S William v Quality Life UK (Care Services) Ltd: 6009717/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6009717/2025

Between

Sharon WilliamClaimant

Quality Life UK (Care Services) LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Ost

In person for claimant

Mr Benskin & Mrs Benskin (Directors (instructed by the Respondent)) for respondent

Date 18 December 2025

JUDGMENT

After hearing from each party at the Preliminary Hearing, the judgment of the Tribunal is as follows:

[1]The Claimant’s application for an extension of time under section 7 of The Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 fails. As such, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider her complaint of wrongful dismissal which is dismissed.

[2]The Claimant’s application for an extension of time under s123(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 succeeds. As such, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider her complaint of discrimination arising from a disability at final hearing. ORDERS

[3]The Claimant’s application of 3 June 2025 to amend her claim to include a complaint of unlawful discrimination in her employment (i.e. contrary to s39(2) of the Equality Act 2010) in the form of discrimination arising from a disability (as defined by s15 of the Equality Act 2010) is hereby granted.

[4]The Respondent has permission to amend its Grounds of Resistance to address the amendment referred to in paragraph 3 above on or before 9 January 2026. PHCM Order 1 of 26 September 2023

[5]The parties should write to the Tribunal to request appropriate case management orders once the Respondent has submitted its amended Grounds of Resistance (or the permitted timescale for doing so has expired). .

REASONS

[6]Oral Judgment was given at the hearing. The Respondent requested written reasons at the hearing which are provided below.

The Background

[7]The Claimant, Ms William, was employed by the Respondent as a Live In Carer working at the homes of the Respondent’s clients as allocated to her by the Respondent. Her employment started on 4 November 2023 further to a contract dated 25 October 2023 but which was unsigned.

[8]On 15 January 2024 the Claimant was involved in a road traffic collision whilst travelling to work at a placement for the Respondent. After the road traffic collision, the Claimant attended her allocated placement and continued to work for the Respondent to complete that particular placement period. After that placement period was complete on 21 January 2024 she went onto sick leave. She never returned to active work duties.

[9]It was a material point of dispute between the parties as to when Ms William’s employment ended, how it ended and by whom it was ended. The claim concerns the termination of the Claimant’s employment.

[10]The Claimant commenced early conciliation on 13 March 2025 and on 18 March 2025 an early conciliation certificate was issued. The Claimant submitted a claim form on 20 March 2025 in which she brought the complaint of wrongful dismissal based upon the Respondent’s decision to treat her employment as ended (the “Wrongful Dismissal Complaint”).

[11]The Respondent submitted its response form in which it resisted the claim on 14 May 2025.

[12]A hearing was listed to determine the Claimant’s claim on 4 June 2025.

[13]On 10 April 2025 the Respondent applied to have Claimant’s claim struck out on the basis that it was submitted out of time. On 8 May 2025 Employment Judge Welch considered and rejected that application. Employment Judge Welch directed that the claim would proceed to hearing and the Respondent should raise any issues it wanted to make regarding time limits at the final hearing.

[14]On 3 June 2025 the Claimant submitted an application to amend her claim to include a complaint of unlawful discrimination in her employment (i.e. contrary to s39(2) of the Equality Act 2010) in the form of discrimination arising from a disability as defined by s15 of the Equality Act 2010 (the “Disability PHCM Order 2 of 26 September 2023 Discrimination Complaint”). The Disability Discrimination Complaint was also concerned with the Respondent’s decision to treat her employment as ended.

[15]On 13 June 2025 Employment Judge V. Butler converted the hearing on 4 July to a preliminary hearing to consider the 3 June 2025 application to amend the claim to include the Disability Discrimination Complaint, and, to consider the time limit issue raised by the Respondent on 10 April 2025.

[16]The Claimant failed to attend the hearing on 4 July 2025 (due to a mistake on her part regarding the start time). Mr and Mrs Benskin of the Respondent did attend. Employment Judge Philips decided that the hearing should be relisted for 18 November 2025 to consider the 3 June 2025 application to amend and the 10 April time limit issue.

[17]Therefore, on 18 November 2025, the Tribunal was required to determine:17.1 the application of 3 June 2025 by the Claimant requesting permission to amend her claim form to include the Disability Discrimination Complaint; and

17.2 whether the existing complaint of Wrongful Dismissal Complaint was brought within time (including whether the time for submission should be extended) and therefore whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider that complaint; and

17.3 whether the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint was brought within time (including whether the time for submission should be extended) and therefore whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider that complaint.

The Hearing

[18]The preliminary hearing took place on 18 November 2025 by cloud video platform. (Initially Mr and Mrs Benskin had some difficulty with their connection but the hearing did not begin until they were able to participate fully. The parties did not report any difficulties participating thereafter.)

[19]The Tribunal explained that it would determine the three issues described above.

[20]The Tribunal explained that there was a dispute over the date of termination and that date was important for determining whether the complaints had been presented in time so the Tribunal would ned to determine this date. Depending on that date of termination, the Claimant may not have submitted her claim within the primary time limit specified in the relevant legislation. Subject to the ‘stop the clock’ provisions relating to the early conciliation process, those primary time limits are:20.1 in relation to the Wrongful Dismissal Complaint, three months from the date of termination; PHCM Order 3 of 26 September 2023

20.2 in relation to the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint, three months from the date of the alleged discriminatory act (which in this scenario is also the date of termination).

[21]The Tribunal further explained that if the Claimant had not brought each complaint within the relevant primary time limit, then the Tribunal would only have the jurisdiction (i.e. the lawful ability) to continue to consider and determine the Claimant’s complaint(s) at a hearing if she was successful in persuading the Tribunal today that it should extend the time to submit the Wrongful Dismissal Complaint and/or the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint under the respective tests for each set out in the relevant legislation.

[22]The Tribunal explained that the extension tests in the relevant pieces of legislation were different.

[23]The Tribunal explained that the extension test for the Wrongful Dismissal Complaint was found in section 7 of The Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 and was known as the ‘not reasonably practicable’ test. There were two issues to satisfy within the extension test in section 7:23.1 firstly, was it not reasonably practicable to present the claim within the time limit, and if it was not reasonably practicable;

23.2 secondly, was the claim presented within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable.

