissal claim, then he does not have the qualifying service to bring an ordinary unfair dismissal claim.

5.5 As the Claimant did not have two years continuous service the burden of proof was on the Claimant to show jurisdiction and therefore to prove that the reason or if more than one of the principal reasons for the dismissal was the protected disclosures?

[6]In respect of wrongful dismissal, a dismissal without notice would be a breach of contract unless the employer can show that the employee was dismissed for a prior repudiation of contract. I would have to determine if the conduct of the Claimant amounted to a repudiatory breach of contract based on the evidence available to the Respondent at the time of dismissal.

[7]With regard to the claim for unlawful deduction of wages, I had to decide if under Section 13 ERA 1996, the Respondent was entitled to make a deduction of £1,435.00 from the Claimant’s final salary with respect to monies paid into the Claimant’s bank account by the Respondent’s client in or around 5 October 2025 and in particular if the deduction was required or authorised by statute, or by a provision in the worker’s contract advised in writing, or by the worker’s prior written consent.

[8]In relation to unpaid holiday pay, it was for the Claimant to prove that he was not allowed to take statutory holiday that he was entitled to and as such had accrued holiday pay that was not paid to him at the termination of his employment.

[9]I had in front of me the Claimant’s bundle of documents made up of 148 pages and the Respondent’s bundle of documents made up of 134 pages. The parties had not agreed a bundle of documents for the hearing despite directions made by Judge Moor that an agreed bundle should be used. In addition, whilst the Claimant had prepared a written witness statement (3 pages) that he had not exchanged it with the Respondent nor printed copies out for use at the hearing. During the reading time I allowed myself to review the bundles, I ordered the Claimant to provide a copy of the statement to myself and to the Respondent. The Respondent’s counsel did not object to this as it was aware of the case it had to address, and he had sufficient time during the reading break to prepare his cross examination. The Claimant gave oral evidence and was subject to cross-examinations and was questioned by me. The Respondent called two witnesses namely Mr Martin Irudayaraj, the senior manager and Dismissing Officer, Mr Senthilkumar Krishnan employed by the Respondent as the Floor Manager at the restaurant. All of these witnesses produced written witness statements and were subject to cross-examination and questions from me.

Facts

[10]In this case, I heard a great deal of conflicting evidence from the Claimant and the Respondent’s witnesses. On balance, I preferred the evidence of the Respondent which appeared to me to be more consistent than that of the Claimant and such consistency mirrored the documentation within the bundles of documents that were produced by the parties for me to consider.

[11]The Respondent is a small business and owns two restaurants and catering businesses based at restaurants called Chenai Dosa. It employs 3 employees in total. There are two branches. One is in Chelmsford, and the other one is in East Ham. Chenai Dosa is a franchise business, and the franchise owner is Edward Issac who owns 14 branches in the UK. He provides chefs and other employees for the restaurants that are paid by the franchise owner. The franchise owner provided 7 employees to the Respondent for the Chelmsford restaurant. The franchise owner also provides 4 employees for the East Ham restaurant. The Respondent only employees three direct employees which included the Claimant at the relevant time. The Claimant was not employed by the franchise owner but by the Respondent.

[12]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as a delivery driver from 4 August 2024 until 5 October 2024, a period of just over 2 months. The Claimant asserted that he was employed as a manager of the restaurant in Chelmsford and not a delivery driver commencing employment at the beginning of July 2024. I did not accept that he was employed at the beginning of July as the WhatsApp evidence produced by him and the Respondent showed quite clearly that the majority of the correspondence between the parties occurred in August and September. This correspondence showed that the Claimant was undertaking mainly deliveries and food shopping on behalf of the Respondent and did not undertake managerial responsibilities. Furthermore, the Claimant’s own WhatsApp correspondence showed limited interaction with the Respondent during July (for only four days) that accorded with his own evidence that he was assisting the Respondent in a casual capacity from January 2024 until he was able to provide the Respondent with his P45 form and authority to work from the Home Office in August 2024. He had previously been working for a pizza business.

[13]I was referred to the Claimant’s own message to the Respondent dated 1 August 2024 in which he provided his P45 form from his previous employer and confirmed his permission from the Home Office to work until 2025. I was also referred to two pay slips provided to me by the Respondent for the months of August and September that showed the Claimant’s pay for two months along with a P45 form from the Respondent that also confirmed payment for two months pay. That P45 form was dated 16 October 2024 showing the termination date as 5 October 2024. Based on all of this evidence, I find that the Claimant was employed as a delivery driver for two months and received this payment for from the Respondent for the two months that he worked. His commencement date was 4 August 2024, and his termination date was 5 October 2024.

[14]The Respondent gave evidence that it made a deduction from the Claimant’s salary on 7 October of £1,435.00 as a consequence of monies directly received from a customer into the Claimant's bank account. The Claimant did not dispute this payment but did dispute that he did not consent to this deduction from his final salary. He also confirmed that he did not receive a written contract of employment, and the Respondent admitted this to be the case. The Claimant was accordingly paid his final salary on 7 October for £1,258.50 that was £2,693.50 less £1,435.50 that was banked by the Claimant from the customer. The Claimant did not give prior authority to the Respondent to make such a deduction, and the Respondent agreed that this was the case.

[15]The Claimant attended a Case Management Hearing on 25 April 2025 before Employment Judge Moor at which the judge set out the legal claims and issues as identified above by me in the background section of this judgement. In the Claimant’s witness statement that was produced on the day of the hearing, he made no reference to the items identified by Judge Moor at paragraph 5.1 of her summary that the Claimant said at the hearing before her were protected disclosures made orally to Mr Irudayaraj in September 2024. These the Claimant said at the time amounted to qualifying disclosures and that because he made those qualifying disclosures, he was dismissed by the Respondent. However, his witness statement made no reference to those disclosures identified by Judge Moor. Instead, the Claimant in his witness statement referred only to ‘speak about the unfairness for my colleague and in the interest of public safety which led to the direct consequences of my dismissal’. When he was asked in cross examination as to what he meant by this, the Claimant stated that he complained about health and safety for two colleagues who were not looked after by the Respondent due to pain they were suffering whilst at work as a consequence of toothache and an injured arm. He argued that the employees should have been given time off for their health and safety. The Claimant said that he made these oral disclosures regarding his colleague’s health and safety to Mr. Irudayaraj. In his witness statement he did not say when he made these disclosures, nor did he do so when he was cross examined. He made no reference to the disclosures to Judge Moor at the Case Management Hearing even though the judge spent a considerable amount of time going through them with the Claimant at the time of the preliminary hearing to ensure that they were correct. At no stage after the preliminary hearing did the Claimant make an application to amend the judge’s summary of the legal issues to be determined at the substantive hearing in front of me nor did he seek to make an application to amend his claim.

[16]The Respondent denied that the Claimant made the oral disclosures identified by Judge Moor in any event despite the Claimant producing no evidence to support them. I also find that the Claimant did not make any disclosures regarding the health and safety of his colleagues. The Claimant told me that these two colleagues left the employment of the Respondent, but the Respondent indicated that they were still employed by the franchise owner at the Chelmsford restaurant. The Claimant produced WhatsApp messages during the course of his short employment with the Respondent from August until the end of September. These messages did not make any reference to any of the public interest disclosures set out by Judge Moor nor did they make any reference to the health and safety of the two colleagues that the Claimant referred to for the first time at the Tribunal hearing. The final message that Claimant sent to the Respondent for his WhatsApp messages was dated 22 November 2024 in which he only referred to unpaid wages. His message made no reference to any public interest disclosures made by him that he said led to his dismissal. Accordingly, I preferred the evidence of the Respondent and find that the Claimant did not make any of the oral disclosures as identified by Judge Moor nor did he make any disclosures related to the health and safety of his colleagues.

[17]The Respondent produced a letter of dismissal dated 5 October 2024 that it said it attempted to give to the Claimant on that date following a short meeting that led to the Claimant's dismissal. The Respondent said that it did not give this letter to the Claimant directly following that meeting because he did not accept it. The Respondent said that the letter and the P45 form was posted to the Claimant on around 17 October 2024. The Claimant said that this letter of dismissal was entirely manufactured by the Respondent and that the first time he saw it was in the discovery process for this Employment Tribunal hearing. I preferred the evidence of the Respondent. I find that the Respondent tried to give the letter of dismissal to the Claimant following a short meeting on 5 October 2024 but that the Claimant did not accept it. Accordingly, the letter of dismissal was posted to the Claimant along with his P45 form on or around 17 October 2024. I note that the P45 form was dated 16 October 2024 which accorded with the Respondent’s evidence to me that it was posted to the Claimant shortly after this date.

[18]The Respondent dismissed the Claimant for serious misconduct on 5 October 2024 with immediate effect because the Claimant admitted that he received payment from a customer directly into his own personal bank account for catering services provided by the Respondent company. Such a payment directly into the Claimant’s own a bank account was not authorised by the Respondent and was treated by the Respondent as a very serious matter and a clear breach of trust and confidence that gave the Respondent no choice but to terminate the Claimant’s employment without notice. The Respondent treated the Claimant’s conduct as a misappropriation of company funds.

[19]At the hearing before me, the Claimant admitted that he received these funds directly into his own bank account but sought to persuade me that the Respondent permitted this. He could point to no evidence where the Respondent gave prior consent for this to be done, and the Respondent disputed that it ever gave such authority to the Claimant. Even though this is a relatively small business, I find that even an unsophisticated employer would not have given authority to an employee to receive company funds directly into their own bank account. Furthermore, in the absence of any evidence from the Claimant pointing to such consent, I find that the Claimant did not have authority for the clients’ funds to be paid into his own bank account. I find that this was the reason for his dismissal and that the Claimant admitted that the funds were paid directly into his bank account without authorization. I was also referred to a letter from the Respondent’s client dated 24 June 2025, confirming that the client used the Respondents catering services on 5 October 2024 and transferred a sum of £1,435.00 directly to the Claimant’s bank account giving details of that bank account and confirming that it was done at the instigation of the Claimant. This piece of evidence supported the Respondent’s contention that the money was paid into the Claimant's own bank account from one of its customers.

[20]The Claimant did not produce or lead any evidence that he did not take any statutory holiday during his short service, nor that he was prevented from doing so by the Respondent nor what if any accrued holiday pay he was entitled to. His witness statement made no reference at all to holiday pay.

Law

[21]The relevant section of the Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 is section 43 which defines the meaning of protected disclosure. Section 43(a) says as follows: “In this Act a “Protected Disclosure” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43(b)) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43(c) – 43(h).” 43(b) – Disclosure qualifying for protection: “(i) In this part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure (is made in the public interest) and, tends to show one or more of the following –(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or likely to be committed;

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject;

(d) that the health and safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered;

(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or

(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the proceeding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.” 43(c) – Disclosure to Employer or other responsible person: “(i) A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure … (a) to his employer ... 103 A ERA - An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employer made a protective disclosure.”

[22]The basic issues for the Tribunal were: -22.1 Was there a protective disclosure or disclosures?

22.2 Was that protected disclosure/were those protected disclosures the reason or principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal? Test for protected disclosures

[23]Any such disclosure must be:-23.1 “Disclosure of information”

23.2 Must be a “qualifying disclosure i.e. one that in the reasonable belief of the worker making it is made in the public interest and

23.3 Tends to show that one or more of six “relevant failures” has occurred or is likely to occur.

23.4 Must be made in accordance with one of the specified methods of disclosure.

[24]A disclosure may concern new information, in the sense of telling any person something of which they were previously unaware, or it can simply involve drawing a person’s attention to a matter of which they are already aware (Section 43(l)(3), ERA 1996). The worker making a disclosure must actually “convey facts”, even if those facts are already known to the recipient (Cavendish Munroe Professional Risks Management Limited v Geduld

(2010) IRLR38

EAT at Paragraph 24 and 25).

[25]In Kilraine the London Borough of Wandsworth

2018 EWCA Civ 1436

, the Court of Appeal held that “information” in the context of Section 43(b) is capable of covering statements which might also be characterised as allegations. Rather than introducing a rigid dichotomy between information and allegations, the EAT in Cavendish Munroe had merely held that a statement which was general and void of specific factual content could not be said to be a disclosure of information tending to show a relevant failure. The word “information” in Section 43(b)(i) has to be read with the qualifying phrase “tends to show”. For a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure, it has to have sufficient actual content and be sufficiently specific as to be capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in Section 43B(i)(a) – (f).

[26]The disclosure will only be a qualifying disclosure if the worker also reasonably believes that the disclosure is in the public interest. The ambit of this requirement has been recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Chesterton Global Limited (t/a Chestertons) v Nurmohamed

(2017) EWCA Civ 979

. The Tribunal has to determine(a) whether the worker subjectively believed at the time that the disclosure was in the public interest and

(b) if so, whether that belief was objectively reasonable. The legislation does not define what “the public interest” means in the context of qualifying disclosure although Employment Tribunals must be intended to apply it “as a matter of educated impression’ looking at the following factors: -

26.1 The numbers in the group whose interests the disclosure served.

26.2 The nature of interests affected and the extent in which they are affected by the wrong being disclosed.

26.3 The nature of the alleged wrong doing disclosed.

26.4 The identity of the alleged wrong doer. Reason for Dismissal

[27]An employee who lacks the requisite continuous service to claim ordinary unfair dismissal has the burden of showing, on the balance of probabilities, that the reason for dismissal was an automatically unfair reason (Smith v Hayle Town Council

1978 ICR 996

) Court of Appeal. The EAT in Ross v Eddy Stobbart Limited EAT0068/30 confirmed that the same approach applied to whistle blowing cases. The Claimant must show that her alleged protected disclosures were the principal reason for his dismissal. Wrongful Dismissal/breach of contract

[28]In respect of wrongful dismissal, a dismissal without notice will be a breach of contract unless the employer can show that the employee was dismissed for a prior repudiation of contract or, a prior unaffirmed repudiatory act where the act was unknown at the time of dismissal: Williams v Leeds United Football Club

[2015] EWHC 376 (QB)

[2015] IRLR 383

. Unlawful Deduction from Wages.

[29]Section 13 ERA 1996 provides that an employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker so employed unless the deduction is required or authorised by statute, or by a provision in the worker’s contract advised in writing, or by the worker’s prior written consent. Certain deductions are excluded from protection by virtue of s14 or s23(5) of the ERA. 10. Under Section 13(3) ERA 1996 there is a deduction from wages where the total amount of any wages paid on any occasion by an employer is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion. Holiday Pay

[30]The Working Time Regulations 1998 give workers a minimum entitlement to paid holiday. The minimum entitlement is to 20 days (4 weeks) paid holiday each year, plus an additional 8 days (1.6 weeks) per year, which can include bank holidays (regulations 13 and 13A).

[31]On termination of employment, a worker is entitled to receive pay in lieu of any unused annual leave (regulation 14). It is for the Claimant to adduce evidence to the Tribunal to prove his claim. Tribunal’s Conclusions

[32]As specified above in the facts section of this judgment, I preferred the witness testimony of the Respondent over that of the Claimant. The evidence of the Respondent mirrored more accurately the documentation that was produced in the trial bundles of documents. Although the Claimant was an intelligent man and represented himself at the hearing in a competent manner, his evidence was vague and lacking in specificity especially in relation to his assertion that his dismissal was automatically unfair as a consequence of oral protected disclosures that he said that he made to the Respondent. His oral evidence to the Tribunal was also inconsistent and changeable according to circumstances. I was not persuaded that his evidence to me was credible or satisfactory.

[33]Dealing with the claim for automatic unfair dismissal first, I conclude that his claim must fall at the first hurdle. It was for him to prove that he did make protected disclosures in the manner that he asserted and that were identified by Employment Judge Moor at the Case Management Hearing on 23 April 2025 at which the Claimant fully participated. Unfortunately for him, the witness statement that he produced at the last minute did not deal with any of the alleged protected disclosures identified by Judge Moor. His evidence to the Tribunal was entirely lacking any detail or specifics as to the defined protected disclosures set out in the Case Management Order. Indeed, there was no reference to any of the alleged protected disclosures set out by Judge Moor. The only reference in his evidence was to the health and safety of two colleagues who he said suffered from toothache and an injured arm and should have been given time off work on sick leave for health and safety reasons. These two alleged protected disclosures were not mentioned to Judge Moor as part of the issues for the hearing in front of me and the Claimant did not seek to amend his claim at the outset of the hearing nor during the course of the hearing. They amounted to two new allegations never mentioned by the Claimant before. The Claimant did not specify when he made such disclosures to the Respondent either in his witness statement or when asked in cross examination.

[34]When I asked the Respondent whether the Claimant made any oral protected disclosures as set out in Judge Moor’s Case Management Order, the Respondent stated that no such oral disclosures were made. To the Respondent’s credit, there was one reference to an incident regarding cockroaches that was reported by the Claimant, and the Respondent told me that this was dealt with but no other instances that could amount to public interest disclosures were ever raised by the Claimant. I also noted that from the numerous WhatsApp messages that were referred to me by the Claimant, there was no reference made by him to any protected public interest disclosures let alone the ones that he referenced to Judge Moor or that related to his colleague’s health raised at the Tribunal before me for the first time. In addition, the WhatsApp message sent to the Respondent on 22 November 2024 in which the Claimant demanded unpaid wages made no reference to his dismissal being related to any protected public interest disclosures that he said that he made failing which he would make a claim in this Tribunal. This email was sent shortly before he filed his Claim Form for automatic unfair dismissal for whistleblowing to the Employment Tribunal on 2 December 2024. Had the Claimant made such disclosures that he said led to his dismissal, I would have expected him to have raised them at the time he said he was owed pay on 22 November 2024 especially if he alleged that these disclosures were the reason for his dismissal. It is telling me that he did not do so at this time especially as he was contemplating litigation for this very reason in the very near future. For the above reasons, I find that the Claimant did not make any protected public interest disclosures to the Respondent leading to his dismissal. Accordingly, his claim for automatic unfair dismissal must fail.

[35]In relation to the reason for the Claimant’s dismissal, I find that it was gross misconduct in that the Claimant accepted client moneys for company catering services directly into his own bank account without authorization or consent from the Respondent. I find that the fact of this misconduct was sufficient for the Respondent to terminate the Claimant’s employment without a payment of one weeks statutory notice pay that he would otherwise have been entitled to had he not committed a repudiatory breach of his contract of employment. Accordingly, I find that his claim for failure to pay one weeks notice pay must fail.

[36]With regard to other contractual payments due to the Claimant, he asserted that he was not paid for his full three months service having given evidence to the Tribunal that he commenced his employment at the beginning of July 2024. As I have said in the facts section of this judgment, I did not find that the Claimant commenced employment at the beginning of July. Rather, I find that he commenced employment on 4 August as a delivery driver having provided the Respondent with his P45 form and his authority to work from the Home Office failing which he was not legally able to work. The Respondent produced two wage slips for August and September that covered the period of his employment as well as a P45 form confirming the same. Consequently, I find that the Claimant was due no other monies in respect of unpaid wages from the Respondent.

[37]The Claimant produced no evidence in his witness statement, oral testimony or his bundle of documents to support a claim for accrued but unpaid holiday pay owing to him at the termination of his employment. Furthermore, his evidence did not specify what holiday he indeed took during his short two-month service. In the absence of the Claimant proving his claim for holiday pay as was his obligation, I find that he is not due any holiday pay under the Working Time Regulations.

[38]Finally, the Respondent gave evidence that it deducted the sum of £1,435.00 from the Claimant’s final wages that related to the money that was paid erroneously by the Respondent’s catering client into the Claimant’s personal bank account leading to the Claimant's dismissal. The Respondent agreed that there was no written contract of employment with a clause that permitted it to make a deduction from the Claimant's wages in such circumstances. The Respondent also admitted that prior to making the deduction it had not obtained the written consent of the Claimant to make such deduction. The Claimant's evidence was that he did not consent to this deduction. I was not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that there was an implied term in the Claimant’s oral contract of employment that in circumstances such as these that would entitle the Respondent to claw back this payment due to the Claimant’s gross misconduct. The Respondent could not point me to any authorities that supported this submission, and the wording of the statute does not permit the Respondent to make a deduction from the Claimant’s wages in the manner that this deduction was made. In these circumstances, the Respondent was not entitled to make the deduction from the Claimant’s final wages. Accordingly, I award the Claimant the sum of £1,435.00 in respect of this unlawful deduction of wages made by the Respondent. Approved by: