Employment Judge PoveyMR MAGIER (instructed by COUNSEL) for claimantMR POLLITT (instructed by COUNSEL) for respondentDate 6 January 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaints of pregnancy & maternity discrimination which occurred before 29 November 2024 were brought out of time and not within such period as was just and equitable. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider and determine them.[2]The complaints of detriment which occurred before 29 November 2024 were brought out of time. It was reasonably practicable for them to have been brought in time. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider and determine them.[3]The complaints of discrimination by reason of pregnancy and maternity were not made out and are dismissed.[4]The complaints of pregnancy and maternity detriment were not made out and are dismissed.[5]The complaint of a failure to provide a written statement of particulars of employment was not made out and is dismissed. - 1 -
REASONS
[1]This is a claim brought by Annabelle Burke de Frias (‘the Claimant’) against her former employer, Colorfoto Limited (‘the Respondent’).
Background
[2]By way of a brief procedural background to the claim:2.1 The Claimant was employed as a Photography Supervisor by the Respondent from 22 September 2023 until her dismissal with effect from 29 November 2024.2.2 Following a period of ACAS Early Conciliation (from 5 December 2024 until 15 January 2025), the Claimant presented her claim to the Tribunal on 11 April 2025, alleging automatic unfair dismissal, discrimination on grounds of pregnancy, detriment due to pregnancy and a breach of the duty to provide a written statement of particulars of employment. In its response, the Respondent resisted the claim in its entirety;2.3 At a case management hearing on 20 June 2025, a list of issues was agreed. Thereafter, the parties agreed an updated list of issues, which was confirmed at the outset of the final hearing as the issues to be determined by the Tribunal (and reproduced at Appendix 1).
The hearing
[3]We heard oral evidence from the Claimant. For the Respondent, we heard oral evidence from Peter Williams (Photography Manager) and Richard Tinkler (Director). All the witnesses we heard from provided and adopted their written statements.[4]The Tribunal was provided with a paginated bundle of documents to which we were referred throughout the hearing (‘the Bundle’) and an agreed, neutral chronology. We also received written and oral submissions from Mr Magier for the Claimant and from Mr Pollitt for the Respondent.[5]We were grateful to both counsel and their instructing solicitors for the assistance they provided and the work they had undoubtedly undertaken both before and during the hearing. We were also grateful to all the witnesses who attended and answered the questions asked of them.[6]We concluded hearing evidence and submissions on 26 November 2025. On 27 November 2025, the Tribunal began but did not conclude - 2 - its deliberations. As such, we reserved our decision and concluded our deliberations on 5 December 2025.[7]In reaching our decisions, we had regard to all the evidence we saw and heard, as well as the submissions we received. The relevant law Dismissal & pregnancy
The relevant law
[8]By reason of sections 94 and 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA 1996’), an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed but only if they have been continuously employed for a period not less than two years, ending on the effective date of termination of their employment.[9]However, section 99 of the ERA 1996 provides as follows (so far as relevant): 99 Leave for family reasons(1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if— (a) the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is of a prescribed kind, or (b) the dismissal takes place in prescribed circumstances.(2) In this section “ prescribed ” means prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.(3) A reason or set of circumstances prescribed under this section must relate to— (a) pregnancy, childbirth or maternity, …[10]Regulation 20 of the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 (‘MPLR 1999’’) states as follows (so far as relevant):[20]Unfair dismissal(1) An employee who is dismissed is entitled under section 99 of the 1996 Act to be regarded for the purposes of Part X of that Act as unfairly dismissed if— (a) the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is of a kind specified in paragraph (3), or (b) the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is that the employee is redundant, and regulation 10 has not been complied with. - 3 -(2) An employee who is dismissed shall also be regarded for the purposes of Part X of the 1996 Act as unfairly dismissed if— (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee was redundant; (b) it is shown that the circumstances constituting the redundancy applied equally to one or more employees in the same undertaking who held positions similar to that held by the employee and who have not been dismissed by the employer, and (c) it is shown that the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was a reason of a kind specified in paragraph (3).(3) The kinds of reason referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) are reasons connected with— (a) the pregnancy of the employee; … 11. Regulation 10 of MPLR 1999 states as follows (so far as relevant): 10 Redundancy: pregnancy and maternity leave (1) This regulation applies where it is not practicable by reason of redundancy for an employer to continue to employ an employee under her existing contract of employment during— (a) the protected period of pregnancy; … (1A) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a) the protected period of pregnancy— (a) begins, subject to paragraph (c), when the employer is informed of the pregnancy which may be after the end of the pregnancy, … (2) Where there is a suitable available vacancy, the employee is entitled to be offered (before the end of her employment under her existing contract) alternative employment with her employer or his successor, or an associated employer, under a new contract of employment which complies with paragraph (3) (and takes effect immediately on the ending of her employment under the previous contract). (3) The new contract of employment must be such that— (a) the work to be done under it is of a kind which is both suitable in relation to the employee and appropriate for her to do in the circumstances, and - 4 - (b) its provisions as to the capacity and place in which she is to be employed, and as to the other terms and conditions of her employment, are not substantially less favourable to her than if she had continued to be employed under the previous contract. 12. Section 139 of the ERA 1996 contains the statutory definition of redundancy. It includes, at section 139(1)(b), the situation where a dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to the requirements of the business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind having ceased or diminished or expected to cease or diminish. 13. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to take account of the economic or commercial reason for redundancy itself. It is not for the Tribunal to assess or comment upon how an employer runs its business. We are only concerned with whether the reason for dismissal was redundancy and whether a genuine redundancy situation (as defined by section 139 ERA 1996) existed (per James W Cook and Co (Wivenhoe) Ltd v Tipper 1990 ICR 716, CA). 14. There is no requirement for a minimum period of continuous employment before an employee gets the protection of section 99 of the ERA 1996 or of Regulations 10 and 20 of MPLR 1999. 15. The Respondent must have known or believed that the Claimant was pregnant to be liable under these provisions (Del Monte Foods Ltd v Mundon [1980] ICR 694; Ramdoolar v Bycity Ltd UKEAT/0236/04). 16. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof is on the Claimant to show that the reason or, if more than one, the principal reason for her dismissal was that she was pregnant. 17. In the alternative, if the reason (or if more than one, the principle reason) for the Claimant’s dismissal was redundancy, it is for her to show, on balance, that she was selected for redundancy because of her pregnancy. Finally, it is for the Claimant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that suitable alternative vacancies existed at the time of her redundancy, she was entitled to be offered one of them and she was not. Pregnancy & maternity detriment 18. Section 47C of the ERA 1996 states as follows (so far as relevant): 47C Leave for family and domestic reasons (1) An employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done for a prescribed reason. - 5 - (2) A prescribed reason is one which is prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State and which relates to— (a) pregnancy, childbirth or maternity, … 19. Regulation 19 of MPLR 1999 states as follows (so far as relevant): 19 Protection from detriment (1) An employee is entitled under section 47C of the [ERA 1996] not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by her employer done for any of the reasons specified in paragraph (2). (2) The reasons referred to in paragraph (1) are that the employee— (a) is pregnant; … 20. The Respondent must have known or believed that the Claimant was pregnant to be liable under these provisions (Del Monte Foods Ltd v Mundon; Ramdoolar v Bycity Ltd, above).[21]The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof is on the Claimant to show that she was subjected to the detriment alleged and the reason for the detriment was her pregnancy.[22]Complaints of pregnancy detriment must be presented to the Tribunal before the end of the period of three months, beginning with the date of the detriment (and where the detriment is part of a series of similar acts of detriment, the last of them) or within such further period as is reasonable, where the Tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonable practicable to present the compliant before the end of the aforesaid three month period (per section 48(3) & 48(4) of the ERA 1996). Pregnancy & maternity discrimination[23]Section 39(2) of the Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA 2010’) states: An employer(a) (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's (B)— (a) as to B's terms of employment;(b) in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service;(c) by dismissing B;(d) by subjecting B to any other detriment. - 6 -[24]Pregnancy is a protected characteristic (per section 4 of the EqA 2010).[25]Section 18 of the EqA 2010 defines pregnancy and maternity discrimination in employment cases, as follows (so far as relevant):(1) This section has effect for the purposes of the application of Part 5 (work) to the protected characteristic of pregnancy and maternity.(2) A person (A) discriminates against a woman if, in or after the protected period in relation to a pregnancy of hers, A treats her unfavourably — (a) because of the pregnancy, … … (6) The protected period, in relation to a woman's pregnancy, begins when the pregnancy begins … …[26]“Unfavourable treatment” means treatment that is adverse, as oppose to beneficial, and is assessed objectively (Williams v Trustees of Swansea University Pension & Assurance Scheme [2018] UKSC 65). As the test is not one of “less favourable treatment”, there is no requirement for a comparator. However the unfavourable treatment must be because of the pregnancy, which requires the reason for the treatment in the Respondent’s mind, consciously or subconsciously, to be the Claimant’s pregnancy, although it need not be the only or the main reason for the treatment. It must however materially influence the conscious or subconscious decision-making.[27]The Respondent has to have knowledge of the pregnancy in order to discriminate in the terms prohibited by section 18 of the EqA 2010 (Hair Division Limited v MacMillan UKEAT S/0033/12).[28]The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof in discrimination complaints has two stages, as follows (per section 136 of the EqA 2010, Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd 2021 ICR 1263, SC; Madarassy v Nomura International plc [2007] IRLR 246 and Igen Ltd (formerly Leeds Careers Guidance) v Wong 2005 ICR 931, CA): 28.1. The Claimant has to prove facts from which the Tribunal could infer that discrimination has taken place; 28.2. If so, the burden ‘shifts’ to the Respondent to prove that the treatment in question was in no way because of a protected characteristic (in this case, the Claimant’s pregnancy).[29]Section 123 of the EqA 2010 requires that proceedings under the EqA 2010 may not be brought after the end of the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates or such - 7 - other period as the Tribunal thinks just and equitable. By reason of section 123(3), conduct done over a period of time is treated as being done at the end of the period, for the purpose of calculating the threemonth time limit for bringing proceedings. Written statement of particulars of employment[30]Section 1(1) of the ERA 1996 states: (1) Where an worker begins employment with an employer, the employer shall give to the worker a written statement of particulars of employment.[31]Section 1(3) & 1(4) sets out what must be included within the written statement of particulars of employment. The statement must be given to the worker not later than the beginning of the employment (per section 1(2)(b) of the ERA 1996).[32]The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof is on the Claimant to show that she was given a written statement of particulars when her employment began.
Findings of fact
[33]We begin with some general observations regarding the evidence we saw and heard, not least because we were addressed on issues of credibility.[34]Given the basis upon which have reached our factual findings below, we did not find that the credibility of any of the witnesses was a material consideration or a factor in making those findings. Rather, it was the documentary evidence, the issues and facts that were not in dispute and the overall assessment of what was being contended for, in the context of, in particular, those events that were not in dispute, which carried most weight in our deliberations.[35]To the extent that we were asked to find that the Claimant was more credible than the Respondent’s witnesses, we have not done so. Rather, we concluded that all witnesses did there best to assist the Tribunal and genuinely believed in the testimony they gave. What was more relevant was whether that testimony was reliable when viewed alongside the other evidence before us.[36]We were also mindful of the vagaries of memory and the stresses of giving evidence and trying to accurately recall events under those circumstances.[37]With those observations in mind, we went on to make findings relevant to the issues which it was agreed we had to determine. - 8 -[38]The Respondent is a school photography business based in Cardiff. The Claimant had worked for the Respondent previously, between 2014 and 2021, as a photographer. The photographers were originally supervised by Mr Williams, in his role as Photography Manager. However, as the business grew and the number of photographers increased, the Respondent decided to create a Photography Supervisor role.[39]The Respondent approached the Claimant and offered her the role, which she accepted. Her employment started on 22 September 2023. At the time of her appointment, the Claimant was responsible for supervising 23 photographers, in addition to undertaking school photography assignments herself.[40]The Photography Supervisor role was a stand-alone post. As stated, it had been a role previously undertaken by Mr Williams and was created because of an increase in the number of photographers employed by the Respondent by 2023.[41]The Claimant said that she met with the Respondent on 22 September 2023 and was given a two-page document to sign as her terms and conditions of employment (at [83] – [84] of the Bundle). In contrast, the Respondent said that the Claimant was provided with the whole document, which started at [71] (and included the pages at [83] – [84).[42]We did not understand it to be in dispute that the two-page document relied upon by the Claimant did not meet the requirements of section 1 of the ERA 1996. Similarly, it was not in issue that the document which began at [71] of the Bundle did comply with the requirements of section 1.[43]The parties signed a declaration which included reference to the Claimant reading, understanding and accepting “the terms and conditions set out in the Written Statement of Employment and the schedules above” (at [84] of the Bundle). In our judgment, it was reasonable to find that that was a reference to both the written statement of employment (at [71] – [82]) and the schedule (at [83] – [84]. In the absence of any of other evidence on the point, we found that it was more likely than not, by reason of the Claimant signing the aforesaid declaration, that she received the written statement of employment as well as the schedule when she started her employment on 22 September 2023.[44]As the Claimant was provided with the whole document, it follows that she was provided with a written statement of her particulars of employment when that employment began.[45]It was not in dispute that the nature of the Respondent’s business was seasonal, in that there was an intense period of activity from September - 9 - to November (when most of the school shoots were undertaken), followed by quieter periods until the following September. The Respondent had a forward order book so was aware of orders and bookings for the months ahead.[46]As such, the Respondent was busy from September to November 2023 and then bookings dropped off into 2024.[47]The duties of Photography Supervisor were defined as follows (per the Claimant’s written statement of employment at [83] of the Bundle, emphasis retained): Job Title & Duties: Photography Supervisor. Duties include visiting schools and taking photographs to exacting company photographic and conduct standards. As a member of the management team, you will assist with training, mentoring, supervising, assessing and directing photographers in the performance of their duties.[48]The Claimant said that during the busy periods, she would only undertake photography assignments and conduct no supervision. The rest of the time, she claimed that her actual role was split 70/30 between photography assignments (70%) and supervision of the other photographers (30%).[49]Both the written statement of employment and the evidence of Mr Tinkler acknowledged that the Claimant was required, on occasions, to undertake school shoots but there was a clear expectation that she would have a role in supervising, supporting and training the photographers, which would include accompanying them to their shoots.[50]In our judgment, it must be right that the Claimant’s role involved a material element of supervision because: 50.1. That was her job title; 50.2. That was her job role per her written statement of employment; and 50.3. She was paid a higher salary (£25,000) than a photographer £21,000).[51]It was also reasonable to conclude that if the Respondent had wanted to employ the Claimant predominantly as a photographer, it would have done so, with the appropriate job title, job role and remuneration.[52]For those reasons, we found that the main element of the Claimant’s role was supervising other photographers, albeit she did also undertake some photographic work when demand dictated. - 10 -[53]The Claimant became pregnant in spring 2024 and notified the Respondent. There was evidence of the Respondent being supportive, understanding and appropriate in its responses to the Claimant and her pregnancy (in particular, in the text message exchange with Mr Williams, at [135] – [136] of the Bundle).[54]Unfortunately, the Claimant miscarried on 5 May 2024. She informed Mr Williams and provided a copy of a fit note, declaring her unfit for work for a period of two weeks (at [137] of the Bundle). It was put to Mr Williams in cross-examination that the Claimant had a week off work, even though she did not want to take time off and wanted to be office-based. That assertion was not in the Claimant’s witness statement and Mr Williams’ recollection was that he was sure that the Claimant had wanted time off and he was concerned for her welfare.[55]What the documentary evidence showed was the Claimant choosing to share her fit note with the Respondent and stating that she would be “back in work and ready to do really soon” (at 137] of the Bundle). She did not say that she wanted to return to an office-based role.[56]In light of the advice of the Claimant’s treating doctor and what the Claimant was saying to the Respondent at the time, in addition to Mr Williams’ recollection, we found that that the Claimant did not want to return to work immediately, as alleged, and it was proper, reasonable and appropriate for the Respondent to allow her to take time off to recover, as advised by her treating doctor.[57]The Claimant became pregnant again in summer 2024 and notified Mr Williams at a meeting with him on 2 September 2024. The Claimant’s case was that no risk assessment was undertaken at that meeting. Mr Williams’ evidence was that a risk assessment was undertaken and he relied upon the completed risk assessment form in evidence (at [88] of the Bundle).[58]In determining what happened at the meeting on 2 September 2024, the Tribunal had regard to the written and oral evidence of the Claimant and Mr Williams, and the documentary evidence before us.[59]The Claimant’s witness statement made no detailed mention of the meeting on 2 September 2024 but did contend that she was not consulted on any risk assessment nor was there any update to the risk assessment (at Paragraphs 7 – 10 of her statement).[60]In her oral evidence, the Claimant said that she had a conversation with Mr Williams on 2 September 2024 about her pregnancy and she recalled him congratulating her. She agreed that she expressed a preference to continuing working out in schools (consistent with Mr Williams recollection in his witness statement, at Paragraph 14). She said that - 11 - she did not ask to be office-based until 11 November 2024, following her bleed (discussed further, below).[61]In his written evidence, Mr Williams provided a lot of detail about what he recalled being discussed and agreed at the meeting on 2 September 2024 (at Paragraphs 7 – 14). He made reference to agreed adjustments to the Claimant’s day-to-day role, including ensuring help was always available to the Claimant with carrying photographic equipment (which was consistent with the Claimant’s concerns about heavy lifting). He said the following about the risk assessment document that was in evidence (per Paragraph 8 of his statement): The pregnancy risk assessment was based on a template we had used for a previous pregnant employee and was created by following an example from the Health and Safety Executive website. I filled in this document at the end of my meeting with [the Claimant] on 2 September 2024 – it was filled in on the same day and based on what we discussed. There were no concerns raised by [the Claimant] during or after this meeting about the adjustments we discussed.[62]In his oral evidence, Mr Williams was questioned about how he had scored the Claimant as low risk for carrying, and for stress and fatigue. Mr Williams confirmed that there was no evidence of a copy of the risk assessment being sent to the Claimant, no evidence of an email to her confirming that it had been placed on her file, no confirmation to her of what was agreed and no minutes of the meeting. He reiterated that he had completed risk assessment with the Claimant in his office on 2 September 2024.[63]Mr Tinkler stated in his written evidence that Mr Williams told him that he had undertaken the risk assessment at that time (at Paragraph 6 and the reference to Mr Williams having “taken steps to put the paperwork in place straight away”). In his oral evidence. Mr Tinkler said that Mr Williams had given him the completed risk assessment form after the meeting on 2 September 2024 and that Mr Tinkler had personally filed it on the Claimant’s record, as his administrator worked part-time and was not working that day.[64]As already alluded to, a copy of the purported risk assessment was in evidence (at [88] of the Bundle). We also had sight of text messages between the Claimant and Mr Williams between 30 August 2024 and 16 December 2024 (at [138] – [140]). On 3 September 2024, Mr Williams texted the Claimant as follows: Hope you’re ok I [sic] you will be with Kelsey tomorrow[65]On 6 September 2024, there was a further text exchange about adding additional photographers to a job the Claimant was undertaking with another photographer. - 12 -[66]The Respondent argued that these text messages were reflective of what had been agreed on 2 September 2024 as part of the risk assessment (namely, that the Claimant would not attend school shoots alone, to ensure someone was available to help her with the equipment). The Claimant did not accept this interpretation, saying that these were always two-person jobs and did not reflect any agreed adjustments to her duties.[67]The Tribunal found itself in a difficult position with both submissions, due to a lack of supporting evidence. There was no evidence of what the usual situation was before 2 September 2024 (as to whether the Claimant usually worked alone or with others) nor was there evidence that these particular assignments were two-person jobs (as oppose to solo assignments where the Respondent was arranging support for the Claimant).[68]In addition, both contentions could be true, since a two-person job would fulfil the requirements to ensure that the Claimant had someone to help her with the equipment and avoid heavy lifting.[69]After considering all the available evidence, we preferred Mr Williams’ recollection of what was discussed, agreed and undertaken at the meeting on 2 September 2024, for the following principle reasons: 69.1. The detail of what Mr Williams recalled being discussed at the meeting on 2 September 2024; 69.2. The Claimant accepted that she discussed her pregnancy with Mr Williams on 2 September 2024; 69.3. Some of what Mr Williams recalled being discussed and agreed was consistent with what the Claimant said her concerns were; and 69.4. Mr Tinkler’s specific evidence that he filed the risk assessment and the reason why (because his administrator was not working that day).[70]To that extent, we found that Mr Williams did undertake a risk assessment of the Claimant, in light of the news that she was pregnant. We found that the risk assessment was undertaken on 2 September 2024. Whilst the document at [88] of the Bundle was not sent to the Claimant, it was a record of that risk assessment, even if completed at the end of or soon after the meeting. The substantive assessment itself took place during the meeting between the Claimant and Mr Williams.[71]Whilst there was some force in the Claimant’s submission that aspects of the assessment appeared to be at odds with what the Claimant was reporting as her concerns (or at the very least, underestimated those - 13 - risks and concerns), that was understandably presented by the Claimant as evidence that the risk assessment did not take place at all. For the reason we have explained, those arguments, in reality, ultimately went to the quality of the risk assessment, not whether the assessment had been carried out. Whatever the Claimant’s criticisms of the quality of the assessment undertaken by the Respondent (and some of those criticisms were not without merit), they did not support a finding, in our judgment, that there was no risk assessment undertaken. For the reasons we have explained, we found on balance that there was a risk assessment undertaken, that it was undertaken on 2 September 2024 and undertaken in the terms described by Mr Williams in his written evidence.[72]The Claimant’s evidence was that she had a bleed on 10 November 2024 and informed Mr Williams the following week (Paragraph 11 of her statement). Mr Williams recalled being informed of the bleed by the Claimant on 1 November 2024 (Paragraph 17 of his statement) but he accepted in his oral evidence that the Claimant was likely to have a better recollection of the precise date.[73]As such, we found that the Claimant experienced the bleed on Sunday, 10 November 2024 and informed Mr Williams of the same some time during the week of 11 November 2024.[74]The Claimant’s evidence was that she also told the Respondent that once the busy period was over, she wanted to be office-based and, in the meantime, have other photographers with her to help with the equipment (Paragraph 12 of her statement).[75]As found above, the risk assessment on 2 September 2024 included providing support for the Claimant with carrying equipment.[76]In addition, it was not in dispute that the Claimant was spending her working days from 2 September 2024 out in schools. Save for 22 November 2024 (considered further, below), the Claimant did not suggest or claim that she attended any of those school assignments alone. She was therefore presumedly always with another photographer. That was in line with her request to be accompanied and, on that analysis, was effective from 2 September 2024. She may have been accompanied because it was a two-person job. She may have been accompanied because she was supervising another photographer. She may have been accompanied because the Respondent specifically arranged for another photographer to be with her. Whatever the reason, the concerns the Claimant had about carrying her equipment were always addressed. .[77]In addition, if that had not been the case, it was reasonable to assume that the Claimant would have raised more than the sole occasion on 22 November 2024 when she worked at a school alone. - 14 -[78]Mr Williams said that he recalled a conversation with the Claimant about her being lab-based (which we took to mean the same as office-based) once the busy autumn period was over but did not say when that conversation took place (Paragraph 16 of his statement). In his oral evidence, Mr Williams accepted that the Claimant had asked to work in the lab. He later appeared to contradict or get confused regarding his evidence about whether the Claimant asked to work in the lab.[79]It did not appear to be in issue that the Claimant asked to become labbased from the end of the busy period (that is, the end of November 2024) and it was not in issue that the request was made following the Claimant’s bleed (as she understandably became more anxious about her pregnancy, though not to the extent of asking to stop all school shoots immediately). As the bleed occurred on 10 November 2024, we concluded that the Claimant’s request to be lab-based from the end of November 2024 was made during the week of 11 November 2024 (at the same time that she informed Mr Williams of the bleed).[80]A subsequent text exchange between the Claimant and Ash Strange (at the time, the Respondent’s booking & scheduling clerk) on 19 November 2024 evidenced that the Claimant’s request was agreed to (at [142] of the Bundle, wherein the Claimant as informed that “the Marion Centre job” was her “last shoot, you’ll be in the lab from then”).[81]It was not in dispute that the Claimant attended her final school shoot on 22 November 2024 on her own and without the support of another photographer. The Claimant alleged that she was asked by Ms Strange to attend the shoot alone and that she agreed reluctantly (Paragraph 15 of her statement). In contrast, Mr Williams’ evidence was that the Claimant was happy to attend the shoot alone as it was a small job, he checked if she was ok to attend alone and she confirmed that she was (at Paragraph 18 of his statement).[82]The text request by Ms Strange and the Claimant’s response were in evidence (at [142] of the Bundle). They repay being set out in full: Ms Strange: Hello, just a heads up that Scott’s been put on another job on Friday. Will you be okay on your own? The Claimant: Morning, it’s the Marion centre one yeah? I know its not a far carry, so should be fine. But them [sic] am I in the lab from then on? As long as it’s like the last one. Ms Strange: Yeah it’s the Marion Centre job. That’s your last shoot, you’ll be in the lab from then. - 15 -[83]It was not correct to say that the Claimant was asked to work alone. Rather, she was asked if she would be okay to work alone. On its face, that invited to the Claimant to say “no, that would not be okay”. Instead the Claimant showed a familiarity with the location and indicated clearly that it “should be fine”. The fact that the Respondent asked the question was, in our judgment, recognition that the Respondent was alive to the Claimant’s wish to have support and had been ensuring that she was always accompanied on jobs (as we have found, that was the case from at least 2 September 2024).[84]If the Claimant was reluctant to say no, she gave no indication of that to the Respondent, who cannot be criticised for concluding that on this occasion, as the Claimant was familiar with the school, she was fine to conduct the job alone. The Respondent was also entitled to conclude that the Claimant knew what was best for her health and was best placed to assess what she could and could not do.[85]The above text exchange was on morning of 19 November 2024. At no time between then and the job on 22 November 2024 did the Claimant return to the Respondent and say that she was having second thoughts or was concerned about doing the job alone.[86]The text exchange also confirmed that the shoot on 22 November 2024 was the Claimant’s last before she became lab-based.[87]For those reason, the Tribunal found that the Claimant was not asked to attend the shoot alone. She was asked if that would be ok attending the shoot alone and she told the Respondent that she would. As such, it cannot be said that the Respondent was requiring the Claimant to carry her equipment alone or was ignoring any request for additional support for the job on 22 November 2024.[88]The Claimant undertook her last school shoot on 22 November 2024. She was due to start work in the lab on 25 November 2024. However, on 25 November 2024, the Claimant was asked to attend a meeting with Mr Tinkler and Mr Williams, where she was informed the her role as Photography Supervisor was at risk of redundancy (which was confirmed in writing the same day, at [90] of the Bundle). The Claimant was offered and agreed to take paid time off instead of attending work during the redundancy consultation process.[89]The Respondent’s evidence was that following factors informed the decision to reduce staff costs: 89.1. It was carrying too many photographers in 2023; 89.2. Forward bookings in 2024 were concerning; and - 16 - 89.3. National insurance increases on employers were coming into effect.[90]That evidence, which came from Mr Tinkler’s written and oral evidence was not materially challenged and we had no basis to doubt it.[91]Regarding the cyclical nature of the business, the Respondent knew its business (and was entitled to decide how to run its business) and, even allowing for the cyclical nature of the work, it was concerned enough to place staff at risk of redundancy.[92]On that point, we accepted Mr Tinkler’s evidence as to the four other employees placed at risk of redundancy, in addition to the Claimant. Their details had been redacted in the evidence before us but the Respondent decided to disclose them, as there was some suggestion from the Claimant that not revealing their details raised questions as to the authenticity of the redundancy situation. Mr Tinkler provided detailed and compelling oral evidence as to the identities and job roles of the other staff placed at risk with the Claimant.[93]The Claimant suggested that the only difference in her role between 2023 (when she was not placed at risk of redundancy) and 2024 (when she was) was that by 2024 she was pregnant. We found that submission difficult to maintain, in circumstances where the Respondent had provided plausible and credible reasons for why that was not the case (as detailed above) and, importantly, the fact that the Respondent felt things were so challenging, it decided to place five employees at risk of redundancy, not just the Claimant.[94]There was also a consistency in what the Respondent was telling the Claimant (and the other employees at risk) in meetings, in their at-risk letters, in the subsequent dismissal and appeal letters, and throughout these proceedings.[95]We reach those conclusions notwithstanding the Claimant’s criticisms of aspects of the evidence relied upon by the Respondent to support its contention that there was a genuine redundancy situation (in particularly, the criticism that the graph at [111] of the Bundle did not compare like with like in respect of the alleged drop off in the number of photographers employed).[96]For all those reasons, we found that there was a genuine redundancy situation. It was not, as alleged by the Claimant, a sham or a cover for her dismissal.[97]The Respondent said that notwithstanding the fact that the Claimant had not been employed for two years, it applied the same process to her regarding the redundancy consultation and subsequent right of appeal - 17 - against dismissal. It was not in dispute that it was under no legal obligation to do so.[98]At the meeting on 25 November 2024, the Claimant was told that she was at risk of redundancy. On her own evidence (Paragraph 17 of her statement), she was told that the reason was a reduction in school budgets (which we took to relate to the lack of bookings) and increased government costs (which we took as a reference to the increase in national insurance contributions for employers). The Claimant recalled that the Respondent confirmed to her that other employees were also at risk of redundancy but did not tell her who they were. We accepted Mr Pollitt’s point that it was not appropriate for the Respondent to reveal the names of the other employees to the Claimant in circumstances where those employees may not yet have been told themselves that they were at risk.[99]During the meeting, the Claimant was asked for any proposals to avoid[100]On 26 November 2024, the Claimant attended a second meeting with Mr Tinkler and Mr Williams. The Claimant’s evidence was that during this meeting, she raised taking an alternative role as a photographer, asked about other alternative, available roles, offered to work term-time and/or part-time and offered to take a pay cut (Paragraph 21 of her statement).[101]Mr Tinkler’s evidence was that he told the Claimant about other measures the Respondent had put in place to try and alleviate its financial circumstances. These included a pay freeze, seeking expression of interest for voluntary redundancy and not replacing the posts of employees who had resigned (Paragraph 20 of his statement).[102]It was not in dispute that the Claimant asked about being moved (or ‘bumped’) into a photographer’s role. The Respondent’s evidence was that it considered that proposal but there were no photographer vacancies at that time. As such, it would have had to make a photographer redundant to create a suitable vacancy, which would involve putting all the photographers in a pool, scoring them and selecting one for redundancy. The Respondent decided against that course of action, as it considered, not unreasonably in our view, that such an expansion of the redundancy selection process would incur additional expense and time.[103]It was not in dispute that there were no vacant photographer-only roles as at November 2024 (two design & photography posts were at risk of redundancy at the same time) or that the Respondent was under no legal obligation to ‘bump’ the Claimant into one of the filled photographer posts (by making the incumbent redundant). - 18 -[104]The Respondent also accepted that the Claimant raised the possibility of being moved to Ms Strange’s role (who had resigned the previous month) at the meeting on 28 November 2024 (considered in more detail below). However, the Respondent did not accept that the Claimant ever raised term-time/part-time hours or taking a pay cut.[105]The Tribunal questioned why the Respondent would pretend that the Claimant had not made other suggestions during the consultation meeting, in circumstances where it had engaged in two suggestions which it accepted the Claimant had made. It seemed more plausible that if the Claimant had made those additional suggestions regarding hours and pay at the time, the Respondent would have engaged with them also. In addition, the Respondent’s evidence in this regard was not materially challenged.[106]For those reasons, we found, on balance, that the Claimant did not propose reducing her hours or taking a pay cut during the course of the redundancy consultation.[107]On 26 November 2024, the Claimant exchanged text messages with Ms Strange, who informed the Claimant that she had resigned (at [143] – [144] of the Bundle). The Claimant was of the view that she could be offered Ms Strange’s vacant role and proposed to raise it at the next meeting with Mr Tinkler and Mr Williams, scheduled for 28 November[108]At the meeting on 28 November 2024, the Claimant asked about being considered for Ms Strange’s vacant post (as bookings & scheduling clerk). The Claimant’s evidence was that Mr Tinkler told her that the Respondent no longer required someone for that role, as business had slowed down (Paragraph 25 of her statement). That was consistent with the Respondent’s evidence that it was facing difficult trading conditions and with its decision not to fill posts which became vacant (in order to minimise its costs and overheads).[109]There was a discussion about the possibility of recruiting to that post the following year and the Claimant being kept in mind if that occurred. However, Mr Tinkler’s unchallenged evidence was that the post was never recruited to and even by the time of the hearing, a year later, the Respondent had still not recruited a replacement for Ms Strange.[110]The Claimant asked again about being redeployed into a photographer role but was informed that the Respondent was not prepared to ‘bump’ an existing photographer out of post.[111]On that point, the Tribunal accepted Mr Pollitt’s submission that, at the same time that the Claimant was asking the Respondent to redeploy her into a photographer role, she was also stating (and the Respondent was accepting) that she could not undertake the photographer role because - 19 - of her pregnancy, so much so that she had requested, and had been granted, lab-based work from 25 November 2024.[112]It was not in dispute that at some point on 28 November 2024, the Respondent dismissed the Claimant by reason of redundancy. The choreography and chronology was, however, in dispute.[113]The Claimant said that her dismissal letter was already on Mr Tinkler’s desk when she attended the meeting on 28 November 2024. In addition, the Respondent already had her redundancy payment calculation and outstanding holiday entitlement to hand. Mr Magier relied on the fact that Mr Williams referred to the meeting on 28 November 2024 as “the dismissal meeting” in his written evidence (Paragraph 23 of his statement). As such, the Claimant contended that her dismissal was predetermined and that the meeting on 28 November 2024 was a consultation meeting in name only.[114]In contrast, Mr Tinkler’s evidence was that the meeting was a genuine consultation meeting and the Claimant’s dismissal was not predetermined or decided ahead of the meeting. He said that he and Mr Williams met with the Claimant to further discuss her proposals and suggestions, following which he and Mr Williams retired to consider what had been proposed and make a decision about the Claimant’s employment. Thereafter, Mr Tinkler met with the Claimant on his own, informed her of the Respondent’s decision, which was confirmed in the letter he handed to her (at [95] of the Bundle). Mr Tinkler said that he had the redundancy payment and holiday entitlement figures to hand because the Claimant had been at risk of redundancy and these had therefore been prepared if she was made redundant. They were not evidence of predetermination but a reflection that the Claimant was at risk of being made redundant.[115]We noted that the Claimant herself referred to the 28 November 2024 meeting as a consultation meeting and explained what was discussed in the meeting about Ms Strange’s former role and her proposal to be redeployed as a photographer (Paragraphs 24 to 26 of her statement).[116]We concluded that the meeting on 28 November 2024 was a consultation meeting, in that the Claimant proposed and the Respondent considered two alternatives to redundancy (Ms Strange’s role and the photographer’s role). The fact that the Respondent decided not to accede to those suggestions did not mean that they were not considered. They were, and reasons were forthcoming for why the Respondent decided not to implement one or other of them, instead of making the Claimant’s post redundant.[117]Given all of those factors, we preferred Mr Tinkler’s recollection that he and Mr Williams met with the Claimant, considered her proposals, which included Mr Tinkler and Mr Williams taking time discussing them in - 20 - private, and that thereafter Mr Tinkler met with the Claimant, informed her that she was being made redundant and handed her the dismissal letter. The fact that the Respondent had redundancy and holiday entitlement figures to hand was not, in itself, suspicious or of concern. Rather, it was understandable and natural for an employer to prepare itself in case, as here, it was decided to dismiss on grounds of[118]The dismissal letter included the reason for making the Claimant redundant, as follows (at [95] of the Bundle): Further to our previous correspondence and two meetings, we write to inform you that Colorfoto is making your post redundant due to insufficient work and a reduced number of photographers. Unfortunately, we have not been able to identify any suitable alternative work for you.[119]That was consistent with the Respondent’s position that the Claimant’s role was stand-alone and the need for it had diminished with the reduction in number of photographers, following the downturn in forward bookings, and that the supervision of the remaining photographers could be undertaken by Mr Williams, as he had done in the past.[120]The dismissal letter informed the Claimant that her employment would be terminated on 29 November 2024. For the sake of completeness, Mr Tinkler provided unchallenged oral evidence as to the fate of the other employees who were placed at risk of redundancy at the same time as the Claimant, as follows: 120.1. Maragret Grant (accounts manager) chose to retire; 120.2. Scott Howard (design & photography) took voluntary redundancy; 120.3. James Maharg (design & photography) was in the same pool as Mr Howard. As such, he remained in post, albeit he left the Respondent a few months later; and 120.4. Emma Cox (account manager) was made redundant.[121]The dismissal letter of 28 November 2024 informed the Claimant that she had a right of appeal (which the Respondent was under no legal or procedural obligation to offer, given the Claimant’s limited continuous employment). The Claimant exercised her right of appeal by a letter dated 4 December 2024 (at [96] of the Bundle). She raised two grounds of appeal (in summary): 121.1. Discrimination on grounds of pregnancy and maternity (in selecting her for redundancy); and - 21 - 121.2. Failure to offer her a suitable alternative job, despite the fact of her pregnancy.[122]The second ground of appeal was premised upon the Claimant’s belief, at the time, that the Respondent had subsequently advertised a vacant sales support role. However, the Claimant now accepts that the advert which she saw was erroneous (it related to an historic vacancy), had not been issued by the Respondent and that there was no such vacancy either available or genuinely advertised at that time. As such, the Claimant accepted that her second ground of appeal effectively fell away.[123]The Respondent held an appeal meeting with the Claimant on 12 December 2024 by telephone. The outcome of the appeal was provided to the Claimant in a letter of the same date (at [97] of the Bundle).[124]The appeal was conducted and determined by Mr Tinkler, who also made the decision to dismiss the Claimant. In the outcome letter, he explained again why Ms Strange’s former role was not available, explained that it was not only the Claimant’s role that had been at risk of redundancy, that it was not possible to ‘bump’ the Claimant into a photographer role and why the job advert she had seen was not genuine (which, as we noted above, the Claimant now accepts).[125]Mr Tinkler also stated that the Claimant was not made redundant because she was pregnant and he referred to the fact that most of any statutory maternity pay would have been met by the Government, such that those costs did not form part of the selection criteria. He also restated that there were no vacancies available at the time to offer her, suitable or otherwise.[126]The Claimant started ACAS Early Conciliation on 5 December 2024 and it ended on 15 January 2025. She issued her claim on 11 April 2025. Analysis & conclusions[127]We considered and determined the complaints before us in accordance with the List of Issues (at Appendix 1), save that we set out our conclusions on the issue of time limits at the end of these reasons. Automatic unfair dismissal[128]It was not in dispute that the Claimant was within the protected period per Regulation 10(1)(a) of the MAPLR 1999 (in particular, the protected period began on 2 September 2024, when the Claimant informed Mr Williams of her pregnancy).[129]Did the Claimant established facts from which we could conclude that the reason (or principal reason) for her dismissal was of a kind - 22 - prescribed under section 99 of the ERA 1996, namely pregnancy, childbirth, or maternity?[130]In our judgment, the answer to that question was no. As we found, there was a genuine redundancy situation and the Respondent was entitled to include the Claimant’s post in that process, given that it was stand-alone, that the number of photographers had diminished (which directly impacted upon the amount of supervision required), and that the supervision function could be reabsorbed into Mr Williams role as Photography Manager, as had been the situation before the creation of the Photography Supervisor’s role.[131]The facts as we found them led to a conclusion that the only reason for the Claimant’s dismissal was redundancy. Her pregnancy played no part in that decision.[132]That conclusion engaged Regulation 10(2) of the MPLR 1999, in that it was it was not practicable by reason of redundancy for the Respondent to continue to employ the Claimant under her existing contract of employment during the protected period. As such, if there were any suitable alternative vacancies, the Claimant was entitled to be offered such alternative employment.[133]However, and again as we found, no vacancies, suitable or otherwise, existed within the Respondent’s business prior to the Claimant’s dismissal with effect from 29 November 2024. The only roles which were explored were Ms Stanage’s former role of booking & scheduling clerk (which was not a vacancy as the Respondent decided not to fill it, consistent with its decision not to recruit to posts where people had resigned) and the photographer role (none of which were vacant and which required the Respondent to make the incumbent redundant, which it was entitled not to do).[134]Reference was made in the course of this litigation to other possible roles the Claimant could have done but there was no evidence that any vacancies existed in those or any role prior to 29 November 2024.[135]As there were no available vacancies, the issue of whether they were suitable fell away.[136]For all those reasons, the complaint of automatic unfair dismissal was not made out and is dismissed. Pregnancy & maternity discrimination: discussion & analysis[137]Again, it was not in dispute that the Respondent was aware of the Claimant’s pregnancy from 2 September 2024 or that the unfavourable treatment, as alleged, purportedly took place during the protected period (by reason of the Respondent’s knowledge of the pregnancy). - 23 -[138]We considered each allegation of treatment in accordance with the agreed List of Issues, before considering whether any proven treatment was unfavourable and, if it was, whether it was because of or materially influenced by the fact that the Claimant was pregnant. Failure by the Respondent to carry out a statutory pregnancy risk assessment during the Claimant’s employment.[139]For the reasons found above, the Respondent did not fail to undertake a risk assessment. It was undertaken by Mr Williams on 2 September[140]As such, the alleged treatment was not made out. Requiring the Claimant to carry equipment for her role, and ignoring requests from the Claimant for additional support, on 22 November 2024.[141]As we found, the Respondent did not require the Claimant to carry equipment, at least from 2 September 2024, nor did it ignore her request for support on 22 November 2024 school shoot. The Claimant was asked if she was ok to attend the shoot alone and she confirmed that she was. There was no requirement to attend the shoot alone imposed upon her by the Respondent and the Claimant did not ask for any additional support for the shoot. The Respondent was also entitled to take its lead from the Claimant as to what she felt capable of doing and what she required support with.[142]For those reasons, the alleged treatment was not made out. Failing to make adjustments to mitigate the risks arising from the Claimant’s pregnancy on 22 November 2024 or at all.[143]We repeat our reasoning above. The school shoot on 22 November 224 cannot be categorised as a failure by the Respondent, in circumstances where it asked the Claimant if she was ok to attend the shoot alone and the Claimant stated that she was.[144]Other than the shoot on 22 November 2024, there were no other suggestions by the Claimant or examples provided, of when she undertook school shoots alone from 2 September 2024. To the extent that this was the adjustment to which the allegation refers (that of mitigating risk by ensuring the Claimant was not required to carry any or any excessive equipment), it was always adhered to by the Respondent (in that it consistently ensured that the Claimant was accompanied by another photographer on school shoots, save, as explained, for the shoot on 22 November 2024). - 24 -[145]The only other potential adjustment sought by the Claimant arose following the bleed on 10 November 2024, when she asked to be officebased once the busy period had ended. This was agreed to and implemented by the Respondent, with it scheduled to take effect from 25 November 2024.[146]The Tribunal was not aware of any other adjustments with the Claimant was contending for at the time.[147]For those reasons, the alleged treatment was not made out. Failing to conduct a fair and reasonable redundancy process between 25 and 28 November 2024.[148]We reminded ourselves that the Respondent was under no obligation whatsoever to conduct any kind of redundancy process in respect of Claimant, still less a fair and reasonable one (as she did not have sufficient continuous service to be entitled to protection against unfair dismissal). In terms, the Respondent did not need a reason to terminate the Claimant’s employment.[149]The Claimant went on, as reflected in the List of Issues, to detail what she alleged constituted unfavourable treatment within the redundancy process undertaken by the Respondent. Failing to consider alternative roles as part of the redundancy process.[150]As we found, the Respondent did consider alternative roles as part of the process (namely, the roles of booking & scheduling clerk and of photographer) but for reasons given both consistently and at the time, it did not offer those alternative roles to the Claimant.[151]As such, the alleged treatment was not made out. Failing to consider “bumping”.[152]The Respondent did consider ‘bumping’ (in that it considered the Claimant’s proposal of redeploying her into a photographer role, notwithstanding that there were no photographer vacancies at the relevant time) and, for reasons explained at the time, declined to do so.[153]Again, the alleged treatment was not made out. Failing to consult meaningfully.[154]The Tribunal grappled somewhat with this alleged unfavourable treatment. The premise was of a fair and reasonable redundancy process, which the Respondent, as we have explained, was under no legal obligation to conduct. As such, we approached this on the basis of - 25 - whether, in circumstances where there was no obligation to consult, the Respondent failed to consult meaningfully, since the Respondent did undertake at least some consultation (as oppose to dismissing the Claimant without any consultation).[155]The Respondent did consider the Claimant’s proposals and though it did not proceed with any of them, it was able to provide reasonable, plausible and consistent explanations for why it did not. That ability to provided reasoned explanations was, in our judgment, compelling evidence of consideration and genuine consultation. Consultation is not the same as doing what the Claimant wants or requests. It required evidence of the Respondent genuinely engaging with and considering the proposals and, if rejecting them, explaining why in terms that were neither arbitrary nor disingenuous.[156]To that extent we concluded that, in the context of an employee who had been in post for just over a year, the Respondent did undertake a genuine consultation process and, by extension, the same was properly characterised as meaningful.[157]For those reasons, the alleged treatment was not made out. Failing to consider alternatives to redundancy meaningfully.[158]In the Tribunal’s judgment, this was a re-wording of the issues addressed above and we repeat the same conclusions as above. The Respondent did consider alternatives to redundancy and rejected them, as it was entitled to do. Again, it engaged with the proposed alternatives and gave reasons for its decisions.[159]For all those reasons, the alleged treatment was not made out. Selecting the Claimant for redundancy on 25 November 2024.[160]It was not in dispute that the Respondent placed the Claimant at risk of redundancy on 25 November 2025.[161]It was not suggested, and we did not find, that this was anything other than unfavourable treatment (since it was detrimental to the Claimant, rather than beneficial). Dismissing the Claimant for redundancy on 29 November 2024[162]It was not in dispute that the Respondent dismissed the Claimant for reasons of redundancy with effect from November 2025.[163]Similarly, it was not suggested, and we did not find, that this was anything other than unfavourable treatment (since it was detrimental to the Claimant, rather than beneficial). - 26 - Not upholding the Claimant’s appeal for redundancy on 12 December 2024.[164]It was not in dispute that on 12 December 2024 the Respondent did not uphold the Claimant’s appeal against dismissal.[165]Again, it was not suggested, and we did not find, that this was anything other than unfavourable treatment (since it was detrimental to the Claimant, rather than beneficial).[166]We then considered each act of proven unfavourable treatment in turn, to determine whether the Respondent’s actions were because of, or material influenced by, the fact that the Claimant was pregnant. The decision to place the Claimant at risk of redundancy[167]Was there a prima facie case to shift the burden to the Respondent to show a non-discriminatory reason for placing the Claimant at risk of redundancy? In our judgment, the chronology of events did shift the burden and required explanation from the Respondent.[168]As detailed above, the Claimant had undertaken her last school shoot on 22 November 2024 and, with the agreement of the Respondent, was scheduled to begin office-based duties from 25 November 2024, because of her pregnancy. Instead, she was told on her first morning of being office-based that her role was at risk of redundancy.[169]However, if the burden did shift to the Respondent, we found that it provided non-discriminatory explanations for placing the Claimant at risk of redundancy. As set out above: 169.1. There was a genuine redundancy situation; 169.2. Other posts were also put at risk of redundancy, the incumbents of which were not pregnant; 169.3. The Claimant was in a stand-alone role and the primary need for that role (the supervision of photographers) was diminishing; 169.4. It was reasonable, plausible and feasible to reabsorb the supervisory element of the role back into the existing post of Photography Manager; 169.5. There were a lack of vacancies, suitable or otherwise, and the Respondent was entitled to put a freeze on recruiting to posts which had been vacated through resignations; and 169.6. The decision not to ‘bump’ the Claimant into a photographer post because it would incur further expense and time, widen the - 27 - redundancy process and cause stress for the pool of photographers.[170]In addition, there was force in the Respondent’s submission that most of the cost of the Claimant’s maternity leave would be met by the state (in the form of statutory maternity pay), further diminishing the allegation that the Claimant’s pregnancy was of concern to the Respondent in terms of cost, in circumstances where she would not be being placed in a photography role or any other role, as there were no other vacancies and the only way of retaining her employment was if the Respondent persisted with the Photography Supervisor role, a post the Respondent had established it no longer justified or required. To that end, we accepted Mr Tinkler’s evidence that it was the post that was redundant and that was, in our judgment, a genuine and reasonable position and conclusion for the Respondent to reach.[171]For those reasons, we did not find that the decision to place the Claimant’s post at risk of redundancy was because of, or materially influenced by, the fact that she was pregnant. The decision to dismiss the Claimant[172]As with the decision to place the Claimant at risk of redundancy, we concluded that the only factor which was capable of shifting the burden on to the Respondent was the timing of the redundancy process, occurring as it did within such close proximity to the Claimant’s pregnancy-related move to office-based duties.[173]However, we also reached the same conclusions upon that burden shifting. The Respondent provided non-discriminatory explanations for the decision to make the Photography Supervisor redundant and dismiss the Claimant (as detailed above).[174]In addition, the Claimant herself had informed the Respondent that it was not suitable for her to be a photographer at that time (prior to the decision to make her post redundant) and then asked to be ‘bumped’ into the very same role. In our judgment, it was not a reasonable alternative to redeploy the Claimant into a role that the Claimant herself was saying not suitable for her.[175]Finally, and as recorded above, there was evidence of others being placed at risk of redundancy, of one other employee being made redundant, while two others either retired or opted for voluntary redundancy. None of those employees were pregnant at the time nor were the Respondent’s decisions regarding them materially influenced by any pregnancy-related issues. - 28 -[176]For all those reasons, we did not find that the decision to dismiss the Claimant was because of, or materially influenced by, the fact that she was pregnant. The decision not to uphold the Claimant’s appeal[177]The Claimant exercised her right of appeal on 4 December 2024 and the appeal was determined on 12 December 2024. As we have stated, there was no obligation on the Respondent to undertake or offer any appeal against its decision to dismiss the Claimant.[178]As with the decisions to place the Claimant at risk of redundancy and then dismiss her, the only factor capable of shifting the burden on to the Respondent was the chronology of events, relative to the proposed start of the Claimant’s pregnancy-related relocation.[179]Again, if the burden shifted to the Respondent, it clearly and cogently discharged that burden and provided non-discriminatory reasons for its decision not to uphold the Claimant’s appeal.[180]We repeat our findings and analysis above. There was a genuine redundancy situation, the Respondent properly considered alternatives to redundancies, there were no suitable vacancies at the time and the Claimant’s primary duties could be reabsorbed by the Photography Manager. None of those factors had changed by the time of the appeal decision.[181]The issue raised by the Claimant at the time that the Respondent was recruiting following her dismissal fell away, with the Claimant now accepting (as had been explained at the time by the Respondent) that the vacancy she saw was historic and the advert erroneous.[182]There was an additional factor which fell in favour of the Respondent. Mr Tinkler, as we have concluded, dismissed the Claimant for genuine, redundancy reasons. He was not materially influenced in that decision by the fact of the Claimant’s pregnancy. Two weeks later, he refused her appeal against dismissal. There was nothing to suggest that, between 28 November 2024 (when he made the decision to dismiss the Claimant) and 12 December 2024 (when he made the decision not to uphold her appeal), the Claimant’s pregnancy had become a factor in Mr Tinkler’s thought process or that it had in any way materially influenced his decision on the Claimant’s appeal. In short, if the pregnancy did not materially influenced the decision to dismiss and the factors which did inform that decision had not changed, there was nothing to suggest that Mr Tinkler’s view had changed (namely, that for genuine financial and business reasons, it was necessary to make the post of Photography Supervisor redundant and, in the absence of any suitable alternatives, to make the Claimant herself redundant). - 29 -[183]For those reasons, we did not find that the decision to dismiss the Claimant’s appeal was because of, or materially influenced by, the fact that she was pregnant. Pregnancy & maternity discrimination: conclusions[184]As explained, we concluded that either the alleged unfavourable treatment was not made out or, where it was, the Respondent’s actions were not because of the Claimant’s pregnancy or materially influenced by it.[185]In the absence of unfavourable treatment which was caused or materially influenced by the Claimant’s pregnancy, the complaints of pregnancy and maternity discrimination were not made and are dismissed. Detriment due to pregnancy & maternity: discussion & analysis[186]The complaints of pregnancy and maternity detriment arose from the same alleged treatment as advanced under the complaints of pregnancy and maternity discrimination. There was, therefore, a degree of overlap and repetition in determining these complaints.[187]As before, the Respondent did not dispute that the Claimant was pregnant at the material time.[188]There were, however, two differences in our approach to determining these complaints, compared to the complaints of discrimination: 188.1. The provisions of section 136 of the EqA 2010 did not apply. Rather, it was simply for the Claimant to show, on the balance of probabilities, that she was subjected to the alleged detriment and, if she was, the Respondent subjected her to it because of her pregnancy; and 188.2. The right not to be subjected to detriment due to pregnancy originates from section 47C of the ERA 1996, as prescribed by Regulation 19 of the MPLR 1999. However, Regulation 19(4) explicitly excludes dismissal from the categories of actionable detriment (because the same is already catered for by reason of section 99 of the ERA 1996 and Regulation 20 of MPLR 1999). As such, we did not revisit the decision to dismiss the Claimant as the same was not an actionable complaint of detriment due to pregnancy and maternity. We did, however, consider the decisions to select the Claimant for redundancy and the decision to dismiss her appeal against dismissal as actionable complaints under this head. - 30 -[189]We repeat our findings and analysis above on the alleged acts of detriment (that is, the acts of alleged unfavourable treatment under the complaints of pregnancy and maternity discrimination, with the exception of the decision to dismiss), as follows: 189.1. The Respondent did not fail to undertake a risk assessment, did not require the Claimant to carry equipment or ignore her request for additional support on 22 November 2024 or at all, did not fail to make adjustments to mitigate the risk to her pregnancy on 22 November 2024 or at all, and did not fail to conduct a fair and reasonable redundancy process. As such, those alleged detriments were not made out. 189.2. Whilst the Respondent did select the Claimant to be at risk of redundancy and did not uphold her appeal against dismissal, both of which could be characterised as detrimental treatment, it did not do so because of the Claimant’s pregnancy. Rather, it did so because of a genuine redundancy situation, arising from genuine business and financial reasons, unconnected with the Claimant’s pregnancy. Detriment due to pregnancy & maternity: conclusions[190]We therefore concluded that either the alleged detrimental treatment was not made out or, where it was, the Respondent’s treatment of the Claimant was not because of her pregnancy.[191]In the absence of subjecting the Claimant to detriment because she was pregnant, the complaints of detriment due pregnancy and maternity were not made and are dismissed. Failure to provide a written statement of particulars of employment[192]As found above, the Respondent did provide the Claimant with a written statement of particulars of employment, when her employment started on 22 September 2023.[193]For that reason, the complaint was not made out and is dismissed. Time limits[194]As detailed in the List of Issues, anything that arose before 29 November 2024 was prima facie out of time (given the dates of ACAS Early Conciliation and the date on which the Claimant presented her claim to the Tribunal).[195]Was there any conduct extending over a period, the effect of which was to bring otherwise out of time complaints in time? In our judgment, and based upon our findings, there was such a course of conduct. Notifying - 31 - the Claimant on 25 November 204 that she was at risk of redundancy was the beginning of a course of conduct which included the decision to dismiss her and culminated with the decision not to uphold her appeal against dismissal on 12 December 2024.[196]On that basis, the decision to place the Claimant at risk of redundancy on 25 November 2024 was brought in time.[197]However, we did not conclude that any other of the alleged complaints of discrimination or detriment because of pregnancy were part of a course conduct or, if they were, that course of conduct ended on 22 November 2024 and remained out of time. The alleged unfavourable treatment and/or detriment on 22 November 2024 was not sufficiently connected to the decision on 25 November 2024 to place the Claimant at risk of[198]We also concluded that the allegation of a failure to undertake a risk assessment, as pleaded by the Claimant, was not sufficiently connected to the decision to place the Claimant at risk of redundancy (such that it was brought in time) and was presented out of time. The Claimant’s case was that no risk assessment was ever undertaken. The complaint was characterised as an omission on the part of the Respondent, which persisted from 2 September 2024 (when the Claimant informed Mr Williams that she was pregnant). It was reasonable to conclude that upon being notified on 28 November 2024 that her employment was ending the following day, the Claimant was aware that no risk assessment would ever be carried out by the Respondent (again, on her case). The date upon which that complaint crystallised was 28 November 2024. It was therefore presented one day out of time.[199]It followed that the Claimant needed to show, on balance, that the complaints of discrimination which were presented out of time were otherwise presented within such other period as was just and equitable.[200]In addition, she needed to show, again on balance, that it was not reasonably practicable to present the out of time complaints of detriment within the requisite time limit and, thereafter, that they were presented within such other period as was reasonable.[201]The Claimant started ACAS Early Conciliation on 5 December 2024. She clearly contemplated litigation at that time and would have been aware of the applicable time limits (whether from ACAS or advice from elsewhere). At the time she started Early Conciliation, all her complaints were still in time. Early Conciliation ended on 15 January 2025. Again, all her complaints remained in time, provided she started proceedings by 12 February 2025. - 32 -[202]The Claimant presented her claim on 11 April 2025, almost three months after the end of Early Conciliation. It was that delay which caused some of her complaints to be presented out of time.[203]The Claimant’s oral evidence to the Tribunal was that the delay from January 2025 to April 2025 was because of her pregnancy. However, we were provided with no evidence to corroborate that assertion and to support the suggestion that, whilst the Claimant was able to initiate ACAS Early Conciliation whilst pregnant, the same condition prevented her from issuing proceedings until April 2025 (by which time, she was in the final trimester of her pregnancy). This was also in the context of the Claimant’s own evidence that following her dismissal, she “immediately” looked for work, “immediately registered” for welfare benefits, and was able to secure alternative employment (Paragraphs 48 & 50 of the her statement).[204]The Claimant was legally represented. Had there been evidence to support the alleged impact of her pregnancy on her ability to present her claim before April 2025, it was reasonable to conclude that it would have been provided. That it was not was telling, as was the fact that, despite being aware that time limits were an issue in this litigation, the Claimant’s witness statement failed to address the matter in any, or any meaningful, way.[205]With respect to the Claimant, she failed to provide the Tribunal with any, or any sufficient, explanation for why these complaints were presented out of time, what, if anything, prevented her from presenting them in time or why she contended that they were presented within such other time period as was either just and equitable or reasonable.[206]In the circumstances, we concluded that the out of time allegations of discrimination were not presented within such other period as was just and equitable and that it was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to have presented the out of time allegations of detriment in time.[207]As such, we had to find that the allegations pertaining to the failure to undertake a risk assessment and the events of 22 November 2024 were presented out of time of time, it was not appropriate to extend time (under either section 123 of the EqA 2010 or section 48 of the ERA 1996) and the Tribunal did have the jurisdiction to consider and determine them.[208]Notwithstanding that and as can be seen, we determined all the complaints before us and have dismissed them (including those allegations of discrimination and detriment which were out of time). It was important for the parties to know and understand our findings and conclusions on the complaints, including those over which, ultimately, we did not have jurisdiction. Discrimination and detriment on grounds of pregnancy are serious allegations. We did not want the Claimant - 33 - believing that those complaints had failed on a technicality (that of being presented out of time). We did not want those accused of pregnancyrelated discrimination and detriment to be left with any residual sense that they had not been fully exonerated of the allegations against them.[209]For those reasons in particular, we considered all the complaints pursued and, as explained above, dismissed them. Approved by: