Ms L Williams-St Louis v West Berkshire District Council: 6015012/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6015012/2024

Between

Ms. L Williams-St LouisClaimant

West Berkshire District CouncilRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Findlay

In person for claimant

Ms. J Linford (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 5 August 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant was subjected to harassment related to race by the respondent within the meaning of section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 as set out at allegations 13.4.1.3, 13.4.1.4 and 13.4.1.9 of the List of Issues and those allegations are well founded;

[2]The claimant was victimised within the meaning of section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 as set out in allegation 12.7 of the List of Issues and that allegation is well founded;

[3]All other allegations of direct race discrimination, harassment related to race and of victimisation are not well founded and are dismissed.

REASONS

[1]The claimant was employed by the respondent as a Youth Turn-Around Intervention Worker in its Youth Justice Support Team (“YJST”) from the 17th of July 2023 until the 21st of August 2024. She resigned giving two months’ notice on the 21st of June 2024.

[2]The claimant contacted ACAS on the 2nd of September 2024, and the certificate was issued on the 14th of October 2024. The claimant's claim was received on the same day.

[3]The claimant ticked the box to claim race discrimination and victimisation in her claim form but provided no further particulars at that stage.

[4]In its notice of hearing, the tribunal directed the claimant to provide further information by the 17th of January 2025, but she did not do so. The claimant said that she was represented by her union at this stage, but that her representative did not tell her that further information had to be provided and that she did not appreciate that herself. After the respondent raised a query about this failure to respond to the Tribunal’s directions, on the 21st of April 2025 the claimant asked for a postponement of the case management hearing as her legal advisor was leaving Unionline, the organisation which was assisting her. That postponement was refused, but on the 21st of April 2025 also, the claimant provided some information about her claim, which appears at page 85 of the bundle to page 89. Her request for a postponement was refused because by the time that her request was placed before a judge, an advisor from Unionline had come on the record, see page 89.

[5]There was then a case management hearing before Judge Hunt on the 2nd of May 2025, when the claimant was represented. She was directed to provide further information by the 30th of May 2025, and that information appears at pages 35 to 44 of hearing file.

[6]The respondent says that the claimant's initial claim form did not include a claim for harassment. We gave permission to the claimant to add a claim for harassment, and to include an additional allegation of direct discrimination at paragraph 6.8 of the agreed draft list of issues (if permission was necessary) on the first day of the hearing, but we reserved the question of whether those complaints were made in time, and if not whether time should be extended, to our determination of the proceedings.

[7]The issues: the issues are therefore as set out in the agreed draft list of issues, including those matters shown in red for which we gave permission as set out above. This draft list of issues runs from page 105 to 109 in the hearing bundle.

[8]Procedural issues: The respondent had made an application for the hearing to be held in private. It had not copied that application to the claimant but had made it ex parte, for reasons which were never properly explained. We gave the claimant time on the first day of the hearing to consider that application, which we were told centred round the need to protect the identity of the young person known as X. For reasons which we gave at the time, we did not consider that it would be proportionate to hold the final hearing in private, bearing in mind that we should interfere with open justice to the least extent possible in order to protect the rights of others. Nor did we consider that it would be in the interests of the overriding objective to make such an order under rule 49 of the 2024 Employment Tribunal Rules. Instead, we made an order that the young person involved should be anonymized and referred to as X within these proceedings, and that there should be a reporting restrictions order in that respect.

[9]Also on the first day, it became apparent that the claimant had covertly recorded conversations with her colleagues and managers which she wanted to adduce in evidence. The claimant had been represented for at least part of the proceedings, including at the previous preliminary hearing on the 2nd of May 2025 when orders had been given for further information to be provided and for disclosure et cetera, although she was not represented by the time of the final hearing.

[10]The existence of the transcripts was not mentioned at disclosure stage, and we were told that the respondent only became aware of their existence on or about 14 April 2024. The claimant accepted this but said she had not been aware that she needed to disclose the transcripts of the covertly recorded conversations. The claimant had brought only one copy of the transcripts with her, in a file which the respondent said was unnumbered.

[11]In addition, the transcripts had been produced using AI, and there were no gaps between words which made them, said the respondent extremely difficult to decipher. In the time available before the hearing, the respondent had not been able to establish whether there had been any editing of the tapes or to listen to them. Although the claimant said that she would be able to identify the key extracts, which she said would take the tribunal only half an hour or less to listen to, Ms. Linford pointed out that, before that happened, it would be necessary for the respondent to listen to the tapes to ensure that nothing had been left out and in order that they could ascertain whether it was necessary for the tribunal to listen to more than only the extracts that the claimant wanted to use.

[12]For reasons which we came gave at the time, we refused the claimant permission to rely upon these transcripts. In particular, we did not consider that it would be in the interests of the overriding objective to do so, as that would have meant postponing the final hearing, which had been listed for about a year, to a future date, as much as a year hence. We accepted the respondent's submissions that there were many hours of transcripts which had been disclosed and that if Ms. Linford had to listen to them in order to check their contents with the respondent’s witnesses and to identify which parts were relevant, there would not have been time for the case to go ahead on the allocated dates. It was difficult to ascertain how much of the transcripts would have been relevant to the issues, and we did not consider that it was necessary for us to listen to them or to have access to extracts of them in order for there to be a fair hearing.

[13]On the first day of the hearing, we agreed to include pages 573 to 575, which included an e-mail from Dave rate, the service manager sent on the 4th of June 2024 to the claimant in response to her e-mail sent earlier that day about the incident on the 3rd of June 2024. This was clearly relevant to the issues that we had to determine, and we considered it necessary to accept it into evidence in order for there to be a fair hearing.

[14]On the second day of the hearing, the respondent disclosed its absence management policy, and again for reasons which we gave at the time we admitted this document into evidence.

[15]The application for admission of the transcripts and about the reporting restrictions/privacy took up a significant part of the first day of hearing. The claimant had requested to leave at 3:00 PM on the first day due to childcare issues, but in the event the tribunal needed the rest of the first afternoon in order to read its way into the documents in any event and the claimant was able to leave on time.

[16]At the start of the hearing also, the claimant disclosed to us that she was dyslexic, and as a result may need to be afforded additional time to gather her thoughts on occasions. The tribunal indicated that it was happy to accommodate such an adjustment and the claimant was given additional time to think during the proceedings. It became apparent on the first day of the hearing that some of the page references in the respondents witness statements were incorrect. Once this was rectified, the claimant was given the opportunity to review the statements and page references before going on to question the respondent’s witnesses. No other adjustments were requested.

[17]On the first day, the claimant was accompanied by her union representative from her employment at the respondent, Mr McMullen as a Mackenzie friend but Mr McMullen did not attend on subsequent days. The judge told the claimant that she should raise her hand if she needed to draw our attention to anything or if she had a question about the proceedings so that this could be dealt with, and the claimant asked for a number of explanations during the hearing which we were happy to give.

[18]In the event, although the issues had not been defined at the preliminary hearing so that four days was a very rough estimate, we completed the oral evidence and our reading within the four days allocated, hearing from the claimant and Stacey Clay, David Wraight, Rose Carberry, Karen Norris and Michele Clarke for the respondent. We also had a witness statement from Jessica Paulissich, a Restorative Justice Worker with the respondent, but she was unable to attend and so could not be cross examined and therefore the weight we could give to the statement was limited. There was insufficient time to hear the parties’ submissions, so we gave directions for written submissions, and for each party to reply if desired, and both parties did indeed reply to the other’s submissions. The submissions and replies were available to us and we read them at the start of our deliberations on the 14th of July 2026.

[19]Relevant Facts: In or about August 2024, the claimant had an Induction meeting with Stacey Clay (SC), the Operational manager of the Youth Justice Support Team (YJST) in which she worked. At that meeting, Ms. Clay talked about the diversity of the Team in which the claimant would work, stating that the team now included a male police officer, one staff member in a same-sex relationship and one black person. This made the claimant feel uncomfortable, and she discussed what she had been told with various colleagues, including JL. The people to whom the claimant talked said that it sounded as if she has been recruited because she was black. This was upsetting for her. The claimant's colleague JL then told another manager, Karen Norris, Assistant Team Manager, and JL said words to the effect that the claimant thought SC was racist, although the claimant had never used that expression herself. Karen Norris then passed the information on to Stacey Clay.

[20]In the way of these things, it was presented to Ms. clay as if it was the claimant who had said that she felt that she was only recruited because she was black, and that she thought Ms. Clay was racist. The claimant denies saying these things, saying only that she felt uncomfortable with Ms. Clay talking about the protected characteristics of herself and others as if it was some sort of checklist.

[21]As a result of this, the claimant had a supervision meeting on the 8th of September 2023 with her line manager Michele Clarke, a senior Social Worker, which was also attended by Ms. Clay. The note of this meeting begins on page 136, and the relevant passage is on page 137. Ms. Clay clarified that she had not been involved in the recruitment of the claimant, and she said that everyone on the team was offered a job on their own merits (not because of protected characteristics) and that the claimant should be proud of herself. Ms. Clay said that the reason she had made the comments in the induction meeting was that she was conscious that the team was not very diverse and that she wanted the claimant to understand that if practise within the team was not as inclusive as she hoped, it was important to raise that.

[22]Whilst we accept that was Ms. Clay's reason for making those comments in the induction meeting, we consider that this was a rather cluMs.y way of going about things and we can understand why the claimant was concerned.

[23]At that meeting, the claimant said she felt better having had the meeting with Stacey Clay and Michele Clarke. She said that having had conversations with other colleagues had been overwhelming, and it was agreed that if she had an issue with a particular colleague, she would raise it with that person going forward. This seeMs. to have been a positive meeting.

[24]In paragraph 5.2 of her Further and Better Particulars, the claimant refers to an incident in late 2023 when she says that she raised concerns about having to visit a household where the young person's grandfather also resided. She said that she had discovered that the grandfather was a former Hell’s Angel, and that she was concerned about that as she had heard that Hell’s Angels had racist views. Karen Norris, who was acting as Operations Manager at the time, overheard the claimant talking about this and asked her whether she had experienced any racism or racist comments from the young person's grandfather. By that time the claimant had been visiting the household for about two months without incident. The claimant said that there had not been any racism or racist incidents and therefore Karen Norris took no action and the claimant continued to visit the household. At a later stage, the claimant says that the young person’s grandfather discussed his views on immigration with her, but she accepts that he had not directed any racist comments towards her.

[25]The essence of the claimant's complaint about this appears to be that sometime later she undertook health and safety training and discussed the situation with the person delivering the training, who said that she should not have been placed in this situation, that is having to visit the household. We do not know who delivered the training or what their experience and qualifications are, and the claimant says in her further particulars that these are not standalone complaints of race discrimination but context to show the respondent’s general behaviour towards the claimant and her race.

[26]At some point in early 2023, there was a staff meeting where the claimant is described by various managers, Ms. Clay, Ms. Clarke and Ms. Norris, as having displayed difficult behaviour in a meeting, in that she was displaying impatience by huffing, standing up and tutting. Miss Clarke believes that the claimant was due to leave work to go to a hospital appointment, abut that Stacey Clay started the meeting late and that the claimant was becoming impatient with the length of time discussions were taking. Ms. Clay was not impressed by the claimant’s conduct and rebuked her for it in front of the whole team. Ms. Clarke, did not consider that this was the best way of addressing the claimant's behaviour, and spoke to Ms. clay afterwards, saying that she would have preferred to have addressed this issue with the claimant privately in her next supervision rather than in front of everyone. Miss Clarke did inform the claimant subsequently in supervision why her behaviour had not been appropriate.

[27]This behaviour did not lead to any kind of disciplinary sanction or warning against the claimant at the time, but was referred to by the three managers within the context of the claimant's grievance at a later stage. The claimant passed her probation at the first attempt and was subsequently offered additional working hours, which indicates that her work and her attitude was satisfactory.

[28]On or about the 5th of April 2024, the claimant was supervising young person X. The young person was unsettled and went outside to vape. When he was out, he smashed his phone. He became upset and asked to speak to Ms. Clay, as he was concerned that he would breach his Youth Rehabilitation Order due to the way he was feeling. The claimant observed his behaviour and was concerned about taking him home. She asked Karen Norris, acting operations manager, if she would make alternative arrangements for somebody else to take the young person home. Miss Norris refused on the basis that the claimant was on the rota to do it.

[29]On the 3rd of June 2024, the claimant was again working with young person X. She found that his behaviour was difficult from the start of the session, as he was not listening to her, he was on his phone and vaping. On page 211 in her e-mail written on the 4th of June, she describes X as being derogatory about staff members and being rude. She says that it was a struggle to get him to stop swearing and singing explicit lyrics about stabbings, Although the claimant had previously told him that she had lost a close relative due to a stabbing.

[30]Eventually the young person agreed to go for a walk with the claimant and he left his phone behind. During the walk, they passed a shop window in which there were animal figurines. The claimant had been working with the young person to educate him about racism and colonialism. They had a discussion about how it was probably not racist for X to refer to the claimant as an elephant, but that it would be if he referred to her as a monkey.

[31]X’s difficult behaviour continued. When they returned to the office, he phoned a friend of his referred to as “Y”. He had his phone on loudspeaker and told his friend that he was with “that battyboy Louise”. Y replied, “Is that the one you call a slave and makes you pick cotton for reparation”, to which X was in fits of laughter. This was a clear reference to the work that the claimant had been doing with X to educate him about colonialism and racism, which he had apparently discussed with Y. Instead of X learning from it, it appeared that it was now being turned against the claimant to mock her.

[32]The claimant was extremely hurt by this and by the nature of the remarks and asked X to end the call. Y continue to speak saying that X had called the claimant “a plus sized baddie”. Y also went on to say X should be allowed to say things about slavery and picking cotton as there was freedom of speech. The claimant was repeatedly asking X to come off his phone, but he did not, and Y continued to make derogatory comments. The claimant said out loud to X that she “did not have time to argue with little boys”. She said that it was a comment aimed at the situation and aimed at Y, but we can see how a neutral observer may consider that the reference was to both X and Y.

[33]The claimant then left the room and went upstairs to get her car keys and bag from the office, to take X home. Whilst she was upstairs, she spoke to her colleague Gabby about what had just happened. We accept that Karen Norris was in the background when she did so, but also that Karen Norris did not take part in the conversation with Gabby and that she was not absorbing what they were saying. The claimant did not ask if anyone else would take X home as she had been told she should do it if she was on the rota to do it when she had previously asked in April.

[34]After dropping X at home, the claimant spoke to her manager Michele Clarke from her car on her telephone about the incident. Ms. Clarke remembers that the claimant was extremely upset. The claimant says that she spoke to Ms. Clarke about wanting to report X to the police, and that whilst Ms. Clarke was sympathetic, she discouraged the claimant from reporting X as that would further criminalise him. Ms. Clarke's recollection is that the discussion about criminalising the young person was on a different occasion and in a different context, but she accepts that her views and the claimant’s differed about whether or not young people should be reported to the police in respect of their interactions with staff. Ms. Clarke cannot remember this part of the discussion, unsurprisingly as her focus was to get he claimant some support from the managers who were in the office that day, Ms. Clarke was at home. The claimant told Ms. Clarke that she was “going to speak to her people” when she got home, Ms. Clarke correctly understood this to be a group of the claimant's friends who were supportive of her. Ms. Clarke was working from home and suggested that the claimant go and see Karen Norris, who had been acting up as Operations Manager, on her return to the office.

[35]The claimant again spoke to her colleague Gabby on her return to the office, and subsequently to Karen Norris in a separate room, away from the open plan office. The claimant says that on this occasion Karen Norris told her that Dave Wraight, the Service Manager, had talked to the onsite policeman and that the incident with X was a “he said/she said” incident, effectively that it would be difficult to prove and that the claimant should not take the matter to the police. Miss Norris disputes that such a discussion took place on the 3rd of June; instead, she says she made the comment on a later occasion, on the 14th of June 2024 after X had made a complaint against the claimant and others.

[36]On balance, we accept Ms. Norris’s account of this -whilst Ms. Norris may well have been in the background when the claimant was talking to Gabby earlier, that does not mean that she heard everything the claimant said or immediately appreciated the severity of the incident, and we think it is unlikely anyway that she would have spoken to Dave Wraight about it or that he would have been able to get advice from the police officer in the time it took for the claimant to drop X at his home and return to the office on 3rd June 2024. We do not consider that the claimant has sought to mislead us about this, simply that matters have got muddled due to the passage of time.

[37]Also on the 3rd of June 2024, the claimant says that Karen Norris discussed what had been said to the claimant by X and compared that to X making comments about being old fat or having a speech impediment to other members of staff. We accept the claimant’s evidence about this as it appears consistent with the attitude taken by Ms. Clay and Ms. Norris to verbal abuse from young people with whom the Team worked towards members of staff. Both Ms. Norris and Ms. Clay spoke in detail during the interviews for the claimant’s grievance about the kind of abuse experienced and how they dealt with it. Their general attitude seemed to be that it was best to ignore it and prioritise work with the young person, that the worker could leave the session and come back if they needed to. They did not seem to differentiate between types and severity of verbal abuse, see page 353 and 359. On page 359, Ms. Clay appears to say that despite X’s racist behaviour in the form of using the “N” word preceding the incident on 3 June 2024, it had simply been left to the claimant to decide if she would continue working with him, and that the claimant chose to do so, hoping to “make a difference” in his attitude and behaviour.

[38]On 3rd June 2024, Miss Norris suggested that if the claimant wanted further assistance, she should speak to Stacey Clay. We accept that the reason she did so was because she had stopped being acting Operations Manager that day, when Stacey Clay returned to her substantive role.

[39]By the time the claimant went to Stacey Clay's office on the 3rd of June 2024 she was visibly upset. The claimant says that she was seated throughout her discussion with Stacey Clay, but we do not accept that. During her questioning of Stacey Clay, the claimant appeared to accept that on 3 June 2024 she had moved to the side of Stacey Clay's desk, and that she was rocking backwards and forwards in her distress.

[40]While she was explaining what had happened previously to Stacey Clay, the claimant told Ms. Clay about what she had said about not having time to waste on “little boys” under the severe provocation of the racist abuse she experienced. Miss Clay took her to task about that, saying that she should not have used such an expression as it was “derogatory” towards the young people. Miss Clay also likened the comments made by the young people to comments made to staff about being fat or old.

[41]At later points in time, Ms. Clay said that she felt threatened by the claimant's behaviour during that meeting, saying that the claimant had “grown in stature” and had been “dysregulated” and “loud” whilst she was describing what had happened, and that the claimant had said either “you do not want to see me when I'm angry” or, on the claimant’s account, “ you don't need to see me when I'm angry”.

[42]Ms. Clay also seemed to be concerned about the fact that the claimant said that she was going to speak to her people, a comment that she had also made to Ms. Clarke and Ms. Norris. Unlike Miss Clarke and Ms. Norris, however, Ms. Clay appeared to consider this comment to have some sort of sinister implication, as if the claimant was going to get support to take retributory action against either X or Ms. Clay. We do not understand why miss clay would put such an interpretation on the claimant's words And we consider that whilst miss clay may have genuinely felt threatened by the claimant's behaviour in getting up out of his seat and coming to stand over her at one point, we consider the aspects of the claimant’s behaviour on that day have been exaggerated by Ms. Clay.

[43]We consider that Ms. Clay's response to the claimant, in likening what had happened to her that day to staff being called them old or fat by a young person and in particular by focussing on the claimant’s use of the expression “little boys” rather than what was said by X and Y to make her react in that way, showed a lack of empathy. In those circumstances we are not surprised that the claimant said she was going home to speak to her people, that is people who would understand how she was feeling.

[44]During her encounter with Ms. Clay on the 3rd of June, the claimant made it clear that she no longer wished to work with X. Neither Ms. Clay nor anyone at the respondent took any action about that on 3 June 2024.

[45]On the 4th of June 2024, the claimant was working from home and Ms. Clay contacted her to see how she was feeling and to say that the claimant could contact her if she wished, and that she would arrange a meeting for later in the week. In the event, there was a meeting involving Dave Wraight, Michele Clarke and Stacey Clay together with the claimant on the 5th of June.

[46]The claimant had sent a detailed email to Mr. Wraight, Ms. Clay and Ms. Clarke at 11:02 AM on the 4th of June, providing full details of the incident with X&Y and how it had made her feel, see page 214. She said that after speaking 2 to colleagues and managers the previous day, she felt that although people were attempting to be supportive and offer her comfort, the continuous “its “likened to”” examples where it was compared to someone being old, that or having a speech impediment was not the same. She makes the point that body shaming, ageism and speech impediments impact all types of people, but as she put it, “the historical barbaric violence linked to Colonialism, Imperialistic rule and slavery, due to white superiority and the belief that black people were savages and beneath white people impacted black people alone. She concludes that she needed to “come home and be around family and friends” in order to be heard and understood, as she had said on the 3rd of June that she felt as though colleagues were unable to see how the experience impacted upon her.

[47]Mr Wraight emailed the claimant after the meeting on 5 June at 16.41 that day, page 214. The claimant had said that she thought there was a need for a greater understanding of racism for the whole team, and equality and diversity training was discussed, subject to funding. The claimant had confirmed that it was helpful to be listened to, and to have managers touch base with her, and to know that she had been heard.

[48]It was agreed that she would not work with X for the future. There was a discussion of whether the claimant should write a victim impact statement that could be used in the process of deepening the young person's understanding and holding him to account for his actions. She agreed to this, and this process was to be coordinated by Stacey Clay.

[49]There was a discussion about having a black male role model for X. The claimant had suggested this and that a black male, K, who worked at an organisation called Waterside, may be suitable. Mr Wraight wrote that it was agreed that it would be valuable if K could undertake further informal education with X on racism.

[50]Regarding Y, it was discussed that it would be helpful if Reading Borough Council, who were dealing with him, undertook some educational work with him around racism and specifically about his actions and language during the incident, and the claimant agreed that the impact statement could be shared with him to support the process.

[51]The claimant was not told that she could meet with young person Y or his support worker at this meeting. During the meeting, Mr. Wraight told the claimant about a discussion he had with the police officer who worked with the Youth Justice Support Team. He told the claimant that because of this discussion, he did not consider that what had happened met the criteria for prosecution as a criminal offence. He had discussed whether it met the criteria for a Public Order Act offence or a malicious communications offence with the police officer, and this is where the phrase “he said, she said” seems. to have originated.

[52]The police officer had indicated that there was no more than a 50% chance of success of conviction using his experience. We accept that Mister Wraight told the claimant this because he had been considering whether the respondent itself needed to take any action in respect of what had happened. We do not accept that the claimant was told that because she was going to make a victim impact statement, she could not herself contact the police but accept that she felt discouraged from doing so by what Mr Wraight said.

[53]As a result of this meeting, although the claimant no longer worked with X and had no further interaction with him, she was still present in the building on occasions when X was present. She said that she was aware of his presence when he was there and that he made sure that he drew attention to himself, but she does not suggest that there was any further interaction between them.

[54]We do not accept that the claimant unnecessarily courted contact with X, as suggested by Karen Norris in her grievance statement. We accept that the kitchen and therefore the drink making facilities on the premises were downstairs, as was the entrance to the building, so that there were occasions when X was present when the claimant needed to visit the kitchen or to leave or re-enter the premises, so that she had to go downstairs.

[55]The claimant in this respect compares her treatment to that of JL, a colleague who had also complained about a young person and who was then asked to work in a different council building from the rest of the team. We accept Ms. Clay's explanation about this, that JL had made a formal grievance about all her colleagues, the whole team, as well as X, and therefore it was not appropriate for her to work beside them whilst that was being investigated. We also accept that Jamie Louise had made the formal grievance at an early stage after X directed homophobic abuse at her, hence there being a formal investigation of her concerns at an earlier stage than there was in relation to the incident involving the claimant and X.

[56]The claimant complains at issue 12.2 that she was excluded from staff meetings regarding X after the 3rd of June 2024. Under cross examination, however, she accepted that she had attended staff meetings where the whole team attended after the 3rd of June 2024, and the meetings to which she was not invited were for workers who were working with X and to discuss his situation. As the claimant was no longer working with X, we do not consider that it was necessary for her to be invited to these meetings or kept up to date with developments in his case.

[57]On the 5th of June 2024, Stacey Clay wrote to the claimant confirming that she had met with X “today” and had told him that the claimant would no longer be working with him, and that if he saw the claimant around the building, she would not speak to him. Stacey Clay explained that she intended to sit down with X and his mother to discuss the incident towards the end of the following week. Stacey Clay also confirmed that she had made arrangements for the claimant to complete a victim impact statement and that Jessica Paulissch (“JP”), a colleague accustomed to drafting such statements in her role, would be happy to offer support and to help her draft a statement. The statement could then be used in the discussion with X and his mother and be shared with Reading Youth Justice Service. Ms. Clay said that this action could be reviewed once the claimant had the opportunity to meet with “Jess”. JP provided a statement, which we read, but did not attend to give evidence so there was limited weight that we could give to her evidence.

[58]The claimant had a supervision meeting with Michele Clarke on the 7th of June 2024. She said that the week had been “up and down”, but after the meeting she had with Stacey and Dave Wraight (on 5th June 2024), she felt that she had been “heard” and had been able to say how the incident made her feel. She felt happy that it had been dealt with well at the Youth Justice Support Team. This is at page 224.

[59]By the 12th of June 2024, see page 232, JP had sent the claimant the draft impact statement to check, and on the 13th of June 2024, see page 234, JP sent the impact statement to Stacey Clay, Dave Wraight and Karen Norris. She asked if the meeting with X and his mother would be rescheduled, because X was now attending court on the day for which the meeting had been arranged.

[60]The original impact statement begins at page 235 in the bundle. On page 237, there are passages to which Mr. Wraight later took exception. By this stage, the 13th of June 2024, the claimant was saying that although staff attempted to support and comfort her after the incident, they could not fully understand what X had said and how it had impacted her, and that it was still affecting her now. She said that she felt “let down”, as yet again racism did not seem to be taken seriously.

[61]Jess had encouraged the claimant to be honest about her feelings, and on page 237 at paragraph 2, in answer to the question “What were you thinking at the time of the incident?” the claimant responded: “Get me the fuck out of this room”. She said she was reminding herself to remain calm and professional, and feeling that she “disliked” X.

[62]On the 14th of June, Stacey Clay emailed the team about X and her attendance at court. She had spoken in general terms. to the Judge about X's behaviour with friends on the phone whilst being supervised by the respondent, and about him making racist, homophobic and suggestive comments. She had not addressed in detail the claimant's situation. The Judge had told the young person that his behaviour was unacceptable, and X was due to attend court again on the 26th of June 2024.

[63]On about the 13th of June, X complained to Dave Wraight, Service Lead/manager, about the claimant and various other staff members. The claimant complains that Mr Wraight told her about the complaint late on the afternoon of the 14th of June 2024, although he had seen her several times previously that day. She suggests that this delay in informing her was a deliberate act by Mr. Wraight, intended to cause her upset due to her complaints of racism.

[64]We accept that the reason that Mr Wraight told the claimant (and others) about the complaints against them by X on the afternoon of the 14th of June 2024 was that he had been told that X had a video of the claimant behaving inappropriately in a car, including speeding and failing to wear a seat belt. Mr. Wraight had asked the young person's mother for a copy of the video so that he could review it before informing the claimant, and he wanted to tell all of those against whom there were complaints at the same time. Towards the end of the day on the 14th of June, Mr. Wraight concluded that the alleged video was not going to be provided. He was also aware that he would be on leave early the next week, and so he wanted to tell staff members about the complaints and to arrange meetings with them for when he came back to work later the following week. We accept that is the reason the claimant was told about the complaint late on the afternoon of Friday 14 June 2024.

[65]Around this time also, Mr. Wraight informed the claimant and JP that the claimant's victim impact statement needed to be amended. We accept that his reasons for doing so were that he was concerned that the claimant referred to her daughter and some of her own previous experiences in the statement, so he wished to protect her, and secondly that he considered that some of the language used gave a poor impression of the respondent Youth Justice service. So, he did not want it to be shown in that form to either X and his mother or the worker at Reading Borough Council who was dealing with Y, or Y.

[66]As Ms. Clarke confirmed, being informed about this complaint was upsetting for the claimant, who was off sick the following Monday and Tuesday – see pages 243-4. She was due to complete a stress risk assessment with Ms. Clarke on the 24th of June 2024 – page 250. On the 21st of June, the claimant gave notice of her resignation to the respondent, saying that her leaving date would be the 21st of August 2024, in accordance with the notice provisions in her contract.

[67]The claimant had been due to go on annual leave on the 17th of June 2024 but instead was off sick. She asked if she could have her annual leave recredited to her because she was ill. During the hearing, the respondent produced its sickness absence reporting and management policy. We accept that this was on the respondent’s intranet at the time that the claimant was employed, and therefore that she could have accessed it during her employment. The policy says at paragraph 6.13 that if an employee is sick whilst on annual leave, if she can obtain a statement of fitness to work stating that she was unfit to work, she will then be considered as being sick. The relevant amount of annual leave will be credited back to her from the date that the statement was signed.

[68]The claimant has suggested that asking her to obtain a statement of fitness to work as a condition of paying back annual leave was discriminatory. She also accepts that she had not been aware of the absence policy, although it was available to her and she probably saw it during her induction, at the time that she was requesting her leave to be credited back. Ms. Clay discussed the matter with Ms. Clarke, and the claimant was informed that she should provide a fit notte. The claimant argued that she was entitled to have three days sick pay without being required to produce a fitness to work statement, so the respondent decided that they would credit her with that day of annual leave in any case.

[69]The resignation letter does not give any reason for her deciding to leave at that point.

[70]On the 24th of June, JP sent a revised version of the impact statement to Stacey Clay and Dave Wraight. This starts at page 254.

[71]By the 27th of June 2024, Karen Norris had been in contact with a youth justice service officer at Reading Borough Council who was dealing with child Y. The worker, MC, told Ms. Norris that she had discussed the matter with Y, who denied being the person who had made the comments about the claimant during the phone call on 3rd June 2024. Despite this, Ms. Norris sent a copy of the revised impact statement to the worker, saying that she would let her decide whether to share it with Y or not. This is on page 259.

[72]A further meeting was held between the claimant, Stacey Clay and Dave Wraight on the 3rd of July 2024, to discuss progress after their first meeting to discuss the incident (5th June 2024). During that meeting, the claimant asked Dave Wraight and Stacey Clay how well-equipped they were to deal with complaints of racism in the workplace. She asked them what training they had undertaken to deal with complaints like this. Mr. Wraight acknowledged that as “a middle class old white man” he had not faced the same experiences as the claimant. In making this comment, we consider that he was simply reflecting the reality of the situation, but nevertheless he made it clear that he had received appropriate training to deal with the claimant’s complaints.

[73]Stacey Clay, however, then commented that Mr. Wraight likewise could not understand the experiences she had as “a menopausal old lady”. Stacey Clay did not say that the claimant could not understand Ms. Clay's experiences, she said that Mr. Wraight could not. In doing so, however, we consider that she was equating her experiences as a menopausal older woman with what the claimant had experienced from X.

[74]During the meeting on the 5th of July 2024, the claimant was informed that instead of introducing X to Ken at “Waterside”, another organisation dealing with young people run by Berkshire Youth Service, as a black male role model, Ms. Clay and Mr. Wraight had decided that another black male called Mark, who was already doing some work with X, would be more suitable to undertake that role. The claimant was upset by this, as she felt that she should have been consulted about this change of plan.

[75]During the meeting on the 3rd of July 2024 also, the claimant was asked by Mr. Wraight and Stacey Clay if she was still looking to report the incident involving X&Y to the police. There was a discussion about the prospects of successfully doing this. The claimant felt that she was being discouraged from reporting the matter to the police.

[76]On the 10th of July 2024, the claimant wrote to Mr. Wraight, copied to Ms. Clarke and Ms. Clay, saying that she had been reflecting on previous conversations regarding X&Y. She complained that at the first meeting on the 5th of June 2024, she had been told it would be “a great option” to look at asking Ken from Berkshire Youth Service to be a mentor for X but that this suggestion was effectively ignored, and a decision was made for her (and not with her) to change the mentor.

[77]She went on to say that she had just remembered that it was also mentioned in the first meeting that it would be “a good idea to perhaps speak to Y’s worker to get my views/feelings across about the incident” before the worker spoke to Y. She complained that Y was effectively provided with her victim impact statement without her having a chance to speak to his worker. We note, however, that in the e-mail following the meeting on the 5th of June 2024, although there was reference to the claimant completing a victim impact statement, there is no suggestion that she would be able to speak to Y’s youth worker or indeed to Y. The claimant did not challenge the accuracy of that email at the time.

[78]In her e-mail of the 10th of July 2024 on page 262, she also complaints that she had received no feedback in respect of what both young people had said in relation to the victim impact statement and she was still unclear if they had ever admitted or denied that the incident took place. In fact, although there were various attempts to set up a meeting with X and his mother at which the victim impact statement could be shared by Karen Norris, this never happened before the claimant left the respondents employment. There were a variety of reasons for this, including the fact that a meeting had to be cancelled in June 2024 because the young person had been called back to court on that date in respect of breach of his order, and that after that he was due back in court on the 26th of June 2024. There was another meeting which Karen Norris attempted to arrange, but X’s mother informed the respondent that X was unwilling to attend. Subsequently, in July 2024, X stopped engaging with the respondent, and ultimately his youth rehabilitation order was discharged, so that there was no further opportunity for the respondent to talk to him about the victim impact statement.

[79]In her e-mail on page 262, the claimant mentions that she was asked (on 3 July 2024) about whether she was still considering going to the police. The claimant said: “I want to ask you how it is I should perhaps feel as though I could do this when I feel so unsupported and let down by the lack of action and brushing under the carpet I have experienced? The meeting was about supporting me, all I have seen as a result is decisions made about me and my choices made without me”. She concludes “I wish to explore this as a potential complaint please.”

[80]On the same day, the 10th of July 2024 (page 261) Mr Wraight replied to the claimant, thanking her for her e-mail and saying that he was sorry to hear that she felt that matters had not progressed in the way she expected or hoped. He referred her to the grievance procedure and said that the first element of the procedure was to look to resolve matters informally and at the point when an informal route was exhausted, then progress to the grievance procedure. He suggested a meeting to explore the matters she had raised in her e-mail and then he would be able to provide her with a written response. He said if she continued to be dissatisfied at that stage, she could follow the grievance procedure.

[81]On the same day, the claimant responded saying that, although a meeting could take place, she was thinking that this would be the third meeting to discuss these issues. She said that the outcome of the first meeting was that she made suggestions that were not followed and were overruled by senior management. In the second meeting she said that she expressed her thoughts and feelings and she was unsure if that was going to be followed up. She wanted to know what the third meeting would be about. She said that she was considering bringing her union representative with her if there was a meeting.

[82]Again on the 10th of July 2024, Mr Wraight explained that he thought there was a difference between the first two meetings which had happened and the proposed meeting. He said that the first meeting was to look at the response to the incident with the young person and determine the course of action to take. The second meeting was to provide feedback on the actions that had taken place or were taking place since the first meeting. The proposed new meeting would be to explore the claimant’s complaint that the management response provided in the first two meetings was not satisfactory.

[83]He pointed out that the grievance procedure asks what steps for informal resolution have taken place, and he said he would suggest that a meeting which looks at the response of management to the incident rather than the incident itself was the next appropriate step.

[84]On the 11th of July 2024, the claimant replied that the first meeting was not in any way beneficial, as her views and suggestions were not respected and decisions were made for her and not with her. She said the second meeting was where Mr Wraight told her what he had done and didn't ask her about what he had planned to do in relation to her suggestions at the first meeting. She says that she also expressed other feelings of being let down and of having inadequate support. She continues: “Yet again in this meeting there was some minimising. I also advised you how I felt about how you dealt with me that day with X's complaint and that you lacked any understanding in relation to my victim impact statement.”

[85]In his reply on the same day, Mr Wraight said that he considered her dissatisfaction with the first two meetings as the basis of the complaint. He again suggested a meeting to look at the management response to her complaint and that she could then take a formal grievance if she wished as she would then have undertaken the preliminary stages suggested in the grievance procedure. He reminded her that if she would like to go straight to a formal grievance, the procedure outlined the steps to be taken and asked her how she would like to proceed. Ultimately, a meeting was arranged for the 22nd of July 2024 to constitute the informal part of the grievance process.

[86]Also on the 11th of July, Mr Wraight asked the claimant to complete an incident report form known as a “CREST” form in respect of the incident with X. This is on page 271. The claimant said that she was not aware that it should or could be completed as “no one seemed to be bothered” about the incident or deem it is serious. Mr Wraight explained that CREST was a health and safety system that tried to capture incidents and “near misses” and was wide enough to capture a variety of types of incident. It would enable the respondent to capture and respond to any learning from a health and safety perspective. He said he would mention the use of the form at a team meeting as a reminder of how and when they should be completed. The claimant replied that the incident had happened on the 3rd of June, which was “quite a while ago”. Mr Wraight replied that it was still worth capturing the incident. The same day, the claimant questioned why now this was seen as important when it had not been previously. Mr. Wraight replied that he had been at a meeting the same week where CREST forms. were mentioned and that as a result, he was prompted to look at the reporting of incidents. So Mr. Wraight did explain to the claimant on the 11th of July 2024 why he was now asking her to complete the form.

[87]On about the 15th of July 2024, Ms. Clay met the claimant to discuss an incident the previous month when X had subjected the claimant’s colleague JL to homophobic abuse and an alarm had been activated by JL. Ms. Clay was concerned that whilst other members of staff had responded to the alarm, the claimant had not. The claimant says this is evidence that JL, a white worker, was treated more favourably than she was. The claimant says she was questioned inappropriately by Ms. Clay on this occasion, and that it is another example of Ms. Clay not understanding the impact that the incident of the 3rd of June had on the claimant. The claimant had said that Dave Wraight had also not responded to the alarm. She regards her situation as comparable to his, in that she says nothing happened to him because of his failure to respond.

[88]There is a dispute about this however; various witnesses say that Mr Wraight did respond to the alarm the first time it went off, but not the second. We also considered that Mr Wraight is not an appropriate comparator, as he is a senior manager who would not necessarily be expected to respond to the alarm. We were not taken to any documentation which suggested that he would. In any case, it would not have been appropriate for Ms. Clay to ask Mr Wraight similar questions to those she asked the claimant, as Mr Wraight was Ms. Clay’s line manager.

[89]The claimant did not set off an alarm on the occasion when she overheard the conversation between X&Y, and we accept that JL had in fact made a formal grievance against the whole team and their treatment of her, and that this explains why JL was moved to work in an alternative building. We do not consider that JL is an appropriate comparator in the circumstances.

[90]The claimant complaints that she was not kept up to date with events concerning X after she stopped working with him. As she had requested not to have any contact with him nor work with him, we do not think that the respondent can be criticised for not updating her about developments regarding X, and for example whether he had been taken to court for a breach of his youth rehabilitation order.

[91]The claimant complains that in July 2024, she became aware that X had been referred again to the respondent service for an incident of racism that occurred back in January 2024. She complaints that her managers did not inform her of this additional referral and incident, although a member of administrative staff did. She complains that no additional safeguards would be put in place by the respondent to protect her from any future incidents and that this was due to her race.

[92]As noted above, as the claimant was no longer working with X since 5 June 2024, we do not consider that the respondent can be criticised or was under any obligation to tell her that X had been referred to the service again in July 2024.

[93]As to whether the respondent should have taken any additional steps to safeguard the claimant after becoming aware of this further incident, as indicated above there had been no direct interaction or difficulties between the claimant and X since the 3rd of June 2024, and the further allegation was a historic rather than a new one. In addition, the claimant had given notice of her resignation by then and X was beginning to disengage with the respondent, which had taken him back to court for breach of his order. In the circumstances we do not consider that it was necessary for the respondent to review the situation or take any further steps.

[94]On the 22nd of July 2024, the informal stage of the claimant's grievance took place. She was accompanied by Michele Clarke and it was attended in addition by Stacey Clay and Mr Wraight. Although there are notes from Mr. Wraight about the meeting on page 286/7 onwards, those were at no point shared with the claimant. He did send the claimant the email at page 287/8.

[95]A more detailed account of that meeting came from Ms. Clarke. On page 371, within the grievance notes, Ms. Clarke said that she had hoped that this would be a positive meeting as the claimant already had a new job by that time, wanted to move forward from the incident on 3 June 2024 and was no longer working with X. Ms. Clarke said she that she felt that to begin with, when Mr Wraight led the meeting, the atmosphere was positive, but then the claimant said she was not happy how matters were dealt with after the other meetings and wanted to talk about that. Ms. Clarke had suggested they could either have another meeting or give details of the claimant’s grievance. There was a discussion about what had been said on the 5th of June about the prospects of a criminal prosecution, and Mr Wraight explained that the burden of proof in courts would be beyond reasonable doubt, and that as there was limited corroborating evidence it may be difficult to get to that standard of proof.

[96]Whilst they were talking through the pattern of events on the 3rd of June 2024, Ms. Clay told the claimant (towards the end of the meeting) that her perception of her meeting with the claimant that afternoon was that the claimant could “come across as aggressive”. This was in the context of the claimant complaining that Ms. Clay had previously said that the claimant could be threatening, or as the claimant recalls it, that Ms. Clay had previously said that she had felt threatened by the claimant (on the 3rd of June 2024). The claimant became upset at that point.

[97]Ms. Clarke was concerned about what the claimant was saying to Ms. Clay, and she touched the claimant to try to calm her down, but the claimant left the meeting. Ms. Clarke told us that she went outside to speak to the claimant and that they then came back into the meeting, but the claimant was still very emotional and said what Ms. Clarke refers to as “unkind things” to Ms. Clay, calling her a bully and scum and “other horrible words”. The claimant said that Ms. Clay had “the audacity” to call the claimant aggressive but would then come in and talk to people in a certain way, lacking empathy and understanding. Ms. Clarke refers to the claimant as “losing it” a bit. At that point, the claimant left the meeting again and it was agreed between her and Ms. Clarke that she would not come back in.

[98]The claimant strongly disputes calling Ms. Clay “scum”; her account is that she said that Ms. Clay treated other people like scum (emphasis added). She does not dispute calling Ms. Clay a bully. It is clear from the accounts of the other people present that the claimant had lost control of herself by that point, and had raised her voice, and whether she actually called Ms. Clay “scum” or said that she treated others like scum, other people in the room genuinely had the impression that she was insulting Ms. Clay, a senior manager, directly. The claimant told us that it was Ms. Clarke's reference to her “coming over as aggressive” which caused her to lose control. She said she is conscious of stereotypes of black women being angry and or aggressive, and hence she became very upset.

[99]So, the attempt at informal resolution of the claimant’s complaints came to nothing. The claimant was then off sick from the 22nd of July 2024 until the end of her employment, and she provided a statement of fitness for work on 24th July, page 290, stating that throughout that period she would not be fit for work due to stress at work.

[100]The claimant complains that there was an underpayment in her final pay packet, and she alleges that this was an act of victimisation by Stacey Clay. On page 292, we see that Stacey Clay wrote to payroll on the 1st of August 2024 saying that the claimant was off sick until the 21st of August when her employment would terminate and therefore would now be owed 7 days’ annual leave payment when she left. Unfortunately, though, Ms. Clay made an error when she completed the leaving form, ticking the wrong box to say that the claimant had been overpaid annual leave rather than underpaid. If the payroll officer had read the e-mail and form together, they would have realised there was a problem, but they did not, and the claimant was underpaid by 8 days in her final pay. This was rectified by Ms. Clay as soon as possible after the claimant drew attention to the fact that she had been underpaid (see page 374-376).

[101]Whilst we accept that this underpayment would have been upsetting and made life very difficult for the claimant until reimbursed, having heard Ms. Clay's evidence we accept that she simply made an error for which she was sorry, and rectified it as soon as she could, once she was aware of it.

[102]On the 5th of August 2024, whilst the claimant was still off sick, she raised a grievance over what she referred to as “the appalling way” she had been treated whilst working for the respondent. She summarised her grievance in an e-mail which is on page 299. Her complaints were that after making serious complaints about the racism towards her by the young person, management did not take her complaints seriously, nor did they take her feelings of upset seriously.

[103]Secondly, she said that management continued to minimise and downplay what had been said to her by X and how it had impacted her, even after reading her victim impact statement.

[104]She said that her complaint was ignored, and that management did not inform her or include her in decisions after she complained, and prioritised the service user over the safety and welfare of their own staff. As a result, she said that management had failed to provide a safe working environment for her to work in. She concluded that when raising her grievances, management complained about incidental things and “showed a lack of empathy or understanding despite upsetting me in meetings”. This is in part a reference to Ms. Clay rebuking the claimant because she had used the expression “little boys” when reacting to the racist abuse that she heard on the 3rd of June.

[105]The claimant asked for an independent hearing manager from outside the service to hear her grievance and said that she would be accompanied by her trade union representative, Mr. McMullen.

[106]The respondent asked Rose Carberry to hear the claimant's grievance, supported by Shona Kelly from its Human Resources department. Ms. Carberry was, at the time, the Principal Advisor for School Improvement, Governance and Adult Community Learning, being responsible for overseeing how 81 schools ran and operated as well as other matters. Previously, she had been a head teacher for 11 years in two different primary schools. So she was, as requested, a person who was not employed in the Youth Justice service.

[107]After some difficulty in arranging a date because of the availability of the Trade Union representative, the grievance meeting went ahead on the 4th of September 2024 at the council offices. Within the meeting guide which starts on page 314, the “Next steps” include a suggestion that further meetings may need to be arranged with the claimant as part of further investigation.

[108]Miss Carberry and Ms. Kelly then met with various of the claimant’s managers, Karen Norris, Michelle Clark, Stacey Clay and Dave Wraight, all on the same day, 16th September 2024.

[109]On the 15th of October 2024, the claimant returned amended notes from the meeting on the 4th of September. The claimant said that some of the things she had to amend had been very upsetting or were untrue or incorrectly noted. It is common ground that the claimant received no acknowledgement of her e-mail which was sent direct to Rose Carberry, and that this caused her concern, as she did not know whether her amended minutes were ever considered. Miss Carberry's evidence was unclear on this point; at first, she said that she thought this would have gone to Ms. Kelly, but when it was pointed out that the e-mail was sent direct to her, she said that she could not recollect receiving it or passing it on to Ms. Kelly. Ms. Carberry said that she had considered that the claimant had “opted out of the process”. This seeMs. strange; the claimant had attended the grievance interview, and Ms. Carberry accepted that she did not consider it necessary to see the claimant again or give her an opportunity to comment on her managers’ statements before reached her conclusions on the grievance. She also did not think it was necessary to see any of the claimant’s colleagues as opposed to her managers, or to speak to Ms. Paulissch who had dealt with the victim impact statement. The only meeting that the claimant refused to attend was the grievance outcome meeting, of which see below.

[110]On the 15th of November, Mr. Wraight was given an opportunity to provide further information to Ms. Kelly for the purposes of the grievance. During his cross examination, we were told that he had been given an opportunity to amend his statement which he took, and which was available to Ms. Carberry when she reached her conclusions.

[111]On the 12th of December 2024, Ms. Carberry invited the claimant to a further meeting on the 17th of December (page 400) and enclosed her investigation report together with the claimant's original grievance. The attached letter (page 402) states that the purpose of the meeting would be to discuss the completed investigation and that Ms. Carberry would explain her findings, and whether or not the grievance was upheld. In other words, Ms. Carberry had reached conclusions which she was going to share with the claimant.

[112]On the 13th of December, the claimant replied that she had work on the 17th of December, at a job she thoroughly enjoyed and was not prepared to take any time off for the meeting. She asked that whatever it was that Ms. Carberry had to say be sent in writing (page 404). The investigation report is at page 405 onwards.

[113]At page 407/8, Ms. Carberry found that the claimant’s complaints and level of upset about the racism shown to her on the 3rd of June were taken seriously by management, however she found that whilst the claimant’s distress was addressed by the team, “the understanding of how this impacted Louise seems. not to have been translated to her”, resulting in the claimant’s perception that they did not take this seriously enough. Ms. Carberry recommended unconscious bias training, EDI and protected characteristics training for the benefit of everyone in the team, and she said that the witnesses welcomed this. She also said that it may be advisable for management not to compare or talk about anyone else's characteristics as if they understand them as this may be taken as if they are minimising the impact of that person’s lived experience.

[114]Regarding the claimant’s complaint that management continued to minimise and downplay what had been said to her, and how it impacted her (even after reading her victim impact statement), and her complaint about lack of support, Ms. Carberry found that there was good reason for the original victim impact statement to be revised, given some of the language used, and in order to protect the claimant. She found that there was no lack of support and commented that witnesses “and X's mother” had said that the claimant would be regularly in the vicinity of X after she was no longer working with him, when he came into the YJST building. Ms. Carberry commented “that it was felt that this could have been avoided if the claimant continued to be feeling the level of distress that is being raised in this grievance”. This is clearly based on Karen Norris’ comments in her grievance interview.

[115]The claimant was given no opportunity to respond to these comments before the report was finalised, and as we have accepted, it was sometimes necessary for her to go downstairs to where X would be when he was in the building, in order to get a drink as the kitchen was located downstairs. The door to the building was also downstairs so that if the claimant had to attend an external appointment or meeting when X was there, she had to pass through the downstairs area of the premises. The claimant was given no opportunity to explain this to Ms. Carberry, and would not have known that the issue would be raised as Karen Norris was interviewed after she was.

[116]Ms. Carberry did recommend, however, that reasons why victim statements produced by a member of staff need to be revised should be fully explained in future, and staff members should sign to accept the changes and confirm that they understand the thinking behind the changes.

[117]Regarding the complaint that management ignored the claimant's complaint and that suggestions and decisions were made without consulting her, Ms. Carberry noted that the claimant had not replied or challenged Mr Dave Wraight's e-mail after the 5th of June 2024 meeting so that he thought matters were resolved. She then goes on to find, however, that on the 3rd of July 2024 there was a “follow up” meeting, which suggests that Mr Wraight did not consider that the matter was closed at that point. She finds that this meeting became difficult because of the claimant’s reaction to the points being discussed with her. Ms. Carberry then continues “previous meetings, documented through witness statements, had been hard, and it is my feeling that this in part contributed to the difficulty in addressing the suggestions and any potential action taken by YJST”. It is unclear what “previous meetings” are being referenced here, as it was not suggested by the respondent that the 5th June meeting, the only previous one about the incident, was “hard”.

[118]Apart from the meeting with Ms. Clay on the 3rd of June 2024 in the immediate aftermath of the racist incident, the only particularly difficult meeting we have been told about that included the claimant is referred to in the grievance statements of Karen Norris and Michelle Clark. In Karen Norris’s statement, at page 351, she clearly did not observe the incident herself but says that there was one meeting where the claimant was said to be “huffing and puffing”. She also said that a seconded member of staff had referred to an incident in a team meeting about the claimant’s behaviour. This person had said that she had never come across someone that behaved the way the claimant did in meetings. Again, this does not refer to anything that Karen Norris had observed herself. In Rose Carberry’s statement at paragraph 38D, she incorrectly attributes that statement to Karen Norris herself, saying that “Karen said that having sat in a lot of health meetings, she had never come across someone that behaves the way Louise did in meetings”. When asked about this in evidence, Ms. Norris confirmed that it was a seconded health worker, not herself, who had made this comment.

[119]Ms. Norris also complained in her grievance interview, page 351, that the claimant “had a thing about turning to her side with her back to you and muttering”. She refers to the claimant being upset on one occasion and standing up, saying “You don't understand, you have no idea”. This appears to be a reference to the claimant’s behaviour on 3 June 2024 when she returned to the office after dropping X at home, when she was extremely distressed by the racism shown to her by X and Y (see KN statement paragraph 17).

[120]Ms. Norris was asked, in the grievance interview, about the amendments to the victim impact statement (page 352). She said that the YJST worked with children, and she was not saying it is right to get abuse but “there is a definite line as a professional… you cannot say something about a young person that they are going to read and you work to build trust to work with them and their family. If you write down I fucking hate X I do not agree with something like that in an impact statement”.

[121]In fact, the claimant did not say that, and she had been encouraged by JP to use her own words when completing the victim impact statement. We accept that the claimant had asked JP if it was all right for her to use this kind of language and that JP had said she should use her own words to express how she was feeling. When asked what she was thinking about at the time of the incident on the 3rd of June, at page 237 in the original statement, the claimant says, “Get me the fuck out of this room” and that “I dislike X”. When asked how she felt now she said “Still feel pretty shit

[122]We consider that Karen Norris exaggerated what was said by the claimant in her victim impact statement and that this was done to cast the claimant in a poor light. It is clear from Ms. Carberry's statement at paragraph 38 that she was influenced by what Karen Norris said about the claimant's behaviour in reaching the conclusion that “a level of professionalism was not evident” from the claimant towards management (p416). See for example paragraph 38D of her statement.

[123]Ms. Carberry also referred to the team meeting where the claimant was said to be becoming impatient (and showing it) because she had a hospital appointment. This is summarised as “Stacey having addressed the issues at the time during the meeting, which the claimant did not like”. As stated previously, the claimant had no opportunity to address these points, and Michele Clarke made it clear to us, when she gave her evidence, that she did not think that Ms. clay had behaved appropriately herself in giving the claimant a dressing down in front of the other staff during the meeting. This again suggests to us that the incident at that team meeting (which KN did not attend) was being taken out of proportion by Karen Norris and Stacey Clay.

[124]At page 368, during her grievance interview Michele Clarke said that in meetings the claimant’s expression and body language could be difficult, and she addressed that with her after meetings, but that there was a meeting where the claimant was “tutting” although she could not remember what that was about. She said that the claimant was obviously annoyed. She said that Ms. Clay had dealt with it in the meeting, but Ms. Clarke felt that was probably not the best way of dealing with it, and she would have dealt with it in supervision. She also said that it was on an occasion when the claimant needed to attend a hospital appointment. The claimant talks about that meeting in her own grievance interview and said that she had ended up missing her hospital appointment because Ms. Clay had delayed the start of the meeting. It seems to us that the relevant point is that the claimant, prior to her resignation, had passed her probation and had never been subject to any informal or formal disciplinary process in relation to her behaviour. By the time of the meeting on 22 July 2024, she had already resigned and her relationship with Ms. Clay had effectively broken down.

[125]Ms. Carberry, in paragraph 38(b) of her statement, also refers to the conversations between the claimant and Stacey Clay that Ms. Clay stated me made her feel threatened and intimidated. We have already addressed what happened on the 3rd of June 2024, when the claimant went to talk to Stacey Clay in a distressed state, having very recently experienced the racist incident. At page 360, in her grievance interview, Stacey Clay says that when the claimant came to her having spoken to KN, she was agitated, saying that she would “go to her people” and “we would not like it if she got angry”.

[126]Ms. Clay said that the claimant was “very heightened and distressed” when speaking to her. We have accepted that because the claimant got out of her seat and walked round the side of the desk towards Ms. Clay, and said that Ms. Clay would not like it if she got angry or would not like to see her if she was angry (or words to that effect), Ms. Clay could reasonably have felt threatened by that. We did consider, however, that Ms. Clay had misconstrued what the claimant said about “going to speak to her people”, one of the matters which Ms. Clay said could have been threatening. As Ms. Norris noted in her own grievance interview, what the claimant meant by that was that she would go to speak to people she knew who were supportive of her or had close relationships with her and who might better understand what she had just been through. We do not understand why Ms. Clay thought that the claimant was suggesting that she was going to wreak some sort of revenge on X (or, indeed, on Ms. Clay) by using that expression, and we consider this is another example of exaggeration of the claimant's behaviour by Ms. clay.

[127]Again, in paragraph 38 of her witness statement, Ms. Carberry directly refers to this occasion - although she says there were “conversations” it seems that this is the only specific occasion when Ms. Clay has suggested that she could have felt threatened by the claimant. Again, in referring to the matters that made her conclude that the claimant lacked professionalism, both sub-paragraphs ( c) and (e) of paragraph 38 of Ms. Carberry’s statement refer to the meeting on the 22nd of July 2024, that is the last meeting that the claimant had directly with members of management. The claimant never saw the minutes that Mister Wraight had made of that meeting and did not have an opportunity to comment on what had been said about her in the grievance interviews.

[128]There is also a factual error in paragraph 38(e), where Ms. Carberry says that the claimant had left the meeting and did not return to it on the 22nd of July, subsequently resigning. We accept the evidence of Ms. Clarke, that the claimant did leave once and then went back to the meeting before ultimately leaving, after she lost control of herself. The claimant had already resigned one month previously, at the time of the meeting on 22 July 2024.

[129]We find it significant that in Ms. Norris's interview, she made the gratuitous comment (p354) that after the claimant stopped working with X and when he was in the building in her words the claimant “would make a point of going downstairs or to the kitchen”. She says that X's mum “found it weird that the claimant would make a complaint about X and then after they stop working together, she would come downstairs when he was there and almost like she is goading him”. She said that the claimant's attitude to X was not good and, on another occasion, when the claimant had to take X home, she said to him “Come on, I am not in the bloody mood for you”. It is difficult to understand why KN would refer to these matters. She was aware from Team discussions that X would make provocative remarks to Team members, such as using song lyrics including the “N” word or referring to stabbings in the claimant’s presence but almost seems. to be shifting responsibility for his behaviour to the claimant.

[130]KN also said in her grievance interview that she was “aware” that the claimant had made complaints in other local authorities, Bracknell and Wokingham.KN said that when the claimant first started working for the Team, she had a complaint with a local housing company for a racial comment a workman had made, and she received financial compensation. Miss Norris said she believed the claimant had a complaint in another authority with 12 points being investigated. The claimant denies that she had made such a complaint and KN did not give any evidence about where she had heard about these matters.

[131]Mis Carberry asked Stacey Clay if there were “any other concerns” during the claimant’s probationary period, other than the claimant’s concern about Ms. Clay discussing other people's protected characteristics. Ms. Clay said that she had heard from a teacher seconded to the YJST (p358) that when the claimant first started and the teacher was on a Teams call, she asked the claimant if she would get her a hot water, and that the claimant had replied that “slavery died out years ago”. This is something which had never been put to the claimant and appears to be a suggestion by Ms. Clay that the claimant would unnecessarily complain about race discrimination.

[132]On page 359, Ms. Clay accepted that the claimant had done “a lot of really clear pieces of work” with X to help him understand racism and colonialism. After discussing the incident on the 3rd of June 2024 and the further developments, Ms. Clay was asked (page 363) if she thought there was “any learning for the Team” from the situation with the claimant. Ms. Clay said it was hard to know, as she thought they had responded to the claimant as they would to anyone. She goes on to say, however, that the claimant had said to Michele Clarke “a few months ago” that she hadn't finished her employments positively and they all ended in a grievance. Stacey had asked Michele Clarke to pick this up in supervision to say that she was supported in the YJST. Again, the claimant denies that her previous employments had ended in a grievance and it is to be noted that her references were positive. Of course, she was never given the opportunity to comment on these statements by KN and SC.

[133]During Michele Clarke's grievance interview, Ms. Kelly asked her if she thought the response from senior management to the claimant was appropriate. Miss Clarke said she felt the situation was “sad” (p372) and that the claimant had learnt a lot from the job. She was asked if she would have done anything different or whether there was any learning for the Team. She said that maybe she should have been more involved in the victim impact statement, but there was a lot going on. She said that she was proud of the work she did with the claimant, that everyone had different management styles, but she felt she did her best, and she had really liked the claimant. She was asked if she felt that there needed to be any training. She said that she would like to learn more about what it is like to be a black person in an environment where no one else is the same, and hearing their perspective.

[134]In the grievance outcome, after the suggestion that the claimant's attitude had contributed to the difficulty in addressing the situation with X, Ms. Carberry said that the witness statements state that behaviours witnessed in meetings were addressed afterwards with Michele, but a level of professionalism was not evident from the claimant towards management and this complicated anything that the management of the YJST were able to provide to her (p416).

[135]This is the passage which the claimant relies upon to say that she was being accused of lacking professionalism, which the respondent accepts is the clear implication of this passage.

[136]In respect of the complaint that management did not inform or include the claimant and decisions and prioritised the service user over the safety and welfare of staff, Ms. Carberry felt that the claimants concerns and suggestions were taken seriously after the 5th of June 2024. The respondents reasoning about the change of a black role model were accepted. She concluded: “It has been hard to see how decisions that have been made by management show that they have prioritised the service user over the staff member. When there is a complaint from a student there is a process to follow and this had to be completed”. She does not address anywhere the claimant's central allegation that when she was attempting to explain to Ms. Clay that she had been racially abused and how she felt about that, Ms. Clay had instead focused on the claimant’s comments about not having time to waste on “little boys” and had rebuked her for what she said was “derogatory” language, and how what had happened to the claimant was compared with comments about being old or fat.

[137]Miss Carberry did however make a recommendation about the length of time it took to deal with allegations of the kind made by X.

[138]Regarding the claimant’s complaint that management had failed to provide a safe working environment, Ms. Carberry noted that the claimant had completed all of the relevant training and was having relevant supervision sessions and one to one meetings, and she concluded that management protected the claimant after the 5th of June 2024 when she was no longer willing to work with X. She did, however, have concerns around the claimant having to take X home on the 3rd of June 2024. She said there was potential for this to have contributed to the claimant’s feeling that management were not taking her distress seriously and she recommended that after traumatic incidents between staff and students, it would be advisable to identify another member of staff to transport the student home as this was perceived as minimising the impact of the incident on the claimant. As we have phoned above, however, it is unlikely that Karen Norris was immediately aware of exactly what had happened, as she was in the open plan office when the claimant was talking to her colleague, but as we have accepted was occupied with her own work and probably did not take in the detail of what had happened at that point.

[139]Regarding the claimant’s complaint that when raising her grievances management complained about incidental things and showed a lack of empathy or understanding, Ms. Carberry focused on the 22nd of July 2024 meeting, although she does refer to the 21st of June when allegations from X were addressed with the claimant. She says that the responses from the claimant were at times difficult and made full exploration of the issues trickier than management would have liked. She does not seem to have addressed, again, what the claimant was saying about the meeting on the 3rd of June 2024, when she said that Stacy clay showed a lack of empathy by comparing the comments to made to comments about being old and fat. She did not uphold this part of the grievance, saying she had not been able to evidence if there was a lack of empathy throughout the meeting.

[140]Although Ms. Carberry says that the claimant ceased to engage with the process, she accepted that the meeting on in December was simply to share the outcome that is findings she had already made, rather than explore matters further with the claimant.

[141]We find that during the grievance interviews with Karen Norris and Stacy Clay, they gratuitously referred to hearsay comments about the claimant's behaviour, in particular about her alleged propensity to complain of racism. We consider that they did so to diminish the seriousness of the complaints of racism that the claimant was making, and that they did so because of the nature of her complaints, that is complaints of race discrimination.

[142]Miss Carberry was significantly influenced by these comments and the criticisMs. of the claimant's behaviour, despite the fact that the claimant had never been subject to any kind of disciplinary process, informal or formal, that she had passed her probation without the need for it to be extended and that she had been asked to work additional hours by the respondent. The claimant never saw the notes of her manager's interviews until she brought proceedings in the Employment Tribunal, and she had no opportunity to give her point of view in response to them before Ms. Carberry reached her conclusions on the grievance.

[143]Relevant Law: There is a draft agreed list of issues, at pages 105 - 109 in the bundle. As set out above, we permitted the claimant’s amendment to add an additional allegation of direct discrimination and allegations of harassment.

[144]The claimant makes complaints of direct race discrimination, victimisation and of harassment related to race.

[145]Under section 39(2) of the Equality Act 2010, an employer(a) (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A -

(b) (B) - by dismissing B (s39(2)( c)) or subjecting B to any other detriment (s39(2)(d)).

[146]Under section 39(4), an employer, A, must not victimise an employee of A's (B) by dismissing B or by subjecting B to any other detriment.

[147]Under section 40(1)(a) an employer(a) (A) must not, in relation to employment by A, harass a person

(b) (B) who is an employee of A's.

[148]Direct discrimination- Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010: a person discriminates against another if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. Under section 23 of the Equality Act 2010 on a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13 amongst others, there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.

[149]In considering why an alleged discriminator acted as they did, otherwise known as the “reason why” question, it is sufficient that the protected characteristic had a significant influence on the decision to act in the manner complained of. It need not be the sole ground for the decision, and the influence of the protected characteristic may be conscious or subconscious.

[150]Direct evidence of a decision to discriminate it on protected grounds will seldom be forthcoming. Usually, the grounds of the decision will have to be deduced or inferred from the surrounding circumstances, see the judgment of Lord Nichols in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

1999 ICR 877

HL. The tribunal is simply required to identify the factual criteria applied by the respondent as the basis for the alleged discrimination, see R v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS and others

2010 IRLR 136

SC. Where the act complained of is not inherently discriminatory, it is necessary to explore the mental processes, conscious or subconscious, of the alleged discriminator to discover what facts operated on his or her mind.

[151]Under section 26 of the Equality Act 2010, a person(a) (A) harasses another

(b) (B) if A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic of B and the conduct has the purpose or effect of (i) violating B's dignity or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. Under paragraph 4, in deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in section 1(b), each of the following must be taken into account: (a )the perception of B, (b) the other circumstances of the case, and

[152]So the three essential elements of a harassment claim under section 26(1) are (1) unwanted conduct;

(2) which has the proscribed purpose or effect; and

(3) which relates to a protected characteristic, here race. According to Underhill J as he then was in Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwall

2009 ICR 724

, it is healthy discipline for a Tribunal to address all three elements expressly in its reasons, although they may overlap.

[153]Section 212(1) of the 2010 Act provides that a detriment does not generally include conduct that amounts to harassment, subject to subsection 5, which does not apply here. So, the same conduct cannot usually amount to harassment and amount to direct discrimination, because if it is harassment, it does not amount to a detriment within section 39.

[154]At the time of the relevant events, employers were not legally responsible for harassment of their employees by third parties. There were provisions which were in force from 2008 to 2013 which made employers liable for harassment by third parties in certain situations, but those provisions were repealed from the 1st of October 2013. Proposals in the new Employment Rights Act 2025 to amend section 40 of the 2010 Act to provide for employers to be liable for third party harassment have not yet come into force.

[155]Under section 27, a person(a) (A) victimises another person

(b) (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because B does a protected act or A believes that B has done or may do a protected act. It is accepted by the respondentthat by complaining about the conversation between X and Y on the 3rd of June 2024, the claimant did a protected act and that by bringing her grievance on the 5th of August 2024, the claimant again carried out a protected act within subsection 2 of section 27.

[156]In considering whether the detriment was “because of” the protected act, the Tribunal must consider what, consciously or subconsciously, motivated the employer to subject the claimant to the detriment? In most cases, this will require an inquiry into the mental processes of the employer. If the necessary link between the detriment suffered and the protected act can be established, the claim of victimisation will succeed. It is necessary to consider what was the reason for the detriment in question, rather than applying a “but for” test. The protected act must have a more than trivial, that is a material, influence on the treatment complained of – see Nagarajan

1999 ICR 931

, Igen v Wong

2005 ICR 931

. So, the protected act need not be the only reason for the treatment in question, so long as the protected act has a significant influence.

[157]By section 109 (1), anything done by a person (A) in the course of A's employment must be treated as also done by the employer.

[158]Section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 deals with the burden of proof in proceedings under that Act. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that if there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. But subsection 2 does not apply (s136(3) if A shows that A did not contravene the provision. A reference in section 136(2) to a “court” includes a reference to an Employment Tribunal (s136(6)).

[159]In the case of Madarassy v Nomura International PLC

2007 ICR 867

Lord justice Mummery stated that in deciding whether there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that there was discrimination, the bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal could conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.

[160]We have taken account of the guidance in Igen Ltd v Wong, which is helpfully set out at paragraph 90 of the judgment of His Honour Judge Tayler in Clifton Diocese v Janet Parker

2026 EAT 68

[161]It is for the claimant who complaints of (here) race discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the employer has committed an act of discrimination.

[162]If the claimant does not prove “such facts” she will fail. In deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts, it is important to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by the tribunal will usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal. It is important to note the word could. At this stage, the tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination.

[163]In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts.

[164]Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the employer has treated the climate less favourably on the relevant grounds, then the burden of proof moves to the employer.

[165]It is then for the employer to prove that he did not commit, or is not to be treated as having committed, that act. To discharge that burden, it is necessary for the employer to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex, since no discrimination whatsoever is compatible with the burden of proof directive. That requires a Tribunal to assess not merely whether the employer has proved an explanation for the facts from which inferences can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that race was not a ground for the treatment in question. Since the facts necessary to prove such an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondent, a Tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof.

[166]In Madarassy, Lord Justice Mummery pointed out that from a practical point of view, although the statute involves a two-stage analysis, the tribunal does not in practise hear the evidence and argument in two stages. In that case, the Lord Justice said it is important to not to make too much of the role of the burden of proof provisions. They will require careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination. But they have nothing to offer whether tribunal can make positive findings on the evidence one way or another as to the reason for the treatment in question.

[167]Under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010, proceedings on a complaint to the Employment Tribunal under section 120 of the Equality Act 2010 may not be brought after the end of the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates or such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[168]Sub-paragraph 3 provides that for the purposes of this section, conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period and under paragraph (b) that failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. By sub-paragraph four in the absence of evidence to the contrary a person is to be taken to decide on a failure to do something when they do an act inconsistent with doing it or, if they do no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which they might reasonably have been expected to do it.

[169]This is a very wide discretion, and whilst the factors in British Coal Corporation v Keeble

1997 IRLR336

are useful guidance insofar as they apply, they should not be followed mechanistically. Of particular importance is the length of, and reasons for, delay and the balance of hardship/injustice – i.e. is there likely to be more injustice to the respondent if time is extended than there would be to the claimant if an extension is refused?

[170]Application of Law to Facts

[171]Harassment: Given the provisions of section 212 of the Equality Act 2010, we decided that it made sense to address the claimant’s complaints of harassment first.

[172]Regarding allegations 13.4.1.1 and 13.4.1.2, as explained in section on the applicable law above, the respondent is not legally responsible for the actions of Y, or indeed of X. They are third parties and are not agents of the respondent, and therefore it is not liable for their actions. Those allegations must therefore be dismissed.

[173]Allegation 13.4.1.3: as we have found above, we accept that on the 3rd of June 2024, when the claimant discussed the incident involving X and Y with her, Karen Norris did compare the racial abuse which had been directed at the claimant to the young person (X) calling other staff members old, fat or making comments about them having a speech impediment. It may be that Karen Norris was trying to liken race discrimination to abuse in relation to other protected characteristics, but we observe that if someone is fat or overweight that is not necessarily a protected characteristic unless it amounts to a disability under UK law. In any case, we consider that the purpose of Karen Norris's comments was to try to calm the situation by suggesting to the claimant that the abuse she had received was not terribly serious, by likening it to insulting comments about being fat or old. The problem with that type of comparison, even if comparisons are made to comments about protected characteristics, is that not all insulting comments are of equal gravity. By making those comparisons, Karen Norris was consciously or subconsciously attempting to diminish the seriousness of what had been said to the claimant, which related directly to the subjugation of black people by white people in the Caribbean in the past.

[174]The claimant describes herself as being British but with Caribbean heritage, and Stacey Clay has acknowledged within her grievance interview that the claimant had done a good piece of work with X prior to the incident on the 3rd of June in trying to educate him about racism and colonialism. Ms. Norris’s comments failed to take account of the context in which the racist comments had been made and belittled or diminished the seriousness of the abuse which the claimant had just received, and which had obviously seriously upset her. Those comments by Ms.. Norris were clearly, on the evidence, unwanted by the claimant and they did relate to a relevant protected characteristic, that is race, as by definition Ms.. Norris was comparing the racist abuse to other protected characteristics and also to other insulting comments about a characteristic which was not protected by the Equality Act.

[175]We consider that these comments were not simply insensitive, but that they had the effect of creating an environment that was hostile, humiliating or offensive to the claimant. Miss Norris was effectively suggesting to the claimant that she should just absorb those offensive comments and move on. Given that this was serious racial abuse, particularly in circumstances where the claimant had done good work with X to try to educate him about racism, which was effectively being used to taunt her, we find that such an implication was not only offensive to the claimant, but we consider that, objectively a reasonable worker in her position would have found Ms. Norris's remarks to be offensive also.

[176]In addition, we find that the claimant was humiliated by Ms. Norris's response as the implication was that she was complaining unnecessarily about the abuse she had received. We consider that in all the circumstances, it was reasonable for the claimant to feel humiliated. In disclosing what had happened to her managers, she was placing her trust in them to take the matter seriously and to offer her support. Instead, Ms.. Norris's attitude was, we find, dismissive – she clearly felt that absorbing that kind of abuse simply “went with the territory” of the kind of work the claimant was doing.

[177]Due to Ms. Norris's response, the claimant clearly perceived that her working environment had become hostile, because as she told us, it made her feel that the young people would always be prioritised over staff no matter what their behaviour or the effect on the staff members in the YJST. In such circumstances, how could she trust that any further complaints she made would be taken seriously? Again, in those circumstances, where this was serious and unpleasant racial abuse by a young person which was clearly intended to hurt and offend the claimant, we consider that it was reasonable for the comments of Ms. Norris, a senior manager, to have that effect. Issue 13.4.1.3 is therefore well founded, and amounts to harassment within the meaning of section 26 of the Equality Act 2010.

[178]Allegation 13.4.1.4: this is broadly put as an allegation that on the 3rd of June 2024 Stacey Clay disregarded the claimant's complaint and her concerns surrounding racist language. This relates to the claimant’s complaint that when she went in a distressed state to speak to Stacy Clay on the 3rd of June, after dropping X at his home, Ms. Clay, instead of being supportive and empathetic, suggested that it may have been difficult for X to understand why it was OK if he made a comment about someone's size (i.e. that they were fat) but not about their race. When the claimant explained that when Y was continuing to be abusive and she could hear it over the speaker phone, she had said that she did not have time to waste on little boys and had left the room, instead of empathising with the claimant, Ms. Clay rebuked the claimant for using the term “little boys”, saying that it was derogatory and that the claimant should not have used this expression. Ms. Clay accepts that she made those comments and is critical of the claimant. The claimant had been upset when she first spoke to Ms. Clay, but after this discussion the claimant became, as Ms. Clay put it, dysregulated, and made comments such as “you would not want to see me when I am angry”. We have accepted that Ms. Clay could reasonably have felt somewhat threatened by this, we were struck by the fact that Ms. Clay's response focused, as the claimant said, on the likely effect on X and Y of being referred to as little boys (X being aged around 15 at the time) rather than this very serious racial abuse which had been directed at the claimant, causing her evident distress.

[179]Ms. Clay's comments were clearly unwanted by the claimant, are they related to race, as the whole discussion was about the racist abuse directed at the claimant, the claimant's response to it and Ms. Clay’s apparent failure to appreciate the impact on the claimant. This was against a background where, as Ms. Clay recognised in the grievance notes at page 359, the claimant had previously become emotional in a team meeting when describing the effect on her of X using the “N” word a lot when repeating song lyrics and talking to his friends, and that this was a “trigger” for her.

[180]In those circumstances, we accept that on the 3rd of June 2024 Stacey Clay did disregard the claimant's complaint and concerns surrounding the racist language that had been used, focusing instead on what the claimant had said under severe provocation to X and Y. It was clear to us that the claimant did feel degraded and offended by this treatment, and in the circumstances, we consider that it was reasonable for her to feel that way. Her concerns about serious racist abuse were being belittled and dismissed and instead of being supported, she was being rebuked for referring to X and Y as “little boys”, a mild response in the circumstances.

[181]In those circumstances also, we consider that the effect of Ms. Clay's conduct was to create a hostile working environment for the claimant, as again, having received such a response from a senior manager, she could not be sure that any future complaints or indeed those complaints would be dealt with seriously. We consider that it was reasonable in the circumstances for her to consider that her working environment was a hostile one, where the young people would be prioritised and she would be expected to tolerate racist abuse. This allegation is therefore well founded.

[182]Allegation 13.4.1.5: We have found that on the 5th of June 2024, when the claimant met with Ms. Clay, Mr. Wraight and Ms. Clarke, that Ms. Clay said that she could have felt threatened on the 3rd of June by the claimant saying that she felt angry about what Y had said and that Ms. Clay would not want to see her get angry. We have concluded that whilst the claimant was upset on 3rd June, she did get indeed get up from her chair and walk round to the side of Ms. Clay's desk where, as she accepted while she was questioning Ms. Clay, she was agitated and rocking back and forth. We accept that the combination of that and her stating that Ms. Clay would not like to see her get angry, could have caused Ms. Clay to feel threatened, although not everyone would have drawn such a conclusion.

[183]In those circumstances, we do not consider that's Ms. Clay's conduct in making such a comment two days later in a discussion about the events of 3 June 2024, while unwanted by the claimant, was related to race or had the proscribed purpose or effect, or that a reasonable person would have thought that they had; Ms. Clay simply described how she had felt.

[184]Allegation 13.4.1.6 : Regarding Dave Wraight asking the claimant to amend her impact statement as he considered that some of the comments were not suitable, whilst this was unwanted by the claimant, we have accepted that Mr Wraight’s actions were not related to race, but were due to the fact that he thought that some of the comments relating to the claimant's daughter, her past experiences and her feelings made her vulnerable to future abuse by X and he wanted to protect her from that, and also because he felt that some of the language used was unprofessional, and he did not want that to be shared with another local authority, Reading Borough Council, which was supervising Y. These reasons are not related to race and therefore this allegation fails.

[185]Allegation 13.4.1.7: This allegation relates to the fact that the claimant had a day's leave booked on the Monday following the 14th of June 2024, when Mr Wraight told her that X had complained about her. She was then off sick on the Monday (17th June) and wanted to apply to have her annual leave day credited back to her. We have found that the reason that she was asked to provide a statement of fitness for work to support her application was that the respondent’s Sickness Absence Reporting and Management Policy Procedure and Guidance, which was available to her on the intranet at the time she was employed, states that a statement of fitness to work relating to the relevant days would be required. This is at paragraph 6.13 of the policy. We have found that this was the reason that the claimant was asked to provide a statement of fitness for work before the annual leave was credited back to her. We accept that it is not usually necessary to receive such a statement in the first 3 days of sickness absence, but we would observe that we have seen numerous sickness management policies which have a similar criterion. The request by Stacey Clay for the claimant to produce a statement of fitness for work before the leave was credited back was therefore not related to race but was a requirement of the respondents Policy. Despite that policy, Ms. Clay did authorise the crediting of a day's annual leave to the claimant in respect of that day so that in our view the proscribed purpose or effect is not present. This allegation is therefore dismissed.

[186]At one point during the hearing, it appeared that the claimant was complaining about the fact that she had been credited a day's leave, because she said that now she had seen the policy it should not have been credited. We did not think that there was any reason to complain about this treatment.

[187]Allegation 13.4.1.8: Mr. Wraight accepts that on the 3rd of July 2024, he did state that as a “middle class, old white man” he had not faced the same experiences as the claimant. This was in response to the claimant challenging the ability of Mr. Wraight and Ms. Clay to deal with her complaints about her treatment by X and Y. She was upset by the time of this meeting by the fact that X had made an unsubstantiated complaint against her, but she had been required to go through an investigation in that respect, and that she had been required to amend her victim impact statement although she had initially been told to be absolutely frank and use her own words in that statement.

[188]Whilst the comment may have been unwanted by the claimant and did relate to race as it was part of a discussion about how Mr. Wraight and Ms. Clay were equipped to deal with the claimant's complaints about racial abuse, we do not consider that this comment had the proscribed purpose or effect. The claimant may have felt offended by it, but we do not consider that it was reasonable in all the circumstances for her to do so. Mr. Wriaght was trying to reassure the claimant by saying that although he had, of course, not experienced racial abuse as she had, he had nevertheless been trained to deal with complaints about racism, and he explained the training that senior managers had received in this regard. We consider that, looked at objectively, referring to his own personal characteristics in this context was not offensive; he was agreeing with the claimant that as a white older male he would not have had the same experiences as she would as a black woman. Indeed, in our view it could have been offensive for him not to acknowledge those differences in experience. We do not consider that his comments, in these circumstances, amounted to harassment.

[189]Allegation 13.4.1.9: Regarding the comments made by Stacey Clay on the 3rd of July, however, in response to Dave Wraight stating that as a white male he accepted that he would not have the same experiences of racism as the claimant, when she stated that Mr Wraight would not understand the experiences that she, Ms. Clay had as a “menopausal old lady”, we accept that those comments were unwanted by the claimant and that they did relate to race, as they were part of a conversation about the ability of Ms. Clay and Mr. Wraight to deal with the claimant's complaints of racial abuse. We consider that by making those comments, Ms. Clay was once again equating the claimant’s experience of receiving the severe racial abuse to which she had been subjected to on the 3rd of June 2024 to insults she had received as a menopausal older woman.

[190]Again, we are concerned that by using such an expression Ms. Clay was treating all insults about protected characteristics as equivalent and hence minimising the abuse experienced by the claimant from X and Y. The clear implication was that she failed to recognise the seriousness and unpleasantness of the racial abuse that had been targeted at the claimant by Y which, as we have said, directly related to the subjugation of black people by white people in the Caribbean.

[191]We accept that this response was unwanted by the claimant and that it created a hostile, offensive and degrading working environment for her, because it revealed that Ms. Clay appeared not to comprehend the seriousness of the nature of the abuse that had been directed at the claimant or its impact upon her. Objectively, Ms. Clay was again belittling what had happened to the claimant in the circumstances which we have described, including the extremely unpleasant nature of the abuse, against a background where she had tried to educate X about racism only to be mocked for her efforts. We consider that it was reasonable for the claimant to feel that her working environment was offensive and degrading due to Ms. Clay’s response, and that it was hostile in the context that if a similar episode happened again, she was unlikely to receive adequate support and that the young person would be prioritised whatever they said.

[192]Given the context and background, therefore, we find that Ms. Clay's comments amounted to harassment.

[193]Allegation 13.4.1.10: Regarding the comment in the grievance outcome, this refers to Ms. Carberry's comments at page 410 where she says that “…the witness statements state that behaviours witnessed in meetings were addressed afterwards with Michele, but a level of professionalism was not evident from Louise towards management and this complicated anything that the management of the YJST were able to provide her”.

[194]These comments made by Ms Carberry were clearly unwanted by the claimant, but it is difficult to see how they relate to race. They relate to comments that were made principally by Ms. Clay and Ms. Norris in their grievance interviews, about how the claimant related to management at the YJST. We have made findings about this above and below. The comments about the claimant’s level of professionalism do not relate to race, so this allegation of racial harassment under section 26 of the Equality Act is not well founded, but we have considered this matter further under victimisation below. 195.Time limit issues: The claimant contacted ACAS under the early conciliation provisions on the 2nd of September 2024. The certificate was issued on the 14th of October 2024, and the claim was issued on the same day. The respondent's submissions do not correctly record those dates. The effects of the early conciliation provisions are that anything that occurred from the 3rd of June 2024 up until the date of the issue of the claim form would be in time.

[196]The respondent correctly states that the claimant ticked a box for race discrimination and in the box which asks if another type of claim is being made states victimisation, but does not mention of harassment, and as we have said there is no attachment to the claim giving further details. It is also correct to say that harassment does not fall within the meaning of discrimination in section 39 of the Equality Act. As a result, we have concluded that even though the directions sent out by the tribunal on the 21st of December 2024 assumed that the claimant was making a complaint of harassment, there is nothing in the claim form which indicates that she was.

[197]We therefore conclude that the first time the claimant raised factual matters that could constitute complaints of harassment was when she presented her first particulars on the 21st of April 2024, when she referred (page 86) to finding the comparison of the racial abuse which she had experienced to being fat old or having a speech impediment to be offensive. She goes on: “no-one understood and added to further feelings of degradation isolation and even at times me questioning if I should have been feeling the way I truly was feeling. It was minimising my experience and feelings”.

[198]The claimant went on to give further Information about her complaints on the 31st of May after further details were directed at the case management hearing. This specifically mentions harassment on page 42 of our file.

[199]If time runs from the last allegation of harassment that we have upheld (as opposed to victimisation, see below), that took place on the 3rd of July 2024, and would have been covered by the ACAS certificate, so that time would have run out on the 15th of November 2024, and by the time the particulars were provided on the 21st of April those claims. would have been five months out of time.

[200]The claimant told us that she had some assistance from her union from about the time that she went to ACAS, but clearly, she was having difficulties with her representation, as there was no response to the tribunal's directions about providing further information given in December 2024, and when the claimant requested a postponement on the 21st of April, she said that her legal representative was leaving Unionline. We accept that she was unaware that she had to provide particulars in accordance with the tribunal's directions by January 2025, and we also accept that in late 2024, the claim was unwell and struggling with her mental health. In addition, without proper support, she struggled to understand Tribunal procedure and what it was necessary for her to provide.

[201]In all the circumstances, we consider that it is just and equitable to extend time for her to bring her complaints of harassment until the 21st of April and/or the 31st of May 2025 as necessary and that we have jurisdiction to deal with her complaints. We consider that there would be more injustice to the claimant in refusing to extend time for consideration of these complaints than there would be to the respondent if we extend time. The respondent knew that the claimant was unhappy about her treatment by 5 August 2024 because she brought her grievance, and most of the comments relied upon by the claimant were admitted. Karen Norris disputed when the comments attributed to her on 3 June 2024 comparing what had been said to the claimant about being old, fat or having a speech impediment were made, but did not deny making similar comments. Direct race discrimination 202.In paragraph six of the list of issues, it is stated that the claimant relies on the incidents set out in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.15 of that document as well as 6.1 to 6.10.

[203]The first allegation is clause 3.1 that on the 3rd of June 2024, the respondent failed to make alternative arrangements for X to be driven home, and the claimant refers to 6.2 point two of her further information, page 36. The claimant relies upon a hypothetical comparator in this respect. She accepts, as we have found, that she did not ask for alternative arrangements to be made to take X home. Her case is that because she discussed this with her colleague Gabby Cook in the open plan office when Karen Norris was present, that Karen Norris ought to have paid attention and made alternative arrangements. The claimant says that on a previous occasion when X had smashed his phone in April 2024, she had asked Karen Norris if someone else could drive X home but had been told that this was not possible as the claimant was on the rota to do so.

[204]We were not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Ms. Norris heard the details of what had happened with X and Y before the claimant had dropped X off at home on 3 June 2024. Although Ms. Norris may have been in the open plan office when the claimant spoke to Gabby Cook, that does not mean that she was fully aware of what the claimant was saying to her colleague, as she had her own work to deal with. The claimant accepts that she did not directly approach Ms. Norris, as a senior manager, and ask her to make alternative arrangements. When the claimant returned to the office, Ms. Norris noted that she was in a distressed state and spoke to her, as the claimant accepted, in a separate room at that stage.

[205]The difficulty with this allegation is not only the fact that Karen Norris was not fully aware of the details of what had happened when the claimant went upstairs immediately after the incident with X and Y, but that there is no evidence from which we could conclude that a worker of different race would have been treated any differently in this situation, where it is clear that the culture in the Team was that workers were expected to take a certain level of abuse from the young people they were working with. It was clear that on the first occasion (April 2024) there had been no racist behaviour directed towards the claimant by X and that Ms. Norris was simply following what she thought was normal procedure by asking the claimant to comply with the rota.

[206]Miss Norris did state that at some later stage, the team developed what she described as a “tag team” approach to dealing with young people such as X, so that, if one person had a difficult session with a young person, another may take over the responsibility of driving them home. As of April 2024, however, there was insufficient evidence before us to conclude that such an approach was in place, and the claimant did not suggest it was, either then or by 3 June 2024. Therefore, there was no evidence from which we could conclude that the claimant was treated less favourably in similar circumstances than a worker of different race would have been in respect of having to drive X home. That is, we do not consider that the claimant has provided us with evidence from which we could conclude that if a person of different race had spoken to Gabby Cook in similar terms. to the claimant before driving the young person home, either Gabby Cook or Ms. Norris would have treated them differently by making alternative arrangements for taking X home. Therefore, this complaint of direct discrimination fails.

[207]Likewise, in respect of allegation 3.2, that when in April 2024 X smashed his phone when he was outside during a “vape” break from a session with the claimant, the respondent failed to make alternative arrangements for X to be driven home, as we have stated above, there is no evidence from which we could conclude that if a person of different race had requested not to drive X home in similar circumstances, where there was no abuse directed at the worker in question, that arrangements would have been made for a different worker to drive X home. So, this allegation is dismissed.

[208]Regarding allegation 3.3, which cross refers to 6.2.6 in the further information, and alleges that on the 3rd of June 2024, the respondent failed to actively support the claimant and take immediate steps following the claimant raising serious concerns related to her race. This refers to Karen Norris telling the claimant, when she returned to the office after driving X home, that she should speak to Stacey Clay. The allegation is that the respondent should have taken immediate active steps to support the claimant rather than referring her to Ms. Clay, who, in the claimant's words, was “passively waiting” for the claimant to approach her for support. The claimant says that the reason for the respondent’s failure to actively support her was due to her race and the fact that her complaint related to race related comments.

[209]We have accepted that if Karen Norris was in the office when the claimant initially spoke to Gabby Cook about the incident, she did not absorb the details as she was in the middle of her working day. It was when the claimant returned from driving X home, visibly distressed, that Ms. Norris first spoke to the claimant directly and became aware of the details of what had been said. We accept the respondent's evidence that the 3rd of June 2024 fell in the first week that Stacey Clay had returned to her substantive role of Operational Manager, which had been covered by Karen Norris for a period. When Karen Norris became aware that there had been an incident between X and the claimant, she sought some guidance from Mr. Wraight who had suggested that she refer the claimant to Stacey Clay if the claimant wanted to discuss the matter further. We accept that when Karen Norris initially went to speak to Stacey Clay about this, she was unable to do so as Ms. Clay was on a “Teams” call. Ms. Norris then told the claimant that if she wanted to speak to Ms. Clay about the incident, she was in her office. The claimant then went to see Ms. Clay.

[210]There was no evidence before us that before the claimant went to see her, Stacey Clay was aware of what had happened between the claimant and X. As the claimant accepts, when she went to see Ms. Clay, she went through the details of what had happened. In the circumstances, there is no evidence from which we could conclude that the respondent would have responded differently to a person of different race who had raised concerns in similar circumstances. The reason that Karen Norris referred the claimant to Ms. Clay was that Ms. Clay had just resumed responsibility for Operational Management, and because Ms. Norris had been advised to refer the claimant to Ms. Clay by Mr Wraight, her manager, for that reason. The reason for this treatment was not therefore race or that the complaint was about race related comments, but because Mr Wraight thought it more appropriate for Ms. Clay to deal with the matter as Operational Manager.

[211]Both Karen Norris and Stacey Clay spoke to the claimant promptly after she returned to the office. Whilst we have found that comments each of them made had the proscribed effect of amounting to harassment related to race, we do not consider that they would have treated anyone of different race who came to them with similar complaints about a young person (for example where similarly offensive comments were made to a person who was Kurdish or Jewish) any differently in respect of the immediate response, and there was no evidence provided to us on which we could base such a conclusion. So allegation 3.3 is dismissed.

[212]Allegation 3.4, referring to clause 6.2.8 of the claimant’s further information: This is a complaint that on the 3rd of June 2024, when the claimant informed Ms. Clay that she did not want to work with X in future, Ms. Clay did not immediately deal with this. Instead, at the meeting on 5 June 2024, when the claimant repeated that she was unwilling to work with X, she was asked if anyone else in the team did not work with X before the respondent agreed that she would not. She also complains that she was still expected to see X around the building. She compares herself to her colleague JL, whom, she says, was moved to work in a different building after complaining of homophobic abuse by X.

[213]In respect of JL, we accept Ms. Clay’s explanation that JL is not an appropriate comparator. Although of different race to the claimant, her situation was different in that very shortly after the incident of homophobic abuse, JL made a formal grievance against all her colleagues in the YJST. This was why she was moved to a different building, as a formal grievance investigation was underway, and it was felt to be inappropriate for her to work alongside her colleagues in those circumstances.

[214]Those are material differences within the meaning of section 23 Equality Act 2010; the claimant had not, at this stage, brought a formal grievance and had not brought a grievance about her managers (or indicated that she might) until over a month later. We do not think that the delay from 3 to 5 June was significant as the claimant worked from home on the 4th of June. We consider that the reason the claimant was expected to continue working in the same building as X was not influenced by race but because the culture of the YJST was to prioritise the needs of the young people over, in most cases, the staff. There was no evidence from which we could conclude that a person of different race who had experienced similar abuse to that experienced by the claimant on 3 June 2024 and who therefore did not wish to work with X in future would have been treated any differently by being moved to a different building.

[215]Allegation 3.5 is failing to protect the claimant from further contact with X. As noted above, there is no evidence from which we could conclude that the reason the claimant was not moved had anything to do with race. There is no evidence that she asked to be moved to a different office at that time, and there are obvious benefits (including support from colleagues) for the YJST team to be based together where possible. The claimant accepts that X never spoke to her or approached her directly after 3 June 2024, although, because the kitchen and front door were downstairs, where X would be, there were times when X would inevitably see the claimant and vice versa. Likewise, there is no evidence from which we could conclude that a person of different race in similar circumstances would have been moved, or other steps taken to stop them seeing X. We have explained our findings in relation to JL above. Allegation 3.5 is dismissed.

[216]Allegation 3.6, paragraph 6.2.210 of the Particulars: this is a complaint about the timing of Dave Wraight informing the claimant about X’s complaint against her, late in the afternoon on the 14th of June 2024.We have accepted Mr Wraight’s evidence that the reason he told the claimant and others about the complaints made by X against them at this point was that he had been waiting to see if X’s mother would provide video evidence in support of his complaint against the claimant. He also wanted to tell all those affected by complaints from X around the same time and in any case, he was due to go on leave the following week and needed to set up investigation meetings before he left, as there are timescales in relation to complaints made by young people. There was no evidence that this treatment was limited to the claimant or that anyone else was treated more favourably. There was no evidence from which we could conclude that the treatment was influenced by race or that a person of different race was, or would have been, treated differently in similar circumstances, so this allegation

[217]Allegation 3.7, cross referring to 6.2.11 of the Particulars, is somewhat repetitive and is that Mister Wraight's decision to inform the claimant of the complaint by X on the same day that the claimant submitted her impact statement was due to the claimant's race and his failure to comprehend the effect that revisiting the incident within the impact statement would have on the claimant. As set out above, we have rejected this allegation. Mr Wraight chose to tell the claimant about the complaint by X late on the afternoon of 14 June for the reasons set out above. Whilst the timing of X’s complaint and the claimant completing the impact statement are unfortunate, on the one hand, the claimant criticises Mr Wraight for not telling her of the complaint earlier that day (6.2.10 p38) and on the other suggests that it would have been better for him to have delayed giving her time to recover (6.2.11 p38). The claimant cannot have it both ways, and as stated above we have accepted Mr Wraight’s reasons for delaying above. So, there is no evidence of less favourable treatment or that the reason for choosing this time was influenced by race and this allegation is dismissed.

[218]Allegation 3.8 refers to paragraph 6.2.13 of the particulars. The claimant alleges that the respondent failed to provide an explanation to the claimant as to why the CREST form needed to be completed on about 11th of July 2024, more than a month after the incident with X and Y occurred. In fact, Mr Wraight did provide an explanation to the claimant on the 11th of July at 13.51, page 270. That was, that he had been at a meeting that week where CREST forMs. were mentioned, and was prompted to look at the reporting of incidents as a result. Having done so, he concluded that the claimant’s incident should be reported. We accepted Mr Wraight’s evidence about this. The reason was not influenced by race and there is no evidence that a person of different race would have been treated differently in similar circumstances, so this allegation fails.

[219]Allegation 3.9, particulars 6.2.14 p39: This is a complaint about Stacey Clay questioning the claimant on or about 15th of July 2024 about an incident where X made homophobic comments to the claimant's colleague JL. At some stage during the incident, a panic alarm was set off, and the claimant had not responded as she was no longer working with X, and due to the incident on 3 June 2024.The claimant was asked why she had not intervened. The claimant considered that Ms. Clay’s focus on this was unnecessary and showed a lack of awareness of the effect of the previous incident on the claimant and was due to her race.

[220]The claimant refers to Dave Wraight as her comparator because she says that he did not respond to the panic alarm but was not spoken to in the manner that the claimant was by Stacey Clay. Mr Wraight is of different race to the claimant, a white male. But he is also the Service Manager for the YJST and Stacey Clay's line manager. That is a material difference between his situation and the claimant’s within section 23. The claimant’s evidence is also inconsistent in that she accepts that Mr Wraight responded the first time the panic alarm went off, but not the second, another material difference.

[221]Whilst we consider it was somewhat tactless of Ms. Clay to ask the claimant why she did not respond to the alarm, given the claimant’s previous experience with X, we note that this was in the context of an investigation into JL’s complaint about her colleagues. As indicated above, we do not consider that Mr Wraight is an appropriate comparator as there are material differences in his situation compared to the claimant: he did respond at least once and is Stacey Clay’s superior manager, so that it would not be appropriate for her to question him in the same way she would the claimant. We did not consider that there was evidence from which we could conclude that a person of different race holding the same role to the claimant and who had been subjected to a similar experience involving X would have been treated differently by Ms. Clay. We do not consider that there is evidence from which we could conclude that race influenced her treatment of the claimant. This allegation must fail.

[222]Allegation 3.10, referring to paragraph 6.2.15 of the Particulars: this relates to the same matter, SC’s questioning of the claimant in relation to the incident between X and JL. The claimant considers that as she had come along to support JL’s complaint, she should not have been asked about her own conduct, which she believed was akin to being “interrogated” by SC, and that SC was dismissive of her concerns when she mentioned that she had overheard X talking about the incident with JL, to which SC said that X “was just a child”. The claimant repeats her complaint that SC was dismissive about her complaints about DW not responding to the panic alarm.

[223]We have explained above why we do not consider that DW is an appropriate comparator. We were not shown JL’s complaint, but as we have accepted it was about her Team as a whole, we can see why the claimant was questioned about the incident. So far as the comment made by SC about X being “just a child” is concerned, we do not consider that this comment was influenced by race – from what we have seen and heard, we consider that the ethos of the organisation, and particularly of Stacey Clay, is that the young people come first and that their needs are prioritised over those of staff, sometimes inappropriately. But in this instance, the comments were made in respect of X’s conduct towards JL. No-one has suggested that his conduct towards JL was influenced by race. Despite the claimant’s belief that she was being “targeted” and her concerns dismissed because of her race, there is no evidence from which we could conclude that SC would have reacted differently if a person of different race to the claimant (and in circumstances which were not materially different) had not responded to the panic alarm or had raised concerns about DW not responding or about X’s comments about JL. This allegation fails.

[224]Allegation 3.11 regarding 6.2.16 page 39: That, when the Claimant completed a victim impact statement on 16 June 2024, the Claimant was asked to be as open and honest as possible about the impact of the comments by X. However, when the Claimant provided these to Dave Wraight these were scrutinised, and the Claimant was informed that the content of this statement was not suitable to be shared with the young people involved and the Claimant was asked to amend the statement. This left the Claimant feeling that she was not being heard and that the Respondent failed to understand the deep impact that the incident had on her.

[225]We have already found that the reasons that the claimant was asked to amend her impact statement were partly to protect her, due to the nature of some of the comments she made, and partly because Mr. Wraight considered that some of the language used was not appropriate to be shared with the other local authority involved, and that it may reflect badly on the respondent. JP, who had told the claimant to use her own words about her feelings, was apparently more used to drafting impact statements for victiMs. who were not also members of staff, where different considerations would apply. These reasons were unconnected with race, and there is no evidence from which we could conclude that someone of different race would have been treated differently in this respect by Mr Wraight, so this complaint is dismissed.

[226]We would observe that we were not told about any other situation where a staff member was asked to complete a victim impact statement. Whilst we do not consider that there is any evidence that the claimant was asked to complete it due to her race, it seeMs. that the essence of a victim impact statement is that it should reflect the person’s feelings and should use their own language. It does not seem to us, therefore, that it a sensible mechanism to use for a worker in a Youth Justice team who may have to work or come into direct contact with the young person who is the perpetrator at any future point.

[227]Allegation 3.12, clause 6.2.17 of the further particulars, page 40: this refers to the allegation that the claimant was told, in a meeting on the 5th of June 2024 that a meeting would be arranged with Y’s caseworker in Reading to discuss the incident on the 3rd of June but this was not arranged. The complaint also reads that whilst the revised impact statement was provided to Ys caseworker, the unedited version was not shared with them, so they were unable to understand the true nature of the incident and its impact on the claimant. The claimant alleges that the reason for the respondent's conduct was the claimant's race and that this left the claimant feeling unsupported and that she was not being listened to in meetings that were supposed to address her concerns.

[228]In fact, we have seen the e-mail that Mr Wraight sent to the claimant after the meeting on the 5th of June. It does not say that it had been agreed that a meeting would be arranged with the caseworker in Reading to discuss the incident. The e-mail from Mr Wraight is on page 214 and in respect of why, it simply records that as Y is available to Reading Youth Offending service it would be helpful if they undertook some educational work with him around racism and specifically his actions and language during the incident, and that the claimant had agreed that the impact statement could be shared with him to support the process. Nothing is said about the claimant meeting the caseworker in Reading. The claimant did not challenge the email at the time, and at around that time told Michele Clarke in supervision that she was content with the outcome of the meeting on 5 June 2024.

[229]As we have recorded in our findings of fact, the worker dealing with Y in Reading did receive a copy of the edited version of the impact statement. We have set out the reasons why the impact statement was requested to be amended by Mr Wraight, and we have already found that the reasons for the amendment were nothing to do with the claimants or anyone else's race.

[230]So, this allegation is based on a false premise, that the claimant was told that she would be able to meet with Y’s caseworker. The claimant did not challenge Mr Wright's e-mail, sent on the same day as the 5th of June 2024 meeting at the time, and therefore we accept on the balance of probabilities that there was no suggestion that the claimant would actually meet or have a discussion with the youth worker from Reading. As a result, this allegation of direct race discrimination fails.

[231]Allegation 3.13, particularised at 6.2.17, overlaps with the previous allegation and refers to the failure to provide Y and his caseworker with an unedited version of the impact statement. We have already concluded that the reasons for asking the claimant to amend her impact statement and the unwillingness of Mr. Wright to share the unedited version with Y and with Reading Borough Council were as stated above and were not connected in any way or influenced by race. There is no evidence from which we could conclude that a person of different race in similar circumstances would have been treated any differently in this respect.

[232]Allegation 3.14 particularised at paragraph 6.2.1.8 of the further particulars on page 40. This is another allegation that in the meeting on the 5th of June 2024, the claimant was told that her impact statement would be shared with X and the incident discussed with him. It goes on that at the meeting on the 3rd of July, the claimant was informed that the document had not been shared with X or his mother, but that a meeting was arranged for the following Friday. It goes on that by the time the claimant ceased work in July 2024 the respondents still had not provided a copy of either version of her impact statement to X. The claimant alleges that the reason that the respondent did not do so and ensure that X was informed of the content of the impact statement was due to race.

[233]We heard evidence and accept that it had been intended to share the claimants impact statement with X on the 5th of July, that is just after the meeting with the claimant, but that the meeting had to be postponed because X had been recalled by the Youth Court and had to appear before the District Judge. A further attempt was made to arrange a meeting to share the impact statement, but by that time the claimant was in breach of his youth rehabilitation order and was failing to engage with the respondent.

[234]We accept that a copy of the edited version of the claimant's impact statement could still have been sent to X's mother for her to share with him, although there is no guarantee that she would have done so. We have already made findings about why the original unedited version of the impact statement was not to be shared with X or Y. These reasons had nothing to do with race, and neither, so we find had the failure to send a copy of the edited version to X or his mother. There was no evidence before us which suggested that if a worker of a different race to that of the claimant had completed a victim impact statement in similar circumstances, it would have been sent to X or his mother in the circumstances that he was in breach of his rehabilitation order and was failing to engage with the service. For those reasons, this allegation of direct discrimination

[235]Allegation 3.15, referring to paragraph 6.2.19 on page 40 and allegation 8.2.7 on page 43 refer to the claimant's allegation that she resigned on the 21st of June 2024 due to the respondent's failure to address her concerns of race discrimination and the respondent's lack of support. Whilst this general allegation adds little in terMs. of liability to the claimant's claim, as it depends on findings of discrimination in respect of other allegations, we have concluded that the allegations of harassment which we have upheld in respect of the events of the 3rd of June 2024 did have a significant influence on the claimant's decision to resign.

[236]Allegation 3.16, which refers to paragraph 6.2.21 of the claimant’s particulars at page 40, alleges that the claimant was excluded from staff meetings and not kept updated with developments about X. It is said that the decision to exclude the claimant from meetings was made without prior agreement or discussion and left her feeling isolated and excluded, and she submits that the reason was due to her race.

[237]In fact, we were taken to evidence, which the claimant accepted during cross examination, that the claimant did in fact attend staff meetings after the incident on the 3rd of June when she said she no longer wanted to work with X. She accepted that the meetings that she was not invited to related to developments in respect of X. As the claimant had told her managers that she no longer wanted to work with X and they agreed to that at her request, we do not consider that there was any reason for the respondent to continue to include the claimant in meetings specifically relating to ex or to update her with developments in his case. We find that the reason that she was not invited to meetings relating to X or kept updated with developments in respect of his case was that at her request, she was no longer working with X and therefore had no need to be told about developments in respect of his case. This had nothing to do with race.

[238]Allegation 3.17 which relates to clause 6.2.22 on page 40 and clause 7. 2.6 on page 42 is an allegation that in July 2024, the respondent became aware that X had been referred again to the respondent service in respect of a further incident of racism that had occurred around January 2024, that is before the incident involving the claimant. The complaint is that the claimant was not informed of this additional incident and no additional safeguards were put in in place by the response to protect the claimant from any future incidents and that this was due to the claimant’s race.

[239]When the claimant was questioned about this, she explained that shortly before she ceased to work, in July 2024, she was told by a member of administrative staff that X had been referred to the service again about a historic allegation of racism from about January 2024. We were told by Ms. Clay and accept that from early to mid-July 2024 X began to disengage from contact with the service. Bearing in mind that by this time it was approximately 6 weeks after the incident on the 3rd of June, and that there had been no further direct contact or incidents between the claimant and X, and the claimant was no longer working with X, it is difficult to see why the respondent would inform the claimant about this historic allegation, or indeed why they would think they needed to take further steps to protect the claimant from X. We accept that the reason that the respondent did not officially inform the claimant about this development was that she had asked not to work with X back in early June 2024 so that there was no reason for the respondent to inform her. There is no evidence from which we could conclude that a worker of different race but otherwise in a similar situation to the claimant would have been treated differently or would have been told about the re-referral and historic allegation by the respondent’s management. So, this allegation of direct race discrimination must fail.

[240]Moving on to the allegations of direct discrimination in paragraph 6 of the list of issues, at paragraph 6.1, the claimant says that the racist comments made in the conversation between X and Y on the 3rd of June 2024 amounted to allegations of direct race discrimination for which the respondent is responsible. The trouble is that X and Y were not employees or agents of the respondent. Nor did they instruct, cause or induce any of the respondent’s employees or agents to discriminate or aid a person for whom the respondent was responsible to discriminate. They were service users, and the allegation is about what they said and did. So, whilst we accept that the comments made in that conversation amounted to really unpleasant and serious racial abuse and would have amounted to direct discrimination if the respondent was legally liable for those comments, there is no basis on which we could find that the respondent was liable.

[241]The next allegation is 6.2, that on the 3rd of June 2024 the claimant was discouraged from reporting the incident to the police by Karen Norris, who informed her that Dave Wraight had stated that it would be a “he said, she said” situation as the comments could be seen as malicious communications. Leaving aside the point that there is an inherent contradiction in such a statement - on the one hand it appears that the claimant is being discouraged and on the other hand being told that a criminal offence has been committed- we have found as a fact that Karen Norris had not, on the afternoon of the 3rd of June 2024, been informed by Dave Wraight that this was a “he said, she said” situation or that the comments could be seen as malicious communication and therefore a criminal offence.

[242]We have found that only by the 5th of June 2024 had Mr Wraight had the opportunity to speak to the on-site police officer, to discuss whether what had happened amounted to something which could viably be prosecuted as a criminal offence. On the afternoon of the 3rd of June 2024, as we were told by Ms. Norris and as we have accepted, it was only after the claimant returned from driving X home that Ms. Norris Went to speak to Mr. Wraight. This was a short conversation in which Mr. Wraight suggested that Karen Norris refer the claimant to Stacey Clay about her concerns. This was the first time he had heard about what had happened, and he did not speak to the allocated police officer until the following day. He then relayed what he had been told about the prospects of a successful prosecution to the claimant at the meeting on the 5th of June 2024.

[243]We have found that when the claimant was told by Mr Wraight that the prospects of a successful prosecution were not good (because it was a “he said, she said” situation without independent corroboration or witnesses), this would have been discouraging for the claimant. We find that in making the comments, however, Mr. Wraight was not influenced by race, but by what he had been told by a police officer. Unfortunately, as a matter of common sense, if there are no witnesses a new independent corroboration, the prospects of a successful prosecution will indeed be lower, hence the expression “he said, she said”. So, this allegation of direct discrimination fails.

[244]In paragraph 8 of the claimants list of issues, she refers to her colleagues Charlotte Macaulay (“CM”) and JL as appropriate comparators. The claimant's evidence was that when CM discovered in May 2024 that X had arrived at the Team's offices with a stolen bike, she alerted managers, who encouraged or urged her to report the matter to the police. We did not hear very much evidence about this incident, and the claimant did not ask the respondent’s witnesses many questions about it, but we observe that it was a very different situation in that there was physical evidence that the claimant had broken the law, in that he arrived on a bicycle which was not his and apparently accepted that he had taken it without permission. So, this was a situation in which there was corroborated evidence of wrongdoing, as opposed to the claimant’s situation with X and Y which Mr. Wraight had described as “he said, she said” because of the lack of corroborating evidence or a witness. So, from the limited evidence we have we do not consider that CM’s situation is like the claimants, it was materially different in that there was physical evidence that wrongdoing had been committed.CM is not an appropriate comparator regarding the allegation that the claimant was discouraged from reporting the incident with X and Y to the police.

[245]So far as JL is concerned, again the claimant did not ask many questions about this and we have got very little evidence about it, but the nub of her case appears to be that when JL was subject to homophobic abuse, she was not asked to write an impact statement and therefore was free, herself, to report the matter to the police. There was no evidence that she was encouraged to report the matter to the police, however, by anyone at the YJST or anyone at the respondent. In any case, writing a victim impact statement would not preclude the claimant from going to the police if she chose to do so.

[246]We have insufficient evidence from which we could conclude that JL was in fact treated more favourably in this respect than the claimant, and we do not know what, if anything was said to JL about the prospects of prosecution by employees of the respondent or whether she indeed told them that she was going to report the matter to police prior to doing so. The claimant did not ask the respondent’s witnesses about this.

[247]There is no evidence from which we could conclude that the fact that JL was not asked to write a victim statement was influenced by the fact that she was white. In some contexts, being asked or given the opportunity to write a victim impact statement might seem to be a positive occurrence rather than a detriment. In the absence of any detailed evidence about JL's situation, we are unable to find that she was an appropriate comparator for the claimant in respect of this allegation, or indeed that she was treated more favourably. Again, we have no evidence from which we could conclude that Mr Wraight’s comments to the claimant were influenced by race. This allegation is dismissed.

[248]As to allegation 6.3, that on the 3rd of June 2024 the claimant was discouraged from reporting the incident involving X and Y to the police by Michelle Clarke, we have found as a fact that the claimant did speak to Michele Clark on the telephone after she dropped X at home and before she returned to the office. We accept that during that conversation the claimant was upset and emotional, and she talked about reporting the incident to the police.

[249]We also accept on the balance of probabilities that Ms. Clarke did discourage the claimant from going to the Police, saying that this would further criminalise the young people involved. In making those comments, however, Ms. Clarke was not influenced by race, but by her own personal views that the respondent’s service was not there to further criminalise the young people referred to it, but to work with them to try and encourage them to change their behaviour and become compliant with the law. Having accepted that this was why Ms. Clarke discouraged the claimant from going to the Police, we conclude that there is no evidence from which we could conclude that she would have reacted any differently to a person of a different race in the same circumstances.

[250]Allegation 6.4 is that on the 3rd of June 2024 Karen Norris compared X and Y's comments to young people making comments to staff about being old, fat, or having a speech impediment. Whilst we have found that Karen Norris did in fact do so, we have found above that this amounted to harassment related to race and it cannot therefore at the same time amount to a detriment within section 39 and section 212 of the Equality Act 2010, and therefore this complaint of direct race discrimination must be dismissed. There is no evidence that Karen Norris would have reacted differently to a person of different race in similar circumstances in any case.

[251]Likewise, the allegation at 6.5 that on the 3rd of June 2024 Stacey Clay was more concerned about the claimant referring to X and Y as “little boys” as opposed to her complaint of racism, we have already accepted that, indeed, Ms. Clay's focus was on what she regarded as derogatory comments by the claimant rather than the particularly nasty racial abuse to which the claimant had been subjected. We have found, however, that this amounted to harassment related to race, and for the same reasons as above, under section 212, a matter which amounts to harassment cannot at the same time amount to a detriment for the purposes of section 39 of the 2010 act, and therefore the complaint of direct race discrimination must be dismissed. Again, there is no evidence that Ms. Clay would have reacted differently to someone of different race in the claimant’s situation.

[252]The allegation at 6.6 is that on the 5th of June 2024 and the 22nd of July 2024 Stacey Clay stated that she felt threatened by the claimant when the claimant explained that she felt angry because of the incident with X&Y. We have already found that on those dates, Ms. Clay did state that she could have felt threatened by the claimant during their discussion on the 3rd of June 2024. We found that she said this because the claimant had become agitated during the meeting and got out of her seat and walked round to the side of Ms. Clay's desk, and had said words to the effect that Ms. Clay would not like to see her if she got angry and that she was leaving to “go and see her people” .

[253]We found that whilst not everyone would have felt threatened in that situation, we could see why Ms. Clay may have felt threatened by the claimants getting up and walking round to where she was sitting while saying that Ms. Clay would not like to see her if she got angry, the claimant being in a highly emotional state. We do not consider that Ms. Clay's comments in that respect had anything to do with race or that she would have said anything different had the claimant been of different race, it was her genuine reaction to the situation.

[254]So far as the words “I am going to see my people” or words to that effect are concerned, we accept that Ms. Clay did misinterpret those words as some kind of veiled threat that the claimant was going to see other people who would assist her to get some kind of revenge on X. Whilst that is an unusual construction to put on the words, and is not a construction which Karen Norris or Michelle Clark put upon them, it is a possible interpretation of the words and we accept that this was Ms. Clay's interpretation of them at the time, in a stressful sitaution. Again, there is no evidence from which we could conclude that she was influenced by race in reaching such a conclusion or would have treated anyone of different race differently.

[255]Allegation 6.7 is that on the 3rd of July 2024, Dave Wraight stated that as a “middle class old white man” he had not faced the same experiences as the claimant. We have found that this was in response to the claimant challenging him and Stacey Clay about their ability to deal with her complaint of race discrimination. Whilst it is unlikely that Mr Wraight would have used the same words to someone of different race to the claimant, we find that in the context, his comments did not amount to a detriment.

[256]Looked at objectively, in the context, as we have set out above, Mr. Wraight was trying to reassure the claimant that, whilst he appreciated that as a “middle class old white man” he would not have had the same experiences as the claimant, a black female, he was trying to reassure her that he could deal with her complaint of racism due to the training he and Ms. Clay had previously received. In that context, we do not consider that a reasonable employee would consider theMs.elves to have been placed at a disadvantage by these words, which was just an attempt by Mr. Wraight to reassure the claimant that whilst he appreciated her experiences would be different from his, he would nevertheless try his best to deal with her complaints using his skills and experience and the training he had received.

[257]Allegation 6.8 is that on the 3rd of July 2024, Stacey Clay stated that the claimant could not understand her experiences as a menopausal old lady. We have found that, in fact, what Ms. Clay said was that just as Mr. Wraight could not understand the claimant's experiences as a black female, he could not understand Ms. Clay's experiences as a “menopausal old lady”. We have found above that those words in the context of this case, and what had happened previously between Ms. Clay and the claimant on 3 June 2024, amounted to harassment related to race. They were an attempt, conscious or unconscious, to diminish the claimant's concerns about the racist abuse she had suffered, and to equate them with insults received by Ms. Clay from service users about being menopausal or an older female.

[258]As we have set out above, section 212(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that, in those circumstances, detriment does not include conduct which amounts to harassment. The circumstances in paragraph 5 of section 212 do not apply in this case. As therefore those words amount to harassment, they cannot amount at the same time to detriment under section 39 of the 2010 Act and therefore the complaint of direct discrimination fails.

[259]Allegation 6.9 is that on the 5th of June 2024, Mr. Wraight and Stacey Clay were positive about the claimant's suggestion of introducing X to a named black male role model but then went on to make alternative arrangements with an alternative provider/individual without consulting the claimant, who was told about it on the 5th of July 2024. On page 214 in the bundle, there is the e-mail that was sent to Mr. Wraight after the meeting on the 5th of June, on the same day. Towards the end of the e-mail, he states it was recognised that X had attended the “Waterside” facility and engaged with Ken, and it was agreed that it would be valuable if Ken could undertake further informal education with him on racism. As we have found above, between the 5th of June and the 5th of July 2024, Mr. Wright and Ms. Clay had discovered that the claimant was already engaging in work with a different black male worker, Mark, and that he had a positive relationship with him. They concluded that it would be better if Mark did this work with X as he had an existing relationship with him, and made arrangements for that to happen, but they did not communicate this to the claimant until the 5th of July.

[260]Whilst we accept that it would have been better for them to inform the claimant about this change and their reasons for it as soon as it happened, we do not consider that the failure to discuss this option with the claimant as opposed to reaching a decision and telling her about it was influenced by race. Mr. Wraight and Stacey Clay are senior managers within the respondent’s organisation, and they had good reasons for making this change. They thought that there was more chance of a positive outcome if the work was done by a black male with whom the claimant had already a positive relationship as opposed to introducing him to someone new. This is a judgement that they were entitled to make, and their reasons were not influenced by race. The claimant was no longer working with X at her own request and could not reasonably expect, in those circumstances, to influence decisions about the best way of dealing with him. There is no evidence from which we could conclude that a person of different race to the claimant would have been treated more favourably in similar circumstances and, indeed, it is difficult to see how a reasonable worker could have thought they were being placed at a disadvantage/subjected to detriment by the decision to use a different black male worker. Allegation 6.9 is dismissed.

[261]The final allegation of direct race discrimination is 6.10, that on the 19th of December 2024 within the grievance outcome it was stated that the claimant “lacks professionalism”. This is a reference to the grievance outcome letter produced by Ms. Carberry, and to her comment in the outcome at paragraph 3, page 416, that “a level of professionalism was not evident from the claimant towards management and this complicated anything that the management of the YJST were able to provide to her”.

[262]As we have found above in our findings of fact, we consider that the basis of Ms. Carberry’s conclusion in this respect was information given to her, primarily, by Ms. Norris and Ms. Clay within the grievance investigation. We deal with what was said by them in more detail under our findings on victimisation, but Ms. Carberry’s conclusion was not based on, or influenced by, race but by what she was told by other employees of the respondent within the grievance investigation. There is no evidence from which we could conclude that if she was told similar things about an employee of different race to the claimant within a similar context, she would have reached a different conclusion. This complaint of direct race discrimination therefore fails. Victimisation

[263]The respondent accepts, at paragraph 44 of its final submissions, that the claimant did protected acts due to complaining informally on the 3rd of June 2024 about what X and Y had said on that occasion and by raising her grievance on the 5th of August 2024.

[264]The first allegation of victimisation Is set out at paragraph 12.1, that on the 3rd of June 2024 the claimant was told by Stacey Clay that by referring to X and Y as “little boys”, that was derogatory.

[265]We have found that Stacey Clay did indeed rebuke the claimant for referring to X and Y as “little boys” on the 3rd of June 2024, and we have found that the effect of this amounted, in the context, to harassment related to race. However, we do not find that in making those comments Stacey Clay was influenced by the nature of the claimant’s complaint about X and Y, that is that it was about racist abuse. Rather, we have concluded that the reason Stacey Clay made those comments was because her ethos is to prioritise the young people who are referred to the YJST. She was concerned about future working relationships if the claimant used terms. such as “little boys” towards young people who were referred to the team.

[266]Whilst we have found that it was inappropriate of Stacey Clay to focus on the claimant’s use of “little boys” at that point in time, we accept that the reason why she made the comments, was that she was focusing on how the claimant had responded to the young people, rather than the nature of the complaint the claimant was making. We find that if the claimant had been of different race and had told Stacey Clay that she had referred to either X or Y as a “little boy” after they had subjected her to serious racial abuse, Stacey Clay's response would have been the same. Then for this complaint of victimisation fails.

[267]Allegation 12.2 is that the claimant was excluded from staff meetings regarding X from the 3rd of June onwards. As we have found above, the claimant was not excluded from staff meetings in general, she was not invited to those discussing X because she had asked to cease working with him. Therefore, the reason not to invite her to meetings discussing X was not influenced by the fact that she had made a complaint about racist abuse in which X was involved, but rather was because of the decision, in agreement with the claimant, that she be removed from working with him. That being the case, there was no need for her to be notified about such meetings or to be involved in them. Therefore, this complaint of victimisation fails.

[268]The next allegation, 12.3, is that on the 14th of June 2024 Dave Wraight informed the claimant that X had made a complaint against her. We have dealt with this above - Mr. Wraight informed the claimant on the 14th of June 2024 that X had made a complaint against her. The timing was because Mr Wraight had been waiting to be sent a video, which he had been told existed by X’s mother, in respect of the complaint against the claimant. He had delayed notifying her because he wanted to see if there was indeed a video. He also wanted to tell all of those who had been the subject of complaint by X at around the same time. He needed to do so before the end of the working day on 14th of June 2024 because he was on leave the following week. Having concluded, by late afternoon on the 14th of June, that there was no video, he decided he could delay no longer to inform the claimant and others about the complaints against them, and set about finding the individuals concerned, including the claimant.

[269]Therefore, the timing of the notification to the claimant was not influenced by the fact that she had previously, on the 3rd of June, complained about the racist incident involving X and Y. It was for the reasons set out above, which were not influenced by her complaint or the nature of it, and this complaint of victimisation must therefore fail.

[270]Likewise in respect of allegation 12.4, that on the 16th of June 2024 Mr. Wraight asked the claimant to amend her impact statement as he considered it not to be suitable to be shared, we have set out the reasons for this above. We accept that Mister Wraight, having received and read the claimant's original impact statement, was concerned that some of the comments made her vulnerable to abuse by X and also that he was concerned that some of the language was unprofessional, and would cast the claimant and the organisation in a poor light where it to be shared with Reading Borough Council as had been planned.

[271]These considerations were not influenced by the nature of the complaint that the claimant had made but were rather to do with matters the claimant had mentioned about her personal life and history, and the language she had used. We accept that the claimant was encouraged to use her own words and say exactly how she felt. We consider that it was not appropriate for JP to have done so, in the context that this statement was to be shared with X, who was a user of the service for which the claimant worked and therefore was more likely to come into contact with her than if a member of the general public was making a victim impact statement, and also because the document was to be shared with another local authority.

[272]If the claimant had made a different kind of complaint, not amounting to a protected act, and her statement involved a service user and was to be shared with a different local authority, we consider that Mr Wraight’s response would have been the same. In those circumstances, the reasons Mr Wraight asked the claimant to amend her victim impact statement were unconnected with the nature of the complaint the claimant had made, and the complaint of victimisation must fail.

[273]Regarding allegation 12.5, that on the 17th of June 2024 Ms. Clay requested the claimant to provide a sick note in order to be reimbursed for a day's leave when she had been ill, we have found above that Ms. Clay was simply following the respondent’s sickness management policies, which were available to the claimant on the intranet had she wished to check them. Again this treatment was not influenced by the nature of the claimant's complaint on the 3rd of June 2024 and there has been no evidence from which we could conclude that it was.

[274]Whilst it is true that at the time, it was not necessary to seek a statement of fitness for work in the first 3 days of illness in order to receive sick pay, in our experience it is not uncommon for absence management policies to require such a statement in circumstances where an employee is seeking to have a day's annual leave credited to them because they were ill whilst on leave.

[275]Therefore, the reasons for asking the claimant to provide a fit note were not influenced or connected with the nature of the complaint she had made on the 3rd of June 2024, Ms. Clay was just seeking to follow the respondent’s policy, although she later agreed to credit the day’s leave to the claimant without the need for a sick note. The complaint of victimisation is dismissed.

[276]Allegation 12.6 is that in July 2024, the respondent failed to inform the claimant that X had been re referred to the service for a further [historic] incident of racism.

[277]As we have set out above, the reason that the respondent’s management did not inform the claimant that X had been referred back to the service due to a historic allegation of racism relating to January 2024 was that the claimant was no longer working with X and had worked in the building that he was visiting for six weeks without there having been any further incidents. This was not a new incident which had occurred after the 3rd of June, when the claimant had made her complaint. The claimant fortuitously became aware that X had been referred again for this incident when she was told informally by a member of administrative staff.

[278]Again, the failure of management to inform the claimant about this re-referral for a historic matter, at a time when X had visited the building without further incident directed at the claimant and was beginning to disengage with the service, had nothing to do with the fact that the claimant had previously made a complaint of race discrimination amounting to a protected act on the 3rd of June 2024. There was no need for the respondent to inform the claimant about the re referral as there had been no further incidents between X and the claimant, she was no longer working with him. X was in breach of his rehabilitation order and was being recalled to court, and in any event, he was disengaging from the service. The claimant had resigned.

[279]When questioned about this, Ms. Clay pointed these matters out and seemed genuinely baffled as to why anyone would think that the claimant needed to be told about this. There is no evidence from which we could conclude that if the claimant’s complaints had not amounted to protected acts and she had similarly stopped working with X, she would have been treated differently. This allegation of victimisation therefore

[280]The next allegation chronologically is 12.8. This is that, within her final pay, the claimant was paid incorrectly by being underpaid by 8 days. Whilst we have accepted the difficulties and distress this would have caused the claimant; we have also found that the reason that she was paid incorrectly was an administrative error by Stacey Clay. Although in her covering e-mail Ms. Clay had said that the claimant was owed annual leave, she had ticked the wrong box in the leaving form which meant that the claimant was underpaid. We have concluded that this was a simple error by Ms. Clay when she was completing the form, as evidenced by the fact that the covering email says that the claimant is owed additional days’ pay. It was not influenced by the fact that the claimant had previously, on the 3rd of June, complained of race discrimination amounting to a protected act (the form was completed on 1 August 2024, before the claimant brought her grievance). It was an error which Ms. Clay rectified as soon as she became aware of it. This allegation of victimisation therefore fails.

[281]Regarding allegation 12.7, this is that on the 19th of December 2024 the claimant was labelled as lacking professionalism in the grievance outcome. This is a reference to the comments made in paragraph 3 of the grievance outcome at p416 of the bundle. In that paragraph, Ms. Carberry was dealing with the third bullet point of the claimant's grievance on page 299, that “management ignored my complaint and the suggestions that were made” and, effectively that decisions were made about rather than with her.

[282]It is clear from the grievance on page 299 that it was about the management's response to her complaints about the incident involving X and Y on the 3rd of June 2024. Despite that, during the grievance interviews, managers were asked about and allowed to comment on the claimant's behaviour from the start of her employment with the respondent. We have set out what was said by them at length in our findings of fact.

[283]At paragraph 38(d) of her witness statement, Ms. Carberry sets out some general observations made by Karen Norris during her grievance interview. This incorrectly suggest that Karen Norris had said she had never come across someone that behaved the way the claimant did in meetings - in fact, that was a reference to a hearsay comment by Karen Norris about what she had been told by a seconded health worker, see p351. She also referred to an isolated incident when Mr. Wraight came to a meeting and did introductions. There was a student present as well as the claimant, but the claimant commented that they were only doing introductions because of her. Miss Norris said that the claimant appeared to take offence. In her grievance interview at 351, Ms. Norris said that the claimant's behaviour was “quite aggressive”. We have made further findings about what Ms. Norris told Ms. Carberry above, including the fact that she implied that the claimant had stood up and said that Ms. Norris “did not understand” on a separate occasion from 3 June 2024. Ms. Norris’ witness statement makes it clear that this is a reference to 3 June 2024 when the claimant had just dropped X at home and, by all accounts, was very distressed having been subjected to racial abuse.

[284]We have also found that when she was asked at page 352 about the claimant’s victim impact statement, Karen Norris exaggerated what had been said by the claimant. We found that she also gratuitously told Ms. Carberry during the grievance interview (p354) that she thought that the claimant made a point of going downstairs or to the kitchen when X was in the building and that X's mum had commented about this. She also referred to another incident when she said that the claimant's attitude to X was not good. We consider that Karen Norris was adding these comments to cast the claimant in a poor light and, seemingly, to pass some of the responsibility to the claimant for the incident with X and Y. She also alleged to Ms. Carberry that the claimant had made complaints in other local authorities Bracknell and Wokingham about race.

[285]The claimant denies much of this but was given no opportunity to comment before Ms. Carberry reached her conclusions, although further investigatory meetings with the claimant would have been an option according to the notes for the grievance interviews. We find that Ms. Norris was making these comments, based on insubstantial evidence about the claimant's propensity to make allegations of race discrimination, in an effort to undermine the complaints that the claimant had made in her grievance and to diminish the seriousness of her allegations of race discrimination. We find that she was doing so because of the serious nature of the allegations in the grievance, that is, that they were allegations of race discrimination amounting to a protected act, which she was trying to discredit. We find that Ms. Carberry was influenced by these exaggerated and unsubstantiated comments when reaching her conclusion that the claimant lacked professionalism in the grievance outcome.

[286]Likewise, Ms. Carberry was, according to paragraph 38 of her witness statement and what she said under cross examination, clearly influenced by what Stacey Clay said in her grievance interview in reaching this outcome. This included, at paragraph 358 , Ms. Clay stating that she had been told by a seconded worker at the YJS Team that when she had asked the claimant to get her some hot water the claimant had replied that slavery died out years ago “with a particular tone of voice”. This had nothing to do with the claimant’s complaints about the way management dealt with her complaints about the 3rd of June 2024, as it predated them by about nine months.

[287]As we have found, Ms. Clay added hearsay comments about what the claimant had allegedly said to Michele Clark about not finishing her employments positively and that they all ended in a grievance. Again, the claimant denies this. We have considered why Ms. Clay made the comments she did about the alleged incident when the claimant had said that “slavery died out years ago” and about the way in which she alleged the claimant's previous employments had ended. We have concluded that once again, the reason Ms. Clay was making those comments was that she was trying to try to discredit the claimant and to diminish the seriousness of the complaints of racism that she was making and that she did so because of the fact that they were complaints about racism and therefore protected acts.

[288]As we have said, Ms. Carberry was clearly influenced by what Ms. Norris and Ms. Clay were saying about the claimant when she reached her conclusion that the claimant lacked professionalism in her interactions with management. It is true that in paragraph 38 (c) and ( e) of her statement Ms. Carberry refers to the meeting on the 22nd of July 2024, but the focus in paragraph 3 of her conclusions is the claimant's behaviour, rather than trying to explore what had made the claimant react in the way that she did. Regarding the 22nd of July 2024, for example, considering Ms. Clarke's evidence, it is clear that matters went downhill after the claimant started to talk about what had happened on the 3rd of June, a very emotive subject for her, and after Ms. Clay repeated that she could have felt threatened by the claimant on that occasion. This meeting was also at the very end of the process about which the claimant complained.

[289]Whilst we do not consider that Ms. Carberry herself reached the conclusion that the claimant sometimes lacked professionalism in her dealings with management based on the nature of the claimant’s complaint, we do consider that she allowed herself to be significantly influenced by what Ms. Clay and Ms. Norris said about the claimant and that this caused her to lose focus on what the claimant complaining about. Ms. Norris and Ms. Clay exaggerated incidents, as we have found above, and referred to irrelevant and unsubstantiated matters because of the nature of the claimant's complaints, that is that they were protected acts complaining about racism. They were both seeking to discredit the claimant and to diminish the seriousness of her complaints.

[290]It was striking to us, that in dealing with the first point in the grievance, that after making serious complaints, management did not take the claimant’s complaints and upset seriously in respect of the racism directed towards her by a young person, there was no mention of the claimant’s complaint that when she was extremely distressed in the aftermath of the incident with X and Y and spoke to Stacey Clay on the 3rd of June 2024, Ms. Clay focused on the fact that the claimant had called X and or Y “little boys” and rebuked her for that, rather than seeming to understand the gravity of the incident. This was a central part of the claimant’s complaint about the management response on the 3rd of June 2024. Nor was there any reference to Ms. Norris comparing the insults and abuse that the claimant had experienced to complaints about people being old fat or having a speech impediment on the same occasion.

[291]We remind ourselves that the purpose of section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 is to protect individuals who do protected acts from being treated unfavourably because of that. To achieve the object of the legislation, in our view, it is sometimes necessary to look beyond the immediate cause of alleged prohibited treatment to consider what has caused that. In this case, it is clear to us that Ms. Carberry was significantly influenced in her conclusion that the claimant sometimes lacked professionalism in her meetings with management by exaggerated and unsubstantiated comments made about the claimant’s behaviour which were presented to her by the respondent’s employees Ms. Norris and Ms. Clay (for example, Ms Norris reference to the meeting where Mr Wraight introduced himself, the allegation by Ms Clay made about the claimant saying that “slavery died out years ago”, the suggestions that the claimant had made other complaints about racism and that her employments had usually ended in a grievance).

[292]We have found that they made those comments because of the nature of the complaints that the claimant was making, that is that they were protected acts. The respondent is responsible for the actions of its employees, Ms. Norris and Ms. Clay. They were influenced in what they told Ms. Carberry by the nature of the claimant’s complaints, protected acts, hence the reference to alleged previous complaints of racism by the claimant, reference to the claimant’s “difficult” behaviour in meetings although she had successfully passed her probation and the reference to the “slavery” comment allegedly made to a third party. These comments significantly influenced Ms. Carberry’s conclusion that the claimant lacked professionalism in her dealings with management.

[293]We therefore find that this allegation is well founded and amounts to victimisation for which the respondent was responsible under section 109 of the Equality Act 2010.

[294]Time: Although the claimant complained of victimisation within box 8 of her claim form, the allegation of victimisation which has succeeded took place on the 19th of December 2024 when the claimant received the grievance outcome. This is after the claimant lodged her claim form. The respondent has taken no point about this, and the allegation was included in the draft list of issues, but we observe that an amendment will be required to include this allegation as it could not have been subject to the original claim. Having considered the balance of hardship, and for the reasons we gave at the start of the hearing, we have permitted the amendment.

[295]Although this was not particularised by the claimant until the 21st of April 2025, see page 88, so that the application to amend was made by the document produced on that date, this was only just over one month after the expiry of the primary limitation period. The last day upon which an “in time” complaint could have been made would have been the 18th of March 2025.

[296]We know from the claimant’s correspondence with the tribunal around this time, as well as what the claimant told us about her circumstances, that her representation changed at around this time. We have also observed previously that she seems not to have been particularly well advised by her original representative, in that there was no attachment to the claim form and this was not picked up by anyone, nor was the Tribunal’s direction for further information complied with until the respondent alerted the claimant to it. The claimant’s own health was not good in the months that followed her leaving the respondent’s employment. For all those reasons, we consider that it would be just and equitable to extend time for her to make this complaint, that we have jurisdiction to deal with it and it therefore succeeds.

[1]By 16 September 2026, the claimant will send any further documents in her possession or control which are relevant to remedy for the matters which have succeeded.

[2]By 16 September 2026, the claimant has permission to send the respondent an updated schedule of loss if she wishes.

[3]By 16 September 2026, the claimant will send the respondent any witness statement(s) upon which she wishes to rely relating to remedy for the matters which have succeeded.

[4]By 23 September 2026, the respondent will send the claimant a hard and electronic file of any additional documents for the remedy hearing, paginated and arranged in chronological order (including the claimant’s documents) and any further witness statement(s) upon which it wishes to rely.

[5]By 23 September 2026, the respondent will provide the Tribunal with electronic copies of the hearing file for the remedy hearing and of any statements produced by either party. Approved by: