S R Omeje v P & E Care Ltd: 6011302/2024 and Others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6011302/2024, 6019719/2024

Between

Sochi Rosemary OmejeClaimant

P & E Care LimitedRespondent

Before

Judge M Aspinall

Date 4 December 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claim for ordinary unfair dismissal under section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is not well-founded and is dismissed. The Claimant does not have the requisite qualifying period of employment.

[2]The whole of claim 6019719/2024 is struck out under Rule 38(1)(b) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024 on the ground that the bringing of these proceedings constitutes an abuse of the Tribunal's process.

[3]The claim for unlawful deduction from wages in claim 6011302/2024 shall proceed to a hearing on liability and remedy in due course.

REASONS

[4]The Claimant, Ms Sochi Rosemary Omeje, was employed by the Respondent as a home care worker. There is a minor dispute about the precise commencement date, the Claimant contending it was 3 October 2022 and the Respondent 4 October 2022, but the one-day difference is immaterial to any issue I am required to determine. It is agreed that her employment ended on 7 September 2024, when she was summarily dismissed for what the Respondent characterised as gross misconduct.

[5]The Claimant became pregnant with her second child during 2024; her first child having been born in January 2023. According to her evidence, which I accept for present purposes, her employer became aware of her second pregnancy in or around April 2024.

[6]The events which followed were complex. The Respondent initially terminated the Claimant's employment on 18 April 2024, citing her unwillingness to work the required minimum hours under her sponsorship certificate. The Claimant raised a grievance on grounds of pregnancy discrimination. That grievance was upheld on 20 May 2024 and the termination was rescinded. On the same day, 20 May 2024, the Claimant was immediately suspended following allegations from a whistleblower concerning alleged falsification of attendance records.

[7]A disciplinary process followed. The Claimant was signed off sick from 10 June 2024 due to pregnancy-related illness and work-related stress. Her maternity leave commenced on 9 July 2024. She gave birth on 7 August 2024. A disciplinary hearing took place on 2 September 2024 which she attended with her three-week-old baby. She was dismissed on 7 September 2024. Her internal appeal was dismissed on 11 October 2024. COMPLAINTS MADE IN THE CLAIMS

[8]The First Claim, filed on 10 September 2024, was brief and focused. At section 8.1 of the ET1, where claimants are asked to indicate the type of claim by ticking relevant boxes, the Claimant ticked only one box: arrears of pay. She did not tick the box for unfair dismissal. She did not tick the box for discrimination on any ground.

[9]At section 8.2, where claimants set out the background and details of their claim, the Claimant provided a short narrative focusing on wages she said were owed to her during her period of suspension. The narrative mentioned that she was seven months pregnant when suspended and that according to the company's disciplinary policy, suspended employees are to be paid in full. She stated that on 7 June 2024 she received her May 2024 salary and payslip and noticed she was short paid for the suspension period, with the amount labelled "holiday pay." She explained she had brought this to the director's attention and mentioned other outstanding monies from January and April and a refund for medication purchased for a client. The claim form concluded with a calculation showing a total claimed of £949.22. The claim was, on its face, a straightforward wages claim and nothing more.

[10]The Second Claim, filed on 25 November 2024, was altogether different in scope and scale. At section 8.1 the Claimant ticked boxes for unfair dismissal and discrimination on grounds of pregnancy or maternity. The factual narrative in the Second Claim comprised 39 numbered paragraphs, several containing multiple lettered sub-paragraphs, set out across many pages.

[11]That narrative began with reduction in working hours from September 2023. It moved through events of early 2024 including her pregnancy becoming known to her employer and described the termination of employment on 18 April 2024 and the grievance which led to its rescission. It detailed her suspension on 20 May 2024 and set out the investigatory and disciplinary processes which followed. It addressed the meetings she was required to attend whilst pregnant and on sick leave, described the disciplinary hearing on 2 September 2024 which she attended with her newborn baby, and concluded with her dismissal on 7 September 2024 and appeal dismissed on 11 October 2024.

[12]The remedy section of the Second Claim sought £80,000 in damages. It also sought tribunal recommendations including a declaration that her employment remained valid and subsisting, the disciplinary process having been tainted by discrimination, and an order directing the Respondent to reinstate her. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

[13]At the preliminary hearing on 23 September 2025, I identified two principal issues requiring determination at this open preliminary hearing before the claims could proceed to a final hearing.

[14]The first issue is whether the Second Claim, or any part of it, should be struck out under Rule 38(1)(b) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024 on the ground that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted is scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious, or on the related ground that the bringing of the Second Claim constitutes an abuse of process within the principle established in Henderson v Henderson.

[15]The second issue is whether the Claimant has the requisite qualifying period of employment to bring a claim for ordinary unfair dismissal under section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

THE HEARING

[16]The hearing took place on 4 December 2025 by Cloud Video Platform. The Claimant, Ms Omeje, appeared in person. She conducted herself throughout with dignity and courtesy. When giving evidence before me, she took the oath on the Holy Bible in the manner she requested. The Respondent was represented by Mr Graham of counsel, instructed by Ashfords LLP. I am grateful to both parties for their assistance.

[17]At the outset of the hearing, I confirmed the matters which required determination. These were the two issues identified at the September hearing: whether the Second Claim constituted abuse of process and whether the Claimant had qualifying service for ordinary unfair dismissal.

[18]Mr Graham made brief submissions on behalf of the Respondent, adopting and developing the points set out in his written skeleton argument. The Claimant then gave sworn evidence, adopting her witness statement dated 13 November 2025 as her evidence in chief. That statement ran to 36 numbered paragraphs. The Claimant confirmed on oath that the statement was true to the best of her knowledge and belief. She confirmed she had made the statement on 13 November 2025 and that there was nothing she wished to correct.

[19]Mr Graham then asked the Claimant questions about her witness statement and about the List of Issues she had prepared. The cross-examination focused primarily on the dates when the various matters now complained of in the Second Claim had occurred and when the Claimant had become aware of them. I then asked the Claimant some clarification questions to ensure I properly understood her evidence.

[20]Following the conclusion of evidence and submissions, I delivered an extempore judgment announcing my decision. I indicated that I would perfect that judgment and make any necessary corrections in a full written judgment with reasons, which I now deliver. THE LAW Rule 38: Striking Out

THE LAW

[21]Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024 provides: "38.—(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds—(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;

(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious;

(d) that it has not been actively pursued;

(e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out). (2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing." The Overriding Objective

[22]Rule 3 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024 sets out the overriding objective: "3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable—(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing,

(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues,

(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and

(e) saving expense. (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules, or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction." The Henderson v Henderson Principle

[23]The principle which lies at the heart of the abuse of process issue takes its name from Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100. Sir James Wigram, Vice-Chancellor, stated the rule in the following terms: "In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case."

[24]This principle was considered in detail by the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood and Company

[2002] 2 AC 1

. Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained the underlying rationale: "But Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole."

[25]Lord Bingham emphasised that the rule is not to be applied mechanistically or inflexibly. It is wrong to hold that simply because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been raised, to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. The question is whether, taking all the circumstances into account, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court. As his Lordship put it: "It is preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party's conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances." Application in Employment Tribunals

[26]The most directly relevant authority is the recent decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Szucs v GreenSquareAccord Limited

[2025] EAT 110

. In that case, HHJ Stout considered how the Henderson principle applies in employment tribunal proceedings. The claimant had brought a first claim and then, sometime later, brought a second claim raising matters that had arisen before the first claim was filed. The employment tribunal struck out the second claim as an abuse of process and the claimant appealed.

[27]In dismissing the appeal, HHJ Stout identified the essence of the abuse at paragraph 38: "The abuse of process in this case is that the claimant deprived the Employment Tribunal of the opportunity of deciding (and the respondent of the opportunity to make representations about) how best to allot time and resources to dealing with the claimant's two claims."

