Mrs C C A Fung v NTN Bearings (UK) Ltd: 6010498/2025 and 6027636/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6010498/2025, 6027636/2025

Between

Mrs C C A FungClaimant

NTN Bearings (UK) LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Manley

Mr. Ahmed (instructed by counsel) for claimant

Date 4 June 2026

REASONS

[2]The issue before me is whether the Claimant was disabled at the material time. By the Case Management Order of Employment Judge Noons of 3 December 2025 the issue was set down for a one-day preliminary hearing in order to determine whether or not the Claimant met the statutory definition in Section 6 of the Equality Act.

[3]The Claimant attended and was assisted by her counsel, Mr. Ahmed and I thank both the Claimant and Mr Ahmed for their assistance during the course of proceedings.

[4]The Claimant and her husband, Mr. Hei (who also attended to give evidence) did so through the assistance of a Cantonese interpreter. I am grateful to both interpreters, Mr. Kuen who attended on day one, and Ms. Liu-Brahman who assisted on day two.

[5]Ms Laxton appeared as counsel for Respondent, and I also thank her for her helpful and useful submissions.

[6]The case was originally listed before me on the 23 February 2026 and unfortunately, we were unable to complete the case in that day, so it went part heard, and I heard submissions on the 27 April 2026 from both sides. Judgment was reserved.

[7]The bundle in this case as I understand was agreed, and it runs to 538 pages. Any reference to page numbers I make here are to page numbers of that bundle.

[8]The Claimant also relied on two witness statements from herself dated 15 January 2026 and 16 February 2026 and a witness statement from her husband dated 16 February 2026.

[9]Prior to the second day the Claimant via her solicitors provided some updated medical records under cover of a letter dated 21 April 2021. These appeared to show that the accuracy of visual field acuity tests carried out earlier were now in some doubt and that it followed that the Claimant’s diagnosis of glaucoma was also now in doubt. The Claimant’s solicitors provided these in order to be transparent and in accordance with their ongoing duty of disclosure but submitted that they ought not to be considered since they do not relate to the material time.

Background

[10]The Claimant brings claims of direct disability discrimination, indirect discrimination, discrimination arising from disability, victimisation and an unlawful deduction from wages by her ET1s dated 26 March 2025 and 25 July 2025.

[11]That is met by an ET3 from the 9 June 2025, which essentially denies all those claims and asserts that reasonable adjustments were put in place once the Claimant disclosed her health condition. The Respondent contends that the Claimant was dismissed for having too many days absence during her probationary period but avers that this did not amount to discriminatory treatment on the grounds of victimisation.

Preliminary Matters

[12]Mr. Ahmed confirmed that the conditions of Ashma, uveitis and keratitis were no longer relied upon as impairments and that the conditions that were relied upon were glaucoma and anxiety/depression. Shortly before the second day, as noted above, the Claimant’s representatives send a letter to the Tribunal indicating that the Claimant’s glaucoma diagnosis was now in some doubt and the Claimant would therefore be relying on the impairment of visual impairment/suspected glaucoma. Although, it was agreed by both counsel that the new records were of limited assistance due to the need of the Tribunal to focus only on the evidence of the impairments at the material time.

[13]In light of the Claimant’s condition, I explored with the Claimant as to whether or not she required any adjustments for the hearing, and I note that Employment Judge Noons, indicated that a video hearing was required as an adjustment for the Claimant. I also ensured that adequate breaks were taken, and that the Claimant had extra time to read any documents that she was referred to. I was also mindful that the Claimant’s first language is not English and that she required the assistance of the interpreter throughout. I am satisfied that having made these adjustments that the Claimant has been able to understand everything and was able to participate fully in the proceedings.

The Evidence

[14]I heard oral evidence from the Claimant and Mr. Hei who both affirmed.

[15]Mr. Hei gave evidence first in accordance with his witness statement and then I heard evidence from the Claimant, who also gave evidence in accordance with her witness statement. Both affirmed.

[16]What follows is a brief summary of the oral evidence I heard.

