Ms M Dolata v University of East London: 6014376/2025 and others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6014376/2025

Between

Ms M DolataClaimant

University of East LondonRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Isabel Manley

In person for claimant

Mr Roberts (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 20 March 2026

JUDGMENT

ON APPLICATION FOR INTERIM RELIEF JUDGMENT having been provided orally to the parties on 2 June 2025, with a short judgment sent on 6 June 2025 and written reasons having been requested by the respondent on 19 June 2025 (and referred to the judge on 9 July 2025) in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024, the following reasons are provided:

REASONS

[1]This was a hearing to determine an application for interim relief that the claimant had made in the above claim under case number 6014376/25. Before the application could be considered there were some preliminary matters that needed attention.

[2]The respondent had made an application to strike out the claim and there was a similar application the claimant had made with respect to late disclosure of documents. I indicated that there would be no strike out considered at this hearing which had been listed as an interim relief hearing and informed the parties that my principal task was to look at all relevant documents for me to be able to determine this application, so we moved fairly swiftly onto the interim relief application. I also needed to leave sufficient time for any necessary case management matters.

[3]There were a substantial number of documents including a bundle (and supplementary bundle) of 206 pages from the respondent and a separate bundle from the claimant of 149 pages, as well as a witness statement, skeleton arguments and a bundle of authorities. In a hearing like this, where my task is to carry out a summary assessment primarily on the papers, I could not look at them all.

[4]The witness statement was from Mr Powell, who was a Centre Manager at the gym where the claimant worked for the respondent. I took a break, at the commencement of the hearing, as I had seen none of these documents before. Because of the volume of the documents before me I could not read everything, but I concentrated on the claimant’s application and the respondent’s response to that application as skeleton argument, as well as looking at what was the pleaded case in this case and the other claim and, to some extent, the response, and the relevant documents some of which included the alleged protected disclosure.

[5]The interim relief application is based on the claimant’s belief that her dismissal was because she had made a protected public interest disclosure.

Facts

[6]I set out what appear to be undisputed facts which are brief. At the moment the claimant has brought two claims against this respondent and this application arises from the second claim which was presented on 23 April 2025. As I understand it, the claims also include claims allegations that the dismissal was disability and/or indirect sex discrimination. So, it is a relatively complex claim, claiming matters apart from public interest disclosure dismissal.

[7]The claimant was employed by the respondent between 6 August 2012 and when she was told that she was redundant, that termination taking place on 16 April 2025. She had been working as a duty manager on reception at the gym which was a part-time post that she shared with a Mr Kabonga.

[8]A new centre manager, Mr Cowell, whose witness statement I have read, took up his post in August 2022. His witness statement says, and there are documents that support this, that he considered a restructure as there had not been one for some time, and he started discussions with other managers about that in August 2023. A business case was drawn up and there were conversations with his line manager and, indeed, with HR.

[9]By early July 2024, at the latest, the claimant became aware, as did other staff members, of this proposed restructure. This meant that there were going to be new roles for staff. There were about 18 staff, but the restructure did not envisage that there would be a need for redundancies, rather that staff would be appointed to new roles.

[10]There is some history that might be relevant in that the claimant wrote several, in some cases, relatively lengthy emails and other documents such as a grievance. It appeared at first, and the respondent certainly believed this was the case, that she was relying in this claim on the emails she had written in February 2024 as being the basis of her public interest disclosure claim.

[11]She clarified this, perhaps after seeing the respondent’s skeleton argument, that she was relying, for this hearing, on the alleged disclosure that she made on 11 September 2024. This is a very long document. It is over 60 pages; it has a number of appendices and what are said to be witness statements from other members of staff. It does say that it is a public interest disclosure, and it raises a number of issues some of which might, on quick reading at least, amount to matters in connection with health and safety or some other legal obligation. However, it is not entirely clear at this stage how it would meet the other tests necessary for it to be decided to be a public interest disclosure under section 43B Employment Rights Act 1996.

[12]In any event, the claimant did receive notice of the restructure. She did not apply for any of the posts believing them to be unsuitable for her and she asked to be redeployed. The claimant was on sick leave and there were therefore matters to be dealt with in respect to that including Occupational Health reports and so on. As I understand it, there might also have been an earlier grievance which was being dealt with which I do not understand to be relied upon as an alleged public interest disclosure. In any event, this was a relatively complex matter for the respondent’s HR and there appear to be quite a number of communications about the claimant’s position coming up to the restructure.

[13]The claimant did not apply, as I say, for any of the new posts in the restructure nor was she redeployed. She was therefore told that she was to be made redundant, as was the other person who was in the same position as her, Mr Kabonga. His situation was perhaps somewhat different given that he was not, so far as I can tell, on sick leave. He did have other concerns, as I understand it, about the process.

