Mr S Zaidi v The Royal Veterinary College and I Hamer: 6011754/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6011754/2025
Between
Mr S ZaidiClaimantThe Royal Veterinary College R1 Isobel Hamer R2Respondent
Date 3 May 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant’s email of 13:41 on 4 July 2025 was unambiguous about his intentions for the indirect discrimination claims set out in the original Particulars of Complaint. Those complaints came to an end on 4 July 2025.[2]I do not issue a judgment, under Rule 52, dismissing these complaints.

REASONS

[1]Rules 51 and 52 read as follows: 51. End of claim Where a claimant informs the Tribunal, either in writing or in the course of a hearing, that a claim, or part of it, is withdrawn, the claim, or part, comes to an end, subject to any application that the respondent may make for a costs, preparation time or wasted costs order. 52. Dismissal following withdrawal Where a claim, or part of it, has been withdrawn under rule 51, the Tribunal shall issue a judgment dismissing it (which means that the claimant may not commence a further claim against the respondent raising the same, or substantially the same, complaint) unless—(a) the claimant has expressed at the time of withdrawal a wish to reserve the right to bring such a further claim and the Tribunal is satisfied that there would be legitimate reason for doing so; or Page 1 of 4(b) the Tribunal believes that to issue such a judgment would not be in the interests of justice.[2]As per the logic of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Khan v Heywood and Middleton Primary Care Trust (2006] EWCA Civ 1087) (a case decided under a previous version of the rules), I do not have a discretion to set aside a notice of withdrawal. Under Rule 51, I must simply make a finding of fact as to whether or not the claimant has informed the tribunal that the claim (or part of it) is withdrawn. If so, that means that Rule 51 has automatically operated to bring the claim to an end from the point at which the Claimant so informed the tribunal.[3]The discretionary part of the decision is under Rule 52, which requires a decision about whether a dismissal judgment should be issued. A decision to decline to issue such a judgment does not mean that the claim continues (because, as a result of Rule 51, the claim has already come to an end).[4]In McCrory Healthwatch Stockport Limited [2026] EAT 3, the EAT carried out a thorough review of the rules and earlier case law. Amongst other things, it was noted that a decision to decline to issue a dismissal judgment under Rule 52 was also a “judgment” as per the definitions in the rules. It also reemphasised that 33. In Segor v Goodrich Actuation Systems Ltd UKEAT/0145/11 Langstaff J (P) stated at paragraph 11 that “a concession or withdrawal cannot properly be accepted as such unless it is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous”[5]I note what was said at the hearing on 12 January 2026 and in the parties subsequent correspondence.[6]The original Particulars of Complaint included: 3.1.2. Indirect Race Discrimination (Section 19) 3.1.2.1. RVC adopted inconsistent recruitment practices; using internal recruitment for some roles and external recruitment for others; and applied an opaque approach to pay-setting, which disproportionately disadvantaged the Claimant due to his BAME ethnic background 3.1.2.2. These practices, which affected access to promotion and employment terms, cannot be justified and contravene section 19 and section 39(2)(a)–(b). 3.1.4. Indirect Sex Discrimination (Section 19) 3.1.4.1. RVC’s informal approach to promotions and advancement, including the use of internal expressions of interest, disproportionately favoured female employees and disadvantaged male staff 3.1.4.2. This practice, applied to promotion and recruitment, is not justified and is in breach of section 19 and section 39(2)(b). 3.1.4.3. The Claimant seeks a declaration of liability, compensation for financial loss and injury to feelings, and any other appropriate remedy. Page 2 of 4[7]This was in addition to a more lengthy narrative about indirect discrimination at paragraph 7.[8]On the face of it, and in isolation, the Claimant’s covering email on 4 July unambiguously withdrew those complaints. However, the email attached a document which might have been seen as what the Claimant intended to be the full version of the new Particulars of Complaint. He had earlier submitted, using tracked changes, an amendment application. The attachment to the 4 July email also used tracked changes, to show what was different to(i) the original Particulars of Complaint and(ii) the June amendments.[9]The Claimant’s new version did not delete the sections about indirect discrimination. I therefore have to consider whether(i) that implies that he did want to go ahead with such complaints, and was actually intending this attachment to be the final and full version of the Particulars of Complaint and(ii) if not, whether – at the least – the fact that he had not crossed through the relevant paragraphs creates any ambiguity (because of any contradiction of, or undermining of, the apparent clarity of the covering email).[10]Neither the Claimant’s email nor attachment suggested that he was asking for different indirect discrimination complaints to go forward. He was not – in reality – seeking an amendment of his indirect discrimination complaints and using (as a litigant in person) expressions similar to “withdrawal” simply to mean that he was no longer relying on a previous assertion but wanted (to have permission to amend and to) rely on a different set of assertions in relation to indirect discrimination.[11]The fact that the indirect discrimination parts of the original Particulars of Complaint were not crossed through in the 4 July attachment did not mean that the correspondence as a whole was ambiguous. The complaints set out in the paragraphs quoted above (and supplemented by paragraph 7) were withdrawn unambiguously. That was the Claimant’s intention at the time (as he concedes) and the only sensible interpretation of the correspondence was that (while not conceding that any assertion he had made was false, or that he was unable to rely on background information for his other complaints), the Claimant was not asking the Tribunal to decide the indirect discrimination complaints on their merits. It would (in my assessment) have been straightforward to use tracked changes to delete the parts about indirect discrimination, but the fact that the Claimant did not do so does not mean that he was not withdrawing all complaints based on the definition of discrimination contained in section 19 the Equality Act 2010 ("EQA"). Regardless of whether the non-deletion was simply to preserve the numbering, or to allow him to refer to the factual assertions as background material for his other claims, or for any other reason, the non-deletion does not create an ambiguity when the correspondence is read as a whole.[12]The list of issues sent to the parties following the preliminary hearing does not need to be amended (to add in indirect discrimination) because those complaints are no longer part of this claim, and because the Claimant’s decision to withdraw them cannot be retracted. Page 3 of 4[13]I express no opinion as to what the result might be if the Claimant sought to present a new claim form which made some allegation of indirect discrimination. If he did, arguments about whether that amounted to an abuse of process would need to be dealt with based on the specific circumstances. That is hypothetical and is not a matter that I am required to decide. However, regardless of what the possible outcome in such circumstances might be, I am satisfied that it is not in the interests of justice to issue a judgment dismissing the complaints at this time. Approved by: