Miss S Wilkinson v Belmont Recruitment Ltd and Others: 6019733/2026

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6019733/2026

Between

Miss S WilkinsonClaimant

Belmont Recruitment LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Beever

In person for claimant

Date 6 July 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s application for interim relief against Belmont Recruitment Limited is not well founded which means it is not successful and is dismissed. EMPLOYMENT JUDGE BEEVER

[1]On 6 July 2026, the Tribunal heard the Claimant’s application for interim relief against Belmont Recruitment Limited. The application was not successful and oral summary reasons were given at the hearing. Subsequently, the Claimant requested written reasons. These are the Tribunal’s summary reasons. The Issue

[2]Section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 relevantly provides that: 128 Interim relief pending determination of complaint. (1)An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and— (a)that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in— (i)section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or ……… may apply to the tribunal for interim relief. 1 of 7 (2)The tribunal shall not entertain an application for interim relief unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the effective date of termination (whether before, on or after that date).

[3]The Claimant’s application satisfies section 128 because it arises from her claim of automatic unfair dismissal contrary to section 103A. There are other Respondents and other claims: this application does not affect those. It is an application against the First Respondent only.

[4]The Claimant also discharged the requirement of section 128(2): she presented her claim on 30 May 2026 in respect of an asserted date of termination of 27 May 2026. The Legal Framework

[5]The Presidential Guidance on Applications for interim relief issued on 22 June 2026 provides an essential framework for interim relief applications. Paragraph 3 3. Interim relief is an emergency measure. It is not an injunction/interdict, although it operates in a similar way, in that it prevents a dismissal from taking effect until the tribunal has heard the complaint of unfair dismissal. If interim relief is granted, the tribunal may order the employer to reinstate the claimant or to re-engage them in an equivalent role, or the tribunal may make a “continuation of contract order” (which has the effect of keeping the employee suspended on full pay until the full hearing). Because of the effect of those orders, there is a high threshold for claimants to satisfy the tribunal that interim relief should be ordered. Most applications therefore do not succeed. Paragraphs 18-20 Legal test for interim relief 18. The legal test the tribunal applies when deciding whether to order interim relief is set out at section 129(1) ERA and section 163(1) TULRCA. This is whether “it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates”, the tribunal will find that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was the reason relied upon by the claimant. 19. This has long been interpreted as requiring the tribunal to determine whether the claimant has a “pretty good chance of success” at the final hearing: Taplin v C Shippam Ltd

[1978] ICR 1068

. This test is not satisfied if the tribunal simply thinks it is more likely than not that the claim will succeed: Wollenberg v Global Gaming Ventures (Leeds) Ltd

EAT/0053/18

. The test is set comparatively high for reasons of policy: Dandpat v University of Bath

EAT/0408/09

. It is something nearer to certainty than mere probability. 2 of 7 20. In assessing whether there is a pretty good chance of success, the tribunal will take into account all elements of the claim, not just the reason for dismissal. This may include preliminary matters such as whether the claimant was an employee (if this is disputed), whether the claimant’s resignation should be construed as a dismissal (a “constructive” dismissal), and whether a protected disclosure has been made: Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 562

. Paragraphs 38-41 38 First, to have a pretty good chance of showing that one or more disclosures are protected, the claimant must have a pretty good chance of showing that:(a) they disclosed information, not simply a bare allegation;

(b) they reasonably believed that the information tended to show one of the types of wrongdoing identified in section 43B(1) ERA, and

(c) they reasonably believed that the disclosure was made in the public interest because it affected other people, not just the claimant personally. 39 Second, the claimant will need to show that there is a pretty good chance the tribunal will find that the protected disclosure caused the dismissal. The employer usually disputes this. If an employer identifies an apparently good reason for dismissing the claimant that is unrelated to a protected disclosure, this is usually something the tribunal will need to decide at the final hearing on the basis of full evidence. It is difficult to see how the claimant will show that they have a pretty good chance of success, unless they have clear evidence that this was not the real reason. 40 Third, the more hurdles the claimant faces in order to succeed with the claim, the more difficult it will be to persuade the tribunal that there is a pretty good chance of success. For example, a dispute about employment status, or a dispute about whether the claimant’s resignation should be construed as a dismissal, will make it even less likely that interim relief will be granted. 41 Fourth, cases which are complex because they rely on a large number of disclosures may make it more difficult for a claimant to succeed because there may be no clear link between any specific disclosures and the decision to dismiss. In contrast, those cases which are strong and which have a pretty good chance of success are generally easily identified and explained. Key Events and Complaints

[6]No oral evidence was received. These reasons represent the Tribunal’s conclusions based on an assessment of the documents and written and oral submissions of the parties.

[7]The Claimant is a specialist in appeals brought in the Special Educational Needs and Disabilities First Tier Tribunal (SENDIST) against the decisions of local authorities concerning EHCPs for children and young people. Belmont 3 of 7 Recruitment Limited- (“Belmont”) is an employment business who introduced C for a temporary assignment with Suffolk County Council. Belmont acknowledges that for PAYE purposes it was liable to be the Claimant’s employer.

[8]In May 2026, the Claimant was interested in a job role which entailed case management, mediation facilitation, hearing representation and working closely with parents carers and young persons.

[9]On 18 May 2026, the Claimant accepted an assignment with Belmont on terms, which still left, among other things, confirmation of the appropriate level of any DBS disclosure, and at the end of the acceptance email, the Claimant wrote: “Once you have provided these standard pre-engagement items and confirmed the level of the check in writing, I will immediately log into the compliance portal to complete any remaining electronic signature steps”.

[10]Belmont operated an onboarding process which required mandatory compliance checks (via its managed service provider, Opus) and this included taking references and the provision of a DBS certificate. The Claimant had authorised a DBS check. However, the dispute at the centre of this case is the appropriate level of that DBS check. Put simply, there are 4 levels of DBS check, increasing in depth: basic, standard, enhanced and, put colloquially, enhanced plus.

[11]The difference in views is epitomised by the fact that the End-User County Council regarded the job role as one which met the definition of “regulated activity” and which was eligible for an enhanced DBS check with childrens barred list. By contrast, the Claimant, who viewed the role as essentially desk based and sedentary and as one which only lawfully required a basic DBS check.

[12]Indeed, by 20 May 2026, the Claimant was already raising an eligibility query directly with the DBS organisation. On 20 May 2026, at 09.43, in an email, the Claimant complained to Belmont that its current DBS check application was unlawful, including non-compliance with the Police Act 1997. The Claimant contends that the processing of criminal records data was unlawful (PD1, as alleged).

[13]Belmont responded and insisted that its standard compliance procedures would be followed. In turn, the Claimant followed this up with a further email on 21 May 2026, raising what she termed as formal notice of an ineligible DBS check request (PD2, as alleged).

[14]The events of 27 May 2026 are key to this case.

[15]At 09.57hrs, Belmont emailed the Claimant and told her that the DBS information had come back and that, “your DBS is not clear”. It asked the Claimant for the copy of the certificate. The Claimant did not respond to that and instead sent a Pre-action Judicial Review letter (PD3, as alleged) and an email, at 11.12hrs, stating that all communication must now be, “addressed exclusively via the appropriate channels”. What that meant remains unclear; but the Respondent says that it interpreted that as a refusal to provide the relevant 4 of 7 information which would have enabled Belmont to ascertain relevance and progress with the assignment.

[16]The Claimant says she had a phone call from Belmont (Daniel) who is alleged to have said to the Claimant that if she had wanted the job, then she was going about it the wrong way. There is no documentation or other corroboration for that.

[17]On 27 May 2026, at 11.26hrs, Belmont emailed the Claimant. The relevant part is extracted here: “The DBS certificate has now been returned and indicates information requiring disclosure. However, you have advised that you do not wish to disclose this information. In addition, on your disclosure form you stated that there was nothing to declare, which has proven to be inaccurate. Following an internal review, we have made the decision that we will no longer be representing you for this role due to the compliance requirements we would not be able to satisfy.”

[18]This is the “dismissal letter” relied on by the Claimant. On a fair reading, it gives two reasons why Belmont wanted in essence to end their relationship with the Claimant. First, that the Claimant declined to disclose the required information and secondly, that the Claimant’s self-declaration had not been true. Conclusions

[19]Taking a step back, the Tribunal reflected that in order for the Claimant to succeed in this application, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of success on each element of the claim. The Claimant accepted this in her oral submissions. Further, the Tribunal is again reminded of the Presidential Guidance that this means, “something nearer to certainty than mere probability”.

[20]The Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence does not come close to this comparatively high threshold.

[21]First, as to the Claimant’s status: there is a factual dispute about whether there was a contract of employment so as to afford the Claimant the status of employee for her section 103A claim.

[22]In this case there was no written employment contract with Belmont. It is plainly open to Belmont to contend that it had not come about at that point because the onboarding process had not concluded. There is no written document to contradict that. The Claimant relies on her “acceptance” email of 18 May 2026 but that is plainly couched with conditionality, and ending with the as yet unfilled “signature steps”.

[23]Nor do subsequent events materially affect that: the Claimant has done no work for the End-User; has not been paid, nor is claiming that she is owed payment 5 of 7 for work done; nor is there any compelling evidence of conduct that could be said to support the existence of a concluded contract or employment relationship.

[24]The Claimant may yet establish that she was an employee with respect to section 103A, but for present purposes, she is far from showing that it is probability let alone something nearer to certainty.

[25]It is not necessary in the circumstances to spend significant time on the statutory framework for the asserted Protected Disclosures: suffice to say that there are at least some uncertainties arising in respect of whether the Claimant, even acknowledging for the sake of argument a genuine subjective belief, held a reasonable belief that she was raising a matter legitimately in the public interest when in terms it entailed her not disclosing potentially (Belmont remains unaware of the information on the Claimant’s DBS certificate that meant that “your DBS is not clear”) highly relevant information in connection with a regulated activity.

[26]Thirdly, the Claimant cannot establish with a sufficiently high degree of probability that any Protected Disclosure(s) were the reason or principal reason for dismissal. This is not a Fecitt “material influence” case and instead it is a more challenging test requiring the Claimant, who does not have 2 yrs’ service, to establish that the reason, not a reason, for dismissal was the making of Protected Disclosure.

[27]The best evidence is liable to be the “dismissal letter”. Here, the email, of 27 May 2026, at 11.26hrs, is likely to assert the contemporaneous position. The Tribunal was shown the DBS outcome which contained the following words, “please wait to view information”. It is inconceivable that Belmont would not be interested in that; and that it would be reasonable to ask the Claimant to provide it.

[28]Indeed, this is one of the reasons why Belmont told the Claimant that it would no longer be representing the Claimant: i.e. because she did not wish to disclose this information. The other stated reason flowed from that: i.e. that the Claimant did not give Belmont accurate information when she said there was nothing to declare.

[29]Belmont has asserted what in the Tribunal’s judgment are apparently good reasons for terminating the relationship with the Claimant and which can forcefully be said to be unrelated to any Protected Disclosure. The Claimant characterises the apparent short time between her Pre-action Letter, at 11.12hrs, which she relies on as one of her Protected Disclosures, and the termination letter, at 11.57hrs, along with the other incidents, including the phone call with Darren in the meantime, as overwhelming proof of causation.

[30]The documentation does not bear that out. There is no clear evidence that Belmont’s stated reasons were not the real reasons. While the Claimant may (or may not) make greater headway when the matter is examined at any Final hearing, at this stage in the Tribunal’s assessment the Claimant fails entirely to 6 of 7 show any high level of probability that she will succeed in causation and in showing that her Protected Disclosure(s) were the reason or principal reason for termination.

[31]It is relevant to note that the End-User also concluded that the offer to the Claimant should be withdrawn. The Tribunal cannot even be satisfied at this stage that on a balance of probabilities the Claimant will establish the necessary causation.

[32]The application for interim relief is not well founded and is dismissed. EMPLOYMENT JUDGE BEEVER APPROVED AND SIGNED BY