Ms Tamsin LittleClaimantConsortium TrustRespondent
Before
Employment Judge MJ SmithIn person for claimantMr L Millington (instructed by Solicitor) for respondentDate 30 April 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s claim for constructive unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is therefore dismissed.[2]The claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal on the grounds of redundancy is not wellfounded and is therefore dismissed.
REASONS
[1]This is a claim for constructive unfair dismissal within the meaning of sections 95(1)(c) and 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) arising from the claimant taking voluntary redundancy due to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence in that the respondent failed to protect the claimant from bullying by Ms Dawn Carman-Jones. It is also alleged that the respondent failed to follow its own processes when dealing with the claimant’s grievance and redundancy. The claimant alleges that the prospect of a return to post of Ms Carman-Jones was the ‘last straw’ which resulted in her taking the voluntary redundancy offer by the respondent.[2]In addition, the claimant claims ordinary unfair dismissal within the meaning of sections 95(1)(a) and 98(4) of the ERA arising from the claimant taking voluntary redundancy which the claimant alleges was a pretext for her dismissal. The claimant further alleges that the redundancy process was flawed and unfair.[3]The respondent is an academy trust which has a number of schools within its remit including mainstream primary schools and special needs primary schools. The claimant was employed by the respondent as its Director of Education from 18 April 2017 until 31 August 2024. The claimant indicated to the respondent on July 2024 that she intended to take voluntary redundancy and a letter was sent from the respondent to the claimant on 18 July 2024 setting out the redundancy offer. The claimant accepted the terms of the letter on 18 July 2024. The claimant was entitled to four weeks’ notice resulting in an effective date of termination of 31 August 2024.[4]The claimant contacted early conciliation via ACAS on 22 July 2024 and the ACAS certificate was issued on 7 August 2024. On 29 August 2024 the claimant presented a claim for unfair dismissal to the Tribunal.
Preliminary Matters
[5]The respondent asserted that the claimant cannot now plead unfair dismissal as she is out of time and they object to her amending her claim. I found that the facts upon which the claimant relied were clear from the outset in her ET1 form. This set out the claimant’s claims regarding the redundancy process such that it would have been clear that she was making a claim of unfair dismissal on the basis of redundancy.[6]I allowed the claimant to amend her claim to include a claim for unfair dismissal on the basis of redundancy. There was no prejudice to the respondent in allowing the amendment as this claim had been evident from the initial claim form and the respondent accepted that the claimant had been dismissed for reason of redundancy. The evidence remained the same and the respondent would be able to address the issue in evidence and oral submissions before me.
Law
[7]Section 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 95.— Circumstances in which an employee is dismissed.(1) For the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and, subject to subsection (2) [...]1, only if)— (a) the contract under which he is employed is terminated by the employer (whether with or without notice), … (c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct.(2) An employee shall be taken to be dismissed by his employer for the purposes of this Part if— (a) the employer gives notice to the employee to terminate his contract of employment, and (b) at a time within the period of that notice the employee gives notice to the employer to terminate the contract of employment on a date earlier than the date on which the employer's notice is due to expire; and the reason for the dismissal is to be taken to be the reason for which the employer's notice is given.[8]Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 98.— General.(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show— (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held.(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it— (a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) relates to the conduct of the employee, (c) is that the employee was redundant, or (d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment.(3) In subsection (2)(a)— (a) “capability” , in relation to an employee, means his capability assessed by reference to skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality, and (b) “qualifications” , in relation to an employee, means any degree, diploma or other academic, technical or professional qualification relevant to the position which he held.(4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. Constructive dismissal[9]The case of Malik (A.P.) v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. (in compulsory liquidation) 1997 ICR 606, HL provides that the test to be considered where the breach alleged is of the implied term of trust and confidence is an objective one: ‘The conduct must, of course, impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at objectively, it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer. That requires one to look at all the circumstances.’[10]Malik sets out the two stage test to be considered when the breach alleged is of the implied term of trust and confidence: i.Was there ‘reasonable and proper cause’ for the conduct ii.If not, was the conduct ‘calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage trust and confidence’[11]The burden of proof is on the claimant to show that there was no reasonable and proper cause as set out in RDF Media Group plc v Clements 2008 IRLR 207, QBD. Unfair dismissal due to redundancy[12]Section 139 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 139.— Redundancy .(1) For the purposes of this Act an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to— (a) the fact that his employer has ceased or intends to cease— (i) to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or (ii) to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that business— (i) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or (ii) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was employed by the employer, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) the business of the employer together with the business or businesses of his associated employers shall be treated as one (unless either of the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that subsection would be satisfied without so treating them). (4) Where— (a) the contract under which a person is employed is treated by section 136(5) as terminated by his employer by reason of an act or event, and (b) the employee's contract is not renewed and he is not re-engaged under a new contract of employment, he shall be taken for the purposes of this Act to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the circumstances in which his contract is not renewed, and he is not re-engaged, are wholly or mainly attributable to either of the facts stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1). (5) In its application to a case within subsection (4), paragraph (a)(i) of subsection (1) has effect as if the reference in that subsection to the employer included a reference to any person to whom, in consequence of the act or event, power to dispose of the business has passed. The evidence before me[13]I was provided with a bundle of 297 pages for the final hearing provided by the respondent. There were witness statements from the claimant, Ms Kirsten Ward, Mr Andrew Aalders-Dunthorne, Mr Steven Martin and Mrs Sarah Conant. I heard evidence from the claimant, Ms Kirsten Ward, Mr Andrew Aalders-Dunthorne, Mr Steven Martin and Mrs Sarah Conant.[14]Having heard the evidence and read such documents as were referred to in the hearing bundle I made the following findings of fact. My findings of fact Constructive Dismissal Dismissal[15]The claimant was employed as a Director of Education by the respondent and commenced her employment on 18 April 2017 with her employment being terminated on 31 August 2024. I found that the claimant terminated her employment by email on 16 July 2024. She was given four weeks notice and her employment was terminated on 31 August 2024.[16]I was referred to the case of Optare Group Ltd v Transport and General Workers Union [2007] 7 WLUK 244 by the respondent which was put forward to show that the claimant taking voluntarily redundancy precluded her from presenting a claim for constructive unfair dismissal. This was a case of redundancy where the issue was whether claimants who agreed to voluntary redundancy could assert that they were dismissed rather than there being a termination by mutual agreement. The respondent asserted that voluntary redundancy is not a resignation and that a resignation is required in a case of constructive dismissal.[17]The claimant referred to the case of White v HC-One Oval Ltd [2022] EAT 56 to show that voluntary redundancy does not preclude a case of constructive dismissal. This was a case of redundancy where the claimant was alleging that her claim was for unfair dismissal and that her redundancy was not a genuine redundancy situation. The claimant in this matter asserted that the tribunal should consider the reason for her decision to accept the[18]In Optare the appeal tribunal considered at paragraph 12: ‘The issue in the appeal is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the termination of employment of the three employees who volunteered for redundancy and whose applications were accepted was a dismissal by the appellant or was a termination by mutual agreement. The question whether a resignation or a consensual termination may amount to a dismissal is one which has arisen both in the context of redundancy and in the context of unfair dismissal.’[19]In paragraph 26 it was held that: ‘26. The question of causation, the union argues, can properly be expressed as being “who really terminated the employment” or “who was responsible for instigating the process resulting in the termination of employment”. The ET addressed this in paragraph 5.1. It pointed out that the three men had not volunteered prior to the redundancy selection exercise occurring but had volunteered because invited to do so when the respondent sought volunteers to mitigate the impact of the redundancies. The union argues that it would be wrong, where such facts have been established, to go further and to investigate each individual who has volunteered pursuant to that process their individual psychological process and/or motives for volunteering. If it is clear, as it was here, that the employer in an existing redundancy situation has issued an invitation to employees to volunteer for redundancy, that certain of them did so and that, as a result, their employments terminated then that is enough, having regard to the guidance in Peck approved in Birch, to enable the tribunal properly to conclude that the cause of the termination was their volunteering to be dismissed. This is not identifying and applying a rule of law but is a common sense application of the principle of causation to factual situations which arise repeatedly in industry and are well understood to have that effect. It may, of course, be that there are situations, even within a redundancy situation, where there are additional facts which point the other way but that was not the case here.’[20]In White the appeal tribunal considered at paragraph 20: 20. It is not in dispute that where an employee has volunteered for redundancy, that can still give rise to a dismissal; see Burton, Allton & Johnson Ltd v Peck [1975] ICR 193 , and North Warwickshire & Hinkley College v Cooke [1997] UKEAT 1338 96. As the learned editors of Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law observe: "[338] … volunteers for redundancy do not agree to terminate their contracts: rather they agree to be dismissed for redundancy."[21]At paragraph 25 it was held that: ‘25. Although the claimant had volunteered for redundancy, as she had clarified at the earlier case management preliminary hearing, she was saying that this was against a background of an outstanding grievance relating to the position of deputy manager/administrator at the care home where she worked. It was the claimant's case that she covered this role from December 2017 and that, although she had been told that the receptionist role was likely to be made redundant and that the administrator role would be considered on a job share basis, that had not been how things had worked out and she had only been offered a role as receptionist with additional duties but no increase in pay. She pointed out that the post of administrator/receptionist was ultimately offered to another individual on a full-time basis, at a higher hourly rate than that enjoyed by the claimant and the documentation before the ET made clear that the claimant considered it relevant that this individual had been recruited only shortly before the redundancy exercise had commenced. It was the claimant's contention that this situation had been deliberately manufactured by the respondent - that the respondent had recruited a new receptionist with a view to replacing the two existing part-time receptionists – and she considered this suggested the redundancy exercise at her place of work was a sham.’[22]I found that the claimant had resigned from her position and consider below whether she was constructively dismissed or whether she resigned due to Was there a fundamental breach of a term of the contract by the employer?[23]The breach alleged is of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The claimant asserted that in failing to address issues of alleged bullying by Ms Dawn Carman-Jones and potentially permitting her to return the respondent had breach the implied term of trust and confidence such that the claimant had no choice but to resign with immediate effect.[24]Where the alleged breach is of an implied term the legal test to determine breach is set out in the case of Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in compulsory liquidation) 1997 ICR 606, HL. (i) Was there no reasonable and proper cause for the respondent’s conduct?[25]The claimant asserted that there were ongoing issues with Ms Carman-Jones which were not addressed by the respondent. Mr Aalders-Dunthorne asserted that while Ms Carman-Jones was abrupt this was simply her manner and that she always had the best interests of the respondent at heart.[26]I considered the case of Amnesty International v Ahmed 2009 ICR 1450, EAT which held that it was possible for the respondent’s conduct to have undermined the trust and confidence of the employee but for the respondent still to have behaved reasonably by making the decision as a result of a thought out process.[27]The claimant asserted that she was subjected to unprofessional behaviour by Ms Carman-Jones during the course of her employment. This behaviour continued into 2024 and resulted in the claimant being signed off from work due to stress. Ms Ward asserted that she had also been subjected to disparaging and unprofessional behaviour by Ms Carman-Jones. Mr AaldersDunthorne accepted that Ms Carman-Jones spoke ‘robustly’ and ‘brusquely’ and that she did not have ‘great interpersonal skills’. He also accepted that she could be ‘abrupt and rude’.[28]The claimant first raised the issue of Ms Carman-Jones’ behaviour in a meeting with Mr Aalders-Dunthorne in June 2023 at the White Horse public house. This was put to Mr Aalders-Dunthorne who accepted it and indeed was set out in a note in his diary giving the date as 29 June 2023 (page 133). It was put to Mr Aalders-Dunthorne that at this meeting the claimant lodged an informal grievance against Ms Carman-Jones. This was accepted. I found that there had been an informal grievance lodged by the claimant against Ms Carman-Jones on 29 June 2023.[29]The claimant asked the following of Mr Aalders-Dunthorne: Q You were aware of Dawn’s behaviour due to previous complaints. Do you think you did enough to create a safe working environment? A Could I have done better, yes. Did I do my best at the time, yes. Dawn is a forthright individual and has clear expectations. She does not have great interpersonal skills and can be abrupt and rude. But she is also a very well-respected educationalist in the governance sphere and I felt she always acted in the best interests of the whole trust and the children. I do regret things that have happened and am sorry that we are where we are. I am sorry you feel that I did not do enough to protect you. I thought I was doing the best I could in the circumstances.[30]The Grievance Policy in relation to the Informal Stage set out the following: 6.2 It is important that the informal process is documented with the recommended resolution recorded, with the aim to support a formal process should it be required.[31]I found that the informal process was not sufficiently documented as per the policy set out above.[32]The claimant asserted that she was told by Mr Aalders-Dunthorne to ‘cope’ or ‘manage’ the situation with Ms Carman-Jones. This was in the context of the second review date on 24 April 2023 of the claimant’s Personal & Professional Development Record (PPDR). It was put to the claimant in cross examination that this was not set out in her PPDR for that date. The claimant asserted that this was discussed on one occasion and that she had been asked to manage Ms Carman-Jones’ behaviour like he [Mr AaldersDunthorne] had. The respondent accepted while putting matters in crossexamination that ‘Mr Aalders-Dunthorne did discuss having to accommodate different personalities’. This was the exchange: Q Mr Aalders-Dunthorne accepts he did discuss having to accommodate different personalities so no controversy there. A That was not everything that was discussed, we discussed other complaints regarding Ms Carman-Jones and that I should learn to manage her behaviours like he had. He accepted that was her conduct not just to me.[33]I found that it was reasonable to suggest that personalities need to be managed in a working environment in order to ensure that all employees are able to work together.[34]The claimant asserted that she had agreed to enter into mediation with Ms Carman-Jones in order to resolve the grievance informally as part of the grievance policy (page 108) and that she had agreed to put the formal grievance on hold in the interim.[35]Mrs Conant was Chair of the Members of Consortium Trust at the relevant time. Mrs Conant stated in her witness statement that she was charged with conducting the formal grievance process regarding the complaint of bullying by the complainant. Ms Conant asserted she had contacted Mr AaldersDunthorne asking for updates in relation to the grievance complaint by the claimant in the period from 19 June to 2 September 2024 but had received no response (paragraph 16 of SC witness statement). I found that there had been no update to the Chair of Members regarding the formal grievance lodged by the claimant against Ms Carman-Jones. It was accepted by all parties that Ms Carman-Jones resigned from the respondent with immediate effect on 5 June 2024.[36]The grievance policy states that: ‘7. Formal grievance process 7.1 If a complaint has not been satisfactorily resolved via informal measures then the employee raising it should set the complaint down in writing, without unreasonable delay, and state what steps have already been taken to resolve the grievance, and what they believe to be the solution to it. This complaint should be given, together with any supporting documentation, to the relevant person as set out in section 5 above.’[37]The relevant parts of section 5 are: ‘5.4 The same principles apply within the formal stages (see below) of this procedure, with the grievance being submitted to the Academy Head, CEO or Chair of the Trust Board as appropriate. The grievance would then be heard by the Academy Head, or by the Hearings Committee consisting of a panel of members from the Trusts’ Governance Structure, accordingly. Where an employee reaches the appeal stage, they would lodge the appeal with the person, or the Chair of the Committee, who heard the first formal stage. The Hearings Committee will then be convened to hear the appeal. For Academy Heads’ grievances, the formal grievance hearing will be carried out by the Hearings Committee and any subsequent appeal by an Appeals Committee. 5.5 In exceptional circumstances, e.g. where the grievance is against the Leadership or Governance of the Trust and it is not possible for the CEO or Trust Board to address the grievance, with the agreement of all the parties the grievance may be referred to the an external body. A meeting of the respective parties will be called, usually in accordance with the timescales set out in this policy.’[38]I found that the respondent had applied its policies and procedures. I found that while the respondent had not adequately documented the informal process, it had followed the formal process once the formal grievance was lodged. The respondent had appointed a grievance manager, Mrs Conant, to deal with the matter and both the claimant and Ms Carman-Jones were spoken to with mediation being offered. Although the main issue was the behaviour of Ms Carman-Jones I found that the intervening acts of Ms Carman-Jones’ resignation and the claimant taking on the new role meant that this was not a ‘final straw’ case.[39]I found that the grievance did not progress for two reasons namely the resignation of Ms Carman-Jones and the subsequent resignation by the claimant. It was put to the claimant that she had told Mr Aalders-Dunthorne words to the effect of ‘What is the point in continuing with the situation’ given the resignation of Ms Carman-Jones. The claimant denied those precise words were said and that she did not intend for the grievance to be withdrawn. The words spoken by the claimant to Mr Aalders-Dunthorne were taken by him to mean that she no longer wished to continue with the grievance process. I found that this was a reasonable inference for Mr Aalders-Dunthorne to come to in the circumstances. This resulted in the grievance process coming to an end. With the resignation of both parties it would have been difficult to complete the grievance process in any event. I found that there was reasonable and proper cause for the respondent’s conduct. (ii) Was the employer’s conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence of the employee?[40]In the interim the claimant had been offered a new role at the respondent and had intended to take on that role until she was informed of the possibility of Ms Carman-Jones returning to the respondent. Mr Aalders-Dunthorne asserted that he had informed the claimant of this possibility because of the previous history between the two parties and because he wanted to give the claimant the full picture. The claimant asserted that the possibility of Ms Carman-Jones’ return was the ‘final straw’.[41]Mr Aalders-Dunthorne’s conduct was clearly an attempt by the respondent to manage a difficult situation. This situation had occurred towards the end of the school year with the claimant due to start her new role in the next academic year. Mr Aalders-Dunthorne asserted that he had not wanted the claimant to leave and return to Ms Carman-Jones possibly being in post. This never happened but the prospect of it prompted the claimant to take voluntary[42]I found that there was no action by the respondent which would have been calculated or likely to destroy the trust and confidence of the claimant. Ms Carman-Jones was at liberty to apply to re-join the respondent. Mr AaldersDunthorne and Mrs Conant both gave evidence that Ms Carman-Jones would have had to go through the usual application process with no guarantee that she would be successful.[43]I found that there was no breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence by the respondent and as such there was no fundamental breach of the employment contract between the claimant and the respondent. Did the breach cause the employee to resign?[44]For the above reasons I found that there was no breach which caused the claimant to resign. As such there was no constructive dismissal by the respondent of the claimant. Redundancy Was the claimant dismissed by reason of redundancy?[45]The respondent asserted that the claimant’s role as Director of Education was being made redundant and a new role of Director of Primary Education was created. The respondent asserted that this was substantially different from the claimant’s previous role. The respondent asserted that the claimant and another colleague’s (Debbie Thomas) roles were being made redundant with the opportunity for both of them to apply for the new role.[46]The claimant stated she would be taking voluntary redundancy via an email dated 16 July 2024 (pages 210-211). The voluntary redundancy letter was sent by the respondent on 18 July 2024 from the respondent (pages 218- 221).[47]All parties agreed that the claimant was dismissed due to redundancy as a result of taking voluntary redundancy. I found that the claimant was dismissed for reason of redundancy. Was the redundancy genuine?[48]The claimant asserted that the new role was not different from her previous role and that the redundancy was not genuine. The claimant further asserted that the redundancy had taken place so close to the grievance process and the resignation of Ms Carman-Jones that it was more than coincidental.[49]All parties agreed that there was a redundancy process starting on 27 June 2024 (pages 181-183). The respondent asserted that this was merely a coincidence and was a direct result of the input from the School Resource Management Advisor (SRMA) who required a £1.5 million reduction in cost (pages 140-145 and 155-164). The respondent further asserted that this reduction needed to come from the management team as this was the biggest cost.[50]Mr Aalders-Dunthorne accepted in cross-examination that the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT), the claimant’s union, was not contacted by the respondent regarding the redundancies. He further accepted that the NAHT had been made aware of the redundancies by their members (page 186).[51]The claimant was asked in cross-examination about the nature of her role and she agreed that her email signature included the title ‘Director of Education’. It was acknowledged that the claimant had primary education within her remit and she asserted that she was always effectively the Director of Primary Education. The claimant asserted that the organisation structure for the new role was the same as her previous one and that any changes to the role were matters that were not within her remit such as special schools. In an email dated 11 July 2024 Ms Beverley Haywood, the claimant’s trade union representative, asserted that the new post of Director of Primary Education covered 70% of the work of the claimant but the claimant told me that she was not sure how that figure of 70% was arrived at.[52]I found that the claimant’s redundancy was required as part of the redundancy process. The evidence from the SRMA was clear about the need to make cuts and that it was more likely that this would have to come from the executive team than front line teaching staff. I found that the redundancy process was a genuine redundancy process. I found that the reason for the redundancy was the reorganisation of the respondent required to save money. This resulted in a number of senior roles no longer being required. Was the redundancy process fair?[53]Mr Aalders-Dunthorne accepted that there was a two week deadline imposed for the process. He asserted that this was because the process needed to be completed before the end of the academic year in order to provide certainty before the school broke up for the summer. It was put to the claimant in crossexamination that this was an acceptable period for the process to conclude which was denied. The final report from June 2024 indicated that the financial situation was precarious and needed to be addressed with most of the costs coming from a reduction in staff.[54]The claimant asserted that the short deadline put her at a disadvantage in that she had to source another union representative as Ms Thomas had already engaged the first available union representative. The claimant asserted that the lack of communication meant she was unable to engage with the process effectively. It was accepted by the claimant that she had engaged a union representative and had been in contact with Ms Haywood during the redundancy process. It was acknowledged by the respondent that the claimant was on sick leave during this period. The claimant had been signed off work due to stress as a result of the alleged behaviour of Ms Carman-Jones resulting in the grievance presented on 30 May 2024.[55]The NAHT had been involved in the process from June 2024 and had advised the claimant during the process. I found that the claimant had been able to engage with the process and that the two week deadline was reasonable in the circumstances especially as the claimant had been able to secure the position of Director of Primary Education in July 2024. I found that there had been opportunities to provide input into the process as seen by emails between Ms Haywood and Mr Aalders-Dunthorne around the redundancy process and the offer of the Director of Primary Education role to the claimant.[56]The respondent’s Organisational Change Management Policy set out a range of approaches to adopt when considering a redundancy situation: ‘6.3 In developing the preferred approach, managers will need to consult with recognised trade union representatives and affected employees in order to seek to agree the way forward. 1. Consider establishing a transition plan, from the existing to the new structure. This should be clear and transparent. It may provide for the following:a. “Red-circling” jobs that are effectively the same in the proposed structure as in the existing structure. Here a “match” may be taken as a job that is broadly the same in terms of grade and remit. 2. Consideration may also be given to “ring fenced” selection processes, where staff may be invited to express preferences for jobs in the new structure, subject to the ring fence criteria; such applications must be assessed in an objective manner, which may include an interview process.b. Consider undertaking a skills audit – identifying those skills required for the jobs in the new structure and assessing the skills of staff within the current structure. To assist with this, managers may want to use job and person profiles, detailing “essential” and “desirable” characteristics.’[57]I found that the redundancy process was fairly carried out by the respondent. The claimant and her trade union had been made aware of the process in June 2024 and the claimant had been able to liaise with her representative throughout the redundancy process. It is clear that an objective selection process had to be undertaken when considering alternative employment. Given the unique limitations of the education sector I found that the need to ensure the process was completed by the end of the academic year necessitated a shorter window. The respondent was only aware of the final need to make reductions once the report was received from SRMA in June 2024 as set out in the letter from Mr Aalders-Dunthorne to all staff (page 181- 183). Alternative job offer[58]The respondent had alternative work to offer in the form of the new Director of Primary Education role. All parties accepted that the claimant was invited to apply for the role and was offered it via email dated 16 July 2024 from Mr Aalders-Dunthorne (page 205) as Ms Thomas had taken voluntary redundancy. The claimant accepted the role and was due to start in the role in September 2024. The reason the claimant did not take up the role was due to her taking voluntary redundancy.[59]The role was clearly suitable for the claimant as she had been offered the role by the respondent.
Conclusion
[60]I found that the claim for constructive unfair dismissal was not well-founded and is therefore dismissed.[61]I found that the claim for unfair dismissal on the basis of redundancy was not well-founded and is therefore dismissed. Approved by