[28]The Employment Appeal Tribunal made clear that where a claimant has already brought employment tribunal proceedings raising some complaints against a respondent and then brings further proceedings raising complaints that could have been raised by way of amendment in the first proceedings, this will generally constitute an abuse of process unless there is a good reason for the separate proceedings. The burden lies on the claimant to demonstrate a good reason why a separate claim should have been brought.

[29]The Employment Appeal Tribunal in Szucs also considered the argument that an application to amend might have been refused. At paragraph 38, HHJ Stout held that this did not assist the claimant because the proper course was to make the application and allow the Tribunal to decide how best to manage the claims, rather than to fragment the litigation by bringing separate proceedings. Section 108 Employment Rights Act 1996

[30]Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 confers upon employees the right not to be unfairly dismissed. However, section 108 provides that section 94 does not apply to the dismissal of an employee unless she has been continuously employed for a period of not less than two years ending with the effective date of termination.

[31]There is no qualifying period for a claim of automatic unfair dismissal under section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or for claims of discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.

THE EVIDENCE

[32]I heard oral evidence from the Claimant, Ms Omeje. She adopted her witness statement dated 13 November 2025 as her evidence in chief. That statement addressed why she had filed her claims in the manner she did.

[33]In her witness statement, the Claimant stated that by 10 September 2024, when she filed the First Claim, she was aware of the matters which she subsequently raised in her Second Claim. She explained that the Respondent's entire disciplinary process lasted approximately six months, from termination to reinstatement to immediate suspension, to disciplinary hearing, dismissal, appeal and dismissal of appeal. She stated that confirmation of dismissal of her appeal was only received on 21 October 2024 and she could not have filed the discrimination claim before that date. She said the underpayment claim was less complex and was promptly filed, but she could not reasonably have filed the discrimination and unfair dismissal claim before the internal process had concluded. She stated she had been unaware that she could apply to amend an existing claim to include new causes of action.

[34]When questioned during the hearing about the specific allegations now contained in her Second Claim, Ms Omeje confirmed matters which were of critical importance to the issues before me. She confirmed that all the allegations in her List of Issues, numbered 3.1.1 through 3.1.9, related to events which had occurred before she filed her First Claim on 10 September 2024.

[35]Mr Graham took the Claimant through her List of Issues systematically. In relation to allegation 3.1.4, concerning failure to show duty of care during pregnancy, the Claimant confirmed this related to events in July, August and September 2024, all before 10 September 2024. In relation to allegations 3.1.5 and 3.1.6, concerning holding meetings during sick leave and maternity leave and denying the right to be accompanied, the Claimant confirmed these related to meetings in May, July, August and September 2024. Mr Graham then put to the Claimant directly that all the allegations she was making against the Respondent predated her first claim form which she presented on 10 September 2024. The Claimant's answer was: "Yes."

[36]Mr Graham then asked the Claimant why, if she knew about all these matters, she had not included them in the First Claim. The Claimant explained that she had begun the process in July, when she contacted ACAS. The ACAS representative attempted mediation before the matter proceeded to tribunal. At that time, the Claimant was nine months pregnant and close to giving birth, so the process was paused to allow her time for the birth. When she returned to the matter in late August or early September and submitted the ET1, she was ‘more after my wage that was being owed’. She explained that she still believed that the disciplinary and appeal processes might result in her being reinstated, which was what she most wanted at that point. She therefore focused the First Claim on the wages she said were owed. She said that, although she had begun the process in July, she only finalised the claim in September because of the time she had taken off for her baby. After submitting the First Claim, she continued to hope that her internal appeal would succeed and that she would return to work, in which case she would not have needed to issue anything further. It was only after the appeal was unsuccessful that she considered it necessary to bring a second claim.

[37]I asked her whether, if her appeal had been upheld and she had got her job back, she would have brought the Second Claim. Her answer was clear. She said that if the appeal had succeeded, she would not have needed to file the Second Claim because she "just wanted [her] job back."

[38]The Claimant also said, and I accept, that she had no intention to abuse the Tribunal's process. She said in terms that were clearly sincere: "I never had the mind of abusing the powers of the tribunal."

[39]I also heard submissions from Mr Graham on behalf of the Respondent. He submitted that the Second Claim should be struck out as an abuse of process. He referred to his skeleton argument and took me through the key authorities, particularly Szucs v GreenSquareAccord Ltd. He submitted that everything the Claimant now relies upon in the Second Claim predated the First Claim. The Claimant's rationale, he submitted, did not bear scrutiny. As of 10 September 2024, when the First Claim was filed, the Claimant had been dismissed and all the matters she now relies upon from September 2023 onwards had occurred. He submitted the Claimant's case simply did not bear scrutiny and there had been an abuse of the Tribunal's process.

[40]The Claimant made submissions in response. She referred to her witness statement and explained her position as set out in that statement and in her oral evidence.

[41]The documentary evidence before me included the three claim forms, the responses, correspondence between the parties, ACAS early conciliation certificates, tribunal orders and correspondence, the Claimant's List of Issues, her Schedule of Loss, her witness statement dated 13 November 2025, and the Respondent's skeleton argument. FINDINGS OF FACT AND APPLICATION OF LAW Ordinary Unfair Dismissal: Qualifying Period

[42]I turn first to the question of qualifying service for ordinary unfair dismissal.

[43]The effective date of termination in this case is 7 September 2024, this being the date on which the Claimant was summarily dismissed. Taking the most favourable start date for the Claimant of 3 October 2022, her period of continuous employment was one year, eleven months and four days. She therefore falls short of the two-year qualifying period required by section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 by twenty-six days.

[44]It was suggested that since the dismissal was without notice when notice was required, the effective date of termination should be extended by one week of statutory notice under section 97(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Even if that extension is applied, giving a notional effective date of termination of 14 September 2024, the Claimant's period of continuous employment would be one year, eleven months and eleven days. She would still fall short of the two-year qualifying period by nineteen days.

[45]During the hearing I set out this calculation for the Claimant and invited her to identify any error in my arithmetic or any special circumstance which might affect the position. She could not do so. Indeed, she frankly accepted that her service fell short of two years. She said: "from what you just said, mine fell short one year, 11 months."

[46]The shortfall is not large, but the statute is clear and the qualifying period is two years. Parliament has chosen that period and it is not for this Tribunal to disapply it simply because the shortfall is small or because an employee might otherwise have a meritorious claim.

[47]I make clear that there is no qualifying period for a claim of automatic unfair dismissal under section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or for claims of discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. The absence of qualifying service therefore affects only the claim for ordinary unfair dismissal under section 94.

[48]That claim cannot proceed because this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain it. I strike out the claim for ordinary unfair dismissal under section 94 on the ground that it has no reasonable prospect of success by reason of this insurmountable jurisdictional bar, applying Rule 38(1)(a) of the 2024 Rules. Abuse of Process: The Second Claim

[49]I turn now to the more substantial issue, namely whether the Second Claim should be struck out in its entirety on the ground that it constitutes an abuse of process.

[50]The starting point is to identify what was known to the Claimant when she filed the First Claim on 10 September 2024. The Claimant addressed this directly in her evidence before me, both in her witness statement and orally.

[51]In her witness statement, the Claimant stated that the Respondent's entire disciplinary process lasted approximately six months and that confirmation of dismissal of her appeal was only received on 21 October 2024. She said she could not have filed the discrimination claim before that date. She said the underpayment claim was less complex and promptly filed but she could not reasonably have filed the discrimination and unfair dismissal claim before the internal process had concluded.

[52]However, when I examined the specific allegations now contained in the Claimant's Second Claim during the hearing, a rather different picture emerged. The Claimant has produced a List of Issues for the Second Claim which identifies nine specific allegations of pregnancy and maternity discrimination, numbered 3.1.1 through 3.1.9. During cross-examination, Mr Graham took the Claimant through each of these allegations systematically and established when they had occurred.

[53]Allegation3.1.1 concerns reduction of working hours from September 2023 contrary to her sponsorship agreement. This plainly occurred in September 2023, over a year before the First Claim was filed. Allegation

3.1.2 concerns demanding an increase in hours in March 2024 knowing she was pregnant. This relates to events in March 2024, some six months before the First Claim was filed. Allegation

3.1.3 concerns termination of employment on 18 April 2024 upon discovering her pregnancy. This occurred on 18 April 2024, nearly five months before the First Claim was filed. Allegation

3.1.4 concerns failing to provide reasonable adjustments or show a duty of care during pregnancy. When asked about this allegation, the Claimant confirmed it related to events during her pregnancy and specifically mentioned meetings that were scheduled when she was nine months pregnant, meetings in July and August 2024, and the meeting of 2 September 2024 when she attended with her baby. All these events occurred before 10 September 2024. Allegation

3.1.5 concerns investigating and disciplinary process whilst she was seven to eight months pregnant. The Claimant confirmed this related to events in May, June and July 2024, all before 10 September 2024. Allegation

3.1.6 concerns denying her right to be accompanied at meetings. The Claimant identified specific meetings: the investigation meeting in May 2024, meetings in July and August 2024, and the disciplinary meeting on 2 September 2024. All occurred before 10 September 2024. Allegations

3.1.7 and

3.1.8 concern holding hearings during sick leave and maternity leave including in her absence and pressuring her to attend hearings with a newborn baby. The Claimant confirmed these related to hearings before she was dismissed on 7 September 2024. Allegation

3.1.9 concerns her dismissal on 7 September 2024 during maternity leave. This occurred three days before she filed the First Claim.

[54]Having taken the Claimant through all these allegations, Mr Graham put to her directly: "So in terms of the allegations that you're making against the respondent, then you accept that all of the allegations predate your first claim form, then which you presented to the tribunal 10th of September?" The Claimant's answer was: "Yes."

[55]This evidence is of critical importance. The Claimant confirmed in her oral evidence that every single allegation she now makes in the Second Claim relates to events which had occurred before she filed her First Claim. She was not subsequently discovering new facts. She was not refining or developing her case as new information came to light. She had complete knowledge of every allegation she now makes, and she made a deliberate decision not to raise those allegations in her First Claim.

[56]This conclusion is reinforced by examining the Claimant's own witness statement prepared for this hearing. That statement, comprising 36 numbered paragraphs, sets out in detail the events from her commencement of employment in October 2022, through reduction of working hours from September 2023, the events of early 2024 including her pregnancy, the termination in April 2024, her grievance and its outcome in May 2024, her suspension, the disciplinary process through June, July and August 2024, her dismissal on 7 September 2024, and her appeal dismissed on 11 October 2024. The Claimant had the capacity and knowledge to prepare that detailed narrative in November 2025. She could, in principle, have prepared a similar narrative in September 2024. She chose not to do so because, as she frankly accepted in her evidence, she was waiting to see whether her internal appeal would succeed.

[57]Notwithstanding this comprehensive knowledge, the Claimant chose to limit her First Claim to wages alone. She ticked only one box in section 8.1 of her ET1: arrears of pay. She did not tick the box for unfair dismissal. She did not tick the box for discrimination. She concluded her claim form with a calculation of wages owed and sought only financial compensation for those wages. The First Claim made no allegation that her treatment was connected to her pregnancy, and no allegation that she had been discriminated against on any ground.

[58]This was not a case of inadvertent omission or clerical error. The Claimant knew what she was doing. She made a deliberate choice to limit her First Claim to wages. The question is why she made that choice, and whether her explanation provides good reason for then bringing a separate Second Claim raising all the matters she had deliberately omitted.

[59]The Claimant's explanation, as given in her oral evidence, was twofold. First, she said that when she filed the First Claim she was "more after my wage that was being owed." Her priority was wages. Second, and more significantly, she said she was waiting to see whether her internal appeal against dismissal would be successful. She was still hoping that the appeal would get her back her job and that was why she focused on just sorting out her wage issue with the first claim. She still felt she wouldn't have needed to put in a second claim. She hoped the appeal would go through. It was after the appeal did not go through that she had to put in a fresh claim for the second claim.

[60]When I asked the Claimant directly whether, if her appeal had been upheld and she had got her job back, she would have brought the Second Claim, her answer was unequivocal. She said that if the appeal had succeeded, she would not have needed to file the Second Claim because she "just wanted my job back."

[61]I have considered this explanation, approaching it with the latitude appropriate when considering the actions of a litigant in person who was navigating an unfamiliar legal system at a time of considerable personal stress. I have been acutely conscious throughout this hearing that Ms Omeje does not have the benefit of legal representation, and I have taken considerable care to ensure that she has had every opportunity to understand the issues, to put her case, and to respond to the arguments advanced against her. Nevertheless, I am unable to accept that her explanation provides good reason for the course she adopted.

[62]The first reason given by the Claimant, that her priority was wages, does not in my judgment provide justification for bringing separate proceedings. Claimants may legitimately prioritise certain claims over others. Recovery of wages owed may be a more pressing concern than vindication of other rights, particularly for someone in financial difficulty. But none of this explains why the claims had to be brought separately. The Claimant could have included all her claims in the First Claim and, if she wished, applied to have the wages claim determined as a preliminary issue or listed first. The Tribunal has ample case management powers under Rule 30 of the 2024 Rules to accommodate such requests. There was no need to fragment the litigation.

[63]The second reason is more troubling. The Claimant said she was waiting to see whether her internal appeal would be successful. If it succeeded, she would not bring claims for discrimination and unfair dismissal. If it failed, she would. In other words, she was holding those claims in reserve to be deployed only if the internal process did not produce the outcome she wanted.

[64]This is precisely the kind of conduct which the Henderson principle is designed to prevent. Parties to litigation are not permitted to keep claims in reserve to see how matters develop before deciding whether to pursue them. They are required to bring forward their whole case at once.

[65]If the Claimant wished to pursue her internal appeal before committing to tribunal proceedings, the proper course would have been to wait until the appeal was determined before filing any claim at all. Alternatively, if she wished to file claims promptly to protect her position on time limits, the proper course would have been to file all her claims together and, if necessary, apply for a stay or case management directions pending the outcome of the internal appeal. What she was not entitled to do was file one claim relating only to wages, wait to see what happened with her appeal, and then file another claim raising everything she had deliberately left out of the first.

[66]I stress that I accept the Claimant's evidence that she had no subjective intention to abuse the Tribunal's process. She said: "I never had the mind of abusing the powers of the tribunal." Those words were clearly sincere. But the test is an objective one. The question is not whether the Claimant intended to act abusively, but whether objectively her conduct amounts to an abuse. A litigant may act in entirely good faith, through ignorance of the rules or through mistaken belief about proper procedure and nonetheless conduct herself in a way that constitutes abuse of process. The Henderson principle is concerned not with subjective intentions but with objective effects.

[67]The effects of the Claimant's approach have been precisely those which the Henderson principle and the public interest in the efficient administration of justice is designed to prevent. The Respondent has been required to file three separate responses to three separate claims, two of which concerned substantially the same factual matrix. The Tribunal has been required to allocate administrative resources to processing multiple claims. Preliminary hearings have been required to determine how the claims should be managed. A four-day final hearing was listed to deal with claims that could and should have been dealt with in a single set of proceedings from the outset.

[68]Moreover, the proper case management of the claims has been impaired. Had the Claimant applied to amend her First Claim to add claims for discrimination and unfair dismissal, the Tribunal would have had the opportunity to consider that application in accordance with wellestablished principles. The Tribunal could have considered whether the amendment should be granted, having regard to the balance of hardship between the parties, the extent of any delay, and whether any prejudice could be remedied by an adjournment or an award of costs. The Tribunal could then have given directions for management of all the claims together, ensuring an efficient and proportionate approach to the litigation in accordance with the overriding objective set out in Rule 3. By filing separate proceedings without seeking to amend, the Claimant deprived the Tribunal of that opportunity.

[69]This outcome is consistent with the Tribunal's duty under Rule 3 to deal with cases fairly and justly, including avoiding unnecessary delay, ensuring efficient use of public resources, and saving expense. The overriding objective requires me to have regard not only to the interests of the parties before me, but also to the interests of other litigants whose claims compete for the same finite resources of judicial time and tribunal administration. Permitting the fragmentation of litigation in this way would undermine that objective.

[70]It is instructive to compare the present case with Szucs v GreenSquareAccord Ltd. In that case, the claimant had significant health difficulties, including hospital admission, surgery and serious mental health problems. The Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted that these were relevant factors to consider but nonetheless concluded that they did not constitute good reason for bringing separate proceedings rather than applying to amend.

[71]In the present case, the Claimant's circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. She was pregnant, and then on maternity leave with a newborn baby. But the Claimant was able to file her First Claim just three days after her dismissal, demonstrating that she could engage with the tribunal process at that time. She engaged with her internal appeal. She obtained three separate ACAS early conciliation certificates over a period of some four months. She filed three claim forms. This is not the conduct of someone who was incapable of managing her litigation. It is conduct consistent with deliberate choices about how she wished to pursue her claims.

[72]If the Claimant had the capacity to file the First Claim on 10 September 2024, she had the capacity to include all her claims in that claim form. She chose not to do so. She has given reasons for that choice, but those reasons do not amount to special circumstances justifying departure from the Henderson rule.

[73]Her stated reasons were prioritising wages and waiting to see if her internal appeal succeeded. The first reason does not explain why separate proceedings were necessary. The second reason is precisely the kind of tactical litigation conduct that the Henderson principle is designed to discourage. Parties cannot hold claims in reserve pending the outcome of internal processes.

[74]I am satisfied that the bringing of the Second Claim constitutes an abuse of this Tribunal's process within the principle established in Henderson v Henderson and recently affirmed in Szucs v GreenSquareAccord Ltd.

[75]The Claimant knew all the material facts when she filed her First Claim. She confirmed this in her oral evidence before me when she accepted that all her allegations predated her First Claim. She made a deliberate choice to limit her First Claim to wages alone. She made no application to amend her First Claim to add claims for discrimination and unfair dismissal. She then brought a Second Claim raising all the matters that she could and should have raised in the First Claim, or by way of amendment to it. She has not shown any good reason for adopting this course.

[76]I therefore strike out the whole of claim 6019719/2024 under Rule 38(1)(b) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024 on the ground that the way these proceedings have been brought constitutes an abuse of this Tribunal's process. Alternative Grounds: Time Limits

[77]Having reached the conclusion that, the Second Claim should be struck out on grounds of abuse of process, it is strictly unnecessary for me to consider alternative grounds. However, in case I am wrong in my conclusion on abuse of process, and in case this matter goes further, I shall briefly set out my conclusions on those alternative grounds.

[78]The relevant time limits for claims under the Equality Act 2010 are set by section 123 of that Act, which provides that proceedings must be brought within three months of the act complained of, subject to extension where it would be just and equitable to allow a longer period.

[79]The Claimant commenced ACAS early conciliation on 19 November 2024 and filed the Second Claim on 25 November 2024. Working backwards, the primary time limit for discrimination claims would have expired on or about 19 August 2024, being three months before commencement of early conciliation. Any acts occurring before that date are prima facie out of time.

[80]Looking at the nine allegations in the Claimant's List of Issues, the position is clear. The allegation concerning reduction of hours in September 2023 is approximately fourteen months out of time. The allegation concerning the demand to increase hours in March 2024 is approximately eight months out of time. The allegation concerning termination on 18 April 2024 is approximately seven months out of time. The allegations spanning May through July 2024 are variously four to six months out of time. Only the allegations concerning events in late August and September 2024, including the dismissal, fall within the primary time limit.

[81]The Claimant might seek to argue that the earlier matters form part of conduct extending over a period within the meaning of section 123(3)(a) of the Equality Act 2010, such that time runs from the last act. I am sceptical of that argument. The allegations span twelve months and involve disparate types of conduct: reduction of hours, demands to increase hours, termination, suspension, disciplinary meetings, grievance hearings, and dismissal. They are in my view more properly characterised as discrete acts than as a continuing situation or policy.

[82]Even if I am wrong about that, the Claimant would need to persuade me that it is just and equitable to extend time in respect of the out-of-time allegations under section 123(1)(b). I would not be prepared to do so. Her explanation for the delay, namely that she was waiting to see if her internal appeal would succeed, is not a good reason for failing to bring claims in time. Internal appeals do not stop time running. The Claimant was aware of her rights and could engage with the ACAS and tribunal processes, as demonstrated by the fact that she filed the First Claim just three days after her dismissal. If anything, her explanation suggests a deliberate tactical decision to delay bringing certain claims, which is not a proper basis for extending time.

[83]Accordingly, if I am wrong about abuse of process, I would strike out the claims in claim 6019719/2024 relating to events prior to 19 August 2024 under Rule 38(1)(a) on the ground that they have no reasonable prospect of success due to being substantially out of time with no reasonable prospect of an extension being granted.

CONCLUSION

[84]For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that the Second Claim constitutes an abuse of process and must be struck out in its entirety.

[85]The Claimant acted in good faith. I accept that entirely. She had no subjective intention to misuse the Tribunal's process. She was in a vulnerable position, being pregnant and then caring for a newborn baby whilst navigating complex legal proceedings without professional representation. I have considerable sympathy for her circumstances. She was dismissed when her baby was one month old. She attended hearings whilst heavily pregnant and with a newborn infant. These are not circumstances to be dismissed lightly.

[86]But sympathy cannot override the proper application of legal principle. The Henderson rule exists for good reason. It protects the public interest in efficient administration of justice. It ensures that parties are not twice vexed in the same matter. It prevents the unnecessary duplication of proceedings which wastes limited judicial resources that must be shared among all users of the tribunal system.

[87]The Claimant confirmed in cross-examination that all nine allegations in her List of Issues predated the First Claim. She accepted she knew about them all when filing the First Claim on 10 September 2024. She confirmed she was waiting to see if her appeal would succeed before deciding whether to bring the discrimination and unfair dismissal claims. This demonstrates the tactical holding back of claims which the Henderson principle prohibits.

[88]Moreover, the Claimant's own witness statement prepared for this hearing sets out in detail every event from October 2022 through to her dismissal in September 2024 and appeal in October 2024. She had the capacity and knowledge to prepare that narrative in November 2025. She could have prepared a similar narrative in September 2024. She chose not to because, as she frankly accepted in her evidence, she was waiting to see whether her internal appeal would succeed.

[89]The Claimant knew all material facts when she filed her First Claim. She made a deliberate choice to limit that claim to wages. She could have included all her claims together. She could have applied to amend when the appeal was determined. She did neither. Instead, she filed a second claim raising matters that should have been raised before, depriving the Tribunal of the opportunity to case manage the claims efficiently and depriving the Respondent of the opportunity to make representations about how the claims should be dealt with.

[90]It gives me no satisfaction to reach this conclusion against a litigant in person who acted in good faith and who was in a vulnerable position at the material time. I have considerable sympathy for the circumstances in which she found herself during the material events. But the public interest in efficient administration of justice must prevail. The rule must be applied fairly and consistently to all who come before this Tribunal, regardless of whether they have lawyers to assist them.

[91]The First Claim, which raises only a claim for unlawful deduction from wages, has not been the subject of any strike-out application and will proceed to a hearing in due course.

[92]Nothing in this judgment should be read as expressing any view on the underlying merits of the Claimant's allegations. I have not found that she was not discriminated against. I have not found that the Respondent acted properly or otherwise. I have not heard evidence from the Respondent, and I have not made findings of fact about the disciplinary process or the reasons for the Claimant's dismissal. Those matters have not been before me, and I express no view upon them. My conclusion is simply that, as a matter of law and procedure, the Second Claim cannot be permitted to proceed because of the way in which the Claimant has chosen to conduct her litigation. APPROVED Judge M Aspinall (sitting as an