[14]The claimant has pointed to some differences she says between her treatment and Mr Kabonga, but I am not going to go into detail about that at this point as it does not seem to be relevant for my determination today given, as I have indicated, it has to be made on the summary assessment basis and relates to whether the claimant can show she has a good chance of showing her dismissal was because of having made a public interest disclosure. Law and submissions

[15]The statutory basis of interim relief is found in sections 128-132 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). Section 128 (2) provides for the application to be made within seven days of the effective date of termination.

[16]The test for determining whether to award interim relief is found in section 129(1), which provides where relevant to a claim for dismissal for having made a public interest disclosure that: “This section applies where, on hearing an employee’s application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find— (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in—(i) section… 103A…”

[17]The leading case is Taplin v C Shippam Ltd

[1978] IRLR 450

, which concerned an application for interim relief in a claim for unfair dismissal for trade union reasons, the EAT held at that the term “likely” should be interpreted to mean that the claimant has “a pretty good chance of succeeding”.

[18]This was considered in the context of whistleblowing claims in Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 562

. In considering the relevant paragraphs of Taplin it was held in the following passage that “likely” connotes “a significantly higher degree of likelihood” than “more likely than not”:

[19]The reason for this very high threshold was stated by the EAT in Parsons v Airplus International Ltd

UKEAT/0023/16

/ (as mentioned earlier in Dandpat v University of Bath [2009]

UKEAT/0408/09

) “This interpretation is justified because if the employee satisfies the test the tribunal must make an order for interim relief and, if it does so, the employer is obliged to pay the employee pending the determination of the complaint and there is no provision for repayment in the event that she ultimately fails on the merits.” Also, in that case the language used by the employment judge that the claim was not (sufficiently) “clear cut” was not criticised.

[20]In order to succeed in an interim relief application, a claimant must show that it is likely that any and all incidental matters will be found in their favour at a final hearing. In Wollenburg v 1) Global Gaming Ventures (Leeds) Ltd (2) Herd

UKEAT/0053/18

, the EAT emphasised that an application for interim relief is “a brief urgent hearing at which the Employment Judge must make a broad assessment.”

[21]In a case such as this, where the application is based on the allegation that the reason (or principal reason) for the dismissal is because the claimant has made a protected public interest disclosure, the judge will need to consider the provisions of section 43B ERA, which sets out the statutory definition of the elements needed to show that there was a qualifying disclosure. In short, that the claimant had disclosed information; that they believed it showed a relevant failure; that that belief was objectively reasonable; and that they believed the disclosure was in the public interest and that belief was objectively reasonable.

[22]Once the claimant has shown a qualifying public interest disclosure, the tribunal then has to assess, in line with section 103A ERA, whether that was the reason, or principal reason, for the dismissal.

[23]The claimant’s case can be summarised as being the following. She says, if she had been redeployed as she requested, she would not have been dismissed and that the reason she was not redeployed was because of the alleged September public interest disclosure. She does not appear to be arguing, at least at this hearing, that it was a sham redundancy but suggested that might be something she returns to later. She has not indicated to me today that she believes there was anything other than a redundancy situation.

[24]The respondent says that the timings make this application and, indeed, the claimant’s whole case for whistleblowing, a hopeless case. In essence, the respondent says, the restructure began to be planned well before any alleged public interest disclosure, particularly this one in September 2024, but also any earlier one. The respondent does not accept that that document, which is, as I have indicated, detailed and lengthy, amounted to a public interest disclosure under the various tests. What is more, the respondent says, there is no evidence whatsoever that the redundancy had anything to do with that, even if it was a public interest disclosure.

[25]The respondent also says that the claimant has a legal difficulty with the way she puts her case given that, if she accepts that it was a genuine redundancy situation, this is not something which she can rely upon for an interim relief application. That is inconsistent with her argument that the dismissal was because of any public interest disclosure.

Conclusions

[26]It is always a difficult task to carry out such a preliminary assessment, especially when the facts are complex and in dispute. It is particularly difficult where the claimant relies on a very lengthy document which was not immediately clear, or not absolutely clear until shortly before this hearing, what the public interest disclosure was that she says she wants to rely upon.

[27]The claimant cannot hope to succeed in this interim relief application. I accept that she is a litigant in person, but she has indicated that she has had some assistance from a charity. Whether they have advised her on the difficult task she faces in succeeding in being granted interim relief in a case like this I am not aware. I cannot possibly say on a summary assessment that this is anything like a clear-cut case.

[28]First the claimant would have to show, on this preliminary assessment, that she has a good chance of showing that this alleged public interest disclosure, which I have said has many complex aspects to it, meets all the tests as set out in section 43B ERA. Not only does she have to show, as we know, that she disclosed information and which of the relevant failures it tended to show, she has also got to show that, in her reasonable belief, that it was made in the public interest. Given the claimant’s historical unhappy relationship with the respondent, that is something she might find difficult to do.