[17]Mr. Hei accepted that he had no direct knowledge of any of the events which took place during the Claimant’s employment and was only able to give evidence based on what she had told him. Mr. Hei confirmed that he had not been out of the UK on business since September 2024 but that he had been away twice with his daughters on holiday. The reference to him needing to return to Hong Kong to run his business applied to 2023. He explained that the symptoms he had listed at paragraph 4.9 of his statement were occurring around every 2-3 days and some were every day during the period January to March 2025. Mr. Hei did not accept that the Claimant’s diagnosis for glaucoma was after her employment had ended and recalled this being made at an appointment he attended in November 2024. He later accepted that the official diagnosis was not made until February 2025. In re-examination, Mr. Hei stated that he was basing his description of the Claimant’s symptoms not only on what she had told him but also on what he had been able to observe himself.

[18]The Claimant then gave her evidence and appeared to have great difficulty in reading the documents that she was directed to and asked for additional time to do so which I duly allowed. The Claimant was also visibly distressed and broke down at various points during her evidence. The Claimant confirmed her periods of sickness absence that were put to her and explained that she had consulted the NHS talking therapies in May 2024 in regard to her anxiety and depression. The Claimant explained that she was having regular panic attacks and anxiety in February 2025 around the time her probationary period was extended. The Claimant was asked why she had not mentioned symptoms of vomiting to the therapist providing her CBT and responded that this did not mean that she was not in fact suffering from these symptoms. The Claimant explained that her symptoms of depression and anxiety had been on and off since she arrived in the UK. The Claimant accepted that she had not taken any antidepressant medication and suggested that this was due to concerns over side effects and particularly the potential side effects which could affect her eye condition. The Claimant explained that she had not disclosed her mental health problems on her pre-employment questionnaire as she believed that she would recover from the same and as a migrant she did not want to give her prospective employer any reason to doubt her working ability. The Claimant agreed that her mental health condition had fluctuated over time and was taken to the symptom graph at page 465.

[19]In respect of her eye condition the Claimant stated that her consultant had told her that she had glaucoma, and she could not understand why it stated ‘presumed’ in the letter on page 228. The Claimant stated that her blurred vision meant that she needed to take extra breaks whilst using a screen and also apply the eye drops, she had been prescribed. The Claimant described her eyes as painful and leaking. The Claimant accepted that she had not been advised to stop driving at any point. She explained it was her right eye that was most affected by the condition, which she had consistently blurred vision in.

[20]In re-examination the Claimant confirmed that her anxiety had come back after being back at work for just two weeks, being the commencement of her role with the Respondent and that she started suffering with sleep disturbance and nightmares. The Claimant explained that the lack of support following her period of sick leave then made her anxiety symptoms worse when she returned to work.

[21]In answer to questions from myself, the Claimant stated that she had not had an interpreter for her CBT treatment sessions or for many of her healthcare appointments. She confirmed that both her eyes remained painful.

[22]I have considered all of the evidence summarised above, but also the documentary evidence contained in the bundle and witness statements when making the findings of fact set out below. Submissions

[23]Following the oral evidence I then heard submissions, firstly from the Claimant’s Representative Mr Ahmed and then Ms. Laxton on behalf of the Respondent. The submissions can be summarised as follows. Written submissions had also been provided by both counsel in advance of the resumed hearing on 27 April 2026.

[24]Mr. Ahmed submitted that the medical records confirmed the diagnosis of glaucoma which required intraocular pressure management through the daily application of eye drops and also that there was an associated loss of field vision. In respect of anxiety and depression it was clear that the Claimant had suffered with episodes of anxiety and depression which fluctuated dependent on her exposure to stressors at work and in daily life and that these had recurred over a period of almost a year and had required treatment with therapy.

[25]My attention was drawn to the ophthalmic referral to the Claimant’s GP at page 378 which referred to the Claimant having suffered with blurred vision for the past twelve months and was dated from 2 November 2024. This had been confirmed by the Claimant’s husband whose evidence was that the Claimant had been suffering with blurred vision in her right eye since around the second half of 2023. I was also referred to the letter from the Claimant’s consultant ophthalmologist dated 26 February 2025 which refers to a diagnosis of ‘presumed normal pressure glaucoma’ at page 282. I was then referred to extracts from the NICE guidelines which appear at page 522 et seq in the bundle.

[26]It was submitted that the condition of glaucoma is permanent and progressive and requires daily treatment in order to manage the condition. The impact on the Claimant was submitted to be substantial and affected her tolerance of screen usage, difficulty reading smaller text, frequent headaches and inability to drive at night. Using a computer for more than 20 minutes caused eye pain, blurred vision and fatigue meaning repeated breaks were required.

[27]In respect of the Claimant’s depression and anxiety I was referred to the Talking Therapies referral which was dated 23 May 2024 demonstrating a longstanding mental health condition, which whilst having improved whilst she was absent from work then rapidly deteriorated when she commenced work with the Respondent in September 2024 (page 186). The Claimant’s oral evidence relating to having suffered with depression on and off since moving to the UK two years ago was relied upon. It was submitted that the impact of the mental health condition on the Claimant’s sleep, panic attacks, vomiting and stomach upset, and uncontrollable crying plainly had a substantial impact on her ability to work, sleep, concentrate and carry out household chores.

[28]I was asked to consider the cumulative impact of both conditions relied in the event that I was not satisfied that either condition met the statutory definition of disability. Mr. Ahmed drew my attention to a total of 19 authorities which I have considered, but I do not intent to refer to all of these here or below when setting out the relevant legal principles that apply, but this does mean that I have not had regard to the same.

[29]Overall Mr Ahmed submitted I should find that the Claimant is disabled within the meaning of Section 6 and was so at the material time.

[30]Ms Laxton then made her submissions. It was submitted that the Claimant’s husband’s evidence was of limited value, and he was simply doing his best to assist his wife and had been absent for work for long periods of time. The Claimant’s account was also suggested to be of limited use on the basis that it was subjective, generalised and amplified. In this regard reliance was place on the failure of the Claimant to mention either her mental health condition or vision problems in her pre-work commencement questionnaire (page 510). Further the reference at page 378 to her blurred vision symptoms being ‘mild’ was significant and in contrast to her current self-reporting. It was suggested that the Claimant’s account of her mental health was inconsistent having reported to talking therapies that her upset had been prompted by marital issues and that she had in fact felt better in her new job. My attention was drawn to pages 454 and 462 in this regard.

[31]In respect of the diagnosis, it was submitted that ‘suspected’ glaucoma was different to a confirmed diagnosis, albeit Ms. Laxton did accept that a specific diagnosis was not required in order for the Claimant to meet the section 6 definition. It was submitted that the Claimant’s alleged mental health difficulties had been significantly overstated and this was reflected by the low-level interventions provided by way of treatment. Namely that no antidepressants were prescribed and only a self-referral to talking therapies.

[32]It was also submitted that there was an overlap in symptoms caused by the temporary eye condition (keratitis) that necessitated the Claimant’s visit to A&E and the glaucoma meaning that the Tribunal could not be clear about what symptoms were attributable to which conditions.

[33]In respect of the Claimant ‘s mental health impairment it was submitted that none of the reported symptoms led to any impact that went beyond the ‘normal differences in ability which may exist among people’. The Claimant’s reactions to her marital problems were entirely normal and were not indicators of disability.

[34]Reliance was placed on the nature of the adjustments requested by the Claimant, and it was submitted that these were minor and simply were for the ability to work from home and not having her probationary period extended. Again, the contrast between the Claimant’s witness statements and the contemporaneous documents was relied upon to suggest that the impact was only minor and is only now being asserted to be more substantial in order to aid the litigation. I was again urged to revisit the Claimant’s medical disclosure form from the start of her employment.

[35]Overall, in respect of the impact of the Claimant’s conditions on her day-today activities, I was asked to find that this was not at the level prescribed by the legislation.

[36]It was submitted that the Claimant’s mental health condition was not in any event long term given that at the material time it had not lasted for 12 months, and I could not consider what had happened since, in order to find it was likely to.

[37]In respect of the Claimant eye condition my attention was drawn to page 318, which was an email from the Claimant to the Respondent where she makes no mention of the need to address a worsening eye condition.

[38]It was submitted that the documentary evidence only supports symptoms from what was a transient but unpleasant eye condition of uveitis and keratitis as opposed to glaucoma.

[39]It was submitted that I could not rely on the subsequent diagnosis of glaucoma since it was outside the material time and quite simply a suspicion of glaucoma was not sufficient given the overlap between the uveitis and keratitis which makes a finding of disability not possible on the evidence that the Tribunal is able to consider.

[40]In oral submissions I was also asked to consider the table of absences and the reasons given for the same at page 518. The new medical documents submitted since the hearing were attempts by the Claimant to retrospectively bolster her case and in fact did the opposite since they showed that the glaucoma diagnosis itself was now in some doubt. In any event this was not evidence which I could properly take into account given that it does not assist as to what the position was at the material time.

[41]Overall, it was submitted that the Claimant did not meet the definition of being disabled.

Applicable Law

[42]In terms of the law that applies to this situation, it is for the Claimant to prove on the balance of probabilities that she was disabled at the relevant time. The relevant time is the period in which she complains of the discriminatory acts themselves. This guidance comes from the Court of Appeal in McDougell v. Richmond Adult Community College

[2008] ICR 431

[43]The issue to be decided is whether or not she is disabled within the meaning of Section 6 of the Equality Act, 2010. Section 6 provides: (1) A person (P) has a disability if— (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.

[44]Section 212 of the Equality Act, defines what substantial means as “substantial” means more than minor or trivial”;

[45]Both parties referred me to the case of Goodwin v Patent Office

[1999] ICR 302

and what are often called the Goodwin questions, namely:(1) did the Claimant have a mental and or physical impairment.

(2) did the impairment affect the Claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-today activities.

(3) was the adverse effect substantial.

(4) was the adverse condition long-term. In this case, the Respondent takes issue with all the Goodwin questions.

[46]In determining the issue of disability, I should also have regard to the ‘Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of disability’ and I have done so.

[47]In respect whether the Claimant had an impairment I remined myself that there is no need for a Claimant to establish a medical diagnosis for their impairment and it is the effect of the impairment that I should consider and not the cause of it (Walker v. Sita Information Networking Computing Ltd,

UKEAT/0097/12

and J v DLA Piper UK LLP

UKEAT/0263/09

). In most cases it is a matter of common-sense inference as to whether there is an impairment and there is no need to apply a ridged sequential approach to the Goodwin questions.

[48]In deciding whether or not something and the effect of something is substantial or as defined, more than minor or trivial, I should not consider this with the benefit of hindsight at the date of the hearing, I can only decide this issue upon the basis of the evidence or the circumstances that would have existed in the material time. The material time in this case is the period of time during which discriminatory acts are alleged, which in this case is February 2025, through to 28 April 2025.

[49]Whilst I can consider evidence outside of that time frame, I am only able to do so to the extent that it can inform on my assessment of the impairment during that material time that I’ve just referred to above. So, it’s important to make that distinction in the sense that if I’m looking at a report or document, as I will be, that is dated some months after that material time, I have to decide whether or not that’s going to be of any assistance to me in deciding whether or not that impairment did in fact exist during the material time frame.

[50]I have considered the case of Aderemi v. London and Southeastern Railway Ltd

[2013] ICR 591

. That case refers to the fact that when it comes to trying to distinguish between something that is more than minor or substantial, there is no sliding scale that goes from one to the other, but rather unless a particular impairment or effect on a day-to-day activity can be classed as trivial or insubstantial, that necessarily that means that it is substantial, so it essentially flicks the switch from one extreme to the other.

[51]In Elliott v. Dorset County Council

[2021] IRLR 880

some further assistance was provided by the EAT that sometimes a comparison between someone that is in the same position without that impairment as compared to the Claimant who is in that position with the impairment can be a useful means of measuring whether the effect is substantial effect.

[52]I have also considered the case of Paterson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

[2007] ICR 1522

, which deals with the extent to which a Tribunal is entitled to consider the abilities of a Claimant doing the job that they are employed to do. This is relevant in this case, because one of the submissions is that the Claimant’s request for adjustments were modest in nature suggesting only a very minor impairment. I am able to take this into account in my assessment and I have done so.

[53]In respect of fluctuating conditions, I note that paragraph 2 (2) of Schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010 requires me to treat the substantial effect as continuing in the event that the effect is likely to recur. The likelihood of a recurrence should be assessed at the material time as opposed to some later period (McDougall v Richmond Adult Community College

[2008] IRLR 227

[54]I should consider regular day-to-day tasks and not just work based activities when assessing impact (Chief Counstable of Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary v Adams [2009] IRLAR 612 (EAT)).

[55]I am able to take into account the cumulative impact of multiple impairments when assessing whether the same is substantial (Ginn v Tesco Stores Ltd

UKEAT/0197/05

[56]The case of Herry and Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council was a case involving a man with dyslexia where the EAT upheld the decision of the first instance Tribunal that there was no disability despite evidence of long periods off work with stress and in so doing made the distinction between evidence which showed that the impairment itself impacted on the ability to carry out day to day tasks and evidence which merely showed an adverse reaction to stressful events at work.

[57]Moving on to other legal considerations is the guidance, which I have already mentioned in passing. This is the Government guidance which is published in order to assist people having to interpret the Equality Act and it is known as the ‘Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of disability’, the most recent version of which is published online and is dated February 2022 having been first published in May 2011. I have taken that guidance into account, and in particular section B, which deals with the meaning of substantial. It is necessary to briefly summarise some of the relevant parts of this guidance which are important to this case.

[58]Section B-1 refers to the requirement of that an adverse effect on normal dayto-day activities should be a substantial one reflects the understanding of disability as a limitation which goes beyond the normal differences in ability which may exist in other people. The substantial effect is one that is more than minor or trivial.

[59]Section D deals with what is meant by normal day-to-day activities. It says that regard should be had at B-2 to the time taken by a person impaired to carry out normal daily activities and should be considered when assessing whether the effect of that impairment is substantial. It should be compared with the time it might take a person who did not have the impairment to complete an activity. Examples of normal day-to-day activities are given at D3, which include driving, reading, using a computer and taking part in social activities.

[60]Section B-3, deals with the way in which the activity is carried out, and states that this should also be considered when assessing the effect, is the way that person with the impairment carries out a normal day-to-day activity. And again, it refers to the comparison to someone that doesn’t have that impairment.

[61]I am also reminded at section B-4 of the cumulative effects of an impairment. Impairment might not have a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability to undertake particular day-to-day activity in isolation so it is important to consider whether its effects on more than one activity when taken together could result in an overall substantial adverse effect.

[62]Section B-6 relates to people with more than one impairment, and that the combination of those could lead to a substantial effect, in that it’s necessary to look at the effect of cases where there are two impairments, cumulatively. The effect of behaviour, and this is potentially important because it’s about coping strategies at section B-7.

[63]This section considers how far a person could be reasonably expected to modify his or her behaviour, for example by use of coping or avoidance strategies to prevent or reduce the effect of impairment on day-to-day activities. In some instances, the coping or avoidance strategy might ultimately affect the impairment to the extent it is no longer substantial, and the person would no longer meet the definition of disability. In other instances, even with the coping or avoidance strategy there is still an adverse effect in the carrying out of normal day-to-day activities.

[64]Section B-8 deals with the extent to which it is reasonable to expect someone to avoid or to engage in various avoidance strategies. Section B-11 is the effect of the environment, and section B-12 is the effect of treatment, which is crossreferred to above from the way in which activities are carried out with coping strategies, that refers to section B-12 and the effect of treatment.

[65]So those are the important parts of the guidance, which I have had particular regard to in this case. I’ve also, considered the appendix, which sets out two sections as follows.

[66]The first section is an illustrative and non-exhaustive list of factors which if they are experienced by a person, it would be reasonable to regard as having substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities. I’m not going to read all of those out, but the sort of factors that might be relevant in this case concern: persistent and significant difficulty in reading or understanding written material when this is the person’s native written language, for example, because of a mental impairment or learning disability or visual impairment. Frequent confused behaviour, intrusive thoughts, feelings of being controlled or delusions or persistently wanting to avoid people or significant difficulty in taking part in normal social interactions or forming social relationships because of a mental health condition or disorder.

[67]The next list section is a list of factors which it would not be reasonable to regard as being substantial and adverse effects on normal day-to-day activities, and again I do not need to refer to all of them but just those that might be relevant to my consideration, namely the inability to read very small or indistinct print without the aid of a magnifying glass and the inability to concentrate on tasks over several hours. Some of these factors are plainly in tension with the with the other parts of the guidance referred to above and demonstrates the room for interpretation when deciding this issue.

[68]In respect of whether the effects of the impairment are ‘long-term’ within the meaning of paragraph 2 (1) a) – c) of schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010 the long-term effect must be assessed at the material time that the acts of discrimination took place (Tesco Stores Ltd v. Tennant UKEAT/01617/19).

[69]In Morris v. Lauren Richards Ltd

[2023] EAT 19

a Tribunal was found to have erred by considering the impact of the dismissal on a Claimant’s anxiety when instead it ought to have focused on whether the effect of the anxiety would likely have lasted a further eight and a half months. The issue is whether the adverse effect is likely to recur and not the impairment itself.

[70]In assessing the likelihood in this context means ‘could well happen’ (see SCA Packaging Ltd v. Boyle

[2009] UKHL 37

[71]My attention was also drawn to the case of Secombe v Reed Ltd EAT/2019/000478 where the EAT observed that often a Claimant was in the best position to be able to explain the impact of their impairment on their dayto-day tasks. Caution should be taken about any reliance on a failure of a Claimant to mention that impairments are ongoing there is no rule that this can never be relevant to determining the issue of disability.

[72]Finally with regard to the effects of treatment I remind myself of the need to consider the effects of the impairment without treatment (paragraph 5 (1), Schedule 1, Equality Act 2010). This does not apply to normal spectacles, but it would apply to other visual aids and eye drops as in this case. Again, the Tribunal is entitled to adopt a common-sense approach to the evidence in this regard (see Fathers v Pets at Home Ltd

UKEAT/0424/13

Findings of Fact

[73]I have taken into account all of the evidence contained in the bundle, the witness statements, oral evidence and submissions in making my findings of fact and do so on the balance of probabilities and on the basis that the Claimant bears the burden of proof.

[74]As for the Claimant’s evidence both written and oral, I have found this to be compelling and overall consistent with the documentary evidence that was drawn to my attention, and accordingly I find her to be a reliable witness and accordingly I have been able to place weight on her evidence. I reject the suggestion that she has sought to exaggerate her symptoms as a means of bolstering her claim to be found disabled in this litigation. However, I have of course had regard to the fact that her written and oral evidence is taken some time after the events that I am concerned with and therefore have cross checked her account with any contemporaneous evidence in order to satisfy myself that the evidence is reliable. In doing so I have had regard to the fact that in the vast majority of instances the contemporaneous documentation was created in circumstances where the Claimant was either writing in English or conversing in English without the aid of an interpreter and English is not the Claimant’s first language.

[75]In respect of Mr. Hei’s evidence I accept to some extent the submission that his evidence can only be of more limited assistance due to him not being witness to any of the events in the workplace and also due to the fact that many of the Claimant’s symptoms in this case are not necessarily visible. However, this is perhaps of less importance in circumstances where I am concerned with the Claimant’s day-to-day experience of her impairments and how these impacted on her ability to carry out day to day tasks, and Mr. Hei was at the material time living with the Claimant and thus was able to observe the impact for himself.

[76]I start by making findings about the impairments themselves and in particular, the condition of glaucoma (or the visual impairment). I find that from towards the end of 2023 the Claimant started to experience blurred vision in her right eye and eye pain, and this continued from then and up to 28 April 2025 when she was dismissed and thereafter. I find the Claimant’s eye symptoms got worse over this time and reached a stage that the Claimant felt the need to attend an eye examination, which she did in November 2024. The eye examination identified that the Claimant had been suffering with mild blurred vision, had bilateral optic nerve cupping and had a right eye visual field defect (see page 379 and 380). The concerns of the optician were such that they made a referral to the Claimant’s GP under the glaucoma pathway (page 378).

[77]By February 2025, around the time of the Claimant’s initial diagnosis, the Claimant was experiencing the following symptoms daily: blurred vision (particularly in her right eye), eye pain, sensitivity to light and visual fatigue. The consequences of these symptoms were that the Claimant struggled daily with prolonged screen use and required extra breaks after 20 minutes, difficulty reading for any prolonged period of time and difficulty reading standard sized text despite wearing glasses. The Claimant also resorted to using text to audio functions on her computer. By early 2025 the Claimant had stopped driving at night.

[78]I find that these symptoms and impacts on the Claimant’s ability to perform such tasks continued throughout 2025 and beyond April 2025, being the end of the material time in this case.

[79]I have considered whether the failure of the Claimant to mention her eye symptoms in her medical disclosure form at page 510 means that she was not in fact suffered such significant symptoms as she contends. I note from the form that it states: ‘I have the following medical conditions I wish to disclose to NTN’. It then states, ‘If yes: Please advise full details below including information which will assist the first aiders in providing rapid response first aid’. It then asked for any information which will assist managers in supporting well being and for the purposes of health and safety. Finally, it states ‘this information is provided in order to assist first aiders and the Health and Safety Officer in proving appropriate rapid response first aid, for health assessment purposes and for managers to support the well being of staff’. Putting aside the Claimant’s understandable concerns over the impact of disclosing her eye condition at the outset of her employment, it is clear that at the point she filled out this form in September 2024, she had not yet been diagnosed with any medical condition for her eyes and there would be no need to disclose the same for the purpose of assisted with any potential first aid. I also note that the form invites employees to inform the employer of any new information thereafter, which the Claimant duly did, for example on 27 February 2025 when she wrote to Pamela Wykes confirming that she had to take eye drops to manage and reduce eye pressure and required short breaks for her eyes whilst working on analysis reports.

[80]In respect of the Claimant’s flare up of keratitis/Uveitis I find that this occurred during a period when the Clamant was suffering with bilateral bacterial conjunctivitis, which led to her attendance at A&E on 3 February 2025 (page 512) and led to periods of absence from work. I find that these were temporary eye conditions, which did not lead to any long-term impairment in this case and are therefore not relevant to assessing the level of the Claimant’s impairment during the material time. I have therefore disregarded the Claimant’s reported symptoms associated with these conditions. However, I reject the suggestion that it is not possible to disentangle the impact of these temporary eye conditions with the Claimant’s persistent blurred vision and the symptoms set out above, which clearly persisted over a much longer period and beyond the more acute flare up caused by keratitis/Uveitis. In coming to this conclusion, I have had regard to the periods of absence and the recorded reasons for the same at page 518.

[81]So far as it is necessary to make findings as to the Claimant’s diagnosis in this case, I do find that on the balance of probabilities she had a physical impairment to her eyes at the material time, which was ‘presumed…glaucoma’ as set out under the heading ‘Diagnosis’ in the letter from the Claimant’s consultant ophthalmologist dated 26 February 2025 (page 281). The Claimant has been prescribed eye pressure reducing drops consistently throughout the material time, which is the main treatment for glaucoma according to the ‘glaucoma UK’ evidence submitted (pages 349 and 525). The use of the word presumed does not in my view preclude me finding that, on the balance of probabilities the Claimant had glaucoma at the material time, indeed the use of the word plainly suggests that the consultant was satisfied that this was the most likely diagnosis in the Claimant’s case. However, even if I am wrong about that I am satisfied that the Claimant has established that she had a visual impairment at the material time which in turn caused the symptoms I have outlined above. The documented loss of 48% of the vision in her right eye in her Humpries visual field test which scored her right eye at 52%, along with the optic disc cupping reinforces me in this view (page 282).

[82]It is clear from page 523, which is an extract from the NICE guidelines that glaucoma is a permanent condition which requires lifelong treatment to prevent irreversible and catastrophic damage to a patients’ vision. In any event I have found that by November 2024 the Claimant had been suffering these symptoms for a period of 12 months. Given the lifelong and progressive nature of the condition it is clear from the above that the condition was likely to last more than 12 months by the start of the material time in this case, being February 2025, since by this point symptoms had persisted since November 2023, at a level which precipitated the Claimant attendance for an eye examination.

[83]In regard to the Claimant’s mental health condition, I find as follows. The Claimant had been suffering with anxiety and depression since April 2024 following an experience of workplace bullying in her previous employment. At this time, she accessed CBT treatment which then took place from 23 May 2024 to 14 August 2024 (page 416). At the point of discharge the Claimant was advised that in the event that she experienced future symptoms she should access the service as required. At the point of her discharge the Claimant expressed concern about the risk of recurrence given that at this point she was not in work and her source of stress had been removed. The Claimant depression and anxiety during this period of mental illness was clinically significant in that her PHQ and GAD scores put her in the moderately severe and severe category respectively. By the time of her discharge from CBT these scores had reduced.

[84]The Claimant commenced work for the Respondent on 11 September 2024 and by 23 September 2024 the Claimant was emailing her CBT therapist to state that she was concerned because her symptoms were returning. The Claimant reported not wanting to go out and socialise, crying when she thought about work and suffering from disturbed sleep and intrusive dreams (page 186).

[85]By 7 October 2024 the Claimant had been able to access further CBT treatment which then took place until 1 July 2025, at which point she was discharged. Again, the Claimant’s PHQ and GAD scores were variable over this period ranging from mild to moderate and severe over the period in March 2025 when the events in this case were taking place.

[86]I find that from September 2024 and throughout the material time, the Claimant suffered what was a recurrence of her anxiety and depression, which included daily symptoms of sleep disturbance (3-4 hours per night), tearfulness (uncontrollable crying after work), panic attacks, loss of appetite and some more isolated episodes of vomiting and upset stomach. These symptoms in turn prevented her from going out to socialise as usual, managing day-to-day chores around the home including food shopping and meal preparation which was taken over by her husband.

[87]In short, I find that the Claimant has established on the balance of probabilities that the restrictions that she describes in her disability impact statement and her supplemental statement accurately set out her difficulties with day to day tasks as caused by the impairments she relies upon.

Conclusions

[88]Overall, I find on the balance of probabilities that the Claimant was suffering with both a mental and physical impairment at the material time, being anxiety and depression and glaucoma/visual impairment.

[89]I find that the respective impairments affected the Claimant’s ability to carry out day-to-day tasks as I have set out at paragraphs 77 and 86. I find these impacts, as described by the Claimant, to be more than minor or trivial, and as such I am satisfied that the effect was substantial, within the meaning of the statutory definition. The Claimant was at the material time experiencing daily interference and pain, whilst using her computer in the form of double vision and eye pain, and was also at the same time suffering with significant symptoms of anxiety and depression, which prevented her from cooking or going out. I find that each impairment on its own would have been capable of amounting to a substantial impairment in any event, but even if I were wrong about that, the cumulative impact of both impairments, puts the issue beyond doubt in my judgment, that the effect was substantial.

[90]In respect of the Claimant’s visual impairment, I find that at the material time it had lasted at least 12 months pursuant to paragraph 2 (1) of Schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010. Yet further, even if this were not the case, the condition was as of February 2025, likely to continue for at least 12 months, given that it is a permanent condition, which following diagnosis requires ongoing management for the rest of a persons’ life.

[91]In respect of the Claimant’s mental health condition, I find that it had been ongoing for a period of five months, by the start of the material time in this case (February 2025). However, pursuant to paragraph 2 (1) (b) of Schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010 I find that it was likely at that time, to last for at least 12 months on account of the fact that this was a fluctuating condition, which I find was likely to recur. The first episode, having occurred in April/May 2024, had ceased to have a substantial effect, but by September 2024 the second episode had commenced and was a recurrence of the condition. This strongly supports my judgment that a further recurrence could well happen in the future when assessing the likely longevity of the mental impairment given this recurrence had materialise by February 2025 and was ongoing throughout the period I am concerned with. Accordingly, assessing this as I must, at the material time, I am satisfied that the impairment as of February 2025, was likely to last at least 12 months.

[92]Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Claimant meets the statutory definition and was disabled during the relevant time.