Mr L Hackney v London Borough of Hackney: 6020412/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6020412/2025
Between
Mr L HackneyClaimantLondon Borough of HackneyRespondent
Before
Employment Judge Suzanne PalmerMr Hackney represented himself for claimantRepresented by Mrs Louise Mankau (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 27 October 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s complaint of Unfair (Constructive) Dismissal is not wellfounded and is dismissed.[2]The Claimant’s complaint of unlawful deduction from wages in respect of holiday pay is dismissed on withdrawal.
REASONS
[1]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent from 5 March 2018 until his resignation with 4 weeks’ notice on 14 February 2025, effective on 14 March 2025.[2]The Claimant’s role was as a Support Officer within the Respondent’s Print Department, which is part of the Finance and Corporate Resources Directorate. Until approximately January 2023 his workplace supervisor was Mr Colin Chapman, and they were both managed by Mr Tony Gallagher. Mr Gallagher was on sick leave from January 2023 and left employment in April 2023. Mr Chapman became, initially on an acting basis (from January 2023) and later on a substantive basis, the Claimant’s line manager.[3]The relationship between the Claimant and Mr Chapman was not always harmonious. In December 2024 the Claimant raised a grievance in which he made a number of complaints, some directed specifically at Mr Chapman and some of a more general nature. That grievance was dealt with informally by way of a mediated conversation on around 16 December 2024. The person who acted as mediator in that conversation was Ms Judith Beckford, the Business Support Services Lead in the Respondent’s Finance & Corporate Resources Directorate.[4]Ms Beckford wrote to the Claimant on 12 February 2025 with a summary of the outcome of the informal grievance process. On 14 February 2025 the Claimant tendered his written resignation, in which he said that he considered that he had been constructively dismissed following what he considered to be a number of fundamental breaches of contract of employment. Part-way through his notice period, the Claimant was signed off work on grounds of ill-health and he remained on sick leave until the effective date of termination.[5]In his ET1 Claim Form, presented to the Tribunal on 2 June 2025, the Claimant complained that he was constructively dismissed and that the dismissal was unfair. He listed five matters which he alleged amounted to fundamental breaches of his contract of employment. He also made a complaint in relation to unpaid holiday pay. This arose from a deduction of 10.99 hours from his final pay in respect of allegedly overpaid annual leave entitlement.[6]The Respondent subsequently sent a response form (ET3) to the Tribunal dated 3 July 202. It denied any breach of contract and asserted that the Claimant resigned and was not constructively dismissed. In the alternative, it asserted that there was a fair dismissal by reason of misconduct. It denied the holiday pay claim, asserting that the Claimant was paid for all annual leave to which he was entitled. Claims and Issues[7]There was no case management prior to this hearing, save for standard directions in respect of the exchange of documents and witness statements and the preparation of a hearing bundle. The Respondent’s representative helpfully provided a draft list of issues in relation to the constructive dismissal claim at the outset of the hearing. I went through that with the Claimant and he confirmed that it accurately summarised the complaint he makes in respect of constructive dismissal (in particular the alleged breaches of contract). I have adapted the format of the list slightly in the version which appears below, and included consideration of the implied term of trust and confidence, but otherwise it follows the Respondent’s draft.[8]The Respondent’s list of issues did not deal with the holiday pay complaint, because this had not been mentioned in the Claimant’s schedule of loss or witness statement and his case was not clearly set out anywhere. During the hearing the Claimant confirmed to me that the holiday pay complaint relates solely to the deduction made from his final pay. I have therefore added it to the list of issues as it appears below.[9]A copy of the full list of issues is annexed to this judgment as Annex A. Documents and evidence[10]An electronic tribunal bundle was provided to me in advance of the hearing. It consisted of 233 pages. In addition, I had an electronic bundle of witness statements consisting of 30 pages. During the course of the hearing I received a further document which had been located by Ms Beckford in response to oral evidence given by the Claimant. This consisted of 2 pages. I also received a number of documents provided by the Claimant in relation to his new employment.[11]I heard oral evidence under oath or affirmation from the following witnesses, each of whom had provided a witness statement. 11.1. The Claimant; 11.2. Mr Arfan Nawazish, workplace colleague in the Print Unit, on behalf of the Claimant; 11.3. Mr Paul Garcia, workplace colleague in the Print Unit, on behalf of the Claimant; 11.4. Ms Judith Beckford, Business Support Services Lead in the Finance & Corporate Resources Directorate, on behalf of the Respondent; 11.5. Mr Colin Chapman, Print Manager in the Print Unit, on behalf of the Respondent.[12]I also received a witness statement from Mr Tony Gallagher, Mr Chapman’s predecessor as Print Manager, on behalf of the Claimant. Mrs Mankau said that the Respondent did not wish to cross-examine Mr Gallagher, although Mr Gallagher was willing to be cross-examined. I therefore indicated that I would treat his evidence, in so far as it was relevant to the issues, as unchallenged. Fact-finding[13]I make the following findings of fact in this case. Events prior to 2023[14]The Respondent is a local authority. It employs approximately 3000 people across a range of sites. It has a number of directorates including the Finance & Corporate Resources Directorate. Within that Directorate is a department called Business Support Services. Within Business Support Services are a number of teams. Those include a Corporate Business Support team, an Information and Technology team, and a Print Team (sometimes also referred to as the Print Unit). The Print Unit provided in-house printing services for internal “clients” throughout the Respondent’s organisation.[15]The Print Unit was situated in the basement of one of the Respondent’s buildings. It consisted of an office, where a Print Manager and Support Officers were based. The office was near a print room, where Print Technicians would carry out the printing of documents. Support Officers were involved in the day to day running of the print unit, including administrative, account management and finance related tasks. They would deal with print requests received from across the Respondent’s organisation, either via email or an online portal. They would deal with enquiries, create work sheets, provide print guidance to staff, provide quotes, and raise purchase orders for materials and external print work.[16]The Claimant commenced employment with the Respondent on or around 5 March 2018. He was originally appointed as a Print Technician. After about 6 months of employment he was promoted to the role of Support Officer. One of his colleagues was another Support Officer called Paul. Until January 2023 they were supervised by Colin Chapman, and the entire team was managed by the Print Manager Tony Gallagher.[17]Mr Gallagher, who managed both the Claimant and Mr Chapman, describes the working relationship between the Claimant and Mr Chapman as having been difficult from an early stage once the Claimant was promoted to the Support Officer role. Mr Gallagher attributes this to the Claimant being unhappy with how Mr Chapman managed what the Claimant perceived to be shortcomings in other staff which impacted on the Claimant’s role and duties.[18]The Claimant had a number of concerns about one of his colleagues, a support officer called Paul. The precise nature of those concerns is not entirely clear and is not relevant for the purposes of these proceedings, but in general terms, it seems that the Claimant’s view was that Paul did not do his fair share of the work within the team and that this was not effectively managed by Mr Chapman and/or Mr Gallagher. At some point in 2020 the Claimant raised a grievance against Paul, which was dealt with as a formal grievance under the Respondent’s grievance procedure by Ms Beckford, before she was in her current role and at a time when she had no line management responsibility for the Print Unit.[19]In addition to the Claimant’s general duties, it seems that he spent a considerable amount of time working with a piece of software called Planet Press. This provided automatic batch mailing, allowing documents to be pre-printed with addresses taken from a template to save time. It seems from the documents I have seen that Planet Press had ceased to be operational following a cyber-attack on the Respondent’s computer system in around 2000 and that ongoing efforts were being made to restore its functionality.[20]The Respondent operated a policy which allowed members of staff to apply, setting out a business case, to be awarded non-contractual enhancements to their pay for specific additional duties they undertook. These payments could be on a one-off basis (ex gratia payments) or on a longer-term basis (honorarium payments). It seems that this operated as a sort of noncontractual overtime scheme, acknowledging additional work which was being carried out over and above contractual duties.[21]At some point in 2021 the Claimant, with the assistance of his union representative, successfully made a case to receive what was in effect an honorarium for the work he was doing in relation to Planet Press. This was approved by his then manager, Tony Gallagher. It seems that the Claimant and his union representative did not tell anyone else in the team about the Claimant’s application or its approval, and wanted the arrangement to be kept confidential (in particular from the Claimant’s colleague Paul). For that reason, the witnesses on behalf of the Respondent at this hearing had little knowledge about the Claimant’s honorarium.[22]In June 2021 Ms Beckford was appointed as Business Support Lead. This meant that she assumed responsibility for oversight of the Print Unit as well as the Business Support Team (of which she had previously been manager). She was the line manager of the Claimant’s line manager Mr Gallagher.[23]On a number of occasions after her appointment as Business Support Lead, until January 2023, the Claimant approached Ms Beckford privately to seek her assistance in relation to issues with his workload and working relationships with his manager (Mr Gallagher) and colleagues. She provided him with assistance and support in resolving these issues, for example providing additional staffing when Paul was on long-term sickness absence. On a number of occasions, the Claimant approached Ms Beckford because he disagreed with decisions taken by his manager Mr Gallagher. Mr Gallagher also approached Ms Beckford on a number of occasions because he considered that the Claimant was challenging decisions he had made. The Claimant did not raise any concerns or complaints about Mr Chapman during this period.[24]Soon after she had been appointed as Business Support Lead, Ms Beckford became aware of the honorarium which had been awarded to the Claimant. The Claimant sked her whether the arrangement would be taken away now that she was in post. She advised the Claimant that as she was not privy to the arrangements which had been made, she did not propose to make any immediate changes to what his line manager had put in place. She continued to authorise the honorarium payments to the Claimant on a regular basis.[25]In around October 2021 staff in both the Corporate Business Support team and the Print Unit were informed by Ms Beckford that there was a proposal, which was at that time at an early stage, to hold a restructuring exercise to merge the two departments. It was considered likely that job descriptions would change, but at that stage, there was no timeline for the process and no decision had been taken about what the final structure would be. The proposal was described as being in “the planning stages”. All staff were asked to provide copies of their job descriptions.[26]At some point thereafter, possibly in late 2021, staff were informed that the proposed restructuring had been put on hold. This was because a larger restructuring exercise was taking place within the Finance & Corporate Resources Directorate, which was fully occupying the support resources which Ms Beckford needed to assist her in the exercise within her own department (for example, Human Resources, Senior Management and the unions). In the event the restructuring exercise did not commence until May 2025, by which time the Claimant had left his employment.[27]In late 2021 the union representative who assisted the Claimant with his application for an honorarium left his employment with the Respondent. At his leaving drinks, in a conversation with Mr Chapman (at that time, the Claimant’s supervisor but not his line manager), the union representative asked Mr Chapman whether the Claimant was happy now. Mr Chapman said words to the effect of “happy with what?”. The union representative then told Mr Chapman about the honorarium.[28]Mr Chapman had no prior knowledge of the honorarium and was hearing about it for the first time. He did not ask for details of the honorarium during the conversation because he was more interested in socialising at what was a social event. However he felt annoyed that Mr Gallagher, to whom he was the deputy, had not told him about the arrangement, because he considered that it was knowledge relevant to a member of staff he supervised. He was also annoyed to be hearing about it for the first time from a union representative, long after the honorarium was awarded. He made his views known to Mr Gallagher. Mr Gallagher in turn told the Claimant that the conversation had happened and that Mr Chapman was annoyed. Mr Gallagher’s view is that the relationship between the Claimant and Mr Chapman worsened after this.[29]In January 2022 Ms Beckford, who was aware that the Claimant had experience (from his application for an honorarium) of drafting a revised job description, appointed him to work with two members of the Corporate Business Support team on producing generic revised job descriptions for merged roles in the potential restructured business. This was part of the preparatory work for the proposed restructuring exercise, to ensure that job descriptions could be evaluated and salaries identified as part of the exercise in due course.[30]In May 2022 Ms Beckford advised the Claimant that she was awaiting the evaluation of the job description which he had helped to draft, and that she was in the process of drafting a Delegated Powers Report in relation to the restructuring proposal, which would need to be approved before any consultation could commence. At around the same time, after the Claimant asked for an update on the restructuring process, Ms Beckford advised the Claimant that “we are only at proposal stage and nothing has been agreed on just yet”. She explained that she could not comment on the process at this time because she would need a lot of guidance from HR as to how the restructure would affect people. In another email on the same day she advised the Claimant that staff would be provided with an update in due course. The Claimant acknowledged her response. Events from 2023 until late 2024[31]In January 2023 Mr Gallagher went on long-term sick leave. Mr Chapman was appointed as acting manager in the Print Unit, and therefore became the Claimant’s line manager, initially on a temporary basis.[32]In April 2023 Mr Gallagher left his employment with the Respondent. Mr Chapman continued to be acting manager in the Print Unit.[33]In May 2023 the Claimant emailed Ms Beckford expressing concern about the fact that Mr Chapman had proposed that all three of the staff members working in the Print Unit office (Mr Chapman, the Claimant and Paul) should start working in the office 3 days a week (prior to this time they had worked 2 days a week in the office, and then during Paul’s extended sickness absence the Claimant and Mr Chapman had each been working a pattern of 2 days in the office one week, and three the following week). The Claimant complained that Mr Chapman had been “pushing for the office staff to be doing more days in the office since the start of Covid and I disagree for the need to have us in there…”.[34]In the final paragraph of his email, the Claimant said the following. “Also, this is a bit sillier than the new office arrangement situation. [Mr Chapman] has a problem with me keeping the office door closed, even though it’s a fire door… It literally says on both sides of the door ‘fire door keep shut’. He’s been having heated words with me about this for some time and he mentioned it again today in the same talk earlier after he spoke about the new office working arrangements. I don’t know what to do about this as I’m pretty sure that door should stay closed but he is telling me that I have to keep it open and getting a bit irate about it. So I’d like your guidance on this as well please. He keeps it open just so you know and I think again this is for selfish reasons rather than following health and safety guidelines. We’ve even had staff from facilities come round and tell us it should be closed because it’s a fire door”.[35]At the time, Ms Beckford understood this issue to be one of a difference of opinion between the Claimant and Mr Chapman about whether the door to the office should be open or shut, rather than an accusation by the Claimant of a “breach of health and safety” by Mr Chapman. She spoke to both parties, advising them that as they generally worked in the office on different days it should not be an issue. On the one day a week they were both in the office, they should reach a compromise, working around each other’s needs. Mr Chapman had told her that he was concerned that visitors to the office who found the door closed were not getting a response if they knocked. Ms Beckford therefore advised attaching a laminated sign to the door telling visitors to knock and wait to be seen. As far as she was concerned, the issue was resolved and nothing further was raised with her about it until December 2024.[36]In March 2024 a new Assistant Director was appointed within the Finance & Corporate Resources Directorate. A review of the Print Unit’s finances and work processes identified significant overspend and mismanagement of the budget. The unit was running at a loss.[37]Following the review of finances, Ms Beckford became aware that the Claimant’s honorarium, which she had continued to approve on a regular basis up to that point, related to his work on Planet Press, that this system was still not active since October 2020, and that “there was very little evidence … to highlight the work that had been carried out over the 3 or 4 years that the Claimant was being paid to work on reviving it”.[38]A decision was made by the new Assistant Director to discontinue the Claimant’s honorarium with immediate effect. As Ms Beckford had approved payments up to 30 September 2024, a decision was taken to allow the payments to continue until that date. The Respondent proposed to consider other options to address the ongoing issues with Planet Press, including potentially bringing it within the remit of the Information and Communication Technology team.[39]On 21 August 2024 Mr Chapman held a “Check In” meeting with the Claimant. Check-In is terminology within the Respondent for one-to-one management supervision or appraisal meetings. On this occasion it seems that the meeting incorporated a return to work discussion following the Claimant’s recent period of sickness absence due to problems with his back. Amongst other matters discussed, Mr Chapman asked the Claimant to “think about reconsidering his position on the door close policy… that door being closed deters people from even knocking to enter, and they take the easy option of just heading to print room. Sign needs to be more prominent…”.[40]On 27 August 2024 Ms Beckford emailed the Claimant to advise him that given the current review of the print unit budget, a decision had been made to discontinue his honorarium from 30 September 2024. The Claimant was advised that the additional duty was no longer required.[41]The Claimant replied the same day saying that the news was “fairly shocking” for him. He expressed disappointment that his work to reanimate the Planet Press system was not going to continue.[42]On 24 September 2024 the Claimant attended his GP reporting a “new complaint” of stress. According to his GP records he told his GP that the project he was working on had been scrapped and he had taken a “4k paycut”. In addition his wife had recently been diagnosed with a medical condition, which was stressful. He was contemplating “quitting his job”.[43]In October 2024 the Claimant was referred, through the Respondent’s Occupational Health department, to a counselling service provided by the Respondent. At his first session he discussed stressors in his personal life. He also informed the counsellor that he was “under a lot of pressure at work due to current restructuring” and that he had “incurred financial loss at work due to the recent restructuring and changes being made”. He said that he was “actively seeking new work opportunities”.[44]The Claimant was signed off work with “stress and anxiety” from 1 to 11 October 2024 and from 5 November to 2 December 2024.[45]On an unknown date, possibly during the Claimant’s sickness absence, Mr Chapman had a conversation with one of the Respondent’s external print suppliers in which he referred to the fact that the Claimant had lost his honorarium. Mr Chapman did not go into any details about the amount of salary the Claimant had lost as a result, although the supplier drew conclusions about the fact that it must have been a significant sum. The supplier then called the Claimant to express his concern for hm.[46]On 4 December 2024 Mr Chapman held a return to work interview with the Claimant. Various matters were discussed including the following. The Claimant expressed his dissatisfaction with the removal of his honorarium and said that he did not think that Mr Chapman had done enough to try to keep the Planet Press project alive. Mr Chapman commented that he had not been able to provide the Associate Director with any documentation in relation to the honorarium to justify it, because he had not been informed about the honorarium when it was approved. The Claimant indicated that, following discussion with his counsellor, he proposed to bring a grievance against Mr Chapman in relation to a number of matters. Mr Chapman apologised to the Claimant for his conversation with the supplier. Mr Chapman confirmed that a stress risk assessment would be carried out by someone other than him. Mr Chapman confirmed that he would approve the Claimant’s request for dependency leave and annual leave around the time of his wife’s forthcoming operation in January 2025. Mr Chapman told the Claimant that he considered it a shame that the Claimant felt the way he did about their current relationship and hoped that they could both “reflect on that and work towards a better understanding”.[47]On 5 December 2024 the Claimant submitted a grievance which I will consider further below.[48]On 6 December 2024 the Claimant sent Mr Chapman a detailed response to his email following the return to work interview. He said that his wife’s ill health was “the main causes of my current stress and anxiety right now. All I want is to be able to come to work and do my job and leave feeling happy with what I have done for the community this Council serves. I’ve not had that because of all these challenging things that are going on here”. He too expressed the hope that the grievance process would be “helpful in realising the conclusive and productive outcome of this dispute”. His response included the following: “… I am in no way meaning my decision to make a formal complaint about you as a personal attack… You’re a manager, you’ve made mistakes, I am unhappy and that is what this is. I understand the organisational change and pressure you are under. I have raised the grievance as of yesterday. I have done this because I need to make sure it is formally reported on in the hopes that the points it includes do not continue to happen. The points are a data, trust and confidentiality breach, unfairly managing staff (Paul and I), pressurising me to break fire risk health and safety guidelines (fire door) and raising your voice when we are having challenging conversations”.[49]On 12 December 2024 an officer of the Respondent contacted the Claimant to arrange a stress risk assessment. In the event it seems that this never took place because of the Christmas period, followed by the Claimant’s time off to care for his wife in January 2025, and then the Claimant’s resignation.[50]In January 2025 Mr Chapman approved time off for the Claimant to care for his wife following her operation, despite the fact that (as I was told) this fell outside the Respondent’s usual policy. The Claimant’s grievance, subsequent resignation and new employment[51]The Claimant sent a grievance to the Respondent’s Human Resources department on 5 December 2024.[52]On 11 December 2024 the Respondent’s Human Resources department wrote to the Claimant to acknowledge his grievance, saying “… In accordance with the Council’s grievance procedures, attempts should be made to resolve the issues informally at first and therefore, I have asked [Ms Beckford] to discuss this with you and let me know what your decision is”.[53]The Claimant replied the same day, copying in Ms Beckford, saying “Great, thank you. [Ms Beckford], I look forward to hearing from you”.[54]On 16 December 2024 Ms Beckford held a meeting with Mr Chapman and the Claimant to attempt to help them to resolve their differences informally.[55]On 18 December 2024 Ms Beckford received an email from the Respondent’s Corporate Facilities Management team, with whom she had sought clarification. This confirmed that “all doors in the Town Hall Basement are fire doors and as part of the building’s Fire Risk Assessment should remain closed at all times”. Ms Beckford forwarded this advice to the Print team.[56]On 24 January 2025 the Claimant attended a job interview for another role.[57]On 3 February 2025 the Claimant returned to work following his leave to care for his wife.[58]On 6 February 2025 the Claimant was offered another job, with a proposed start date of 24 February 2025. The start date was subsequently moved to 24 March 2025 because the Claimant had a 4 week notice period.[59]On 12 February 2025 Ms Beckford wrote to the Claimant confirming the discussion at the meeting she mediated on 16 December 2024. She set out the resolutions identified at the meeting, as follows: 59.1. Mr Chapman had apologised for his conversation with a supplier about the termination of ex gratia payments to the Claimant, and explained that there was no malice behind it. Ms Beckford had explained that the disclosure of personal information was inappropriate and unacceptable. She proposed to meet with Mr Chapman to discuss his actions under the Respondent’s Standard Setting policy. 59.2. Mr Chapman had explained that the office door had been left open for years and that the Claimant had never previously raised any concern about this. Mr Chapman’s view was that staff needed to be visible to visitors to the Unit. Mr Chapman also felt claustrophobic when working with the office with the door closed. However, in light of the Claimant’s assertion that he considered this a breach of health and safety rules, Ms Beckford had sought advice from the Facility Management team and had forwarded their advice to all members of the Print Team “with confirmation that all doors in the lower ground floor… are fire safety doors and as such must be kept closed at all times”. 59.3. Having listened to what Mr Chapman and the Claimant said about their perspectives on working relationships, Ms Beckford considered that “a lack of team work, trust and respect play a big factor in the majority of your complaints. I also believe that clashes in personalities amongst team members also play a part in the disharmony that is displayed across the team and there is an urgent need for everyone to be more considerate and mindful when talking to each other”. 59.4. Ms Beckford proposed that there should be new working methods to address the current tensions between the Claimant and his colleague Paul and allow better working relationships to develop. Ms Beckford said that to avoid further accusations of members of the team being treated unfairly, Mr Chapman proposed that all members of the team should work in the office 5 days a week with effect from 3 February 2025. Ms Beckford said that she had advised Mr Chapman to be mindful of the tone and delivery of his message when speaking to the Claimant. 59.5. Ms Beckford noted that at the meeting she had asked the Claimant what his expected outcome would be from his complaint. He replied that “because he had lost all trust in his manager, he wanted his concerns and the breach of confidentiality incident formally documented as he felt that they both needed mediation in order to get past this”.[60]On 14 February 2025 the Claimant emailed the Respondent’s Human Resources department tendering his resignation with 4 weeks’ notice (effective on 14 March 2025). The letter was drafted based on a template he found on the internet. It included the following: “Reason for my resignation: You should be aware that I am resigning in response to repudiatory breaches of contract by my employer and I therefore consider myself constructively dismissed. Also I have been under the duress, stress and anxiety of a restructure that has been mismanaged and its movements poorly communicated since October 2021. I now consider my position … is untenable and my working conditions intolerable, leaving me no option but to resign in response to your breach. I do not in any way believe I have affirmed or waived your breach. I would like to add that it would be mutually beneficial for me to be placed onto garden leave for the duration of my notice period and await your decision on this matter”.[61]During his notice period, the Claimant raised various concerns about his working arrangements and working relationships with colleagues and with Mr Chapman, including an allegation that he was receiving “silent treatment” from Mr Chapman. He wrote to the Respondent’s Human Resources department on 18 and 26 February asserting that his working conditions were “unacceptable” and that his position was untenable. He asked for a response to his request for garden leave.[62]On 19 February 2025 Ms Beckford wrote to the Claimant proposing that he should have a “cooling off period of 5 working days to reflect on your decision to resign…”. The Claimant was asked to confirm by 25 February 2025 whether he wished to proceed with his resignation or to withdraw it. He was advised that he had the right to lodge a formal grievance if he remained dissatisfied with the informal resolution. He was advised that the Respondent did not have a gardening leave policy and that he would be required to work his notice period.[63]On 25 February 2025 the Claimant confirmed that he wished to proceed with his resignation. He said that he was dissatisfied with the grievance outcome and did not need to be told to exercise his rights to lodge a formal grievance, saying that he had already attempted to do so. He said that the concerns he had raised remained unanswered, and raised various issues about working conditions during his notice period.[64]The Claimant was signed off as unfit for work with stress and anxiety from 6 March 2025 for the remainder of his notice period.[65]On 13 March 2025 the Claimant received his final payslip and queried the deduction of 10.99 hours of holiday pay. It was subsequently clarified by HR that this related to the fact that the Respondent’s system had allowed him to take leave in excess of what he had accrued by his last day of service, and an adjustment had been made to reflect this. The Respondent’s policies and documentation[66]The Respondent had an “Additional Duties” policy which governed acting duties, honoraria, ex gratia payment and secondments. The policy provides that an honorarium or acting up allowance may be ended with one week’s notice by either side.[67]The Respondent had a Grievance Resolution Procedure. This provided, amongst other things, that: 67.1. “Informal resolution normally gets the best result. The best form of informal resolution depends on the circumstances and what will work best. For example, mediation may be an option”; 67.2. “Grievances are concerns, problems or complaints, and can relate to the employee’s work, working conditions or working relationships. Problems can be real or perceived and inappropriate behaviour can be intentional or unintentional. Examples include health and safety concerns, changes to employment conditions, unequal treatment; and the behaviour of colleagues, managers and supervisors. This is not an exhaustive list”; 67.3. “Managers will: … take all complaints seriously, seeking resolution quickly and objectively”; 67.4. “Informal resolution may imply that the complaint is being taken less seriously or is less important. However, this is not the case. It is simply a different approach that might resolve the problem faster and more constructively e.g. with less conflict. Employees are free to make a formal complaint later if they are unhappy with the outcome or if the problem continues”; 67.5. “Drawbacks: [informal resolution is] not always appropriate e.g. if the complaint is serious”; 67.6. “Examples of informal approaches: Where the issue is about working conditions or arrangements, or unequal treatment: The employee and line manager can meet informally to explore the issue and what might resolve it”; 67.7. “Mediation is a way to mend relationships where there is a disagreement at work. Informal resolution should still be considered as a first step, with mediation to follow where informal resolution has not been successful…”; 67.8. Examples of when to use the formal procedure include: Informal resolution has been tried and didn’t work; The complaint is serious enough to warrant a formal investigation”; 67.9. The grievance must be set out in writing using the online form… The form is automatically forwarded to HR who will allocate the complaint to the appropriate line manager for consideration”.
Law
[68]I have reminded myself of the following case law which is relevant to the issues in dispute in this case.[69]Where the claim is that the worker was constructively unfairly dismissed, the Tribunal must first determine whether the claimant was constructively dismissed, applying the established principles, and if so, identify what conduct breached the implied term of trust and confidence.[70]The best-known summary of the applicable test for a claim of constructive unfair dismissal was provided by Lord Denning MR in Western Excavating (ECC) Limited v Sharp [1978] IRLR 27: “If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment; or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract; then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of his employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed. The employee is entitled in these circumstances to leave at the instant without giving any notice at all or, alternatively, he may give notice and say he is leaving at the end of notice. But the conduct must in either case be sufficiently serious to entitle him to leave at once. Moreover, he must make up his mind soon after the conduct of which he complains: for, if he continues for any length of time without leaving, he will lose his right to treat himself as discharged. He will be regarded as having elected to affirm the contract.”[71]In Tullett Prebon PLC and Ors v BGC Brokers LLP and Ors Maurice Kay LJ endorsed the following legal test at paragraph 20: “... whether, looking at all the circumstances objectively, that is from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the innocent party, the contract breaker has clearly shown an intention to abandon and altogether refuse to perform the contract.”[72]In Courtaulds Northern Spinning Ltd v Sibson it was held that reasonable behaviour on the part of the employer can point evidentially to an absence of significant breach of a fundamental term of the contract. However, if there is such a breach, it is clear from Nottingham County Council v Meikle [2005] ICR 1 CA; Abbey Cars (West Horndon) Ltd v Ford EAT 0472/07; and Wright v North Ayrshire Council [2014] IRLR 4 EAT, that the crucial question is whether the repudiatory breach “played a part in the dismissal” and was “an” effective cause of resignation, rather than being “the” effective cause. It need not be the predominant, principal, major or main cause for the resignation.[73]With regard to trust and confidence cases, Dyson LJ summarised the position thus in Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2005] IRLR 35 CA: The following basic propositions of law can be derived from the authorities: 73.1. The test for constructive dismissal is whether the employer’s actions or conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment: Western Excavating (ECC) Limited v Sharp [1978] 1 QB 761. 73.2. It is an implied term of any contract of employment that the employer shall not without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee: see, for example Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20, 34H – 35D (Lord Nicholls) and 45C – 46E (Lord Steyn). I shall refer to this as “the implied term of trust and confidence”. 73.3. Any breach of the implied term of trust and confidence will amount to a repudiation of the contract, see, for example, per Browne-Wilkinson J in Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 CA, at 672A; the very essence of the breach of the implied term is that it is calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship. 73.4. The test of whether there has been a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence is objective. As Lord Nicholls said in Malik at page 35C, the conduct relied on as constituting the breach must: “impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at objectively, it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer”.[74]This has been reaffirmed in Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation [2010] IRLR 445 CA.[75]The same authorities suggest that unreasonable conduct alone is not enough to amount to a constructive dismissal (Claridge v Daler Rowney [2008] IRLR 672); and that if an employee is relying on a series of acts then the tribunal must be satisfied that the series of acts taken together cumulatively amount to a breach of the implied term (Lewis v Motorworld Garages Ltd [1985] IRLR 465). If relying on a series of acts the claimant must point to the final act which must be shown to have contributed or added something to the earlier series of acts which is said, taken as a whole, to have broken the contract of employment (Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2005] IRLR 35 CA).[76]The approach in Omilaju was endorsed by Underhill LJ in Kaur v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2018] IRLR 833 CA. Having reviewed the case law on the “last straw” doctrine, the Court concluded that an employee who is the victim of a continuing cumulative breach of contract is entitled to rely on the totality of the employer’s acts notwithstanding a prior affirmation by the employee.[77]If the suggested last straw was entirely innocuous, further guidance was given in Williams v The Governing Body of Alderman Davies Church in Wales Primary School UKEAT/0108/19/LA at paragraph 33. “If the most recent conduct was not capable of contributing something to a breach of the Malik term, then the Tribunal may need to go on to consider whether the earlier conduct itself entailed a breach of the Malik term, has not since been affirmed, and contributed to the decision to resign.”[78]In addition, it is clear from Leeds Dental Team v Rose [2014] IRLR 8 EAT, that whether or not behaviour is said to be calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the parties is to be objectively assessed, and does not turn on the subjective view of the employee. Hilton v Shiner Ltd - Builders Merchants [2001] IRLR 727 EAT makes it clear that even where there is conduct which objectively could be said to be calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the parties, if there is reasonable and proper cause for the same then there is no fundamental breach of contract.[79]A claimant cannot rely upon a breach of contract which he/she has been taken to have affirmed. Affirmation can be express, but it can also be implied by inaction and delay, although simple delay is rarely enough. In Chindovev-Morrisons UKEAT/0201/13/BA, Langstaff J said this (paragraph 26); “[the claimant] may affirm a continuation of the contract in other ways: by what he says, by what he does, by communications which show that he intends the contract to continue. But the issue is essentially one of conduct and not of time..... It all depends upon the context and not upon any strict time test.”[80]The Respondent drew my attention to the case of Jagex Ltd v McCambridge UKEAT/0041/2019 which considers whether or not information about an employee’s salary will automatically be confidential. At paragraph 60, the following observations are made: “Is salary confidential? There is no universal answer – company law requires disclosure of directors’ pay; many public sector salaries are in the public domain – e.g. the judiciary; where there is collective bargaining pay rates are generally known and published, as indeed they are in many private sector employers where formal pay structures exist, and starting salaries are often advertised in recruitment literature. But some employers are less transparent and open about pay and do not publish pay rates. Some have specific contractual provisions identifying pay and salary as a confidential matter. It cannot be implied into the contract that salary details are confidential and falls far short of the business efficacy, officious bystander or necessity test”.
Discussion and Conclusions
[81]I remind myself of the list of issues identified at the outset of the hearing. I will start by considering each of the alleged acts on the part of the Respondent set out at 1.1.1 of the list of issues, and setting out my findings as to whether they then occurred. For any which I consider did occur, I will then move on to consider whether those matters, individually or cumulatively, amounted to a breach of any term of the Claimant’s contract of employment.[82]Somewhat unusually, in this case the Claimant has not sought to rely on the implied term of trust and confidence. Instead he has focused, throughout his internal grievance process, in his ET1, in his witness statement and in his presentation of his case at this hearing, on specific contractual provisions which he says were breached by the five matters he complains about.[83]In closing submissions, I invited the Respondent to address me in the alternative on whether the matters could, viewed cumulatively, be said to amount to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence which is a fundamental term of any contract of employment. The Respondent’s representative made the fair point that the case had not been put on that basis and that matter had therefore not been addressed by the Respondent in its ET3 or in its defence at the hearing. She addressed me in broad terms on the issue in the event that I was minded to consider it.[84]I acknowledge the force in the Respondent’s argument that the Claimant’s case has not been put on the basis of trust and confidence and that there could be unfairness to the Respondent in me considering it on that basis. However, I note that the Claimant, who is not legally qualified, has on occasion expressed himself in language which implies that he considers that his trust and confidence in his manager and in the Respondent was undermined by the five specific acts he complains about. I did therefore consider it appropriate for me to go on to consider whether, if proved, the matters the Claimant has complained about were capable cumulatively of breaching the implied term of trust and confidence. General matters raised by the Claimant[85]I note that the Claimant made a number of general assertions and complaints about his working environment which did not form part of his internal grievance or the matters he relied on as alleged breaches of contract in these proceedings. These included assertions that his work colleagues, particularly “Paul”, did not do their fair share of the work and “cherry-picked” the easiest tasks, and that this was not effectively or fairly managed by his managers over the years, first Mr Gallagher and then Mr Chapman.[86]I make no findings in respect of those matters because I am not required to do so in order to determine the list of issues agreed at the outset of the hearing. I note, however, that the Claimant’s evidence in this regard appears to corroborate the evidence from Ms Beckford that once she took over second line management responsibility for the Print Unit, the Claimant regularly came to her expressing this type of concern, addressed at Mr Gallagher until his departure, and after that time addressed at Mr Chapman once he took over line management responsibility for the Claimant. Ms Beckford also said that the Claimant regularly came to her to challenge decisions taken by those with line management responsibility which he did not like or agree with. Similarly, those managers would raise with Ms Beckford their concerns that the Claimant was constantly challenging their decisions and what they perceived as routine management instructions.[87]It appears that the Claimant therefore had some general dissatisfaction with his working arrangements, his colleagues and his managers, which appeared to be a fairly constant feature in the period from 2021 to his resignation, but that he was content to continue in his role notwithstanding that dissatisfaction.[88]The Claimant also made some assertions of improper or inappropriate conduct levelled at both Mr Chapman and Ms Beckford, in his witness statement and oral evidence. These were not raised as part of his internal grievance and were not mentioned in his claim form. They did not appear to form any part of, or to be relevant to, the matters identified by him in his complaint of constructive dismissal. I make no findings about those matters. Did the Respondent do the following things?[89]Breach of confidentiality in early 2021 by Colin Chapman, regarding a discussion of the Claimant’s salary increase at a colleague’s leaving drinks (1.1.1.1); 89.1. It is clear that there was a conversation between Mr Chapman and the Claimant’s union representative, at the union representative’s leaving drinks in 2021. In the course of that conversation, in circumstances which I have discussed above in my findings of fact, the union representative disclosed to Mr Chapman the fact of the Claimant’s honorarium, which Mr Chapman hitherto knew nothing about because the Claimant and his representative had asked Mr Gallagher (with whom the arrangement was made) to keep it from the Claimant’s colleagues. 89.2. I do not consider that a discussion about a payment arrangement for additional duties under the Respondent’s policy, with a person acting in a supervisory capacity in relation to the Claimant, is capable of being regarded as a breach of confidentiality, and certainly not to the extent that it could be characterised as a breach of contract going to the root of the employment relationship. I am mindful of the point made in the case of Jagex that salary details are not in and of themselves confidential information. The Claimant appeared to concede this point in his closing submissions once he had been provided with a copy of Jagex. 89.3. In any event, even if this was a breach of the Claimant’s request for confidentiality in relation to this arrangement, I do not consider that it was done by the Respondent. It is clear that the information was volunteered by the Claimant’s union representative. I do not consider that Mr Chapman encouraged or was complicit in that disclosure simply by virtue of asking what the representative meant when he asked whether the Claimant was “happy now”: he could not have anticipated the answer as he knew nothing about the arrangement, and in my view he could have nothing to prevent the disclosure in the circumstances. 89.4. I therefore find that the Claimant has not established that this alleged breach of contract occurred or that it was capable of amounting to a breach by the Respondent in any event.[90]Poor management and poor communication of a corporate restructure starting in October 2021, and not concluded by the time of the Claimant’s resignation (1.1.1.2); 90.1. In my judgment the Claimant has not established that there was poor management or poor communication in respect of the proposed restructure of the Respondent’s Business Support Services department. 90.2. I accept Ms Beckford’s evidence that staff were made aware in 2021 of her proposal to embark on a restructuring exercise to merge the Corporate Business Support team and the Print Unit as a costsaving exercise. However I also accept her evidence that at no point were staff told that the proposed restructure had “started”. On the contrary, they were expressly told that it was still at the planning stage and that they would be provided with further information once a plan was under active consideration, at which point they would be consulted. It was through no fault of Ms Beckford’s that progress with the proposed exercise was then delayed, apparently for some years, by a wider restructuring exercise within the Finance & Corporate Resources Directorate more generally. 90.3. It appears that the Claimant may in fact have been better informed than some of his colleagues about the progress of the proposal, in the sense that Ms Beckford appointed him, along with two colleagues from the Business Support team, to assist her with the task of redrafting job descriptions for the proposed merged team so that these could be evaluated to assist with budgeting the proposals. The Claimant was clearly in communication with Ms Beckford in relation to that task in the first half of 2022. 90.4. I note, however, that Ms Beckford’s last word on the subject to the Claimant, in writing at any rate, appears to be in the emails she sent him in May 2022, in which she clearly said that “we are only at proposal stage and nothing has been agreed on just yet”, and that staff would be provided with an update in due course. The Claimant acknowledged her responses. 90.5. There is nothing in the documentation I have seen or the oral evidence I heard during the hearing to suggest that the Claimant sought any further information or clarification from Ms Beckford after that time. I consider it likely that this is because the Claimant understood that the proposal was just that, and that no formal restructuring process had commenced yet. 90.6. I fully accept that it will have been worrying for the Claimant, as for all his colleagues in both the affected departments, to know that there was the possibility of a restructuring exercise on the horizon, with uncertainty as to what if any impact that would have on their roles. However that worry was not, in my judgment, attributable to poor management or poor communication, but rather to an awareness, perhaps inevitable in a public sector role in today’s economic climate, that financial constraints were such that restructuring was potentially on the horizon. 90.7. There may be an argument that the worry could have been mitigated if staff had not been told about the restructuring until there was a concrete proposal in place. However that has to be set against the fact that employers are urged by good industrial relations practice to inform employees as early as possible about matters such as restructuring which may impact on their employment. In addition, given the nature of the preparatory work which Ms Beckford had to undertake (including gathering and redrafting job descriptions), it seems inevitable that rumours and uncertainty would have spread if staff had not been told about the proposal, which might have increased potential stress. 90.8. I also find that there is no clear evidence that the proposal was in fact causing anxiety and stress to the extent that the Claimant now claims it was. I do not consider that the Claimant is deliberately misrepresenting this, simply that the impact on him may have become exaggerated in his mind with the benefit of hindsight. First, I note the lack of any evidence of the Claimant raising any further queries with Ms Beckford after May 2022. Second, I note that at the point the Claimant first consulted his GP in relation to anxiety and stress, on 24 September 2024, he did not refer to the restructuring exercise as a cause of his stress. He referred only to the removal of his honorarium and his wife’s illness. Although he did mention it in his consultation with a counsellor in October 2024, it did not form part of the grievance he raised following that counselling in December 2024. That appears to suggest that he did not regard it at that time as a potential breach of his contract of employment. 90.9. I bear in mind the case law set out above in relation to constructive dismissal. Even if an employer acts unreasonably, that will not of itself be enough to give rise to a fundamental breach of contract. In my judgment, an allegation like this one of “poor management and poor communication”, in order to be relied on as a potential fundamental breach of contract, would have to be of such a degree that it could be characterised as conduct which, without proper cause, was calculated or likely to destroy the relationship of trust and confidence or which went to the heart of the relationship between employer and employee. 90.10. In my judgment that bar is nowhere near being reached in this case. As I have already said, on balance in my view there was no poor management or poor communication in relation to the restructuring. However even if there had been, it was caused by the reasonable and proper wish to inform employees of the fact that a proposal was afoot, albeit at the early stages of planning. The fact that the proposal was then delayed was not within the control of Ms Beckford and was attributable to the lack of resource available to her. The fact that this may have caused anxiety is not of itself indicative of behaviour “calculated or likely” to destroy the employment relationship. 90.11. I therefore find that this allegation did not amount to a breach of contract, still less a fundamental one.[91]The next issue is whether there was a breach of confidentiality in late 2024 by Colin Chapman, in telling one of the Respondent’s suppliers, Anthony Harris of Radcliffe Culross Sproston, about the removal of the Claimant’s ex gratia payment (1.1.1.3). 91.1. Mr Chapman admitted to the Claimant, before and during the Claimant’s grievance, that he had had a conversation with the supplier about the fact that the Claimant’s additional duties had been removed, resulting in a reduction in pay (although I accept Mr Chapman’s evidence that he did not go into any details about the pay reduction and that the supplier drew his own conclusions or assumptions about this). Mr Chapman apologised to the Claimant for this repeatedly. 91.2. This was clearly regarded by Mr Chapman’s manager, Ms Beckford, as an inappropriate and unprofessional disclosure of personal information to someone outside the organisation. Ms Beckford concluded that it warranted formal action, in the form of a documented conversation with Mr Chapman under the Respondent’s “Setting Standards” policy. 91.3. It is also clear that this resulted in the Claimant, who was not aware that the conversation had taken place, receiving a telephone call (presumably to express sympathy or concern) from the supplier in question. At a time when the Claimant was suffering with anxiety and stress, it is understandable that this may well have been unwelcome, although the Claimant does not say in terms that the contact from the supplier caused him any additional stress or distress – in his grievance and in these proceedings he focused simply on the fact that the disclosure occurred. 91.4. The incident clearly occurred. What I have to consider is whether or not this amounted to a breach of contract, and if so, whether it was to the extent that it could be said to go to the root of the contract of employment. 91.5. I note, again, the point made in the case of Jagex that there is no implied contractual right to confidentiality in respect of information about pay. I see no evidence in this case to establish such a contractual right expressly. I note that in his closing submissions, and after having been shown a copy of Jagex, the Claimant appeared to abandon this allegation. However I am also mindful that the Claimant is not legally represented and so I will go on to make my own decision on the issue rather than take a technical approach by regarding the apparent concession as binding. 91.6. It seems to me that Mr Chapman’s actions in relation to this allegation could be characterised as unreasonable (in the sense that there was no reasonable explanation for him having acted as he did), albeit that I accept Mr Chapman’s evidence that his actions were not malicious and that he felt sympathy for the financial loss the Claimant had experienced as a result of the termination of the honorarium. 91.7. I am mindful, however, that mere unreasonableness on its own will not be sufficient. I need to consider whether this was an act calculated or likely to destroy the relationship of trust and confidence, or going to the root of the employment relationship. 91.8. In isolation, my judgment is that this action did not cross that bar. It could be characterised as clumsy and ill-judged, and potentially as thoughtless. However, as the Claimant acknowledged in correspondence with Mr Chapman at around the time he submitted his grievance, “You’re a manager, you’ve made mistakes, I am unhappy and that is what this is. I understand the organisational change and pressure you are under. I have raised the grievance as of yesterday. I have done this because I need to make sure it is formally reported on in the hopes that the points it includes do not continue to happen. The points are a data, trust and confidentiality breach…” 91.9. That appears to me to amount to a recognition by the Claimant, at the time, that this was an action which, although the Claimant wanted it to be marked, was not fatal to the employment relationship. Viewed objectively, that appears to me to be correct. An incident such as this, in my view, can be characterised as an error of judgment capable of being rectified. It also seems to me that it was appropriately rectified, prior to the Claimant’s resignation, by the recognition by both Mr Chapman and Ms Beckford that it should not have happened, by an apology from Mr Chapman, and by the formal action which Ms Beckford took with Mr Chapman in response to the incident. 91.10. I therefore conclude that this incident was not sufficient to be characterised as a breach of contract, and certainly not to the extent that it went to the heart of the ongoing employment relationship.[92]Breach of health and safety guidelines/gross misconduct by Colin Chapman by keeping fire door in the basement office propped open (1.1.1.4). 92.1. It is very clear from the evidence that Mr Chapman’s preference was for the door of the Print Unit office to be left open and that this became something of a flash point between him and the Claimant over time. It is equally clear that the view of the Respondent’s Facilities Management team, when Ms Beckford sought their advice during the grievance process, was that this was a fire door and should be kept closed. 92.2. What I have to consider in this claim, however, is whether Mr Chapman’s actions in leaving the door open, or causing it to be left open, amounted to a (fundamental) breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment. The way in which the Claimant has put his case on this issue is in very black and white terms. He considers that the simple fact that this is a fire door is enough to establish a breach of contract because leaving it open is a breach of health and safety guidance. 92.3. It seems to me, however, that this issue is not as straightforward as that, and that it is relevant to consider some of the context. 92.4. The evidence which I heard from Mr Chapman and from Ms Beckford, and which did not appear to be disputed by the Claimant, is that the door to the print office had been left open for years without it ever being raised as an issue by the Claimant (or indeed by anyone else). 92.5. The Claimant does not appear to have raised this as an issue at any point prior to May 2023. When he did raise it at that time, it appeared to be almost as an afterthought, mentioned by him as a “silly” thing in the final paragraph of an email primarily about an instruction to start attending the office 3 days a week. Although his email correspondence with Ms Beckford mentioned health and safety in passing, that was not the focus of the way the issue was articulated. I accept Ms Beckford’s evidence that, when she spoke to both parties at the time, what emerged presented to her as a simple difference of opinion between the Claimant and Mr Chapman as to their personal preference. 92.6. Ms Beckford addressed that difference of opinion, encouraging the Claimant and Mr Chapman to negotiate a solution with her assistance. That solution was that the door could be open when Mr Chapman was in the office, closed when the Claimant was in the office, and on the one day each week when they were both in the office it would be closed but with a sign on the outside to address Mr Chapman’s concerns about visitors to the unit being unable to ascertain whether anyone was in the office to answer their queries. 92.7. I note that the Claimant does not appear to have raised any objection to that solution, or to have taken the matter further as an alleged “health and safety” issue. He did not raise the matter again, at all, until the time of his grievance in December 2024, over 18 months later. Only at that stage was the matter articulated primarily as an alleged health and safety issue. 92.8. In his evidence to me, Mr Chapman articulated his reasons for wanting the door left open. He referred to his concerns about visitors to the Print office not being able to make contact, which he had raised in May 2023. He referred to his claustrophobia, which he had raised in December 2024. He referred in his witness statement to his own health, and concerns he had related to that, particularly when he was alone in the office. In his oral evidence he emphasised that point, adding that the office was a basement room with only one exit (the fire door), bars over the windows, and no other way out if there were to be a fire. He said that he had strong feelings on the potential health and safety implications of leaving the door closed. I note that the latter points, in relation to Mr Chapman’s health and his health and safety concerns, do not appear to have been articulated in May 2023 or December 2024. 92.9. In his evidence, the Claimant did not articulate any reasons for wanting the door to be closed, other than the fact that it was a fire door and therefore he considered that it ought to be closed. This was a point he had made in December 2024 but had not articulated clearly in May 2023. 92.10. It appeared to me that both the Claimant and Mr Chapman were to some extent seeking to justify their respective positions, long after the event, in relation to the dispute which had arisen between them on this point. I did not find either of their stated positions at the hearing particularly convincing as explanations for why the issue had become a dispute between them. On balance I find that the issue of whether the door was open or closed was, at the time, more an issue of personal preference (as Ms Beckford concluded it was when she became involved in May 2023) than one of safety concerns. It seems likely to me that as their relationship deteriorated, this became something of a flash point or point of principle between them, and that neither of them wanted to concede the issue. 92.11. There is obviously merit in the Claimant’s point that because the door is a fire door it ought to be closed. However it seems clear that, historically, it had not been kept closed and the Claimant had not, apparently, viewed that as a fundamental issue over a period of many years. The health and safety concerns he articulated in relation to it being open appeared to be largely hypothetical. 92.12. It also seems to me that there is some merit in Mr Chapman’s argument that, as the only access point to the office, there were potential safety issues with leaving it closed. Again, it appeared to me that the health and safety concerns he articulated were largely hypothetical, but it may have been a matter he should have taken up with the Respondent’s facilities management team rather than with the Claimant. 92.13. I do not consider that a failure to comply with a fire safety direction in relation to the premises is capable on its own of amounting to a breach of an individual’s contract of employment: were that to be the case, I suspect that employers up and down the country would be facing constructive dismissal claims from groups of employees. 92.14. What can, in my judgment, amount to an individual contractual right is a right not to be exposed unreasonably to a tangible risk to individual health and safety, or for appropriate steps to be taken once such a risk is identified by the individual employee. 92.15. However, because of the context I have described above, I do not consider that Mr Chapman’s actions in leaving the door open amounted to a breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment in this case, and certainly not to the extent of being a fundamental breach of contract. Throughout most of the Claimant’s employment the door was left open without it being identified as a concern by the Claimant. When a concern was first raised by the Claimant in May 2023 it was addressed by way of a compromise solution, following which the matter was not raised again for 18 months. When the concern was articulated again but with a greater focus on fire safety implications, Ms Beckford acted appropriately by seeking specialist input and then issuing an instruction that the door should be left closed. 92.16. I therefore conclude that there was no breach of contract in respect of this allegation, still less a fundamental breach. Even if I am wrong about that, I note that, prior to his dismissal, the Claimant had “won” on this issue as a result of his grievance: Ms Beckford had issued an instruction for the door to be left closed. There was therefore no basis for this forming any part of the Claimant’s decision to resign in February 2025. 92.17. When I asked the Claimant for his response to this point in his closing submissions he said that he did not believe that Mr Chapman would have followed the instruction. In this regard he relied on the evidence of his two witnesses, Mr Nawazish and Mr Garcia, that the door is still being left open to this day. I note that Mr Nawazish visits the print office only infrequently and had not done so for some time prior to submitting his statement. In any event, however, the Claimant could not have known that the door would continue to be left open (in contradiction of Ms Beckford’s express instruction) at the time of his resignation, and therefore any reliance on this as an alleged ground for resignation would be premature.[93]Breach of grievance procedure in ignoring the Claimant’s request to deal with his grievance formally, rather than informally (1.1.1.6). 93.1. I note that the Respondent’s grievance procedure is a policy, and non-contractual. In any event, however, it is clear from the provisions of that policy, some of which I have quoted above, that informal resolution of grievances is encouraged where the individual making the complaint agrees to this. 93.2. I see nothing in the policy that confines that approach to cases which are not “serious”. Whilst it is noted that a formal process may be required if an allegation is particularly serious, the policy expressly states that “Informal resolution may imply that the complaint is being taken less seriously or is less important. However, this is not the case. It is simply a different approach that might resolve the problem faster and more constructively e.g. with less conflict. Employees are free to make a formal complaint later if they are unhappy with the outcome or if the problem continues”. I also consider that, whilst the matters complained about by the Claimant in his grievance were undoubtedly serious to him, it would be reasonable for an employer to conclude that matters of the type the Claimant was raising were, in the overall scheme of matters which might be raised in a grievance, not at the more serious end of the spectrum. 93.3. The Claimant says that he expressly asked for his grievance to be considered as a formal grievance, both when he raised it with HR and at the meeting held by Ms Beckford on 16 December 2024. However I do not consider that his recollection is accurate on that issue. 93.4. I note that on receipt of the grievance, the Respondent’s HR department wrote to the Claimant indicating that generally attempts should be made to resolve grievances informally first, and that the matter was being referred to Ms Beckford so that she could discuss this with the Claimant. Far from objecting to this course of action, the Claimant sent a response the same day (11 December 2024) saying “Great, thanks” and that he was looking forward to hearing from Ms Beckford. 93.5. I further note that the note of the meeting on 16 December 2024, sent by Ms Beckford on 12 February 2025 after the Claimant had returned from leave, records that Ms Beckford asked the Claimant at the meeting what his expected outcome would be from his complaint. He replied that “because he had lost all trust in his manager, he wanted his concerns and the breach of confidentiality incident formally documented as he felt that they both needed mediation in order to get past this”. 93.6. In my judgment, the meeting which Ms Beckford conducted on 16 December 2024 can be regarded as something of a conflation of an informal meeting and a mediation: she was dealing with the grievance informally but at the same time seeking to assist the Claimant and Mr Chapman in achieving a resolution to their differences. 93.7. There is nothing to indicate that the Claimant ever objected to this as a course of action or that he ever asked for his grievance to be dealt with in a different way. Neither did he make any request for the matter to progress to the formal procedure prior to resigning. 93.8. I further note that, following receipt of his letter of resignation, the Claimant was offered the opportunity to retract his resignation and request a formal grievance. He declined this offer. 93.9. I do not consider that there was any contractual right to have the grievance dealt with by way of a formal rather than an informal process. There was such a (non-contractual) right within the grievance procedure itself. However in the circumstances I have set out above, in my judgment the Respondent (in the form of the HR department and Ms Beckford) did not, by proposing to deal with the matter informally, breach the Claimant’s right, or act in a way calculated or likely to destroy the employment relationship or the Claimant’s trust and confidence in the Respondent. The Claimant was made aware of his right to raise the matter formally if he was dissatisfied with the outcome of the informal process, and chose not to do so prior to resigning. Conclusion in relation to alleged breaches of contract[94]It follows from the above discussion that I do not consider that any of the matters raised by the Claimant as alleged breaches of his contract of employment were sufficient to amount to a breach, still less a fundamental one.[95]For the sake of completeness, I have gone on to consider whether, viewed cumulatively, those matters are capable of being regarded as a course of conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer. The authorities to which I have referred above remind me that unreasonable conduct alone is not enough to amount to a constructive dismissal.[96]I do not consider that there is a course of conduct capable of giving rise to a constructive dismissal in this case. The five matters identified by the Claimant can be summarised in this way: 96.1. An alleged breach of confidentiality some 4 years prior to the Claimant’s resignation, which was the responsibility of his union representative; 96.2. Alleged defects in the consultation process in relation to a proposed restructuring process which the Claimant had been advised, 2 years prior to his resignation, was on hold; 96.3. An alleged breach of confidentiality by Mr Chapman in 2024 in respect of which, two months prior to his resignation, the Claimant had received an apology and a reassurance by Ms Beckford that the matter would be addressed formally with Mr Chapman; 96.4. An alleged breach of fire safety rules which, by the time of the Claimant’s dismissal, had been resolved in the Claimant’s favour by way of an instruction issued by Ms Beckford that the door should be kept closed; 96.5. A grievance which had been addressed at a hearing at which Ms Beckford had provided the mediation the Claimant said he was seeking, following which the Claimant had made no request for further formal action.[97]I do not consider that, viewed cumulatively and considered objectively, these matters can be said to amount to a course of action calculated or likely to destroy trust and confidence. Moreover I note that the Claimant’s stated position, both to Mr Chapman on 6 December 2024 and to Ms Beckford on 16 December 2024, was clearly that he envisaged the employment relationship continuing but wanted his concerns to be noted and addressed through mediation so that the issues would not recur. That was, in my judgment, achieved through Ms Beckford’s hearing on 16 December 2024, following which the Claimant appears to have taken no steps to pursue the matters further by way of a formal grievance process.[98]The Claimant has not pointed to any “final straw” and none is apparent from the circumstances of this case. For much of the period between the meeting on 16 December 2024 and his resignation on 14 February 2025 the Claimant was on leave. The only noteworthy event in the period immediately prior to his resignation was that he received Ms Beckford’s email of 12 February 2025 summarising the outcome of the meeting on 16 December 2024. Resignation in response and affirmation[99]It will be apparent from the discussion above that I conclude that the matters raised by the Claimant did not amount to breaches, individually or cumulatively, of the Claimant’s contract of employment, still less to the extent that the Claimant would have been entitled to treat the contract as being at an end.[100]Having reached that finding, I do not need to go on to consider the remainder of the issues set out in the list of issues.[101]Had I done so, however, I would have concluded that the Claimant had affirmed the contract. Many of the matters he was complaining about in his grievance were historic (in some cases by many years) at the time he raised the grievance, but he had continued in his role. He expressly stated at the time he raised his grievance that what he wanted to achieve was a formal marker in relation to things he was unhappy about, and mediation to assist in improving his working relationship with Mr Chapman.[102]Moreover, I would have concluded that the Claimant did not resign in response to the alleged breaches. On the Claimant’s own account, both to medical professionals at the time and in this hearing, he had started to look for alternative employment in Autumn 2024. I agree with the submissions on behalf of the Respondent that it appears to be no coincidence that he first considered this in September 2024, just at the point when his honorarium was terminated. In August 2024 he had emailed Ms Beckford expressing “shock” at that decision, and he had cited it as one of two main stressors (the other relating to his personal circumstances) when he consulted his GP for the first time in relation to anxiety and stress on 24 September 2024.[103]It is clear from the evidence that by October 2024 the Claimant was actively seeking work elsewhere, although he did not find it easy. In the course of January 2025 he had a job interview and on 6 February he received an offer of permanent employment with an anticipated start date of 14 February 2025.[104]On balance, I consider it beyond coincidence that, having previously made it clear that he wished to continue his working relationship, it was shortly following the offer of new employment that the Claimant tendered his resignation. It appears to me to be likely that the Claimant’s decision to look elsewhere for work was prompted by the removal of his honorarium (a matter in respect of which he makes no complaint in these proceedings) and that, once he had secured that alternative work, he accepted it, and it was this which prompted his resignation.[105]It seems clear that the Claimant was unhappy, and may have become increasingly unhappy, with his working environment and relationships. It may well have been that which led him to start looking for work elsewhere. However on the balance of probabilities, that appears to me to be a matter of choice rather than compulsion. Having decided that he would rather look for a new job than continue in a job where was unhappy, and then having found a new job, the Claimant resigned.[106]Having found that the Claimant has not established the matters he would need to establish in order to prove a case of constructive dismissal, my conclusion is that he resigned and was not dismissed by the Respondent, whether fairly or otherwise. Holiday pay complaint[107]In the course of his oral evidence, the Claimant was taken to documentation in relation to the deduction of 10.99 hours from his final salary in relation to an overpayment of annual leave.[108]While the Claimant did not accept that he was responsible for the error occurring, he accepted that the Respondent was entitled to recover the sum from his final salary as an overpayment.[109]He therefore confirmed to me that he wished to withdraw his complaint in respect of holiday pay and was content for me to issue a judgment dismissing that complaint on withdrawal.
Conclusion
[110]For the reasons I have given, I find that the Claimant was not dismissed by the Respondent. The Claimant’s complaint of unfair (constructive) dismissal is dismissed.[111]The Claimant’s complaint of unlawful deduction of holiday pay is dismissed on withdrawal. Approved by Employment Judge Suzanne Palmer Dated: 27 October 2025 ANNEX A – List of Issues[112]Unfair dismissal 112.1. Was the Claimant dismissed? 112.1.1. Did the Respondent do the following things: 112.1.1.1. Breach of confidentiality in early 2021 by Colin Chapman, regarding a discussion of the Claimant’s salary increase at a colleague’s leaving drinks; 112.1.1.2. Poor management and poor communication of a corporate restructure starting in October 2021, and not concluded by the time of the Claimant’s resignation; 112.1.1.3. Breach of confidentiality in late 2024 by Colin Chapman, in telling one of the Respondent’s suppliers, Anthony Harris of Radcliffe Culross Sproston, about the removal of the Claimant’s ex gratia payment; 112.1.1.4. Breach of health and safety guidelines/gross misconduct by Colin Chapman by keeping fire door in the basement office propped open; 112.1.1.5. Breach of grievance procedure in ignoring the Claimant’s request to deal with his grievance formally, rather than informally. 112.1.2. Did those matters, individually or cumulatively, amount to breaches of the Claimant’s contract, whether express or implied, including the implied term of trust and confidence? In relation to the implied term of trust and confidence the Tribunal will need to decide: 112.1.2.1. whether the Respondent behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the Claimant and the Respondent; and 112.1.2.2. whether it had reasonable and proper cause for doing so. 112.1.3. Was the breach a fundamental one? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach was so serious that the Claimant was entitled to treat the contract as being at an end. 112.1.4. Did the Claimant resign in response to the breach? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach of contract was a reason for the Claimant’s resignation. 112.1.5. Did the Claimant waive the breach or affirm the contract before resigning? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the Claimant’s words or actions showed that they chose to keep the contract alive even after the breach. 112.2. If the Claimant was dismissed, what was the reason or principal reason for dismissal - i.e. what was the reason for the breach of contract? 112.3. Was it a potentially fair reason? 112.4. Did the Respondent act reasonably or unreasonably in all the circumstances, including the Respondent’s size and administrative resources, in treating that reason as a sufficient reason to dismiss the Claimant? 112.5. The Tribunal’s determination whether the dismissal was fair or unfair must be in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.[113]Unauthorised deductions / failure to pay annual leave 113.1. Did the Respondent make deductions from the Claimant’s wages by deducting 10.99 hours of holiday pay from the Claimant’s final payslip. 113.2. Was that deduction unauthorised for the purposes of Section 13 Employment Rights Act 1996? 113.3. In particular, was it an “Excepted deduction” for the purposes of Section 14 ERA 1996, in that the purpose of the deduction was the reimbursement of the employer in respect of an overpayment of wages? 113.4. If not: 113.4.1. Was any deduction required or authorised by statute? 113.4.2. Was any deduction required or authorised by a written term of the contract? 113.4.3. Did the Claimant have a copy of the contract or written notice of the contract term before the deduction was made? 113.4.4. Did the Claimant agree in writing to the deduction before it was made? 113.4.5. How much is the Claimant owed?[114]Remedy for unfair dismissal 114.1. If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide: 114.1.1. What financial losses has the dismissal caused the Claimant? 114.1.2. Has the Claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? 114.1.3. If not, for what period of loss should the Claimant be compensated? 114.1.4. Is there a chance that the Claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason? 114.1.5. If so, should the Claimant’s compensation be reduced? By how much? 114.1.6. Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply? 114.1.7. Did the Respondent or the Claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it? 114.1.8. If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%? 114.1.9. If the Claimant was unfairly dismissed, did he cause or contribute to dismissal by blameworthy conduct? 114.1.10. If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the Claimant’s compensatory award? By what proportion? 114.1.11. Does the statutory cap apply? 114.2. What basic award is payable to the Claimant, if any? 114.3. Would it be just and equitable to reduce the basic award because of any conduct of the Claimant before the dismissal? If so, to what extent?