[29]But what is even harder in a case like this is, where there was a restructure, and where the claimant was made redundant, is trying to show that that dismissal was connected to any public interest disclosure. It appeared to me that a number of people were involved in dealing with the claimant at various times. I certainly cannot say that she has got a pretty good chance of showing that there is a causal connection between any public interest disclosure which she does manage to show, and the decision taken to dismiss her, given the background information on what appears to be a restructure involving, apparently, around 18 people.

[30]It is certainly not clear enough to me, at this stage, that this is a matter where I should grant interim relief given the difficulties in this case. I cannot say that the claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in this part of her claim. The application is refused. Approved by:

Conclusions

[1]At this Public Preliminary Hearing I considered the Respondent’s application to strike out a number of the Claimant’s claims pursuant to Rule 38 on the basis that they have no reasonable prospect of success.

[2]I considered the pleadings, the bundle of documents, the Respondent’s Skeleton Argument dated 2 December 2025, and the Claimant’s written and oral submissions. These are summary reasons only. Full reasons were not requested.

[3]This was not a Full Merits Hearing. I made no findings of primary fact beyond those necessary to determine the Rule 38 application. The Tribunal’s Approach

[4]I reminded myself that strike‑out is a draconian power, particularly in discrimination and whistleblowing cases. However, the Tribunal is entitled to strike out claims which, taken at their highest, disclose no reasonable prospect of success.

[5]I accepted the Respondent’s submission that this was an appropriate case for a realistic and robust assessment of the pleaded claims, given the extent of the claims advanced and the documentary chronology relied upon. Whistleblowing Claims

[6]The Claimant relied on alleged two protected disclosures made in February and one in September 2024. The Respondent submitted that the February complaints were, in substance, workplace complaints and did not disclose information tending to show a relevant failure within section 43B Employment Rights Act 1996 (Skeleton §§3–5).

[7]I accept the Respondent’s submission. Taken at their highest, the communications relied upon did not meet the statutory definition of qualifying disclosures.

[8]In any event, the I accept the Respondent’s submission that the chronology was fatal to the February whistleblowing claims (Skeleton §§3, 8–11). The business reorganisation leading to dismissal was conceived, developed and consulted upon before the alleged disclosures.

[9]The Claimant’s case depended upon an assertion that the reorganisation was a sham designed to remove her because of whistleblowing. I find that assertion speculative and inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents.

[10]The Respondent accepted for the purposes of today’s that the 11 September 2024 grievance could be regarded as a protected disclosure but would have contested the status of the document if this matter had proceeded to trial. However, I find that the claimant showed no connection between the disclosure and the detriments alleged. She attempted to compare her treatment with that of her jobshare colleague, but I find that no comparison should be made because they were not in materially the same circumstances. The claimant has no reasonable prospect of establishing the connection on the documents and submissions presented to me.

[11]The Tribunal further accepted the Respondent’s limitation submissions (Skeleton §§12–14). A number of alleged detriments were pleaded outside the primary limitation period, and no coherent basis for extension was established. Failure to Make Reasonable Adjustments

[12]The Claimant alleged a failure to make reasonable adjustments, relying on an asserted duty to redeploy her. The Respondent submitted that no provision, criterion or practice was identified, and that occupational health evidence did not recommend redeployment as a required adjustment (Skeleton §§18–21).

[13]I agree with the Respondent’s submissions. The matters relied upon were individual management decisions, not the application of a PCP. The reasonable adjustments claim was legally misconceived. Indirect Discrimination

[14]The Respondent submitted that these claims were founded on a misunderstanding of the statutory framework, including the limited scope of associative discrimination, and were in any event out of time (Skeleton §§22–25).

[15]I accept that submission. The claimed facts were not capable of succeeding as a section 19 claim. The Claimant had not pleaded facts capable of bringing the claims within section 19A Equality Act 2010. Part‑Time Workers Regulations

[16]The Respondent submitted that this claim was not properly articulated and disclosed no facts capable of establishing less favourable treatment because of part‑time status (Skeleton §§26–27).

[17]I agreed. The claim had no reasonable prospect of success. Proportionality

[18]I accepted the Respondent’s submission that the claims were out of all proportion to their factual and legal foundation, and that allowing them to proceed would be inconsistent with the overriding objective (Skeleton §§2, 6–7).

Conclusion

[19]Taking the claims at their highest, I conclude that they depended upon speculation, legal misunderstanding, and a fundamental misconception as to chronology.

[20]The claims therefore had no reasonable prospect of success and were struck out pursuant to Rule 38.

[21]The claimant’s claim of ordinary unfair dismissal because of redundancy remains. Approved by: Employment Judge S Shore Dated: 20 March 2026 Note – These reasons were given orally at the hearing under Rule 60(4A(b)(i). The claimant requested that the summary reasons be put in writing. Full written reasons will not be given unless requested by a party by a written request received by the Tribunal within 14 days of the sending of these written summary reasons.