[24]The Tribunal explained that the extension test for the Disability Discrimination Complaint was found in s123(1)(b) of the Equality Act and it was known as the ‘just and equitable’ test. The test within s123(1)(b) is whether the claim was submitted within such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[25]The Tribunal explained that many of the issues relevant to the determination of the 3 June 2025 application to amend were also relevant the assessment of the extension tests had been met so the parties should make submissions on all three issues (including the date of termination) and then the Tribunal would retire to deliberate on all the submissions as they applied to each of the three issues to be determined.

[26]In summary, the Claimant made the following submissions:26.1 She was a good worker and she had good rapport with clients.

26.2 On 15 January 2024 she was involved in road traffic collisions whilst commuting to work.

26.3 She notified a manager, Gail, of the fact of her road traffic collision but despite being in pain she still went to work but adjusted her duties due to the pain. PHCM Order 4 of 26 September 2023

26.4 She communicated to managers that she was in pain and taking medication that made her drowsy. She managed to work for seven days to complete the placement.

26.5 She was already due to be not working from 22-28 January 2024. She was only due return to active work on 29 January 2024.

26.6 She told Alicia Stamp by ‘Whats App’ message (p6 R bundle) that she was not fit to return to work on 29 January 2024 and wouldn’t be back for a while.

26.7 She submitted fit notes and sent updates on treatment to the Respondent and she did so because she thought she was employed.

26.8 She disputed Mrs Benskin’s assertion that she thought that the Claimant no longer wanted her job. The Claimant submitted that Mrs Benskin knew that she had financial pressures arising from her divorce because she had previously asked Mrs Benskin if she could receive her wages early due to her financial pressures.

26.9 Whilst off work she remained in the work ‘Whats App’ group. She did see the various general messages but she chose not respond to those because she was off work due to her ill health.

26.10 She disputed the Respondent’s assertion that it had/had tried to email her. She submitted that she only used one email address and she used that at the time and didn’t receive any emails from the Respondent except those disclosed.

26.11 She disputed the Respondent’s assertion that it had provided a P45 by post. She said she did not receive a P45 by post. She submitted that at the time she was receiving lots of medical appointments and information by post so she was very careful about checking post and she would not have missed receiving a P45. She also submitted that the Respondent had not provided any proof of posting.

26.12 She had never been able to access the Bright Pay system and could not access documentation on Bright Pay. Documentation showed the Claimant emailing Ms Stamp on 22 March 2024 to ask how to log on to the Bright Pay system (p24-25 R bundle). When she did access the Bright Pay system later that day she saw a message saying she had ‘no employments’.

26.13 During 2024 she brought a personal injury claim in respect of the road traffic collision. Within that process she wanted to apply for an interim payment for the loss of earnings which had been caused by the road traffic collision. As a result, her personal injury solicitors wanted details of what she had been paid and would have been paid but for the road traffic collision and they asked for written confirmation from her employer. She PHCM Order 5 of 26 September 2023 contacted Mrs Benskin at various times in November 2024 to explain what her personal injury solicitors wanted. In that thread of emails Mrs Benskin said that the Claimant was no longer employed.

26.14 The Tribunal asked the Claimant to clarify when she says that she first knew that her employment with the Respondent had ended. The Claimant said that it was when she saw the email addressed “To whom it may concern” (p41 R bundle). The Claimant said she believed she found out in approximately 26 to 28 November 2024.

26.15 She said that initially she thought that she had just been removed from payroll and so when communicating with the Respondent she thought it was just a case of being reinstated on payroll.

26.16 She was overwhelmed and not well at this time after the road traffic collision. She remained unwell for a long time and she was going back and forth for medical appointments.

26.17 The Claimant volunteered that in a previous role she had dealt with personal injury claims and employer’s liability claims as part of her job.

26.18 She said that as the communication with the Respondent continued and she realised there was an issue she tried to get legal advice. However, the advisors asked for a letter or some form of concrete evidence that her contract of employment had been terminated. She said had difficulty explaining that she didn’t have any evidence.

26.19 She said that it was only when she finally got support from Derbyshire Law Centre that she found out about the option to bring the discrimination claim.

26.20 Medication makes her drowsy for large parts of the day so it was difficult for her to do much.

26.21 She wrote to ACAS. Then there was the Christmas break and not much happened in terms of trying to submit a claim. The Tribunal asked the Claimant to clarify when she started seeking and receiving the different types of advice on her employment issues to which she had referred.

26.22 She said that she started seeking advice at the end of November 2024. She spoke to her personal injury solicitors to explain to them that, whilst she hadn’t been aware, her contract of employment had been terminated without her knowledge. The personal injury solicitors just discussed the impact upon her claim for loss of earnings in the personal injury claim. They told her that they couldn’t give advice on employment issues and advised to her to take advice from other solicitors. PHCM Order 6 of 26 September 2023

26.23 She did call other solicitors around December time to find out what her options were regarding the termination of her employment.

26.24 She didn’t make much progress over Christmas.

26.25 She said that she then remembered some things from an employer law module on her masters degree course but she knew that she couldn’t bring a claim for unfair dismissal because she hadn’t worked for the Respondent for 2 years.

26.26 She submitted her original claim form for the claim that she thought she could bring.

26.27 She was required to prepare a schedule of loss for that claim and didn’t know what to do so she contacted Derbyshire Law Centre to try and get help. It was Derbyshire Law Centre who suggested that her treatment by the Respondent could be discrimination.

26.28 Derbyshire Law Centre then assisted the Claimant to prepare her statement and she submitted her application to include the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint on 3 June 2025.

26.29 She emphasised that she was having lots of injections (she estimated maybe six over this period) to manage the pain, she was still in lots of pain and she was also taking medication which made her drowsy. This made it difficult for her to do her own research.

26.30 The Tribunal asked the Claimant what research she did. In response the Claimant submitted that she tried to look up cases online and got some books about time limits. She said that from everything she could see she was ‘out of time’ but she hoped that if she could explain the reasons for delay then the tribunal might listen.

[27]On behalf of the Respondent, Mr and Mrs Benskin submitted the following:27.1 Mrs Benskin’s email on 23 Feb 2024 (p17 R bundle) explained to the Claimant that due to a period of non-communication the Respondent had assumed that the Claimant no longer wanted to work for the Respondent. As a result of the non-communication, Mrs Benskin had told the Claimant that the Respondent was due to take her off the payroll.

27.2 The Respondent didn’t hear from the Claimant to expressly state that she wanted to remain employed so it instructed the payroll provider to remove her from payroll.

27.3 Whilst the Claimant says that she emailed the Respondent on 23 February 2024, the Respondent has never seen that email and it hasn’t been disclosed to them. PHCM Order 7 of 26 September 2023

27.4 The Respondent did receive an email from the Claimant on 4 March 2024 (p22 R bundle) in which the Claimant expressed dissatisfaction with the way in which her employment had come to an end.

27.5 The Tribunal asked the Respondent to identify where in that email the Claimant referred to dissatisfaction at the ending of her employment. They explained that they took the reference to her being ‘baffled’ as being baffled about the end of employment. However, after being invited to read the email (p22 R bundle) the Respondent accepted that the Claimant did not actually say she was dissatisfied or baffled at the ending of her employment but rather regarding in relation to other aspects.

27.6 The date for termination of 1 February 2024 which was on the P45 (p19- 20 of R bundle) and which was sometimes referred to or quoted elsewhere was an error caused by the payroll system. The payroll system generated this date because Ms William hadn’t physically worked in February. However, the Respondent said that the payroll process wasn’t actually run until the end of February; so the end of February 2024 was when the Respondent decided to process the termination of the Claimant’s employment.

27.7 All employees receive emails on the Bright Pay system containing their pay slip. Example of what the Respondent said the Claimant would have received (but not hers) was included for illustrative purposes (p74 R bundle).

27.8 The Respondent cannot provide that type of email in respect of the Claimant because the Employer doesn’t see the email; it only goes from the payroll provider, Bright Pay, to the employee. (The example provided in the bundle was provided by the agreement of a worker.)

27.9 The P45 is also available online to employees on the Bright Pay portal for a month. The Claimant could have seen it there as well if she had looked on the Bright Pay portal.

27.10 The Respondent posted the P45 to the Claimant’s home address but it doesn’t obtain proof of postage generally and didn’t do so when sending it to the Claimant. The Respondent sent the Claimant’s P45 to the correct address.

27.11 In the Claimant’s 4 March 2024 email there was no statement that she wanted to remain in employment.

27.12 There was nothing to suggest to the Respondent that the Claimant wanted to stay in employment with the Respondent.

27.13 The Tribunal asked why the Respondent thought that the Claimant was still telling Ms Stamp and Mrs Benskin about treatments, providing fit notes, and not knowing how long they would take if she believed she was PHCM Order 8 of 26 September 2023 no longer employed by the Respondent? The Respondent said that they thought it was just a general conversation.

27.14 The last sick note sent from the Claimant covered her to 19 March 2024 after which the Respondent didn’t receive any more communications from her regarding her absence.

27.15 The Claimant didn’t receive any sick pay whilst off sick and she made no representations about that state of affairs. The Respondent said that this suggests that the Claimant thought her employment had come to an end. (However, in an email from the Claimant to Mrs Benskin (p38 R bundle) the Claimant wrote “I have not received any SSP (i.e. statutory sick pay) or CSP (i.e. company sick pay) as I had just joined Quality Life“. A flawed belief by the Claimant that she lacked the service to obtain SSP would provide an alternative potential reason why she did not interpret the lack of sick pay as a sign that her employment had ended.

27.16 The Respondent would have expected to continue receiving fit notes from her if she was still employed or thought she was still employed.

27.17 The email from Mrs Benskin to the Claimant on 16 April 2024 (p27 R bundle) refers to payslips “from your time with us”.

27.18 The Claimant would have known that her employment had ended due to receiving her p45 by post and by email on the Bright Pay system.

27.19 At no point did the Respondent say that it wanted to end the Claimant’s employment. It is difficult to obtain good workers in this industry.

27.20 The Claimant had three months to bring her claim(s). If there was any confusion or uncertainty about the date of termination, that was surely cleared up on 12 November 2024 when the “to whom it may concern” letter was sent” (p39 R bundle). However, the Claimant didn’t submit her claim until 20 March 2025.

27.21 The email on 26th November 2024 at 16:04 from the Claimant’s personal injury solicitors to Mrs Benskin (p41 R bundle) says “We understand she (i.e. the Claimant) was employed from 25th October 2023 to 1st February 2024.” Those solicitors were instructed by the Claimant. Therefore, their knowledge of her employment dates must have come from her instructions to them before sending that email 26th November 2024 that her employment was from 25th October 2023 to 1st February 2024. The only place that the Claimant’s personal injury solicitors could have got that date range from was from P45 which suggested that the Claimant had received the P45 and she had provided it to them. (However, when the Tribunal queried whether the personal injury solicitors could also have obtained those dates from the Respondent’s letter “To whom it may concern” of 12 November 2024 (p39 R bundle) the Respondent accepted that the date range could also have come from that letter.) PHCM Order 9 of 26 September 2023

27.22 The Respondent said it was not sure there was anything unusual about the Claimant’s case that warrants the need for legal advice about types of claim and time limits.

27.23 The Respondent did not believe the Claimant needed a longer period than three months to submit her claim and that it was not justified.

27.24 She had already commenced a personal injury claim and had pursued her loss of earnings. She was capable of bringing proceedings.

27.25 The Claimant had explained her legal background which showed that she is already several steps ahead of other litigants in person.

27.26 The Respondent was very sympathetic to the Claimant’s medical issues but she was well enough to bring a personal injury claim in 2024 and it posed the question of why she was not well enough to bring an employment law claim.

27.27 The Claimant had referred to medication which makes her ‘drowsy’ but she no provided any evidence about what that medication was or its impact upon her. (However, the Tribunal noted that the medication and its asserted impact on the Claimant was already referenced elsewhere in documentation.)

27.28 The Claimant had not provided any explanation as to what had changed in March 2025 which then enabled her to bring her claim.

27.29 The Respondent’s position was that the Claimant knew in February 2024 that her employment had ended. Even if she only found that out in November 2024 then she had the opportunity to bring the claim in November 2024 and she didn’t bring a claim within three months of that knowledge.

27.30 The Respondent considers the claim to be out of time whichever way one looks at it.

27.31 The Respondent is a caring employer. It has positive relationships with its workers. It said it had never been in this situation before.

27.32 Ms Benskin said she was very accommodating to the Claimant at the start of her employment. She confirmed that she had advanced payments to the Claimant to support her in her difficult family situation so that she could work. (This was indirectly referenced in documents showing an email exchange between the Claimant and Mrs Benskin on 13 May 2025 (p60 R bundle).)

27.33 In terms of communication with carers when off sick, the Respondent did ‘What’s app’ during period of absence. The Respondent prides itself on looking after staff. PHCM Order 10 of 26 September 2023

27.34 Mrs Benskin said that the Claimant was a great carer and was a valued member of team but she only did 26 days of work in three months. Mr Benskin then qualified that statement by saying that from what the Respondent had seen in that limited time the Claimant seemed to be a good worker.

27.35 The Respondent emphasised that it had no reason to remove the Claimant because it always needed good workers because recruitment is difficult within their industry. That is why the email on 23 February 2024 (p17 R bundle) says we will need a return date from you if you are returning.

27.36 The Claimant should not be allowed to amend her claim to include the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint.

[28]The Tribunal discussed with the parties and then agreed to extend the time for the hearing to a full day in order to be able to deliberate and deliver decisions and judgment on the three issues at the hearing.

Findings of Fact

[29]The Claimant studied for a masters degree and this included a module on employment law. She had also previously worked as a paralegal for Irwin Mitchell Solicitors undertaking litigation work in relation to Personal Injury claims and Employer’s Liability claims. She understood the importance of time limits.

[30]The Claimant was employed as a live-in carer by the Respondent from 25 October 2023.

[31]The Claimant was in a road traffic collision on 15 January 2024, she remained in work for seven days and then went onto a period when she was not due to be working. On 24 January 2024 the Claimant notified the Respondent that she was unwell due to the impact of the road traffic collision and was not fit to start the next placement on 29 January 2024.

[32]The Respondent (via a manager called Alicia Stamp) was in contact with the Claimant via ‘What’s App’ messages during January and was aware that the Claimant was unwell, timescales for treatment were unclear and she could be off work for a considerable time. The documentary evidence shows that on 24 January 2024 at the Respondent, Alicia Stamp contacted the Claimant by ‘What’s App’ to check on her and the Claimant responded the same day to explain that she was in pain, taking medication and expecting a lengthy wait for a referral for treatment. Ms Stamp asked the Claimant to let them know about dates in case it falls on working days. The Claimant further responded to say “Unfortunately I won’t be back for a while. I’ve had a major flare up”. Ms Stamp further responded with “Well keep us posted on know when you can come back then won’t you”. The Claimant agreed to do so and she mentioned that she had previously been off for more than 8 months with a similar issue (p9 R bundle). PHCM Order 11 of 26 September 2023

[33]The Claimant provided a fit note saying she was not fit to work from 22/01/2024 to 18/02/2024.

[34]The Respondent made attempts between 24 January and 22 February 2024 to telephone the Claimant, but she did not answer. The Claimant did not answer because she was signed off work, in pain and drowsy from medication.

[35]On 22 February 2025 the Claimant emailed Ms Stamp with her latest fit note and confirmed she had a medical appointment on 14 March 2024 (p13 R bundle).

[36]On 23 February 2025 Mrs Benskin responded to the Claimant on behalf of Respondent by email to say that she had interpreted the lack of response to those telephone calls as the Claimant not wanting to work for the Respondent and not coming back. The documentary evidence (p17 R bundle) and also Mrs Benskin’s submissions on behalf of the Respondent showed Mrs Benskin writing “I am unsure why you have this (i.e. the email with the fit note) as you are due to be taken off payroll this month”. The reference to being ‘taken off payroll’ was oddly and regrettably imprecise. Mrs Benskin said the Respondent had telephoned several times but not got an answer and then so she believed that the Claimant had blocked the Respondent. Mrs Benskin wrote said “Because of this we had taken it that you had no longer wanted to work for us (i.e. the Respondent)”. Mrs Benskin gave the Claimant option to avoid this saying “if this is not the case then please do call the office to speak to me. If I don’t hear from you then I will know this is not the case and you are not returning”.

[37]The Claimant responded to Mrs Benskin on 4 March 2024 (not 23 February 2024 as asserted by the Claimant) to express her surprise at the Respondent’s interpretation that the lack of telephone contact with the Claimant meant she was blocking them and didn’t want to remain in employment. Inherent within the Claimant’s expression of surprise at the Respondent’s interpretation was the underlying message that the Respondent’s interpretation was wrong, but the Claimant did not expressly state that she wanted to remain in employment as per Mrs Benskin’s request. (This too was regrettably imprecise.) The Claimant did however give a further update on her prognosis which is also indicative of keeping her employer informed of her expectations regarding the timescales for her ability to return to work

[38]The Claimant was signed off sick from 22 January 2024 to 18 March 2024 and provided fit notes to the Respondent for that period. The Claimant did not submit any fit notes for the period after 18 March 2024.

[39]The P45 generated for the Claimant by the Respondent’s payroll provider in February 2024 shows an employment end date of 1 February 2024, However this is not the correct date (as accepted by the Respondent).

[40]The Claimant was indirectly made aware that her employment with the Respondent had ended on 22 March 2024. On 22 March at 11:55 the Claimant tried to access the Bright Pay self-service portal for employees of the Respondent and when she was able to do so was met with the statement “You have no employments” which are sufficiently clear and unambiguous in the PHCM Order 12 of 26 September 2023 circumstances to communicate the termination. This message was recorded in the documents provided to the Tribunal because the Claimant shared the message by email with Ms Stamp (p24 R bundle). This was the first time that the Claimant was explicitly and unambiguously told that her employment was being or had been terminated. After this point, the Tribunal notes that the Claimant did not interact with the Respondent to provide further fit notes which would be required if she remained employed but was on sick leave.

[41]The Claimant experienced severe pain arising from the road traffic collision and its impact upon an existing condition, sacroiliac joint dysfunction.

[42]She took medication and received injections to help manage pain. The medication she took to assist her to sleep makes her drowsy at different times in the day.

[43]She is a single mother and has had to focus time on her parenting responsibilities.

[44]As a result of losing her income, the Claimant had a financial imperative to apply for various benefits such as income support, council tax support, and PIP to manage her family’s financial situation, and these processes demanded a large amount of time and focus. She understandably prioritised that process of providing income for herself and her family.

[45]The Claimant pursued a personal injury claim regarding the road traffic collision and engaged solicitors to do that.

[46]In November 2024 the Claimant wrote to the Respondent requesting information to support her personal injury claim.

[47]The Respondent wrote to the Claimant on 26 November 2024 and referred to the fact that the Claimant was employed “from 25th October 2023 to 1st February 2024”.

[48]In late November 2024 the Claimant asked her personal injury solicitors to assist regarding the termination of her contract but they indicated that they couldn’t provide that advice and advised her to obtain support from elsewhere.

[49]The Claimant did not have the financial means to pay for legal advice to explore her employment law issues.

[50]The Claimant tried to conduct her own research into legal options. She was hampered in this by her medical problems and the prioritised focus she gave to her applications for relevant benefits as a means to provide for herself and her family.

[51]In early 2025 the Claimant was only aware of the possibility of submitting a wrongful dismissal claim in her circumstances.

[52]The Claimant submitted a claim on 20 March 2025 and only included a complaint of wrongful dismissal. PHCM Order 13 of 26 September 2023

[53]After becoming aware that she needed to prepare a schedule of loss, in or around 22 May 2025 the Claimant obtained specialist employment law advice from Derbyshire Law Centre to assist with that task. Whilst discussing her case Derbyshire Law Centre made the Claimant aware that a claim for discrimination arising from a disability may be appropriate.

[54]The Claimant submitted her application to amend her claim to include the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint on 3 June 2025

[55]The Respondent’s payroll providers say that they no longer have access to documentation relating to the termination of the Claimant’s employment (specifically the email communication with her about her P45).

[56]The Respondent’s HR manager and Recruitment manager from the time of the Claimant’s employment no longer work for the Respondent. The HR manager and Recruitment manager from the time of the Claimant’s employment could have given evidence about the decision to recruit, what the Respondent knew about the Claimant’s asserted disability at that time, the dismissal and the lack of contact from Claimant.

[57]The Respondent’s payroll provider, Bright Pay, can no longer provide messages to the Claimant from the Bright Pay system regarding the issue of her P45 because they are only stored for a limited time.

The Law

[58]Section 7 of The Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 provides in so far as is relevant: “Time within which proceedings may be brought 7. … an employment tribunal shall not entertain a complaint in respect of an employee’s contract claim unless it is presented— (a) within the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination of the contract giving rise to the claim, or … (c) where the tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within whichever of those periods is applicable, within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.”

[59]Section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides in so far as is relevant: PHCM Order 14 of 26 September 2023 “123. Time limits (1)… proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of—(a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

(b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.”

[60]Whenever exercising any power under the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the Tribunal is required to take into account rule 3 which is entitled the ‘Overriding Objective’. This provides: “Overriding objective 3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.

(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing. (b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, (c) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings, (d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and (e) saving expense.” Analysis & Conclusions A. Jurisdiction to hear the Wrongful Dismissal Complaint

[61]The Tribunal first addressed stage one of the test in section 7: was it not reasonably practicable to present the claim within the time limit. The burden of proving this was on the Claimant (as per Porter v Bandridge Ltd

[1978] ICR 943

EWCA). PHCM Order 15 of 26 September 2023

[62]Most of the case law on the ‘not reasonably practicable’ test relates almost entirely to unfair dismissal claims under the Employment Rights Act 1996. However, the EAT made it clear in GMB v Hamm EAT 0246/00 that the words ‘not reasonably practicable’ are to be given the same meaning whenever they appear in an equivalent context in comparable legislation, so similar considerations will apply to all other statutory employment claims using the same formula. Section 7 uses the same formula.

[63]In Lowri Beck Services Ltd v Brophy

2019 EWCA Civ 2490

, CA, Lord Justice Underhill set out the essential points established in the case law. This included:• the test should be given a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee (as per Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd

1974 ICR 53

, CA).

• the statutory language is not to be taken as referring only to physical impracticability and for that reason might be paraphrased as whether it was ‘reasonably feasible’ for the employee to present his or her claim in time.

• if an employee misses the time limit because he or she is ignorant about the existence of a time limit, or, mistaken about when it expires in his or her case, the question is whether that ignorance or mistake is reasonable. If it is not, then it will have been reasonably practicable for the employee to bring the claim in time.

[64]When assessing the “reasonably practicable” element of the test, the question which the Tribunal has to answer is “what was the substantial cause of the employee's failure to comply” and then assess whether, given that cause, it was not reasonably practicable for the Claimant to lodge the claim in time, London International College v Sen

[1992] IRLR 292

, EAT and Palmer and Saunders v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council

[1984] IRLR 119

. The reason for the Claimant’s delay was a combination of a lack of clarity over her employment status, the impact of her ill health and the treatments and her prioritisation of other issues.

[65]The Claimant did not bring the wrongful dismissal claim within the primary three month time limit beginning from 22 March 2024 (being the effective date of termination as determined by the Tribunal at this hearing). The Tribunal’s determination is that it was reasonably practicable or reasonably for the Claimant to have brought the Wrongful Dismissal Complaint within that period.

[66]The Tribunal considered the following factors which impeded the Claimant’s ability to present her claim within that period:66.1 The Claimant’s confusion on her employment situation due to a consistent lack of clarity from the Respondent itself.

66.2 The Claimant’s inability to pay for specialist advice.

66.3 The Claimant’s need to try to research options herself. PHCM Order 16 of 26 September 2023

66.4 The negative impact of the Claimant’s pain and her treatments and medication upon her ability to conduct that research.

66.5 The legitimate focus and priority which the Claimant gave to obtaining benefits and managing her finances given her lack of income and her responsibilities as a single parent.

[67]However, the Tribunal considered the following factors meant that it was ‘reasonably practicable’ to submit the claim within the three month period:67.1 The Claimant is an intelligent and competent woman who was pursuing a masters degree and had undertaken a module on employment law.

67.2 The Claimant had been a paid professional who was involved in litigation, and she accepted that she understood the importance of time limits.

67.3 When the Claimant did apply herself to self-research, she discovered for herself that she could bring a complaint for wrongful dismissal.

67.4 The Claimant confirmed that she was able to conduct the personal injury litigation by engaging and instructing solicitors to undertake that claim through a large part of 2024.

[68]For completeness, the Tribunal also considered the second stage of the test: did the Claimant present her claim within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable. This is to be determined objectively taking into account all material matters (as per Westward Circuits Ltd v Read

[1973] ICR 301

, NIRC) and considering all of the circumstances of the case, including steps taken by the Claimant; the reasons for the delay; and what the Claimant can be taken to have known about time limits (as per Nolan v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services EAT 0109/11). The Tribunal found that the Claimant did not bring the claim within such further period as was reasonable. This is because:68.1 Whilst the Claimant said that she remained confused about the termination of her employment the Claimant was aware and it was unambiguously clear that her employment had been terminated on 28 November 2024.

