Ms S Dawswell v Secretary of State for Justice: 6019080/2024 Ms S Dawswell v Secretary of State for Justice: 6019080/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6019080/2024
Between
Ms S DawswellClaimantSecretary of State for JusticeRespondent
Before
Employment Judge Howden-EvansIn person for claimantShane Crawford (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 7 July 2026
JUDGMENT
The reserved judgment of the
REASONS
[1]At the outset, I apologise for the delay in providing this decision, caused by a combination of ill health and ongoing workload. I offered to provide an oral decision and reasons on 28th January 2026, to avoid the delay associated with considering written submissions and drafting full written reasons. Whilst the Respondent’s Counsel had provided written submissions prior to the hearing, on the day of the hearing Respondent’s Counsel had relied on X v Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau & Others [2012] UKSC 59. The Claimant objected that as a litigant in person she did not have adequate time to consider this authority so I permitted written submissions to ensure the Claimant had adequate time to consider and make submissions on this key authority.[2]By 4th March 2026 both parties had provided written representations and the Claimant had provided further written representations. I have taken those written representations into account in my decision, as well as the bundle of documents, witness statement of the claimant, oral evidence and oral closing submissions.[3]Section 83(2)(a) Equality Act 2010 provides that: "Employment means employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work."[4]The Claimant submits that section 83 is broader than conventional employment law concepts and that I should focus upon the reality of the relationship rather than the label "volunteer". I accept that the scope of section 83 is broader than a contract of employment. However, section 83 still requires a contractual relationship. The statutory wording expressly refers to a contract.[5]Here I found there was no contract (express or implied) between the Claimant and Respondent.[6]The Claimant commenced volunteering as a Witness Service volunteer in or around January 2017, following an appointment process conducted by Citizens Advice Witness Service. The contemporaneous documents show that it was Citizens Advice Witness Service (and not the Respondent) which interviewed the Claimant, appointed her as a Witness Service volunteer, undertook the necessary DBS arrangements and welcomed her to the organisation.[7]The appointment letter dated 13 December 2016 expressly offered the Claimant the role of "Witness Service Volunteer" at Stratford Court and was sent on behalf of Citizens Advice Witness Service. The Claimant accepted that appointment and subsequently undertook volunteer duties supporting witnesses attending court.[8]Throughout the period of her volunteering the Claimant worked within a court environment and provided valuable assistance to witnesses attending proceedings. She attended regularly, usually on Tuesdays, she undertook training, attended meetings, supported vulnerable witnesses and was regarded as reliable and committed. She took her responsibilities seriously and regarded herself as under a strong moral obligation to fulfil commitments she had made.[9]However, the issue before me is not whether the Claimant made a valuable contribution or whether she had a close working relationship with court staff. The issue is whether she fell within section 83 Equality Act 2010.[10]I find that the documentary evidence consistently demonstrates that the Claimant's volunteering relationship was managed and administered by Citizens Advice Witness Service (not the Respondent). The supervision and one-to-one meetings were organised by Citizens Advice Witness Service. The travel reimbursement arrangements came from Citizens Advice Witness Service. The requests for assistance at Snaresbrook came from Citizens Advice Witness Service. The volunteer meetings were organised by Citizens Advice Witness Service.[11]The safeguarding policy and dignity at work policies relied upon by the Claimant were Citizens Advice Witness Service policy.[12]During cross-examination the Claimant accepted that arrangements and communications came through Citizens Advice Witness Service, although she submitted that this was done in conjunction with HMCTS.[13]I accept the Witness Service worked closely with Respondent. However, close cooperation between organisations is not the same thing as a contractual relationship between the Claimant and Respondent.[14]I accept there is a complete absence of any agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent. The Claimant accepted in evidence that there was no written contract between herself and the Respondent and she was never promised a wage as this was a voluntary role. She accepted there was no agreement which the Respondent could have relied upon to compel her attendance at court.[15]Instead, the Claimant submits she felt obligated to attend because of her personal commitment and work ethic. However, a strong sense of personal obligation is not the same thing as a legally enforceable contractual obligation.[16]I therefore find that there was no express contract between the Claimant and the Respondent.[17]Further and in the alternative there was no implied contract between the Claimant and the Respondent.[18]The Claimant relied heavily on evidence that Witness Service volunteers were designated as key workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Whilst I accept this evidence, I do not accept that conferral of key-worker status created a contractual relationship where none previously existed. It merely reflected the important public service performed by Witness Service volunteers during the pandemic. It did not create any legally enforceable obligations between the Claimant and the Respondent. Approved by: