Mr R Bashir v GH Pizzas Ltd and Others: 6013600/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6013600/2024

Between

Mr R BashirClaimant

GH Pizzas Ltd and OthersRespondent

Before

Employment Judge B Beyzade

In person for claimant

Date 15 December 2025

REASONS

[1]These written reasons are provided pursuant to Rule 60(4) of The Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024. They relate to the Tribunal’s judgment dismissing the claimant’s application for interim relief under section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and refusing the claimant’s oral application for reconsideration under Rule 70(2) issued to parties on 14 July 2025. The Employment Judge apologises for the delay in providing these written reasons (due to the reasons stated in previous correspondences sent from the Tribunal to parties) and for any inconvenience caused. These reasons address jurisdiction, merits, and the outcome of the claimant’s oral reconsideration application made at the hearing on 31 March 2025 and explain the Tribunal’s determination relating to the Effective Date of Termination (“EDT”).

List of issues

[2]The Tribunal recorded the following issues, agreed by the parties, at the outset of the hearing: “2.1 Should the claimant’s application for interim relief be granted? - 2.1.1 Is it likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates, the Tribunal will find that the reason or principal reason for dismissal is that the claimant made a protected disclosure? (“Likely” meaning “having a pretty good chance” as explained in Taplin v C Shippam Ltd). 2.2 Whether the Tribunal’s decision dated 13 January 2025 should be reconsidered. 2.3 Whether or not there was a claim presented for unfair dismissal pursuant to section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 2.4 Whether or not there was a claim presented for interim relief pursuant to the Employment Rights Act 1996. 2.5 If not, should the claimant’s email dated 19 November 2024 be treated as an application to amend their claim to include a complaint of unfair dismissal pursuant to section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and an application for interim relief? 2.6 Was any complaint of unfair dismissal presented to the Tribunal within the statutory time limit set out in section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996? 2.7 It is not disputed that the claimant was dismissed and that he was an employee of the first respondent at all material times. The claimant says he was dismissed on 12 November 2024 as he received the letter of dismissal after 5pm on 11 November 2024 and the respondent says the claimant was dismissed on 11 November 2024, being the date on which the letter of dismissal was sent by email. 2.8 Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide: -2.8.1 What did the claimant disclose? -

2.8.2 Did he disclose information? -

2.8.3 Did he believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest? -

2.8.4 Was that belief reasonable? -

2.8.5 Did he believe it tended to show that: - a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject; and/or - the health or safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered? -

2.8.6 Was that belief reasonable? Further or alternatively: 2.9 If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, was it made: -

2.9.1 To the Home Office and the Fire Safety Audit Officer in accordance with section 43F of the Employment Rights Act 1996? -

2.9.2 Did the relevant disclosure fall within any description of matters in respect of which that person is so prescribed? -

2.9.3 Was the information disclosed, and any allegation contained in it, substantially true?” Summary of submissions

[3]The claimant represented himself during the hearing.

[4]The first and second respondents were represented by Ms Sarah-Jane Wood, Solicitor at the hearing.

[5]I heard oral submissions from the claimant and the respondents’ representative, took account of written representations made in advance of the hearing, and considered any documents to which I was referred, including but not limited to documents within a Hearing Bundle comprising 153 pages prepared by the respondent’s representative.

[6]The third respondent were not present or represented at the hearing.

[7]The claimant submitted that his dismissal was retaliatory and linked to eight disclosures concerning immigration compliance, visa fee deductions, exploitation of migrant workers, fire safety breaches, wage deductions, and discriminatory practices. He argued these were qualifying disclosures under section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) and made in the public interest. He relied on passages from his ET1 such as: “The employer offered employees visas and subsequently charged them fees, which were unlawfully deducted from gross pay rather than net pay. This was done to evade taxes and avoid paying higher National Insurance contributions.” [ET1, page 101]

[8]The respondent’s representative submitted that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction because the second application was presented one day late. They relied on section 128 of the ERA 1996 and the case of Astle v Travis Perkins

UKEAT/0097/19

. They argued that the first application was invalid because the claimant was still employed. On merits, they submitted that the claimant’s case did not meet the high threshold for interim relief, citing Taplin v C Shippam Ltd and Dandpat v University of Bath. They argued that the ET1 contained sweeping allegations without specificity and relied on Cavendish Munro v Geduld and Kilraine v LB Wandsworth to argue that the claimant’s statements were allegations, not disclosures of information. They maintained that dismissal was for gross misconduct, supported by documentary evidence [Bundle pages 145–153], and not for whistleblowing. Jurisdiction analysis

[9]The Tribunal considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s application for interim relief. The letter dated 13 January 2025 stating the application was “in time” was a case management decision, not a judicial determination of jurisdiction. To the extent it is argued that that decision was determinative of the claimant’s Effective Date of Termination (“EDT”), it is necessary in the interests of justice to set aside that decision because jurisdiction was not determined and there has been a material change of circumstances, namely the full evidence now available regarding the Effective Date of Termination and the statutory time limit, and the respondents’ representative had not previously had any opportunity to address the Tribunal relating to the same.

[10]The first application for interim relief made by the claimant in October 2024 was not properly before the Tribunal because the claimant was still employed and his ET1 confirmed ongoing employment. Section 128 of the ERA 1996 requires dismissal and presentation of an unfair dismissal claim in order to apply for interim relief. The claimant did not have title to present the application, and the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider it.

[11]The second application dated 19 November 2024 was presented by email rather than on the prescribed form (namely an ET1 Form). Whilst it could be averred that this was irregular, as the respondent did not object and engaged with the application, the Tribunal does not consider this defect fatal.

[12]The disciplinary outcome letter dated 11 November 2024 states: “As a consequence, it is my decision to summarily dismiss you i.e., without notice or notice pay, from today’s date.” [Bundle page 153]

[13]This letter was sent by email correspondence to the claimant’s personal email address at 17:11 on 11 November 2024. Email is an instantaneous form of communication. Once sent, it is delivered to the recipient’s inbox within seconds and is deemed communicated when reasonably accessible. There is no evidence of delay or lack of access.

[14]On the balance of probabilities, the claimant received and could read the email in question on 11 November 2024. Applying Gisda Cyf v Barratt

[2010] UKSC 41

, the Effective Date of Termination occurs when dismissal is communicated, not when internally decided. The EDT was therefore on 11 November 2024.

[15]Section 128(2) of the ERA 1996 provides: “An application under this section must be made before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the effective date of termination.”

[16]The seven-day period expired on 18 November 2024. The claimant’s second application, dated 19 November 2024, was one day late.

