Employment Judge BansalIn person for claimantDate 16 October 2025
REASONS
[1]This Public Preliminary Hearing was listed by Employment Judge Harding at a Preliminary Hearing for case management held on 2 June 2025 to determine the following preliminary issues, namely,(i) whether the claims should be struck out on the basis they have no reasonable prospect of success;(ii) whether the claimant is estopped by way of issue estoppel from pursuing all or any of the claims;(iii) whether all if any of the claims are an abuse of process (Henderson v Henderson) and should be struck out;(iv) whether all or any claims have been settled under a qualifying settlement agreement as defined in section 147 of the Equality Act 2010.[2]The claimant is a litigant in person. Miss Scarborough-Lang represented the respondent. The Tribunal was provided with a bundle of documents of 141 pages prepared by the respondent representative, and the parties written submissions.[3]I first heard from the claimant. He repeated the representations advanced in his written submissions. He was not cross examined. The claimant was also given an opportunity to respond to the respondent’s written submissions. Miss Scarborough-Lang relied on the written submissions which she expanded orally. Background Facts The Claimant’s claims
Background Facts
[4]The claimant is an unpaid elected Parish Councillor at the respondent Council.[5]Between the period June 2023 to October 2024, the claimant has issued 4 separate claims to this Tribunal. These are listed below;(i) Claim 1- Case No.1304407/2023 issued on 1 June 2023. This claim was for not having been provided with monthly payslips and P60’s. This claim was settled with the assistance of ACAS by a COT3 settlement agreed on 18 October 2023. Accordingly, a withdrawal judgment was issued on 30 October 2023 and sent to the parties on 1 November 2023.(ii) Claim 2- Case No.1304632/2023 issued on 9 June 2023. This claim was for direct age discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. The pleaded allegations were; (i) Harassment; (ii) Detrimental treatment at Council Meetings and in the course of his work;(iii) Refusal to provide monthly payslips. (iii) Claim 3- Case No.1300455/2024 issued on 28 December 2023 This claim was for unlawful detriment for making a protected disclosure under S47B Employment Rights Act 1996. The pleaded detriments were; (i) the refusal to provide necessary information to participate in meetings; the blocking of emails to deny access to information; (ii) refusal to provide training as part of his role on the Finance & General Purposes Committee.(iv) Claim 4- Case No. 6015667/2024 issued on 20 October 2024 This claim is for discrimination on the grounds of philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010, and brought under s58 of the Equality At 2010; The pleaded acts of less favourable treatment are; (i) Since 2022 the parish council clerk has refused to provide the claimant with hard copies of Council paperwork for meetings. (ii) Between 4 January 2022 - July/August 2023 the parish council clerk failed to provide the claimant with copies of his allowance slips (i.e pay slips). (iii) During an AGM on 18 May 2023 the parish council clerk stated that the claimant needed the permission of the Monitoring Officer before he could sit on the personnel/staffing committee. (iv) On 4 December 2023 the parish council clerk blocked the claimant’s access to email for a two-month period.(v) The respondent refused to allow the claimant to go on training on: 7 March, 26 July and 25 November 2024.(vi) At a council meeting on 14 November 2023 the parish council clerk refused to allow the claimant to speak.[6]By an Order dated 14 March 2024 Claims 2 & 3 were determined to be heard together. A Public Preliminary Hearing was listed for 7 June 2024 to determine the jurisdictional preliminary issues, namely;(i) Does the claimant have the right to bring a claim of age discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 and/or unlawful detriment on the grounds of having made a protected disclosure under section 47B Employment Rights Act 1996 given his status as an elected Parish Councillor? or(ii) Does the claimant have the right to pursue a claim under the Equality Act 2010 or the Employment Rights Act 1996 under any alternative provision of those Acts?(iii) Taking into account all matters does the Employment Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s claim?[7]At a Public Preliminary Hearing held on 7 June 2024, Employment Judge Gidney dismissed both claims. No request for written reasons was made by either party within the time limit, and neither was an application made for reconsideration of the judgment. The claimant did not appeal this decision.[8]Also at this Preliminary Hearing, the claimant’s application to amend his claim to include bringing the same complaints under section 58 of the Equality Act 2010 (s58 EqA 2010) was refused. Preliminary Hearing for Case Management – 2 June 2025 – Claim 4[9]On 2 June 2025, Employment Judge Harding conducted a preliminary hearing for case management. At that hearing, Employment Judge Harding ascertained the claimant’s claim to be that of direct discrimination based on the protected characteristic of philosophical belief, and that this claim is pursued under s58 EqA 2010.[10]The alleged acts of less favourable treatment relied upon are those stated above at Paragraph 5(iv).[11]The respondent in their Response have denied the discrimination complaint and contend the claim is without merit; is a repetition of previously dismissed claims and an abuse of process. The respondent also pointed out that the dispute in relation to the claim for allowance slips pursued under Claim 1 (Case No. 1304407/2023) this was settled under an ACAS settlement agreement and a withdrawal judgment was issued.[12]Further, the respondent in their written application made on 25 May 2025 to strike out the claim, asserted the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the claims on the basis of res judicata, as the claimant is attempting to relitigate facts and claims which have already been determined.[13]Employment Judge Harding considered there were potentially a number of different preliminary issues for the Tribunal to consider. Therefore, this claim was listed to this hearing to determine the preliminary points identified at Paragraph 1 above. The Parties Submissions The Claimant[14]The claimant presented a written submission with references to case authorities. In summary, the claimant submitted;(a) this claim is brought under section 58 of the EqA 2010, which the respondent has accepted can be pursued.(b) the protected characteristic relied upon is a philosophical belief in democracy. (c ) the respondent’s arguments of cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel and abuse of process under Henderson v Henderson are misconceived and unsustainable for the following reasons; (i) this claim is legally distinct as it is brought under s58 of the EqA 2010 and on the basis of the protected characteristic “philosophical belief” and not age as he did previously. He relied on the case of Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac seats UK Ltd (2013) USKC, to make the point that cause of action estoppel did not apply to this claim. (ii) that the principle of issue estoppel does not apply because Claims 2 & 3 although dismissed by Employment Judge Gidney at the preliminary hearing on 7 June 2024, there is no evidence that s58 EqA 2010 was substantively adjudicated. Further the application to amend his claim to pursue the claims under s58 EqA 2010 did not amount to a determination of the merits of a s58 claim. (iii) that abuse of process requires a fact based balancing exercise, and that the mere fact that a claim could have been raised earlier does not render it abusive. The claimant pointed out that in this claim he has raised several acts which postdated the previous claims, eg, training refusals in July and November 2024 and the refusal to provide him with necessary financial information on 8 November 2024 (incorrectly dated as 14/11/23) .[15]In discussion the claimant accepted there is an overlap in the complaints pursued with the previous three claims, however this latest claim is a new claim pursued under s58 EqA 2010. The claimant’s explanation for not pursuing his previous claims under s58 EqA 2010, was that he realised he used the “wrong vehicle” to pursue those claims previously.[16]In respect of the new claim and the pleaded allegations the claimant accepted the complaints relating to (i), (ii) & (iv) were pleaded in the previous Claims, 1, 2 & 3 and were disposed of; and that complaints (iii), (v) & (vi) were new claims. The Respondent’s case[17]The respondent in their detailed written submission provided a helpful analysis of the relevant legal principles and case law on, cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel and the rule in Henderson v Henderson on abuse of process.[18]Firstly, the respondent submitted that the pleaded allegations in this current claim (Claim 4) were pleaded in the previous claims. The analysis provided is set out below.(a) Allegation (i) Since 2022 the parish council clerk has refused to provide the claimant with hard copies of Council paperwork for meetings. This was pleaded in Claim 3.(b) Allegation (ii) Between 4 January 2022 - July/August 2023 the parish council clerk failed to provide the claimant with copies of his allowance slips. This was pleaded in Claims 1 & 2.(c) Allegation (iii) During an AGM on 18 May 2023 the parish council clerk stated that the claimant needed the permission of the Monitoring Officer before he could sit on the personnel/staffing committee. This specific allegation has not been previously pleaded, however the alleged act pre-dates all 3 earlier claims.(d) Allegation (iv) On 4 December 2023 the parish council clerk blocked the claimant’s access to email for a two-month period. This allegation was pleaded in Claim 3.(e) Allegation (v) The respondent refused to allow the claimant to go on training on: 7 March, 26 July and 25 November 2024. This was pleaded in Claim 3.(f) Allegation (vi) At a council meeting on 14 November 2023 the parish council clerk refused to allow the claimant to speak. This was pleaded in Claim 2.[19]In summary the respondent submitted that each and every fact pleaded by the claimant in this claim, is the same and has been previously pleaded in Claims 2 & 3. The only difference between the current claim and the Claims 2 & 3 is the legal label used to pursue this claim. This claim is pursued under the label of philosophical belief and breach of s58 EqA 2010.[20]At the public preliminary hearing held on 7 June 2024 Employment Judge Gidney refused the claimant’s application to amend to pursue the same complaints under s58 EqA 2010. This refusal amounted to a dismissal of the claim, which is a jurisdictional bar to pursue a new claim under s58 EqA 2010.[21]Further under the Henderson v Henderson rule, it is an abuse of process for the claimant to now pursue the same complaints under a new protected characteristic (philosophical belief) which he should have done previously. There are no new circumstances that have arisen that were not present at the outset of Claims 2 & 3 by which the claimant could not have perceived that the alleged discriminatory conduct was due to his philosophical belief. The Legal Framework Cause of action estoppel & Issue estoppel[22]Cause of action estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a claim which has already been decided between the parties. Issue estoppel prevents a party from seeking to pursue a claim relying on the same facts which are the subject of a prior claim between the same parties.[23]The distinction between cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel was set out by the Supreme Court in Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd 2014 AC 160 at paragraph 20: “Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter. In such a case the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged, such as to justify setting aside the earlier judgment. The discovery of new factual matter which could not have been found out by reasonable diligence for use in the earlier proceedings does not, according to the law of England, permit the latter to be reopened. Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue forming a necessary ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided and in subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different cause of action to which the same issue is relevant one of the parties seeks to reopen that issue.[24]In cases where issue estoppel is raised as a defence in subsequent proceedings, it is generally essential that the issues in those proceedings are identical with those that were determined in the earlier proceedings and also that the findings of fact in the judgment in those earlier proceedings are clear and precise – (see Jones v Mid-Glamorgan County Council 1997 ICR 815 CA at page 819 which quotes from O’Laoire v Jackel International Ltd (No. 2) 1991 ICR 197 CA.) Rule in Henderson v Henderson[25]The rule in Henderson v Henderson 1843 3 Hare 100 is a wider form of issue estoppel which says that a claimant can be barred from bringing a different claim from the one which has been decided if with reasonable diligence that claim could have been put forward in the original claim. There is discretion for special circumstances. Sir James Wigram V-C said: ''… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward the whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of the case. A plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of the litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.''[26]In Talbot v Berkshire County Council 1994 QB 290 the Court of Appeal in discussing the rule in Henderson v Henderson said: “The rule is thus in two parts. The first relates to those points which were actually decided by the court; this is res judicata in the strict sense. Secondly, those which might have been brought forward at the time, but were not. The second is not a true case of res judicata but rather is founded on the principle of public policy in preventing multiplicity of actions, it being in the public interest that there should be an end to litigation; the court will stay or strike out the subsequent action as an abuse of process”.[27]In the recent case of Szucs v GreenSquare Accord Ltd [2025] EAT 110, the EAT confirmed at para 27 that the Henderson v Henderson principle applies not only to matters existing at the time a claim is issued but also to events arising before the final hearing. Where facts are known and there is time to seek an amendment, failure to do so can render subsequent proceedings an abuse of process. It is no defence that an amendment might have been refused; the obligation is to bring the matter before the tribunal so it can decide whether to permit amendment or require a separate claim.[28]The underlying public policy was set out by the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co 2002 2 AC 1 that there should be finality in litigation and that a party “should not be twice vexed in the same matter” or to “avoid the oppression of subjecting a defendant unnecessarily to successive actions”.[29]In Johnson v Gore Wood Lord Bingham set out a broad merits based approach. “…Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before…………. While the result may often be the same, it is in my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party’s conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances.”[30]Lord Millett said in Johnson v Gore Wood: “It is one thing to refuse to allow a party to relitigate a question which has already been decided; it is quite another to deny him the opportunity of litigating for the first time a question which has not previously been adjudicated upon. This latter (though not the former) is prima facie a denial of the citizen's right of access to the court conferred by the common law and guaranteed by Article 6….”.[31]A party’s reasons for not raising the issue earlier should be examined: James v Public Health Wales NHS Trust EAT 0170/14 (at paragraph 53). Analysis and conclusion[32]I approached this case by first determining if the claimant is estopped by of estoppel or the claim should be struck out as an abuse of process under the Henderson principle. Subject to my decision, I would then, if necessary consider whether the claim should be struck out on the grounds it has no reasonable prospects of success.[33]I first considered the legal position of Claim 1. (i.e the failure/refusal to provide pay slips).This was the only complaint litigated in Claim 1. This complaint was settled by the parties with the assistance of ACAS. Following this settlement a judgment confirming withdrawal of the claim was entered on 30 October 2023. The claimant pursued the same complaint in Claim 2, as a claim of direct age discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 which was dismissed. In my judgment, the principle of issue estoppel applies. The claimant is precluded from bringing another legal claim on a complaint that has already been determined and settled. I also concluded it is an abuse of process under the principle in Henderson v Henderson.[34]I find the factual basis of the new complaints essentially concern the same factual matrix and are materially same (except for the complaint set out at Paragraph 35 below) which were raised in the previous three claims. The difference is the statutory provision relied upon in bringing this claim (i.e s58 EqA 2010), and a new protected characteristic of philosophical belief. In my judgment, the claimant cannot seek to re-litigate those complaints already dismissed by relying upon a different statutory provision and a new protected characteristic. The claimant had the opportunity to advance all relevant statutory grounds in the earlier claims. He did not do so. It is not open to the claimant to bring successive claims based on the same facts under a different protected characteristic and provision of the Equality Act. In my judgment the earlier claims were disposed of and therefore this current claim is barred by cause of action estoppel in accordance with the ruling in Arnold v National Westminster Bank Plc (1991) 2 AC 93.[35]In relation to the new complaint that has not been pleaded in the previous claims, namely, “During an AGM on 18 May 2023 the parish council clerk stated that the claimant needed the permission of the Monitoring Officer before he could sit on the personnel/staffing committee.”, this complaint pre-dates all of the earlier claims. The claimant could have advanced this complaint in the previous claims which he has failed to do. To do so now, is an abuse of process under the principle in Henderson v Henderson.[36]If I am wrong that cause of action estoppel does not apply strictly, I find this new claim constitutes an abuse of process within the principle in Henderson v Henderson. Under the broader merits-based approach required under Henderson, the claimant ought to have been aware of his right to bring a claim. The claimant could and should have with reasonable diligence advanced his complaint of discrimination by reason of philosophical belief in the earlier claims (Claims 2 & 3). To permit him to do so now is an abuse of Tribunal process and would undermine the finality of litigation as it would subject the respondent to oppression and unfairness. I note the respondent is a public body, and the time spent and the costs of litigation is from public funds. There is a public interest in finality of litigation. The respondent should not be brought into or “vexed” with another claim.[37]I considered the guidance in Johnson v Gore Wood and Bairstow. No exceptional circumstances have been shown which would justify a departure from them.[38]Alternatively, I considered Rule 38(1)(a) Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, which permits a Tribunal to strike out all or part of the claim if it is "scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success". On the basis it is an abuse of the process to attempt to re-litigate matters which have already been decided by a Tribunal or another court of competent jurisdiction, the claim can have no reasonable prospects of success. 39.For the reasons stated above, I have concluded this new claim is barred by cause of estoppel and is also an abuse of process under the principle in Henderson v Henderson. I therefore dismiss this claim in its entirety. Approved By
Background Facts
[1]By a Reserved Judgment dated 16 October 2025 and sent to the parties on 16 October 2025, the Tribunal dismissed the claim on the grounds of cause of action estoppel and/or abuse of process under the principle of Henderson v Henderson.[2]By email dated 26 October 2025 the claimant made an application for reconsideration in a document of 6 pages.
The Law
[3]Under Rule 68(1) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the Tribunal may, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the decision may be confirmed, varied or revoked.[4]Rule 69 provides that an application for reconsideration under Rule 68 must be made in writing within 14 days of the date on which the decision (or, if later, the written reasons) were sent to the parties.[5]The process by which the Tribunal considers an application for reconsideration is set out in Rules 70(2),(3)(4)&(5).[6]The Tribunal has discretion to reconsider a judgment if it considers it to be in the interests of justice to do so. Rule 70(2) requires the Judge to dismiss the application if the Judge decides that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked. Otherwise, the application is dealt with under the remainder of Rule 70.[7]In deciding whether or not to reconsider the judgment, the Tribunal has a broad discretion, which must be exercised judicially, having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.[8]The reconsideration rules and procedure are not intended to provide an opportunity for a party to seek to re-litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way. They are not intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed (with or without different emphasis). Nor do they provide an opportunity to seek to present new evidence that could have been presented prior to judgment.[9]Guidance for Tribunals on how to approach applications for reconsideration was given by Simler P in the case of Liddington v 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust UKEAT/0002/16/DA. Paragraphs 34 and 35 provide as follows: “34. […] a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to relitigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered. Tribunals have a wide discretion whether or not to order reconsideration. Where […] a matter has been fully ventilated and properly argued, and in the absence of any identifiable administrative error or event occurring after the hearing that requires a reconsideration in the interests of justice, any asserted error of law is to be corrected on appeal and not through the back door by way of a reconsideration application.”[10]In the case of Outasight VB Limited v Brown 2015 ICR D11 EAT (the "EAT") it was held that an employment judge has a broad discretion to consider whether reconsideration of a judgment is appropriate in the circumstances. However this discretion must be exercised judicially and must have regard not only to the interests of the claimant (as the person making a reconsideration application) but also in the interests of the respondent, as well as the public interest requirement that there should, so far as is possible, be finality in litigation. 11.In coming to a decision whether to grant the claimant’s application for reconsideration because it was necessary in the interests of justice to do so, I reminded myself that I must also seek to give effect to the overriding objective in Rule 3 of the ET Rules to deal with cases "fairly and justly" and to be guided by the common law principles of natural justice and fairness.[12]In determining the claimant's application I directed myself that in assessing the "interests of justice" I must make an assessment of all relevant facts and circumstances of the matter and balance the interests of both parties which includes the principle of finality of litigation.[13]In Fforde v Black EAT 68/60 ("Fforde") the EAT decided that the interests of justice ground of review does not mean: "...that in every case where a litigant is unsuccessful he is automatically entitled to have the tribunal review it. Every unsuccessful litigant thinks that the interests of justice require a review. This ground of review only applies in the even more exceptional case where something has gone radically wrong with the procedure involving a denial of natural justice or something of that order". The Application[14]In compliance with Rule 69 the claimant’s application for reconsideration was made within the required 14 days of the date on which the judgment was[15]Rule 70(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether there is any reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked. The Tribunal is required to decide whether there is any reasonable prospect of a conclusion that variation or revocation of the original decision is necessary in the interests of justice. The Tribunal has considered the application with this test in mind.[16]The application for reconsideration is made as stated on the grounds “the Reserved Judgment is effected by a procedural irregularity and that reconsideration is necessary in the interests of justice because;• The Tribunal did not address two expressly pleaded applications under the overriding objective (Rule 3) which were lodged before the first case management hearing and which were foundational to procedural fairness and equality of arms.• The Tribunal proceeded to determine the jurisdictional preliminary issues and strike out the claim on grounds of estoppel and abuse of process without having considered or given reasons for not considering the Rule 3 applications.• The omission materially undermined the fairness of the proceedings because the April 15 Rule 3 application alleged interference with the Claimant’s council emails by the Respondent which, if established, affected the availability of documentary evidence and the Claimant’s ability to present his case.• The Respondent’s written reply dated 3 September 2025 in which the Respondent representative expressly stated that she was not prepared to defend a strike out application of the Response and objected to evidence being required at the 15 September hearing, is relevant objectively to whether the Tribunal appreciated the procedural applications and the parties’ positions on them. The Respondent’s position confirms that contested procedural matters existed and that the Tribunal’s silence and failure to order evidence or consider the Rule 3 applications deprived the Claimant of a fair procedural forum in which to establish those matters.[17]I have considered the application carefully, and in doing so, have had regard to the interests of justice and the overriding objective as set out in Rule 3 to ensure cases are dealt with fairly and justly. For the reasons which are set out below, I concluded there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being revoked or varied.(i) Firstly, there has been no procedural irregularity or unfairness caused to the claimant or undermined the fairness of the proceedings. The issues to be determined at the Public Preliminary Hearing held on 15 September 2025 were clearly set out by Employment Judge Harding in the Order dated 2 June 2025. This did not include dealing with the claimant’s application dated 15 April 2025 made under Rule 3 alleging interference with the claimant’s Council emails. Neither was there any Tribunal Order to determine the claimant’s application dated 14 July 2025 to strike out the Respondent’s response for alleged breach of the overriding objective and the application dated 3 September 2025 to cross examine the Respondent’s witness, Ms Paula Coyle, under the same Rule 3 framework. On this basis there has been no omission or procedural irregularity as the Tribunal determined the jurisdictional issue in accordance with the Order dated 2 June 2025.(ii) Further, the two applications referred to have no bearing or relevance to the jurisdictional issue (i.e estoppel or abuse of process) which the Tribunal had to consider and determine. The Tribunal decision to dismiss the claim for the reasons given, has rendered these applications academic which automatically fall away.(iii) The Tribunal is not required to determine or give reasons for applications which are not relevant to the issue(s) to be determined. Further by not mentioning the applications in the judgment and written reasons is not a procedural irregularity or an error of law.[18]In conclusion there is no basis on which it could be said that reconsideration would be in the interests of justice. Therefore, the application for reconsideration is refused on the basis there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked. Accordingly, the claimant’s claim remains dismissed. Approved By