68.2 The Claimant stated that she “didn’t do much” over Christmas 2024.

68.3 The Claimant did not submit her claim until 20 March 2025.

[69]After addressing the two-stage test set out in Section 7 as described above, the Tribunal concluded that the Claimant’s application for an extension of time under Section 7 of The Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 fails and, as such, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider her complaint. B. Jurisdiction to hear the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint PHCM Order 17 of 26 September 2023

[70]The test for extension under the Equality Act 2010 is fundamentally different. It involves asking whether the complaint was presented within such period ‘as the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable’. Accordingly, this does not require a claimant to reach the high threshold of showing that presentation within the primary time limit was ‘not reasonably practicable’. Also, the determination of what period is ‘just and equitable’ incorporates an additional assessment of an important and highly influential factor; namely the ‘balance of prejudice’ to each party of extending or not extending the time.

[71]In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan

2018 ICR 1194

, CA, the Court of Appeal pointed to the fact that it was plain from the language used in s123(1) ‘such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable’ that Parliament chose to give employment tribunals the widest possible discretion’. In this case the Tribunal has a wide discretion to determine whether the Claimant has presented her claim with a period that it considers just and equitable in all the circumstances of this case. The Tribunal has considered all the factors which were raised with it which are considered relevant.

[72]In Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link

2003 IRLR 434

, CA, the Court of Appeal made it clear that when tribunals consider exercising their discretion under the ‘just and equitable’ extension test, ‘there is no presumption that they should do so unless they can justify failure to exercise the discretion. Quite the reverse, a tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time so the exercise of the discretion is the exception rather than the rule.’ In this case as in others, the onus is therefore on the Claimant to convince the Tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend the time limit.

[73]However, this does not mean that exceptional circumstances are required before the time limit can be extended on just and equitable grounds. The law simply requires that an extension of time should be just and equitable (as per Pathan v South London Islamic Centre EAT 0312/13). The Claimant does not need to prove exceptional circumstances arose in her situation; she is required to persuade the Tribunal that she presented her claim within such period as the Tribunal considers just and equitable bearing in mind in all the relevant circumstances of the situation.

[74]In Southwark London Borough Council v Afolabi

2003 ICR 800

, CA, (a case in which the Tribunal’s decision to extend the time limit for a period of 9 years was upheld) the Court of Appeal suggested that there are two factors which are almost always relevant when considering the exercise of any discretion whether to extend time: the length of, and reasons for, the delay; and whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh). The length and reasons for the delay PHCM Order 18 of 26 September 2023

[75]The length of the Claimant’s delay in this was extensive, being approximately twelve months after the primary time limit expired. The Claimant’s reason(s) were:75.1 The Claimant’s confusion on her employment situation due to the lack of clarity from the Respondent.

75.2 The Claimant’s inability to pay for specialist advice which she ultimately required in order to identify the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint.

75.3 The Claimant’s failure to research and identify the option of the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint herself, which may have been influenced by the pain arising from her medical issues and the effects of the medication and pain management treatments upon the Claimant.

75.4 The legitimate focus and priority which the Claimant gave to obtaining benefits and managing her finances given her lack of income and her responsibilities as a single parent.

75.5 The Claimant’s lack of knowledge regarding the option of bringing a claim based on discrimination arising from a disability until she was advised of this option by Derbyshire Law centre. The Claimant’s ignorance of the existence and availability of a less usual form of discrimination was considered reasonable.

75.6 The Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s submission that she acted promptly once she was made aware of the availability of that type of claim to reflect the circumstances of her termination.

[76]The Tribunal considered this multi-factoral reason to be a persuasive and legitimate reason which was capable (depending on other relevant factors) of supporting a conclusion that it was just and equitable for an individual in the Claimant’s situation to present the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint one year after the expiry of the primary time limit. The Prejudice to the Respondent

[77]In Miller and ors v Ministry of Justice and ors and another case EAT 0003/15 Mrs Justice Elisabeth Laing (as she then was) stated that the prejudice that a respondent will suffer from facing a claim which would otherwise be timebarred is ‘customarily’ relevant. Accordingly, the Tribunal was concerned to identify any prejudice which would be caused to the Respondent as a result of the Claimant’s delay. In particular, the Tribunal sought to identify any ‘forensic prejudice’ (the reduction in the quality of relevant evidence as memories fade and relevant witnesses become unavailable) which often increases the later a claim is brought and as time passes since the events under examination.

[78]The Tribunal noted that the single act that would be under examination did not stretch back to earlier in the employment relationship; it was the termination itself. This meant the issues requiring determination dated back from 15 months PHCM Order 19 of 26 September 2023 prior to the application to amend. Such time scales are not generally prohibitive to a fair examination and the Tribunal commonly deals with matters from such timescales in hearings. Therefore, the Tribunal did not consider this timescale to be an automatic barrier to consideration despite its length.

[79]More importantly, the Respondent had already shown in the submission of its ET3 and grounds of resistance and through Mrs Benskin’s submissions regarding the termination in particular, that the Respondent could provide clear and detailed recollections of the Respondent’s reasoning for treating the Claimant as terminated. The Respondent appeared able to fully present its position with evidence from a key decision maker, Mrs Benskin.

[80]The Respondent referenced the departures of the HR manager and Recruitment manager but, when asked how their evidence would be relevant, the Respondent described their evidence in terms of those individuals knowing about the Claimant’s health issues at recruitment and the Respondent’s decision to recruit her nevertheless. In this case, such issues are not likely to be in dispute because the Claimant’s broad health issues appear to be agreed so as not to require determination by the Tribunal. Also, Mrs Benskin would appear able to give evidence as to that issue for the Respondent. The Respondent also said the HR manager and Recruitment manager could give evidence about the the lack of contact from Claimant. However, once again Mrs Benskin would appear able to give evidence as to that issue for the Respondent also as she was the person corresponding with the Claimant and it was her whom the Claimant was invited to contact if she wanted to avoid being taken off payroll. Therefore, he HR manager and Recruitment manager would appear to be providing supporting evidence, and, in some areas providing evidence on issues which are unlikely to be in dispute.

[81]The Tribunal also noted that the Respondent did not submit that it had tried to contact the HR manager and Recruitment manager but was unable to reach them.

[82]The Respondent also referred to its payroll provider no longer being able to provide emails and records to show when the Claimants employment was actually terminated. However, that issue has already decided as 22 March 2024 by virtue of this hearing (as set out in the ‘finding of facts’ section) and so evidence on the date pf termination will not be require at final hearing.

[83]The Tribunal did not believe the cogency of the evidence would be significantly adversely affected by allowing the extension.

[84]Self-evidently, the Respondent would incur the additional cost and time demands involved in defending its decision-making and its reasons for treating the Claimant’s employment as ended. That is always an issue for employers and the Tribunal does not take that lightly. Litigation by employees is a risk of operating a business with employees and so in a general sense the costs of litigation is a foreseeable risk for which an employer should plan. (Employers often do so obtaining insurance.) In terms of proceedings which might have been avoided if they were rejected for being ‘out of time’ but which are allowed to proceed, this does inevitably lead to a cost which an employer would not have PHCM Order 20 of 26 September 2023 had to bear if the extension of time was refused. The Tribunal acknowledges that this is an additional and often unwelcome cost but that additional cost is always the consequence of granting an extension of time and so that additional cost cannot therefore be an automatic bar to granting an extension. It is a factor which the Tribunal took into account. However, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the potential financial consequences to the Respondent of granting the extension outweighed the potential financial consequences to the Claimant of refusing the extension.

[85]Having carefully considered the Respondent’s submissions, the Tribunal was not persuaded that extending time so as to allow the claim to proceed would result in substantial or material real-world prejudice to the Respondent (and would cause minimal forensic prejudice) so as to compromise the Respondent’s ability to defend its actions. The Balance of Prejudice

[86]The Court of Appeal in Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Carroll

2017 EWCA Civ 1992

, CA, summarised the similar test used in s33 of the Limitation Act 1981 as follows: ‘The essence of the proper exercise of the judicial discretion under s.33 is that the test is a balance of prejudice and the burden is on the claimant to show that his or her prejudice would outweigh that to the defendant.’ Although s.33 does not strictly apply to employment tribunals when deciding whether to extend time under the Equality Act 2010, a consistent line of EAT authority beginning with British Coal Corporation v Keeble and ors

1997 IRLR 336

, EAT shows that employment tribunals are generally expected to apply an equivalent test. In the Keeble case the EAT stated the court would need to consider the prejudice which each party would suffer as a result of the decision reached. In Department of Constitutional Affairs v Jones

2008 IRLR 128

, CA, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the factors referred to by the EAT in Keeble are a ‘valuable reminder’ of what may be taken into account.

[87]The Tribunal noted that a refusal to extend time so that the Claimant’s proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint is not heard would entirely deprive the Claimant of any consideration of her complaint and remove the only means of obtaining any legal redress which may be appropriate. In effect a refusal would provide the Respondent with a ‘windfall’ immunity from being held to account for its actions and decision making.

[88]The Tribunal has not assessed or made any assessment of the merits of the claim but it did need to engage with the Respondent’s submission that the Claimant’s proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint was inherently hopeless. If correct, then the Claimant would lose nothing by being unable to proceed with a hopeless claim. However, the Tribunal did not agree with the Respondent’s characterisation of the Claimants proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint as hopeless. The Tribunal notes that shortly after the Claimant notified the Respondent that she may be off work for a considerable period as a result of a long-standing health issue (which previously resulted in an eight month absence). The Tribunal also noted that the Respondent described itself in the documentation it provided to the Tribunal (p17 R bundle) that the PHCM Order 21 of 26 September 2023 Respondent had ‘taken it that you [i.e. the Claimant] no longer wanted to work for us [i.e. the Respondent] and were not coming back’ which it described in submissions as the Respondent assuming that the Claimant no longer wanted to work for the Respondent (which is akin to asserting a ‘constructive resignation’). The Respondent did so even though the Claimant did not appear to have said she was/was considering terminating her employment, she had provided fit notes to explain her non-attendance at work, and, she continued to provide updates to the Respondent on the timescales for treatment.

[89]In contrast, allowing the claim to be heard would allow justice to be properly applied to the issue (however it was ultimately determined). The Respondent would have the costs of defending the claim but as described above this is an inherent cost whenever granting an extension.

[90]The Tribunal determined that the balance of prejudice was clearly in favour of allowing the claim to proceed to be considered. Other Relevant Factors

[91]The Tribunal did note that the Claimant was an intelligent woman who had undertaken a masters course and has experience of legal processes but it did not consider this to outweigh the balance of prejudice. The Tribunal was mindful of the case of Pathan (above) in which the EAT decided that an employment tribunal erred when it refused to extend time on because the claimant was an intelligent woman who, in that case, had taken advice but still submitted her sex discrimination claim five months out of time, deciding that she ought to have known about the time limit.

[92]The Tribunal also noted that the lack of clear communication from the Respondent regarding the termination had been a material factor in the Claimant’s confusion over her status which had hindered the Claimant’s full realisation of her employment status and had hindered her attempts to obtain advice (as described above). The Tribunal considered that it would not be just and equitable if the Respondent obtained a benefit from its failure to provide clear communication to the Claimant regarding the termination of her employment.

[93]In Director of Public Prosecutions and anor v Marshall

1998 ICR 518

, EAT, the EAT referred to the ‘just and equitable’ extension for discrimination claims before saying ‘As a matter of statutory language, the discretion which is given by the Act to extend time is unfettered and may include a consideration of the date from which the complainant could reasonably have become aware of her right to present a worthwhile complaint.’ The Tribunal took into account and was influenced by the Claimant’s submission that she was ignorant of the right to bring a claim of discrimination arising from a disability. The Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s account of her lack of knowledge and found her description of how and when she became aware through Derbyshire Law Centre to be coherent and credible. The Tribunal considered the Claimant’s lack of knowledge of a specific and nuanced despite element of discrimination law to be reasonable despite her involvement in personal injury claims and employer PHCM Order 22 of 26 September 2023 liability claims and having undertaken a module on employment law in her masters degree course.

[94]After considering all of the above and weighing the relevant factors, the Tribunal concluded that it should exercise its discretion to grant the Claimant’s application for an extension of time under s123(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010. As a result, the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to consider the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint.

[95]The Tribunal will only actually consider the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint if the Claimant obtains leave to amend her claim to include that proposed complaint. C. Application to amend to include the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint

[96]As explained the Tribunal has the discretionary power as a result of its general case management powers within Rule 30 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, to allow amendments to a claim or response at any stage and may do so by making a case management order. As with all case management orders, the Tribunal must take into account the ‘Overriding Objective’ in Rule 3 and must exercise its discretion ‘justly and fairly’ and “in a manner which satisfies the requirements of relevance, reason, justice and fairness inherent in all judicial discretions”: as per Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore

[1996] ICR 836

[97]The Tribunal took into account the Presidential Guidance on Case management which must be taken into account but may be departed from before making a decision. Guidance Note 1 to that Presidential Guidance deals specifically with amendments. The Tribunal took into account all the factors listed in section 5.

[98]The main case addressing the factors for determining amendments is Selkent (above), which sets out the principles for deciding whether to allow an amendment. It identified various factors that should be taken into account:• The nature of the amendment,

• the timing of the amendment and explanation for that,

• the impact on the parties of allowing or refusing the amendment.

[99]The Tribunal addressed each of those factors below. When doing so the Tribunal took into account the guidance provided by HHJ Tayler in Vaughan v Modality Partnership that it should not treat the ‘Selkent factors’ as a checklist, and, that it should focus on the real-world hardship or injustice rather than hypothetical or speculative hardship considering: The nature of the amendment

[100]The amendment sought is a substantial amendment introducing a new head of claim, but it is fundamentally based on the same factual events which are already addressed within the claim form (i.e. the termination of the Claimant’s PHCM Order 23 of 26 September 2023 employment). It would require some new enquiry regarding 9a) disability (however based upon the Respondent’s statements that it was aware of the Claimant’s health issues upon appointment that may well not be a contested issue), and, (b) the Respondent’s legitimate aims for adopting the approach which it did to the termination of Claimant’s employment. That is a minimal amount of additional enquiry. The timing of the amendment and explanation for that timing

[101]The overall time scale and the reasons for delay from the alleged act have been described and addressed in detail above which are taken into account but repeated here. In terms of the timescale within the lifetime of the proceedings, the amendment was sought within three months of the presentation of the original claim. The Claimant brought the claim at that point because she obtained advice from a more specialist advisor who advised her of the relevance the proposed Disability Discrimination Complaint to her situation. The Tribunal notes that this is early in the life of the proceedings, the final hearing has not been listed, case management would not be significantly disrupted by allowing the new complaint and the minimal hearing preparation undertaken to date would not be wasted. The impact on the parties of allowing or refusing the amendment

[102]The facts relied upon in the proposed new head of complaint are similar facts to those relied upon within the existing complaint within the claim form, namely the termination of the Claimant’s employment in the context of her ill health and the extent of communication that took place between the Claimant and the Respondent.

[103]The areas of enquiry are similar in respect of the Respondent’s treatment of the Claimant in the termination of her employment although there would be some additional areas of enquiry namely the disability status of the Claimant and the Respondent’s potential to justify its approach to the termination of the Claimant’s employment in the circumstances.

[104]There would be some different factual and legal issues to address as described above and due the different nature of discrimination claims compared to contractual claims such as wrongful dismissal.

[105]The application to amend has been made early within the life of the claim at the Employment Tribunal. In particular no final hearing has been listed as yet and no substantial steps have been undertaken regarding preparation for final hearing.

[106]The application was made on 3 June 2025 because the Claimant received advice from Derbyshire Law Centre that she could bring such a claim. The reason why the application wasn’t made sooner is because the Claimant wasn’t aware of the option of bringing a complaint for unlawful discrimination arising from a disability under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010. PHCM Order 24 of 26 September 2023

[107]In accordance with section 11 of Guidance Note 1 of the Presidential Guidance, the Tribunal gave careful consideration to the application of relevant time limits. The application was made outside the primary time limit for a claim by an employee of unlawful discrimination arising from a disability under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010. However, the Tribunal had determined that the time for submitting the claim should be extended on the grounds that is just and equitable to do so in accordance with s123(1)(b) for the reasons set out above meaning the proposed new claim would be presented in time.

[108]If the proposed new claim proceeds, then there would be additional expense for the Respondent which describes itself as a small family business. As stated above, this not taken lightly but litigation is a risk of operating a business and it is inevitable in any application to include a new complaint that it will incur additional time and cost but that is not a barrier to allowing an application.

[109]The impact on the claim and the logistics in this case is likely to be minimal. The Tribunal would estimate that (aside from any challenge to the Claimant’s asserted disability status which may not be contested) the hearing is still likely to only require one or two days due to the narrow issues to be determined.

[110]Although Mr Benskin for the Respondent described the Claimant’s case as hopeless, the Tribunal did not agree with this assessment for the reasons described above. The hardship for the Claimant if the Tribunal refused her application would be that she would lose the ability to have a potentially valid claim adjudicated and she lose her only ability to receive legal redress if that was appropriate.

[111]As set out above the Respondent also submitted that it was no longer able to obtain the messages which were issued to the Claimant about her P45 and to obtain witness evidence from its former HR manager or Recruitment manager. However, for the reasons set out above the Tribunal did not consider this to cause substantial prejudice to the Respondent.

[112]The main issues to be evidenced for determination in this case would be the reason(s) for terminating the Claimant’s employment which was made by Mrs Benskin, and, whether the Respondent’s approach was justified as proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

[113]The Tribunal noted that delay on its own is not a reason to refuse an amendment as per Vaughan (above).

[114]The primary question for consideration in an application to amend is where does the ‘balance of hardship’ lie. The Tribunal gave paramount importance to the balance of hardship or injustice (as per Cocking v Sandhurst

[1974] ICR 650

) The balance of prejudice has been set out in detail above and, whilst it is not duplicated here, it is equally applicable in this context and it is adopted here.

[115]As a result of the considerations above, the Tribunal decided it should grant the Claimant’s application to amend the claim within the scope of her letter of 3 June PHCM Order 25 of 26 September 2023 2025 to add in a claim for unlawful discrimination arising from a disability s15 Equality Act 2010.

[116]The Tribunal considers that these decisions are in accordance with the ‘Overriding Objective’ of dealing with the case fairly and justly because they are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues and they avoid unnecessary formality and seek to provide flexibility. There would be minimal delay as a result of the decisions. Written Reasons

[117]The Tribunal provided its Judgement orally at the hearing and advised the parties of the right to request written reasons. Mr and Mrs Benskin indicated at the hearing that the Respondent requested written reasons which are hereby provided. Approved by: Employment Judge Ost Dated: 18 December 2025 ...19 January 2026............... For the Employment Tribunal .............................................. Notes Where reasons for the judgment have been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/ PHCM Order 26 of 26 September 2023