[17]Section 128 confers no discretion to extend time. In Astle v Travis Perkins

UKEAT/0097/19

, the Employment Appeal Tribunal confirmed the seven-day limit is strict and cannot be waived. The Tribunal cannot override this statutory bar, regardless of fairness or health considerations.

[18]In conclusion, the claimant does not have title to present the interim relief applications and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the applications or to grant interim relief. Accordingly, the claimant’s applications for interim relief stand dismissed.

[19]In the alternative, and in the event the Tribunal were wrong to conclude that it had no jurisdiction, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the claimant’s second interim relief application on its merits, applying the statutory test under section 129 ERA 1996 (whether it appeared likely that the claim would succeed at a Final Hearing). The Law – Interim Relief

[20]Section 128 of the ERA 1996 permits interim relief where an employee alleges dismissal for an automatically unfair reason, including whistleblowing under section 103A of the ERA. Section 129 requires the Tribunal to grant relief if “it appears to the tribunal that it is likely” the claim will succeed. In Taplin v C Shippam Ltd

[1978] IRLR 450

, Slynn J explained: “Likely means a pretty good chance of success, not merely arguable.”

[21]Underhill P in Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 562

reaffirmed: “The test requires a significantly higher degree of likelihood than just more likely than not.”

[22]Interim relief is a draconian remedy; as Underhill P observed in Dandpat v University of Bath: “If relief is granted the respondent is irretrievably prejudiced because he is obliged to treat the contract as continuing and pay the claimant until the conclusion of proceedings: that is not a consequence that should be imposed lightly.” Alternative findings under section 103A of the ERA

[23]Although the Tribunal decided the claimant did not have title to present the application and the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear the application, the Tribunal considered the merits of the application in the alternative.

Legal Framework

[24]Section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) provides that dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason or principal reason for dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure. For a disclosure to be protected, the following four elements must be satisfied:24.1 Disclosure of Information: The worker must disclose factual information rather than make a bare allegation or express an opinion. (Cavendish Munro v Geduld; Kilraine v LB Wandsworth).

24.2 Reasonable Belief of Relevant Failure and Public Interest: The worker must have a reasonable belief that the information disclosed tends to show one of the specified failures under section 43B ERA (e.g., breach of a legal obligation, health and safety risk) and that the disclosure was made in the public interest. (Chesterton Global v Nurmohamed).

24.3 Protected Status under ERA 1996: The disclosure must be made to an appropriate person or body as set out in sections 43C–43H ERA (e.g., employer, prescribed person) and in accordance with the statutory framework.

24.4 Causation: The claimant must show that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was the making of the protected disclosure. (Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd; Fecitt v NHS Manchester). Assessment of protected disclosures relied on by the claimant

[25]For the purposes of assessing whether each alleged disclosure qualifies under section 43B ERA 1996, the Tribunal applied the following four tests:(i) whether the claimant disclosed information rather than made a bare allegation (“Step 1”);

(ii) whether the claimant believed the disclosure tended to show a relevant failure (“Step 2”);

(iii) whether that belief was objectively reasonable (“Step 3”); and

(iv) whether the disclosure was made in the public interest (“Step 4”).

[26]The Tribunal has applied these four tests (Steps 1–4) to each of the eight alleged disclosures set out below. Disclosure 1: Immigration Compliance (September 2022)

[27]The claimant stated he told Waseem Shahzad that Sameer Shahzad lacked rightto-work documents and raised concerns about illegal workers [ET1, page 97]. This was an allegation rather than a conveyance of specific facts (Step 1). Applying Cavendish Munro and Kilraine, the statement lacked sufficient factual detail to amount to information. While the claimant may have subjectively believed this showed a breach of immigration law, the belief was not objectively reasonable and no factual basis or corroboration was provided.

[28]The claimant may have subjectively believed this showed a breach of immigration law (Step 2), however, the Tribunal finds that the belief was not objectively reasonable (Step 3).

[29]Furthermore, immigration compliance is a public interest matter, but the disclosure was framed as a grievance rather than systemic wrongdoing (Step 4).

[30]Therefore, Step 1 (information) is not satisfied because the statement lacked sufficient factual detail. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed this showed a breach of immigration law. Step 3 (objective reasonableness) fails because the belief was not objectively reasonable. Step 4 (public interest) is satisfied in principle as immigration compliance is a public interest matter, but the disclosure was framed as a personal grievance rather than systemic wrongdoing. Disclosure 2: Visa Fee Deductions and Tax Fraud (March/April 2024)

[31]The claimant alleges he told Naveed Syed that visa fees were unlawfully deducted from gross pay to evade tax [ET1, page 101]. The respondent denies this and states in their Response that no evidence of the same exists [ET3, page 94].

[32]On analysis, the claimant’s statement conveys some factual content (Step 1), but it lacks corroboration. Subjectively, the claimant believed this showed tax fraud (Step 2). However, without supporting evidence (by way of documents or otherwise) or contemporaneous records, the Tribunal is not satisfied that this belief was objectively reasonable (Step 3).

[33]Applying Chesterton Global v Nurmohamed, the Tribunal considered whether the disclosure was made in the public interest. Tax fraud is a public interest matter (Step 4), but the disclosure was not substantiated and appears grievance-driven rather than a genuine attempt to report wrongdoing.

[34]Therefore, Step 1 (information) is partially satisfied because the statement contained some factual content, albeit limited. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed this showed tax fraud. Step 3 (objective absence of corroboration. Step 4 (public interest) is satisfied in principle because tax fraud is a public interest matter, but the disclosure lacked substance and was grievance-driven. Disclosure 3: Exploitation of Migrant Workers (January–February 2024)

[35]The claimant says he contested practices in pre-meetings with Waseem Shahzad, alleging exploitation [ET1, page 102]. The respondent denies any disclosure and argues these were grievances [ET3, page 94].

[36]On analysis, the claimant’s statements were general and lacked factual detail such as dates, names, or supporting documents. Applying Cavendish Munro and Kilraine, these were allegations rather than disclosures of information (Step 1). The claimant may have subjectively believed these matters showed exploitation, satisfying the subjective limb (Step 2), but that belief was not objectively reasonable because the statements were unsupported and arose in the context of personal grievances rather than reporting wrongdoing (Step 3).

[37]Exploitation of migrant workers is a public interest matter (Step 4), but the disclosure was framed as a personal concern rather than systemic failure.

[38]Therefore, Step 1 (information) is not satisfied because the statements lacked sufficient factual detail. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed these matters showed exploitation. Step 3 (objective reasonableness) fails because the belief was not objectively reasonable given the absence of corroboration and grievance context. Step 4 (public interest) is satisfied in principle because exploitation of migrant workers is a public interest matter, but the disclosure was framed as a personal grievance rather than systemic wrongdoing. Disclosure 4: Yearly Review Meeting Concerns (January 2024)

[39]The claimant states that he raised concerns about exploitation during his yearly review [ET1, page 103]. The respondent denies any disclosure was made.

[40]On analysis, the claimant says he raised concerns about exploitation during his yearly review meeting. No contemporaneous notes or corroborating evidence were produced. The statements lacked specificity and were grievance-driven. Applying Kilraine, these were allegations rather than factual disclosures (Step 1). The claimant may have believed these concerns showed unlawful conduct (Step 2), but that belief was not objectively reasonable given the absence of detail or corroboration (Step 3).

[41]Exploitation of workers is a public interest matter (Step 4), but the disclosure was primarily about the claimant’s own treatment rather than systemic wrongdoing.

[42]Therefore, Step 1 (information) is not satisfied because the statements lacked sufficient factual detail. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed these concerns showed unlawful conduct. Step 3 (objective absence of corroboration and grievance context. Step 4 (public interest) is satisfied in principle because exploitation is a public interest matter, but the disclosure was framed as a personal grievance rather than systemic wrongdoing. Disclosure 5: Fire Safety Risk Assessment (April 2024)

[43]The claimant says he forwarded legislation on fire safety to management and spoke to Naveed Syed [ET1, page 104]. The respondent disputes that any email was sent.

[44]On analysis, referring to legislation is factual and therefore satisfies Step 1. The claimant may have believed this showed a relevant failure (Step 2), and fire safety is clearly a public interest matter (Step 4). However, no evidence of the email or communication was produced, and without evidence or specificity of the relevant communication, the Tribunal finds that the claimant’s belief was not objectively reasonable (Step 3).

[45]Therefore, Step 1 (information) is satisfied because the claimant referred to legislation. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed this showed a relevant failure. Step 3 (objective reasonableness) fails because the belief was not objectively reasonable given the absence of corroboration. Applying Chesterton, the Tribunal considered whether the disclosure was made in the public interest. Step 4 (public interest) is satisfied in principle because fire safety is a public interest matter. Disclosure 6: Fire Safety Compliance Concerns (March 2024)

[46]The claimant states that he raised concerns with Karen, Company Secretary, and reported via the company portal [ET1, page 105]. The respondent denies receipt of the same.

[47]On analysis, the claimant says he raised concerns with Karen, Company Secretary, and reported via the company portal. Fire safety is clearly a public interest matter (Step 4), and the claimant may have believed the disclosure showed a relevant failure (Step 2). However, no evidence of the portal report or any contemporaneous record was provided. Without corroboration, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the claimant disclosed factual information (Step 1) or that his belief was objectively reasonable (Step 3).

[48]Therefore, Step 1 (information) fails because no evidence of the disclosure was produced and the Tribunal was not referred to any such document by the claimant during the hearing. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed this showed a relevant failure. Step 3 (objective reasonableness) fails because the belief was not objectively reasonable given the absence of corroboration. Applying Chesterton, the Tribunal considered whether the disclosure was made in the public interest. Step 4 (public interest) is satisfied in principle because fire safety is a public interest matter. Disclosure 7: Wage Deductions (April/May 2024)

[49]The claimant refers to unlawful deductions and emails sent on 15 April 2024 [ET1, page 106]. The respondent denies that any email was received.

[50]On analysis, the claimant’s statement refers to unlawful deductions and emails, contains some factual content and therefore partially satisfies Step 1. The claimant may have believed this showed a breach of legal obligation (Step 2). However, no evidence of the email or supporting documentation was produced, and without corroboration, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the claimant’s belief was objectively reasonable (Step 3).

[51]Applying Chesterton, the Tribunal considered whether the disclosure was made in the public interest. Wage deductions primarily affect individual employees and do not raise a matter of wider public interest. Applying Chesterton, the public interest test is not satisfied (Step 4).

[52]Therefore, Step 1 (information) is partially satisfied because the statement contained some factual content. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed this showed a breach of legal obligation. Step 3 (objective absence of corroboration. Step 4 (public interest) fails because wage deductions primarily affect individual employees and do not raise a matter of wider public interest. Disclosure 8: Discriminatory Practices (March/May 2024)

[53]The claimant’s ET1 refers to grievances alleging bias against minority employees and discriminatory practices [ET1, page 107]. He says these concerns were raised in grievance letters dated 13 March 2024 and 24 May 2024. The respondent argues these were discrimination complaints under the Equality Act 2010, not whistleblowing disclosures under section 43B of the ERA 1996.

[54]On analysis, the claimant’s statements were framed as grievances alleging unfair treatment and bias. They did not convey factual information tending to show a breach of a legal obligation beyond the scope of discrimination law. Applying Cavendish Munro and Kilraine, these were allegations, rather than disclosures of information (Step 1). The claimant may have believed these concerns showed unlawful discrimination (Step 2), but that belief was not objectively reasonable because the context was grievance handling, not reporting wrongdoing (Step 3).

[55]Applying Chesterton, the Tribunal considered whether the disclosure was made in the public interest. While discrimination is unlawful under the Equality Act 2010, the disclosure was primarily about the claimant’s own treatment and workplace bias, not a systemic failure affecting the wider public. Applying Chesterton, the public interest test is not satisfied (Step 4).

[56]Therefore, Step 1 (information) fails because the statements were allegations rather than factual disclosures. Step 2 (subjective belief) is satisfied as the claimant believed these concerns showed unlawful discrimination. Step 3 (objective reasonableness) fails because the belief was not objectively reasonable given the grievance context. Step 4 (public interest) fails because the disclosure was primarily about personal treatment and did not raise a matter of wider public interest. Conclusion – s 43B of the ERA 1996

[57]Having applied the four tests (Steps 1–4) referred to at paragraph 25 above to each of the eight alleged disclosures, the Tribunal concludes that none satisfy all four tests and, in all the circumstances and on the information before the Tribunal, it does not conclude that it is likely that a Tribunal at a Final Hearing will determine that the claimant made any qualifying disclosures within the meaning of section 43B ERA 1996. Further or Alternatively – Prescribed Persons (Section 43F ERA)

[58]The claimant suggested that some disclosures may have been made externally to regulators, including the Home Office and the Fire Safety Audit Officer. These allegations require consideration under section 43F ERA 1996, which governs disclosures to prescribed persons.

[59]The claimant did not produce evidence that any disclosure was made to the Home Office or the Fire Safety Audit Officer. Under section 43F ERA 1996, for a disclosure to a prescribed person to qualify as protected, the following requirements must be satisfied:(i) The disclosure must be made to a person prescribed by an order made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of s43F of the ERA 1996.

(ii) The worker must reasonably believe that the relevant failure falls within the remit of that prescribed person.

(iii) The worker must reasonably believe that the information disclosed, and any allegation contained in it, is substantially true.

[60]Even if such disclosures were made, the Tribunal would need to consider whether these statutory conditions were met. No documents or sufficient information were provided to enable the Tribunal to determine these matters affirmatively.

[61]Having considered the statutory requirements under section 43F ERA 1996 and the information before the Tribunal, the Tribunal concludes that no or insufficient evidence was provided to establish that any disclosure was made to a prescribed person or that the relevant statutory conditions were met. In all the circumstances, the Tribunal does not conclude that it is likely that a Tribunal at a Final Hearing will determine that the claimant made any qualifying disclosures to a prescribed person within the meaning of section 43F ERA 1996. Causation

[62]Even if qualifying disclosures were established (notwithstanding the above), the claimant must show that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was the making of those disclosures. In Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd

[2008] ICR 799

, the Court of Appeal held that where an employee asserts an inadmissible reason for dismissal, he must produce some evidence supporting that case. In Fecitt v NHS Manchester

[2012] ICR 372

, the Court confirmed that the protected disclosure must have a “material influence” on the dismissal decision.

[63]The claimant did not refer to any evidence (whether by way of documents or information, or otherwise) linking the alleged disclosures to his dismissal. His ET1 and oral submissions did not identify any contemporaneous document or witness evidence supporting his position relating to causation. By contrast, the respondents’ representative produced the dismissal letter dated 11 November 2024 [Bundle pages 145–153], which cites gross misconduct for repeated lateness, failure to follow absence protocol, and abusive communications. The letter provides a reason for dismissal that is wholly unrelated to any whistleblowing, it is detailed, and it is apparently credible. Applying Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd and Fecitt v NHS Manchester, on the basis of the information before the Tribunal, the Tribunal finds that there is no evidence, or alternatively, insufficient evidence, that any purported protected disclosures materially influenced the decision to dismiss the claimant. Applying Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd and Fecitt v NHS Manchester, the Tribunal at a Final Hearing would need to be satisfied that the any alleged protected disclosures were the reason or principal reason for dismissal.

[64]Having considered parties’ submissions, the documents and information before the Tribunal, in all the circumstances and on the information before the Tribunal, the Tribunal does not conclude that it is likely that a Tribunal at a Final Hearing will determine that any alleged protected disclosures were the reason or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal.

[65]Accordingly, the Tribunal does not conclude that it is likely that a Tribunal at a Final Hearing will determine that any alleged protected disclosures materially influenced or were the reason or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal.

[66]In light of the above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that it is likely that the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal contrary to section 103A of the ERA 1996 will succeed at a Final Hearing. ICO Complaint and GDPR principles

[67]The claimant alleged breaches of GDPR and referred to an ICO decision dated 1 November 2024. While serious, these matters do not affect the statutory test for interim relief. Alternative conclusion – merits

[68]Accordingly, in the alternative, the claimant’s application for interim relief would have failed on the merits because the statutory test under section 129 of the ERA 1996 is not satisfied. Reconsideration application

[69]The claimant applied orally under Rules 68-70 of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (“the ET Rules”) at the hearing on 31 March 2025, citing health issues and fairness. The claimant argued that the Tribunal should revisit its decision on jurisdiction in light of his personal circumstances and the principles set out in Gisda Cyf v Barratt

[2010] UKSC 41

. The claimant submitted that he had been under significant stress and ill health at the time of dismissal and that fairness required the Tribunal to take these factors into account. He also relied on the Tribunal’s letter dated 13 January 2025, which stated that the application was “in time,” arguing that this created a legitimate expectation.

[70]Rule 68 of the ET Rules provides that a Tribunal may reconsider a judgment if it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so and Rule 70(2) of the ET Rules provides “If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal.”

[71]The claimant contended that the previous Employment Judge had effectively determined the application was valid and that this should not now be overturned.

[72]The Tribunal considered these submissions carefully. While Gisda Cyf establishes that the EDT occurs when dismissal is communicated, it does not confer any discretion to extend statutory time limits.

[73]Section 128 of the ERA 1996 imposes an absolute seven-day period for presenting an interim relief application. As confirmed in Astle v Travis Perkins

UKEAT/0097/19

, this time limit is strict and cannot be waived, even where fairness considerations arise. The Tribunal cannot override this statutory bar, regardless of health issues or otherwise.

[74]The claimant’s argument based on fairness and reliance on earlier correspondence does not alter the legal position. The previous Employment Judge did not determine jurisdiction; the listing decision was procedural only. There is no error of law or fact in this Tribunal’s finding that the application was out of time and that jurisdiction is lacking.

[75]Applying Rule 70(2) of the ET Rules, the Tribunal concludes that there is no reasonable prospect of the original judgment being varied or revoked. The interests of justice do not require reconsideration where the statutory bar is absolute. In any event for the reasons set out above the application would have failed on its merits. The claimant’s oral reconsideration application made at the hearing on 31 March 2025 is therefore refused.

Conclusion

[76]The claimant’s first application for interim relief, made in October 2024, was not properly before the Tribunal because the claimant was still employed and had no title to present it. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider that application. The second application for interim relief, made on 19 November 2024, is dismissed for want of title to present the application and jurisdiction to consider the application as it was presented out of time.

[77]For the avoidance of doubt, the judgment refers to “the application” in the singular because only the second application was substantively addressed during the hearing. It was considered on its merits solely in the alternative, and only in the event the Tribunal were wrong on jurisdiction.

[78]In the alternative, and applying section 129 ERA 1996, the Tribunal concludes that the claimant’s second application would not have met the statutory test for interim relief.

[79]The claimant’s oral reconsideration application made at the hearing on 31 March 2025 is refused.

[80]Case Management Orders have been made under separate cover. Approved By:

Introduction

[1]This case called before the Tribunal on 15 December 2025, for an in chambers Reconsideration Hearing, with the Employment Judge sitting alone in chambers (in private). This was appropriate having taken account of the matters contained in the Senior President’s Practice Direction on Panel Composition (“the Practice Direction”) along with the Presidential Guidance on Panel Composition which came into effect on 29 October 2024. It is noted in this regard that the Practice Direction provides, “6. In respect of any other matter an Employment Tribunal is to consist of a judge. This includes consideration of whether a party’s application for reconsideration discloses a reasonable prospect of a judgment being varied or revoked.” The Presidential Guidance indicates at paragraph 16 that post-hearing matters in respect of a reconsideration application (including when deciding whether or not such an application discloses a reasonable prospect of a judgment being varied or revoked under Rule 72 of the ET Rules 2013) will always be decided by an Employment Judge sitting alone. In addition, I am satisfied that this decision in respect of panel composition furthers the interests of justice and accords with the Tribunal’s overriding objective.

[2]The claimant made an application dated 28 July 2025 for reconsideration. At the date the application was made, the rules for reconsideration were set out at Rules 68 to 70 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (“the ET Rules 2024”).

[3]The Employment Judge considered the claimant’s application under Rule 70 of the ET Rules 2024 (the legal test under Rule 70(2) of the ET Rules 2024 is in the same terms as Rule 72(1) of Schedule 1 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013). The Employment Judge decided that there is no reasonable prospect of the Original Judgment being varied or revoked because of the reasons set forth below.

[4]The reconsideration application arose out of the Tribunal’s Judgment on 07 July 2025 (issued to parties on 14 July 2025) [“the Original Judgment”] that: 1.2 The claimant’s application for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Judgment set out at paragraph 1.1 above made orally at the hearing on 31 March 2025 pursuant to Rules 68-70 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 is refused pursuant to Rule 70(2) of the same on grounds that the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked.” (“the Original Judgment”)

[5]Parties were sent updates as appropriate and an initial apology was sent to the parties on 16 September 2025 acknowledging the delay and setting out the reasons for the same. The Employment Judge apologises for the delay in providing this Reconsideration Judgment and Reasons.

[6]Shortly after the claimant’s reconsideration application was referred to the Employment Judge and following the Employment Judge’s directions, the Clerk to the Tribunal, sent correspondence to the parties dated 16 September 2025 advising that the claimant’s application had been referred to the Employment Judge for consideration and that directions would be issued in due course.

[7]The chambers hearing assigned was the earliest convenient date for the Tribunal to consider the claimant’s application and complete the decision, on account of other commitments, including annual leave, the date of receipt of the claimant’s application, and other judicial and personal commitments. The Tribunal’s Original Judgment

[8]On 24 and 31 March 2025, following an initial 1-day Preliminary Hearing in public (and a continuation hearing thereafter) that took place as an in person hearing at the London East Employment Tribunal and having heard and considered documents, information and detailed submissions from parties, the Tribunal, dismissed the claimant’s interim relief application in its entirety (as detailed below), and it did so for the reasons given at the time in the Tribunal’s written Reasons approved on 15 December 2025 that were yet to be issued to parties at the time of preparing these reasons.

[9]The issues that the Tribunal were required to investigate and determine during the Preliminary Hearing in Public, were set out at paragraph 2 of the Reasons provided relating to the Original Judgment.

[10]For present purposes, it will suffice to note here the specific terms of the Tribunal’s Judgment only, issued in writing on 14 July 2025 (“the Original Judgment”), as follows: 1.2 The claimant’s application for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Judgment set out at paragraph 1.1 above made orally at the hearing on 31 March 2025 pursuant to Rules 68-70 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 is refused pursuant to Rule 70(2) of the same on grounds that the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked.” (“the Original Judgment”) Claimant’s reconsideration application

[11]On 28 July 2025, by way of an email sent that day to the Tribunal, the claimant, applied to the Tribunal, for reconsideration of the Original Judgment that was given to parties orally at the conclusion of the hearing on 31 March 2025 (the Judgment was issued to parties in writing on 14 July 2025). The claimant’s application was copied to the respondents’ representative.

[12]The claimant’s reconsideration application states as follows, in summary: that the Tribunal erred in determining the effective date of termination (“EDT”), asserting it was 12 November 2024 rather than 11 November 2024. He argues that the Tribunal overlooked prior judicial findings and case law including GISDA Cyf v Barratt. The claimant also submits that strict adherence to the statutory time limit caused procedural unfairness given his health-related delay of 81 minutes, supported by medical evidence. Further, he alleges that his dismissal was predetermined, citing audio recordings and internal discussions, and that the process was tainted by hostility and bias.

[13]He contends that the respondents failed to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010 and that his dismissal amounted to disability discrimination. The claimant also asserts that his dismissal was retaliatory following protected disclosures to internal management and external regulators concerning fire safety compliance. He refers to disclosures made to the London Fire Brigade and alleges that enforcement action followed. Additional grounds include breaches of the ACAS Code of Practice, GDPR violations, and improper handling of grievance and DSAR requests.

[14]The claimant seeks reconsideration of the interim relief refusal and requests a fresh judgment acknowledging retaliatory dismissal and protected disclosures. He maintains that the interests of justice require reconsideration and that the original decision was legally flawed and procedurally unfair.

[15]The above paragraphs provide a summary of the claimant’s grounds for reconsideration. They are not intended to set out the application in full detail. For the avoidance of doubt, I have considered the entirety of the claimant’s written application, which runs to 146 pages, together with all supporting material and the documents, and information before me, the Original Judgment and written reasons, and my notes of the representations made at the interim relief hearing. Issues for determination by this Tribunal

[16]The only live issue for determination by the Tribunal at this Reconsideration Hearing was the claimant’s application for reconsideration of the Original Judgment dated 07 July 2025 and issued on 14 July 2025, as per the claimant’s application of 28 July 2025.

[17]Accordingly, the case file was referred to the Employment Judge thereafter for further directions. The Employment Judge was provided with copies of all correspondences received from parties since 31 March 2025 (in addition to correspondences prior to 31 March 2025 which were accessible within the Tribunal file that were before the Tribunal at the Preliminary Hearing and had been forwarded to the Employment Judge thereafter).

[18]The Employment Judge also reviewed all correspondences on the Tribunal file between the parties and the Tribunal up to and including today’s date, 15 December 2025. Relevant law: reconsideration

[19]The ET Rules 2024 in relation to the reconsideration of judgments are at Rules 68 – 70. Those provisions are as follows: “Principles 68.—(1) The Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. (2) A judgment under reconsideration may be confirmed, varied or revoked. (3) If the judgment under reconsideration is revoked the Tribunal may take the decision again. In doing so, the Tribunal is not required to come to the same conclusion. Application for reconsideration 69. Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration must be made in writing setting out why reconsideration is necessary and must be sent to the Tribunal within 14 days of the later of— (a)the date on which the written record of the judgment sought to be reconsidered was sent to the parties, or (b)the date that the written reasons were sent, if these were sent separately. Process for reconsideration 70.—(1) The Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69 (application for reconsideration). (2) If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. (3) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the Tribunal must send a notice to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application must be received by the Tribunal, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may also set out the Tribunal’s provisional views on the application. (4) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any written representations provided under paragraph (3), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. (5) If the Tribunal determines the application without a hearing the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations in respect of the application.”

[20]I noted that the ET Rules 2013 set out the Rules of Procedure in Schedule 1, and those in relation to the reconsideration of judgments were at Rules 70 – 73.

[21]When considering such an issue regard must also be had to the Tribunal’s overriding objective in Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024 (previously Rule 2 under the ET Rules 2013). The Tribunal’s “overriding objective” under Rule 3 is to deal with the case fairly and justly. The precise terms of Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024, are as follows: “3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable— (a)ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, (b)dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, (c)avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings, (d)avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and (e)saving expense. (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a)exercises any power under these Rules, or (b)interprets any rule or practice direction. (4) The parties and their representatives must— (a)assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b)co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal."

[22]A reconsideration application requires to be dealt with as per Rules 68 to 70 of the ET Rules 2024. I have set out its full terms above for ease of reference. As this was an application for reconsideration by the claimant, Rule 71, relating to reconsiderations by the Tribunal on its own initiative, does not fall to be considered further. Further, as always, there is the Tribunal’s overriding objective, under Rule 3, to deal with the case fairly and justly.

[23]The previous Employment Tribunal Rules 2004 provided a number of grounds on which a judgment could be reviewed (now called a reconsideration). The only ground in the ET Rules 2024 is that the judgment can be reconsidered where it is necessary “in the interests of justice” to do so. That means justice to all parties.

[24]However, it was confirmed by Her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she then was, now Mrs Justice Eady, the current EAT President) in Outasight VB Limited v Brown [2014]

UKEAT/0253/14/LA

, reported at [2015] ICR D11, that the guidance given by the EAT in respect the previous Rules is still relevant guidance in respect of the ET Rules 2013 (the legal test under Rule 70(2) of the ET Rules 2024 remains unchanged) and, therefore, I have considered the case law arising out of the 2004 Rules.

[25]The approach to be taken to applications for reconsideration was also set out more recently in the case of Liddington v 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust [2016]

UKEAT/0002/16/DA

in the judgment of Mrs Justice Simler, then President of the EAT, and now Lady Justice Simler in the Court of Appeal. The Employment Tribunal is required to: “1. identify the Rules relating to reconsideration and in particular to the provision in the Rules enabling a Judge who considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked refusing the application without a hearing at a preliminary stage; 2. address each ground in turn and consider whether is anything in each of the particular grounds relied on that might lead ET to vary or revoke the decision; and 3. give reasons for concluding that there is nothing in the grounds advanced by the (applicant) that could lead him to vary or revoke his decision.”

[26]In paragraph 34 and 35 of the Judgment, the learned former EAT President, Mrs Justice Simler (now Lady Simler, a Justice of the Supreme Court), stated as follows: “34. In his Reconsideration Judgment the Judge identified the Rules relating to reconsideration and in particular to the provision in the Rules enabling a Judge who considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked refusing the application without a hearing at a preliminary stage. In this case, the Judge addressed each ground in turn. He considered whether was anything in each of the particular grounds relied on that might lead him to vary or revoke his decision. For the reasons he gave, he concluded that there was nothing in the grounds advanced by the Claimant that could lead him to vary or revoke his decision, and accordingly he refused the application at the preliminary stage. As he made clear, a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to relitigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered. Tribunals have a wide discretion whether or not to order reconsideration, and the opportunity for appellate intervention in relation to a refusal to order reconsideration is accordingly limited.

[35]Where, as here, a matter has been fully ventilated and properly argued, and in the absence of any identifiable administrative error or event occurring after the hearing that requires a reconsideration in the interests of justice, any asserted error of law is to be corrected on appeal and not through the back door by way of a reconsideration application. It seems to me that the Judge was entitled to conclude that reconsideration would not result in a variation or revocation of the decision in this case and that the Judge did not make any error of law in refusing reconsideration accordingly.”27. There is a public policy principle that there must be finality in litigation and reviews or reconsiderations are a limited exception to that principle. In the case of Stephenson v Golden Wonder Limited

[1977] IRLR 474

it was made clear that a review (now a reconsideration) is not a method by which a disappointed litigant gets a “second bite of the cherry”. Lord Macdonald, the EAT Judge in Scotland, said that the review provisions were “not intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence can be rehearsed with different emphasis, or further evidence produced which was available before”.

28. The Employment Appeal Tribunal went on to say in the case of Fforde v Black EAT68/80 that this ground does not mean “that in every case where a litigant is unsuccessful is automatically entitled to have the Tribunal review it. Every unsuccessful litigant thinks that the interests of justice require a review. This ground of review only applies in even more exceptional cases where something has gone radically wrong with the procedure involving the denial of natural justice or something of that order.”

29. “In the interests of justice” means the interests of justice to all parties. The EAT provided further guidance in Reading v EMI Leisure Limited EAT262/81 where it was stated “when you boil down what it said on [the claimant’s] behalf it really comes down to this: that she did not do herself justice at the hearing so justice requires that there should be a second hearing so that she may. Now, “justice”, means justice to both parties. It is not said, and, as we see it, cannot be said that any conduct of the case by the employers here caused [the claimant] not to do herself justice. It was, we are afraid, her own inexperience in the situation.”

30. I consider that any guidance on the meaning of “the interests of justice” issued under the 2004 Rules (and the earlier Rules) is still relevant to reconsiderations under the ET Rules 2024. I also remind myself that the phrase “in the interests of justice” means the interests of justice to all parties.

31. Further, I have also reminded myself of the guidance to Tribunals in Newcastle upon Tyne City Council – v- Marsden

[2010] ICR 743

and in particular the words of Mr Justice Underhill when commenting on the introduction of the overriding objective (now found in Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024) and the necessity to review previous decisions and on the subject of a review: “But it is important not to throw the baby out with the bath-water. As Rimer LJ observed in Jurkowska v Hlmad Ltd.

[2008] ICR 841

, at para. 19 of his judgment (p. 849), it is “basic” “… that dealing with cases justly requires that they be dealt with in accordance with recognised principles. Those principles may have to be adapted on a case by case basis to meet what are perceived to be the special or exceptional circumstances of a particular case. But they at least provide the structure on the basis of which a just decision can be made.”

32. Further, I have also considered the further guidance on the ET Rules 2013 from Her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she then was, now Mrs Justice Eady, EAT President) in her judgment in Outasight VB Limited –v- Brown [2014]

UKEAT/0253/14

. I have considered that guidance and in particular have noted what is said about the grounds for a reconsideration under the ET Rules 2013: “In my judgment, the 2013 Rules removed the unnecessary (arguably redundant) specific grounds that had been expressly listed in the earlier Rules. Any consideration of an application under one of the specified grounds would have taken the interests of justice into account. The specified grounds can be seen as having provided examples of circumstances in which the interests of justice might allow a review. The previous listing of such examples in the old Rules - and their absence from new - does not provide any reason for treating the application in this case differently simply because it fell to be considered under the “interests of justice” provision of the 2013 Rules. Even if it did not meet the requirements laid down in Rule 34(3)(d) of the 2004 Rules, the ET could have considered whether it should be allowed as in the interests of justice under Rule 34(3)(e). There is no reason why it should then have adopted a more restrictive approach than it was bound to apply under the 2013 Rules”.

33. In considering matters in the present case, I also reviewed the EAT judgment in Wolfe v North Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust

[2015] ICR 960

; [2015]

UKEAT/0065/14

, and I have noted, from that judgment, at paragraph 75, what the EAT judge, His Honour Judge Serota QC, stated: “There is now a long line of authority to the effect that where a would be Appellant believes there has been a material omission on the part of an Employment Tribunal to deal with a significant issue or to give adequate reasons in respect of significant findings, the proper course is not to lodge a Notice of Appeal, but to go straight back to the Employment Tribunal and ask that the omission be repaired. If reasons are given orally, this should be done as soon as practicable on the completion of delivery of the judgment, and if Written Reasons are later handed down as soon as practicable after the Judgment is received. I would like to make clear that it is the duty of advocates to adopt this course in litigation in the Employment Tribunal.”

34. Further, in considering this reconsideration application, I have also taken into account the helpful judicial guidance provided by Her Honour Judge Eady QC, then EAT Judge, and now EAT President, in her judgment in Scranage v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2018]

UKEAT/0032/17

, at paragraph 22, when considering the relevant legal principles, where she stated as follows: - “The test for reconsideration under the ET Rules is thus straightforwardly whether such reconsideration is in the interests of justice (see Outasight VB Ltd v Brown

UKEAT/0253/14

(21 November 2014, unreported). The "interests of justice" allow for a broad discretion, albeit one that must be exercised judicially, which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.” 35. At Outasight VB Ltd v Brown, at paragraphs 27 to 38, the learned EAT Judge (now Mrs Justice Eady, EAT President) reviewed the legal principles. The EAT President, then Mr Justice Langstaff, in Dundee City Council v Malcolm [2016] UKEATS/0019- 21/15, at paragraph 20, states that the current Rules effected no change of substance to the previous Rules, and that they do not permit a claimant to have a second bite of the cherry, and the broader interests of justice, in particular an interest in the finality of litigation, remained just as important after the change as it had been before

[36]Further, I have also taken into account the Court of Appeal’s judgment, in Ministry of Justice v Burton & Another

[2016] EWCA Civ.714

, also reported at

[2016] ICR 1128

, where Lord Justice Elias, himself a former EAT President, at paragraph 25, refers, without demur, to the principles “recently affirmed by HH Judge Eady in the EAT in Outasight VB Ltd v Brown

UKEAT/0253/14

.”

[37]Specifically, at paragraph 21 in Burton, Lord Justice Elias had stated that: “An employment tribunal has a power to review a decision "where it is necessary in the interests of justice": see Rule 70 of the Tribunal Rules. This was one of the grounds on which a review could be permitted in the earlier incarnation of the rules. However, as Underhill J, as he was, pointed out in Newcastle on Tyne City Council v Marsden

[2010] ICR 743

, para. 17 the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not openended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board

[1975] ICR 395

) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily…” Discussion and decision Disposal Grounds of claimant’s application – is it necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the Original Judgment?

Disposal

[38]The Tribunal has now carefully considered the claimant’s written application for reconsideration, the entirety of the supporting material, and all relevant documents and submissions from the interim relief hearing. The legal test under Rule 68 of the ET Rules 2024 is whether reconsideration is necessary in the interests of justice.

[39]The Tribunal has also considered its own obligations under Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024, being the Tribunal’s overriding objective to deal with the case fairly and justly.

[40]The claimant’s application raises multiple points, some of which repeat arguments already considered at the interim relief hearing, while others introduce new points that could and should have been raised at that hearing. Reconsideration is not an opportunity to re-litigate matters or to advance new arguments that could reasonably had been made at the interim relief hearing.

[41]The Tribunal has reviewed the Original Judgment, the written reasons, and its own notes of the evidence and submissions at the interim relief hearing. It has also considered the claimant’s representations in full, including the 146-page application and annexed materials.

[42]The claimant’s principal grounds relate to the effective date of termination (“EDT”), alleged procedural unfairness due to strict adherence to time limits, health-related delay, and assertions of predetermined dismissal. The claimant’s additional grounds include alleged disability discrimination, failure to make reasonable adjustments, retaliation for whistleblowing, breaches of the ACAS Code, breaches relating to the GDPR, and improper handling of grievance and Data Subject Access Requests.

[43]While these matters have been summarised earlier in this judgment, the Tribunal confirms that it has considered each ground as detailed in the claimant’s Reconsideration Application individually. However, none of those grounds disclose any basis upon which the Tribunal could properly conclude that it is necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the Original Judgment.

[44]The Tribunal notes that the claimant’s arguments regarding EDT and time limits were fully addressed at the interim relief hearing. The claimant’s health-related delay and reliance on medical evidence were also considered at that stage. Attempting to rehearse those points again at this stage does not alter the Tribunal’s earlier conclusions.

[45]The allegations of predetermined dismissal, bias, and hostility are serious but unsupported by the evidence (including documents and information) before the Tribunal at this stage that would justify reconsideration. These matters were either raised and addressed at the interim relief hearing or could have been raised at that hearing. Reconsideration is not intended to provide a second bite at the cherry.

[46]The claimant’s contentions relating to whistleblowing and protected disclosures are noted. The issues relating to the likelihood of the Tribunal finding (at a Final Hearing) that the claimant made the alleged protected disclosures and whether or not any of the same were the reason or principal reason for dismissal were central to the interim relief application and were fully considered by the Tribunal at that hearing. However, the claimant’s points made in his reconsideration application do not demonstrate that the Original Judgment was wrong or that reconsideration is necessary in the interests of justice.

[47]The Tribunal has also considered the claimant’s submissions on alleged breaches of the ACAS Code and GDPR. These points, while serious if proven, do not affect the Tribunal’s conclusion on interim relief and do not justify reopening the Original Judgment.

[48]The overriding objective under Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024 requires the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. That includes avoiding unnecessary delay and ensuring finality in litigation. Reconsideration in this case would not be proportionate or consistent with those principles.

[49]The Tribunal has considered whether any circumstances exist that would justify reconsideration. None have been identified. There is no evidence of a denial of natural justice or any procedural irregularity that would make reconsideration necessary in the interests of justice.

[50]A substantial part of the claimant’s application appears to be a challenge to the weight given to evidence and submissions at the interim relief hearing. That is not a proper basis for reconsideration. By way of guidance, such challenges should be pursued by way of appeal to the EAT, if so advised. In any event, a perversity appeal, which is essentially a complaint about a Tribunal’s conclusions (if so advised) should be pursued at the EAT. In reaching this decision on the claimant’s reconsideration application, consideration has been given to the leading case in terms of the threshold for a perversity appeal, Yeboah v Crofton

[2002] IRLR 634

at paragraph 93, in which Mummery LJ said: “Such an appeal ought only to succeed where an overwhelming case is made out that the Employment Tribunal reached a decision that no reasonable tribunal, on a proper application of the evidence and the law, would have reached. Even in cases where the appeal tribunal has ‘grave doubts’ about the decision of the employment tribunal, it must proceed with ‘great care,’ British Telecommunications PLC v Sheridan

[1990] IRLR 27

at para 34.”

[51]The Tribunal has reminded itself of the guidance in Outasight VB Ltd v Brown and Liddington v 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust. Reconsideration is not intended to provide a rehearing or to allow parties to reargue matters with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously reasonably available.

[52]The Tribunal has also considered the public policy principle of finality in litigation. Allowing reconsideration in circumstances where there is no reasonable prospect of the Original Judgment being varied or revoked would undermine that principle.

[53]The Tribunal has reviewed all documents referred to in the claimant’s application, including those cited in support of allegations of bias and discrimination. None demonstrate that the Original Judgment was wrong or that reconsideration is necessary in the interests of justice.

[54]The Tribunal has also considered whether any error of law is apparent on the face of the Original Judgment. None has been identified. The claimant’s arguments on this point are noted but do not meet the threshold or legal test for reconsideration.

[55]The Tribunal has taken account of all relevant circumstances, including the claimant’s personal situation and the seriousness of the allegations made. However, these factors do not alter the conclusion that reconsideration is not justified in all the circumstances.

[56]For completeness, the Tribunal confirms that it has considered the entirety of the claimant’s application and supporting material, together with the Original Judgment, written reasons, and its own notes of the interim relief hearing. Furthermore, the Tribunal is satisfied that the claimant has had a reasonable opportunity to present his case.

[57]In summary and in reaching this decision, the Tribunal has considered each of the claimant’s grounds in detail. The arguments concerning the EDT and time limits were fully addressed at the interim relief hearing. The claimant’s health-related delay and reliance on medical evidence were also considered at that stage. Reintroducing these points does not alter the Tribunal’s earlier conclusions. The allegations of predetermined dismissal, bias, and hostility are serious but unsupported by the documents and information before the Tribunal at this stage that would justify reconsideration. These matters were either raised and addressed at the interim relief hearing or could have been raised then.

[58]Similarly, the claimant’s contentions relating to whistleblowing and protected disclosures, breaches of the ACAS Code, breaches of GDPR, and alleged failures to make reasonable adjustments do not demonstrate that the Original Judgment was wrong or that reconsideration is necessary in the interests of justice.

[59]A number of these points are new and could (and should) have been raised at the interim relief hearing. Reconsideration is not intended to provide a second opportunity to litigate issues that were or could have been addressed earlier. The Tribunal has also considered whether any error of law or procedural irregularity exists. None has been identified. The claimant’s submissions largely seek to reargue matters already determined or introduce new points that fall outside the scope of reconsideration. The Tribunal has taken account of the overriding objective under Rule 3 of the ET Rules 2024 and concludes that granting reconsideration would not be proportionate or consistent with the need for finality in litigation.

[60]The Tribunal has taken account of its previous findings on jurisdiction and merits as set out in the written reasons for the interim relief judgment dated 07 July 2025 and confirms that those findings remain unaltered.

[61]The Tribunal’s Original Judgment remains unaltered having taken a step back to consider the claimant’s application in light of the full factual matrix, the evidence and the submissions that were before the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not accept the claimant’s position that it is in the interests of justice to reconsider the Original Judgment. In my Judgment, it would not be appropriate or proportionate to revisit or to reconsider the Original Judgment (or to list a reconsideration hearing), in circumstances in which there is no reasonable prospect of the Original Judgment being varied or revoked.

[62]Having carefully considered the points made by the claimant in this reconsideration application, the Tribunal does not consider that it is necessary in the interests of justice to revoke or vary the Original Judgment in respect of any of the grounds of the claimant’s reconsideration application, and the Tribunal adheres to the Original Judgment, for the reasons given then with the Original Judgment, and as now amplified in these Reasons. As such, the Original Judgment stands, and the Tribunal does not set it aside

Conclusion

[63]The claimant’s application dated 28 July 2025 for reconsideration of the Judgment original Judgment being varied or revoked for the reasons set out above, and the Original Judgment therefore stands.

[64]Accordingly, the Tribunal does not vary or revoke the original Judgment in respect of any of the grounds of the claimant’s reconsideration application. The appropriate disposal is to confirm the Original Judgment, having refused the claimant’s reconsideration application for the reasons given above and as amplified in these Reasons. Further procedure

[65]The reconsideration application made by the claimant having been refused, no further consideration shall be given to the same and no further directions shall be issued. As the Original Judgment has not been varied or revoked, the Original Judgment is confirmed.

[66]Although this is advisory and it does not form part of the reconsideration application or the Tribunal’s decision relating to the same, in the interests of assisting the parties, they are reminded of the Tribunal’s overriding objective (Rule 3). The Tribunal has made Case Management Orders with a view to ensuring that the case progresses to a Final Hearing as soon as possible, and further that, if the claimant’s unfair dismissal claim succeeds, the claimant may apply (if so advised) for reinstatement or reengagement. It is necessary in the interests of justice for parties to ensure that they comply with those orders to facilitate the Final Hearing taking place as soon as possible. This advisory note does not affect the Tribunal’s decision on the reconsideration application. Approved by: